Over the past few years, the U.S. has moved its focus from the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and long running counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan to strategic competition. The emphasis of the national security establishment and the Department of Defense has been on our chief competitors in the global arena. Of primary importance is the threat posed by China in the Indo-Pacific region and by Russia in Eastern Europe. This redirection toward great power competition with Russia and China has us moving away from our involvement in the Middle East.

A recent article published by the Middle East Institute points out that the Middle East region is still a volatile place that deserves our attention. Authored by Gen. (ret.) Joseph Votel and Col. (ret.) Christopher Costa, the article argues for continued support of Iraq’s premier counter terrorism unit by U.S. Special Operations Forces.

Iran is still supporting its proxy forces in Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere in the region. The Houthis of Yemen are wreaking havoc on the shipping lanes in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. The conflict in Gaza could very likely spill over into neighboring countries. The incidents of attacks against U.S. personnel and facilities in the Middle East has grown significantly since the Hamas terrorist attacks against Israel in October 2023 and subsequent invasion of Gaza by Israel.

Currently, the U.S. is involved in negotiations with Iraq about future U.S. force presence in Iraq. The Higher Military Commission (HMC) is one of the mechanisms for discussions on the continued fight against the Islamic State. To many outside observers – this seems like negotiations for a withdrawal or reduction of western forces.

During the August 2023 U.S.-Iraq Joint Security Cooperation Dialogue (JSCD) the United States and Iraq committed to launch the Higher Military Commission (HMC) on a mutually determined date (DOD Release, 8 Aug 2023). On January 25, 2024, the beginning of the HMC officially took place (DOD Transcript, 25 Jan 2024). The HMC process will discuss the evolution of the Coalition mission while taking into consideration that one result will be that the Islamic State can never resurge.

Currently there are 24 nations that are contributing to the Coalition Joint Task Force and the mission of Operation Inherent Resolve. There are about 2,500 American troops in the Iraq region as well has hundreds from other European countries. The main focus of the Coalition is the enduring defeat of ISIS and the advise-assist-enable missions with partner forces – Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), Kurdish Security Forces, and Iraqi SOF units.

It is quite possible that the Coalitions personnel strength and combat enabling capabilities (ISR, strike, etc.) will be reduced as a result of the HMC process. One important consideration in the talks should be the continued relationship between U.S. Special Operations Forces (USSOF) and the Iraqi Counterterrorism Force (CTS).

This relationship has spanned twenty years – beginning in 2004 with the establishment of the Iraqi Counter Terrorist Force (ICTF) and the 36th Commando Battalion. Over those past twenty years these two units have evolved into one of the premier counterterrorism units in the Middle East. The CTS has performed admirably over the past two decades and remains one of the few professional non-sectarian units in the Iraqi security establishment.

As the talks between U.S. and Iraqi negotiators proceed it is important that one of the provisions of any resulting agreement be the continued relationship between USSOF and the CTS. This should include the presence of USSOF in Iraq and the authorities to continue the advisory and support mission.

Gen. (ret.) Joseph Votel and Col. (ret.) Christopher Costa argue that “the CTS is a strategic hedge against violent extremist organizations in the Middle East”, USSOF has had an enduring relationship with the CTS, and a “strong CTS strengthens a sovereign Iraq”. They provide three recommendations on how the U.S. can continue to support the Iraqi Counterterrorism Service.

Gen. Votel is the former commander of USSOCOM and CENTCOM. Col. Costa is a former career intelligence officer who served with Special Operations Forces. Their article is an excellent read about the Iraqi Counterterrorism Service and why the U.S. should continue supporting it in the future.

“Maintaining the best thing the US built in Iraq: Continued support to the Iraqi Counterterrorism Service”, Middle East Institute, February 26, 2024. https://www.mei.edu/publications/maintaining-best-thing-us-built-iraq-continued-support-iraqi-counterterrorism-service

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Photo: Iraqi Counterterrorism Service (CTS), photo by PFC Anthony Zendejas, CJTF-OIR, Apri 4, 2018.

Story by Isaih Vega, 10th SFG(A).

“In the Spring of 2002, as the concept started to take shape, all I could think was, this sounded like an exciting but unrealistic script for a TV show or movie about Special Forces,” said retired Lt. Col. Mark Grdovic. “Our concept was to open a second front against Saddam’s forces that would force him to divide his limited forces to defend the north and ease the pressure on the invading U.S. and collation forces in the south.”

In 2003, the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), along with approximately 55,000 Kurdish Fighters (aka Peshmerga) from the Kurdish Democratic party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), rallied together for what would be known as Task Force Viking. The objective of TF Viking was to disrupt the enemy forces in the Joint Special Operations Area North, specifically the 13 Iraqi Divisions that included: two Republican Guard Divisions and an Armor Division. In addition to the Iraqi forces, an Islamic extremist group, Ansar al-Islam, with ties to Al Qaeda, was also situated along the Iranian border. However, to effectively enable the PUK to threaten the Iraqi positions, it first required Ansar al-Islam to be neutralized as a threat to their rear area.

“As I understood the situation, all we must do is successfully conduct a division-size, daylight, uphill, frontal attack in mountainous terrain, with a partner whom I have not yet met, against a fanatical entrenched enemy with minimal resources. Amidst this task is a facility that the USG is interested in and would like us to conduct a raid and subsequent sensitive site exploitation to determine the extent of the suspected chemical/biological experiments.”

Col. (Ret) Mark Grdovic, former 3rd Battalion, 10th SFG(A) Operations Officer

He continued to state, “To be crystal clear, this effort, as complex as it is, is not my actual mission but merely a precursor that must be accomplished to conduct my actual mission (to open a second front against Saddam). This task comes with an unknown expiration date for its value to the U.S. CENTCOM plan based on the undeclared (secret) D-Day for the invasion”.

Map: Map of Northern Iraq March 2003, courtesy of Mark Grdovic. Ansar-al-Islam’s area of operations was in the vicinity of the red blob on the above map along the Iraqi-Iranian border – in the vicinity of Sargat, Iraq (Google Maps).

The operation would require attacking along a 25-mile front uphill in incredibly rugged mountainous terrain connected with the Iranian border. On the 21st of March, the U.S. forces launched 64 Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAM), minimally impacting the terrorist’s defenses. Several of the TLAMs hit around the Sargat chemical weapons facility.

“I don’t think anyone slept that night. It was quiet; everyone was sitting around, checking equipment, reviewing their portion of the plan, loading vehicles, and trying to rest or eat,” said Grdovic.
Over the next four days, their defenses were softened with intermittent airstrikes.

On the 25th of March, Operation Viking Hammer was underway. The plan called for 5 ODAs, each with an accompanying PUK unit with 1000 peshmerga fighters, attacking along a five separate axis of advance or “prongs,” with 4000 Peshmerga in reserve. The attack ended up as six different routes, each named with a different color. As the PUK forces advanced, they encountered minefields and prepared enemy positions. The ODAs, operating at the front of the PUK columns, called in close air support. In addition, they provided fire support from mortars, crew-served weapons, sniper systems, or small arms. Over the first day of the battle, the PUK columns, with their ODAs, successfully overcame the Ansar al-Islam defenses and pushed the enemy almost to the Iranian border.

During the advance, the Yellow and Green prongs reached and secured the suspected chemical weapons facility in Sargat. The Red and Blue prongs seized a compound near a village called Darga Chakan that was known to house foreign fighters and advisors. One of those foreign fighters was rumored to have been a Jordanian named Zarqawi, who got away and later started the group AQ in Iraq. The ODA accompanying the Black prong was almost overrun during a counterattack when engaged in an intense close-quarter attack with an attempted suicide bomber. The northernmost prong (added the day before and not assigned a color) was also at risk of being overrun until the ODA called in a close airstrike (danger close) to break the enemy’s advance.

The remainder of the day was spent eliminating any final pockets of resistance and consolidating their hold over the terrain. The sensitive site exploitation of the Sargat site yielded positive tests for hydrogen cyanide, the collection of dozens of forged passports, and written documents outlining the process form making VX nerve agent.

The PUK lost approximately 40 fighters during the attack, and at least 2-3 times as many were wounded. The enemy suffered approximately 150-200 hundred killed in action. The following day, 9,000 of the Peshmerga, armed with weapons and ammunition from the battlefield, moved west toward the Green Line like a tidal wave, eager to press the fight to the Iraqi forces and toward Kirkuk. The PUK left 1,000 peshmerga to secure the territory in and around the Halabja and Sargat regions. Over the next two weeks, isolated pockets of Ansar al-Islam fighters would be captured or surrendered.

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This story by Sgt. Isaih Vega of the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) was first published by the Defense Visual Information Distribution Service on March 29, 2023. DVIDS content is in the public domain.

Top Map: The six axis “prong” that advanced across northern Iraq during Operation Viking Hammer. (Courtesy photo by Mark Grdovic)

Related Articles:

Operation Viking Hammer, Wikipedia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Viking_Hammer

“Operation VIKING HAMMER”, by Kenneth Finlayson, Veritas, Vol. 1. No. 1, 2005.

“Operation Ugly Baby and 10th Special Forces Group (Iraq 2003)”, SOF News, March 31, 2023.

“Video – History of Task Force Viking (2003)”, SOF News, October 29, 2022.

“Book Review – The CIA War in Kurdistan”, SOF News, January 26, 2021.

“173rd and Operation Northern Delay – March 26, 2003”, SOF News, March 26, 2023.

By Steven Alger, 10th SFG(A).

In early 2003, planning between the United States and coalition partners was underway to eliminate Saddam Hussein and his influence throughout Iraq. This operation would later be known as Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). This initial operation was divided into multiple missions, one of which was named “Ugly Baby,” aiming to open a second front in enemy territory.

The goal was to insert the majority of two 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) battalions into the country. The mission was to cross through Turkey’s airspace under cover of darkness to establish a foothold on the northern border of Iraq. Though a reliable NATO ally, Turkey feared that OIF might ultimately reinvigorate Kurdish plans for an independent Kurdistan. However, on March 1, 2003, their military was still against the United States utilizing their airspace due to the internal political situation.

As a result, the Joint Special Operations Aviation Detachment-North (JSOAD-N) and the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-North (CJSOTF-N), which included members from the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), started looking for an alternate route into the north. With the help of the United States European Command, Romania offered the U.S. the use of Mihail Kogălniceanu (M.K.) Air Base near Constanta.

Chief Warrant Officer 5 Jefferey Elwell, then an Operation Detachment Alpha (ODA) team sergeant with the 10th Special Forces Group at the time, shared his experience during the initial operation. “It was about three days of us trying to get into northern Iraq by flying over Turkish airspace, and each time they would deny our flight,” said Elwell, now the Command Chief Warrant Officer for 10th SFG(A). “We had been planning this for months, and we were anxious to get in and get to work.”

Planning was underway to establish a new route that would jump from M.K. Air Base, but that added hours of flight time and required more fuel on the already heavily loaded MC-130Hs.
This new route was also a heavily defended airspace which required that operations be conducted at lower elevations to avoid anti-air bombardment. Regardless, it was deemed the only direct route available. What initially had started as three MC-130Hs turned into six, dispersing as much weight as possible for necessary equipment. Members of the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Army Green Berets would take off in intervals throughout the night to either Bashur Landing Zone (LZ) or Sulaymaniyah LZ, located on the northern border of Iraq.

Map of Northern Iraq, March 2003. Red denotes Iraqi positions. The green line is the extent of Peshmerga lines. (Image courtesy of Mark Grdovic, DVIDS)

Jim Donovan, an ODA team sergeant assigned to the 3rd Battalion, 10th SFG(A), said, “When we flew north on the western border of Iraq, that’s when all the Ugly Baby portion really started.”

The planes taking off were staggered, which allowed the Iraqis to adjust fire as each plane flew the route to Bashur and Sulaymaniyah L.Z.s. The last few planes received the most contact from anti-air. Most of the flight had been an average ride until the aircrew started to receive enemy fire. At that point, the airplane initiated evasive maneuvers to avoid taking too much damage. During the rollercoaster of a ride, the pilots had to change elevation throughout the flurry of rounds, sometimes reaching nearly 200 ft off the ground and at near top speeds with as many as 60 Green Berets on board.

“You could see tracers and hear all the rounds outside, but we had all the confidence in the Air Force to get us through,” Donovan stated.

Donovan also said that at the time, he thought about what they would do if they had to make an emergency landing. He hoped it was in a flat enough area for convenience because everyone on the plane was surrounded by necessary equipment while wearing all the necessary gear they would need.

Contact would come in waves as they passed through embedded anti-air. The sound of rounds impacting the aircraft’s fuselage could be heard throughout the flight, and a few stray rounds hit one of the engines, causing fuel and oil to leak. As another engine was struck, the pilots would come on the radio declaring an inflight emergency. Unfortunately, the damaged engine would have the MC-130H land sooner than anticipated. Given the circumstances, the closest and safest place would be to cross the border into Turkey.

“We passed over a small convoy, and they started firing everything from shoulder-fired Surface to Air Missile Systems to pistols and everything in between,” said Elwell as he recounted moments from his experience. “The lights came on, and the pilots declared an inflight emergency which would have them divert landing into Incirlik Air Base, Turkey. As the ramp came down, everyone started running as they realized aviation fluid was spilling over the tarmac.”

During the night of March 22, 2003, the JSOAD-N would successfully insert 19 U.S. Army Special Forces teams along with 4 Company Headquarters elements between Bashur and Sulaymaniyah L.Z.s. No casualties or injuries were sustained throughout the high-risk flight, which ultimately caused Turkey to rethink its decision to allow the U.S. to utilize its airspace to send much-needed supplies to the northern border.

Ugly Baby was remembered as the longest low-level infiltration via aircraft since the Second World War.

“That next day, we proceeded to load up and continue through the mountains to later coordinate close air support down on Iraqi positions across the green line alongside peshmerga fighters,” Elwell said. “They were excellent and very brave, and many had sacrificed their lives alongside us to liberate Iraq.”

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This story by Spc. Steven Alger of the 10th Special Forces Group was first published on March 30, 2023 by the Defense Visual Information Distribution Service. DVIDS content is in the public domain.

The map shows the route flown north along the western border of Iraq during the mission Ugly Baby on March 22, 2003. The mission intent was to insert ODA teams into two different landing zones to help gain a northern front as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom. (Photo Courtesy of U.S Army)

Related Articles:

“Video – History of Task Force Viking (2003)”, SOF News, October 29, 2022.

“Book Review – The CIA War in Kurdistan”, SOF News, January 26, 2021.

“173rd and Operation Northern Delay – March 26, 2003”, SOF News, March 26, 2023.

by Maj. Robyn Haake.

On March 26, 2003, during the 2003 invasion of Iraq, 1,000 paratroopers or “Sky Soldiers” from the 173rd Airborne Brigade jumped into Bashur, Iraq as part of Operation Northern Delay. 20 years later, 2nd Battalion, 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment “The Rock” commemorated the anniversary of this combat jump by inviting Army and Air Force veterans of the mission to return and drop together again on March 22, 2023 in Aviano, Italy.

Operation Northern Delay was the last large-scale combat parachute operation conducted by the U.S. military since Operation Just Cause in 1989. The operation was the first strategic brigade airdrop using C-17 aircraft in formation, integrating a conventional Army airborne brigade within the 10th Special Forces Group, and integrating an armored battalion into an airborne operation. The 62d Airlift Wing, 315th Airlift Wing, 437th Airlift Wing, and 446th Airlift Wing provided aircraft and crew to fly the mission.

On the night of the jump, the airfield was a mud pit. The veteran jumpers don’t call the combat star on their jump wings a “mustard stain,” they call it a “mud stain.” Many Sky Soldiers could not perform their parachute landing fall when they made contact with the ground due to being stuck in waist-deep mud.

The airborne assault seized a foothold for the rest of the brigade and follow-on forces, including an armored battalion task force. The 173rd’s introduction to the northern front in Operation Iraqi Freedom was an important step in the evolution of joint forcible entry (JFE), special operations interoperability, and airborne-armored force integration.

Two decades later, most of the veterans of the mission have left the military, but some are still serving and returned to Aviano Air Base to tell their story to the current generation of Sky Soldiers and airmen. To help commemorate the 20th anniversary of the jump, the 446th Airlift Wing came all the way to Italy from Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Wash. to exit Sky Soldiers once again. Chief Master Sgt. Derek Bryant was on one of the aircrews for Northern Delay.

“20 years ago, we came to Aviano and you could really see the seriousness in people’s faces, you could see the intensity that was building. It means a lot to me to come back. I was really looking forward to seeing if I had any jumpers from 20 years ago and there was one. It was really cool.”

Chief Master Sgt. Derek Bryant, 446th Airlift Wing

The jumper that he reunited with is 1st Sgt. Travis Stoddard, who is the current 1st Sgt., or senior enlisted member, of Bull Battery, 4th Battalion, 319th Airborne Field Artillery Regiment, the 173rd’s organic artillery unit. Stoddard made the combat jump as a forward observer for one of the infantry units.

“We were rigged heavy that night. Once we stood up and hooked up, all I could think about was, ‘I’m ready to go. I’m ready to jump and get this gear off,”’ said Stoddard.

Among the returning veterans was Col. John Spencer, who was a 2nd lt. and platoon leader during the jump. On March 22, the parachute rigging area at Aviano was filled with junior and senior Sky Soldiers assigned to “The Rock,” ready to jump and assemble fast, as their ancestors did in Bashur 20 years ago.

Col. Spencer helped set the mood for a combat-equipment jump by speaking to all of jumpers and reminded them why they train as hard as they do.

”That night when we jumped into Iraq, we landed in knee-deep mud, not only that but we all had 120 pounds on our backs. We do this over and over again so when you guys are tested, you’ll succeed. The 173rd holds a special place in the military because you are asked to do a lot. In this case, we were asked to hold off an Iraqi mechanized division with two battalions of light infantry and we said, “hooah!” and we did it.”

Col. John Spencer, member of 173rd during Operation Northern Delay

Later that day, the sunny Italian sky was filled with Sky Soldiers descending onto their drop zone with full combat equipment. Just as those who came before them did, the paratroopers landed, packed the heavy weight on their backs hustled to the assembly area for their next objective.

On the following day, the 173rd held a ceremony at their headquarters in Vicenza that praised the bravery and intense efforts to accomplish the mission of opening up a northern front in Iraq. During the ceremony, Lt. Col. Kevin Ward, the battalion commander for 2nd Battalion, 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment recognized ten combat jumpers and one army civilian (a unit movement coordinator) who returned to the 173rd to meet with brigade leadership and tell their stories to the current generation of paratroopers.

The 173rd Airborne Brigade is the U.S. Army’s Contingency Response Force in Europe, providing rapidly deployable forces to the United States European, Africa and Central Command areas of responsibility. Forward deployed across Italy and Germany, the brigade routinely trains alongside NATO allies and partners to build partnerships and strengthen the alliance.

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Historical Note: Twenty years ago the 173rd parachuted into northern Iraq with the aim to reinforce a second front established by US Special Forces, CIA officers in northern Iraq, and the Peshmerga. Operation Northern Delay occurred on 26 March 2003 as part of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. It involved dropping 1,000 paratroopers from the 173rd Airborne Brigade into Northern Iraq. It was the last large-scale combat parachute operation conducted by the U.S. military since Operation Just Cause.

Author: This story by Maj. Robyn Haake, 173rd Airborne Brigade, is about the 20-year anniversary parachute jump commemorating that event during the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The article was first published on March 24, 2023 by the Defense Visual Information Distribution Service. DVIDS content is in the public domain.

Photo: U.S. Army paratroopers assigned to 2nd Battalion, 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment, 173rd Airborne Brigade conduct an airborne operation in commemoration of the 20th anniversary of Operation Northern Delay at Aviano Air Base, Italy on March 22, 2023. Photo by Spc. Alisha Grezlik.

Story by Sgt. Cambrin Bassett, SOJTF-OIR, June 20, 2020

Qwat al-Khasah or SFI (Special Forces of Iraq) are handpicked from the Iraqi Security Force or ISF, whose members come from all regions of Iraq and many different backgrounds. They consider themselves a non-sectarian specialized fighting force, putting their country first, and always ready to answer the call in defense of the nation.

SFI, under the Iraq Ministry of Defense, is the first special operations force in the Iraqi military and operates similar to US Army Rangers. The name Qwat al-Khasah is Arabic for “Special Forces.”

“The Special Forces of Iraq have a long and prestigious history as a well-known and highly respected unit prior to partnership with Coalition Special Operations,” states the U.S. Special Forces Commander currently advising the SFI on training and combat operations against Daesh. “When the Qwat al-Khasah arrive to locations throughout Iraq, just their presence in the area has a stabilizing affect as they are highly respected by the people for their humanity and outreach to locals, but also because of their skill at closing with and destroying Daesh.”

With three battalions that stand ready to deploy anywhere in Iraq within 96 hours, the Qwat al-Khasah is a specialized light fighting force capable of rapid infiltration, raid, ambush, aerial and ground reconnaissance, and wide area clearance. The group is also trained on various weapons platforms, ranging from light machine guns to mortar systems.
Since 2018, validation of the 1st and 2nd Qwat al-Khasah battalions included real-world operations outside of traditional training grounds. This specialized training paired with real operations have quickly transformed them into an elite force that supports and strengthens the Iraqi Army and other Iraqi Security Forces with their expertise in small unit tactics for counter-terrorism operations.

“With strong efforts from the Iraqi Army leadership the Special Forces were established equivalent to world armies. The Special Forces were trained and equipped at a high level with cooperation of the coalition forces,” says a senior Qwat al-Khasah leader. “The Qwat al-Khasah Brigade established and is ready to implement missions as a long arm for the Iraqi Army and as a strong reserve to involve in any mission that requires counter-terrorism operations.”

The Qwat al-Khasah partner with Special Operations Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve on Iraq-focused counter-terrorism missions to bring the fight to Daesh directly. This kind of partnership helps eliminate future terrorist attacks and provides stability to Iraq and the region.

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Photo: Qwat al-khasah, Special Forces Iraq, is provided advice, assistance, and support by SOJTF-OIR. Photo by Sgt. Cambrin Bassett, June 24, 2020.

This article was originally posted on DVIDS on June 20, 2020. The author is Sgt. Cambrin Bassett, Special Operations Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve.

Gunnery Sergeant Scott Koppenhafer died from injuries sustained during combat action in Iraq on Saturday, August 10, 2019. He suffered fatal wounds while on a planned operation with Iraqi Security Forces. He was a member of the 2nd Marine Raider Battalion based at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.

Koppenhafer, age 35, was originally from Mancos, Colorado. He graduated from Adams State College in Alamosa, Colorado in 2005 with a B.S. in Business Marketing.

He joined the Marine Corps in 2005 – spending the last 10 years as a MARSOC Critical Skills Operator (CSO). Before joining MARSOC he served as a machine gunner with 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, and later as a scout sniper.

Koppenhafer completed the MARSOC training pipeline in 2009. He was the Individual Training Course honor graduate. He has had multiple combat tours – serving in both Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2018 he was recognized as the MARSOC Critical Skills Operator of the Year.

His personal decorations include: two Bronze Star Medals with Combat Distinguishing Device, two Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medals with Combat Distinguishing Device, one Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal, two Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medals, one Humanitarian Service Medal, two Combat Action Ribbons, four Good Conduct Medals, the National Defense Service Medal, the Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal, the Global War on Terrorism Service Medal, and six Sea Service Deployment Ribbons.

Gunnery Sergeant Koppenhafer was a graduate of the School of Infantry, Mountain Survival Course, Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE), Scout Sniper Course, MARSOC’s Individual Training Course, MARSOF Advanced Sniper Course, Basic Airborne Course, Military Freefall, MARSOF Heliborne Insertion/Extraction Techniques Master, and Military Combatant Diver Course.

He is survived by his wife and two children.

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Photo: Courtesy of U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Special Operations Command

References:

DOD Identifies Marine Casualty, DoD, August 11, 2019.

The Department of Defense Office of Inspector General has posted the quarterly report to Congress on OIR. The report covers the period of April 1, 2019 to June 30, 2019.

The report is entitled Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve | Quarterly Report to the United States Congress | April 1, 2019 – June 30, 2019. It covers the overseas contingency operation to combat the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and summarizes the quarter’s key events.

The report finds that ISIS is continuing its transition from a territory-holding force to an insurgency in Syria. It says that ISIS has solidified its insurgent capabilities in Iraq. ISIS is conducting suicide attacks, assassinations, abductions, and arson of crops in both countries.

ISIS personnel strength appears to be, according to the report, about 16,000 total – within Iraq and Syria. Some of these personnel are referred to as ‘foreign fighters’. In addition, ISIS has reestablished its financial networks in both countries. The jihadist group also continues to utilize an extensive worldwide social media effort for recruitment of fighters and to maintain and enhance support.

Syria Update

U.S. Reduction in Forces. The partial withdrawal of U.S. forces from Syria (known as Operation Deliberate Resolve) has decreased the support available to partner forces (SDF and other smaller groups). This withdrawal is taking place at a time that the SDF need additionally trained personnel and more equipment to defeat the ISIS insurgency. The nature of the conflict – now an insurgency – has changed the type of training and equipment needed by the SDF.

Coalition Assistance Requested. The U.S. is seeking increased coalition support to offset the reduction in U.S. forces. The U.S. has requested assistance from 30 other countries; the UK and France have agreed to help. Germany said ‘not so much’. Although not cited in the report, it is estimated that there are about 1,000 U.S. military personnel in Syria.

U.S. SOF. The bulk of these troops are likely members of U.S. Army Special Forces with their attached enablers. The SF teams are part of the Special Operations Joint Task Force – OIR – which is a component of the Combined Joint Task Force – OIR. One of the missions of the SOJTF-OIR is to perform “. . . partnered training, equipping, and reinforcing of the SDF to enable the SDF to conduct counterinsurgency operations.”

In addition, U.S. forces assist with security during raids of ISIS members or facilitators as well as in some detention operations. Other U.S. ground and air assets are also employed in support of the SDF.

SDF Needs More Assistance. The U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces are unable to sustain long-term operations against IS jihadists. The SDF is limited in personnel, equipment, and intelligence to confront the ‘resurgent cells’ of IS. In particular, it needs to further develop its human-based intelligence capabilities. There is the possibility, if further U.S. cutbacks take place, that the SDF may look for partnerships with Russia or the Syrian regime.

IDPs. The camps that host thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) – the two largest are Rukban and al Hol – are lacking basic services. The al Hol camp is a security concern due to the 45,000 ISIS family members and supporters that reside there. The U.S. is urging other nations to repatriate the ISIS foreign fighters and supporters – for security and humanitarian reasons. ISIS has established cells within the al Hol camp to spread its ideology as well as aid in recruitment. IDPs are prevented from leaving the camps to return home due to ongoing lawlessness and violence elsewhere in Syria.

Detained ISIS Fighters. With the defeat of the ‘territorial’ Caliphate the SDF captured thousands of ISIS fighters. There are about 10,000 detained fighters – 2,000 classified as ‘foreign fighters’. They are held in ‘pop-up prisons’ in northeast Syria. Most countries are reluctant to repatriate their citizens who have been captured by the SDF. This is putting a strain on the SDF and Kurdish administration.

Uncertainty. Not addressed in the DoD IG report is the political uncertainty of whether or not the United States is in Syria for the long haul. There is the possibility that the U.S. president would turn Syria over to the third party countries currently involved – Turkey, Iran, and Russia. In fact, several months ago he said that Turkey could finish off ISIS. This followed his announcement in December that the U.S. would withdraw all forces from Syria. Certainly the statements and ‘tweets’ of the U.S. president has caused deep concern within the SDF and YPG.

Iraq Update

IS Insurgency Continues. ISIS has regrouped in provinces north and west of Baghdad. IS has reorganized its leadership and has established safe havens in rural Sunni-majority areas. The strength of IS in Iraq got bumped up as a result of fighters fleeing the impending defeat of IS in the Middle Euphrates River Valley (MERV) in Syria this past spring. As ISIS saw the future demise of the ‘territorial’ Caliphate it began its transformation into an insurgency.

ISF. The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are still having difficulty getting on top of the IS insurgency that exists in Iraq. The ISF can conduct offensive operations to ‘clear’ an area of insurgents – but they lack the capability to ‘hold’ these areas. So the typical ISF operation, while successful, is a ‘short-term gain’ with a minimal effect. This is especially true in some of the more remote areas of Iraq – such as the Makhmour Mountains in Ninewa province and the Jazeera Desert in Anbar province. So the insurgents flow back in to the ‘cleared’ areas as soon as the security forces depart.

Diminished ISR Assets. The ISF has seen its organic ISR assets decrease by 50%. In addition, some U.S. ISR platforms have been diverted to monitor Iranian activity.

Iraqi Government Struggling. Politics and other factors are hindering the security efforts of the ISF. The government has seen changes in the leadership of the defense, interior, and justice ministries. There have been some significant protests over the lack of electricity and other basic government services – to which the ISF has to respond.

‘Peshmerga’ and ‘Kurdistan’. One of the U.S. most reliable allies in the Middle East continues to be the Kurds of both Syria and Iraq. However, the Kurds in Iraq have some deep-seated internal political divisions (KDP vs PUK). This results in separate administrative and intelligence organizations representing the two political parties. This division extends to the Peshmerga as well.

In addition, the Kurdish government is at odds with Iraq’s central government on a number of issues. One of these is some disputed territory lying between Arab and Kurdish regions. There is a security gap in this area and ISIS is taking advantage of this gap.

Departure of State Department Personnel. Threats against U.S. personnel working in Iraq prompted a severe cut-back in embassy and consulate strength. The threats are from Iran and some of its proxy forces in Iraq – principally the Iranian-backed Shia militias belonging to the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). This “. . . eroded the ability of the Embassy Baghdad and Consulate Erbil to manage humanitarian assistance and stabilization efforts in Iraq.” The number of personnel was reduced from 563 to 312. This evacuation order has also affected some of the almost 5,000 contractor personnel stationed in Iraq.

The ‘Takeaway’

Based on a reading of the report it would be easy to draw the conclusion that the drawdown of military forces (SOF included) in Syria has diminished the ability of the SDF to kill off ISIS. In addition, the reduction of State and USAID personnel in Iraq has reduced humanitarian and stabilization efforts in Iraq. From the report: “Despite the loss of physical territory, thousands of ISIS fighters remain in Iraq and Syria and are carrying out attacks and working to rebuild their capabilities.”

Read the 116-page report here:
DoD Quarterly Report on OIR – August 2019

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Photo: Iraqi soldiers move through a smokescreen that provides concealment during an assault exercise.
(U.S. Army photo, page 2, of OIR IG Report, August 2019).

By David M. Witty

Major General Fadhil Barwari, commander of the 1^st Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF) Brigade, Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service (CTS), was a central figure in the Iraqi ethos in the struggle against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and more importantly, a much-needed symbol in bridging ethnic and sectarian divides in Iraq. [1]

Barwari died, at age 52, in the Kurdistan Region capital of Erbil. He was born in 1966 in Dohuk (located in northern Iraq not far from the Turkish border).

A Kurd and former member of the Peshmerga [2], he was a part of ISOF since its inception in 2003.  Extremely active in social media, Barwari was outspoken in emphasizing the non-sectarian and non-ethnic nature of ISOF and CTS, which he came to personify as a high-ranking Kurdish officer serving in the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) after 2014, when many Kurds left to join the Peshmerga.

Barwari participated in almost all the major battles against ISIS and was immensely popular in Iraq; during the height of the anti-ISIS campaign, his image was everywhere on the internet. Always a public figure, before the rise of ISIS in 2014, he was often misidentified in the Iraqi press as the overall commander of the CTS instead of as the commander of the 1st ISOF Brigade. His brigade was the oldest and most proficient of the three ISOF brigades in CTS and had a reputation for providing care for civilians and avoiding civilian casualties. The 1st ISOF Brigade was the spearhead force of CTS, containing its most elite units, and CTS as a whole is largely credited as the primary force Iraq depended on to liberate urban areas from ISIS.

Barwari, never without a cigarette, had an easy-going nature, was very pro-US, and was considered extremely easy to work with by US advisors and trainers. He maintained close relationships with senior US special operations forces (SOF) leaders throughout the years, and he repeatedly emphasized his close U.S. ties.

MG Barwari was not without controversy. He was largely blamed for the fall of Ramadi to ISIS in May 2015, where he commanded ISOF. In reality, ISOF was the only ISF unit in Ramadi offering significant resistance to ISIS, and after other ISF retreated from the city, Barwari was force to withdraw to prevent his unit from being cut off and destroyed. In 2017, two former U.S. defense contractors in testimony to a U.S. federal court accused Barwari of having paid them hundreds of thousands of dollars in kickbacks as part of a U.S. defense contract to rent land at an extremely inflated cost that Barwari owned near the Baghdad International Airport. [3]

Following his death from a heart attack in September 2018, mourning gatherings for him occurred in many locations in Iraq.  The gathering in Baghdad was attended by Iraqi Prime Minister Haider Abadi. Iraq has lost a central icon that made Iraqis proud of the unity of their nation as a place where all sectarian groups and ethnicities can live and work together to achieve a common purpose.

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Footnotes:

[1] For more info read a 45-page paper on the CTS. The Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service, Brookings Institution, by David Witty, 2015. See also “The Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service: From the War on ISIS to the Future”, Iraq in Context, 2018,
https://www.iraqincontext.com/home/author/David-M.-Witty

[2] The Peshmerga are the military forces of the federal region of Iraqi Kurdistan. Formally the Peshmerga are under the command of the Kurdistan Regional Government; however, much of this military organization is affiliated with two regional political parties – The Democratic Party of Kurdistan and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peshmerga

[3] Rachel Weiner, “Iraqi General Helped Cheat U.S. Government Contractors Involved in Scheme Say . . . .,” Stars and Stripes, Nov. 28, 2018, https://www.stripes.com/news/middle-east/iraqi-general-helped-cheat-us-government-contractors-involved-in-scheme-say-1.499861

Video:

Major General Fadhil Jalil Barwari is interviewed by TRT World (Turkey), published online on December 5, 2016 (7 mins).
www.youtube.com/watch?v=2jhYMs7-RfE

Photo: MG Fadhil Barwari, CJTF-OIR Twitter, September 22, 2018.

Author: David M. Witty, a retired U.S. special forces colonel and adjunct professor at Norwich University. He can be followed on Twitter @DavidMWitty1

]]> 8397 https://sof.news/iraq/update-kirkuk/ Wed, 18 Oct 2017 08:00:52 +0000 http://www.sof.news/?p=4234 Update Kirkuk – It appears that the Kirkuk offensive conducted by the security forces of the Government of Iraq (GoI) on Sunday and Monday (October 15-16) was more a coordinated movement into areas held by Kurdish forces and not so much [...]]]>

Update Kirkuk – It appears that the Kirkuk offensive conducted by the security forces of the Government of Iraq (GoI) on Sunday and Monday (October 15-16) was more a coordinated movement into areas held by Kurdish forces and not so much a combat operation. Before or as the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) moved into strategic military, government, and economic locations the Kurdish Peshmerga moved out. There were some clashes that caused some fatalities but they were minimal – when compared to what could have transpired.

Importance of Kirkuk. The city of Kirkuk, located in the province of Kirkuk, has had a mixed ethnic composition for many years. Looking back into history Kirkuk has always been on the fault line between the Kurds and Arabs. Kirkuk is contested for a number of reasons – it has a mixed population (Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen, and Christians) [1], is the location of significant oil fields, and it is an economic center for the region. In addition, there are some important military bases near the city – an army installation and a military air base.

Kirkuk and the Constitution. The status of the city was supposed to be determined by a referendum according to the new constitution that emerged after Saddam Hussein and his government was removed after the U.S. invasion. The referendum was never held and remains a source of discontent for many Kurds.

ISIS Offensive in August 2014. After winning battle after battle against the Iraq army the Islamic State turned its attention to the Kirkuk area (no doubt with the oil fields in mind). As ISIS advanced the Iraqi army fled in disarray. It left behind armored vehicles, artillery, and other weapons and equipment to be captured by ISIS. The Kurds, assisted with U.S. air power, prevented the capture of Kirkuk by ISIS.

Negotiated Withdrawal or Ultimatum? It appears that behind-the-scenes negotiations took place prior to the ISF move into Kirkuk city and the surrounding areas. Some reports say that the negotiations broke down and the Government of Iraq issued an ultimatum. At any rate the Kurds simply decided not to fight. Time will tell as ‘experts’ analyze this event over the next several weeks. Hopefully we will see some statements from the U.S., Government of Iraq (GoI), and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) that clarify the situation.

Themes Emerging. In reading the media reports (across a wide spectrum) there are several ‘stories’ coming out that are attracting attention. These themes include the influence of Iran, escalation of tensions between Shia and Kurds, possible loss of the Kurds as an ally with the ISF in the fight against ISIS, diminishing hopes of independence for the Kurds of Iraq, loss of oil revenue to the Kurds, and the future of Kurdish autonomy within Iraq. A sampling of reporting on these themes is presented below.

Iranian Influence. The big winner in the defeat of ISIS in Iraq will likely be Iran. The United States has simply been outflanked diplomatically by the long-time regional rival to U.S. power in the Gulf region. Certainly Iran is a major player in the current dispute between the GoI and the Kurds. It’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) provides support to the Shia militias (Hashd al-Shaabi) – many who are currently at the gates of Kirkuk. In addition, the Federal Police (historically linked to Iran), are taking part in the Kirkuk occupation.

U.S. – Iran Relations. Iran has been reaping benefits from the war on ISIS. It has consolidated its position in Syria and Iraq. While presumably an ally in the Iraqi fight against ISIS it is at odds with the U.S. in Yemen and Syria. While the U.S. is urging restraint through diplomatic overtures to Tehran President Trump is threatening to designate Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organization. The Shia may very well be taking the lead (urged on by Iran) to oppose the move towards Kurdish independence and the continued holding of ‘disputed areas in Iraq’ by the Kurds forces.

Shia – Kurd Relations. The Kurds have been known to be a tolerant people towards other ethnic groups. As an oppressed people they have sympathized with the fate of the Shia, Christians, Turkmen, and Yazidi. However, the dyamics between the Shia and Kurds have taken a turn for the worse.

“Racism becoming a dangerous tool in Kurdistan”, by Michael Rubin, American Enterprise Institute (AEI), October 16, 2017.

“A new war in Iraq, now between Shia Arabs and Kurds”, The Economist, October 16, 2017.

Kurdish Fragmentation. The rival factions within Kurdistan are accusing each other of abandoning Kirkuk. However neither of the groups appeared to have fought the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) incursion into Kirkuk or the outlying strategic military and economic targets. The behind the scenes maneuvering that took place in the days prior to the move by the ISF into Kirkuk will certainly be interesting (if the moves are ever fully revealed). The Democratic Party of Kurdistan (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) have long been at odds with each – and their relationship (or lack of) has been a significant factor in being unable to present a unified Kurdish front to the central government. There are reports that the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) worked very closely with the ISF to turn over areas to the Baghdad forces. In addition, it seems the PUK is working closely with Iranian officials to enhance its status in the aftermath of this event.

“Baghdad Retakes Kirkuk”, Soufan Group, October 17, 2017.

“Kurdish Dreams of Independence Delayed Once Again”, by Dexter Filkins, The New Yorker, October 16, 2017.

Loss of Oil Revenue. The taking of the oil fields by the central government of Iraq will severely restrict the amount of funds that the KRG will have available to run the region. This is at a time when the central government has sent little in funding to the Kurds for the administration of the region, providing government services, or to maintain the military forces of the Kurds. There are reported to be at least six oil fields in the area and the GoI’s security forces now control at least one of them.

Economic Strangle Hold. The borders of Kurdistan are subject to closure by the governments of Iran and Turkey. International flights into the airports located in Kurdistan have been stopped. For the moment, both nations are working closely with the government of Iraq to ensure the Kurdish referendum for independence held on September 25th does not lead to a declaration of independence by the Kurdish officials.

Fight Against ISIS. The Islamic State has been removed from almost all of the territory it captured in 2014 and 2015. It still remains in isolated pockets throughout Iraq and has areas under its control in the West of Iraq; especially along the Syrian border. ISIS is predicted to adapt its tactics – becoming (once again) an insurgent / terrorist group. Prolonged fighting between the ISF and the Peshmerga will detract from the future counterinsurgency operations that will be conducted against ISIS.

“What’s behind the dangerous escalation of tension between forces fighting ISIS in Iraq”, Stars and Stripes, October 16, 2017.

A Headache for the U.S. The tension between the Kurds and the central government is a headache for the United States. At the same time it is focused on eliminating (as much as that is possible) the ISIS presence in Iraq (and numerous other countries) it is trying to limit the spread of Iranian influence and military activities in the greater Middle East area. The elite Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF) that the U.S. has trained, equipped, and advised (with U.S. SOF personnel at the tactical level) is now in Kirkuk in opposition to the Peshmerga.

U.S. Way Ahead? In and effort to de-escalate the tension the U.S. will put pressure on the Kurds to make some concessions in the days and weeks ahead.  It probably has become clear to the inhabitants of Kirkuk that US support for the Kurds is a fragile and probably temporary arrangement. In addition, it will threaten the curtailment of assistance to the Government of Iraq in the fight against ISIS (money, equipment, weapons, trainers, advisors, air support, artillery support, etc.). [2]

Footnotes:

[1] In the 1980s the Iraqi regime conducted an ethnic cleansing campaign in northern Iraq – removing Kurds from key areas of the region. In the 1990s Saddam Hussein conducted an ‘Arabization’ of Kirkuk; moving Kurds out of the city and Arabs into the city. This had a significant change in the ethnic composition. In 2003, after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Kurds began returning to their homes. In 2014 the Iraqi army fled in the face of the Islamic State offensive in northern Iraq. The Peshmerga stopped the advance into many of the northern regions of Iraq and retook much of the Kirkuk area back from ISIS.

[2] See “We’re Not Taking Sides, Trump Tells Clashing Kurds, Iraqis”, Defense One, October 16, 2017.

Kirkuk Update – The offensive launched on Sunday, October 15th by the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and the Iranian-backed militias continued into Monday. Initial news reports said that some of the oil fields have been seized as well as parts of Kirkuk.

(Information in this article is as of Monday, October 16, 2017)

ISF in Kirkuk. A lot of media reports say that the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) have entered Kirkuk. Elements of the 9th Division of the Iraqi army, the Federal Police, and the Counterterrorism Services (CTS) are involved in the Kirkuk security operation. In addition, Shia militias – Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) backed by the IRGC – are also taking part in the offensive; although the PMF may not have entered Kirkuk city proper.

Targets Secured. The Government of Iraq has stated that they have secured federal installations and strategic locations in and around the city of Kirkuk and in the province of Kirkuk. The government claims it now controls the K1 Air Base northwest of Kirkuk. In addition, they claim the Baba Gorgor oil field (near the K1 Air Base) is under their full control. Several government buildings in Kirkuk have been occupied by the ISF. Other possible targets that may have been secured include the offices of the North Gas Company (near K1 Air Base) and the Bai Hassan and Khabbaz oil fields.

Fracturing on Kurdish Front. The two rival parties of the Kurdish people are at odds with each other. There are reports of fighting between the PUK and KDP in Kirkuk after the PUK decision to hand over positions to the ISF.

Negotiated Withdrawal? A lot of international pressure is being exerted on the parties in dispute. Certainly the United States is in the lead in trying to negotiate a settlement. It appears that the Kurds agreed to withdraw from some areas of Kirkuk province as well as important military sites – such as the K1 Air Base.

Scale of Fighting. Some reports indicate that up to 100 casualties have resulted from the fighting. Reports vary but some Peshmerga troops fought while others withdrew from positions around Kirkuk. The fighting is less than was expected at the onset of the ISF move into Kirkuk. Some reports attribute the fighting to engagements between Peshmerga and the PMF units. Meanwhile U.S. authorities have minimized the fighting stating that any casualties have been the result of a “misunderstanding”. [1]

Will the Fighting Spread? There are media reports of fighting in other areas of Iraq where Kurdish forces hold disputed territory. Fighting has been reported in Sulamaniya and Diyala provinces. Once again these reports attribute the fighting between Kurds and Shia militia.

Kurds Fleeing? Thousands of Kirkuk residents fled north to safer areas to avoid a possible escalation of the fighting. Many cite the prospect of Shia militias entering the city.

Timing of the Independence Referendum? Some observers will likely look back and conclude that the Kurds scheduled their independence referendum poorly. The Iraqi Security Services have increased their capabilities over the past year as they have taken first Mosul, then Tal Afar, and finally Hawija. The last city is key as it is in the Al-Hawija District of the Kirkuk province. The fight for Hawija was ongoing (now concluded) at the same time that the referendum took place (Sep 25th). So the security forces of the Government of Iraq were fully mobilized to move a few miles east (one hour drive, 66 kms) to Kirkuk. Bad timing!

Government of Iraq Narrative. Part of the Government of Iraq’s narrative is that the operation was necessary to protect the people of Kirkuk and to “protect the unity of the country”. In addition, it cites the presence of PKK terrorists in the province. The government has named the offensive “Operation Impose Security in Kirkuk”.

PKK? The Iraqi government is stating that members of the Kurdish terrorist group are in Kirkuk opposing the ISF. The PKK, or Turkish Kurdistan Worker’s Party, is based in Turkey and has had a long-running conflict with the security forces of Turkey.

U.S. Response?

GoI Airpower? The success on the battlefield against ISIS was due in part to the artillery, air, and ISR support of the United States and its Coalition partners. But even without this international operational assistance the seaonsed Iraqi Security Forces and its Shia militias should be able to handle the Peshmerga if it keeps its objectives minimal. The Iraqi Air Force has steadily improved its capability and its capacity has grown over the past few years – so it should not be discounted if needed in an extended fight with the Kurds.

GoI in Driver’s Seat. The Government of Iraq has a new-found confidence. It’s security forces have attained success on the battlefield against ISIS strongholds. Most of Iraq has been liberated from the Islamic State fighters. The governments of Iran and Turkey are solidly behind Iraq on the Kurdish issue. The U.S. government and most of the international community issued proclamations against the independence referendum. The GoI seems intent to mix negotiations with force in the current dispute with the Kurds.

Possible Outcome? It appears that the Government of Iraq will try to recover the areas not held by the Kurds prior to the summer of 2014. These were the areas that the Iraqi army fled from and that the Islamic State fighters moved into – and that the Peshmerga subsequently fought ISIS and occupied. These disputed areas are in parts of Kirkuk, Diyala, and Ninawa provinces.

Footnotes:

[1] See Coalition Statement on Military Movements Near Kirkuk, Operation Inherent Resolve, October 16, 2017.

References:

Kirkuk – A Contested City in Northern Iraq, SOF News, October 15, 2017.
www.sof.news/iraq/kirkuk/

Kurdish Independence – A Regional Flashpoint, SOF News, October 4, 2017.
www.sof.news/iraq/kurdistan-independence/

Independent Kurdistan – What are the Implications (RAND Paper), SOF News, December 9, 2016.
www.sof.news/iraq/independent-kurdistan-implications/

Kurdistan Update – 20161108, SOF News, November 8, 2016.
www.sof.news/iraq/kurdistan-update/

US Support of Kurds – A Temporary Arrangement?, SOF News, August 31, 2016.
www.sof.news/middle-east/us-support-of-kurds/