By Charles Davis.

“Nobody wants to sit where I am and think now about what ‘coulda, shoulda, woulda’ happened in order to avoid this.” – Secretary of State Hilary Clinton [1]

The Department of State has an abysmal record of conducting Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO), especially when it comes to emergency response to social unrest and instability in conflict zones. There are internal mechanisms in place for leaders to learn from these events and to take steps to strengthen their processes. However, whether an issue of not wanting to have written documentation of failures and shortcomings or general disregard for the requirements, Department of State (DoS) officials are slow to publish after-action documentation of past events and neglect to act on the recommendations of these reports. This calls into question DoS level of readiness as we face continued friction and instability over Taiwan.  

A memorandum of agreement between the Departments of State and Defense indicates the Department of State (DoS) will exercise overall responsibility for protecting U.S. citizens and nationals and designated other persons, to include, when necessary and feasible, their evacuation to and welfare in relatively safe areas.  DoS further assumes responsibility for minimizing their risk of death or seizure as hostages and reducing their presence in probable or actual combat areas, so that combat effectiveness of U.S. and allied forces is not impaired. [2]

This same memorandum tasks the Department of Defense (DoD) with monitoring the political, military, economic, and other conditions. DoD will assess levels of hostility; local national willingness to provide protections for US citizens, nationals and other designees; number and locations of the same persons abroad and evacuation and protection capabilities, including transportation/lift requirements and their availability as well as the availability of relatively safe holding or survival areas for staging evacuees during emergencies. [3] These are considered Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs).

While each agency has its own lines of effort, the DoS has ultimate responsibility to prepare plans for protection and evacuation of US citizens and DoD non-combatants. This includes coordination to maximize timely use of available military transportation assets and existing host nation support infrastructure. Given the significant failures of Benghazi and Afghanistan along with questionable decisions about non-government US citizens in Sudan, it is no wonder there is concern and apprehension in the DoS planning approach to Taiwan.

Concerns Over DoS Planning and Readiness for NEOs

National level concerns over DoS planning and readiness is not a new focus. In 2007 the Government Accountability Office (GAO) was tasked with assessing evacuation planning and preparations for overseas posts. As part of the evaluation, the team assessed DoS guidance and plans to prepare for evacuation, training and exercises to prepare post staff for crisis, and efforts to collect, analyze, and incorporate evacuation lessons learned into guidance and training. [4]

The findings stated, “Posts do not find State’s primary guidance particularly useful in preparing for evacuation. In addition, while State requires posts to update Emergency Action Plans (EAP)s annually, almost 40 percent of posts surveyed have not updated their plans in 18 months or longer. Post-produced estimates of American citizens in a country are best guesses and more than three-quarters of posts said their last estimate was, at best, only somewhat accurate. We also found weaknesses in a memorandum of agreement (MOA) between State and DoD that could limit these agencies’ ability to effectively work together during a large-scale evacuation.” [5]

Other findings, from the report, suggest Emergency Action Committee members have not been properly trained on their duties, new staff have gone untrained and, crisis management exercises do not reflect likely scenarios given the assignment locations. Furthermore, roughly 60% of posts evacuated between 2002-2007 did not produce the required after action report, so there are no lessons learned to be applied to future crisis management situations.

Several of the GAO findings and recommendations provided in the 2007 report surfaced again in the Final Report of The Select Committee on the Events Surrounding the 2012 Terrorist Attack in Benghazi (H. Rept. 114-848). Select Committee recommendations included “a clear designation of ‘who is in charge of managing and following up on response in emergent situations as well as the roles and responsibilities of involved departments and agencies. There needed to be greater interoperability and improved communications during contingencies. Additionally, relevant agencies need to be involved in each other’s emergency action plans and, where capability on the ground is insufficient and the DoD cannot respond immediately the DoS and other agencies adjust their plans to allow for local or regional resources to be identified ahead of time. [6]

Commonalities in the GOA report of 2007 and the planning and coordination failures in the 2012 Benghazi report suggest lessons learned were not being captured and shared. This is an indicator that recommendations from 2007 may not have gained traction over the proceeding five years. A final recommendation from the Benghazi report encourages agencies on the ground to plan for standby military support before a crisis occurs in high threat environments. The recommendation also suggests including feasible support from U.S. allies. “In addition, the coordinating body should provide for a specific mechanism to know and understand assets and capabilities actually available at any given time.” [7] It is evident from the failures in the Afghanistan evacuation, these recommendation also gained little or no traction in the proceeding 10 years.

In 2017 the GAO initiated a follow-on assessment of DoS emergency preparedness. GAO findings during this evaluation period indicate only 2 of the 20 evaluated posts, which were approved by DoS Bureau of Diplomatic Security, had updated all key EAPs. “GAO also found that EAPs are viewed as lengthy and cumbersome documents that are not readily usable in emergency situations”, suggesting that EAPs serve as a check the box requirement rather than a functional plan for implementation. [8] Another significant finding indicates only 36% of the posts reported completing their evacuation drills.

GAO report 17-174 reiterated what should be obvious from previous agency assessments and actual events. DoS needs to ensure posts complete EAP updates and training exercises. Because of the inconsistency in following requirements, DoS should more closely track the policy requirements and verify posts are following through during EAP cycles. Most importantly, “State could develop a more streamlined version of the EAP—consisting of key sections, checklists, and contact lists—that could be used [by staff in and emergency], in addition to the full EAP… and take steps to ensure overseas post complete required lessons learned reports…” [9] These are all items addressed in some form during the 2007 assessment of DoS readiness.

Kabul NEO – August 2021

Photo: U.S. Marines from the Special Purpose Marine Air-Gournd Task Force – Crisis Response Central Command provide security during the Kabul NEO on August 20, 2021. (Photo by Lance Cpl Nicholas Guevara).

Four years after GAO report 17-174 there was a systemic failure during the evacuation of Afghanistan. House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) Interim Report “A Strategic Failure: Assessing the Administration’s Afghanistan Withdrawal” asserts there was a failure to plan. Findings from the report indicate the “[DoS] took very few substantive steps to prepare for the consequences that were expected.” [10] The report further indicates “Military commanders have clearly stated there was an utter lack of urgency on the part of the White House, the National Security Council (NSC), and the State Department as it pertained to an evacuation, despite repeated dire warnings.” [11] These comments seem to be echoed by reports that Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Milley believed DoS waited too long to initiate evacuation efforts. [12]

The HFAC report also addresses key planning failures regarding NEOs. “[DoS] was unable to provide adequate assistance to U.S. citizens (AMCITs), lawful permanent residents (LPRs), Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) holders and applicants, and other at-risk Afghans who were attempting to evacuate the country during the NEO. Would be evacuees were sent conflicting messages, told they could not be helped, or left standing outside the gates of the airport…” [13] Given our adversaries use of Information Warfare, disinformation operations and deep fakes, DoS needs to be both mindful and prepared with a strong communications plan.

Additionally, “U.S. military personnel on the ground involved in the evacuation said they had been prohibited from coordinating evacuation planning with all allies except for the UK until early August 2021.” [14] This is an operational failure which was identified and addressed as a key planning consideration in the Benghazi Report. General Sullivan noted US forces weren’t even allowed to coordinate with the Turkish forces commanding a primary military contingency at the airport and Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman did not begin NEO coordination through her channels until August 22, 2021, which was nine days after the fall of Herat and Taliban seizing control of all national border crossings. [15] These types of coordination would have been critical to success given the more than 20 countries and organizations that were trying to conduct similar evacuations. Failing to heed this type of coordination in future NEOs, such as Taiwan, will also be disastrous. This is especially true given the number of countries who have a significant population of citizens working in Taiwan.

In early July 2023 the U.S. Department of State released its After Action Review on Afghanistan that covers the period of January 2020 to August 2021. The principal finding in the 87-page report was that the State Department acted too late to conduct the NEO and that there was a lack of coordination among the senior leadership of the State Department.

Sudan NEO – April 2023

Photo: Secretary of State Blinken monitoring the evacuation of diplomatic staff from Sudan on 22 April 2023. DoS photo.

On April 22, 2023 DoS initiated an evacuation of Embassy personnel and their dependents from Khartoum Sudan. This evacuation did not include civilians and other designees. Under Secretary for Management, Ambassador John Bass indicated the DoD took the lead on evacuation operations for the Embassy after it was determined that use of commercial air and access to the airport was no longer an option. He further applied to the loss of access to commercial air as a reason not to attempt a US government evacuation of other American citizens in the near term. [16]

Ambassador Bass did indicate the DoS was attempting to maintain contact with US citizens and provide them with a best assessment of the security environment, while encouraging them to take appropriate precautions. He further asserted the DoS was working with other countries and the United Nations, as well as international organizations to enable US citizens to make their way to safety. [17]  There was no indication that this was part of an EAP or that early coordination had been ongoing, with an expectation for the DoS to need the support of partner countries and non-government organizations. Given previous examples of planning failures and the number of posts that have not completed EAP requirements, it is likely these efforts were cobbled together as events unfolded.

Is DoS Prepared for a Future NEO in Taiwan?

Recent reporting from multiple news agencies suggests the United States is conducting advance planning for a potential NEO evacuation of the Taiwan DoS post. While the one China policy has dictated that the US not establish an embassy in Taiwan, DoS works out of the American Institute in Taiwan. A June 13, 2023 piece by dayFREURO suggest multiple sources provided perspective on US evacuation planning that began more than 6 months prior. Unnamed sources indicated the planning process was not a public topic due to its sensitive nature and the potential fear and apprehension it might evoke within the Taiwanese population. [18]  The fact that DoS is taking an active planning approach, suggests recommendations and lessons learned are finally being applied in EAP development for this post.

A Messenger report from December 2021 indicates roughly two thirds of the Taiwanese population identifies as Taiwanese rather than Chinese. This growing shift along with recent Taiwan and US efforts to shore up defenses may be contributing to China’s need to act sooner rather than later, on its claims to the island nation.  This is not the first time Taiwan and the US have drawn attention over evacuation training. A 2003 Taipei Times report on joint training exercise Han Kuang #19 indicated Deputy Defense Minister Chen Chao-ming specifically addressed the inaccurate perception the US military was participating in evacuation training. [19]

“China has unsuccessfully attempted military force against Taiwan before, in the 1950s and 1990s. For much of that period, Taiwan itself had a superior military to the People’s Republic, and U.S. naval dominance in the region was unquestioned.” [20] An example can be found in June 1950, when President Truman placed the 7th Fleet between mainland China and Taiwan. In this case deterrence through the neutralization of the Taiwan Strait discouraged Chinese forces from conducting an amphibious assault. However, the same policy of deterrence today may be speeding China’s decision-making timeline.

As DoS continues to develop NEO evacuation planning, the Philippines are likely to play a key role. The  country’s May 2022 presidential election significantly shifted Philippine relations with the US and China and allowed the US to reestablish democratic relationships that had deteriorated under Rodrigo Duterte. [21]  And, as recently as May 2023 the US has reaffirmed its 72 year defense alliance with the Philippines, through a defense treaty in the South China Sea. [22]  Just days after confirming this treaty, President Marcos indicated Philippine bases could play a key role if China were to attack Taiwan. [23]

An example of how DoS planning might leverage Philippine bases includes the Ports of Kaohsiung and Subic Bay. Kaohsiung is located on Taiwan’s southwestern coastline and Kaohsiung port is one of the biggest container handling facilities in the world. The port handles roughly 5000 vessels and 18,900,000 tonnes of cargo annually. [24] Along with the port, Kaohsiung boast one of the country’s largest international airports co-located just outside the port area. Subic Bay, Philippines is approximately 500 miles south and served as a US naval base until 1992. The Subic facilities also include an international airport. Given DoS intentions to rely on commercial transportation as a first alternative, these two facilities provide multiple avenues for departure and arrival, not only for US citizens but other countries as well.

A possible indicator to the approach above can be found in a DoS Joint Statement from April 11, 2023. “Mindful of the growing complexity of the Indo-Pacific security environment, including the multidimensional nature of modern challenges and threats to the peace and security of the Philippines and the United States, the Secretaries reaffirmed their shared determination to defend against external armed attack in the Pacific… Accelerate the implementation of [Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement] EDCA projects and increase investments in EDCA agreed Locations to further support combined training, exercises, and interoperability between the U.S. and Philippine Armed Forces, as well as the Philippines’ civilian-led disaster preparedness and response capacities. The United States expects to have allocated over $100 million by the end of fiscal year 2023 toward infrastructure investments at the existing five EDCA sites and to support swift operationalization of the four new sites.” [25]

Whether through learning from previous events or developing new approaches, DoS will face significant obstacles during a NEO event in Taiwan. Reliance on a variety of networks and resources will be paramount to conducting a successful NEO. This will include advance coordination and relationship building before the crisis and NGOs may play a substantial role. In early 2000 Taiwan established the Department of NGO International Relations, which falls under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is responsible for maintaining positive relationships with NGOs, through open dialogue on difficult topics such as political freedom and civil rights. Associations such as this provide early indicators of instability which may extend operational and execution timelines and in a potential crisis such as this time is a valuable commodity. 

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Top Photo: U.S. Marines provide security during drawdown of designated personnel in Afghanistan on August 18, 2021. (U.S. Marine Corps photo).

Map: Taiwan map derived from maps from the Central Intelligence Agency.

[1] https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/01/23/top-quotes-from-hillary-clintons-benghazi-hearings

[2] https://prhome.defense.gov/Portals/52/Documents/PR%20Docs/DOS-DOD%20Memo%20of%20Agreement%20on%20Protection%20and%20Evacuation.pdf

[3] Ibid.

[4] GAO-08-23 State Department: Evacuation Planning and Preparations for Overseas Posts Can Be Improved

[5] ibid

[6] https://www.congress.gov/114/crpt/hrpt848/CRPT-114hrpt848.pdf

[7] ibid

[8] https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-17-714.pdf

[9] https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-17-714.pdf

[10] https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/HFAC-Republican-Interim-Report-A-22Strategic-Failure22-Assessing-the-Administrations-Afghanistan-Withdrawal.pdf

[11] ibid

[12] General Mark Milley Privately Blamed the State Department for the Disorganized Evacuation of Afghanistan (sofrep.com)

[13] https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/HFAC-Republican-Interim-Report-A-22Strategic-Failure22-Assessing-the-Administrations-Afghanistan-Withdrawal.pdf

[14] Ibid

[15] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/afghan-commander-ismail-khan-captured-taliban-seize-herat-2021-08-13/

[16] https://www.state.gov/briefing-with-under-secretary-for-management-ambassador-john-bass-assistant-secretary-for-african-affairs-ambassador-molly-phee-assistant-secretary-of-defense-for-special-operations-and-low-intensit/

[17] ibid

[18] https://euro.dayfr.com/trends/352257.html

[19] https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2003/01/03/189539

[20] https://themessenger.com/grid/test-imagining-the-unimaginable-the-us-china-and-war-over-taiwan

[21] https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/2022-philippine-election-trouble-democracy-and-foreign-relations-ahead

[22] https://www.reuters.com/world/us-issues-guidelines-defending-philippines-south-china-sea-attack-2023-05-04/

[23] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/marcos-says-philippines-bases-could-be-useful-if-taiwan-attacked-2023-05-05/

[24] https://www.marineinsight.com/know-more/8-major-ports-of-taiwan/

[25] Joint Statement of the U.S.-Philippines 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue – United States Department of State

By Michael J. Listner.

The passage of an intelligence-gathering balloon from the Peoples Republic of China through U.S. sovereign airspace earlier this month created a Sputnik-conundrum in terms of international law and national sovereignty. The balloon, which was first detected entering U.S. sovereign airspace around the Aleutian Island chain was permitted to transit this airspace unimpeded into Alaska and then reenter the continental U.S. where it was allowed to transit the continental U.S. unchecked until it was finally brought down within the 12-mile zone of the southeast coast of the U.S. Much is not publicly known what types or amount of intelligence was gathered by the balloon; however, aside from this the permissive entry and transit of the balloon raises questions about the effect of incident on international law and U.S. national sovereignty.

Hybrid Warfare and International Law

The term hybrid warfare was coined by Xu Sanfei, the editor of Military Forum and a senior editor in the Theory Department of Liberation Army News. Hybrid warfare “…refers to an act of war that is conducted at the strategic level; that comprehensively employs political, economic, military, diplomatic, public opinion, legal, and other such means; whose boundaries are blurrier, whose forces are more diverse, whose form is more mixed, whose regulation and control is more flexible, and whose objectives are more concealed.” The CCP’s Central Military Commission adopted the concept of hybrid warfare when it announced in 2003 three new types of warfare capabilities: legal warfare (lawfare), psychological warfare, and media warfare, which individually and collectively attain a political objective. This new strategy, which is called the Three Warfares, was subsequently adopted by the Peoples Liberation Army. This article will focus on the legal aspect of hybrid warfare.

Sovereign Airspace and Near Space          

The Federal Aviation Administration regulates territorial airspace up to 60,000 feet (approximately 18.288km), which makes this airspace unquestionably sovereign airspace. Beyond this altitude some question  whether the so-called “near-space” can be claimed as sovereign airspace. The non-legal spatial demarcation for where outer space begins is 60 miles (approximately 100km). The U.S. does not recognize the need for an international legal demarcation for where outer space begins and gives supports for a rule of international law that a nation’s sovereign airspace extends not only beyond the 60,000-foot altitude but up to where an aircraft or spacecraft would enter a full orbit of the Earth and unquestionably be in the sovereignless domain of outer space. This rule that a nations sovereign airspace extends past 60,000 feet into near-space and into outer space is borne out with high-flying reconnaissance aircraft that have operated in near-space altitudes. The U-2 operates at altitudes of 70,000 feet, and the CIA’s OXCART program and the Strategic Air Command’s SR-71 both operated at altitudes of 80,000+ feet, which is well within the alleged legal gray zone purported to exist. Moreover, all these aircraft encountered defensive actions while at these altitudes from nations as they overflew or flew in proximity to what these nations claimed as sovereign territory, including a U-2 shot downed over the Soviet Union on May 1, 1960 while flying over the Soviet Union and at least six U-2s operated by the Black Cat Squadron of the Taiwanese Air Force while flying at so-called near-space altitudes over the PRC.

Chinese Balloons and Hybrid Warfare

The transit of the PRC balloon over U.S. territory creates a larger question as to the purpose of the action. The primary purpose of the balloon was undoubtedly to collect intelligence; however, ancillary to that mission is whether the PRC was testing for a political response from the U.S. to see if it could use the legal aspect of hybrid warfare and the Three Warfares, which is called lawfare, to potentially test of a new rule of international law for near-space and assess the resolve of the U.S. to not only defend its territory but also support and assert its sovereign rights under international law. Two aspects of the intrusion are pertinent to this analysis.

First, the unimpeded transit of the balloon brings into question whether the PRC was seeking to establish an international rule of law for passing over sovereign territory at “near-space” altitudes. The balloon’s trek over U.S. territory began its violation of sovereign U.S. air space when it passed over the Aleutian Islands yet, no action was taken to intercept its course purportedly because it was not deemed a military threat. Regardless, no assertion in messaging by the U.S. was made the balloon was violating its sovereign airspace. This potentially gives the PRC the impression that if not creating a toe-hold for a rule of customary international law for overflights at near-space altitudes it at least shows a reluctance by the U.S. to push-back on implicit attempt to create a rule of international law. A repeat of the overflight that would give further credence to this claim would be difficult considering the political fallout following this incident. Yet, even if the PRC were to attempt to repeat the incursion and the U.S. intercepted, would the U.S. assert its sovereign rights as trigger for the intercept? This leads into the second legal aspect.

The second legal aspect of the incursion is whether it was a test by the PRC to see how the U.S. would respond to a violation of its sovereign airspace and whether it would assert international law or waiver politically. The intrusion into and passage through U.S. airspace was a direct challenge to this rule of international law and arguably could have been a lawfare action to dilute the precept itself. By failing to properly message the true nature of the incursion, the U.S. not only waivered on its defense of national airspace but signaled to the PRC it might waiver on asserting international law in other domains, which brings into questions the U.S. response to future geopolitical events.

The Strategic and Geopolitical Effect

The lack of coherent messaging to enunciate the violation of U.S. airspace and assert the violation of international law and instead down-playing the seriousness of the incident creates strategic problems for the U.S. This lack of messaging continued with the intercept of the objects subsequent to the intrusion where the Administration cites safety as the rationale for the interventions instead of the violation of sovereign U.S. airspace. This brings into question the U.S. commitment to not only defending the sovereign airspace of the U.S. but the rule of international law at home and abroad. This in turn has a psychological effect on the public perception of political leaders in the U.S. to uphold national security. More critically, it also creates shadows of doubt about the willingness of the U.S. to uphold international law and respond decisively to challenges to international law abroad, including both treaty commitments and political assurances. Moreover, the lack of decisive action and clear messaging by the U.S. dilutes the credibility of the U.S. not only enforcing and asserting international law in other domains but also it standing to conjure new standards of behavior in other domains, including outer space.

Conclusion

The reluctance of the U.S. to immediately deal with and unambiguously charge the incursion of the PRC surveillance balloon as a violation of its sovereign territorial rights under international law and the hesitancy to demonstrate resolve in intercepting the balloon eroded the credibility of the U.S. in the eyes of its domestic citizens and allies in the geopolitical sphere. More critically, the standing of the U.S in geopolitical adversaries in the context of great power competition has shifted as the PRC analyzes the U.S. response to the incursion and makes its next calculation in great power competition to shift the rule of international law to its world-view.

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Author: Michael J. Listner is a licensed attorney in the State of New Hampshire and the founder and principal of Space Law and Policy Solutions. He is a subject matter expert in outer space law, outer space policy and hybrid warfare/lawfare strategy and the author and editor of the space law and policy briefing-letter, The Précis.

Photo: A U.S. Air Force U-2 pilot looked down at the suspected Chinese surveillance balloon as it hovered over the Central Continental United States February 3, 2023. Recovery efforts began shortly after the balloon was downed. (Photo courtesy of the Department of Defense)

In October 2022 the Irregular Warfare Center (IWC) reached initial operating capacity. The IWC serves as a central mechanism for developing DoD Irregular Warfare (IW) knowledge, concepts, and doctrine. The center will be featuring research, analysis, education, and international engagement to strengthen the U.S. network of international allies and security partners.

Staff. Some of the leading members on the IWC leadership team include Dr. Dennis Walters, Lori Leffler, Chris Burns, Kevin Stringer, Dr. Sandor Fabian, and Dr. Richard Newton. Each of these people bring a wealth of national security experience to the organization – most of them with a deep background in special operations.

TILT-C. One of its initiatives is the establishment of five-day course entitled Transformational Irregular Warfare Leaders Thought Course (TILT-C). The purpose of TILT-C is to develop senior US government leaders from across the departments and agencies to understand and employ IW as a tool of US policy as well as understanding its uses by near-peer adversaries. The course uses real-world IW problems to allow course participants to design policies, strategies, or campaigns.

Insights. The IWC will be providing information about Irregular Warfare through published articles. These are available on its website under the “Insights” tab. The first article published, by Dr. Kevin Stringer, is entitled “Irregular Warfare Campaigning and the Irregular Warfare Center”, Insights, December 1, 2022.

Future Plans. The IWC will soon be announcing a variety of future engagements for the irregular warfare community. These include conferences, seminars, webinars, podcasts, wargames, and other IW-related events.

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References:

Irregular Warfare Center
https://irregularwarfarecenter.org/

TILT-C
https://irregularwarfarecenter.org/initiatives/tilt-c/

By Jim Garamone, DoD News.

The United States is an Arctic power, and the Defense Department has established an office to ensure U.S. strategy and policy protects U.S. interests in that crucial region.  Iris A. Ferguson is the deputy assistant secretary of defense for Arctic and global resilience, a new position that signifies the importance U.S. leaders place on the region.

The importance of the region will only grow as the impacts of climate change accelerate. Ferguson noted that temperatures in the Arctic are rising at least three times faster than anywhere else in the world. “We’re seeing a lot of geophysical changes that have dramatic impact on our operations and our infrastructure,” she said.   

A lot of military infrastructure in the region is built on permafrost foundations, which are melting. “We’re working to mitigate that,” she said. “There’s also coastal erosion that has the potential to impact our radar sites.”  

The changes are also opening up the area to civilian endeavors — and to strategic competitors, Ferguson said. “We’re seeing increased geopolitical activity by Russia, as well as China, in the region,” she said.   

Russia has the largest land mass in the Arctic, and Russian leaders think of the country as the region’s preeminent power, the deputy assistant secretary said. “They have been refurbishing a lot of their airfields and renewing much of their defense architecture across the Arctic region.”  

Russia is only 55 miles away from the United States at the Bering Strait. Russian officials maintain their bases and assets in the Arctic are defensive, yet they arm their icebreakers with Kalibr-K missiles, defense officials have said. “We’re increasingly watching the amount of activity that’s happening in the Arctic region from them,” she said.   

China, the United States’ other strategic competitor, is thousands of miles from the Arctic. Yet, Chinese leaders have “been trying to insert themselves into the Arctic,” she said. “They have called themselves a near-Arctic nation, even though they aren’t even remotely near the Arctic.”  

Chinese leaders are trying to adjust international norms and governance structures in their favor, and they are cognizant of their economic coercion globally and in the Arctic region, she said. “So, we’re being very mindful about their activity and in wanting to ensure that our interests are protected in the region,” she said.   

The Arctic is often overlooked, “but it’s a place where we have immense territorial equity, actually, for our homeland defense needs, our ability to monitor and respond to threats, and our capacity to project power,” Ferguson said.  

The Air Force has based its top-of-the-line aircraft in Alaska because they can be easily deployed to respond to crises throughout the Indo-Pacific. It’s also a key refueling stop for aircraft. The Army has established the 11th Airborne Division in the region to develop expertise in Arctic mobility and extreme cold weather operations.

From a military standpoint, the region is a key defense node for the homeland, with missile defense facilities, radars, early warning sites and more throughout Alaska and Canada as part of the North American Aerospace Defense Command.   

The latest DOD strategy on the Arctic refers to the region as an avenue of approach to the homeland. “The priorities for that defense strategy are in protecting the homeland, ensuring that our national interests are safeguarded and protected, and working with nations on shared challenges,” Ferguson said. “The overarching goal is to ensure we maintain peace and stability in the region.” 

The Arctic is a huge area with segments in three geographic combatant commands’ areas of responsibility: U.S. Northern Command; U.S. European Command; and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. Ferguson’s office is a focal point for Arctic policy. Its initiatives include helping the services prioritize capabilities for the region, developing deeper partnerships with allies and partners, and enhancing Arctic education across the department through its oversight of the newly created Ted Stevens Center for Arctic Security Studies on Joint Base Elmendorf Richardson near Anchorage, Alaska. 

“It’s important to have an office like this now to try to start laying the groundwork for how we can best prepare ourselves and to know what the challenges of the future may be,” she said. “There might not be conflict now — and there hopefully will never be conflict in the Arctic — but we need to be prepared to operate there.”  

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This article was first published by the U.S. Department of Defense on September 27, 2022. Content by the DoD is in the public domain.
https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3171173/dod-establishes-arctic-strategy-and-global-resilience-office/

Photo: Army paratroopers land on Malemute Drop Zone during airborne training at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska, March 24, 2022. Photo by Alejandro Pena, USAF.

References:

Arctic Security, National Security Info
https://www.national-security.info/topics/arctic-security.html

The House Armed Services Committee held a hearing about the U.S. Army’s 2022 budget. Secretary Wormuth and General McConville testified on Tuesday, June 29, 2021 – defending the Biden administration’s cuts to the Army’s budget for 2022. They both said the U.S. Army is “ready to fight” and said that the budget has the right priorities for the conflicts of the future.

The hearing was entitled “The Fiscal Year 2022 National Defense Authorization Budget Request for the Department of the Army”. The purpose was to allow the committee to receive testimony from the Secretary of the Army and the Army Chief of Staff on the FY22 budget request, priorities, and key issues as they relate to the service.

Some of the themes throughout the testimony of all the services before the House and Senate were reflected in this hearing as well. These include the modernization effort of the Army, the recognition of the changes in warfare brought about by technology and great power competition, readiness, and training. In addition, diversity, sexual assault, sexual harassment, racism, housing standards, and extremism have been common topics.

Secretary Wormuth, in her opening remarks and during testimony, stated that the Army must continue to invest in people, ensuring that the right programs are in place to ensure that eliminate racism, sexual assault and harassment, and suicide. She said that the Army is in the lead for incorporating new technology. Wormuth stressed the importance of partnerships and allies in the Indo-Pacific region – emphasizing that having a continual relationship will help in responding to future crisis and conflicts. She believes that modernization is the key to preparing the U.S. Army for the next conflict – which will be in an all domain environment.

General McConville reiterated the comments in his opening remarks and during testimony by the Secretary saying that the Army is on the right path with its prioritization on people, readiness, and modernization. He also mentioned the importance of reducing racism, extremism, sexual assault and harassment, and suicides. He stated that changes in leadership training and mentoring should begin at the small unit level – from the squad, to the platoon, and then higher – to build an Army that recognizes the importance of each soldier. He shared his vision of ‘peace through strength’ as a way of winning wars – especially in the Indo-Pacific region.

Politics, Of Course. The Democratic and Republication representatives stuck to their usual talking points during the question and answering session. Each representative was allocated five minutes each for their respective Q and A. Major themes for the Democrats were topics related to racism, extremism, sexual harassment and assault, and suicide. Republicans voiced concerns over the budget cuts that the Army will experience in 2022 – sometimes questioning the lack of funding priority of specific programs. Many of the representatives had several topics in common that they had questions on, to include military housing, suicide, and infrastructure. Some of the testimony touched on the topics listed below.

Modernization. Mentioned several times in the testimony by the Secretary and the Chief were the 6 focus areas for Army modernization, the 31 plus 4 systems, and the need to be ready for conflict in the Indo-Pacific region. Both Army leaders consistently stated that the priority of the Army 2022 budget was modernization. They repeatedly defended the emphasis on modernization over other pressing priorities citing the refocus from the counterterrorism (CT) and counterinsurgency (COIN) mission of the past two decades to one of preparing for great power competition or GPC. They cited the modernization of China’s military and the aggressive foreign policy of both Russia and China as the number one defense concern – and that modernization was the key to competing with both of these nations in the future.

Budget Cuts. Some representatives stated their concerns that the modernization programs may take time to come on board and that equipment currently in use need some significant upgrades. They pointed to decreases in spending for force strength, equipment upgrades, munition procurements, some research and development programs, and other examples. The answers by the Secretary and Chief were consistent – priority is being given to force modernization without sacrificing the ability of the U.S. Army to respond to current crisis or conflicts. The R&D programs were scrutinized and priority given to the more important R&D projects.

Priority of Spending. Some representatives questioned the lack of priority for some programs. The Secretary and Chief were quick to point out that many of these programs were listed in the Unfunded Requirements List and that if Congress had some additional money then the Army would gladly accept it. Throughout the testimony they stressed that the Army has to balance spending on people, readiness, and modernization – and that hard choices were made.

Enduring Programs. The Army leaders stressed that some ‘legacy’ programs and equipment did not receive prioritization due to replacements that would soon come on line and the recognition that money spent on this older equipment is best spent on ‘enduring’ programs and modernization. They pointed out that funding for some ‘enduring’ programs like the Abrams tank, UH-60 Blackhawk, and AH-64 Apache remains in place.

Multi-Domain Task Force. The Army is establishing three task forces for future conflicts. One will be regionally aligned to Europe and two aligned to the Indo-Pacific. Representative Strickland (WA) asked the Secretary to consider basing an additional Multi-Domain Task Force in Washington State – providing reasons why that would be good for the Army. The Secretary diplomatically said that will be considered and the decision will be based on what is good for the Army and national defense.

Social Issues. The topics of diversity, racism, extremism, suicide, and sexual assault and harassment were repeatedly raised. The answers by McConville were consistent – to begin at the foundational level to build a cohesive team where everyone respects one another. He stated that many of the problems are found among junior soldiers in the 18 to early 20s age range. He believes that the command culture needs some work to ensure units and unit leaders are taking care of people. The Secretary mentioned that the Army’s SHARP program is being revitalized and updated and that the command selection process will take into account past command climate performance.

Questions on Specific Programs and Issues. Some representatives spent their time asking about very specific items such as long-range precision fires, integrated air defense systems, ‘crushing’ optempo, deterrence in the Baltics, sensor to shooter systems, Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs), combat aviation, Global Defender Exercise, domestic missions and the national guard, reduction of CTC rotations from 24 to 17, and others. Probably one of the best few minutes of the testimony were the questions (gender neutral physical training testing, emphasis on Air Force and Navy in Indo-Pacific, restructuring of the National Guard based on population, and is the budget for the Army large enough) asked by Representative Mike Waltz.

SOF. Representative Murphy (FL), a member of the House Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations, asked how the Army’s special operations forces (ARSOF) are adapting to and improving training for the refocus from CT/COIN to GPC. The Secretary response stressed that the shift from CT/COIN to GPC has been ongoing and continues. She said that ARSOF is still needed in a GPC environment and that training scenarios are changing to incorporate the changes outlined in the Irregular Warfare Annex to the National Defense Strategy. General McConville stated that SOF has done an incredible job the past 20 years. He stated that CT/COIN is not going away, however he said SOF is very agile and can perform both the CT/COIN missions as well as the future fight with near-peer adversaries. McConville stated that SOF is uniquely suited to working with allies and partners in the combatant regions they are aligned to – and that SOF will continue to help partners build their CT capability. The Secretary briefly discussed the ‘resistance capability‘ that US Special Forces can enhance in the Baltic nations.

The Secretary and Chief of Staff answered almost all of the questions posed to them – sometimes with the same answer: force modernization has taken priority over many of the other important programs of the Army due to the need to meet the competition posed by Russia and China. There were a few occasions when the Secretary or Chief did not have a satisfactory answer and they promised to get back to the committee member posing the question. Overall the hearing was cordial and lacked some of the drama associated with some other Senate and House hearings on defense issues that took place earlier in the week.

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Video: The entire testimony can be viewed at the link below:
U.S. Army 2022 Budget Hearing

References:

The Army’s Modernization Strategy: Congressional Oversight Considerations, CRS-R46216, February 7, 2020.
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46216

Photo: General James McConville. Testifying before the House Armed Services Committee on June 25, 2021.

The U.S. Army has announced the new Army Arctic strategy. On March 16, 2021 it released a document entitled Regaining Arctic Dominance. The strategy outlines how the Army will generate, train, organize, and equip its forces to secure U.S. national interests and maintain regional stability. The Arctic region is gaining a lot of attention from several nations – to include Russia and China.

The Arctic is an important region that contains natural resources, key shipping lanes, is key to protecting the homeland, and is a platform for projecting global power. The region encompasses activities to include resource extraction, trade, shipping, scientific operations and expeditions, and national defense.

The Army needs to be able to project forces into the Arctic region so it can respond in competition, crisis, and / or conflict situations. The region is vast and is an area where air and naval travel is critical because of the harsh environment and logistical challenges.

The Arctic Region. There are eight nations that border on the Arctic region. These are the United States (Alaska), Canada, Russia, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Denmark (Greenland). The United States has strong defense relationships with six of the seven other Arctic nations. The diminishment of the Arctic sea ice has prompted many of these nations to take a renewed interest in the Arctic – especially with the increased human activity that the melting ice cap has allowed. With climate change access to rich natural resources has improved – especially for oil deposits, rare earth minerals, and fishing grounds. The two seasonal waterways, the Northern Sea Route and Northwest Passage, are experiencing increased navigation due to the receding polar ice pack. This is also raising the possibility of future sovereignty and shipping disputes among the countries bordering the Arctic Ocean.

Competition in the Arctic. In this era of great power competition the U.S. is being confronted by both Russia and China in many areas of the world – and this includes the Arctic region. The recent activities of Russia and China in the past several years in the Arctic have been increasingly concerning. Both nations are seeking to use military, diplomatic, and economic power to gain greater access to the region – at the expense of United States interests. A troubling concern is the effort by both nations to announce ever-increasing claims on northern territories and waterways. Equally troubling is the apparent attempts by both Russia and China to de-legitimize the sovereignty of territories and dis-establishing the ‘rules-based order’ currently in place.

Key Waterways. There have always been shipping lanes used for military and commercial vessels in this region. With climate change, the sea lanes in the Arctic are becoming open for longer periods of time and new sea lanes are becoming available. The waterways of the Arctic are important from an economic standpoint. China can significantly reduce travel time for shipping by using the Arctic instead of transiting the Pacific, Indian Ocean, and Suez Canal. From a military standpoint the United States and Russia can move naval ships between two primary theaters of engagement – the Indo-Pacific and Europe. This northern waterway route is becoming more important as an avenue for great power competition and aggression.

Russia. Russia is re-establishing some of its military capabilities and increasing its exploration for natural resources. It has increased its military presence to include conducting military exercises and establishing new military bases. It recently conducted a series of parachute jumps in the region with its special operations forces. Many national security observers believe that Russia maintains the largest military presence above the Arctic Circle. Russia has increased its attempts to constrain freedom of navigation (maritime traffic) and overflights of aircraft in violation of international law.

China. China is increasing its presence to ensure that it has access to key shipping lanes and natural resources. The use of the ‘northern shipping route’ ties into its ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative. It also is attempting to inject itself into the ‘governing’ of the Arctic region; upsetting the current regime of ‘rules’ that currently govern the Arctic region. China is advancing its claim to the Arctic with the notion that it is a “Near Arctic State”. It currently is a member of the Arctic Council Observers States along with twelve other non-Arctic states. The Arctic Council, created in 1996, is the leading international forum for addressing issues relating to the Arctic. China has conducted a range of economic and research activities that are likely tied to strengthening the country’s military capabilities in the Arctic Ocean and region in the future. It is currently embarked on an effort to design and build a nuclear-powered science icebreaker.

Photo: Radar system at Thule Air Base, Greenland, one of several that scan the skies for foreign military rockets, missiles, and aircraft. Photo by JoAnne Castagna, U.S. Army.

Strategy Objectives. The Army has developed some objectives and plans that will allow it to ‘regain’ Arctic dominance:

• Establish a two-star headquarters with specifically trained and equipped combat brigades
• Improve material readiness of Arctic-capable units
• Improve individual and collective training in mountainous and high-altitude environments
• Improve quality of life for Soldiers, civilians, and families living and working in the Arctic region

In this new era of great power competition the United States has to be able to project power into the Arctic region. This power projection by the Air Force, Navy, and Armor will ensure that Russia and China do not interfere with navigation, sovereignty rights, or the ability of the US to defend the homeland or project power from the Arctic region. The US Army has an important role to play in this region. The Army’s new Arctic strategy will allow it to regain its ability to protect US interests in the region.

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Photo: High Altitude Lowe Opening (HALO) parachute jump during winter warfare training in Sweden, February 2018. Photo by Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR).

Maps. Central Intelligence Agency.

References:

“Army Announces release of Arctic Strategy”, U.S. Army Pubic Affairs, March 16, 2021

Regaining Arctic Dominance: The U.S. Army in the Arctic
Headquarters, Department of the Army, January 19, 2021, PDF, 54 pages.

Report to Congress: Department of Defense Arctic Strategy, Department of Defense, June 2019, PDF, 19 pages.

Arctic Strategy, Department of the Air Force, July 2020, PDF, 20 pages.

Arctic Strategic Outlook, United States Coast Guard, April 2019, PDF, 48 pages.

Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, CRS R41153, February 2021, PDF, 140 Pages.

The Department of Defense has been on top of the coronavirus pandemic from the start. Sure there were some missteps – and in some cases overreaction and late responses. Although training and operations were significantly affected – the military was always ready to perform its mission. Things will slowly return to almost normal as the herd immunity becomes a reality due to past infections and vaccinations among the US population – and the military force.

The United States military response to coronavirus has taken place in a variety of ways and at many levels. It has adapted to conducting training and operations in the coronavirus environment in 2020 and now in the early stages of 2021. The military has taken measures to limit the spread of the virus within the ranks of military personnel and also assisted the nation in preventing the spread of the virus.

COVID-19 Update

The Data. For much of last year the US had a disproportionate number of worldwide reported COVID cases (25%) and deaths (20%) given the US percentage of the world’s population (4.5%). The United States still leads the world in COVID related deaths – at 535,000 as of mid-March 2021. Over the summer of 2020 the US was struggling more than any other country to contain COVID. Of course, data is always suspect – and the US failed to adequately track data about the coronavirus crisis in the first part of 2020.

US Population. The US population as a whole has experienced a huge number of cases, hospitalizations, and deaths. January 2021 saw a record high of hospitalizations due to the virus. Over the past year parts of the country suffered from maxed out Intensive Care Units (ICU) and a shortage of ICU hospital beds. Specialized equipment such as protective masks and ventilators were in short supply and high demand. Many hospitals were in crisis mode for long periods of time. Medical staffs serving in hospital emergency rooms and ICUs are experiencing ‘burn out’ from the medical crisis.

US Military. Due to stringent safety measures (wearing a mask, physical distancing, health precautions, working environment adaptations, etc.) the military is faring well when compared to the civilian population. As of March 16, 2021 only 24 members of the U.S. military have died due to COVID-19; while about 8% of military personnel have contracted COVID since the start of the pandemic. These numbers include active and reserve components personnel. The veteran community has been hit hard by the virus. Veterans Affairs patients experienced 150,000 infections with more than 6,500 deaths. Most of these veteran cases and deaths took place in the last few months of 2020. Several VA facilities and ‘Soldier’s Homes‘ have experienced a high rate of deaths.

Fact vs Fiction. It is difficult sometimes to pinpoint exactly what is the right thing to do as an individual or organization based on the public guidance provided by medical and government officials at the local, regional and national level. The guidance over the past year has been ever-changing and contradictory. In addition, disinformation by foreign nations (China, Russia, and others) as well as conspiracy theories advanced by some news media outlets contribute to the muddled picture of the virus. And, of course, the political parties took full advantage of the pandemic, sometimes distorting the facts, to advance their agendas – further clouding the picture.

Photo: Navy Lt. Kathryn Hrezo, a critical care nurse assigned to the Rural Rapid Response Team, checks a patient’s blood sugar level while working in the COVID-19 ward at the Northern Navajo Medical Center, Shiprock, N.M., Dec. 31, 2020. Throughout 2020 members of the military have augmented medical personnel in civilian medical facilities to deal with the burden of COVID patients. Photo by Spc. Ashunteia Smith.

How COVID-19 Has Affected the Military

The military’s death rate from coronavirus is extremely low when compared to the U.S. population in general. This is to be expected given that the military population is comprised of younger, healthier, less obese, and more physically fit personnel. Those members of the military who have been affected have seemingly recovered quite well compared to some people in the civilian population who have suffered long-term effects (long-haulers). Many military training activities and exercises in the United States and overseas were cancelled or scaled back. Military schools (Basic, Advanced Individual Training, and other training) were temporarily closed. With the surge of coronavirus across the nation military recruiters have been experiencing a high exposure and infection rate. At times the virus has forced the military to take drastic action – such as the emergency port call in Guam of the aircraft carrier Theodore Roosevelt in the spring of 2020 when a quarter of the 5,000 sailors onboard tested positive.

Adapting to COVID-19. The military has taken a number of measures to mitigate the threat of the coronavirus to its military personnel as well as to the conduct of operations and training. Some were very simple measures while others involved some significant changes to how the military conducted operations.

Mandatory mask use, stringent quarantine measures, regular and rapid testing, physical distancing, and other procedures have helped the military adapt to a COVID-19 environment. The Defense Department continually provides information and resources on a variety of coronavirus-related subjects for members of the DOD community.

Photo: Soldiers assigned to Group Support Battalion, 20th Special Forces Group (Airborne) assist with COVID-19 response efforts making personal protective face masks in Birmingham, Alabama. The GSB Riggers shifted their focus from parachute operations to full production of personal protective equipment in support of COVID-19 response. The masks were distributed to the Joint Forces Headquarters in Montgomery, Alabama to be disseminated to disinfection and medical teams across the state working on COVID-19 response missions. (U.S Army photo by Sgt. 1st Class Brian Cox, May 1, 2020)

Preventive and Mitigation Measures

The Department of Defense took immediate measures in response to the coronavirus. It adopted the Center for Disease Control (CDC) recommendations of washing hands, cleaning surfaces, and wearing a mask.

Face Mask Production. One of the first things the Department of Defense did was to put parachute riggers to work making face masks. Riggers supporting special operations units made protective masks for their unit’s personnel as well as for other units and local hospitals.

Army’s Official ‘Combat’ Face Mask. One of the Army’s latest uniform additions is the Combat Cloth Face Covering or CCFC. It only took almost a year to roll out the ‘official’ face mask for combat troops – just about the same amount of time to develop a vaccine for COVID-19. This ‘new’ face mask was rolled out in December 2020.

Swabbing and Testing. One of the simplest mitigation measures is testing for infection. Nasal swabbing has proven to provide some indication of the presence of the infection – although the accuracy of some of the tests is not always reliable.

Photo: Dr. John S. Baxter, director of the Pentagon Flight Medicine Clinic, conducts COVID-19 testing. Image taken by Lisa Ferdinando, DOD, March 14, 2021.

New Ways of Doing Business

Changing Work Routines. Many military units, where possible, instituted policies where military personnel, DoD civilians, and contractors could work fully or partially from their home. In many cases internet, email policies, and work-place activities had to be re-designed to adapt to this new work environment. By June 2020, more than a million DOD personnel were teleworking due to the pandemic.

Physical Fitness. Until the pandemic most military organizations held organized group physical fitness activities on a daily basis. COVID-19 has provided its fair share of challenges for maintaining physical fitness for military personnel and group physical fitness training has adapted. A video, entitled New Normal – Staying Fit, shows how the 26th Special Tactics Squadron has adapted to changes and kept fitness a top priority. 27th Special Operations Wing Public Affairs, Cannon Air Force Base, NM, September 29, 2020.

Virtual World. Initially many conferences, events, schools, and exercises were cancelled or significantly scaled back. A lot of meetings, were local or requiring travel, were conducted virtually using VTC formats or Zoom sessions. For instance, the Special Operations Command Africa conducted its annual Silent Warrior Conference online this year.

Overseas Locations. Many parts of the world where US service members are based have experienced low rates of coronavirus (Japan, South Korea, and others locations). This has been a boon for the US military operating in these regions; although safe health practices are certainly adhered to.

Remote Advise and Assist (RAA) and COVID. The pandemic has caused SOF, SFAB, and other military advisors working in conflict zones to refine how they conduct advisory mission. In person advising has yielded to other means of communication – such as phone, email, video conferences. One of the long-term effects of this RAA environment is how it will change how SOF military advisors will do their job in the future. “Global Special Operations: Advising and Mentoring in the Zoom Era”, Clearance Jobs, December 8, 2020.

Travel Restrictions. The Department of Defense came out with some early directives that drastically curtailed travel in the conduct of operations and training. These restrictions were in effect for the 48 states as well as host countries (Germany, Japan, South Korea, and the UK). This guidance has been refined periodically as the rate of COVID-19 has increased or subsided. In mid-summer 2020 the US military lifted some travel restrictions and saw coronavirus cases surge. The latest guidance (March 15, 2021) can be found in this 5 page PDF.

Quarantine. Personnel and units traveling to or returning home from an overseas tour or exercise were usually put into mandatory quarantine. For instance, a unit redeploying after a nine-month tour in Afghanistan would find itself quarantined for two weeks prior to reuniting with families and resuming its normal activities. A unit heading overseas for a major training exercise could find it is spending two-weeks in the host country under quarantine prior to participating in the exercise. Individuals who are infected are instructed to shelter-in-place (homes).

Photo: Army Spc. Alexis Ruth, a health care specialist assigned to the Maryland Army National Guard Medical Detachment, prepares to administer a vaccine, Jan. 30, 2021, at the Veterans Affairs Medical Center in Baltimore, Md.

Assistance to the Nation

The Department of Defense is assisting the nation in arresting the spread of COVID-19. Active duty and reserve component units and service members responded to the pandemic in 2020 -helping out communities and medical facilities. Two U.S. Navy hospital ships were deployed to New York and California to assist in the surge of COVID cases. Army field hospitals were set up to take on overflow patients from highly impacted hospitals. Ventilators were provided to hospitals running short. The Michigan National Guard deployed 1,000 members of Task Force 46 to as many as 15 states across the nation. There are a host of programs and projects that the Defense Department is engaged in to assist with confronting the pandemic. One of these is developing an advanced method of manufacturing N95 respirators for frontline health workers. Just a few of the many efforts on the part of the Department of Defense to assist are mentioned below.

Assistance to Hospitals. In the spring of 2020 the DoD mobilized individuals and units to assist in providing patient care to COVID-19 patients. National Guard units from every state assisted in nursing homes, testing sites, hospitals, and morgues. This assistance continues into 2021 with doctors, nurses, medical technicians, and support personnel working with communities across the country to cope with ‘surge’ cases.

Vaccination Teams. Currently DOD vaccination teams are assisting local communities across the nation – many co-located with Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) vaccination centers. The DOD teams come from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines. Each team includes medical and support personnel – 15 for command and control, 80 for vaccination administration, 15 RNs, 57 clinical staff, and 55 general purpose personnel. In the past month over 500,000 shots in arms were made by these DOD vaccination teams.

Operation Warp Speed. The DOD played a major role in the effort to accelerate the development, testing, production, supply, and distribution of COVID-19 vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics. Operation Warp Speed was instituted in May 2020 with the intent to deliver 300 million doses of safe and effective vaccines available by January 2021. The goal had not been reached. In a DoD statement (Jan 12, 2021) it was revealed that 25 million doses of the Moderna and Pfizer-BioNTech vaccines had been sent to 16,000 locations throughout the US. However, by early 2021 the pace of deliveries had picked up. In addition, the DoD is involved in the purchase and distribution of Regeneron’s therapeutic treatment to use for non-hospitalized, high-risk COVID-19 patients.

Photo: The 48th Fighter Wing received its first shipment of COVID-19 vaccines at Royal Air Force Lakenheath, England on December 27, 2020. Photo by USAF.

Vaccine

Tremendous progress was made in the development of a vaccine for the COVID-19 virus. The vaccines developed and produced by Pfizer-BioNTech, Moderna, and other firms are being distributed across the country.

Vaccination Roll-out – US and EU, a Comparison. The US vaccine rollout – although far from perfect – is much better than that being experienced by countries in the European Union (EU). As of March 2021 about 21% of the US population have received their first shots while only 7% of EU’s population have had their first shot. Three factors play into the EU falling behind in vaccinations – which have a lot to do with the current resurgence of coronavirus (3rd wave) in Europe. The EU had too much bureaucracy involved in making vaccination policy decisions, it was penny-wise and pound-foolish (holding out for a lower price per vaccination and losing out in the initial distribution), and the fact that Europe is the world’s epicenter of vaccine skepticism.

Vaccinations for Military Personnel. The DOD has its vaccine distribution plan and has established a priority system for who gets the vaccine. The DOD maintains a website with information about the COVID-19 vaccine. Early on some units were given a priority designation for vaccines – special operations, air crews, and others. Forward deployed units and bases overseas began receiving the vaccine in late December 2020. The vaccination of military personnel is not mandatory at the moment. Many members of the military are balking at getting poked in the arm citing concerns about the long-term effects. Military leaders have indicated that in some instances roughly a third of service members have declined the vaccines when it was offered. DOD is conducting an outreach program to dispel some of the myths association with the vaccine.

MHS GENESIS. The Defense Department has established an electronic health record system that provides a digital record of COVID-19 vaccinations administered to service members and their families. Referred to as “MassVax”, the digital archive will track and ensure that the DOD’s patient population has received COVID-19 vaccinations. MassVax will track who has received the vaccine as well as when and where it was given. The system pre-populates registration data directly from a patient’s electronic health record (EHR). This saves time with registration for shots and also will alert medical health care workers of potential risks with each patient – such as drug interactions or allergies.

Distorting Facts About Vaccines. China and Russia have been busy promoting the vaccines that they have developed and are now marketing to other countries. At the same time they are spreading disinformation around the world about the effectiveness of vaccines developed by the United States and other nations. This distortion of facts is being spread by some segments of the U.S media and is contributing to a reluctance to getting the vaccine. Read more about Chinese and Russian influence campaigns risk undermining Covid-19 vaccination programs.

Adverse Effects of Vaccines? Overall, most medical professionals are finding that there are very few links found between vaccinations and deaths. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) provides information on reports of adverse events after a COVID-19 vaccination on its website.

Photo: (Former) Acting Secretary of Defense Chris Miller receives a COVID vaccination in January 2021.

Assisting with Patient Care

DOD medical facilities are providing medical care for those infected with COVID-19. Most people receive outpatient medical care but some with severe cases require hospitalization. Some DOD medical centers are offering the infusion of investigational antibody medications that have been authorized under a Food and Drug Administration emergency use directive.

STORM CHASER. The military is taking part in or conducting a number of research projects associated with COVID-19. One of these is the STORM CHASER study by the Uniformed Services University’s Infectious Disease Clinical Research Program. This particular program seeks to find out if COVID-19 could be prevented in those who have recently been exposed to the SARS-CoV-2 infection by administering an intramuscular monoclonal antibody within eight days of exposure and not yet symptomatic.

Outpatient Care. Some military hospitals have established new procedures for out patient care of COVID patients. One is the COVID-19 Remote Monitoring Program – a joint effort of the Virtual Medical Center and Brooke Army Medical Center in San Antonio, Texas. If a patient qualifies for enrollment in the program they are equipped with the FDA-approved home monitoring kit that contains a tablet, a network hub, arm band monitor, blood pressure cuff, temperature patch, and spirometer.

Conclusion

The United States military has and continues to successfully manage its way through the coronavirus threat. The number of deaths among military members is minimal and operations and training – although drastically reduced – are being conducted to ensure the nation is ready for any contingency. The pace of operations in overseas conflict zones was reduced – with training and advisory activities seeing drastic changes in frequency and effectiveness. The level of activity overseas has now picked up and will likely be back to almost normal over the next several months. An aggressive approach to confront coronavirus by the DoD resulted in the military successfully getting through one of the worst health scares the nation has experienced in a long time.

Top Photo: May Oliva, a clinical nurse assigned to Naval Medical Center San Diego, administers a nasopharyngeal swab to test a patient for the coronavirus. Photo by Navy Petty Officer 3rd Class Jacab Greenberg, Dec 17, 2020.

References

“Coronavirus: DOD Response”, U.S. Department of Defense.
https://www.defense.gov/Explore/Spotlight/Coronavirus/

The last several years the term Irregular Warfare (IW) has gained increased prominence within the national defense community. It has become a buzzword meaning different things to a variety of people and organizations. Irregular warfare consists of unconventional warfare (UW), counterinsurgency (COIN), counterterrorism (CT), foreign internal defense (FID), and stability operations (SO).

The U.S. recently published the Irregular Warfare Annex to the National Defense Strategy – which clarifies the role of IW within the Department of Defense and other government organizations. Since the IW annex has been published (Nov 2020) national security commentators have provided their perspective on what it means for the US defense establishment. Some of their more recent articles are provided below – with a brief synopsis of the article and link to the author’s article or publication.

Reimagining IW. A career Department of Defense civilian serving in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD SO/LIC), Kevin Bilms, expresses his views on how “Irregular Warfare” needs a new market strategy that will eliminate some misconceptions and assist others in recognizing IW’s potential value in great power competition. Read “What’s in a Name? Reimagining Irregular Warfare Activities for Competition”, War on the Rocks, January 15, 2021.

From CT to IW? Jason Criss Howk notes that the U.S. is moving from a narrow focus on counterterrorism (CT) to a broader focus on irregular warfare (IW). He says that the shift to a larger view of IW and all the tools in the government tool box is also part of a natural evolution of how CT is conducted. “From Counterterrorism to Irregular Warfare: What Does That Mean?”, Clearance Jobs, January 15, 2021.

Critical Thinking in the Military. Steve Ferenzi, a strategic planning officer at the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), shares his thoughts about red teaming and critical thinking in the military. He argues that “traditional American military culture diametrically opposes divergent thought.” For the US military to lead through influence and tools short of armed conflict it needs a tectonic cultural shift to harness the power of divergent thought. Read his article “The Death of Critical Thinking in the Military? Here’s How to Fix It”, Real Clear Defense, January 14, 2021.

IW and a Pentagon Bureaucracy Change. The introduction of great power competition has brought back (for some) the importance of irregular warfare (IW). The Defense Department has placed more emphasis on IW as part of a broader effort to counter Russia and China. Despite the emphasis on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency over the past two decades the US still has an overwhelming conventional force advantage with its near-peer adversaries. For that reason, Russia and others are using political warfare and irregular warfare to advance their strategic interests. It is time for the US to step up its IW game as well. The Pentagon has recently turned the Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office into the Irregular Warfare Technical Support Directorate. Read “A small bureaucratic change at the Pentagon hints at a major shift for US special-operations units”, Business Insider, January 11, 2021.

Dave Maxwell on IW, UW, PW, and CT. A retired Special Forces officer provides his perspective on the way forward when confronting Russia and China (as well as Iran and North Korea) in this new era of great power competition. He believes that SOF needs to focus on CT as well as on irregular warfare, unconventional warfare, and support to political warfare. He advocates some new principles both to frame special operations and communicate how the force supports the national strategy. “The Two Special Operations Trinities”, Small Wars Journal, January 6, 2021.

IW in Competition. Kevin Bilms states that “Irregular Warfare” is not a perfect term, but it helps to understand strategic competition short of an all-out war. He proposes that IW “. . . represents one way the military can apply its power complementarily with diplomatic, economic, financial and other elements of government power to secure strategic outcomes.” Read more in “Better Understanding irregular warfare in competition”, Military Times, January 1, 2021.

CA and IW. Three Army officers collaborate in an article on the role that Civil Affairs can play in bridging planning gaps and seams between convention and special operations forces in an irregular warfare environment. See “Building a Bridge: Cultivating an Irregular Warfare Mindset in the 83rd Civil Affairs Battalion”, Eunomia Journal, The Civil Affairs Association, December 28, 2020.

Podcast – Breaking the Boom-Bust Cycle of Irregular Warfare. David Maxwell (retired SF) and Deak Roh (of the ASD SO/LIC office) examine the IW Annex to the National Defense Strategy of 2018 and its relevance in an era defined by great power competition. Modern War Institute at West Point, December 18, 2020, 45 minutes.

Embracing IW. David H. Ucko, a professor at the National Defense University, believes that the release of the IW annex to the National Defense Strategy is insufficient to influence the reform and change needed to bring IW to the forefront within DoD and the US government at large. “Nobody Puts IW in an Annex: It’s Time to Embrace Irregular Warfare as a Strategic Priority“, Modern War Institute at West Point, October 14, 2020.

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Photo: A U.S. Army Special Forces Soldier assigned to 20th Special Forces Group and a Lithuanian National Defence Volunteer Forces (KASP) member conduct mission planning during exercise Saber Junction 2018 at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany. The exercise provided the opportunity to conduct irregular warfare in enemy occupied territory. Photo by 1st Lt. Benjamin Haulenbeek, SOCEUR, Sep 16, 2018.

References:

Summary of the Irregular Warfare Annex to the National Defense Strategy, DoD, 2020
https://media.defense.gov/2020/Oct/02/2002510472/-1/-1/0/Irregular-Warfare-Annex-to-the-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.PDF

Summary of the National Defense Strategy, DoD, 2018
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf

Special Forces and Irregular Warfare (IW)
https://specialforcestraining.info/topics/irregular-warfare.htm

“Book Review – The American Way of Irregular War”, SOF News, August 4, 2020. In this book LTG (Ret) Charles Cleveland provides an interesting look at the past 40 years of history of U.S. special operations. He provides recommendations for the restructuring of the U.S. special operations community and its approach to irregular warfare.
http://www.sof.news/publications/american-way-irregular-warfare/

The Special Operations / Low Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) office within the Department of Defense provides civilian advocacy and oversight over the U.S. special operations community. However, there are some in the SOF community that feel the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) position should be upgraded to the Under Secretary level. They argue that SOF does not have sufficient civilian advocacy and oversight in the Department of Defense.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations / Low Intensity Conflict is the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense on special operations and low-intensity conflict matters. The ASD SO/LIC has a responsibility for policy and the overall administrative supervision of SOF activities. These core SOF tasks include counterterrorism (CT), unconventional warfare (UW), direct action (DA), special reconnaissance (SR), foreign internal defense (FID), civil affairs (CA), information operations (IO), psychological operations (PSYOP), and counterproliferation of WMD. But the reach of SO/LIC is more than just SOF – it is involved in humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, disaster relief, counternarcotics, and more.

The ASD SO/LIC was mandated by the National Defense Authorization Act (1987). The position was established in January 1988 by Defense Directive 5138.3. The ASD SO/LIC is assisted by three Deputy Assistant Secretaries of Defense:

• DASD, Special Operations and Combating Terrorism
• DASD, Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations
• DASD, Counternarcotics and Global Threats

Growth of SOF Force. Over the past 18 years, since 9/11 and the Global War on Terror began, USSOCOM has increased in size – from 40,000 to about 70,000. The SOF budget has grown significantly – by the billions. The SOF mission set has expanded with constant, persistent presence in many countries and engagement in many more. ASD SO/LIC has not seen a corresponding increase in structure or staffing – this is problematic for conducting the type of oversight needed.

Congressional Action. In recent years Congress has directed that the Department of Defense fill key billets, increase the staff, and consider processes that would give ASD SO/LIC direct access to the Secretary of Defense. The 2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) (Section 922) instructed DoD to implement some mandatory reforms – which would expand the role of ASD SO/LIC.

DoD Inaction. The Defense Department – one of the finest examples of a bureaucracy if ever there was one – has been slow to implement the ‘wishes’ of Congress to increase the ‘reach’ of ASD SOLIC. DoD has taken an incremental implementation approach to the requirements of section 922. There has been some resistance on the part of former USD(P)s to SO/LIC exercising more independence. SO/LIC is a significant portion of the overall manpower of OUSD(P).

Future Congressional Action? It is quite possible the Congress will once again decide to provide some pressure to DoD to address this issue. The solution that Congress comes up with may be more than the Department of Defense would want. Possible options include an Under Secretary position for SO/LIC, making ASD SO/LIC an independent ASD (similar to ASD for Public Affairs), or establishing USSOCOM as a separate service. Currently ASD SO/LIC reports to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

Why Have an Under Secretary for SO/LIC? The DoD is a huge bureaucracy that slowly grinds away with its daily routine. Hot button issues requiring timely responses concerning SOF do not always receive immediate action. The staffing process at the Pentagon is very slow both vertically and horizontally.

U.S. SOF operates in a fast paced world. This has been true over the past two decades in the counterterrorism fight and will continue in the near peer competition short of armed conflict. China and Russia will not confront us in general war; but rather using irregular warfare (IW). More often than not SOF is the appropriate force to meet these hybrid threats.

Resource allocation is an ongoing battle for the different services and programs. SOF needs a seat at the table where the big decisions are made. The hierarchy of the Pentagon has a lot to do with the division of resources. The higher the head of SO/LIC is within the hierarchy the better SOCOM and SOF equities are represented.

And USSOCOM? Former ASD SO/LIC (see “A Seat at the Table” podcast below) and some members of Congress are in favor of strengthening the SO/LIC staff. However, USSOCOM may not be in strong agreement. The commander of SOCOM currently has direct access to the Secretary of Defense – as he should. USSOCOM probably is not too keen to have to answer to or take direction from SO/LIC. The command is probably quite happy with the current level of ‘advocacy’ help they receive from SO/LIC. One challenge is that SOCOM maintains its own Special Operations Legislative Affairs office that directly engages with Congress – bypassing SO/LIC. SOCOMs own network of connective tissue is an impediment to SO/LIC fulfilling the role of a “service like” secretary.

It will be interesting to see where this issue goes in the months or years ahead. Some informative reading (and listening) is provided below under “References” for those who want to learn more.

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References:

“A Seat at the Table”, SOFspot, Global SOF Foundation, March 9, 2020. A panel discussion about upgrading the position of ASD SO/LIC. Panel members include three former ASD SO/LICs – Michael Lumpkin, Brian Sheridan, and Mark Mitchell. A 38 minute long podcast.
http://www.sofspot.org/204030/2964385-a-seat-at-the-table

“Special Obfuscations: The Strategic Uses of Special Operations Forces”, article by Alice Hunt Friend and Shannon Culbertson, Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), March 6, 2020. This article highlights the importance of an effective SO/LIC in the context of balancing CT/COIN and strategic competition.

“America’s Special Operators Will Be Adrift Without Better Civilian Oversight”, article by Mark Mitchell, Zachary Griffiths, and Cole Liveiratos, War on the Rocks, February 18, 2020.

“America’s avengers deserve an advocate”, The Hill, November 5, 2019. Authors Meaghan Keeler-Pettigrew (Global SOF Foundation), James R. Locher III (former ASD SO/LIC), and Thomas Trask (Lt Gen Ret and former Vice Cdr USSOCOM) argue that SOF does not have sufficient civilian oversight and advocacy in the Department of Defense.

Special Operations Forces: Additional Actions Are Needed to Effectively Expand Management Oversight, U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), May 2019, 37 pages.
https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/699051.pdf

“A View from the CT Foxhole: Mark Mitchell”, CTC Sentinel, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, December 2018. Mark Mitchell, the Principle Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations / Low Intensity Conflict is interviewed about SO/LIC and the role of SOF in the counterterrorism fight.

“Senate votes to boost civilian oversight of special ops, reinforcing earlier mandate”, Federal News Network, June 19, 2018. This article provides some detailed information on the measures the Congress expected DoD to take to beef up the staff of SO/LIC.

Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict Legislation: Why Was it Passed and Have the Voids Been Filled?, by Colonel William G. Boykin, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, April 1991, 71 pages.
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a235154.pdf

President Trump announced on Saturday, December 8, 2018 that General Mark Milley will be the next Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Milley will replace General Joe Dunford at some point in the fall of 2019. 

General Milley has been the Army chief of staff since August 2015. During his long career he has had deployments to many different regions of the world. This includes Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Columbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Panama, Egypt, and Haiti. He is extremely familiar with counterinsurgency operations but is also well-versed in how to conduct ‘the big fight’, having served in leadership positions in eight divisions.

One of his earliest assignments was in the 5th Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg, North Carolina when he served as a commander of a Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha (SFODA). He served on a Special Forces Combat Dive team. For some of that time he was the OIC of  the Special Operations Training (SOT) Course at Mott Lake (FBNC). 

Milley has deployed to Afghanistan three times. His most recent tour there was in the 2012 time frame. By all accounts he did a good job in overseeing the transition from partnering to security force assistance and helping the Afghan security forces to take the lead in combat operations. This was accomplished at the same time that he and his staff were closing down hundreds of U.S. bases and combat outposts, shipping whole units back to the states as part of the downsizing of U.S. forces, and retrograding tons and tons of vehicles, supplies, and equipment from Afghanistan.

He has pushed through a number of initiatives and projects while head of the Army. These include the establishment of the Security Force Assistance Brigades, adoption of a new combat fitness test, and the development of a more lethal combat force.

Milley took some heat over the SFAB decision. There are many high-ranking Army officers who discount the need for a professional and permanent advisory corps within the Army. However, Milley, when he was commander (as a LTG) of ISAF Joint Command (IJC) saw first hand the work of the SFABs and SFAATs that were formed ad hoc and put into the field as advisors to the Afghan security forces. He drew from this experience the need for a number of units that could deploy using personnel who were carefully selected and trained for the advisor mission.

In addition, the rollout of the 1st SFAB also put Milley on the hot seat with Special Forces community. The Army did a poor job of ‘prepping’ the battlefield for the introduction of the SFAB when it came to the Special Forces community. While the senior leadership of the Special Forces community saw the need for SFABs and welcomed the concept; the rank and file of SF saw it as a competing force that would steal the “foreign internal defense’ or FID mission from SF. In addition, there was the impression that the SFABs were going to appropriate the culture and identity of SF. A couple of months of damage control mitigated the initial public relations fiasco.

The chairman of the JCS oversees military operations around the world. He serves as the chief advisor on military matters to the president. Milley is going to be instrumental in the implementation of the latest change in the National Security Strategy that will shift the U.S. military from its fight against terrorist and insurgent groups to a possible future fight against ‘near peer’ competition (Russia, China, etc.).

Milley is thought to be a bit more outspoken than the current chairman – General Dunford. So it will be interesting to see just how long he can bite his tongue when it comes to dealing with a very problematic President. General Dunford and SECDEF Mattis have been very restrained and ‘diplomatic’ when it comes to Trump. Can Milley be as restrained?

General Milley’s early life was spent in Massachusetts where he attended prep school. His home town was Winchester, Ma. He attended Princeton, graduating in 1980. He would later receive a Master’s Degree from Columbia University (International Relations), a Master’s Degree for the U.S. Naval War College (National Security and Strategic Studies). In addition, he is a graduate of the MIT Seminar XXI National Security Studies Program.

If confirmed he would be the second “Bostonian” in a row as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff – following the ardent Red Sox fan – General Joe Dunford. One unknown is which team he favors more – the Red Sox or the Patriots.

References:

General Mark Milley, biography, Department of Defense.