By Riccardo Catalano.

In the rapidly evolving information environment of the 21st century, a new battlefield has emerged, one where influence operations have taken center stage. Transversal to the “Cognitive Dimension” of warfare, and the six domains, the Information Environment is a battleground that knows no geographic boundaries, and is accessible from any point around the globe through a few taps on a smartphone or keystrokes on a computer.

According to NATO’s doctrine, “the information environment is an aggregation of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information”.

While western democracies champion the virtues of a free and open Internet, certain adversarial nations are exploiting this openness to their advantage. China, Russia, and Iran have weaponized social media and press freedom in a sophisticated and strategic influence campaign, while maintaining a tightly controlled media environment within their own borders.

The openness of Western societies provides fertile ground for disinformation campaigns. Adversaries can easily disseminate false or misleading narratives through social media platforms and digital news outlets, exploiting freedom of speech to sow discord and confusion.

In contrast, the highly controlled media landscape in countries such as China, Russia, and Iran, effectively shields them from reciprocal influence operations.

One primary example is Russia’s activities during the conflict in Ukraine and more broadly across western democratic elections. With state-sponsored troll farms and the use of artificial intelligence bots, the Russian government has systematically spread disinformation to create societal divisions and challenge democratic values.

Similarly, China’s influence operations are not only aimed at promoting a positive image of China globally, but also at creating divisions within western societies. China’s combination of strict domestic censorship, such as the “Great Firewall,” and its prolific use of platforms like TikTok and WeChat for influence operations presents a particularly asymmetrical threat.

Iran, while technologically behind China and Russia, has also engaged in digital influence operations. Their efforts have focused on inciting discord among western allies and spreading anti-western propaganda.

Confronting this asymmetry requires a multi-pronged approach. The western alliance must prioritize the protection of their own information environment while developing capabilities to penetrate the adversaries’ information barriers. This includes investing in technologies to detect and counteract disinformation, and educating the public on how to recognize and respond to foreign influence efforts.

Civilian professionals with experience in digital marketing, social media, and information security can play a crucial role in this battle. Their expertise can be used to create compelling narratives that support democratic values, while their understanding of information flow and audience analysis can help identify and neutralize adversarial influence operations.

In an era where ‘the pen is mightier than the sword‘, we are in an arms race for narrative control. The challenge for western democracies is to strike a balance between protecting our information environment from adversarial influence operations while upholding the principles of freedom of speech and open information access that define us.

In this tug-of-war, the key is not to choose between one over the other, but rather to find a way to uphold both commitments simultaneously. This requires a nuanced and multi-faceted approach. A purely defensive posture, focused solely on identifying and countering disinformation, is not enough.

Democracies must go on the offensive, leveraging the skills and resources of both the government and private sectors to effectively communicate democratic values, reinforce societal resilience against disinformation, and promote critical thinking. Initiatives like digital literacy programs, fact-checking services (truly independent ones), and public awareness campaigns can go a long way towards equipping citizens with the tools to discern reliable from unreliable information.

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Author: Riccardo Catalano is a former SGT in the Italian Air Force. He is now a copywriter and editor. His writings can be found on his blog at https://www.narrazionistrategiche.net/.

By CW4 Charles Davis.

Information technology has significantly enhanced human interaction around the globe and elevated the importance of information as an instrument of power wielded by individuals and societies in politics, economics, and warfare. Advances in information technology have significantly changed the generation of, transmission of, reception of, and reaction to information. – Joint Concept for Operations in the Information Environment July 2018

The Russian concept of Information Warfare (IW) began to develop in the post WWII Soviet Union. However military theory on the concept gained traction with the USSR’s Military Research Institute (MRI), through the writings of Dr. Vladimir Lefebvre. [1]  Lefebvre is credited with developing Reflexive Control (RC) Theory in the 1960s, while working for the MRI. His book, “The Algebra of Consciousness”, was the foundation for classifying the theory and establishing a Soviet research institute to assess its applications. [2] 

Reflexive Control Theory requires a foundational understanding of the psychology of the target. Developing a targeted operation requires deep cultural understanding and occurs through modeling

Diagram: Lefebvres Reflexive Control Technique.

Lefebvre’s philosophy was reaffirmed in a 1976 paper by V Druzhinin and D Kontorov, titled “Problems with Military systems Engineering”. The work firmly asserts; control of the target’s decision process derives from a profound knowledge of the state of his forces, military doctrine, objectives, and personal qualities of his executive personnel. Additionally, an adversary’s politics, ideology, emotional state, and mutual relations can also be leveraged to influence decision-making. (Chotikul, 1986) [4] Putin’s approach to conducting Information Warfare through RC is firmly intrenched in these concepts, with global implications.

Russia does not distinguish Information Operations (IO) as a peacetime or conflict tool and there are no restrictions between leveraging RC against military or civilian targets. Therefore, adversaries such as the United States can expect IW to be a constant in competition, crisis, and conflict. As such, IW is conducted globally and indiscriminately. Putin affirmed this position in his 2006 address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation.  “We must take into account the plans and directions of development of the armed forces of other countries…. Our responses must be based on intellectual superiority, they will be asymmetric, and less expensive.” [5]

An early example of Soviet forces applying Lefebver’s Reflexive Control is evident in interviews with Vladimir Ryzhkov (Russian State Duma Deputy 1993-2007). Ryzhkov recalls conversations with KGB propaganda officers regarding their efforts in Afghanistan in the 1980s and several points can be taken. The Afghan population had to be convinced the government was acting in their interests and the enemy provoked the crisis. Operations also focused on fabricating incidents of persecution of Russian speaking populations, using just enough truth to draw social attention and outrage. Using these incidents, IOs focused on demonizing the adversary and masking Soviet aggression as humanitarian aid to those persecuted. Controlling the narrative was most important and crackdowns on all accessible media outlets secured their ability to direct the message. [6]

Later examples provided by Ryzhkov present RC in a new light. For example, in 1999 Russia used reports of Chechen attacks into Dagestan as a mechanism for driving public opinion in support of a second military incursion into Chechnya. None of the jihadist groups ever took responsibility for the August and September apartment bombings and there is broad speculation that Moscow conducted false flag reporting to justify a military presence.

Additionally, Russian press suggested as many as 100 foreign instructors participated in training Chechen terrorists. Other Russian press reporting indicated Usama Bin Laden was sending mercenaries from Afghanistan and Yemen. [7] Narrative control here provided popular support for elevated military operations in the region. Media influence during the second Chechen war was highlighted in a Newsline piece by Paul Goble: “Indeed, the Russian government’s own newspaper ‘Izvestiya’ noted rather critically that “the introduction of centralized military censorship regarding the war in the North Caucasus is the only new idea in the much-vaunted national security doctrine.” [8] These examples along with press observations suggesting a shift in tactic, reinforce the presence of RC as a recognized component of Russian political and military strategy.

Also in the 1990s, the Russian government started to see the value in state-sponsored think tanks. While Russia leveraged academia for research and analysis, it did not apply the concept of state sponsored institutes, like RAND in the United States. The Russian Institute for Strategic Studies (RISI) is one such organization, which was established by presidential decree in February of 1992. Atlantic Council Research indicates; by 2007 there were roughly seventy researchers, working on international security, the near abroad, military-strategic questions, international economic security, and market economic issues. [9]

RISI provides a unique view of how Lefebvre’s concepts for RC are studied and applied. A 2019 product by Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center provides an in-depth study of several think tanks in today’s Russia. According to Barbashin and Graef, in April of 2009 RISI was identified as a Federal Scientific Institution. Categorizing it in this manner solidified funding through the Presidential Administration. The increased funding allowed RISI to broaden its scope and add new departments. Putin also installed Lieutenant General (ret) Leonid Reshetnikov, formerly the Director of Foreign Intelligence Services, as administrator. [10]

Between 2011 and 2014 Reshetnikov was able to expand RISI research and analysis capabilities. In 2011, RISI established a Center for Regional and Ethno-Religious Studies. Then in March 2014 Reshetnikov hired representatives from Helsinki, Belgrade, and Warsaw to support his newly established Information Center in Tiraspol Transnistria. At the opening ceremony, he spoke of the importance of the Crimean vote for reunification with Russia. [11]  RISI remained supportive of the creation of Novorossiya (New Russia) and endorsed escalation of military operations in eastern Ukraine. [12]

RISI remained vocally supportive of Russian operations in Ukraine throughout 2014 and drafted a report in October framing the events as a western plot. In the October 2014 report, titled “The Ukrainian Crisis: Instrument of Geopolitics of the West”, RISI analysts asserted the United States was waging an information, economic, and political operation against Russia. Russia was portrayed as foiling US plots to establish a new world order of US “business and political elites”. [13] The October report also alluded to US intentions for American military bases on the Black Sea. The report and narratives to insight fear of the US and incompetence in Ukrainian governance all align with the primary concepts of RC.

Also in 2011, Russian Chief of General Staff Nikolai Makarov began to voice his reservations that Russia’s military had not successfully adopted to the requirements of modern warfare. Specifically, he did not believe the military would be successful in non-contact warfare such as Information Operations. Makarov’s concerns fueled General Valery Gerasimov’s efforts to address the question of how to describe/define modern war and frame operational concepts for Russian success in 2013. One key distinction in Gerasimov’s framing of Information Warfare (IW), and that of western generals is that Russia does not distinguish cyber warfare from other types of IO: it’s simply another tool in the box. [14]

Graphic from Gerasimov article in Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kurier, 26 February 2013 [15]

By 2014 there were two primary templates for IO. The first, “Red Web”, written by former KGB officers Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan centered on media control. But an article in the Journal of the Academy of Military Science, written by several Belarusian nationals approached the concept in much broader terms. The concept focused on 13 goals and more closely aligns with Reflexive Control Theory. They are described in an article by MITRE as:

• Changing the citizen’s moral values
• Creating a lack of spirituality
• Destroying traditions and cultivating a negative attitude toward cultural legacy
• Manipulating the social consciousness
• Disorganizing systems and creating obstacles
• Destabilizing political relations
• Exacerbating political struggles and provoking repression
• Reducing information support
• Misinforming, undermining, and discrediting administrative organs
• Provoking social, political, national, and religious conflicts
• Mobilizing protests and strikes
• Undermining authority
• Damaging interests of a state [16]

Where Soldatov and Borogan focused on a single platform, the Belarusian theorists addressed measurable objectives. Their approach has garnered more attention, and practical application of their concepts has appeared more recently in Russian IW efforts.

In 2014, Vladislav Surkov left his position of Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation for an appointment as Presidential Aide to Putin. Surkov assumed responsibilities for the Presidential Directorate for Social and Economic Cooperation with the CIS Member Countries. In this capacity, Surkov assumed the responsibility for developing policy towards Ukraine and began to receive daily updates focused on social, economic, and political issues in specific regions of the country. The data allowed Russia to frame a narrative and develop supporting disinformation that would manipulate Ukrainian public sentiment and political decision-making.

Graphic image from hacked Surkov emails, Euromaiden Press, March 26, 2020.

Hacked emails, associated with Surkov’s position during the annexation of Crimea, also provide supporting evidence Surkov relied on several Russian think tanks to assist with developing RC concepts to use in IW against Ukraine and NATO countries. This data provides a connection back to Reshetnikov and the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, supporting direct involvement in privately funded efforts to recruit and finance the separatist insurgency in eastern Ukraine. [17]   

 In 2019, The Royal United Service Institute was able to establish a chronology of Surkov- led activities during the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014.  The final paper was a direct result of hacked emails from Vladislav Surkov during this period. [18]  Authors, Alya Shandra and Robert Seely, assert Russia accomplished the seizure of Crimea through overt and covert activities, along with local ideologs and paid collaborators.

At the covert level, Russia interfered in Ukrainian elections, organized and funded a pan-Ukrainian campaign for a ‘soft federalization’ of the country, attempted to change Ukraine’s constitution and establish an alternative center of power, and created an illusion of widespread support for these activities…. The Kremlin conducted painstaking research into the intricacies of Ukrainian daily life to understand the Ukrainian world view and identify vulnerabilities that could be exploited. Then, using media, front groups, provocateurs, and paid rallies, it created a virtual reality designed to compel Ukraine into making decisions serving Russian objectives. [19]

Stark similarities can be drawn between Russian actions in the second Chechen war and that of the annexation of Ukraine. Pro-Russian proxies in the Donbas were inundated with fake news targeting Ukrainian government and military atrocities; while the Russian population was provided similar media coverage focused on stimulating their emotional support of the ethnic Russian people trapped in Ukraine. In the international community, Russia continued to distract, and deceive, creating information overload paralysis and indecision among the NATO partners.

The May 2nd, 2014, street fighting and fire in Odesa is an excellent example of Russian IO. Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed “Ukrainian nationalists drove defenseless people into the Trade Union building and burned them alive.” Reporting goes on to reassert the pro-Nazi position of the western backed Ukrainian government. [20] The Russian Federation continues to use the incident for propaganda purposes, through heavily financed exhibitions and select witness testimony in European countries.

Learning from IW activities in numerous other countries, Putin enhanced and refined Russia’s IO capabilities and turned his sights on the United States. Russia’s primary platforms to manipulate social consciousness, destabilize political relations; exacerbate political struggles; provoke repression; reduce information support and; misinform, undermined and discredit administrative organs were Facebook and Twitter.  The weapons he intended to use were Russian Troll Farms.

In Late 2014, Russia experienced a great deal of internal social unrest. Citizen protests regarding corruption and abuse of power seemed to appear without warning, fueled by social media. To manage domestic social unrest, he turned to the Internet Research Agency (IRA), financed and developed by Yevgeny Prigozhin in 2013. [21]  Christian Science Monitor correspondent Fred Weir states:

The IRA is a well-funded “internet marketing” operation that may perform commercial functions but has become notorious for its political activities. These include loading Russian social media with pro-Kremlin commentary, blogs, postings, and graphic content. Experts believe there are several such operations around Russia, some aimed at regional audiences. [22]

Russian expatriate and investigative reporter, Lyudmila Savchuk, describes IRA troll operations as mental bullying, explaining how lies are mixed with the truth to discredit and repress dissenting political opinions in Russia. In her Oslo Freedom Forum interview, Savchuk discusses her infiltration of IRA and the operational effectiveness of the Troll Farms, fake accounts, and fictitious activist groups. [23] Other interviews indicate she had daily quotas of 5 political posts, 10 non-political and 150-200 troll comments. [24]

Applying this very successful media exploitation weapon against the 2016 US presidential elections, Russia’s IRA was able to establish 3,184 Twitter accounts responsible for posting 175,993 election related tweets. [25] Additionally, Facebook assesses 126 million Americans received posts from roughly 470 IRA accounts and 3,000 IRA adds. [26] Investigations, by both the Justice and Treasury Departments, determined:

“The Internet Research Agency LLC (IRA) tampered with, altered, or caused a misappropriation of information with the purpose or effect of interfering with or undermining election processes and institutions. Specifically, the IRA tampered with or altered information in order to interfere with the 2016 U.S. election.  The IRA created and managed a vast number of fake online personas that posed as legitimate U.S. persons to include grassroots organizations, interest groups, and a state political party on social media.  Through this activity, the IRA posted thousands of ads that reached millions of people online.  The IRA also organized and coordinated political rallies during the run-up to the 2016 election, all while hiding its Russian identity.  Further, the IRA unlawfully utilized personally identifiable information from U.S. persons to open financial accounts to help fund IRA operations.” [27]  

Image: Department of Justice, Affidavit Press Release, September 28, 2018, page 23.

Additional details from federal investigations into the IRA operation known as “Project Lakhta” indicate a multimillion-dollar budget, financed by Prigozhin, and supervised by GRU officers assigned to Russia’s Unit 26165 and 74455. [28] In total four entities, seven individuals, three aircraft and a yacht were determined to be directly involved; resulting in asset seizures and sanctions. The Internet Research Agency was designated for directly or indirectly engaging in, sponsoring, concealing, or otherwise being complicit in foreign interference in a U.S. election. [29]

However, Russia’s attempts to apply RC measures against the American population continued, leading up to the 2020 elections. According to researchers from MIT Technology Review “Facebook’s most popular pages for Christian and Black American content were being run by Eastern European troll farms.” [30] Furthermore, content from troll farms was viewable to 140 million US accounts each month and these farms boasted the largest Christian American page, largest African American page, second largest Native American page and the fifth largest women’s’ page. Lastly, as of October 2019 roughly 15,000 Facebook Pages were being operated from Kosovo and Macedonia. [31]  

In March 2021, the Director of National Intelligence released assessments of malign Russian activities targeting the 2020 US elections. In this report, the Intelligence Community assessed Putin authorized influence operations to denigrate the Biden candidacy and the Democratic Party, through proxies. The intent was to disseminate influence narratives and misleading allegations to media and government officials as well as influential private citizens. Some activities intended to undermine public confidence, sow division, and exacerbate social tension were directly linked to Iran.  

More recently, a June 2022 Chatham House report indicates Russia’s IO efforts are targeting South Africa, India, Brazil, and Mexico; attempting to garner support and sympathy for Russia’s position on Ukraine. [32]  Chatham House concerns, along with July 2022 reporting from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, paint a stark picture for US relations with the Latin American Countries.  Russian IW in Venezuela, Nicaragua, Cuba, Mexico, Brazil and Argentina, will require significant counter-efforts from the US Department of State and with malign leadership in a number of these countries, it is likely to be a hard-fought war on perception. [33]   

As stated in the Department of State report, Pillars of Russia’s disinformation and Propaganda Ecosystem: “The perpetual conflict that Russia sees in the information environment also means that officials and state media may take one side of an issue, while outlets with a measure of independence will adopt their own variations on similar overarching false narratives. The ecosystem approach is fitting for this dynamic because it does not require harmonization among the different pillars. By simultaneously furthering multiple versions of a given story, these actors muddy the waters of the information environment in order to confuse those trying to discern the truth.” [34]

[1] https://sofrep.com/news/russian-reflexive-control-is-subverting-the-american-political-landscape/

[2] ibid

[3] ibid

[4] https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA170613.pdf

[5] http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/23577

[6] http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/thekremlins-war-propaganda/496779.html

[7] https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1289/RAND_MR1289.pdf

[8] http://www.hri.org/news/balkans/rferl/1999/99-10-12.rferl.html#28

[9] https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/thinking-foreign-policy-in-russia-think-tanks-and-grand-narratives/

[10] ibid

[11] https://mid.gospmr.org/en/DPj

[12] https://lithuaniatribune.com/russian-think-tank-that-pushed-for-invasion-of-ukraine-wants-moscow-to-overthrow-belarus-lukashenko

[13] https://riss.ru/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/AO_2014_ves-tekst.pdf

[14] https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1019062.pdf

[15] https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20160228_art009.pdf

[16] https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/2021-11/prs-19-1004-russian-military-thought-concepts-elements.pdf

[17] https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2017/03/04/kremlins-balkan-gambit-part/

[18] https://euromaidanpress.com/2020/03/26/a-guide-to-russian-propaganda-part-5-reflexive-control/

[19] https://static.rusi.org/201907_op_surkov_leaks_web_final.pdf

[20] https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2014/05/03/ukra-m03.html

[21] https://edition.cnn.com/2023/02/14/europe/russia-yevgeny-prigozhin-internet-research-agency-intl/index.html

[22] https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2018/0221/Before-Russia-s-troll-farm-turned-to-US-it-had-a-more-domestic-focus

[23] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z4OAQfoMyC8

[24] https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/magazine/the-agency.html

[25] https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2018/01/19/twitter-there-were-more-russian-trolls-than-we-thought/1050091001/

[26] https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2017/11/01/russians-used-facebook-way-other-advertisers-do-tapping-into-its-data-mining-machine/817826001/

[27] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm0312

[28] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm577

[29] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm787

[30] https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/09/16/1035851/facebook-troll-farms-report-us-2020-election/

[31] ibid

[32] https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/06/disinformation-fight-goes-beyond-ukraine-and-its-allies

[33] https://www.csis.org/analysis/russia-western-hemisphere-assessing-putins-malign-influence-latin-america-and-caribbean

[34] https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Pillars-of-Russia%E2%80%99s-Disinformation-and-Propaganda-Ecosystem_08-04-20.pdf

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Author’s Note: Thoughts and assessments in this work are those of the author and are not meant to reflect organizational opinions of the Warrant Officer Career College or the Army.

By Faruk Hadžić.

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Abstract

Undemocratic processes of hybrid and psychological geopolitical warfare blurred relations and security paradigm. The legacy of conflicts and the applied Western policies to the region is the strengthening of ethnonational discourses and the activation of regional crises. The Anglo-American project of post-Cold War spatial planning in the Western Balkans is ineffective. It would be necessary to formulate new Western policies. Balkan nationalist and separatist ideas, which resurfaced with the former Yugoslavia’s break-up, should be reticent and transform within the European Union (EU).

Montenegro and, in particular, Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H) is vulnerable to destabilizing Russian influences, using a complicated social, political, and economic environment, a lack of strategic orientation, and divisions over NATO integration. As for China, Arab countries, and Israel, their influence in the Balkans remains limited, primarily – but not exclusively – to economic projects. However, these impacts will continue to grow unless more severe and concrete measures are taken by the US and EU. Further weakening or eventual disappearance of the EU perspective in the Balkans could lead to new attempts to establish “Greater”- Albania, Croatia, Serbia, or even Ottoman Turkey through violent border changes in the region. Instead of democratizing, the 21st century has brought fragility in the Balkans.

Author

Faruk Hadžić is an independent researcher and an author from Bosnia and Herzegovina. He holds the MSc in Security Studies, Criminal Justice and Law Enforcement Studies, BSc in Psychology & Economics, and Diploma (MBTA) in Mindfulness-Based Transactional Analysis. His research is multidisciplinary in Social and Political Psychology, Political Science, Socioeconomics, Critical Security Studies, and Criminal Justice.
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1158-7858
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Faruk_Hadzic2

The Phenomena and the Western Balkans

The new geopolitical climate has changed the character of conflicts in which wars are fought in the name and for the benefit of other actors supported by powerful forces, which can be terrorist groups, various revolutionary independence movements. When it comes to political pressures, one usually uses one’s position at the international level to force a political decision or influence one to give up already established attitudes. There is the possibility of providing support to specific groups or individuals in power to change the country’s political system or cause riots and conflicts, then political embezzlement that can help violate some international agreements. Psychological – propaganda activities are a form of special operations aimed at achieving psychological effects for their benefit. By carrying out psychological actions, it seeks to “weaken and overthrow the defense of the attacked party by encouraging internal divisions, provoking mistrust and suspicion in the ranks of the defense and encouraging internal enemies of the attacking system to initiate fear, insecurity, disorganization; it serves to spread bad promises, illusions, rumors.” [1] The use of psychology for war purposes dated back to the Chinese thinker Sun Tzu’s thoughts and received its real revelation in the 20th century through two worlds and the cold war. However, the form of use of psychological actions in the new information space has changed significantly. Likewise, psychological operations used to be the exclusive advantage of the state and the armed forces. However, today, in the new social information media, it is in the hands of non-governmental organizations, formal and informal groups, and individuals. In the socio-information framework, the primary means of war participation are becoming psychological activities and operations. Psychological techniques are used to realize numerous general goals of hybrid warfare, which are primarily aimed at avoiding the emergence or minimization of the duration of the regular (militarized) mode of leadership war. Confrontation in the information space has become of general importance and for the collapse of the political, economic, and social system. [2] Thus, psychological activities play a central role in hybrid geopolitical warfare.

The fact is that after the end of the Cold War, the world found itself at the epicenter of a hybrid war in which disinformation became the primary weapon of populism, right or left-wing. The penetration of fake news and various misinformation is becoming more and more powerful on social networks, and the users of these platforms are increasingly victims of deception and manipulation. The Balkans are witnessing the growing crisis of Western powers daily and the worsening populist, nationalist, and conservative US and European leaders’ policies, from US President Trump to Hungarian President Viktor Orban. They nullify any European Union (EU) and The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) attempts to reform Balkan countries.

Hybrid warfare is a new term by which they try to cover and emphasize all the specifics of contemporary conflicts in the first two decades of the twenty-first century. There is still no generally accepted definition of hybrid warfare, despite the great popularity in the professional field and scientific circles. Initially, hybrid warfare [3] was considered a combined application of conventional military capabilities and special forces, irregular acts, terrorist acts, and criminal activity. In the combined application of different forms, a synergistic effect is expected both in the conflict’s physical and psychological [4] domains. Later, the perception of hybrid warfare is extended to all other forms, means, and ways of endangering security. In the broadest sense, hybrid war is any action by any means that undermine, hinders, damages an opposing-rival-hostile state, its economy, people, and the entire social life. In a narrower sense, hybrid warfare undermines state order in the opposing state in any way and by any means. Within the category of hybrid warfare, hybrid action, it is necessary to mention the notion of “soft power” as a weapon that threatens universalist and inclusive elements better than the conventional one. I maintain that hybrid warfare is a term used uncritically today. The very expression as a peculiarity – sui generis – has existed since the Lebanese war in 2006 and Hezbollah’s strategy towards Israel and implies a combination of conventional, irregular, and information warfare. According to specific goals of interest and with the help of specific and psychological operations or the so-called, there are several traditional state strategies according to specific goals of interest, reflexive control operations to influence someone’s decision-making process.

The Balkan territorial-expansionist ethnopolitics’ destructive power has already shown that it can destroy states, peoples, religious institutions, educational systems, scientific plants, and human dignity. In the dominant diplomatic discourse, the Western Balkans’ stability and prosperity are viewed in the context of two integrative processes: the accession of the region to NATO and the EU regions and their targeted Europeanization. The newly formed countries of the region become an area of export of democracy, the object of geopolitics enlargement, political and security order, and the US and the EU’s engagement, which as external actors moderate the crisis in the region. In particular, the US’ policy toward the region, in which it has been active since the end of the Cold War, can be seen in the context of a complex diplomatic and military approach aimed at establishing a new geopolitical configuration in Southeast Europe. In the crisis area of Southeast Europe, the US has been present for almost three decades, and in resolving the crisis and stabilizing the region, it has continuously used a whole range of diplomatic, political, and military instruments to securely “encircle” the Western Balkans, geopolitically necessary for strategic control of the Adriatic Mediterranean and the Black Sea regions. However, after 2000, preoccupied with the “war on terror,” and thus the geopolitical restructuring of the Middle East, the US was present in the Western Balkans indirectly, through the actions of Allied actors pursuing a policy of expanding security (NATO) and economic (EU, IMF and other international financial institutions) order, and with the help of which the region is identity-shaped as a western value. [5]

The US geopolitician Robert Kaplan (2017) argued that peace in the Balkans could be achieved and maintained solely with “external imperial force.” According to Kaplan, in the times of the empires’ (Charlemagne, the Habsburg Monarchy, and the Ottoman Empire) collapse that ruled the Balkans, the region regularly turned into battlefields. [6] A logical question arises – did the European Union become a new empire that would maintain a peace order in the Balkans? The EU’s role in Southeast Europe is inconsistent between its normative potential and current problematic aspects of process implementation policies. Moreover, outside the ritual, political matrix framework, concentration on specific programs to stimulate economic, technological, social, human development, and regional integration is not progressive. [7] Although the EU adopted a new Enlargement Strategy for the Western Balkans in 2018, the potential of stability is not proven. Instead of liberalism and Europeanization, further Balkanization of the region resulted from the EU’s failure and the allies’ conflicting interests – the US and NATO. Such a constellation of relations has made it possible to strengthen many non-Western actors – Russia, Turkey, China, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, whose presence has strongly shaped the Western Balkans’ security climate for many years. After years of close cooperation, during which mostly followed EU and US peacekeeping solutions in the region, Montenegro decided to declare independence (2006), and Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence (2008) significantly damaged relations between Russia and the West. The unusually active role of the US and Western allies in the decomposition of Serbia and the region’s geopolitical transformation has resulted in increased Russian engagement with the region. Ever since the Ukrainian crisis outbreak in 2014, the US and the European Union have seen Russia’s presence in the Balkans as a security threat. The geopolitical clash between the West and Russia is gradually profiling itself into a conflict of interest of the great powers, which measure their influence on the region’s countries through diplomacy, significant investment, and confrontational energy infrastructure projects. [8]

Because NATO is still the strongest geopolitical alliance, Russia is increasingly turning to new allies who are actively working to create a counterweight to the US as a unipolar center of the post-Cold War world. China, Iran, and Turkey, which are increasingly moving away from Western countries’ influence and policies, are strengthening their own economic and political ties with Russia. Although not without risk to Turkey, the new alliance with Russia, Iran, and China has a significant impact on the region. In the Western Balkans, China is more present, especially in the sphere of economy. So far, Chinese investments in energy, roads, railways, and other 5.5 billion euros have come to Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H), Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia. Saudi Arabia finances numerous humanitarian centers and non-governmental organizations and provides several other investments in B&H, such as market centers and separate luxury resorts for Arab citizens. Investments are expanding widely in the region. Turkey has long strengthened its economic and political influence and seeks to establish itself as a dominant regional power. Besides, it is an indisputable fact that during the genocide and war crimes, and within the arms embargo, Iran provided the most significant possible military and diplomatic assistance to the B&H people during the war.

I maintain that “negative influence” threatens universalist and inclusive elements of Balkan societies, the political and national history of these countries, intercultural diversity, and sovereignty, strengthening regional pan-nationalisms’ irredentist aspirations. Based on credible data, analyzes, and estimates that after the failures in Montenegro and Macedonia, which are today within NATO, almost all Russia’s capacities in this area are directed, i.e., Russia’s hybrid action towards Macedonia, Montenegro, and BiH. In such hybrid activities, Serbia, one of the neighboring countries, gives Russia excellent aid and plays a significant role. The fact is that representatives of the Serbian state apparatus were active in Montenegro, Macedonia, at the events’ time, which was a clear sign. At the same time, we should not rule out that such activities are very intensive towards B&H. However, Russia should not be denigrated either. It is trying to use the same means, although it succeeds to a lesser extent than the US and Western Europe combined. We have had the Snowden case and the Prizma affair, and Western spying on the states and officials, with contractual cooperation with Facebook, Google, Twitter, and Microsoft. Russia did not invent such particular warfare, even though they are merely adopting Western techniques. They also have a significant learning capacity, with a high population having a university degree.

The Balkan security dilemma’s central discourse is “who will control the land,” a piece of a particular territory within the pressure of national hegemonist ideas (Greater Serbia and Croatia). Albanians in Macedonia did not get territory but rights (they changed the Constitution, the President of the Assembly is of Albanian nationality, the right to speak in Albanian was also introduced), while in B&H, ethnicity was gained, which means increased opportunities for monopoly and power over the territory. [9] According to Jadranka Polovic (2018), the Greater Albania concept, behind all the previous post-Cold War administrations of the US and UK, has already been practically-legally realized and becoming irrelevant. The borders between Kosovo and Albania and the borders between Kosovo and western Macedonia do not exist. Formal recognition of the creation of a “Greater Albania” that reaches beyond western Macedonia, the southern and eastern parts of Montenegro (Ulcinj and parts of the municipalities of Plav and Rozaje), the Presevo Valley in southern Serbia, and southern Greek Epirus, parts of foreign countries, would cause complete chaos and a new war in the region. The Greater Albania concept’s implementation is being achieved by drawing the entire region into NATO and the EU. [10] B&H and the former Yugoslavia area with a nationalist ethnopolitics and a continuous conflict, as a dangerous “barrel of gunpowder,” become a scene of competition, collisions, and competition between most influential actors of the modern world in the first decades of the 21st century. In this constellation, violent hegemonic nationalism in the Balkans partly serves as a space of displaced European horror in which clashes of “great powers” take place, while a small number of South Slavic peoples maniacally exterminate each other, demolish places of worship, expel the population, commit mass crimes, destroy the remaining ethnically homogeneous and clean spaces. [11]

Dominant perceptions in the countries of the Western Balkans are sometimes present. It narrows the framework for observing and understanding the behavior of great powers in this region, with an unargued overestimation of their significance and importance in the plans of these great powers, and the introduction of emotional elements in the field of international relations where only interests are most valued and measured. The great powers’ mutual relations are complex, multi-layered, and pragmatic above all. The great powers in some regions or on some issues agree, coordinate actions, and even help, while in other areas or issues, there is disagreement and confrontation. In pursuing their interests, the great powers have a wide range of opportunities and resources at their disposal. The various forms of contemporary conflict are often portrayed as the result of the projection of hybrid threats and termed hybrid warfare. The wide presence and topicality [12] of the phenomenon of hybrid warfare is the reason to problematize the concept of hybrid warfare by evaluating central questions and answers of practical interest to decision-makers at the strategic level. The Western Balkans region’s importance in the two elected great powers’ strategic agendas – Russia and Turkey are evident. For years, Montenegro and other countries in the region have been a testing ground for cyber attacks and the spread of false news by which some foreign powers, primarily Russia, are trying to undermine and slow down the Euro-Atlantic integration of the post-Yugoslav states. Indeed, other great powers are closely following the development of events in the Western Balkans and possible trends and scenarios [13] of future development. In addition to the “malignant” Russian influence, the West is increasingly facing Turkey’s arbitrary policy, which, especially after 2000, is questioning the possibilities of its action in the region. Namely, Turkey, a strategically important member of NATO, until recently an unquestionable ally of the US, is trying to renew its sphere of influence in the Balkans, a region that belonged to the Ottoman Empire until the First World War. Turkey is a unique, doubly “endowed” country – with the space of its geopolitical influence, especially the control of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles as internationally important straits and the successor to the Ottoman Empire. The mutual relations between Russia and Turkey have become very topical in recent times and is there much research in this area. [14] It is critical in the current time in the broader context of the relations of these two countries with other great powers and the conflicts in the Middle East and growing tensions in South America.

In Serbia, approaching NATO is taboo due to Serbia’s 1999 bombing to stop Kosovo’s conflict. This relationship is reflected in B&H politics. There is also a declarative commitment to European integration, which is burdened by the Kosovo syndrome. By the Kosovo syndrome, we mean Serbian politics’ burden with the belief that joining the EU means renouncing territorial sovereignty. In this way, the EU’s demands for better functioning of BiH are read in the Republic of Srpska RS (one of the B&H entities). In B&H and Kosovo’s relations, no aspect can be singled out to function at a satisfactory level. Relations remain in the realm of political rhetoric, and the problem of freedom of movement between BiH and Kosovo is directly linked to asymmetric and scarce economic cooperation. B&H is a permanent crisis state, with the world’s most complex political and public administration, the inability to create the minimum internal political cohesion needed to build a stable political identity. In the BiH’s ethnoreligious model formed by the Dayton Peace Accords (1995), the demographic remnant is unconstitutional. For the most part, a mere constitutional decor appropriately enshrined in the last indent of the discriminatory BiH Constitution’s Preamble. Therefore, the name “Others” is an unsentimental description of their position in this ethnoreligious divided society. [15] Furthermore, Chinese investments in the Western Balkans economies have brought the presence of the Chinese intelligence service MSS with them. This service deals with the interests of China’s state policy and the protection of Chinese investments. Moreover, the Chinese service, together with business people, operates not only in the Western Balkans but also throughout Europe. The German counterintelligence service has marked 10,000 German citizens in contact with fake intelligence officers from China. That is why the presence of the Chinese intelligence service on the territory of B&H, and especially in Serbia and Croatia, is very significant for the intelligence and security apparatus of B&H. [16]

The Western Balkans remain poorly connected in terms of infrastructure atomized energy market, burdened with political instability, which negatively affects the energy security of the region. The EU on the Western Balkans is focused on infrastructure projects that can significantly affect the energy sector’s decarbonization (hydropower, renewables, natural gas), while China prefers mining and thermal energy. Russia is focused on the gas and oil sector and currently fully controls areas in Serbia and B&H. [17] Some argue that strategic or religious goals drive the Arab Gulf countries’ investment interest in the Balkans. Others state that the reasons are strictly financial, a convenient location at the crossroads, competitive labor cost, and the EU joins the regions for investments. While the media’s attention is on companies from Arab countries, the crucial fact is that 80 percent of real estate investments in the region must be due to Israel. “Israel investors have concentrated on retail parks and shopping malls.” [18] 

Social media has become a platform for diversity in psychological activities and processes of a coercive, deceptive, alienating, and defensive nature. People receive most of their information daily via Facebook and other online platforms. If we briefly focus on B&H, 1,500 media outlets have been proven to have published false news at least once. During one-year research and analysis of the observed media, a whole network (hub), domestic and newspapers from the environment that spread false news in an organized manner, exists. “The hub is not actually in B&H, but it consists of 14 media from B&H and 15 media from Serbia, which have been proven to share misinformation and have over ten connections in spreading various misinformation. It is alarming because they work together and operationally. Among these media is Russian Sputnik.” [19] These are elements of information warfare, as a type of special warfare, which is an essential feature of the information-communication era in which information, misinformation, false information, deception, and propaganda are on the scene. However, it is not just the states that do it, but huge companies, non-governmental organizations, and formal and informal groups.

Conclusion

The legacy of conflicts and the applied Western policies to the region is the strengthening of ethnonational discourses and the activation of regional crises. The Anglo-American project of post-Cold War spatial planning in the Western Balkans is ineffective, so it would be necessary to formulate new Western policies. Undemocratic processes of hybrid and psychological geopolitical warfare blurred relations and security paradigm. Confrontation in the information space created the ground for numerous influences on the physical and the opponent’s cognitive sphere in the hybrid geopolitical warfare.

Balkan nationalist and separatist ideas, which resurfaced with the former Yugoslavia’s break-up, should be reticent and transform within the EU borders. Montenegro and, in particular, B&H is vulnerable to destabilizing Russian influences, using a complicated social, political, and economic environment, a lack of strategic orientation, and divisions over NATO integration. As for China, Arab countries, and Israel, their influence in the Balkans remains limited, primarily – but not exclusively – to economic projects. However, these impacts will continue to grow unless more severe and concrete US and EU replace them. Further weakening or eventual disappearance of the EU perspective in the Balkans could lead to new attempts to establish “Greater Albania,” “Greater Croatia,” “Greater Serbia,” or even “Greater Ottoman Turkey” through violent border changes, which would unquestionably lead to new violence in the region. Thus, instead of democratizing, the 21st century has brought fragility to the Balkans.

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References, Endnotes:

[1] Ranogajec, V. (2000). Psihološki rat [Psychological war]. Polemos, Casopis za interdisciplinarna istraživanja rata i mira. 3(5). https://hrcak.srce.hr/2999

[2] Hunter, E. & Pernik, P. (2015). The challenges of hybrid warfare. International Centre for Defence and Security EESTI-Estonia. https://www.icds.ee/fileadmin/media/icds.ee/failid/Eve_Hunter__Piret_Pernik_-_Challenges_of_Hybrid_Warfare.pdf

[3] Tagarev, T., (2018). Hybrid Warfare: Emerging Research Topics, Information & Security: An International Journal. 39. 289-300.

[4] Vučinić D., (2017). Psihološko ratovanje u prostoru društvenih informacionih medija – aspekt hibridnog ratovanja. Vojno delo.7

[5] Polović, J. and Frlan, J. (2019). Zapadni balkan: „divide et impera“ ili zašto suprotstavljeni interesi velikih sila generiraju trajnu nestabilnost regije [Western Balkans: “divide et impera” or why the conflicting interests of the great powers generate lasting instability in the region]. Acta Economica et turistica. 5(2)

[6] Kaplan, R. (2017). New York Times. The Necessary Empire. May 5

[7] Hadžić, F., (2020). Bosnia between the Dayton’s peace straightjacket, development, and power centers’ moral obligation; solicitation to Biden, Small Wars Journal

[8] Polović, J. & Frlan, J. (2019). Zapadni balkan: „divide et impera“ ili zašto suprotstavljeni interesi velikih sila generiraju trajnu nestabilnost regije [Western Balkans: “divide et impera” or why the conflicting interests of the great powers generate lasting instability in the region]. Acta Economica et turistica. 5(2)

[9] Niall M., (2017). NATO and the Western Balkans, From Neutral Spectator to Proactive Peacemaker. London: Palgrave Macmillan

[10] Polovic, J. (2018). Geopolitika. Velika Albanija: san ili realnost? [Great Albania: dream or reality?]. https://www.geopolitika.news/analize/dr-sc-jadranka-polovic-velika-albanija-san-ili-realnost/

[11] Nikolić N. (2017). Razmatranje inovativnosti koncepta hibridnog ratovanja [Consideration of the innovativeness of the concept of hybrid warfare]. Vojno delo. 2. 320-332.

[12] Graham, T., Levitsky, J., Munter C. & Wisner F. (2018).
Time for Action in the Western Balkans. Policy report, EastWest Institute

[13] Arbatova, N. (2018). The Russia-Turkey Relations: Strategic Partnership or Strategic Rivalry – Policy paper series 4/2018. Nicosia: Cyprus Center for European and International Affairs.

[14] Ünver, A. (2019). Russian Digital Media and Information Ecosystem in Turkey. Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies. 1-56. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep21042?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents

[15] Hadžić, F. (2020). Post-Yugoslav spaces between defective democracies, authoritarianism, and kleptocracies, International Affairs and Global Strategy. 86. 38-52. 10.7176/IAGS/86-04

[16] Kico, A. & Kapetanovic M. (2019). Bosna i Hercegovina i Zapadni Balkan – Aspekti geopolitike i hibridnog rata [Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Western Balkans – Aspects of Geopolitics and Hybrid Warfare]. Sarajevo: Atlantska incijativa.

[17] Turcalo, S. (2020). Energetska geopolitika na Balkanu. [Energy geopolitics in the Balkans], http://library.fes.de/pdf-giles/bueros/sarajevo/16147.pdf

[18] Dnevnik.hr. (2017). Financial times. https://dnevnik.hr/vijesti/svijet/financial-times-otkriva-zasto-bliskoistocni-investitori-ulazu-u-balkan—474690.html

[19] Brkan, D. (2020). Slobodna Europa. Hibridni rat dezinformacijama nad Balkanom [A hybrid war of disinformation over the Balkans]. https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/sajber-napadi-crna-gora/30230596.html

By; LtCol Chris Howard (UK Army), LtCol Rolf Starosta (DEU Army), Maj Eliann Carr (US Army), and Cpt Philipp Nebgen (DEU Army).

Modern warfare requires abrupt adaptation to dynamic developments of circumstances in which the use of special operations forces to counter violent extremism has become increasingly essential to provide the required immediate response. After decades of reaction to each action in the physical environment, patterns of behavior are emerging in the information environment that lead to the predictability of how both adversary and ally respond to kinetic action.

The momentum of information has accelerated through the evolution of social media and real time messaging. This developed capability integrated an ancient perspective of the “war on influence” using modern day platforms. The nearly instantaneous nature of information flow illuminates one single source being the strongest point influence—the mind.

As seen in current campaigns, we are fighting a networked non-state enemy with highly professional and advanced propaganda that exploits modern media, most notably through the internet, to disseminate messages globally. There messages are simple in presentation but deep in influence as they bolster recruitment and propagate extremist ideology. Because the enemy’s center of gravity exists in the information domain, it is there that we must engage.

This places a stronger emphasis on the role of special operations forces within every military campaign due to their inherent nature of expedient adaptation and ability to shape the environment through integration of kinetic and non-kinetic actions. This integration of effects propels special operations into the modern warfare front where conventional forces continue to remain fixated on predominately-kinetic actions.

The next evolutionary in the application of combined kinetic and non-kinetic action is toward the predictive nature of human behavior, such as the emerging pattern of how adversaries respond to kinetic action. Through intentionally applying combined effects to this strategic intercept is what will ultimately disrupt adversarial decision-making, resulting in our more dominant positioning within the information environment. Although kinetic actions are a form of messaging, alone they will only evoke a primal response, which will likely lead to continued escalation of action and reaction. To attain sustainable success for military operations is through the prevention of retaliatory escalation leading to direct de-escalation. All of which is achieved through the integration of both kinetic and non-kinetic planning in conjunction to the primary kinetic action.

Special operations house highly skilled men and women with unique abilities tailored toward this form of tangible and intangible warfare. It is through the orchestration of each generated effect of these skills that will mitigate the degree of adversarial response. Furthermore, it is the application of these same effects into the information environment in the time leading up to a kinetic strike that may potentially mitigate adversarial kinetic response altogether in the physical environment.

As warfare advances in stride with technology, so does the methods of how to analyze and assess the environments of wartime operations. Through these advancements, evidence of existing algorithms of predictable behavior surface giving way to the development of revised protocols. Existing research in the predictability of criminal behavior and the time-sequenced escalation of retaliation are the theoretical framework applied to understand the predictableness of adversarial behavior. Through the indicated points of predicted response are the points of intercept where non-kinetic effects are most potent in eliciting an intended response from adversarial decision-makers.

The key to achieve this level of interdiction is a purposeful approach to the development and distribution of strategic communication that will guide the synchronization of both kinetic and non-kinetic efforts. Unlike conventional war strategies, it is the understanding that non-kinetic actions are essential to surgically shaping the information environment leading to tangible operations. To say that the pen is mightier than the sword, is certainly not entirely wrong. However, to address the concerns of violent extremism and wartime threats, we need both.

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Photo:

Selected from https://pixabay.com/de/; a free to use website.

Authors:

Lieutenant Colonel Christian L Howard. Adjutants General’s Corps (Educational and Training Services) (AGC(ETS)) BSc (Hons), MSc, PGCE.

Lieutenant Colonel Rolf Starosta. Chief Operations 1st German Armored Division. Currently deployed with CJTF-OIR.

Major Eliann Carr. Ph.D., Human Dev & Ed Psych. Presently serving as an Information Operations Analyst.

Captain Philipp Nebgen is an intelligence officer for the Strategic Reconnaissance Command of the German Armed Forces and currently on duty for the Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve.

By Ajit Maan

“Narratives are essential in mobilizing local actions to defeat violent extremists. Some leaders laugh nervously at this concept, and dismiss it with arrogant waves of the hand. Misperceptions about narrative and story as somehow being a squishy and un-warrior-like action to be out-sourced, are putting us at a severe disadvantage. It is one thing to get a narrative wrong. It is worse not to consider it a part of the campaign when your enemy is already kicking your ass with it.” 

Col. (ret) Scott Mann, Game Changers: Going Local to Defeat Violent Extremists

One way to lose an unconventional war is to address it conventionally. In fact, when we have won a kinetic victory and taken back territory, as we have against ISIS in Iraq and Syria, but have not won the war, we have done something worse than not winning. We have driven our adversaries underground, across borders, and left them with only the irregular weapons that they use better than we do. Now we have to fight in a domain that they dominate.

As per their plans, our Jihadist adversaries have cost us blood and treasure, they have waited us out, they have eroded our will to fight, they have caused division in our homelands, they have used our own actions against us in a way that has won them recruits, and those recruits, made in our homelands, are what threatens us now.

We have not won.

But we have not quite lost either. There is a way forward.

First we need to get clear about the nature of the non-kinetic conflicts we are in.

The two views expressed by the new general in charge of operations in Afghanistan, General Scott Miller, and by RAND’s counterterrorism guru Brian Jenkins, are representative of pervasive thought among those who appreciate the non-kinetic basis of current conflicts around the world. Jenkins expresses a common confusion between ideological and narrative warfare, and Miller overlooks the narrative foundation required for successful engagement, whether military or political. This is not because these talented professionals are completely wrong in their assertions but because they are not well versed in the nature of narrative and the way it conditions human cognition, identity, and behavior.

Jenkins recently said that despite battlefield victories against ISIS, the taking back of physical territory, and the degrading of their operational capabilities, “We have had less success in countering the narrative of the Jihadists. We are not very good at it. We are better on the battlefield than we are in ideological warfare. We haven’t dented the determination of our Jihadist foes to continue the struggle.” And he says, “Wars have become even more about perceptions. Outcomes are increasingly dependent on whose story wins.” While I agree with this general perspective the conflation between ideological and narrative warfare requires clarification.

We are engaged in narrative warfare and narrative warfare is not a battle of ideologies nor is it information warfare. Narrative Warfare is warfare over the meaning of information. Ideologies rarely motivate behavior until they are narrated. Ideas get their legs from narratives. The most influential ideas are presented in narrative form. Ideas, on the other hand, have no inherent strategy. Ideas are conscious; narratives are often not conscious. So, when it comes to conflict, much of what happens in narrative conflict is happening at a subconscious level. Narrative warfare is much more insidious than ideological conflict.

General Scott Miller has recently stated that we are not going to win in Afghanistan militarily and what is needed is a political solution.

But in order for there to be a political solution, a narrative resolution is required. That means that each side will need to be able to tell a story about the policy change that is supported by their cultural narratives and that preserves their identities. And yet the story of each player has to be consistent with the stories of the other players. That is what we have to work out at the diplomatic table.

The international spectacle of the most powerful nation on earth compromising with the Taliban didn’t need to happen had we dominated the narrative space in the first place. As Thomas Johnson, author of Taliban Narratives, insists, “The challenge for the US in Afghanistan was to develop a strategy for defeating the insurgent narrative just as decisively as the enemies capability. Unfortunately, this was never done.” And as Scott Mann warned early on, “….we are recklessly giving up narrative ownership to the extremists and other transnational threats. The extremist will fill the local space we ignore with his own version of the story– one that is extremely dangerous to us.”

The single most important part of any operation is the preliminary establishment of a narrative strategy. It is the narrative strategy that must inform/support IO and PsyOps. By “narrative strategy” I don’t mean a mission plan or an explanation about what is going to happen and why. Rather, a narrative strategy proceeds from Narrative and Internarrative Identity Analysis© of the target audiences.

Both types of analysis are critical in developing a series of stories that trigger unconscious cultural narratives (which are bound up with identity) in order to establish, alter, or effect the cognitive frame that will determine how all participants, including domestic audiences and the international community, will view threats to their stability. As Mann says, “This is a paradigm change for our intelligence community as well. They have to get well beyond the threat networks and into the world of narrative. ….not enough leaders are calling for narrative perspective as an information requirement….”

The Special Operations community has long understood the importance of Human Terrain Analysis but a significant gap in fully understanding the Human Terrain is the narrative foundation of that terrain.

Let us be clear that the power of narrative does not begin with messaging or communication. Narrative is more basic than that. Narratives provide a cognitive framework, a sort of meaning map, that will determine what meaning will be assigned to events and experiences. Strategic narratives provide a frame for incoming information. Human experience of events, and the meaning we assign to them, are determined by the narratives we live by.

To the extent the DoD includes narrative considerations, it is focused only on countering them. The current emphasis on counter narratives is misplaced and insufficient because it treats narrative as a type of messaging and ignores the identity components of narratives. Further, counter-narratives are reactive and defensive. We will not dominate by playing only defense.

I suspect US counter-insurgency strategy focuses so much on counter-narrative because it is less difficult to get our hands on an adversarial narrative and object to it (often unnecessarily and counter-productively) than it is to construct an offensive narrative. In other words, it is easier to be a critic than an artist. But counter-narratives are often counter-productive because, as we have witnessed, they are easy to get wrong and perhaps worse, they reiterate the original adversarial message.

We need an offensive narrative strategy that gets there first, shapes perceptions ahead of action, and continues to shape perceptions for years to come. If we are successful our narrative will determine how ensuing actions will be interpreted. It will preempt further insurgency by inoculating populations to insurgent narratives. Once the narrative is in place, the context for understanding future action/events/experience will have been established.

The lasting long-term effects of narrative dominance are the closest we can get to something like victory in irregular warfare. Counter narratives are not nearly enough to get us there. Narrative Warfare is warfare over the meaning of information and we need to learn how to tell our meaning. Our adversaries have demonstrated they already know how. It is not enough to catch up with them by countering their narrative. We must dominate with our own.

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Ajit Maan, Ph.D. is author of Counter-Terrorism: Narrative Strategies, Narrative Warfare, and co-author of Introduction to Narrative Warfare. She is Affiliate Faculty, Center for the Study of  Narrative and Conflict Resolution at George Mason University, member of the Brain Trust of the Weaponized Narrative Initiative at Arizona State University, and Founder of Narrative Strategies, LLC.

Here at SOF News (an extremely small staff I tell you) we scour the Internet and social media everyday for hours to find relevant news for our SOF audience (that follow the SOF News website, Twitter, LinkedIn, and Facebook). We do this so you don’t have to. You get to read about special operations news from around the world by following us. We do the hard work and package it up for you so you can get on with your busy day – content that you know all about the latest SOF news and can hold your own in a conversation during coffee break – whether in a team room or in the vast domain of USSOCOM HQs. We have a website, weekly newsletter, and several social media accounts – pick your poison.

Political Aspects of Mil Blogging. Which brings me to my point about mil bloggers. One dynamic that is becoming increasing clear is an undercurrent within the military blogger community (includes all social media) where the political views are advanced by participants on the left and right (yes, surprise, surprise there are liberal mil bloggers out there as well). There is a certain variety of liberal mil bloggers, it seems to me, that are using their status as ‘military veterans’ to advance their liberal agenda – some in a very academic and civil manner. Others in a more insidious way. Of course, on the other side of the coin there are some conservative mil bloggers doing the same. Then there are the mil bloggers who ignore the ‘political grist’ and concentrate on military news, commentary, and analysis (I think this is where SOF News resides).

Virtue Signalling. One tactic of some of the leftist mil bloggers is the accusation of ‘virtue signaling’. For instance, if a writer says that he spent a career in SF and he feels women don’t belong on an ODA he is accused of ‘virtue signaling‘ with the intent of discrediting the author and his argument. Many of these social media accounts take every opening to discredit someone opposed to their views. Some of them are targeting members of the SOF community – casting doubt on their credentials and asking questions like “What really makes a Green Beret or SEAL so special?”

Trash Talking. I was quite aware of the conservative mil blogging community – most of whom are quite reputable; although there are many that do a lot of ‘trash talking’ (reminds me of cornerbacks in the NFL). [1] What has become more evident to me is the (apparently) growing presence of mil bloggers on the left. Once again, most of whom are quite reputable. However, there seems to be a growing number who engage in the trash talking tactics as well.

Hot Button Issues. Some favorite topics of leftist mil bloggers include gun control, women in SOF and combat arms, equal representation of women in national security forums (panel discussions, symposiums, etc.), and non-veterans being able to comment on national security issues. Of course, some of these same issues and points of view are advanced by centrist and conservative mil bloggers as well (for instance women in SOF). [2] It isn’t a well-defined area. Probably one way of describing the situation is saying the leftist mil bloggers are advancing issues of concern important to (using a favorite conservative term) ‘social justice warriors’ (SJW).

Gun Control. The latest school shooting in Florida really brought this out – on the left and the right. For example some commentators with a SOF background, relying on their training and experience, voiced their opinions and observations on the topic of LE officers responding to school shootings. If their stance differed from that of a ‘leftist’ mil blogger (who was a veteran) then the ‘just because you are SOF doesn’t make your opinion or observation more valid than mine; I carried an M16 in Iraq’ argument is used. I guess we ignore the fact that the SOF guy probably has specialty courses like SOTIC, SFAUC, CQB, hostage rescue, CT opns, etc. in his toolbox.

Non-Veterans and National Security Issues. Another favorite issue of some liberal mil bloggers is reinforcing the idea that non-veterans can comment on issues relating to conflict and national security. There seems to be a big push to invalidate the military service of mil bloggers (who are veterans) even among the liberal mil bloggers. It is a ‘just because you served doesn’t mean your opinion means more than a non-veteran’ type of argument. Of course, sometimes it is the personality at hand. They are quick to point out the virtues of Max Boot (a military historian and great author but no military service) probably because of his constant pounding of President Trump in social media. [3] On the other hand I find that the leftist military bloggers are quite ready to criticize the ‘national security credentials’ of President Trump (by raising the draft deferment issue) or John Bolton (by pointing out he joined the National Guard to avoid service in Vietnam). I guess it is very ‘situational’ in their mind.

Discrediting SOF Commentators. Another troubling aspect is the apparent ‘offensive’ against the SOF social media community. There appears to be a small group of non-SOF mil bloggers and social media users who take every opportunity in very open and sometimes ‘hidden’ ways to discount a mil blogger or social media user who has a SOF background. As if the special training and wartime experiences a SOF service member has gone through doesn’t make him any more special than the regular infantryman, personnel clerk, cook, or mechanic. SOF folks and organizations are accused of having a ‘warrior mindset’ (as though that was a bad thing) and living in a ‘hypermasculine culture’. [4] This same crowd ridicules the ‘alpha male’ while ‘ endorsing the ‘beta male mindset’.

Mutual Admiration Society and Ganging Up. There appears to be – at least in the ‘leftist’ mil blogger community (and it is also in the ‘rightist’ mil blogger community as well) – a ‘mutual admiration society’ that employ reinforcing tactics; especially in the “Twitter Sphere”. It is almost as though there is a ‘ganging up’ policy. Some of the tactics include the use of ‘memes’ and others use humor. For example Duffel Blog (I am a big fan) recently took the opportunity to poke fun at the ‘veteran blogger’. [5]

It is all very interesting in an academic sort of way. So does SOF News have a ‘leftist’ or ‘rightist’ approach?

Probably not. As Joe Friday once said . . .

Footnotes:

[1] If I took the occasion to point out that I was a corner back on a college football team (which I was) and therefore I know about corner backs ‘trash talking’ then I could be accused of ‘virtue signaling’.

[2] A broad generalization of the ‘women in SOF’ issue could be this: one segment of the mil blogging community think women don’t belong in SOF (usually SOF commentators) while another segment would like to see more women in SOF as long as the standards are not changed. Then, there is the segment that believes the standards are outdated or inappropriate; which of course, would ‘change’ (not lower) standards allowing more women to become SOF.

[3] Max Boot is one of my favorite book authors. I like his commentary on national security. His constant disparaging of Trump, to the delight of leftist mil bloggers, during the election and over the past year detracted considerably from the value of his Twitter feed. Once Trump is out of office in 3 to 7 years Boot will most likely be looked upon less favorably by the leftist mil blogger crowd.

[4] Twitter feed on March 8, 2018.

[5] See “Opinion: As a veteran, my opinion counts more than yours”, Duffel Blog, March 7, 2018. I love the Duffel Blog by the way.

MISO Name Change – The U.S. Army is changing the name of the units that conduct influence operations from Military Information Support Operations or MISO to Psychological Operations. A few years back PSYOP was discarded and MISO became the general term to describe the units that conducted information operations.

The MISO name was supposed to reflect a new age in information operations that encompassed new aspects with the inform and influence activities that the U.S. Army conducted. It also seemed to be a term that was less offensive to non-military members of government (State Department?).

MISOC. The Military Information Support Operations Command (Airborne) (Provisional) was provisionally activated in August 2011. The commander is a one-star general officer. The command was created with the intent of unifying MISO efforts globally – with two MISO groups. The command has approximately 2,500 Soldiers. The MISOC is part of the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). MISOC consists of the 4th and 8th Military Information Support Groups. There are several Military Information Support Battalions – five with a regional orientation and two with a general, worldwide mission. In addition, there are MISO Planning and Advisory Teams (MPATs) that work with the Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs).

There are three levels of PSYOP – strategic, operational, and tactical. These three levels of PSYOP operations are conducted to support national security objectives. At the strategic level – especially when working within embassies – the term PSYOP was viewed with a little suspicion. MISO was a more benign term that non-military people could more easily accept.

The name change is mostly administrative – the mission of PSYOP units and personnel will not change. Some see the MISO name change as a morale booster – and a re-establishment of the PSYOP communities heritage and history.

Read “The Army’s psychological operations community is getting its name back”, by Meghann Myers, Army Times, November 6, 2017.

References:

Info on 4th Military Information Support Group
www.soc.mil/4th%20MISG/4thMISG.html

Read an interesting article on why the Army decided to go with “MISO” in 2011 by Col Curtis Boyd entitled “The Future of MISO”, Special Warfare Magazine, January – February 2011.

Resolute Support Social Media – Everyone knowledgeable about counterinsurgency recognizes the importance of winning the media battle. Unfortunately, it seems the insurgent and terrorist groups like ISIS, the Taliban, and others seem to be way out in front of the U.S. and its coalition partners in the information operations (IO) and social media fight. But things seem to be getting better.

CJTF-OIR is setting a high bench mark for successfully using social media in the IO war against ISIS in the Syrian – Iraq area of operations. CJTF-OIR’s use of Twitter and other social media avenues is fairly consistent and rings of accuracy (to an extent). Resolute Support Social Media staff workers in Kabul seem to be a step behind CJTF-OIR but it isn’t for lack of trying. The strategic communications (EF8) and PAO advisors get high marks for working with the Afghan institutions in developing their IO organizations. The use of social media in Afghanistan is just as important as in the Middle East region (Iraq and Syria).

Take a look behind the scenes of one ‘social media operator’ who just completed a tour in Kabul with Resolute Support HQs managing the Facebook, Twitter, Flickr, and YouTube accounts for Resolute Support. Megan Gully, a member of the U.S. Army Material Command Public Affairs office, deployed to Kabul for an extended tour. Read her story “Commentary: My Deployment to Afghanistan”, DVIDS, July 28, 2017.

Social Media and Conflict – selected articles, papers, analysis, and commentary on the role of social media in conflict and war.

The Importance of Counter Influence Operations. History has shown that the United States is vulnerable to an extent by propaganda and covert influence operations. The British used it to lead us into World War I, the Soviet Union used it effectively against us during the “Cold War”, and the North Vietnamese were effective in its use to paint the Tet Offensive in 1968 as a U.S. military failure. Unfortunately the United States no longer has the U.S. Information Agency which could mount counter influence operations. One observer thinks that the U.S. Congress needs to ” . . . use 21st-century policy means to wage the 21st-century information war. America needs a Strategic Information Agency.” Read “Laying Bare the Enemy’s Aims: Defending Public Opinion in the 21st Century”, War on the Rocks, January 2, 2017.

Shaping Opinions. “War Goes Viral”, by Emerson T. Booking and P.W. Singer, The Atlantic, November 2016. A great and comprehensive article about how social media shapes opinion and is used by warring parties in conflict.

The Virtual Caliphate. The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) has an approach to information warfare that represents a key component of its overall strategy. Even though it is under pressure on the ground in the virtual world ISIS continues to make headway. While it may not establish a Caliphate that holds territory (it does now but may not in the long-term) it certainly can carve out a slice of the virtual world for its Caliphate. The United States and its allies need to continue to diminish the ISIS threat in the physical world but must meet the challenge ISIS poses in the virtual world as well. Read more in “The Virtual Caliphate: ISIS’s Information Warfare”, Institute for the Study of War, December 20, 2016.

Lone Wolfs and ISIS Virtual Planners. The Islamic State has its physical caliphate (Syria and Iraq) with provinces in places like eastern Afghanistan and the Lake Chad Basin. It also operates in the ‘virtual world’ as well. Learn more in “ISIL’s Virtual Planners: A Critical Terrorist Innovation”, War on the Rocks, January 4, 2017.

DARPA, Social Media, and the ID of Terrorists. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency is moving ahead with a project that looks to develop automated software designed to identify terrorist threats through social media. Executive Biz Blog, January 3, 2017.

Soft Power and the Weaponized Narrative. The new battlespace (in part) can be found on the Internet. Almost all parties to every current conflict in the world uses social media to shape the fight. Read more in “Weaponized Narrative is the New Battlespace”, Defense One, January 3, 2017.

ISIS and Social Media: A Fatal Attraction. Cellphones, computers, and social media are used by terrorists, insurgents, and political dissidents to spread their message and sway the conversation. But their use also pose danger. Read “Fatal Attraction: ISIS Just Can’t Resist Social Media”, The Daily Beast, January 3, 2017.

Social Media News – papers, publications, commentary, and analysis on how information operations is used to influence the population in support or against governments and their security forces. Islamic State and Social Media, the Kremlin’s IO machine, ‘disinformation’ (dezinformatsiya) is now ‘fake news’, and more.

Social Media News and the Islamic State in Afghanistan. The Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) uses propaganda to advance its cause, gain popular support, gain recruits, and spread its narrative of Salafi-jihadism. Borhan Osman, writing for the Afghanistan Analysts Network, examines the influence operations of the ISKP in eastern Afghanistan. Read ISKP’s Battle for Minds: What are the main messages and who do they attract?, AAN, December 12, 2016.

Extremist Use of Media. Terrorist and insurgent groups have long used the latest in media technology to gain support in their cause, instill fear among target populations, and gather recruits. Read more in “The Age of Selfie Jihad: How Evolving Media Technology is Changing Terrorism”, CTC Sentinel, November 30, 2016.

Law to Reorganize VOA, Radio Free Europe, etc. There are a number of news outlets run by the U.S. to disseminate information. These include Radio Free Asia, Radio Free Europe, and Middle East Broadcasting Networks. Some congressional members feel that the organizations are not centralized and therefore cannot quickly adapt to the 24/7 news cycle. Read more in “New Law Would Reorganize VOA, Other US Government Broadcasters”, Voice of America, December 14, 2016.

Islamic State’s Media War. ISIS has a very competent media operation that has successfully disseminated its strategic communications throughout the world. Read more in “Lighting the Path: The Story of the Islamic State’s Media Enteprise”, War on the Rocks, December 12, 2016.

Paper on US IO Efforts. A recent paper by Christopher Paul discusses shortfalls and deficiencies in U.S. capabilities in information operations (IO). Read more in “Enhancing US Efforts to Inform, Influence, and Persuade”, Parameters, Autumn 2016, Strategic Studies Institute, pages 87-97.

‘Dezinformatsiya’ is now ‘Fake News’. The use of disinformation – through social media news – has been a tool for governments for a long time. The Soviets refined it as a component of ‘political warfare’. Recent news reports in main stream media would suggest that ‘fake news’ is a new aspect of the media. Not so much. Read “Before ‘fake news,’ there was Soviet ‘disinformation'”, The Washington Post, November 26, 2016.

ODNI Statement on Foreign Influence on U.S. Elections. The Democrats are up in arms about the possibility that the Russians influenced the U.S. presidential election in favor of President-Elect Trump. Some intelligence agencies are pointing at the Kremlin as well. The Director for National Intelligence is looking into the matter – read a press release (Dec 14, 2016) on this topic in “Intelligence Community Statement on Review of Foreign Influence on U.S. Elections”.

How to Fight ‘Fake News’. One commentator suggests that we should not “. . . try to fight the firehose of falsehood with the squirtgun of truth.” We should instead “. . . put ‘raincoats’ on those who will be hit with the firehose.” Read “Beyond the Headlines: RAND’s Christopher Paul Discusses the Russian ‘Firehose of Falsehood'”, The RAND Blog, December 13, 2016.

Kremlin and IO. The Russians have mastered the realm of information operations. Recent news reports indicate that they have a significant social media machine designed to influence audiences around the world. The Russians cyber warfare capability is also well resourced. This type of hybrid warfare is dominated by information and psychological conflict. Russians view modern warfare as not only military conflict but competition in the political, diplomatic, economic, and informational sectors. (Sort of reminds you of the Cold War – doesn’t it?). Read more in “The Kremlin’s ‘New Generation Warfare’ Is Just Getting Started”, War is Boring, December 10, 2016. For more on this topic read Alexander Velez-Green’s article “The United States and Russia Are Already at War”, Small Wars Journal, December 13, 2016.