Colonel (Ret) Roger H.C. Donlon passed away on Thursday, January 25, 2024, at the age of 89. He first enlisted in the Air Force and then served in the Army. Much of his military service was with Special Forces. During the Vietnam War he deployed with an A-team of the 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne); during which he was awarded the Medal of Honor.

Donlon graduated from high school in 1952 and enlisted in the U.S. military. He attended the U.S. Military Academy Preparatory School and qualified in 1955 to attend the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. However, after attending West Point for two years he left to earn his commission through the Officer Candidate School (OCS) in 1959. In 1963 he joined Special Forces. He served for more than 30 years as an Infantry, Special Forces, and Foreign Area Specialist.

On July 6, 1964, his Special Forces detachment (A-726) was attacked by a force of an estimated 900 enemy troops in the early morning hours. The SF team, along with 60 Chinese Nungs and a few hundred South Vietnamese irregulars, defended Camp Nam Dong, South Vietnam. The camp was near the border of Laos. During the battle Captain Donlon repeatedly exposed himself to heavy enemy fire – defending against the enemy, moving ammunition and weaponry, aiding the wounded, and rallying his men. He was wounded several times during the fight.

For his actions that day he was awarded the Medal of Honor. His was the first MoH award for the Vietnam War. On April 10, 2008, he was inducted (swcs.mil, PDF) into the Special Forces Regiment as a Distinguished Member.

In addition to the Medal of Honor, he was awarded the Legion of Merit, the Bronze Star Medal, Purple Heart, Vietnam Cross of Gallantry, CIB, and the Parachutist Badge. He attended the Special Warfare Course, Command and General Staff College, and the Army War College.

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References:

Congressional Medal of Honor Society
Press Release, January 25, 2024

Congressional Medal of Honor Society – Roger H.C. Donlon
https://www.cmohs.org/recipients/roger-h-donlon

Roger Dolan – National Medal of Honor Museum
https://mohmuseum.org/medal_of_honor/roger-donlon/

CPT Roger H. C. Donlon -ARSOF History
https://arsof-history.org/medal_of_honor/recipient_donlon.html

Special Forces Taps
Obituary

Roger Donlon – Wikipedia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roger_Donlon

Battle of Nam Dong – Wikipedia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Nam_Dong

“Outnumbered Green Berets Defend Camp Nam Dong”, Military Heritage, Volume 22, No. 3, Fall 2020. https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/article/outnumbered-green-berets-defend-camp-nam-dong/

By Erin Thompson.

On 23 January 1951, Col. John H. McGee and Maj. William A. Burke of the Eighth Army (EUSA) G-3 submitted a report to the United Nations Far East Command (FEC) recommending the use of North Korean anti-communist guerrillas for intelligence gathering and sabotage missions behind the 38th parallel. This report led to the formation of the United Nations Partisan Forces Korea (UNPFK).

The Army’s early forays into organized special warfare came about over a need to perform reconnaissance and sabotage operations behind the 38th parallel. The Army encountered the North Korean partisans during the retreat from the Chinese Communist Force (CCF) invasion in late 1950. Many of these guerrillas had moved to the hillsides to escape being drafted into the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) in the late 1940s. They quickly gained sympathizers among the villages, raided NKPA encampments, stole Soviet and Chinese weapons, arranged for the spreading of propaganda, and actively recruited from the nearby villages.

Colonel (later Brig. Gen.) McGee was a veteran of World War II, where he served with the 45th Infantry Scouts training indigenous troops on Mindanao, Philippines. After two years as a prisoner of war in Japan, McGee escaped a prison transport ship in 1944 and became involved with and eventually commanded a unit of Filipino guerrillas. At the start of the Korean conflict, he was working under EUSA G-3. Since gathering intelligence behind the 38th parallel often required the resources and personnel of the G-3, Colonel McGee’s involvement with unconventional and covert warfare consistently found him performing tasks under the umbrella of both G-2 and G-3 control. From his previous experience working with guerrillas, McGee believed the partisans could secure valuable intelligence behind enemy lines.

In early January 1951, FEC permitted McGee to establish the partisans as an organized force under Eighth Army command. Operating under EUSA G-3, Miscellaneous Division, the “Attrition Section,” as it became known, initially employed only one officer: McGee. He was joined a week later by FEC G-3 Executive Officer Maj. William A. Burke. Burke took McGee’s early plans for guerrilla operations and began refining them into a formal report for the Attrition Section under a mixed EUSA/FEC coordination. On 23 January 1951, Major Burke submitted Plan ABLE to Eighth Army command, recommending the use of partisans in performing intelligence and sabotage missions. This plan, known later as Operational Plan One, became the basis for the organization of all UNPFK activities during the Korean War.

Plan ABLE called for guerrillas to be trained in areas of intelligence gathering, communications, demolitions, and basic infantry tactics. It outlined the organization of partisan units and command structure and outlined west coast areas of operations. East coast and potential airborne operations were expected to begin in March. [See “This Week in MI History” #177 15 March 1951] Above all, Plan ABLE anticipated the partisans would be useful for the UN’s planned counteroffensive in mid-1951 to push CCF and NKPA troops north of the 38th parallel and called for recruitment of more guerrillas to assist with the operation.

The efforts of UNPFK were consistently hampered by command structures, as commanders like McGee were placed under Army G-3 while operational control remained under FEC G-2. Staff elements would consistently be moved and reorganized throughout the remainder of the war. Despite this, partisans showed proven successes in their ability to infiltrate enemy encampments, disrupt enemy communications, collect maps and documents for EUSA and FEC intelligence, and perform sabotage missions against NKPA bridges, tunnels, and bases.

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This story, “Guerrillas Recommended for Intelligence & Sabotage Work (23 Jan 1951)“, by Erin Thompson of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence was originally published by the Defense Visual Information Distribution Service on January 19, 2024. DVIDS content is in the public domain.

Photo: UNPFK Guerrillas with AN/GRC-9. (DVIDS)

Dec 7th – On this day in 1941 Japanese naval forces launched a carrier-based air attack against U.S. Navy and Army installations, ships, and aircraft based on or near Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The surprise attack resulted in numerous ships sunk or damaged and over 2,400 deaths of military members and U.S. citizens.

Prelude to the Attack. Difficulties between the United States and Japan began in the 1930s and continued into 1941. The Japanese was expanding its empire in Asia the United States was viewed as a roadblock to these expansion efforts. The U.S. Pacific Fleet based at Pearl Harbor was a danger to Japanese plans for the seizure of the resource-rich territories of Southeast Asia – so the Japanese decided to immobilize the U.S. fleet at the start of the war.

Surprise Attack. Early on Dec 7th Japanese planes from six aircraft carriers launched the first wave of 181 planes – torpedo bombers, horizontal bombers, dive bombers, and fighters. A second wave of aircraft continued the attack. The Japanese achieved complete surprise (despite early sightings of miniature submarines and incoming aircraft) when they hit naval bases and army installations in Hawaii.

Damage to Fleet. The attack, lasting about two hours, sunk or damaged twenty-one ships of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Over 188 aircraft were destroyed with 159 aircraft damaged. American dead, including civilians, totaled 2,403. Over a thousand American military members and civilians were wounded.

Japanese Losses. The attacking force suffered light losses. Only twenty-nine planes failed to return to the carriers. No Japanese ships were lost although a miniature submarine was lost.

Not a Complete Success. The Japanese failed to sink or damage any aircraft carriers. Two were out of port delivering planes to Wake and Midway Islands. All but three of the sunk or damaged ships were raised and repaired and pressed into service in the ensuring war. Most important, the surprise attack united the country and helped enter the United States into World War II against Japan, Germany, and their allies.

Learn more about the attack by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor from the Naval History and Heritage Command:

Overview of The Pearl Harbor Attack, 7 December 1941

By Evan Cooper.

FORT DEVENS, MA – Community members from across the U.S. Army Garrison Devens Reserve Forces Training Area (USAG Devens RFTA) gathered to celebrate Nashoba Valley Celebration Day on a summer’s evening Aug. 19, 2023.

The festival celebrates the founding of Fort Devens in 1917. The installation was used as a training location during World War I, World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. The base officially closed in 1996 and became an U.S. Army Reserve training area which currently serves as a base of operations and capabilities for the New England area.

“This festival is a chance for military groups and civilian entities to come together and celebrate the ties between military and civilian organizations,” said Mark Deuger, a retired Special Forces veteran that served on Fort Devens in 1983. “The Special Forces retiree community is strong here on Fort Devens; a lot of us that served in the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) still have an opportunity to gather and reminisce within our Chapter 54 in the Special Forces Association. Others and I were on Fort Devens when 10th SFG(A) moved to Fort Carson in the mid-1990s.”

Fort Devens served as the home of the 10th SFG(A) starting in 1968 and then most of the Group moved to Fort Carson, Colorado between 1994 and 1995. Currently, 10th SFG(A) operates out of Fort Carson housing three battalions including a Group Support Battalion. 1st Battalion continues to operate as a permanently stationed battalion in Germany.

10th SFG(A) still maintains its historical connection to the installation after decades of their departure from the New England area. Some of the current 10th SFG(A) operators attended the festival, providing a link to their heritage at the installation and interacting with community members and retired veterans.

“I decided to stay in the Fort Devens area because it reminds me of my time living in Germany,” said retired Command Sgt. Maj. Julius Reinitzer, formerly Command Sgt. Maj. of 1st Battalion, 10th SFG(A). “Serving in Special Forces was something different than the regular Army. I would have never stayed in the Army if I was in a regular infantry unit, but because of Special Forces we did something different every day. We could go mountain climbing or scuba diving as often as we wanted.”

The festivities during Nashoba Valley Celebration Day included onstage performances featuring a live band and dancing performances on Rodgers Field. The event also featured vendors, food and fireworks display at the conclusion of the event.

USAG Devens RFTA continues to support training operations for U.S. Army Reserve units within the New England area.

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This story by Staff Sgt. Evan Cooper of the 10th Special Forces Group was first published by the Defense Visual Information Distribution Service on August 25, 2023. DVIDS content is in the public domain.

Photo: U.S. Soldiers assigned to 2nd Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), interact with local community member on Nashoba Valley Celebration Day at U.S. Army Garrison Devens Reserve Forces Training Area (USAG Devens RFTA), Massachusetts, Aug. 19, 2023. The base officially closed in 1996 and became an U.S. Army Reserve training area which currently serves as a base of operations and capabilities for the New England area. (Photo by Spc. Steven Alger, 10th SFG.)

On August 17-18, 1942, members of the 2nd Marine Raider Battalion made an attack on a small island in the Pacific Ocean held by Japanese forces during World War II. The raid had several objectives – destroy Japanese installations, gather intelligence of the Gilbert Islands area (map by Wikipedia), capture prisoners, and divert Japanese attention away from allied landings on Guadalcanal that occurred on August 9th. The raid also was an initial test of the raiding tactics and capabilities of the Marine Raider units.

Makin Island. The small island was the home of a Japanese seaplane base and had a garrison of less than 100 men. The island was a strategic atoll in the Marshalls as it afforded the Japanese a location from which to conduct air patrols along the eastern flank of the Japanese perimeter. The island is known as Butaritari Island, however, during World War II, the military referred to it as Makin Island. It had a large lagoon surrounded by the island that could accomodate fairly large ships; although the entrances to the lagoon were narrow. The island would later be taken by American forces in the November 1943.

Image. Astronaut photo, U.S. government. Government of Kiribati mapping information. (2012) Makin Island (Butaritari Island, Wikepedia).

Image. Gilbert Islands, Makin Island is the top island of the archilago. By Pitichinaccio – CC BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=1350215

Submarine Infiltration. The Marine Raiders were transported to the island from Pearl Harbor aboard two large mine-laying submarines that had been converted to troop transports – the Nautilus and the Argonaut. The subs departed Pearl Harbor on August 8, 1942. Each of the submarines carried a company of raiders – for a total of 211 men (some sources say 221). The two companies were Companies A and B. The voyage was several days long – under cramped and hot conditions inside the submarines – one sub arriving on the 16th and the second on the 17th. During the Makin Island battle the submarines would provide fire support for the raiding party; firing against enemy positions on land, aircraft, and boats. During the course of the raid the submarines would be forced to submerge several times to avoid attack from enemy aircraft.

Landing Difficulties. The raiding force was to depart the subs in inflatable boats with motors and make a predawn landing on two locations on Butaritari Island beginning at 03:00 of the 17th. Once ashore it would destroy the garrison and then withdraw that evening. Things went badly from the outset while boarding the rubber boats from the subs. When the subs surfaced there were high seas and heavy rain. Many of the underpowered rubber boats were swamped and the engines had difficulty starting due to flooding with water. Some rubber boats were towed by others to make it to the island landing site. Due to the weather, it was decided at the last minute to utilize only one landing site on the island; instead of two. However, one element didn’t get the word and was separated from the main force. Some of the boat motors malfunctioned, slowing the landing process and causing confusion amongst the raiders. Once on shore the rubber boats were stashed in vegetation. Unfortunately, one of the Marines discharged his weapon shortly after the landing ruining the element of surprise.

Battle with the Garrison Force. The Marines were soon in contact with the Japanese force, estimated at 85 personnel, upon landing upon the island. Enemy snipers and machine guns halted the Marines advance towards the garrison. The Japanese then launched two banzai attacks which were defeated by the Americans. At that point, although not known to the Marines, the Japanese force was greatly diminished. Later in the day the Japanese attacked with air attacks and attempted to land troops in the lagoon with seaplanes – but unsuccessfully. Eventually, over the course of the next two days the surviving Japanese forces were dispersed and scattered around the island. The Japanese garrison was destroyed; to include the radio station, fuel, and other supplies.

Leaving the Island – More Difficulties. The departure from the island was a disaster. The heavy surf and barrier reef caused a lot of problems. Many of the outboard engines of the 18 rubber boats did not work. It was difficult to paddle against the heavy breakers and some boats capsized with the loss of equipment. Seven boats and less than 100 men did make it to the submarines on the evening of the 17th; but more than 100 men were still stranded on the island and were to remain overnight on the island. Things were thought to be dire for the Americans. Many had lost their clothing and weapons in the severe surf and the raid force had overestimated the remaining strength of the Japanese garrison. At one point in the early morning of the 18th, the commander of the raid, Lt Col Carlson, contemplated surrender to the enemy.

Back on the Subs. However, during the course of the next day – the 18th – it became evident that there was little Japanese resistance on the island and that the submarines were still available for exfiltration. A more suitable location was found for leaving the island on rubber boats – one with less surf. Almost all of the remainder of the raiding force would make it to the submarines the night of the 18th. Nine men were inadvertently left behind once the submarines set off for Pearl Harbor, arriving on August 25th (Nautilus) and August 26th (Argonaut).

Casualties. The Marine unit suffered losses in the raid. The official tally states that 18 (19?) were dead and 12 missing; among those missing were nine that had been left alive on the island. Seven Marines had drowned. They were captured on August 30th and later beheaded by the Japanese at Kwajalein Atol. Figures on Japanese losses vary, depending on the source. Estimates range from 65 to 160 enemy dead. Two Japanese seaplanes were destroyed while trying to reinforce the island with troops.

Marine Raiders. The Marine Corps had established four Raider battalions during World War II to provide the capability of small light units that could strike deep into enemy territory during the Pacific campaign. The Second Marine Raider Battalion was designated on February 19, 1942. For Raider Battalions would serve in the Pacific over the course of two years. In early 1944 the four battalions were disbanded. On February 1, 1944, the 1st Raider Regiment was redesignated the 4th Marine Regiment. Members of the Raider Training Center were transferred to the newly formed 5th Marine Division. In 2014, the Marine Special Operations Regiment, a subordinate unit of the United States Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC), ws redesignated the Marine Raider Regiment.

Achievements of the Raid. The Makin Island raid was a learning moment for the Marines and the training of the Marine Raider battalions. The commander of the raiding party, Lt Col Evan Carlson, received the Navy Cross for his efforts in the battle. He would retire as a Brigadier General. Although the mission did not achieve all of its objectives it did prove to be a morale booster for the Marines and Navy and was a public relations success for the war effort. In 1943, the film Gung Ho! was released (see movie trailer, 1943). It depicted the 2nd Raider Battalion’s raid on Makin Island. Two U.S. Navy ships would bear the name of USS Makin Island. The 2nd Marine Raider Battalion would see more fighting during the Guadalcanal campaign.

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Image of Nautilus: U.S. Marines arrive at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii on 26 August 1942 on board the U.S. submarine Nautilus following their raid on Makin Island on 17-18 August, 1942.
Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=1388486

References:

“The Makin Island Raid”, Proceedings, U.S. Naval Institute, October 1946.
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1946/october/makin-island-raid

“Last Reminiscence of a Makin Island Raider”, Proceedings, U.S. Naval Institute, October 2022.
https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/2022/october/last-reminiscence-makin-island-raider

“The Makin Island Raid, August 1942”, The Text Message, National Archives, November 14, 2012.
https://text-message.blogs.archives.gov/2012/11/14/seventy-years-ago-the-makin-island-raid-august-1942-2/

Videos:

Video – The Echoes of Makin Island. This video has clips of the 1943 movie Gung Ho!. Defense Media Activity – Marines, August 15, 2023, DVIDS, 3 minutes.
https://www.dvidshub.net/video/893859/echoes-makin-island

Video – 1942 Raid on Makin Raid. The History Guy, YouTube, 2020, 17 minutes.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DvE03k7t2d4

Video – Raid on Makin Island. Kings and Generals, YouTube, 2022, 20 minutes.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QJ3YN-QFYbI

June 19th, 2017 is the 65th anniversary of U.S. Army Special Forces. The elite Green Beret unit was formed in 1952. It draws its heritage from a number of different special operations, intelligence, and unconventional warfare organizations to include the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), U.S. Army Rangers, 1st Special Service Force, and others. Currently there are seven Special Forces Groups – five active duty Special Forces groups and two National Guard Special Forces groups.

By Petty Officer 1st Class Alex Smedegard.

The sun ascends over the horizon as military personnel make their way onto the compound at Silver Strand Training Complex. After catching their breath from a grueling morning workout, the bagpipes playing in the background orchestrate a calming atmosphere. With the sun now fully visible, five current and past service members step onto the stage in front of approximately 150 personnel to commemorate the 40th anniversary of SEAL Team 5.

“On May 1, 1983, Underwater Demolition Team (UDT) 11 redesignated as SEAL Team 5,” said the current commanding officer of SEAL Team 5. “Recognizing our 40 years of service and the ascension to success is a testament to the incredible leadership, character and cognitive attributes of personnel throughout our unit’s rich history.”

Retired and active operators reunited with former teammates. Enlisted Sailors and officers alike stood united by the trident they had all earned and wore on their chests. The five guest speakers delivered remarks, each representing every decade dating back to the 1980s.

“To understand how SEAL Team 5 formed, we first need to understand the foundation laid by our predecessors of UDT-11,” said retired Capt. Pete Toennies, a former SEAL Team 5 commanding officer.

UDT-11, formed in May of 1944, initially was conceptualized for the invasion of the Pacific Island Iwo Jima. Although they did not serve on Iwo Jima, the men saw significant action in the invasion of Okinawa alongside approximately 1,000 frogmen conducting reconnaissance and demolition work to support the follow-on amphibious invasion.

Photo: Retired Capt. Pete Toennies, former commanding officer of SEAL Team 5, delivers remarks during the SEAL Team 5 40th anniversary ceremony at the Silver Strand Training Complex. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Alex Smedegard)

“They conducted hydrographic surveys, both clandestinely and under fire, to enable conventional force amphibious landings during WWII and the Korean War,” added Toennies. “They were experts at underwater demolitions and saw significant employment clearing obstacles for landing craft to make their way onto enemy beaches.”

During periods in between wars, the Sailors of UDT-11 were innovators, pushing the limits in harsh, uncomfortable, and unforgiving environments like the Arctic and undersea.

“During the Cold War, the command led special projects in the Artic, innovated with underwater delivery vehicles, and partnered with the space program to recover astronauts,” said Toennies.

UDT-11 played a very important and public role on July 24, 1969, as millions around the world, including President Nixon in person aboard Essex-class aircraft carrier USS Hornet (CV 12), watched the UDT-11 frogmen recover astronauts from the Apollo 11 mission.

“Continuing into the Vietnam War, the unit was active in South Vietnam conducting hydrographic reconnaissance of nearly the entire coastline as well as conducting operations with SEAL Team 1 and the Brown Water Navy,” said Toennies.

Photo: Two members of Underwater Demolition Team 11 watch an airstrike against the Viet Cong from the deck of the amphibious transport dock USS Ogden (LPD-5). (Courtesy Photo)

Their success in non-traditional assignments built trust with and demonstrated UDT’s value to the Navy and the Department of Defense. This ultimately set the foundation for UDT-11’s redesignation to SEAL Team 5 in 1983.

Under the new designation as SEAL Team 5, from 1987 to 1988, operators were assigned to task units in the Persian Gulf aboard Mobile Sea Bases during the “Tanker War” – a war between Iran and Iraq that spilled into the maritime environment. These task units were assigned the mission of ending the Iranian mine place efforts, and the presence of SEALs in theater acted as a strong deterrence to Iranian mining operations.

Photo: Mobile Sea Base (MSB) Wimbrown VII was headquarters for the Special Operations Task Unit during the “Tanker War”. The MSB was outfitted with SEAL Team FIVE personnel, Mk III Patrol Boats, and 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment assets. (Courtesy photo NSW)

“The U.S. saw the “Tanker War” as a threat to not only to our economy but the world economy,” said Toennies. “We reflagged those tankers as U.S. vessels so we could provide support and protection to them as they transited the Persian Gulf.

“The 1980s continued to be a time of growth, both in the size of the community and the tactics we developed,” added Toennies.

Retired Cmdr. Tom Dietz, a member of SEAL Team 5 throughout his career and commanding officer from 2000-2002, delivered remarks about the team’s history during the 1990s.

“I can define the success of a SEAL Team in six words,” said Dietz. “The mission. The mission. The mission. And in the 1990s, I was a SEAL Team 5 platoon commander getting ready to deploy to the Philippines when Iraq invaded Kuwait. Within 72 hours, our guys deployed to Saudi Arabia. Our mission was now Operation Desert Storm.”

As Operation Desert Storm developed, SEAL Team 5 would send an additional platoon tasked to work with the CIA and Kuwaiti special operations units to infiltrate behind enemy lines to call in airstrikes and provide deconflictions.

“Our platoon was tasked with the coastal reconnaissance of Kuwait to locate a beach appropriate for the Marines to do an amphibious landing,” said Dietz. “The enemy was expecting this, even though the Marines weren’t going to do it, and one night six guys swam in with 20 pounds of explosives each and simulated a large amphibious Marine assault drawing in and relocating enemy forces allowing our military to conduct other missions nearby. Those missions were all a success.”

Further on in the 1990s, SEAL Team 5’s Delta platoon conducted operations from amphibious ships in continued support to Operation Desert Storm. Following the completion of the platoon’s cycle, they headed back to the U.S. when the 1991 Bangladesh cyclone occurred – one of the deadliest tropical cyclones on record.

“Combat operations are important – it is our mission – but so are humanitarian operations,” said Dietz. “We support our nation’s missions, whatever it may be. A massive typhoon struck Bangladesh and Delta platoon was able to go in there and provide humanitarian support.”

Following the Battle of Mogadishu in 1993, popularly depicted in Hollywood film “Blackhawk Down,” SEAL Team 5 sent a platoon to Somalia in the spring of 1994 to provide support in the extraction of all United Nations forces in country.

“We had a platoon pulled off an amphibious ready group to support this,” said Dietz. “These operations continued to 1996.”

Dietz would become SEAL Team 5’s executive officer in 1997. Operations continued with a stronger emphasis on maritime interdiction operations. And the platoons aboard the amphibious ready groups would engage enemy ships out of Iraq against United Nations sanctions.

“We sent a lot of guys out there to operations out in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” said Dietz. “So you look at the operations we did across this decade alone – underwater, above water and land mission sets. It was the mindset in the leaders from this decade, those who were molded from those in the 80s and UDT era. The approach these guys had in finding solutions is a testament to the resilient mindset that continues to the shape our special operation forces in upcoming decades.”

Following the attacks on 9/11, SEALs were in theater less than one month later. SEAL Team 5 would deploy platoons to Afghanistan to work with interagency and international partners. What started off with the deployment of platoons to theater, and by the Iraq War, turned into full SEAL team deployments.

“That little thing called ‘to serve’, where we didn’t have enough SEALs to go into combat for Afghanistan and Iraq,” said retired Master Chief Petty Officer Ron Culpepper, a former SEAL Team 5 command master chief. “We became tired. What were typically six-month deployments turned into seven, eight, all the way up to eleven. We answered the call of our nation, and we were willing to pay the ultimate sacrifice in doing so.”

The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq extended into the next decade.

“The war continued, and it always came back to being ready,” said an active-duty operator and former SEAL Team 5 commanding officer. “We continued to train as much as we could, while still fighting the fight. You never knew what was going to come next, but as it did, it came very quickly.

“It was the shift in tactics and our approach that changed the dynamic, eventually leading local counterparts to gain traction,” added the former SEAL Team 5 commanding officer. “This ultimately led to the securing of East Mosul and eventually set the conditions for forces to continue westward.”

The speeches all reflected on the evolution of SEAL Team 5.

“To truly appreciate history, you first have to understand it,” said the current commanding officer of SEAL Team 5. “Regardless of the size of platoon and whatever the mission tasking may be, the warriors here today carry the same DNA in their blood as the generations before. As we look towards the future, we can expect SEALs to continue to be a critical component in our National Defense Strategy.”

“I could not be prouder to serve at SEAL Team 5, nor could I be more excited for the future of this great command,” added the current commanding officer.

As the ceremony concluded, past and present teammates along with their families gathered in small circles in front of the stage. Frogmen shared their stories, laughed and reminisced about their days as SEAL Team 5 operators.

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This story by Petty Officer 1st Class Alex Smedegard was first published by the Defense Visual Information Distribution Service on May 11, 2023. DVIDS content is in the public domain.

Top photo: Recovery swimmers assigned to Underwater Demolition Team 11 rehearse the recovery of Apollo Spacecraft in San Diego Bay. The practice of anticipating and rehearsing contingencies remains a crucial aspect of contemporary special operations mission planning and execution. (Courtesy photo NSW)

The Iranian Embassy siege took place from April 30 to May 5, 1980. A group of six armed Arab men stormed the Iranian Embassy in London. They took 26 hostages – demanding safe passage out of the United Kingdom and the release of Arab prisoners held by the Iranian government in Khuzestan Province, Iran. On the sixth day the armed men killed a hostage and threw his body out of the embassy. Shortly afterward the elite Special Air Service conducted Operation Nimrod to rescue the remaining hostages.

Hostages. The hostages included embassy staff, several visitors, and a police officer who was guarding the embassy. The hostage takers demands were release of 91 Arab prisoners in Khuzestan Province, Iran and safe passage out of the United Kingdom. The British government did not accede to the demands and a standoff ensued. Negotiations resulted in the release of five hostages for some air time for the hostage takers on British television.

Hostage Takers. The Arabs who took the hostages were members of the Democratic Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of Arabistan (DRFLA). These were Iranian Arabs who wanted to establish an autonomous Arab state in the southern region of the Iranian province of Khuzestan (Google maps) on the border of southern Iraq and the Persian Gulf. The province was rich in oil. Some members of the hostage takers were politically active in Iran and had been subject to interrogations by the Iranian secret police – the SAVAK. The Arabs had arrived in Britain in March 1980 and while there acquired firearms, ammunition, and grenades – possibly provided by the Iraq embassy in London.

Rescue Force. The Special Air Service is a regiment of the British Army – part of the UK’s special forces. It was formed during the Second World War to conduct special operations and irregular warfare. After the Munich massacre at the 1972 Olympic Games in Germany and the many airline hijackings of the early 1970s, some western nations established or realigned special forces units to have a counter-terrorism capability. The SAS became the United Kingdom’s primary anti-hijacking and counter-terrorist unit. The raiding party of the SAS for Operation Nimrod numbered from 30 to 35 soldiers.

First Day. The hostage event took place at mid-day on April 30, 1980. Police responded immediately and within hours journalists and camera crews set up watch in front of the Embassy and began broadcasting live. The police were in charge of the overall response to the terrorist event and provided the negotiation team. Between the first day and the last day of the siege negotiations took place and some hostages were released. However, the hostage takers were becoming increasing frustrated – realizing their demands were not being met by the British authorities.

Sixth Day. On the sixth day of the siege, May 5, 1980, the Arabs killed a hostage and threw his body out of the embassy. The British government decided to attempt a rescue of the remaining hostages. The task was given to the Special Air Service (SAS). Members of the SAS rappelled from the roof of the embassy and entered the building through the windows. The raid lasted less than 20 minutes resulting in five of the six hostage takers killed and the rescue of the hostages; except one. A single hostage was killed during the rescue and two wounded. The one hostage taker who survived served 27 years in prison, was paroled in 2008, and lives in England. The raid took place in full view of journalists who were covering the event and it was broadcast in real time on live television.

Aftermath. Operation Nimrod brought the Special Air Service back into the public spotlight; enhancing its already stellar reputation. It also was a source of pride for Britain; as it occurred the same time that the U.S. Embassy in Tehran was held by Iranian revolutionary students and the failed U.S. rescue attempt – Operation Eagle Claw. The successful raid prompted many United Kingdom citizens to apply for the unit. The 22 SAS had multiple requests by other governments around the world for training its anti-terrorist forces. Members of the SAS were also requested by other nations for advise during hostage or terrorist events. The 22 SAS, as well as the 21 SAS and 23 SAS – two regiments from the volunteer Territorial Army, were safe from any force reductions and received increased funding as a result of the success of Operation Nimrod.

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References:

Iranian Embassy Siege – Wikipedia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iranian_Embassy_siege

Iranian Embassy Siege – National Army Museum
https://www.nam.ac.uk/explore/iranian-embassy-siege

Photo: The Iranian embassy in London, severely damaged by fire after the Iranian siege. Photo by Steve White, 2008. Creative Commons 2.0.

At the conclusion of the Gulf War (Desert Storm) thousands of Iraqi Kurds – called Peshmerga – revolted against the Saddam Hussein regime. The rebellion was quickly squashed by Iraqi tanks and armed helicopters that had not been destroyed or damaged by Coalition forces during the 1991 conflict.

Millions of Iraqi Kurds fled to the border areas of Turkey and Iraq with very few belongings. The border areas were mountainous and snow covered. However, Turkey refused to allow refugees to enter their country and the Kurds had to encamp on the mountain terrain with no food or shelter. A humanitarian crisis soon ensued with thousands of Kurds dying each day from starvation, exposure, and disease.

At first the U.S. administration ignored the plight of the Kurds. But it didn’t take long for CNN and the international media to take notice and publish daily highlights of the suffering taking place along the border of Turkey. The Bush administration decided to conduct a humanitarian operation to relieve the suffering of Iraqi Kurds located in over 30 border camps.

Operation Provide Comfort began in mid-April 1991. A ‘no-fly zone’ was established – denying Iraqi use of the air space above the 36′ North line in northern Iraq. At first humanitarian supplies – tents and food – were airdropped by C-130s flown from Incirlik Air Base in eastern Turkey. This phase of the operation lasted about two weeks.

Soon, an advance element of the 10th Special Forces Group arrived in Silopi, Turkey to set up a forward operating base. Silopi was located in southeastern Turkey on the border with Iraq. Before long, the 10th SFG(A) had its entire group deployed along the entire border area. The SF unit provided a variety of missions to include administration of the refugee camps, medical assistance, and setting up secure helicopter landing zones (HLZs) within the camps for the delivery of food, water, and medical supplies. CH-53s, CH-47s, CH-46s, and other aircraft of the U.S. and international partners began a huge effort to deliver MREs to the refugee camps.

The task force headed by the 10th SFG(A) was augmented with units from all branches of the U.S. military and with military units from other nations as well. Eventually the humanitarian mission grew so big that a three star general, LTG Shalikashvili, would be placed in charge of CTF Provide Comfort located at Incirlik Air Base. The SOCEUR commander, BG Potter, would assume control of Task Force Alpha operating out of Silopi. TF Bravo was established in the Iraqi town of Zakho located south of the Turkish border under the command of another U.S. general officer.

In time, the humanitarian effort moved south of the border into northern Iraq. ‘Way stations’ and refugee camps were established in northern Iraq in more hospitable terrain. Humanitarian organizations from around the world joined the effort and slowly the Iraqi Kurds left the refugee camps in the border areas and returned to their homes in the Kurdish region of Iraq.

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Read more about Operation Provide Comfort (Iraq War News)
https://iraqwarnews.info/pc/provide-comfort.html

Map of Kurdistan – CIA, 1986

During Desert Storm several U.S. Army teams of Green Berets were infiltrated deep behind enemy lines to conduct surveillance and reconnaissance missions. Some of these Special Forces teams were compromised by civilians who discovered their location. A few of the SF teams had to fight enemy combatants until they were exfiltrated by helicopter.

On February 23, 1991, SFODA 525, led by CW2 Chad Balwanz, was inserted by helicopter at night and moved to a hide site to observe traffic moving south along Highway 7 at a location north of the Euphrates River. This 5th Special Forces team would soon find itself fighting for survival against an overwhelming enemy force.

On the night of the day before the ground offensive of Desert Storm began, Special Forces reconnaissance teams were inserted deep behind enemy lines in Iraq to gather and report intelligence of Iraqi troop movements. Many were put in areas over 150 miles inside Iraq – far from friendly forces. The teams had at least three members – sometimes 8 or more. Each team had at least one communicator responsible for sending and receiving messages from the command and control node.

These Special Reconnaissance (SR) teams were emplaced in enemy territory in support of both the XVIII Airborne Corps and the VII corps. They were on watch for movements of SCUD missiles, elements of the Republican Guard, and other significant enemy activities.

The teams would carry rucksacks that contained water, food, radios, ammunition, batteries for the radios, and more. In addition, other equipment such as a GPS, knife, compass, and medical kit were hung in various configurations on their combat vests. Rucks and other equipment could easily reach over 150 pounds. Add to that the equipment and materials needed to dig and camouflage the hide site.

Most teams would insert via MH-60 or MH-47 helicopters from the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) at a location far from the observation site yet within walking distance. Once infiltrated, at night, the team would move by foot overland to the target area, select the hide site, and begin the process to dig in and camouflage the area before early morning light.

ODA 525 had infiltrated in two MH-60 Black Hawks from Task Force 160 and moved overland with their heavy rucks (175 lbs) to the target area. The eight team members dug in at a location about 300 meters east of Highway 7 that offered a good observation point. The highway was one of the main routes that ran from Baghdad south through the Euphrates river valley. The team finished the process of building the hide site before dawn on the morning of February 24, 1991 and settled in to observe the highway.

As the morning sun came up the team could see and hear a lot of civilian activity in the area. There were people tending to cattle and sheep, women were collecting firewood, and children were playing. The area had more people in the area than the team had anticipated and intelligence reports had indicated. The soil was very difficult to dig into so the hide site was less than optimal.

The team was soon discovered by three children – a boy and two girls. The SF detachment reached a critical decision point – what to do with the children. The children left the team’s location unharmed. The team decided to change their location and began movement to another area. Not long after that an adult with Bedouin headdress approached the team with children . . . and saw members of the team. The unarmed adult was allowed to leave – which he did in haste.

Before long the team had armed Bedouin tribesmen in their immediate area and which was followed with the arrival of Iraqi soldiers. The team was in a tenuous position – miles behind enemy lines, lightly armed, and vastly outnumbered with no ground mobility vehicles to evade.

Within minutes the team was engaged in a battle with the 150-man Iraq force. In the first ten minutes of the battle 40 Iraqi soldiers lay dead and many more were wounded.

The battle continued through the day. The team leader, Balwanz, called in for air support. The team was supported with air strikes that kept the Iraqi troops from overrunning the team’s position. Many of the bombs were dropped ‘danger close’. Estimates of enemy deaths were from 100 to 300 personnel due to the SF team and supporting aircraft.

The SF soldiers used emergency PRC-90 radios and signal mirrors to communicate with the supporting aircraft during the battle. Although the fight had lasted hours none of the Green Berets were killed or wounded.

By nightfall the fight was under control – the team and supporting craft had kept the Iraqis at bay. The team moved to an area more suited for a helicopter exfiltration. That evening, after darkness settled in, two MH-60s from TF-160 landed near the team’s location and brought the team to safety and to King Fahd International Airport.

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References:

Thomas, Rhys. (2016). Danger Close: The Rescue of ODA-525. Lulu.
https://bookshop.org/a/753/9781365626548

Johnson, William M. (1996). U.S. Army Special Forces in Desert Shield / Desert Storm: How Significant an Impact. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, pages 68-70, PDF.
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA312864.pdf

“Voices in the Storm: Against all Odds”, Frontline, PBS. – The Gulf War. Chad Balwanz, the team leader of SFODA 525, is interviewed about the team’s mission.
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/voices/2.html

“Chad Balwanz”, Hazard Ground Podcast, Episode 140, October 31, 2019. Hear the firsthand account of ODA 525 and their fight to survive from the team leader of the Special Forces detachment.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ksmg0U2ILo8

Editor’s note: This article was first published by SOF News on February 24, 2021.