By Fiona G. Holter, USAICoE Staff Historian, October 13, 2022.

On 14 October 1993, CWO3 Michael Durant, a pilot with the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR), was released by Somali insurgents after being held captive for eleven days following the crash of his MH-60L Blackhawk. The Blackhawk, Super 64, was the second helicopter shot down in the Battle of Mogadishu after a high-risk raid by Task Force (TF) Ranger to capture two high value, Somali National Alliance (SNA) assets.

After successfully completing a high-risk raid to capture high-value SNA assets in the Habr Gedir sector of Mogadishu on 3 October, TF Ranger—a team of Army Special Operations Forces (SOF) and support elements—was faced with a new mission after enemy insurgents shot down Super 61, a Blackhawk piloted by CWO4 Clifton “Elvis” Wolcott and CWO3 Donovan “Bull” Briley, who were providing air support to the mission. As TF Ranger saw the helicopter crash, they diverted their resources to secure the crash site and rescue the crew.

As ground troops raced clan militias to the Super 61 crash site, in what became a baited ambush, Super 64, a second Blackhawk piloted by CWO3 Durant was shot down approximately twelve minutes later. A Quick Reaction Force (QRF) comprised of infantry from 2d Battalion, 14th Infantry and 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry were deployed as combat support as well as search and rescue. Supported by Pakistani tanks and Malaysian armored personnel carriers, the QRF teams eventually secured the Super 61 crash site, retrieved the dead and wounded, and provided support to elements of TF Ranger as they redeployed to safety. However, by the time they reached the Super 64 crash site, the crew was missing.

In the aftermath of the Battle of Mogadishu, casualties totaled thirteen dead, eighty-two wounded, and six missing. Lt. Col. (later Col.) James T. Faust, the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) J-2 Chief of Intelligence Operations, TF Ranger, explained that with six missing soldiers, TF Ranger quickly shifted their mission. He said, “everything we built for TF Ranger intelligence focused on Aideed and his infrastructure;” now their mission was to build a new collection plan, combining the efforts of human and signal intelligence and surveillance systems to find the soldiers missing in action.

Within a couple of days, HUMINT sources reported Somali insurgents were dragging dead American soldiers through the streets, which was later confirmed by CNN footage. They also recovered a soldier whose body was left at a roadblock within the city. Eventually, five of the missing were located and declared dead; however, the search for Durant continued.

Maj. Gen. (then Capt.) Robert Walters, the Assistant S-2, 1st Battalion, 160th SOAR, which deployed with TF Ranger, explained that after other search methods failed, the S-2 shop reached out to Durant’s wife for a list of his favorite songs, “divided the city into quadrants and then put speakers on [their] helicopters and played his favorite song, a different one in each of the four quadrants.” He explained their hope was Durant would hear the song and mention it in a Red Cross message, helping them narrow down the search. Unfortunately, none of Durant’s messages were mailed but, on 14 October 1993, after being held captive for eleven days, he was released to the International Committee of the Red Cross.

The events of 3-4 October 1993 prompted withdrawal of U.S. forces from Somalia. According to CWO4 (Retired) Gregory Peterson, a senior civilian analyst at JSOC at the time of the raid, “While the common legacy of TF Ranger is the casualties associated with the October raid, that operation survives today as [a] hallmark of surgical Special Operations units.”

Overall, it was a costly learning experience and one that also demonstrated the courage of SOF Soldiers who earned two Medals of Honor. In 2021, the Army and Congress approved upgrades for sixty awards for valor in the Battle of Mogadishu, including fifty-eight new Silver Stars and two Distinguished Flying Crosses.

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This story by Fiona G. Holter was first published on October 12, 2022 by the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence and posted by the Defense Visual Information Distribution System. DVIDS content is in the public domain.

Photo: Crew of Super 64, September 1993. From left: Winn Mahuron, Tommy Field, Bill Cleveland, Ray Frank, and Mike Durant. The crew served with TF Ranger in Operation Gothic Serpent in Somalia. Photo by Maj. Robin Cox.

Read more about “Operation Gothic Serpent” and the Battle of Mogadishu, SOF News, July 18, 2020.

A strategic bridge that connects mainland Russia with the Crimean peninsular was severely damaged in an explosion on Saturday morning (on or about 0600 Moscow time), October 8, 2022. The southbound road lane traveling from Russia to Crimea has been blown up. Currently, all traffic is closed on the bridge. When it reopens, the flow will be constricted, hindering Russia’s war effort. The bridge is also known as the Crimean Bridge and the Kerch Strait Bridge.

Initial reports include speculation on how the explosion took place. Some reports indicate it was a missile or drone struck, some a truck bomb, while others say that Ukrainian special operations sappers conducted the operation. Several fuel cars of a passing railway train also were destroyed, resulting in a huge fire. The passing of the railway train at the same time that the explosion occurred has led to some interesting speculation. View Russian security camera footage of the Kerch Strait Bridge explosion (Twitter, 8 Oct 2022, @mrsorokaa)

Map: Kerch Strait MarineTraffic.com, 2018

Crimea was taken by the Russians from Ukraine in 2014 and, up until 2022, this 12-mile long bridge was the lifeline to Russia and a vital supply line for its military operations in Ukraine. The bridge has certainly been on Ukraine’s target list since February 2022, if not before that. This is another humiliating setback for the Russians; following successful Ukrainian counteroffensives in the northeast, east, and south. The Russians do have a land corridor (M14 highway) connecting Russia to Crimea through the recently captured and occupied land along the west coast of the Sea of Azov.

The Russians have taken extensive preparations in the defense of the bridge. This includes the stationing of S-400 surface to air missile regiments, security cameras, combat swimmers, special Naval boats, and more. The graphic above from an article in a Russian publication details the defensive efforts to keep the bridge intact. Read more in “Promise to strike? But who will! How is the Crimean bridge protected”, Komsolskaya Pravda, May 8, 2022.

At one time the Kerch Strait was a strategic waterway for Ukraine. Maritime traffic would flow, under the bridge, and visit the various ports on the Ukrainian coastline located on the west edge of the Sea of Azov. The bridge was opened in 2018 and is considered the longest bridge in Europe (12 miles or 18 kilometers).

This latest event is an embarrassing episode in the Russian invasion and occupation of eastern Ukraine. The Russian’s have suffered several setbacks in recent months. The building of the bridge, which cost almost $4 billion, was a source of pride for Russia and solidified its annexation of Crimea.

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Photo: Kerch Strait Bridge, courtesy of the Federal Road Agency of the Russian Federation (Rosavtodor), 13 September 2019.

Map: Kerch Strait Nov 2018 (MarineTraffic.com)

Video: “Crimea Bridge Attack: How Russia Has Been Security Putin’s Prized Kerch Bridge Against Strikes”, CRUX YouTube, August 24, 2022. This online video provides a detailed examination of how the Kerch Strait Bridge could be destroyed and the strategic importance of the bridge.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ssRdZ-0r6Zw

On February 28, 1991, the Gulf War came to an end. A coalition of international military forces, led by the United States, conducted an offensive that removed Iraqi forces from Kuwait. In August 1990, Iraq had invaded Kuwait claiming that the country on its southern border was historically a part of Iraq.

President George Bush assembled a coalition of nations to defend Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States from further aggressive Iraqi action and to eventually oust Iraq from Kuwait. The defense of the Arabian peninsular was called Desert Shield. The offensive military action to relieve Kuwait from Iraqi occupation was called Desert Storm. The air campaign began in mid-January 1991 – lasting over a month. The ground offensive lasted just 100 hours ending on February 28, 1991.

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Photo: M-3 Bradley cavalry fighting vehicle. Desert Storm. Photograph from XVIII Airborne Corps History Office by SGT Randall M. Yackiel.

By Faruk Hadžić.

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Abstract

Undemocratic processes of hybrid and psychological geopolitical warfare blurred relations and security paradigm. The legacy of conflicts and the applied Western policies to the region is the strengthening of ethnonational discourses and the activation of regional crises. The Anglo-American project of post-Cold War spatial planning in the Western Balkans is ineffective. It would be necessary to formulate new Western policies. Balkan nationalist and separatist ideas, which resurfaced with the former Yugoslavia’s break-up, should be reticent and transform within the European Union (EU).

Montenegro and, in particular, Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H) is vulnerable to destabilizing Russian influences, using a complicated social, political, and economic environment, a lack of strategic orientation, and divisions over NATO integration. As for China, Arab countries, and Israel, their influence in the Balkans remains limited, primarily – but not exclusively – to economic projects. However, these impacts will continue to grow unless more severe and concrete measures are taken by the US and EU. Further weakening or eventual disappearance of the EU perspective in the Balkans could lead to new attempts to establish “Greater”- Albania, Croatia, Serbia, or even Ottoman Turkey through violent border changes in the region. Instead of democratizing, the 21st century has brought fragility in the Balkans.

Author

Faruk Hadžić is an independent researcher and an author from Bosnia and Herzegovina. He holds the MSc in Security Studies, Criminal Justice and Law Enforcement Studies, BSc in Psychology & Economics, and Diploma (MBTA) in Mindfulness-Based Transactional Analysis. His research is multidisciplinary in Social and Political Psychology, Political Science, Socioeconomics, Critical Security Studies, and Criminal Justice.
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1158-7858
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Faruk_Hadzic2

The Phenomena and the Western Balkans

The new geopolitical climate has changed the character of conflicts in which wars are fought in the name and for the benefit of other actors supported by powerful forces, which can be terrorist groups, various revolutionary independence movements. When it comes to political pressures, one usually uses one’s position at the international level to force a political decision or influence one to give up already established attitudes. There is the possibility of providing support to specific groups or individuals in power to change the country’s political system or cause riots and conflicts, then political embezzlement that can help violate some international agreements. Psychological – propaganda activities are a form of special operations aimed at achieving psychological effects for their benefit. By carrying out psychological actions, it seeks to “weaken and overthrow the defense of the attacked party by encouraging internal divisions, provoking mistrust and suspicion in the ranks of the defense and encouraging internal enemies of the attacking system to initiate fear, insecurity, disorganization; it serves to spread bad promises, illusions, rumors.” [1] The use of psychology for war purposes dated back to the Chinese thinker Sun Tzu’s thoughts and received its real revelation in the 20th century through two worlds and the cold war. However, the form of use of psychological actions in the new information space has changed significantly. Likewise, psychological operations used to be the exclusive advantage of the state and the armed forces. However, today, in the new social information media, it is in the hands of non-governmental organizations, formal and informal groups, and individuals. In the socio-information framework, the primary means of war participation are becoming psychological activities and operations. Psychological techniques are used to realize numerous general goals of hybrid warfare, which are primarily aimed at avoiding the emergence or minimization of the duration of the regular (militarized) mode of leadership war. Confrontation in the information space has become of general importance and for the collapse of the political, economic, and social system. [2] Thus, psychological activities play a central role in hybrid geopolitical warfare.

The fact is that after the end of the Cold War, the world found itself at the epicenter of a hybrid war in which disinformation became the primary weapon of populism, right or left-wing. The penetration of fake news and various misinformation is becoming more and more powerful on social networks, and the users of these platforms are increasingly victims of deception and manipulation. The Balkans are witnessing the growing crisis of Western powers daily and the worsening populist, nationalist, and conservative US and European leaders’ policies, from US President Trump to Hungarian President Viktor Orban. They nullify any European Union (EU) and The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) attempts to reform Balkan countries.

Hybrid warfare is a new term by which they try to cover and emphasize all the specifics of contemporary conflicts in the first two decades of the twenty-first century. There is still no generally accepted definition of hybrid warfare, despite the great popularity in the professional field and scientific circles. Initially, hybrid warfare [3] was considered a combined application of conventional military capabilities and special forces, irregular acts, terrorist acts, and criminal activity. In the combined application of different forms, a synergistic effect is expected both in the conflict’s physical and psychological [4] domains. Later, the perception of hybrid warfare is extended to all other forms, means, and ways of endangering security. In the broadest sense, hybrid war is any action by any means that undermine, hinders, damages an opposing-rival-hostile state, its economy, people, and the entire social life. In a narrower sense, hybrid warfare undermines state order in the opposing state in any way and by any means. Within the category of hybrid warfare, hybrid action, it is necessary to mention the notion of “soft power” as a weapon that threatens universalist and inclusive elements better than the conventional one. I maintain that hybrid warfare is a term used uncritically today. The very expression as a peculiarity – sui generis – has existed since the Lebanese war in 2006 and Hezbollah’s strategy towards Israel and implies a combination of conventional, irregular, and information warfare. According to specific goals of interest and with the help of specific and psychological operations or the so-called, there are several traditional state strategies according to specific goals of interest, reflexive control operations to influence someone’s decision-making process.

The Balkan territorial-expansionist ethnopolitics’ destructive power has already shown that it can destroy states, peoples, religious institutions, educational systems, scientific plants, and human dignity. In the dominant diplomatic discourse, the Western Balkans’ stability and prosperity are viewed in the context of two integrative processes: the accession of the region to NATO and the EU regions and their targeted Europeanization. The newly formed countries of the region become an area of export of democracy, the object of geopolitics enlargement, political and security order, and the US and the EU’s engagement, which as external actors moderate the crisis in the region. In particular, the US’ policy toward the region, in which it has been active since the end of the Cold War, can be seen in the context of a complex diplomatic and military approach aimed at establishing a new geopolitical configuration in Southeast Europe. In the crisis area of Southeast Europe, the US has been present for almost three decades, and in resolving the crisis and stabilizing the region, it has continuously used a whole range of diplomatic, political, and military instruments to securely “encircle” the Western Balkans, geopolitically necessary for strategic control of the Adriatic Mediterranean and the Black Sea regions. However, after 2000, preoccupied with the “war on terror,” and thus the geopolitical restructuring of the Middle East, the US was present in the Western Balkans indirectly, through the actions of Allied actors pursuing a policy of expanding security (NATO) and economic (EU, IMF and other international financial institutions) order, and with the help of which the region is identity-shaped as a western value. [5]

The US geopolitician Robert Kaplan (2017) argued that peace in the Balkans could be achieved and maintained solely with “external imperial force.” According to Kaplan, in the times of the empires’ (Charlemagne, the Habsburg Monarchy, and the Ottoman Empire) collapse that ruled the Balkans, the region regularly turned into battlefields. [6] A logical question arises – did the European Union become a new empire that would maintain a peace order in the Balkans? The EU’s role in Southeast Europe is inconsistent between its normative potential and current problematic aspects of process implementation policies. Moreover, outside the ritual, political matrix framework, concentration on specific programs to stimulate economic, technological, social, human development, and regional integration is not progressive. [7] Although the EU adopted a new Enlargement Strategy for the Western Balkans in 2018, the potential of stability is not proven. Instead of liberalism and Europeanization, further Balkanization of the region resulted from the EU’s failure and the allies’ conflicting interests – the US and NATO. Such a constellation of relations has made it possible to strengthen many non-Western actors – Russia, Turkey, China, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, whose presence has strongly shaped the Western Balkans’ security climate for many years. After years of close cooperation, during which mostly followed EU and US peacekeeping solutions in the region, Montenegro decided to declare independence (2006), and Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence (2008) significantly damaged relations between Russia and the West. The unusually active role of the US and Western allies in the decomposition of Serbia and the region’s geopolitical transformation has resulted in increased Russian engagement with the region. Ever since the Ukrainian crisis outbreak in 2014, the US and the European Union have seen Russia’s presence in the Balkans as a security threat. The geopolitical clash between the West and Russia is gradually profiling itself into a conflict of interest of the great powers, which measure their influence on the region’s countries through diplomacy, significant investment, and confrontational energy infrastructure projects. [8]

Because NATO is still the strongest geopolitical alliance, Russia is increasingly turning to new allies who are actively working to create a counterweight to the US as a unipolar center of the post-Cold War world. China, Iran, and Turkey, which are increasingly moving away from Western countries’ influence and policies, are strengthening their own economic and political ties with Russia. Although not without risk to Turkey, the new alliance with Russia, Iran, and China has a significant impact on the region. In the Western Balkans, China is more present, especially in the sphere of economy. So far, Chinese investments in energy, roads, railways, and other 5.5 billion euros have come to Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H), Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia. Saudi Arabia finances numerous humanitarian centers and non-governmental organizations and provides several other investments in B&H, such as market centers and separate luxury resorts for Arab citizens. Investments are expanding widely in the region. Turkey has long strengthened its economic and political influence and seeks to establish itself as a dominant regional power. Besides, it is an indisputable fact that during the genocide and war crimes, and within the arms embargo, Iran provided the most significant possible military and diplomatic assistance to the B&H people during the war.

I maintain that “negative influence” threatens universalist and inclusive elements of Balkan societies, the political and national history of these countries, intercultural diversity, and sovereignty, strengthening regional pan-nationalisms’ irredentist aspirations. Based on credible data, analyzes, and estimates that after the failures in Montenegro and Macedonia, which are today within NATO, almost all Russia’s capacities in this area are directed, i.e., Russia’s hybrid action towards Macedonia, Montenegro, and BiH. In such hybrid activities, Serbia, one of the neighboring countries, gives Russia excellent aid and plays a significant role. The fact is that representatives of the Serbian state apparatus were active in Montenegro, Macedonia, at the events’ time, which was a clear sign. At the same time, we should not rule out that such activities are very intensive towards B&H. However, Russia should not be denigrated either. It is trying to use the same means, although it succeeds to a lesser extent than the US and Western Europe combined. We have had the Snowden case and the Prizma affair, and Western spying on the states and officials, with contractual cooperation with Facebook, Google, Twitter, and Microsoft. Russia did not invent such particular warfare, even though they are merely adopting Western techniques. They also have a significant learning capacity, with a high population having a university degree.

The Balkan security dilemma’s central discourse is “who will control the land,” a piece of a particular territory within the pressure of national hegemonist ideas (Greater Serbia and Croatia). Albanians in Macedonia did not get territory but rights (they changed the Constitution, the President of the Assembly is of Albanian nationality, the right to speak in Albanian was also introduced), while in B&H, ethnicity was gained, which means increased opportunities for monopoly and power over the territory. [9] According to Jadranka Polovic (2018), the Greater Albania concept, behind all the previous post-Cold War administrations of the US and UK, has already been practically-legally realized and becoming irrelevant. The borders between Kosovo and Albania and the borders between Kosovo and western Macedonia do not exist. Formal recognition of the creation of a “Greater Albania” that reaches beyond western Macedonia, the southern and eastern parts of Montenegro (Ulcinj and parts of the municipalities of Plav and Rozaje), the Presevo Valley in southern Serbia, and southern Greek Epirus, parts of foreign countries, would cause complete chaos and a new war in the region. The Greater Albania concept’s implementation is being achieved by drawing the entire region into NATO and the EU. [10] B&H and the former Yugoslavia area with a nationalist ethnopolitics and a continuous conflict, as a dangerous “barrel of gunpowder,” become a scene of competition, collisions, and competition between most influential actors of the modern world in the first decades of the 21st century. In this constellation, violent hegemonic nationalism in the Balkans partly serves as a space of displaced European horror in which clashes of “great powers” take place, while a small number of South Slavic peoples maniacally exterminate each other, demolish places of worship, expel the population, commit mass crimes, destroy the remaining ethnically homogeneous and clean spaces. [11]

Dominant perceptions in the countries of the Western Balkans are sometimes present. It narrows the framework for observing and understanding the behavior of great powers in this region, with an unargued overestimation of their significance and importance in the plans of these great powers, and the introduction of emotional elements in the field of international relations where only interests are most valued and measured. The great powers’ mutual relations are complex, multi-layered, and pragmatic above all. The great powers in some regions or on some issues agree, coordinate actions, and even help, while in other areas or issues, there is disagreement and confrontation. In pursuing their interests, the great powers have a wide range of opportunities and resources at their disposal. The various forms of contemporary conflict are often portrayed as the result of the projection of hybrid threats and termed hybrid warfare. The wide presence and topicality [12] of the phenomenon of hybrid warfare is the reason to problematize the concept of hybrid warfare by evaluating central questions and answers of practical interest to decision-makers at the strategic level. The Western Balkans region’s importance in the two elected great powers’ strategic agendas – Russia and Turkey are evident. For years, Montenegro and other countries in the region have been a testing ground for cyber attacks and the spread of false news by which some foreign powers, primarily Russia, are trying to undermine and slow down the Euro-Atlantic integration of the post-Yugoslav states. Indeed, other great powers are closely following the development of events in the Western Balkans and possible trends and scenarios [13] of future development. In addition to the “malignant” Russian influence, the West is increasingly facing Turkey’s arbitrary policy, which, especially after 2000, is questioning the possibilities of its action in the region. Namely, Turkey, a strategically important member of NATO, until recently an unquestionable ally of the US, is trying to renew its sphere of influence in the Balkans, a region that belonged to the Ottoman Empire until the First World War. Turkey is a unique, doubly “endowed” country – with the space of its geopolitical influence, especially the control of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles as internationally important straits and the successor to the Ottoman Empire. The mutual relations between Russia and Turkey have become very topical in recent times and is there much research in this area. [14] It is critical in the current time in the broader context of the relations of these two countries with other great powers and the conflicts in the Middle East and growing tensions in South America.

In Serbia, approaching NATO is taboo due to Serbia’s 1999 bombing to stop Kosovo’s conflict. This relationship is reflected in B&H politics. There is also a declarative commitment to European integration, which is burdened by the Kosovo syndrome. By the Kosovo syndrome, we mean Serbian politics’ burden with the belief that joining the EU means renouncing territorial sovereignty. In this way, the EU’s demands for better functioning of BiH are read in the Republic of Srpska RS (one of the B&H entities). In B&H and Kosovo’s relations, no aspect can be singled out to function at a satisfactory level. Relations remain in the realm of political rhetoric, and the problem of freedom of movement between BiH and Kosovo is directly linked to asymmetric and scarce economic cooperation. B&H is a permanent crisis state, with the world’s most complex political and public administration, the inability to create the minimum internal political cohesion needed to build a stable political identity. In the BiH’s ethnoreligious model formed by the Dayton Peace Accords (1995), the demographic remnant is unconstitutional. For the most part, a mere constitutional decor appropriately enshrined in the last indent of the discriminatory BiH Constitution’s Preamble. Therefore, the name “Others” is an unsentimental description of their position in this ethnoreligious divided society. [15] Furthermore, Chinese investments in the Western Balkans economies have brought the presence of the Chinese intelligence service MSS with them. This service deals with the interests of China’s state policy and the protection of Chinese investments. Moreover, the Chinese service, together with business people, operates not only in the Western Balkans but also throughout Europe. The German counterintelligence service has marked 10,000 German citizens in contact with fake intelligence officers from China. That is why the presence of the Chinese intelligence service on the territory of B&H, and especially in Serbia and Croatia, is very significant for the intelligence and security apparatus of B&H. [16]

The Western Balkans remain poorly connected in terms of infrastructure atomized energy market, burdened with political instability, which negatively affects the energy security of the region. The EU on the Western Balkans is focused on infrastructure projects that can significantly affect the energy sector’s decarbonization (hydropower, renewables, natural gas), while China prefers mining and thermal energy. Russia is focused on the gas and oil sector and currently fully controls areas in Serbia and B&H. [17] Some argue that strategic or religious goals drive the Arab Gulf countries’ investment interest in the Balkans. Others state that the reasons are strictly financial, a convenient location at the crossroads, competitive labor cost, and the EU joins the regions for investments. While the media’s attention is on companies from Arab countries, the crucial fact is that 80 percent of real estate investments in the region must be due to Israel. “Israel investors have concentrated on retail parks and shopping malls.” [18] 

Social media has become a platform for diversity in psychological activities and processes of a coercive, deceptive, alienating, and defensive nature. People receive most of their information daily via Facebook and other online platforms. If we briefly focus on B&H, 1,500 media outlets have been proven to have published false news at least once. During one-year research and analysis of the observed media, a whole network (hub), domestic and newspapers from the environment that spread false news in an organized manner, exists. “The hub is not actually in B&H, but it consists of 14 media from B&H and 15 media from Serbia, which have been proven to share misinformation and have over ten connections in spreading various misinformation. It is alarming because they work together and operationally. Among these media is Russian Sputnik.” [19] These are elements of information warfare, as a type of special warfare, which is an essential feature of the information-communication era in which information, misinformation, false information, deception, and propaganda are on the scene. However, it is not just the states that do it, but huge companies, non-governmental organizations, and formal and informal groups.

Conclusion

The legacy of conflicts and the applied Western policies to the region is the strengthening of ethnonational discourses and the activation of regional crises. The Anglo-American project of post-Cold War spatial planning in the Western Balkans is ineffective, so it would be necessary to formulate new Western policies. Undemocratic processes of hybrid and psychological geopolitical warfare blurred relations and security paradigm. Confrontation in the information space created the ground for numerous influences on the physical and the opponent’s cognitive sphere in the hybrid geopolitical warfare.

Balkan nationalist and separatist ideas, which resurfaced with the former Yugoslavia’s break-up, should be reticent and transform within the EU borders. Montenegro and, in particular, B&H is vulnerable to destabilizing Russian influences, using a complicated social, political, and economic environment, a lack of strategic orientation, and divisions over NATO integration. As for China, Arab countries, and Israel, their influence in the Balkans remains limited, primarily – but not exclusively – to economic projects. However, these impacts will continue to grow unless more severe and concrete US and EU replace them. Further weakening or eventual disappearance of the EU perspective in the Balkans could lead to new attempts to establish “Greater Albania,” “Greater Croatia,” “Greater Serbia,” or even “Greater Ottoman Turkey” through violent border changes, which would unquestionably lead to new violence in the region. Thus, instead of democratizing, the 21st century has brought fragility to the Balkans.

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References, Endnotes:

[1] Ranogajec, V. (2000). Psihološki rat [Psychological war]. Polemos, Casopis za interdisciplinarna istraživanja rata i mira. 3(5). https://hrcak.srce.hr/2999

[2] Hunter, E. & Pernik, P. (2015). The challenges of hybrid warfare. International Centre for Defence and Security EESTI-Estonia. https://www.icds.ee/fileadmin/media/icds.ee/failid/Eve_Hunter__Piret_Pernik_-_Challenges_of_Hybrid_Warfare.pdf

[3] Tagarev, T., (2018). Hybrid Warfare: Emerging Research Topics, Information & Security: An International Journal. 39. 289-300.

[4] Vučinić D., (2017). Psihološko ratovanje u prostoru društvenih informacionih medija – aspekt hibridnog ratovanja. Vojno delo.7

[5] Polović, J. and Frlan, J. (2019). Zapadni balkan: „divide et impera“ ili zašto suprotstavljeni interesi velikih sila generiraju trajnu nestabilnost regije [Western Balkans: “divide et impera” or why the conflicting interests of the great powers generate lasting instability in the region]. Acta Economica et turistica. 5(2)

[6] Kaplan, R. (2017). New York Times. The Necessary Empire. May 5

[7] Hadžić, F., (2020). Bosnia between the Dayton’s peace straightjacket, development, and power centers’ moral obligation; solicitation to Biden, Small Wars Journal

[8] Polović, J. & Frlan, J. (2019). Zapadni balkan: „divide et impera“ ili zašto suprotstavljeni interesi velikih sila generiraju trajnu nestabilnost regije [Western Balkans: “divide et impera” or why the conflicting interests of the great powers generate lasting instability in the region]. Acta Economica et turistica. 5(2)

[9] Niall M., (2017). NATO and the Western Balkans, From Neutral Spectator to Proactive Peacemaker. London: Palgrave Macmillan

[10] Polovic, J. (2018). Geopolitika. Velika Albanija: san ili realnost? [Great Albania: dream or reality?]. https://www.geopolitika.news/analize/dr-sc-jadranka-polovic-velika-albanija-san-ili-realnost/

[11] Nikolić N. (2017). Razmatranje inovativnosti koncepta hibridnog ratovanja [Consideration of the innovativeness of the concept of hybrid warfare]. Vojno delo. 2. 320-332.

[12] Graham, T., Levitsky, J., Munter C. & Wisner F. (2018).
Time for Action in the Western Balkans. Policy report, EastWest Institute

[13] Arbatova, N. (2018). The Russia-Turkey Relations: Strategic Partnership or Strategic Rivalry – Policy paper series 4/2018. Nicosia: Cyprus Center for European and International Affairs.

[14] Ünver, A. (2019). Russian Digital Media and Information Ecosystem in Turkey. Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies. 1-56. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep21042?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents

[15] Hadžić, F. (2020). Post-Yugoslav spaces between defective democracies, authoritarianism, and kleptocracies, International Affairs and Global Strategy. 86. 38-52. 10.7176/IAGS/86-04

[16] Kico, A. & Kapetanovic M. (2019). Bosna i Hercegovina i Zapadni Balkan – Aspekti geopolitike i hibridnog rata [Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Western Balkans – Aspects of Geopolitics and Hybrid Warfare]. Sarajevo: Atlantska incijativa.

[17] Turcalo, S. (2020). Energetska geopolitika na Balkanu. [Energy geopolitics in the Balkans], http://library.fes.de/pdf-giles/bueros/sarajevo/16147.pdf

[18] Dnevnik.hr. (2017). Financial times. https://dnevnik.hr/vijesti/svijet/financial-times-otkriva-zasto-bliskoistocni-investitori-ulazu-u-balkan—474690.html

[19] Brkan, D. (2020). Slobodna Europa. Hibridni rat dezinformacijama nad Balkanom [A hybrid war of disinformation over the Balkans]. https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/sajber-napadi-crna-gora/30230596.html

The Lead Inspector General report to the United States Congress on Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) has been published online. The 136-page report covers the period of October 1 to December 31, 2020 – although there are some updates that cover significant events that took place in January 2021.

The report states that Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) continued to contain the Islamic State (IS). The insurgent group has been operating at a low level in Iraq and Syria. It has failed to execute complex attacks, seize territory, or conduct external attacks.

Militia groups in Iraq continue to pose a security threat to U.S. forces and the OIR mission. Iranian-aligned militias have increased violent acts against U.S. interests. The Baghdad regime is caught in the middle between the United States and Iran in attempting to curtail the activities of these militia groups.

In Syria the United States interests are threatened by Iranian and Syrian regime proxies that are operating in northeastern Syria. These groups continue their attacks against the Syrian Democratic Forces and are attempting to gain influence in territory previously held by the Islamic State.

The IG report provides an update on the status of ISIS, reviews major developments in the two countries, and outlines its IG oversight activities. In addition, it has sections (about both Iraq and Syria) on the following:

• Actions conducted against ISIS
• Partner force development
• Role of third parties
• Diplomacy and political developments
• Stabilization
• Humanitarian assistance

There are several appendices that cover the methodology for preparing the report, Department of Justice activities, actions against terrorist financing, acronyms, maps, and endnotes.

There is very little mention of U.S. special operations forces. One entry on page 60 of the report states that U.S. SOF sometimes accompany the SDF on targeted operations or support from a nearby mission support site. A “Ctrl-F” search of the document (PDF) for SOJTF, CSOJTF-S, or CSOJTF-I provides zero results. These three acronyms are not even listed in the two-page acronym appendix. Usually there is a classified appendix to this report that would likely provide some insight into SOF activities in Iraq and Syria for Congressional members (and others). However, due to constraints resulting from the coronavirus disease-2019 pandemic, the IG agencies did not prepare a classified appendix this quarter. If you are looking for an update on SOF activities in Iraq or Syria over the past few months you will need to go elsewhere.

There are some sections of the report that are very interesting and make for good reading if you are looking to increase your awareness of the current state of the conflicts in Iraq and Syria. For instance the map of Syria (page 56) reveals just how much of the territory once controlled exclusively by the SDF is now patrolled by Turkish, Syrian, and Russian forces. Coalition forces, for the most part, are reduced to operating on the eastern flank of northeastern Syria.

The report provides a good update (from the perspective of the DOD, State, and other agencies) on the overall situation in Iraq and Syria. There is a lot of information in the report on the situation and events taking place in the two countries that doesn’t get reported in the media.

Operation Inherent Resolve Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, covers October 1, 2020 to December 31, 2020, published online February 9, 2021, PDF, 136 pages.
View online or download here.

By Affan Burki.

Allied forces have utilised the decapitation of insurgent network leaders in its counterinsurgency campaigns in Afghanistan, Iraq, and around the world. However, this is why our COIN efforts have failed. Cutting the head off the snake just causes more heads to grow as junior, more ambitious members of organisations rise up in these decentralised insurgent groups. The new leaders are often far more violent and less reasonable than the ones we have deposed of. Our political leaders need to shift focus and become involved in the campaigns against insurgents and terrorists.

One of the most prominent of the COIN principles is ‘Primacy of Political Purpose’. Every other principle stems from this and / or is a deviation of this erstwhile COIN principle. The human terrain cannot be understood without understanding the political terrain; intelligence cannot be integrated unless it is analysed in a political context of affiliations and motives; the population cannot be made to feel secure by neutralising the insurgents without political backing; there is no strategic narrative unless it is initially spawned from a legitimate political authority. In turn, politics is all about gaining the support of the population using whatever legal means necessary, and then maintaining that support.

The reason we have failed to win these recent COIN campaigns is due to the lack of political contribution by our political masters. The diplomacy has been left to the soldiers, sailors, and airmen operating on the ground with minimal training for tasks that they are not designed nor suitably prepared for. Military troops are inherently trained to close in and destroy the enemy. The training that military personnel receive from Day 1 is to dehumanise the enemy, which makes it more palatable to destroy the enemy when required to do so. Although counterinsurgency retains the critical ability to destroy the enemy irreconcilables it also requires the same troops to apply a more dynamic application of this understanding. This is not the conventional role of military forces.

This is a completely different mindset to that required when working in a COIN campaign; one which requires the differentiation between non-combatants and combatants – both of these terms of identification being highly fluid and are subject to change in an instant. Counterinsurgents need to be prepared to respond to that fluid environment. Even SOF personnel, who are selected because of their ability to think outside of the box and to operate in more broad-scope operating environments, find it very difficult to be soldier-diplomats.

It is time for politicians, who sent us to fight COIN campaigns, to take responsibility for their (in)actions. They sent us to stabilise far-off lands without proper training, equipment and clearly defined strategic goals. More importantly, they failed to provide political support through training and operations. In short, military personnel have been set up for failure by our own political leadership. The COIN campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan did not fail because of weaknesses in the conduct of operations using COIN principles; they failed because of a lack of political will and cohesion amongst the coalition.

The failure of the COIN campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have resulted in numerous civilian and military casualties on all sides. These casualties would have been minimised if the politicians within our home countries had taken a more active role in the leadership of these campaigns instead of leaving it to military troops to figure out a way of dealing with complex political problems. COIN Campaigns have not failed because of a lack of determination and desire to succeed by troops on the ground, they have failed because the political leadership failed to assume responsibility when it was most needed.

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Author: Affan Burki is a former British Army officer with a background in counterinsurgency. He has spent the vast majority of his career in the military as a teacher and planner for individual and collective training. Affan has spent the last 10 years focusing on Afghanistan, monitoring the political and military situation while contributing to military capacity building and security force assistance in the country. As a civilian, he is responsible for the design and delivery of training for multinational personnel working in Afghanistan and Iraq.

A report by CNA Analysis & Solutions provides a study of past and current use of proxy warfare by the United States. It examines case studies of the use of proxy forces by the U.S., identifies several common themes, and then outlines a broad set of guidelines for senior policy makers in the future use of proxy forces. The report then goes on to discuss implications for U.S. special operations forces.

Proxy warfare is defined as when a “. . . major power instigates or plays a major role in supporting and directing a party to a conflict but does only a small portion of the actual fighting itself.” The use of proxies in a conflict transfers many of the risks and costs onto the proxy. The United States has a lot of experience in employing proxies in the past and continues to use proxies in current conflicts.

This CNA paper aims to assist “. . . senior civilian and military leaders to assess US capabilities for conducting proxy war, for evaluating costs, risks, and benefits, and for developing policies and programs that will promote US national interests abroad.”

The first part of the report examines four case studies. Two in the past and two that are currently in progress.

• “Secret War” in Laos
• Contras in Central America
• Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Syria
• African Union Mission in Somalia

Topics explored in each case study include the U.S. objectives, proxy objectives, nature of support, and impact of the use of the proxy. Common factors are identified which are then analyzed to identify key themes across the case studies.

The key themes identified, there are seven of them, help to develop eight rules of thumb for policy makers and decision makers in the use of proxy forces in the future.

The concluding paragraph of the Executive Summary provides an abstract of the purpose of the paper:

“Although there are pitfalls and hazards associated with using proxy forces, the underlying logic of employing them – their relatively low cost, their disposability, and their deniability – suggest that their continued use will prove to be an attractive foreign policy option for the United States and its rivals and adversaries. Cast in that light, it is our hope that these rules of thumb will help the US to most effectively employ proxy forces in the future.”

Page iii

Proxy warfare has been used by the United States and other nations throughout history. The use of proxies by the United States in future international security environments will very likely grow. U.S. special operations forces will continue to play a prominent role in proxy warfare.

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“The Cheapest Insurance in the World”? The United States and Proxy Warfare,
by William Rosenau and Zack Gold, CNA Analysis & Solutions,
July 2019, 80 pages.
https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/DRM-2019-U-020227-1Rev.pdf

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Photo: Hmong Guerrilla Company, Phou Vieng, 1961, Wikimedia Commons.

The Department of Defense Office of Inspector General has posted the quarterly report to Congress on OIR. The report covers the period of April 1, 2019 to June 30, 2019.

The report is entitled Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve | Quarterly Report to the United States Congress | April 1, 2019 – June 30, 2019. It covers the overseas contingency operation to combat the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and summarizes the quarter’s key events.

The report finds that ISIS is continuing its transition from a territory-holding force to an insurgency in Syria. It says that ISIS has solidified its insurgent capabilities in Iraq. ISIS is conducting suicide attacks, assassinations, abductions, and arson of crops in both countries.

ISIS personnel strength appears to be, according to the report, about 16,000 total – within Iraq and Syria. Some of these personnel are referred to as ‘foreign fighters’. In addition, ISIS has reestablished its financial networks in both countries. The jihadist group also continues to utilize an extensive worldwide social media effort for recruitment of fighters and to maintain and enhance support.

Syria Update

U.S. Reduction in Forces. The partial withdrawal of U.S. forces from Syria (known as Operation Deliberate Resolve) has decreased the support available to partner forces (SDF and other smaller groups). This withdrawal is taking place at a time that the SDF need additionally trained personnel and more equipment to defeat the ISIS insurgency. The nature of the conflict – now an insurgency – has changed the type of training and equipment needed by the SDF.

Coalition Assistance Requested. The U.S. is seeking increased coalition support to offset the reduction in U.S. forces. The U.S. has requested assistance from 30 other countries; the UK and France have agreed to help. Germany said ‘not so much’. Although not cited in the report, it is estimated that there are about 1,000 U.S. military personnel in Syria.

U.S. SOF. The bulk of these troops are likely members of U.S. Army Special Forces with their attached enablers. The SF teams are part of the Special Operations Joint Task Force – OIR – which is a component of the Combined Joint Task Force – OIR. One of the missions of the SOJTF-OIR is to perform “. . . partnered training, equipping, and reinforcing of the SDF to enable the SDF to conduct counterinsurgency operations.”

In addition, U.S. forces assist with security during raids of ISIS members or facilitators as well as in some detention operations. Other U.S. ground and air assets are also employed in support of the SDF.

SDF Needs More Assistance. The U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces are unable to sustain long-term operations against IS jihadists. The SDF is limited in personnel, equipment, and intelligence to confront the ‘resurgent cells’ of IS. In particular, it needs to further develop its human-based intelligence capabilities. There is the possibility, if further U.S. cutbacks take place, that the SDF may look for partnerships with Russia or the Syrian regime.

IDPs. The camps that host thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) – the two largest are Rukban and al Hol – are lacking basic services. The al Hol camp is a security concern due to the 45,000 ISIS family members and supporters that reside there. The U.S. is urging other nations to repatriate the ISIS foreign fighters and supporters – for security and humanitarian reasons. ISIS has established cells within the al Hol camp to spread its ideology as well as aid in recruitment. IDPs are prevented from leaving the camps to return home due to ongoing lawlessness and violence elsewhere in Syria.

Detained ISIS Fighters. With the defeat of the ‘territorial’ Caliphate the SDF captured thousands of ISIS fighters. There are about 10,000 detained fighters – 2,000 classified as ‘foreign fighters’. They are held in ‘pop-up prisons’ in northeast Syria. Most countries are reluctant to repatriate their citizens who have been captured by the SDF. This is putting a strain on the SDF and Kurdish administration.

Uncertainty. Not addressed in the DoD IG report is the political uncertainty of whether or not the United States is in Syria for the long haul. There is the possibility that the U.S. president would turn Syria over to the third party countries currently involved – Turkey, Iran, and Russia. In fact, several months ago he said that Turkey could finish off ISIS. This followed his announcement in December that the U.S. would withdraw all forces from Syria. Certainly the statements and ‘tweets’ of the U.S. president has caused deep concern within the SDF and YPG.

Iraq Update

IS Insurgency Continues. ISIS has regrouped in provinces north and west of Baghdad. IS has reorganized its leadership and has established safe havens in rural Sunni-majority areas. The strength of IS in Iraq got bumped up as a result of fighters fleeing the impending defeat of IS in the Middle Euphrates River Valley (MERV) in Syria this past spring. As ISIS saw the future demise of the ‘territorial’ Caliphate it began its transformation into an insurgency.

ISF. The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are still having difficulty getting on top of the IS insurgency that exists in Iraq. The ISF can conduct offensive operations to ‘clear’ an area of insurgents – but they lack the capability to ‘hold’ these areas. So the typical ISF operation, while successful, is a ‘short-term gain’ with a minimal effect. This is especially true in some of the more remote areas of Iraq – such as the Makhmour Mountains in Ninewa province and the Jazeera Desert in Anbar province. So the insurgents flow back in to the ‘cleared’ areas as soon as the security forces depart.

Diminished ISR Assets. The ISF has seen its organic ISR assets decrease by 50%. In addition, some U.S. ISR platforms have been diverted to monitor Iranian activity.

Iraqi Government Struggling. Politics and other factors are hindering the security efforts of the ISF. The government has seen changes in the leadership of the defense, interior, and justice ministries. There have been some significant protests over the lack of electricity and other basic government services – to which the ISF has to respond.

‘Peshmerga’ and ‘Kurdistan’. One of the U.S. most reliable allies in the Middle East continues to be the Kurds of both Syria and Iraq. However, the Kurds in Iraq have some deep-seated internal political divisions (KDP vs PUK). This results in separate administrative and intelligence organizations representing the two political parties. This division extends to the Peshmerga as well.

In addition, the Kurdish government is at odds with Iraq’s central government on a number of issues. One of these is some disputed territory lying between Arab and Kurdish regions. There is a security gap in this area and ISIS is taking advantage of this gap.

Departure of State Department Personnel. Threats against U.S. personnel working in Iraq prompted a severe cut-back in embassy and consulate strength. The threats are from Iran and some of its proxy forces in Iraq – principally the Iranian-backed Shia militias belonging to the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). This “. . . eroded the ability of the Embassy Baghdad and Consulate Erbil to manage humanitarian assistance and stabilization efforts in Iraq.” The number of personnel was reduced from 563 to 312. This evacuation order has also affected some of the almost 5,000 contractor personnel stationed in Iraq.

The ‘Takeaway’

Based on a reading of the report it would be easy to draw the conclusion that the drawdown of military forces (SOF included) in Syria has diminished the ability of the SDF to kill off ISIS. In addition, the reduction of State and USAID personnel in Iraq has reduced humanitarian and stabilization efforts in Iraq. From the report: “Despite the loss of physical territory, thousands of ISIS fighters remain in Iraq and Syria and are carrying out attacks and working to rebuild their capabilities.”

Read the 116-page report here:
DoD Quarterly Report on OIR – August 2019

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Photo: Iraqi soldiers move through a smokescreen that provides concealment during an assault exercise.
(U.S. Army photo, page 2, of OIR IG Report, August 2019).

On Sunday, November 25th the Russian and Ukrainian navies engaged in a small skirmish in waters off the coast of Crimea in the vicinity of the Kerch Strait. The Russians announced a stoppage of commercial traffic through the Kirov Strait – halting vessel movement between the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. The strait was blocked by the Russians with a large oil tanker. This denied access by commercial ships to Ukrainian ports on the northern coast of the Sea of Azov.

The incident seems to have begun after the Russians rammed a tugboat earlier in the day. [1] This was followed by the Russians damaging an artillery boat and wounding six Ukrainian sailors. 23 Ukrainian sailors are held captive at this time. The three Ukrainian boats attempted to pass through the Kerch Strait from the Black Sea into the Sea of Azov but were intercepted by Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Border Guard vessels.

Some news reports indicate that the Russians have seized three small boats of the Ukrainian navy in the vicinity of the Kerch Strait. Russian special operations forces boarded the three Ukrainian boats. The boats are being identified as one tugboat and two Ukrainian Gyurza-M class artillery boats. [2]

The Ukrainian government is convening emergency meetings. The Ukrainian military has alerted its military forces to be prepared for further aggressive actions by the Russians. Ukrainian officials have been in contact with European Union (EU) officials, as well as with senior leaders of NATO. In response to the incident Ukrainian naval vessels have set sail from the Ukraine port of Odessa on the Black Sea. In addition, Ukraine is considering invoking martial law. [3]

Both Russia and Ukraine have equal rights to transit the waters leading to the Sea of Azov based on a 2003 treaty on the use of the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait. Other agreements on the maritime navigation of straits include the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention of 1982 and the Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits of 1936.

The European Union, NATO, and other international organizations have condemned the Russian action. The United Nations has scheduled an emergency meeting for Monday, November 26th.

By closing the Kerch Strait Russia will effectively make the Sea of Azov a Russian maritime region despite the long Ukrainian coastline along the Sea of Azov and two Ukrainian commercial ports of Mariupol and Berdyansk on the Sea of Azov.

In 2014 Russia illegally annexed the Crimean peninsular – taking the Ukrainian territory and making it part of Russia. Ukraine’s large naval base of Sevastopol on the Crimean peninsular was taken over by the Russians. Moscow built the Kerch bridge which connected Crimea with the Russian mainland. [4] Many Ukrainian naval ships were also captured as well. So it is fairly certain that the Russian Black Sea Fleet would make short work of the Ukrainian navy if the situation escalates.

Since the annexation of Crimea Russia has also made inroads into eastern Ukraine as well. This has heightened the awareness of NATO to possible Russian aggression in eastern Europe and the Baltic States. The events in the Kerch Strait is an escalation of the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Russia’s moves are incremental in nature but in time they become big game-changers.

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Footnotes:

[1] Watch a 2 minute long video of a Russian Coast Guard ship ramming the Ukrainian tugboat. Posted on Facebook by Ukrainian Interior Minister Arsen Avakov.

[2] See info on the Gurza-M artillery boats of the Ukrainian Navy in “Gurza-M class small armored artillery boats of the Ukrainian Naval Forces”, Naval Analyses, November 17, 2017.

[3] See “Ukraine Considering Martial Law After Russia  Opens Fire on Black Sea Ships”, Radio Free Europe, November 26, 2018.

[4] The Crimean Bridge – also known as the Kerch Strait Bridge – spans the Strait of Kerch at its most narrow location. Planning for the bridge began in 2014 after the Russians illegally annexed Crimea. The bridge provides for traffic between Crimea and the Russian mainland. It also makes it much easier for the Russians to close the Kerch Strait. The road bridge opened in the spring of 2018 while the rail bridge will open in 2019.

References: 

Naval Capabilities – Sea of Azov, Covert Shores, November 25, 2018.
www.hisutton.com/Naval_Capabilities-Sea_of_Azov.html

Live Blog on Ukraine. Radio Free Europe has a live blog that gets updated as important events take place. You can read it at:
www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-live-blog-events-as-they-happen/29467569.html

Maps: CIA

]]> 9235 https://sof.news/conflicts/hezbollah-in-nigeria/ Tue, 31 Jul 2018 05:00:21 +0000 http://www.sof.news/?p=7408 by Chris Martin In February 2018, I met with the House Committee on Foreign Affairs to discuss irregular warfare concerns, more specifically, the intrusive and merciless groups that are currently destabilizing Nigeria. Boko Haram is located in the North East, the [...]]]>

by Chris Martin

In February 2018, I met with the House Committee on Foreign Affairs to discuss irregular warfare concerns, more specifically, the intrusive and merciless groups that are currently destabilizing Nigeria. Boko Haram is located in the North East, the Fulani Herdsmen in the middle belt states, and the Niger Delta Avengers [1] are situated in the south. Another emerging threat group is the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN) – a Shiite Muslim organization. A developing situation surrounds the future employment by Iran of Hezbollah in Nigeria (or perhaps present employment). My concerns surround the possibility of the Hezbollah providing training to the Nigerian Shiites; resulting in more devastation to the country. Should this occur, it is my estimation that the security situation will be alarmingly more serious to Nigeria than the havoc of Boko Haram. Further substantiating my concerns, it was recently reported in the Daily Nigerian [2] and Amebo Nation [3] that the Hezbollah are training select Shiite Muslims in Lebanon and Hezbollah wants to expand its operations in Nigeria and West Africa. The introduction of Hebollah in Nigeria has some serious security implications for Nigeria’s stability.

Leadership of the Shiite Movement

As is the case with many religions, Islam cannot be declared monolithic. Numerous traditional branches of Islam exist. For example, the Sunni Muslims are the majority Islamic faction in Nigeria. The Shiite Muslims are the minority. Many of the Shia in Nigeria are currently under the aggressive leadership of Sheikh Ibrahim Zakzaky, who is the primary cleric leading the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN). Zakzaky established this religious society in the late 1970s during the time of the Iranian revolution was led by the influential religious and political leader, Ayatollah Khomeini.  In the subsequent decades, discontent between the opposing religious groups in Nigeria has escalated. In addition, Zakzaky’s promotion of pro-Palestinian idealism was characterized by the Nigerian military as rebellious and threatening. [4]

It has been reported in the Nigerian media, that the Nigerian military targeted Zakzaky during the 2014 Zaria Quds procession and in a raid of his home in December 2015. In 2015 Zakzaky and his wife, both suffered seriously bodily harm, and three of his sons along with countless followers were massacred. The Nigerian military detained Zakzaky following the 2015 raid. The President of Iran publicly reproached the Nigerian government on their heavy-handed tactics and indicated that he hopes the Nigerian government will release Zakzaky and compensate the Shiite family members for their losses.

Tactics

Grasping the complex intricacies of irregular warfare is a challenging, yet necessary task. Essentially, when opponents clash, a small war ensues but not always along conventional norms. Many factors need to be considered when attempting to understand the tactics of insurgent and violent groups or movements. The history, geographical location, religion, ethnic alignment, and politics of a particular group should be studied when attempting to understand insurgent groups or violent extremist movements. Another consideration is recognizing that the practitioners of irregular warfare (especially insurgents, terrorists, etc.) enjoy several tactical advantages – travelling short distances swiftly on familiar territory, agile mobility due to lack of heavy weapons (artillery), equipment, and supplies, and operating with a reduced amount of technological dependency.

In Nigeria there are several groups using irregular warfare tactics to further their goals and objectives. For instance, in the northeast Boko Haram uses basic guerrilla warfare tactics and weapons including Improvised Explosive Devices (IED), Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIED), suicide bombers, kidnappings, attacks on villages, attacks on military/police installations, and the use of propaganda and information operations (IO). The Fulani Herdsmen attack villages and shoot security forces at will in central Nigeria. Niger Delta Avengers attack oil pipelines and, occasionally, attack urban centers like Abuja with IEDs.

Hezbollah in Nigeria

Hezbollah in conjunction with Iran will likely deploy all of the above tactics as well as utilize sniper attacks on police and military. Hezbollah are masters of guerrilla warfare tactics – and can pass on lessons on how to attack police and military leadership in Nigeria. If the Nigerian security forces are powerless against Boko Haram, the Niger Delta Avengers, and the Fulani Herdsmen, how will they counter militant Shiite Muslims (the IMN perhaps)? This is especially troubling given the sophisticated training they are receiving or will likely receive in the future.

U.S. and Israeli Interests at Risk in Nigeria

In the event of a strike on Iran by either Israel or the United States, Iran will certainly retaliate. One retaliation option is with the use of surface to surface missiles against Israel or U.S. targets in the Middle East. Certainly Syria and Hezbollah would be likely allies in such a retaliation (or larger conflict). While this conventional response is an option; so is the use of asymmetrical warfare or irregular warfare. There are U.S. and Israeli citizens located in Nigeria who live and / or work there, including government employees. Many of these citizens (U.S. and Israeli) are ‘soft targets’ frequenting hotels, eateries, and venues in Abuja – Nigeria’s capital city. Hezbollah in Nigeria and Iran (assisting from afar) could use the IMG to conduct attacks on Israeli and US targets and citizens in Nigeria.

Nigerian Security Forces and Hezbollah in Nigeria

The Nigerian Security forces are reactive or ‘right of bang’. They need to be ‘left of bang’ or proactive. The potential of Hezbollah in Nigeria working with the IMN warrants closer monitoring. If the Nigerian government does not want a more serious and deadly problem on their hands, they need to put a halt to this the IMN’s questionable activities immediately. Keeping the leader detained is not the complete answer to the problem; leaders can be replaced. When the Nigerian security forces killed Yousef Mohammed, the founder of Boko Haram, he was replaced with another leader. The new leader of Boko Haram – Shekau – proved to be very brutal and not restrained in the deadly use of force. So taking out the leadership of the IMN is not the fix to the potential problem. The entire group has to be reckoned with and possibly dismantled.

Conclusion

In closing, Nigeria is a powder keg ready to explode. Economic issues, high unemployment rates, people angry with the government of Nigeria, and several insurgent groups in existence all contribute to a serious security situation. If this Shiite Muslim group – the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN) – becomes active it will possibly be more deadly than Boko Haram, especially with the possibility of Hezbollah in Nigeria providing advice, training, and assistance. Nigeria with all of its instability has the potential of collapsing into a failed state.

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About the Author: Chris Martin was a Police Officer with the Metropolitan Police Department of Washington D.C. He has 25 years of law enforcement experience domestically and internationally. He was assigned to Special Operations Task Force South in Afghanistan, working as a Law Enforcement Advisor for the United States Department of State. He was also a United States Department of Defense Advisor / Law Enforcement Professional (LEP) assigned to ISAF- SOF in Afghanistan. He has worked as a Tactics / Training specialist for Academi Training Center, training Nigerian Security forces on a Department of State Contract. He is the President of Martin Group International LLC, an irregular warfare consulting firm from the Washington D.C. area. He has spent the last 19 months in Nigeria, the last eight in Abuja.

Footnotes:

[1] The Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) is a Nigerian militant group that has been attacking oil-producing facilities. The groups aim is to create a sovereign state in the Niger Delta. Read more in a Wikipedia entry.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Niger_Delta_Avengers

[2] “Hezollah gives military training to Nigerian Shiites – MEI report”, Daily Nigerian, July 5, 2018.

[3] “Militant Group, Hezbollah gives military training to Nigerian Shiites in Lebanon”, Amebo Nation, July 7, 2018.

[4] For a more detailed description of Ibrahim Zakzaky see a Wikipedia webpage.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ibrahim_Zakzaky

Photo: Map image by SOF News, derived from maps of Nigeria from Central Intelligence Agency, July 28, 2018.