On August 15, 2021, the Taliban entered Kabul and assumed the reigns of government. A few months earlier, the Biden administration announced the implementation of the February 2020 Doha agreement that had been negotiated by the Trump administration. This resulted in an announcement of a full withdrawal of U.S. forces and contractor support.

Defeat of the ANDSF. By the spring of 2021 the support provided to the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) was greatly diminished and it experienced defeat after defeat on the battlefield. There are number of reasons for the defeat of the ANDSF and these will be studied for decades to come by military analysts and national security ‘experts’. However, the bottom line is that the Taliban took district after district and province after province until it reached the gates of Kabul. However, the reasons for the loss of Afghanistan extends far beyond the defeat of the ANDSF. The successive Afghan governments were inept and corrupt and lack influence and capacity at the sub-national level. The United States is far from blame – having made many strategic errors in Afghanistan over the course of twenty years.

Kabul Airlift. As the Taliban advanced, the United States was withdrawing the last of its forces. By August 15th, the remaining troops were either located at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul or at the Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA). In the preceeding months the Department of State (DoS), despite urging from the Department of Defense (DoD), refused to evacuate the U.S. Embassy as the Taliban were steadily making progress across Afghanistan. The DoS, over the course of time, has a dismal record when initiating non-combatant evacuation operations in times of crisis. Finally, much too late, DoS declared a Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) and the DoD was presented with an almost impossible task of securing the Kabul airport and conducting operations in support of the Kabul NEO.

SIV Program. Over the course of the 20-year involvement of the United States in the long-running conflict in Afghanistan it received considerable support from Afghans. The military and other governmental agencies were very reliant on interpreters to conduct operations, activities, and implement programs in Afghanistan. In 2009, the Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) program was established to provide an opportunity for some of these interpreters and others who assisted the U.S. to re-locate to the United States. Eventually, this would lead to the ability to apply for a legal permanent resident (LPR) status (Green Card). However, the program was slow and bureaucratic.

At-Risk Afghans. With the rise to power of the Taliban these interpreters and others realized they and their families would be subject to reprisals by the victorious Taliban. In fact, this has been happening over the past two years – former interpreters have been singled out for detention, imprisionment, torture, and death. In addition, former members of the National Directorate of Security (NDS), Afghan National Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC), Afghan Air Force (AAF), and Special Mission Wing (SMW) have also been hunted down and faced reprisals. It is no wonder that these at-risk Afghans swarmed the Kabul airport seeking space on U.S. military aircraft conducting the evacuation of Americans, LPRs, foreign nations, and those who could prove they were holders of a Special Immigrant Visa. The airport was overwhelmed.

Two Weeks of Chaos. From August 15 to August 30 the world was captivated by the attempt of nations from across the world to evacute their embassy staff, foreign nationals, and at-risk Afghans that they could identify as having aided their country’s efforts in Afghanistan. During this two week period over 124,000 people were evacuated from the Kabul airport by the various nations. Unfortunately, by the end of the NEO, many U.S. citizens, LPRs, and SIV holders were left behind.

Volunteer Groups. Beginning in early August 2021 informal groups of U.S. veterans and others began to organize themselves in an effort to assist the thousands of Americans, LPRs, and at-risk Afghans (interpreters and others) get access to the interior of HKIA. While a few were actively on the ground in Kabul the vast majority were supporting the effort from their home offices or workspace using phones, WhatsApp, Signal, Zoom, and other messaging services. These volunteer groups – like No One Left Behind, Team America Relief, and others – stepped into the gap caused by the inadequate planning and preparation of the DoS. Thousands of people got onto the HKIA evacuation flights as a result of these hastily formed volunteer groups. Over time, these groups – hundreds of them, small and large – would be affiliated with larger umbrella organizations such as the Afghan Evac coalition, Evacuate our Allies, or the Moral Compass Federation.

The Aftermath of the Kabul NEO. After the conclusion of the Kabul airlift at the end of August these volunteer groups continued to operate for several months – assisting Americans, LPRs, and Afghans in departures from the Mazur-e-Sharif airport in northern Afghanistan and in overland movement to Pakistan and other neighboring countries. As Afghans made their way to the United States the efforts of many groups turned to the resettlement process – finding jobs, living arrangements, processing legal paperwork, and navigating the difficulties of adapting to a new country.

Afghan Adjustment Act. One of the more important efforts of the various volunteer groups is the advocating for Congressional legislation that would provide a legal pathway for Afghans who arrived in the U.S. after evacuation from Kabul. In addition, there are provisions in the proposed Afghan Adjustment Act (AAA) that would provide SIV status to members of ANASOC, AAF, and the SMW. Unfortunately, Congress has failed to support this important legislation. Organizations at the national level such as Evacuate Our Allies (EOA) are fighting hard in Washington, D.C. for Congressional support for the AAA. This advocacy effort is also found across the country at the local level – the Maine Vets for Afghans is one such example.

More Work Remains. The work of assisting at-risk Afghans continues today – two years after the fall of Kabul. Some volunteer groups have disbanded, the members having completed their mission of relocating the Afghans they were assisting. Some are no longer operating – the members returning to their normal lives – after depleting their financial resources, spending time away from their jobs, and sacrificing family life. Many U.S. veterans of the Afghan conflict and members of these Afghan Evac volunteer groups have suffered from moral injury. But many groups, like Team America Relief, continue to assist in the relocation of Afghans to the United States, resettlement efforts, and advocacy for Afghans.

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The author is a member of Team America Relief and Maine Vets for Afghans.

The Lead Inspector General report to the U.S. Congress on Operation Enduring Sentinel (OES) Afghanistan has been published (May 2023). The report provides an update on significant events in Afghanistan covering the period from January 1st to March 31st 2023.

Major Topics of Report

Intelligence Shortfalls. The commander of Unites States Central Command says that the Department of Defense lacks the ability to see the full picture of terrorist threats that could come from Afghanistan. He indicated that there is a need for new airborne intelligence platforms capable of remaining aloft in the region for extended periods of time. He also said that there is a need for increased intelligence collection – both signals and human intelligence.

ISKP. The Islamic State Khorsan Provice (ISKP) continues to mount attacks against Taliban officials and civilians in Afghanistan. The high-profile attacks include assassinations and bombings. ISKP could also strike U.S. or Western interests abroad within six months if they prioritized such attacks.

Diplomacy. U.S. diplomats continue to engage with the Taliban to promote U.S. interests. Issues under discussion include the safety of U.S. citizens in Afghanistan, relocation of U.S. Afghan allies, economy, terrorism, and human rights.

Assisting Afghan Allies (SIVs). The State Department is reported to have provided permanent consular staffing in Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Pakistan to improve Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) and refugee processing. The Department of State issued 5,616 SIVs this quarter. Afghan resettlement agencies in the United States are facing challenges due to the rapid pace of arrivals (from Afghanistan and elsewhere), difficulty in obtaining documentation, and limited staffing.

Humanitarian Situtation. The number of Afghans needed assistance in Afghanistan has doubled since 2020; more than 2/3s of the population is in need of assistance. The U.S. is providing $541 million in aid to Afghanistan in FY2023 focused on food, health, shelter, livelihoods, and education.

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Operation Enduring Sentinel, Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, January 1, 2023 – March 31, 2023, published May 18, 2023, PDF, 54 pages.
https://www.stateoig.gov/uploads/report/report_pdf_file/q2fy2023_leadig_oes_508.pdf

Photo: U.S. Marines assigned to the Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force – Crisis Response – Central Command provide security at Hamid Karzai International Airport during the Kabul non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO) in Afghanistan on August 18, 2021. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by 1st Lt. Mark Andries).

By CW4 Charles Davis, U.S. Army.

In 2014 Rand Corporation analysts stated: “The U.S. drawdown from Afghanistan may lead to greater instability and a vacuum in that country. The Islamic Republic of Iran, one the most powerful regional actors in Afghanistan, is poised to exercise substantial influence there after the U.S. drawdown.” [1] The Rand product also suggested Iran would likely leverage its influence to alleviate political and economic pressures associated with the country’s ongoing nuclear program. Seven years later these forecasts seem to be ringing true. Iranian political and military leadership are diligently shoring up old relationships to place the country in a position of strength throughout the region. 

The SOUFAN Center, a non-profit strategic analysis organization, also believes Iran is posturing to reinforce its influence base within the new Taliban government. In its August 26, 2021 INTELBRIEF [2], SOUFAN indicated “Iranian officials began meeting with Taliban insurgent leaders, and Iran hosted a senior Taliban delegation in Tehran in February 2021.” SOUFAN assesses Tehran is hoping to stabilize its borders and  reduce the flow of refugees into Iran, which hosts some 600,000 documented and two million undocumented Afghans. While many of these predominantly Shia refugees are not likely to rush home to a country led by staunch Sunni fundamentalists with a history of Shia abuses, Iran is probably hopeful stability in the western provinces might provide some relief within the camps.  The INTELBRIEF also reflects on Tehran’s past strategy in Afghanistan and suggests Tehran will hedge its engagement with a new Taliban regime with attempts to build leverage against the group, should the Taliban again become hostile to Iran and its Afghan allies.

Three individuals and one highly effective program are likely to provide Iran placement, access, and operational capability within Afghanistan, in the near future. These men are not on the interim government organizational chart, developed by US State Department Officials, and they are not likely to be as publicly known here in the United States. However, they are historic figures in Iranian, Pakistani and Afghan political and military circles. Their names are Gulbeddin Hekmatyar, Ismail Khan, and Esmail Qaani.   The program is Iran’s heavily recruited and highly effective Fatemiyoun network of soldiers.

Gulbeddin Hekmatyar made a public appearance on September 5^th 2021, in an Afghan news clip, when he met with Pakistan’s ISI commander General Faiz Hameed. News coverage suggested the meeting focused on Taliban’s approach to a more inclusive government. [3]  As a former Prime Minister for the country, in 1996, Hekmatyar anticipates an opportunity within this newly forming government. It will be interesting to see how this plays out, as Hekmatyar lost that position when the Taliban overthrew the Soviet supported government.

Hekmatyar fled Afghanistan and established residence in Mashhad Iran and ultimately in Pakistan. After the 2001 retreat of the Taliban Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force used Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e Islami militia to get Bin Laden back into Afghanistan via his loyalist, Hassan al-Turabi, [4] as well as helping them protect Bin Laden and the rest of Al-Qaeda’s leadership in both Iran and Pakistan. Hekmatyar was also instrumental in aiding IRGC Quds Force efforts in launching the insurgency of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq; an organization that eventually became the Islamic State. [5]

Hekmatyar’s relationship with Iran is much older though. In their book, Night Letters, Sands and Qazizai assert Khomeini and Hekmatyar established a connection in 1979, when the newly established IRGC provided weapons and funding for his Islamic Republic, which grew into Hizb-e Islami. [6] A Guantanamo Bay detainee interview [7] indicates in January of 2000 Hekmatyar, the detainee, Taliban officials, and Iranian representatives all met to discuss US intervention in the region as well as strengthening ties between the Taliban and Iran.

Ultimately, Iran’s long standing relationship with Hekmatyar will provide open lines of communication and situational awareness regarding the strength and presence of Islamic State/al Qaeda in Afghanistan and may eventually provide Tehran a voice within the governmental structure. Hekmatyar, in turn, will likely continue to receive Quds Force support, training, and financing to maintain his militia.

Ismail Khan‘s relationship with Iran has grown from his provincial governance of Herat. Like Hekmatyar, Khan fled to Mashhad Iran after the Taliban seized Herat in 1995. Khan also commands a militia and used these roughly 8,000 fighters to support US and Northern Alliance efforts against the Taliban. But, like Hekmatyar, Khan’s relationship with Iran began in 1979 when he pledged allegiance to Ruhollah Khomeini. [8] Khan, serving as a Captain in the Afghan Army, led a revolt in Herat that year. Using soldiers and civilians he attempted to seize control of the border province from the Soviet backed government. [9]

Khan served in several positions in the US backed Afghan government, first as the Provincial Governor of Herat and then as President Karzai’s Minister of Water and Energy. He was dismissed from both positions due to concerns regarding the depth of his relationship with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Khan was also known to withhold customs revenue and tax collections intended for the country’s national coffers. [10] While governor of Herat, Khan received fuel, ammunition, and arms from Tehran. In exchange, he provided access through Shindand District into the heart of Afghanistan’s Shia Hazara communities. A Los Angeles Times report from 2002 suggests between November and December of 2001 Khan received as many as 20 truckloads of money to secure his Iranian loyalty and support. [11]

In early 2012, the IRGC began reactivating its Fatemiyoun network under Khan in response to NATO’s drawdown. [12] Comprised of Afghan Shias, similar organizations have not fought outside Afghanistan since the Iran Iraq war. The program, which is supervised by IRGC Quds Force and maintains a primary recruitment office in Mashhad Iran, saw regular combat in Syria from 2013 through 2017, when Tehran began to draw down the numbers and encourage veterans to return home to Afghanistan. In 2016 Iran boasted Fatemiyoun numbers reached 20,000. [13]

A 2019 report by USIP indicates “The IRGC may have downsized the Fatemiyoun, but a committed core of the most loyal fighters remains, which suggests that Iran envisions a use for the outfit in a protracted, low-intensity fight in Syria or for deployment to other regional conflicts in the Middle East.” [14] In December 2020, Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif offered to coordinate with the Afghan government for the use of Fatemiyoun forces. [15] He framed this offer of support as an effort to combine forces to defeat Daesh [ISIS-K] and reaffirmed that Fatemiyoun forces would fight under the guidance/command of the Afghan government.

Coincidentally, Khan again raised his militia in an effort to protect Herat, during the Taliban advance in August of 2021. He was captured on August 13^th and held for questioning, only to resurface in Mashhad Iran several days later. Additionally, in the same TOLO news interview with Iran’s Foreign Minister, he was specifically asked about Taliban and Iranian connections in Mashhad. While acknowledging he has heard of the Mashhad Council, he was not familiar with it. [16] Historic and recent reporting continuously provide links back to the city of Mashhad. 

Most recently Khan has spoken out against former president Ashraf Ghani. Using Iranian media platforms, Khan is reestablishing his narrative as a Mujahedeen leader and central figure in Afghanistan’s long fight against occupation. [17] Khan is also playing on his prominence in Shia communities, even though he is a Sunni. He likely hopes this will provide an opportunity for political clout as more governmental positions are announced.

There is a common thread between the Fatemiyoun Brigade, Ismail Khan, and Gulbeddin Hekmatyar; it is the IRGC. This relationship is long standing, with origins to Ruhollah Khomeini and the Islamic movement of the late 70s and early 80s. The new face of the IRGC Quds Force is Esmail Qaani, former deputy to his predecessor Qasim Soleimani and expert on Afghanistan. Qaani, who was born in Mashhad Iran, once said of Soeimani “Those who become friends at times of hardship, have deeper and more lasting relations than those who become friends just because they are neighborhood friends.” [18]

This bond of hardship and combat likely extends to both Hekmatyar and Khan through their mutual ties to the United Islamic National Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan, also known as the Northern Alliance, against the Taliban in the late 1990s. [19] Furthermore, this affiliation to what Qaani calls the boys of Mashhad extends to the current Supreme leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei. A young Khamenei would lead mourning ceremonies for Imam Reza, the eighth Imam of the Shi’a buried in Khorasan, with “the boys from Mashhad,” who served in the Fifth Nasr Division during the war with Iraq. [20]

Qaani’s Quds Force experience in Afghanistan is first reported in Mohammad Mohaddessin’s “Islamic Fundamentalism: The New Global Threat” circa 1993 [21] and this expertise has solidified his point position on all things Afghan. On September 7, 2021, Qaani briefed the Majlis (Iranian parliament) focusing on the Taliban’s intention to form an inclusive government and the importance of avoiding a Sunni/Shia conflict in the country. This message is certainly in line with holding back on use of Hekmatyar and Khan’s militia groups in favor of political maneuvering up front.

Another key indicator of a common and unifying goal in Afghanistan comes from author Sadollah Zarei: “Worthy of note is that in the past two decades, the Taliban have been following the call of the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini on Muslims to strive to form governments that are independent of oppressing foreign powers, and fight against corruption at home.” [22] This thought resonates with another observation by Oved Lobel. In his paper, The Graveyard of Empires: The Causes and Consequences of American Withdrawal from Afghanistan, Oved Lobel states: “In reality, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), as its name implies, has absolutely no relation to Iran.  It is the army of a wholly integrated transnational clerical network that emerged out of the Iraqi Shia religious center of Najaf in the 1950sand 1960s.” Lobel further asserts it is not the leaders of Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan who call the shots, but pan-Islamic global crusade whose elements are inextricably intertwined and ultimately control Pakistan and Iran. [23]

Conclusion

Understanding Khomeini’s interpretation of velayat-e faqih (province or governorate) is the key to Iranian foreign policy. This is especially true since the players outlined in this work are all vehement followers of his movement. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini claimed both religious and political authority over jurists (those who make law) and the people. This is in direct contrast to Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani and current marji (religious reference) in Najaf. Sistani is a staunch believer in the separation of church and state, denouncing the idea of absolute guardianship. So, as the West continues to view current events as a move towards regional dominance, the East likely sees this as the next step in validating Khomeini’s interpretation of the Quran.

Endnotes:

[1] Alireza Nader, “Iran’s Influence in Afghanistan Implications for the U.S. Drawdown” Rand Corporation, 2014

[2] https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2021-august-26/

[3] https://www.geo.tv/latest/368929-isi-chief-meets-gulbuddin-hekmatyar-and-other-taliban-leaders-in-kabul

[4] Leah Farrall and Mustafa Hamid, The Arabs at War in Afghanistan, London: Hurst & Co., 2015

[5] Chris Sands with Fazelminallah Qazizai, Night Letters pp. 410-13.

[6] Sands and Qazizai, p. 343.

[7] https://kyleorton.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/khirullah-khairkhwa-2005-10-07-evidence-summary-links-with-iran.pdf

[8] Barnett R. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System p. 187

[9] Vasili Mitrokhin and Christopher Andrew, The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World (New York: Basic Books, 2005), pp. 391-2

[10] Philadelphia Inquirer, 5 October 2003. Significant revenue is raised by custom officials who demand as much as $300 for trucks to pass through the city

[11] Los Angeles Times, 6 Jan 2002 and The Guardian, 24 Jan 2002. Khan’s militia forces that not only wear uniforms supplied by Iran but are distinguished by their Palestinian-style black and white checkered keffiyehs

[12] Graham Bowley, “Afghan Warlord’s Call to Arms Rattles Officials,” New York Times, November 12, 2012

[13] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/1/22/iran-foreign-legion-leans-on-afghan-shia-in-syria-war

[14] https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2019-03/sr_443-the_fatemiyoun_army_reintegration_into_afghan_society-pdf_0.pdf

[15] https://tolonews.com/afghanistan-168674

[16] Ibid

[17] https://ifpnews.com/ismail-khan-recent-events-in-afghanistan-coup-ghani-committed-treason

[18] https://agsiw.org/who-is-the-new-chief-commander-of-irans-quds-force/

[19] Ibid

[20] “Mo’avenat-e Farhangi-ye Moassesseh-ye Revayat-e Sireh-ye Shohada: Jay-e Pa-ye Baran” [The Footprint of Rain], Qom: Moavenat-e Farhangi-ye Moassesseh-ye Revayat-e Sireh-ye Shohada, n.d., 10.

[21] Mohammad Mohaddessin, Islamic Fundamentalism—The New Global Threat (Washington DC: Seven Locks Press, 1993, 2001), 200

[22] https://iranintl.com/en/world/us-wary-iran-taliban-alliance-hardliner-newspaper-claims

[23] Oved Lobel “The Graveyard of Empires: The Causes and Consequences of American Withdrawal from Afghanistan” April 21, 2021

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Photos:

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar: BBC Persian, September 28, 2019. Creative Commons license, Wikipedia.

Ismail Khan: Ismail Khan at the 2010 National Conference on Water Resources, Development, and Management of Afghaninistan. By Employee of the United States Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan (U.S. State Department). Cropped by Officer – U.S Embassy Kabul Afghanistan, Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=14968711.

Esmail Ghaani: By Khamenei.ir, 2020, CC BY 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=98095340.

Map: Derived from CIA map.

On April 6, 2023, the Biden administration has released a statement that outlines the key decisions and challenges surrounding the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. This 12-page PDF covers the time period from when President Biden took office to the aftermath of the disastrous and chaotic withdrawal that was completed on August 31, 2021.

Contents:

• Background and President Biden
• Decision to Leave
• Planning for the Withdrawal
• Warning about Potential Evacuation
• Triggering the Evacuation
• The Evacuation and the Attack at Abbey Gate
• Keeping our Promise to American Citizens and Afghan Partners
• Rebuilding Long-Term Capacity
• Putting the United States on Stronger Footing

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U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan, The White House, April 6, 2023, PDF, 12 pages.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/US-Withdrawal-from-Afghanistan.pdf

Photo: U.S. Marines from the Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force – Crisis Response Central Command provide security during the Kabul NEO on August 20, 2021. (Photo by Lance Cpl Nicholas Guevara).

This story was first published on April 7, 2023 by Afghan Report.

The Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) has published a report entitled Why the Afghan Security Forces Collapsed. The report, issued in February 2023, is a 148-page long PDF. SIGAR looks at the causes of the failure of the Afghan government and the quick defeat of the Afghan National Defense Security Forces (ANDSF) in the summer of 2021. SIGAR has found there were immediate causes as well as some long-standing issues that resulted in the Taliban takeover of the entire country and the government.

The decisions of two U.S. presidents to withdraw from Afghanistan accelerated the collapse of the ANDSF in August 2021. But the stage for that collapse had been set years ago – by the failure of the U.S. and Afghan governments to create an independent and self-sustainable ANDSF. This, despite the provision of $90 billion of international support over twenty years.

The morale of the ANDSF was severely affected by these presidential decisions. The Doha agreement signed in February 2020 made it clear that the ANDSF was being left on its own – resulting in a sense of abandonment for the police and army – as well as the population.

U.S. airstrikes – a critical force mulitplier – were curtailed in the spring and summer of 2021; resulting in a degrading of ANDSF effectiveness on the battlefield against the Taliban. The Afghan security institutions and ANDSF were very dependent on western support – as they were established as mirror images of western fighting forces. The withdrawal of on-site contract maintenance for Afghan air platforms and ground vehicles had an immediate detrimental effect. This severly degraded the ability of the ANDSF to conduct medevacs, resupply, and troop movements in the air and on the ground. Combat units in remote locations suffered from lack of ammunition, food, water, and other types of sustainment.

This report covers so much more than that detailed in the previous paragraph. It begins with a background to the conflict, lists six short-term factors that accelerated the collapse of the ANDSF, and lists eight systemic factors that contributed to the ANDSF’s collapse.

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Why the Afghan Security Forces Collapsed, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), February 2023, PDF, 148 pages.
https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/evaluations/SIGAR-23-16-IP.pdf

Photo: Courtesy of Resolute Support, 11 August 2017.

This article was previously published by Afghan Report on February 27, 2023.

The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) has released a report entitled Collapse of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces: An Assessment of the Factors That Led to its Demise. The SIGAR report, published in May 2022, is based in part on interviews with U.S. and Afghan former government officials and military leaders. It details how and why the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) collapsed abruptly in August 2021. This is an interim report, a final version will be released in the Fall of 2022.

One finding will be sure to generate some discussion among political circles; SIGAR states that the decision of the current and previous U.S. presidents to withdraw the U.S. military and contractors from Afghanistan, while Afghan forces remained unable to sustain themselves. One former U.S. commander in Afghanistan told SIGAR:

“We built that army to run on contractor support. Without it, it can’t function. Game over . . . when the contractors pulled out, it was like we pulled all the sticks out of the Jenga pile and expected it to stay up.”

One example of the drastic effect of no contractor support was the vastly diminished Afghan helicopter support provided to Afghan ground troops in remote locations. The majority of the U.S.-made UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters were grounded in ever increasing numbers each day once the U.S. contractors who performed the maintenance were pulled from Afghanistan. As a result, soldiers in isolated posts were running low on ammunition and could not be medically evacuated. Morale of the ANDSF plummeted.

A poor logistics system and corrupt Afghan police and army commanders and staffs resulted in unpaid salaries, lack of food, water, and ammunition, and shortages of fuel. These all contributed to low morale and a less than effective ANDSF.

Two other factors that drove ANDSF morale down was the U.S.-Taliban agreement for the withdrawal of U.S. troops and the announcement by President Biden that the U.S. would withdraw in a matter of months in the spring of 2021. Another important factor was air support by the U.S. to the ANDSF was vastly curtailed after the signing of the withdrawal agreement with the Taliban in February 2020.

The lengthy report has many more detailed observations on how and why the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces collapsed so quickly in the summer of 2021. It argues that it takes years to build a self-sustaining security sector in a poor, impoverished country that has suffered decades of conflict. The U.S. set constantly changing and politically driven milestones which undermined the attainment of a capable and self-sustaining military and police force.

The report concludes that the U.S. approach to reconstructing the ANDSF lacked the political will to dedicate the time and resources necessary. As a result the ANDSF was a force that could not operate independently and had never become a cohesive, substantive military capable of operating on its own. The February 2020 decision to commit to a rapid U.S. military withdrawal sealed the ANDSF’s fate.

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Collapse of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces: An Assessment of the Factors That Led to Its Demise, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), SIGAR 22-22IP, May 2022, PDF, 70 pages.
https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/evaluations/SIGAR-22-22-IP.pdf

By How Miller.

Nimo is thrilled with his new prosthetic leg, called a Hydraulic Ottobock that was donated to him with the help of SFA Chapter 78 among others in the SFA community. He says that he greatly appreciates all who helped; they have no idea how much pain he has been enduring for years.

With his old, ill-fitting, and clumsy device he would get so many bruises in a single day that he needed to rest on the next day to recover, unable to work. Now he is able to work easily every day, and he even said it “kind of feels like my own leg.” Besides the enormous difference in simply having something that fits properly, he now has something which actually helps him walk, not something he had to drag from behind him with each step. Not only does the ankle bend, allowing him to place his feet flat on the floor when he sits, but the hydraulics provide power to help him walk and climb stairs. He said it pushes him instead of holding him back. This clearly will help him navigate life more easily for a long time to come.

Nimo explains that even though his given name is Niamatullah, when he started working with American Special Forces at the age of fourteen they started calling him Nimo, which was much more efficient when quick communication was necessary, such as in combat situations. As his work skills and language skills grew he was asked to be an interpreter and became an invaluable team member. He worked through various critical assignments with different SF groups over the years. Eventually he emigrated to California, settled in, and later accepted another assignment wherein he returned to Afghanistan.

He was back in California when Afghanistan fell. Besides all the anxiety of hearing about other interpreters being killed by the Taliban, and fear for his relatives that remained in country, his future wife, Nadia, an American citizen, was stuck in Afghanistan for months after the fall. She had been visiting her relatives and her passport had been stolen by an apparent Taliban while he was supposedly helping her get into the Kabul airport in August. She had to hide from the Taliban until she was transported out of country by an NGO far away from Kabul. This is why we were so secretive last year about Nimo’s real identity.

Nimo and Nadia are now on another new adventure as they recently married. They have the well wishes of all who know this wonderful couple. Nimo is now employed as Project Manager of Refugee Housing for the non-profit Affordable Community Living. His duties include all phases of assisting Afghan refugees who have been vetted to have worked with American forces, often with SF. He coordinates their transfer from other NGO locations in the U.S. to one of two California manufactured home communities, one in Ridgecrest and the other in Mojave. These locations are ideal in that they largely resemble the desert environment where the immigrants were living in Afghanistan. The parks are also rural and now house other Afghans on whom these folks can rely on for mutual support.

It is fun to listen to Nimo describe the various things he is called on to do to help these folks become accustomed to their new environment. That ranges from accustoming them to American culture, to simply showing them how to use appliances they are not familiar with. It also involves lots of behind the scenes administrative tasks, such as helping arrange for schooling, and working with agencies such as DHA to set up food stamps, Medicaid, cash payments, and other legal paperwork. He also hires some of them to do jobs where they can learn new skills such as painting and basic carpentry. Each family is given 6 months free rent and Nimo is hopeful that all will become self-sufficient within that time frame.

They are still in need of house and school supplies. Because the families traditionally sit on the floors to eat around a cloth floor covering, on some kind of carpeting, the bare floors in their new houses are uncomfortable and there is a need for large rugs, such as 9’x9’ or 9’x12’. Many of the immediate needs, such as plates and silverware, have been provided for now, but school supplies including backpacks, paper, and pencils are a current need as well.

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Learn more how you can help Affordable Community Living’s Afghan Refugee Housing Project.

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This story by How Miller was originally published in February 2022 in The Sentinel. The monthly newsletter of Chapter 78 of the Special Forces Association.

The rapid defeat of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) and subsequent fall of the Afghan government caught most people by surprise. This included the Biden administration, Department of Defense, and Department of State. In addition, thousands of American citizens and Lawful Permanent Residents (LPRs with a green card) were stranded in Afghanistan. The United States and other nations responded with a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) that took many thousands of AMCITs, LPRs, other foreign nationals, and at-risk Afghans to safety.

However, the ordeal is not over for some U.S. citizens. There are likely a few hundred still left in Afghanistan. In addition, many green card holders are stranded as well. Of great concern for military veterans of the 20 year involvement of U.S. military in Afghanistan are the Afghans who worked for the U.S. military or government organizations. Many of these have approved or pending Special Immigrant Visas (SIVs) and are trying to leave Afghanistan. Some have gotten out prior to or during the NEO; but most remain behind.

For the past month, the editor of SOF News has been posting daily updates on the Kabul NEO operation and subsequent events at Afghan War News. You can follow the news of the effort to rescue AMCITs, LPRs, SIV applicants, and others at the link below.

Kabul NEO

Over the last few decades there have been a number of courses established to prepare advisors and trainers for a deployment to Afghanistan. Some of these courses were extremely good, while others . . . not so much. The Afghanistan pre-deployment training at NATO’s Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC) was one of the better ones. With the withdrawal of U.S. and NATO troops from Afghanistan the premier advisor training course is being discontinued.

JFTC. The Joint Force Training Centre is located not far from the city center of Bydgoszcz, Poland. It is a modern yet modest campus of several buildings housing offices, classrooms, training areas, and a large auditorium. JFTC supports training for NATO and partner forces to improve joint and combined tactical interoperability. JFTC conducts a number of activities to include conferences, seminars, exercise support, and training courses. It has an international flavor with staff from many of the different NATO nations. The common language used is English as is all training materials and in training environments.

Advisor Training Schools. For the first several years of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) existence advisors and trainers were deployed on various types of training missions in Afghanistan on an ad hoc basis. Once it was apparent that the U.S. and NATO was committed to supporting the Afghan military over the long-term it was recognized that a professional advising and training effort was required. Over the years a number of schools and courses were established by the U.S. and NATO countries to train their officers and NCOs to be effective advisors and trainers. Many of these courses were established quite a few years after they were needed, but once set up, provided the needed pre-deployment training for advisors and advisor teams heading to Afghanistan.

ISAF and Training the SFAATs. In the 2011 to 2014 timeframe there was a huge push to deploy advisor teams to Afghanistan. The intent was to professionalize the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) and the Afghan security institutions (ASIs) so that the Afghans could take the lead in combat operations. At the same time the U.S. and NATO were reducing their combat power in Afghanistan. With help from these Security Force Assistance Advisory Teams (SFAATs) the Afghans were slowly taking the lead for combat operations. To prepare the advisors and the advisory teams in this Security Force Assistance mission pre-deployment training was necessary. The United States had several advisor courses – one of the largest was located with the U.S. Army’s Joint Readiness Training Centre (JRTC) at Fort Polk, Louisiana. Another course to prepare trainers and advisors was conducted at the U.S.-run Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) in Hohenfels, Germany. Many NATO advisor teams attended the excellent JMRC course in preparation for their Afghan tour.

Photo: Attendees listen to a presentation about Afghan security institutions by senior Afghan officials of the MoI and MoD during the academics portion of the Resolute Support Training Event at Joint Forces Training Centre. (photo by JFTC staff)

RS and Advisor Training. As the effort in Afghanistan was reduced the ISAF combat-oriented mission ceased and morphed into the Resolute Support Mission focused on the train, advise, and assist effort. U.S. and NATO manpower significantly declined over time and the number of SFAATs deployed at the Afghan army kandak (battalion) and police district levels diminished. The training at JMRC in Germany for advisor teams was discontinued. The training of NATO officers and NCOs for deployment to Afghanistan was picked up by NATO’s Joint Forces Training Center in Poland in 2014. JFTC had a tough act to follow as the JMRC advisor training course was very professional and produced a quality product. The emphasis at JFTC was less tactics and more staff level as most of the advisor teams were now with the ministries in Kabul or at the brigade, corps, provincial, or police zone level.

RS Training Events. JFTC conducted its pre-deployment training for Afghanistan for several years. The Resolute Support Training Events were usually run for two-weeks, four times a year. The training audience varied from 200 to 500 personnel each training event. The training was geared for three different types of attendees: those who would work on the Resolute Support Mission headquarters staff in Kabul in a non-advisory capacity, those who would be on the RSM staff supporting the Security Force Assistance mission, and those who would be advisors with the ANDSF or ASIs.

Photo: A Swedish advisor team member is learning how to interact with his interpreter and Afghan counterpart during pre-deployment training at the Joint Forces Training Centre. (photo JFTC staff)

Course Content. The first week of the course was on general Afghanistan topics – RS mission structure, security environment, intelligence updates, ANDSF, Afghan security institutions, aspects of the security force assistance mission, culture, politics, religion, top issues and challenges, and other relevant subjects. This week of academics was, for the most part, conducted in an auditorium setting. All three attendee categories underwent this phase of the training. The non-advisory RSM staff attended just the first week and returned to their home countries or continued on their deployment to Afghanistan.

The second week encompassed two different types of training. Those destined to be advisors went to the ‘advisor track’ while those supporting the SFA effort on the RSM staff were on the ‘SFA staff track’. This week of training combined both academics and practical exercise events – usually in a small group environment. A key component of the training was the presentations given by high ranking officials of the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense that provided an Afghan perspective on the Resolute Support Mission. In addition, during this week of advisor training numerous Afghan role players were employed to provide an ‘advisory experience’ to the course attendees. Some of the RS training events incorporated training and a mini-CPX for Train Advise Assist Command (TAAC) staffs – usually from TAAC North or TAAC West.

Photo: One of the small groups learning about their future role on staff at Resolute Support headquarters supporting the Security Force Assistance effort in Afghanistan. (photo by JFTC staff).

In-Country Site Surveys. Over the past several years JFTC continually refined and improved the advisor / SFA training experience. Prior to each advisor course a small cadre of JFTC staff and subject matter experts would travel to Afghanistan to receive briefings at the RSM headquarters in Kabul as well as travel out to the relevant Train, Advise, and Assist Commands (TAACs) for briefings on the ANDSF, current status of SFA, hot topics, and training issues. Upon their return to Bydgoszcz this small site survey group (approximately 10 personnel) would set out to update and refine the training for the upcoming evolution of advisor training. This ‘site survey’ aspect of JFTC’s training certainly elevated the value of the advisor training at Bydgoszcz. The approach to improving the training utilizing the in-country training refinement visits was one that seemed unique among all the other advisor training courses.

In-Country SMEs. One of the strong aspects of the RS training events was the incorporation of subject matter experts (SMEs) from Afghanistan into the training event in Bydgoszcz. Much of the instruction and mentoring was provided by military personnel assigned to RS headquarters as well as those at the TAACs. These SMEs came from advisor teams or were staff members working in one of the ‘functional’ SFA areas. The use of SMEs provided the students with up-to-date information on the various aspects of the security force assistance mission and the train, advise, and assist processes in place. These in-country SMEs were augmented by recently re-deployed military personnel who had completed an Afghan tour in an advisor capacity.

Photo: Members of the JFTC staff and SMEs during a exercise coordination meeting at JFTC during Resolute Support pre-deployment training for Afghanistan. (photo JTFC staff)

NATO Plans for Future Afghan Advising Efforts. Now that the NATO mission in Afghanistan has ended (ISAF and now RSM) there are no troops left to conduct the train, advise, and assist mission. However, according to recent announcements by NATO, the withdrawal of troops does not mean the end of the relationship with Afghanistan. NATO will continue to provide training and financial support to the ANDSF. It will also continue out-of-country training for the Afghan Special Operations Forces; and, perhaps for other ANDSF or ASI organizations as well. Fortunately, there is a large number of NATO officers and NCOs who have worked in Afghanistan as trainers and advisors over the years that can be called upon to continue this ‘over the horizon‘ Afghan training mission. In addition, JFTC has had the good fortune of being assisted by several civilian firms (foremost among them Cadence Consultancy) that provided quality staff, instructors, and trainers to the RS Afghan pre-deployment course and that remain available for future training efforts.

NATO Mission Iraq. With the end of the Resolute Support Mission the Afghanistan advisor course at JFTC has come to an end. However, the mission of providing advisor training to NATO officers and NCOs will certainly continue. NATO has shown that it will remain involved in advisory efforts – of note is the current NATO Mission Iraq or NMI. This is a non-combat mission that aims to strengthen Iraqi security institutions and forces so they are able to degrade and defeat the fighters of the Islamic State. This advisory, training, and capacity-building mission in Iraq was established in 2018 and involves several hundred trainers and advisors, some who will attend the JFTC NATO Mission Iraq Pre-Deployment Training.

Bydgoszcz. The Joint Force Training Centre is located in the picturesque city of Bydgoszcz, Poland. The JFTC campus is a short walk from the city center where there are a number of hotels for the course attendees. During off duty hours there are some aspects of the small city that can be explored and enjoyed – to include the opera, museums, the river walk, and more. In addition, there are a large number of excellent restaurants in the Old Market Square. Bistro Katarynka is a favorite with superb food, excellent service, and a friendly staff.

Photo: An Afghan flag flies over an observation post, Pekha Valley, Achin district, Nagarhar province. (photo by CPL Matthew DeVirgilio, NSOCC-A)

Not Forgetting Advisor Lessons Learned. The Joint Force Training Centre provided quality training for several years for NATO and partner nations forces sending advisors and trainers to Afghanistan. Their unique method of providing up-to-date and relevant instruction by inviting in-country SMEs, utilizing contractor support, and conducting site surveys in Afghanistan is a model for other institutions providing advisor training. There is concern that with the U.S. and NATO shift in focus from counterterrorism and counterinsurgency missions to great power competition the lessons learned in providing trained professionals for advisory assignments will be lost. Hopefully institutions like JFTC will retain that capability for future conflicts.

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Top Photo: A German advisor at TAAC North reviews an ANA exercise plan. (Image by Resolute Support Twitter 16 Feb 2018).

The author served in Afghanistan with the U.S. Army Special Forces. Upon retirement from the military he served as a Counterinsurgency Advisor with the COMISAF Advisory and Assistance Team (CAAT) in Afghanistan during the 2012-2014 time frame. His primary focus was Security Force Assistance. During this period he visited, observed, interviewed, and / or embedded with over 100 SFAATs. He also observed advisor team training in the United States, at JMRC, and at JFTC. From 2015 to 2017 he was an adjunct SFA SME for JFTC to include several JFTC site surveys in Afghanistan. He was a contributor to the RS Security Force Assistance Guide.

A term that has seen an increased level of use is ‘Over the Horizon’. The Department of Defense and national security commentators have been using over the horizon (OTH) in two contexts when discussing Afghanistan. One is the ability to hit terrorist targets and threats inside Afghanistan from bases or assets outside of Afghanistan. The second is the ability to provide training, advise, assistance, and support to the Afghan security ministries and Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) from outside Afghanistan.

OTH and Counterterrorism

The United States has the most professional counterterrorism capability in the world. The Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) has proven to be extremely effective in eliminating terrorist threats whenever it has targeted them. JSOCs achievements in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Somalia, and around the world are well documented. It has evolved into a very proficient killing machine that can conduct offshore, over the horizon counterterrorism (CT) operations.

Temporary Base in Afghanistan. The ability to hit specific terrorist targets in Afghanistan is hindered by the lack of bases from which to operate from in Afghanistan. The huge air base at Bagram Air Field (BAF) has now been turned over to the Afghans. The only ‘known’ U.S. military presence is at the international airport in Kabul and perhaps at a location near to the U.S. embassy. In addition, the significant intelligence capability of the military and other intelligence agencies has been severely diminished. However, it is certainly plausible that a CT strike and support package could fly into the Kabul airport (with the permission of the Afghan government) and set up a temporary base long enough to hit a terrorist target in Afghanistan. In fact, an arrangement could be made that establishes a ‘warm base’ or ‘cold base’ at either Bagram or the Kabul airport. One ready for occupation that could quickly transition to a forward operation base for SOF units.

Base in Central Asia. There are a few neighboring countries that might host U.S. counterterrorist forces on a permanent or temporary basis. Iran and Pakistan are not among these countries. This could be an agreement for U.S. CT forces to deploy for the length of a mission. Or it could be the establishment of a small base manned by a minimal number of support staff to accommodate a CT force to come in, set up, and then conduct an operation. For a number of years the Central Asian states of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan hosted U.S. military forces during the 20-year U.S. conflict in Afghanistan. In fact, this has been a topic of discussion among national security gurus. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken hosted Uzbekistan Foreign Minister Kamilow and Tajikistan Foreign Minister Muhriddin in Washington, D.C on July 1, 2021. A discussion about permanent or temporary basing in one of those countries was likely on the meeting agenda. Of course, Russia continues to exert significant influence in the region so geopolitical concerns have to be taken into account.

Regional Bases and Assets. The U.S. has a number of air bases and facilities in the Middle East region that have a substantial number of fighter, bomber, surveillance, and tanker aircraft and drones that can hit targets in Afghanistan. In addition, these bases can support a CT ground force that can stage on a base in the Middle East and then strike a target in Afghanistan. The U.S. Air Force has long range bombers and the U.S. Navy maintains an almost constant presence in the region with an carrier strike group as well as naval vessels with cruise missile capability. The long flight times and overflight permissions are an important planning and execution factor for consideration.

OTH and Support to Afghanistan

The Resolute Support Mission (RSM) in Afghanistan has come to an end; although it hasn’t been declared as officially over. The RSM has been engaged in Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan through the Train, Advise, and Assist (TAA) mission for the past several years. The endeavor has been providing support to the Afghan National Army, the Afghan National Police, and the Afghan security institutions. Thousands of advisors and trainers from the United States, NATO, and other partner nation countries have ‘cycled’ through tours of duty providing advice and training to the Afghan security forces. So there is a wealth of advisory experience that the international community can tap into within their respective militaries in the effort to support the ASI and ANDSF.

Leveraging Technology for Communication. Of course, this training and advising mission has to be done in an over the horizon effort now that the withdrawal is complete. In a technological world that now has the internet, video conferencing, email, cell phones, and other advanced methods of communication – providing support to the Afghan security forces is entirely possible from outside the country. The world is just now coming out of a year long struggle with COVID – an event that transformed the way we communicate and work. The use of Zoom and other online communication methods have become refined over the past year. This certainly is something that needs to be leveraged by the United States and others to assist Afghanistan. Is it ideal? No. But it is a tool in the toolbox.

Training. The ‘T’ part of the TAA mission that Resolute Support conducted in Afghanistan can, to a certain extent, be done from outside the country. Online instruction grew significantly over the past year providing learning opportunities at the elementary, high school, and university level. Large and small businesses conducted internal and for profit training over the internet using Zoom and other media. Of course, the U.S. and other nations have to actually do a little work to set up organizations to carry on this training. Certainly, with funding, people, and organizations earmarked for this event it can be done. Is it as good as person-to-person instruction? No, but it can be done.

There are a host of military schools and exercises that Afghan officers and NCOs can participate in that are located in Europe, the United States, and the Middle East. One positive move is the coordination being done to host training for the Afghan SOF in Qatar.  The instruction provided at Camp Commando (near Kabul) can be augmented with the training offered by US and international SOF in Qatar for the Afghan Commandos and other Afghan SOF units. This type of arrangement could be extended to conventional Afghan military personnel and units – something that will help train the ANDSF.

For several years NATO’s Joint Force Training Centre has conducted a two-week training course for NATO officers and NCOs scheduled for deployment to Afghanistan to work as mentors and advisors. This course could be continued to allow for a readily available pool of military professionals that can train and advise the Afghan security forces – except now it would be done remotely and by bringing Afghan counterparts out of Afghanistan for meetings and training. The Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) in Germany provided training for advisor teams preparing for deployment to Afghanistan. So the JMRC has some institutional knowledge on the topic, and with some work, an onsite course for Afghan military officers could be setup to offer training on a variety of military topics.

The International Military Education and Training (IMET) program can be leveraged to professionalize the Afghan military. At one time there was a counterinsurgency academy in Afghanistan that members of the Afghan military attended – staffed by Afghan and international military officers and NCOs. This could be reestablished in a Central Asian or Middle East country. The U.S. could bring back the AfPak Hands program to maintain continuity of U.S. trainers and advisors. So there are a lot of opportunities that could be utilized from existing or past training programs.

Advising. One of the ‘As’ in the TAA mission is advising. The advisory mission began in the early years of the U.S. involvement in the Afghan conflict. It became a major effort in the 2011-2012 timeframe when the U.S. and other nations deployed hundreds of Security Force Advisory and Assistance Teams (SFAATs) to work at the kandak (army) and district (police) level all the way to the ministries. This effort lasted about two years until the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) transitioned to the Resolute Support Mission. With the transition the troop levels dropped significantly, which required a big reduction in the advisory teams. The SFAATs were pulled off the kandaks, districts, brigades, and provinces but remained at corps level. During this process Resolute Support continued the TAA mission but through innovative concepts such as the Expeditionary Advisory Package. Eventually, in the past few years, even some corps level advisory teams were removed with the TAA mission being conducted by email, cell phone, through the security ministries, and in conferences in the Kabul area.

Assisting. One of the most important aspects of the TAA mission was providing assistance. A very significant part of this assistance was helping the Afghans with their maintenance and logistical operations. This is most likely one of the weakest aspects of the security situation. The Afghan military is burdened with a vast amount of equipment – drones, aircraft, vehicles, computers, and more – that they do not have the expertise or capability to maintain and sustain. The effort to build and Afghan military to resemble the U.S. military was a huge mistake. For example, providing the Afghans with the UH-60 Blackhawk (a complex and expensive aircraft) instead of additional Mi-17s or Mi-35s was a disaster in the making. Now the U.S. has to rapidly put together a method of providing maintenance, logistical, and technical support to the ANDSF from outside the country. The U.S. will need to find a way to provide contract support by remote and virtual means. Of course, this is less effective than in-country contract workers maintaining vehicles and aircraft. Of course, continuing to fund the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) will be key to helping the ANDSF and ASIs.

RAA Operations. More recently – as demonstrated in Iraq and Syria – U.S. special operations forces as well as conventional forces have been using new technology and methods to offer train, advise, and assist support. This has been called remote advise and assist operations. SOF, and CF personnel, have developed persistent relationships with Afghan leadership. These relationships should be leveraged to continue an over the horizon advising capability. One way to maintain these personal relationships is to invite Afghan military leaders to one of the bases maintained by the U.S. in the Middle East. The working relationship can be continued remotely. This can be done – there just has to be some vision and a will to do it. Is it as effective as in-country advising efforts? Of course not. But it is one method of getting the job done.

Conclusion. Certainly the United States has the capability to conduct over the horizon counterterrorism missions in Afghanistan to hit targets that pose a threat to the the homeland. It won’t be as effective and responsive as operating from a base within Afghanistan; especially consider the loss of intelligence capability. But it can be done.

The advise and train mission can also be done. However, it appears that the political climate will offer a lot of lip service to this OTH training mission but the assets needed (money, people, organization, political will) is most likely lacking. Thus far – it is not apparent that much planning or preparation has occurred on conducting an OTH assistance mission for the Afghan military.

Even if the U.S. got its act together on conducting an effective OTH training mission – there is another significant factor to consider. After twenty years of the U.S. and the international community providing billions of dollars and thousands of military personnel to first fight the Taliban and then provide training and assistance – the Afghan government and military have not been able to defeat the Taliban. The likelihood of the Afghans defeating the Taliban now – even with US and international over the horizon assistance is bleak.

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Image: Map derived from a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) map of Afghanistan.