The Department of Defense Office of Inspector General has posted the quarterly report to Congress on OIR. The report covers the period of April 1, 2019 to June 30, 2019.

The report is entitled Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve | Quarterly Report to the United States Congress | April 1, 2019 – June 30, 2019. It covers the overseas contingency operation to combat the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and summarizes the quarter’s key events.

The report finds that ISIS is continuing its transition from a territory-holding force to an insurgency in Syria. It says that ISIS has solidified its insurgent capabilities in Iraq. ISIS is conducting suicide attacks, assassinations, abductions, and arson of crops in both countries.

ISIS personnel strength appears to be, according to the report, about 16,000 total – within Iraq and Syria. Some of these personnel are referred to as ‘foreign fighters’. In addition, ISIS has reestablished its financial networks in both countries. The jihadist group also continues to utilize an extensive worldwide social media effort for recruitment of fighters and to maintain and enhance support.

Syria Update

U.S. Reduction in Forces. The partial withdrawal of U.S. forces from Syria (known as Operation Deliberate Resolve) has decreased the support available to partner forces (SDF and other smaller groups). This withdrawal is taking place at a time that the SDF need additionally trained personnel and more equipment to defeat the ISIS insurgency. The nature of the conflict – now an insurgency – has changed the type of training and equipment needed by the SDF.

Coalition Assistance Requested. The U.S. is seeking increased coalition support to offset the reduction in U.S. forces. The U.S. has requested assistance from 30 other countries; the UK and France have agreed to help. Germany said ‘not so much’. Although not cited in the report, it is estimated that there are about 1,000 U.S. military personnel in Syria.

U.S. SOF. The bulk of these troops are likely members of U.S. Army Special Forces with their attached enablers. The SF teams are part of the Special Operations Joint Task Force – OIR – which is a component of the Combined Joint Task Force – OIR. One of the missions of the SOJTF-OIR is to perform “. . . partnered training, equipping, and reinforcing of the SDF to enable the SDF to conduct counterinsurgency operations.”

In addition, U.S. forces assist with security during raids of ISIS members or facilitators as well as in some detention operations. Other U.S. ground and air assets are also employed in support of the SDF.

SDF Needs More Assistance. The U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces are unable to sustain long-term operations against IS jihadists. The SDF is limited in personnel, equipment, and intelligence to confront the ‘resurgent cells’ of IS. In particular, it needs to further develop its human-based intelligence capabilities. There is the possibility, if further U.S. cutbacks take place, that the SDF may look for partnerships with Russia or the Syrian regime.

IDPs. The camps that host thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) – the two largest are Rukban and al Hol – are lacking basic services. The al Hol camp is a security concern due to the 45,000 ISIS family members and supporters that reside there. The U.S. is urging other nations to repatriate the ISIS foreign fighters and supporters – for security and humanitarian reasons. ISIS has established cells within the al Hol camp to spread its ideology as well as aid in recruitment. IDPs are prevented from leaving the camps to return home due to ongoing lawlessness and violence elsewhere in Syria.

Detained ISIS Fighters. With the defeat of the ‘territorial’ Caliphate the SDF captured thousands of ISIS fighters. There are about 10,000 detained fighters – 2,000 classified as ‘foreign fighters’. They are held in ‘pop-up prisons’ in northeast Syria. Most countries are reluctant to repatriate their citizens who have been captured by the SDF. This is putting a strain on the SDF and Kurdish administration.

Uncertainty. Not addressed in the DoD IG report is the political uncertainty of whether or not the United States is in Syria for the long haul. There is the possibility that the U.S. president would turn Syria over to the third party countries currently involved – Turkey, Iran, and Russia. In fact, several months ago he said that Turkey could finish off ISIS. This followed his announcement in December that the U.S. would withdraw all forces from Syria. Certainly the statements and ‘tweets’ of the U.S. president has caused deep concern within the SDF and YPG.

Iraq Update

IS Insurgency Continues. ISIS has regrouped in provinces north and west of Baghdad. IS has reorganized its leadership and has established safe havens in rural Sunni-majority areas. The strength of IS in Iraq got bumped up as a result of fighters fleeing the impending defeat of IS in the Middle Euphrates River Valley (MERV) in Syria this past spring. As ISIS saw the future demise of the ‘territorial’ Caliphate it began its transformation into an insurgency.

ISF. The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are still having difficulty getting on top of the IS insurgency that exists in Iraq. The ISF can conduct offensive operations to ‘clear’ an area of insurgents – but they lack the capability to ‘hold’ these areas. So the typical ISF operation, while successful, is a ‘short-term gain’ with a minimal effect. This is especially true in some of the more remote areas of Iraq – such as the Makhmour Mountains in Ninewa province and the Jazeera Desert in Anbar province. So the insurgents flow back in to the ‘cleared’ areas as soon as the security forces depart.

Diminished ISR Assets. The ISF has seen its organic ISR assets decrease by 50%. In addition, some U.S. ISR platforms have been diverted to monitor Iranian activity.

Iraqi Government Struggling. Politics and other factors are hindering the security efforts of the ISF. The government has seen changes in the leadership of the defense, interior, and justice ministries. There have been some significant protests over the lack of electricity and other basic government services – to which the ISF has to respond.

‘Peshmerga’ and ‘Kurdistan’. One of the U.S. most reliable allies in the Middle East continues to be the Kurds of both Syria and Iraq. However, the Kurds in Iraq have some deep-seated internal political divisions (KDP vs PUK). This results in separate administrative and intelligence organizations representing the two political parties. This division extends to the Peshmerga as well.

In addition, the Kurdish government is at odds with Iraq’s central government on a number of issues. One of these is some disputed territory lying between Arab and Kurdish regions. There is a security gap in this area and ISIS is taking advantage of this gap.

Departure of State Department Personnel. Threats against U.S. personnel working in Iraq prompted a severe cut-back in embassy and consulate strength. The threats are from Iran and some of its proxy forces in Iraq – principally the Iranian-backed Shia militias belonging to the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). This “. . . eroded the ability of the Embassy Baghdad and Consulate Erbil to manage humanitarian assistance and stabilization efforts in Iraq.” The number of personnel was reduced from 563 to 312. This evacuation order has also affected some of the almost 5,000 contractor personnel stationed in Iraq.

The ‘Takeaway’

Based on a reading of the report it would be easy to draw the conclusion that the drawdown of military forces (SOF included) in Syria has diminished the ability of the SDF to kill off ISIS. In addition, the reduction of State and USAID personnel in Iraq has reduced humanitarian and stabilization efforts in Iraq. From the report: “Despite the loss of physical territory, thousands of ISIS fighters remain in Iraq and Syria and are carrying out attacks and working to rebuild their capabilities.”

Read the 116-page report here:
DoD Quarterly Report on OIR – August 2019

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Photo: Iraqi soldiers move through a smokescreen that provides concealment during an assault exercise.
(U.S. Army photo, page 2, of OIR IG Report, August 2019).

“Wilayah of Hind”

ISIS Attempting to Put Global Meaning on a Regional Conflict

By Ajit Maan

In mid-May 2019 ISIS announced the establishment of a province in India. The newly dubbed “Wilayah of Hind” (Indian Province) was announced by its Amaq News Agency. The same statement claimed the infliction of casualties on the Indian Army in Amshipora in the Shopian district of Kashmir.

There are at least five things that are clear:

1. There is no physical geographical “province” called “Wilayah of Hind.” The claim is not true and the so-called province is not real.
2. While the claim of provincial establishment may seem preposterous, it is not so in light of the larger strategy. An austere and hardline form of Islam has roots in India as far back as the mid 18^th century, often centered around the teachings of Shah Waliullah Dehlawi. ISIS is very likely attempting to inspire Indian Muslims with a very personal narrative regarding this iconic Shah.
3. The combined statement of the very real and confirmed strike in Kashmir along with the illusory claim to have established a province in India are a continuation of the ISIS strategy of attempting to establish global meaning of regional conflicts and also to reinvigorate their ultimate victory narrative recently suffering dramatic setbacks in the Levant.
4. The fact that ISIS claimed a province in India rather than Kashmir may indicate the interests of its financiers. The group’s report card is not looking good as a result of its territorial withdrawals and its financiers may be re-enthused by in-roads into India.
5. The group is recruiting in Kashmir for strikes in India.

ISIS leadership is looking for foot soldiers to activate the kinetic tactics that will serve the larger psychological strategy. And it knows that local Kashmiri populations vulnerable to exploitation will be motivated primarily by the potential for territorial defense. Tribal defense narratives are common and effective for rallying support for the group portrayed as “under attack”, true or not. The mythological province is designed for the ears of its financiers and for an audience that is recruitable primarily through appeal to defense of territory and more foundationally – the defense of the identity that is associated with the physical territory. By re-framing the regional conflict as a small instance of a global Salafi-jihadism, ISIS is trying to put a global brand on a regional conflict by attempting to swallow up the conflict and re-define it.

Notice that ISIS is not engaging in counter-narrative (it is not addressing this regional conflict in the terms of the conflict itself and then taking a side and defending it) rather it is re-defining the conflict as a small part of something larger. 

Kashmiris are worried about Kashmir. India wants to retain it. Pakistan wants to own it. Other players have their own vested interests. But ISIS is not interested in Kashmiri independence nor in Kashmir as anything more than recruitment grounds for a mythological re-mapping of the caliphate. They are seizing opportunistically on violence driven by factors mostly unrelated to jihadism.

That hard truth will not win recruits from within Kashmir.

In order to get recruits to strike India or even to get civilian support for ISIS operatives in Kashmir, ISIS will have to re-define the nature of the fight, changing it from a dispute over territorial rights to a fight between them and the rest of the world. Doing that will require an alteration in Kashmiri identities from Kashmiri nationalists to global jihadists. 

Up until this point Kashmiri separatists have either wanted independence or they want Pakistan to take Kashmir. They have not aspired to anything like a global empire. 

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Ajit Maan, Ph.D. is author of Counter-Terrorism: Narrative Strategies, Narrative Warfare, and co-author of Introduction to Narrative Warfare. She is Affiliate Faculty, Center for the Study of  Narrative and Conflict Resolution at George Mason University, member of the Brain Trust of the Weaponized Narrative Initiative at Arizona State University, and Founder of Narrative Strategies, LLC.

Islamic State Update – The Islamic State is suffering huge losses in Iraq and Syria yet the battle is far from over. The upper echelons of leadership have made their way out of the cities of Raqqa and Mosul and are sure to continue the battle (and war) on other fronts. ISIS will likely revert (where necessary) back to an insurgent and terrorist organization utilizing clandestine methods of operation. Over the past few years ISIS has opened several new fronts – to include Libya, Afghanistan, Philippines, and other locations. In addition, it has inspired many ‘Lone Wolf’ attacks in European cities and other locations. This article provides a review of recent articles, publications, papers, analysis, and commentary about the Islamic State.

M777 Howitzers Making a Difference in Iraq. ISIS militants are faced with a number of adversaries and weapons systems in Iraq and Syria. Aircraft bombing from above, snipers from opposing forces, and artillery of the U.S. Marines and U.S. Army. One of these artillery pieces is the 155-mm M777 Howitzer that can hit a target almost 19 miles away. The gun can be towed or airlifted (CH-53s, CH-47s, and MV-22 Ospreys). Read more in an article by James Clark entitled “This Is The Devastating Piece of Artillery Leading the Ground Fight Against ISIS”, Task and Purpose, June 29, 2017.

The Expendable Fighters of ISIS. Brian Jenkins, of the RAND Corporation, provides his analysis of how the Islamic State uses (and abuses) their rank and file. He points out that ISIS losses in Mosul and Raqqa have been staggering yet the organization will continue to exist. Read “The Islamic State’s Disposable Army”, The RAND Blog, June 20, 2017.

Who Takes Tal Afar? Powerful Iran-backed militias have surrounded the northern Iraq city of Tal Afar located to the west of Mosul. Once Mosul is fully liberated who will take the lead on Tal Afar? The Iranian-supported militias or the Iraqi government’s Army? Read “Iraq’s Dilemma: Who Will Lead the Next Big Fight Against ISIS?”, The Wall Street Journal, June 30, 2017.

Raqqa Encircled. U.S. backed Syrian forces (composed of Kurdish and Arab fighters) are slowly eating away at the defenses of the Islamic State in the Syrian city of Raqqa. While the top leadership of ISIS has left the city the ISIS fighters are still putting up a robust defense. Eventually, if you read the press releases of CJTF-OIR and other defense officials, the city of Raqqa will soon fall to the Syrian Democratic Front (SDF) forces. The large country to the north – that would be Turkey – is not pleased with these developments. It harbors deep distrust of the Kurdish fighters and would like to see the further expansion of Kurdish-held territory in Syria halted. Some observers believe that Turkey is about to embark on an anti-Kurd offensive in northern Syria. Read more in “U.S. Kurdish allies in final push to encircle Raqqa amid increasing threats from Turkey”, Military Times, June 29, 2017.

The ISIS Caliphate Crumbles. David Ignatius writes about the current state of ISIS and how it is facing defeat in the Middle East. Read “The Crumbling ISIS Caliphate”, Real Clear Politics, July 2, 2017.

Syria – U.S. Waging War on the Cheap. Frederic C. Hof provides his take on the Syrian conflict – saying that the U.S. has missed the boat on the opportunity to set things right. Read Operation Successful, Patient Dead posted on the Atlantic Council, June 29, 2017.

Post-Raqqa Problems. Once Raqqa falls to the Syrian Democratic Front (SDF) what will the political and security environment look like? See “New Conflicts Threaten Syria After Islamic State Defeat”, Reuters, June 30, 2017.

Syria – Mapping Out the Factions and Enclaves. Sam Heller, a Beirut-based writer and analyst focused on Syria, provides us with a primer of the various contestants in the Syrian conflict in “The Signal in Syria’s Noise”, War on the Rocks, June 30, 2017.

After the Fall – ISIS will Re-Emerge. Giorgio Cafiero and Daniel Wagner write about the realities of the Islamic State after the fall of Mosul and Raqqa. It isn’t going away. See Islamic State’s New Realities, the Atlantic Council, June 26, 2017.

Strategy of Occupation? Presumably the U.S. will maintain military forces in parts of Syria even after ISIS is defeated (although, to be certain, it will revert back to an insurgency). So what happens then? The U.S. should have a strategy to deal with the ‘liberated’ areas but . . . . . Read “The Closer We Get, the More Complex It Gets. White House Struggles with Strategy as ISIS Nears Defeat in Iraq and Syria”, Task and Purpose,  July 3, 2017.

Islamic State Will Fight On in Liberated Cities. ISIS is being dislodged from the major cities of Raqqa and Mosul but the fight with the Islamic State will continue well into the future. Although major and smaller cities are being liberated by the Iraqi security forces and the Syrian Democratic Front (SDF) the conflict within the cities will not end. Those who are involved in the planning and execution of “post-liberation security, reconstruction, and governance plans” are aware (at least they should be) that ISIS will continue the struggle by other means – presumably through terrorism, sabotage, suicide bombings, and guerrilla warfare. Daniel Milton and Muhammad al-Ubaydi have penned a 23-page tract entitled The Fight Goes On: The Islamic State’s Continuing Military Efforts in Liberated Cities, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, United States Military Academy, June 2017.

“Light Rollback Strategy” Against ISIS. Several writers have collaborated on a RAND Corporation paper entitled Rolling Back the Islamic State published in June 2017. The authors include Seth Jones, James Dobbins, Ben Connable, and others. The paper addresses the topics such as the ideology and objectives of ISIS, strategies the U.S. and allies should use against ISIS, specific steps to be taken against ISIS in areas where it controls territory and population centers, and steps to neutralize the Islamic States support mechanisms (recruiting, financing, propaganda) around the globe. This 297-page paper proposes that the U.S. has four possible strategies for dealing with the Islamic State: disengagement, containment, rollback “light”, and rollback “heavy”. The RAND authors conclude that rollback “light” is the best way forward – using special operations forces, the Central Intelligence Agency, intelligence assets, and airpower.

Additional Readings on SOF News about the Islamic State:
www.sof.news/?s=islamic+state

The Raqqa Internal Security Force (RISF) is a militia organization vetted by local leaders of the Raqqa, Syria community. The Raqqa Internal Security Force will be made up by local fighters that reflect the ethnic makeup of the city of Raqqa and overseen by the Raqqa Civilian Council.

Composition and Training. The Raqqa Internal Security Force will likely be about 3,500 strong and are being trained up by U.S. special operations forces (SOF) along with its Syrian Democratic Force allies. The force will go through a week-long training program on basic military and policing duties and responsibilities. Most likely they will learn the fine art of crowd control, setting up vehicle checkpoints, and how to fire their weapons.

Similar to ALP? Some observers have noted the similarity of the RISF with the Afghan Local Police (ALP) program stood up in Afghanistan by U.S. Special Forces. The Afghan Local Police were vetted by local community leaders, trained by U.S. SOF (Special Forces, Navy SEALs, and MARSOC), and outfitted with a uniform and AK-47. The program eventually was turned over to the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MoI) with mixed results.

Equipment? According to some news reports the Raqqa Internal Security Force will be outfitted with uniforms, AK-47s, pickup trucks, and medical supplies. They will be outfitted with equipment similar to that provided to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The RISF fighters will wear a light blue arm patch with the image of an eagle.

Mission. The militia force will be used to establish security in Raqqa once the SDF (composed of Arab and Kurd fighters) liberate the city from the Islamic State fighters. One probable purpose of the militia force is to put a ‘local face’ on security forces providing security to Raqqa. Many of its citizens are not happy with the likely liberation of Raqqa by Kurdish forces.

Some of the information above came from the following articles listed below:

“Seven Days, A Gun, and a Prayer: The Pentagon’s Plan to Pacify Raqqa”, Foreign Policy, June 29, 2017.

“U.S.-led coalition helps train Raqqa police: Syrian Kurdish officials”, Reuters, March 24, 2017.

“US-backed Syrian Forces Step Training Ahead of Raqqa Offensive”, Vocie of America, May 25, 2017.

Social Media and Conflict – selected articles, papers, analysis, and commentary on the role of social media in conflict and war.

The Importance of Counter Influence Operations. History has shown that the United States is vulnerable to an extent by propaganda and covert influence operations. The British used it to lead us into World War I, the Soviet Union used it effectively against us during the “Cold War”, and the North Vietnamese were effective in its use to paint the Tet Offensive in 1968 as a U.S. military failure. Unfortunately the United States no longer has the U.S. Information Agency which could mount counter influence operations. One observer thinks that the U.S. Congress needs to ” . . . use 21st-century policy means to wage the 21st-century information war. America needs a Strategic Information Agency.” Read “Laying Bare the Enemy’s Aims: Defending Public Opinion in the 21st Century”, War on the Rocks, January 2, 2017.

Shaping Opinions. “War Goes Viral”, by Emerson T. Booking and P.W. Singer, The Atlantic, November 2016. A great and comprehensive article about how social media shapes opinion and is used by warring parties in conflict.

The Virtual Caliphate. The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) has an approach to information warfare that represents a key component of its overall strategy. Even though it is under pressure on the ground in the virtual world ISIS continues to make headway. While it may not establish a Caliphate that holds territory (it does now but may not in the long-term) it certainly can carve out a slice of the virtual world for its Caliphate. The United States and its allies need to continue to diminish the ISIS threat in the physical world but must meet the challenge ISIS poses in the virtual world as well. Read more in “The Virtual Caliphate: ISIS’s Information Warfare”, Institute for the Study of War, December 20, 2016.

Lone Wolfs and ISIS Virtual Planners. The Islamic State has its physical caliphate (Syria and Iraq) with provinces in places like eastern Afghanistan and the Lake Chad Basin. It also operates in the ‘virtual world’ as well. Learn more in “ISIL’s Virtual Planners: A Critical Terrorist Innovation”, War on the Rocks, January 4, 2017.

DARPA, Social Media, and the ID of Terrorists. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency is moving ahead with a project that looks to develop automated software designed to identify terrorist threats through social media. Executive Biz Blog, January 3, 2017.

Soft Power and the Weaponized Narrative. The new battlespace (in part) can be found on the Internet. Almost all parties to every current conflict in the world uses social media to shape the fight. Read more in “Weaponized Narrative is the New Battlespace”, Defense One, January 3, 2017.

ISIS and Social Media: A Fatal Attraction. Cellphones, computers, and social media are used by terrorists, insurgents, and political dissidents to spread their message and sway the conversation. But their use also pose danger. Read “Fatal Attraction: ISIS Just Can’t Resist Social Media”, The Daily Beast, January 3, 2017.

The Islamic State in 2017 – Despite reverses in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Afghanistan the Islamic State in 2017 still presents a viable and persistent threat to the United States, Europe, Middle East, and other regions of the world. Some recent news articles, publications, reports and papers are presented below.

France and ISIS. “Francois Hollande: Fighting IS in Iraq prevents terrorism in France”, BBC News, January 2, 2017. Hollande recently visited Iraq where he met with the Iraqi leaders, senior military members of the Coalition, and French troops. There are over 500 French troops in Iraq to include some Air Force units. In addition, there are French special operations forces on the ground engaged in the fight for Mosul.

Fighting ISIS over the Long-Term. A three-star general based in the Middle East says it will take two more years to defeat the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. See “Top U.S. General: Two More Years to Beat ISIS”, The Daily Beast, by Kim Dozier, December 25, 2016.

Destroying the Oil Revenue Base of ISIS. The U.S. Air Force along with its Coalition partners are having an impact on the revenue base of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. The destruction of its ability to produce and market oil has hampered the finances of ISIS in a significant way. Read more – “Inside the economic war against the Islamic State”, The Washington Post, December 31, 2016.

ISIS Support and Twitter. A group of authors writing for the RAND Corporation have penned a report entitled  Examining ISIS Support and Opposition Networks on Twitter, December 2016.

The Fight Continues – Phase II. After a two-week lull in the action in the waning days of December the Iraqi military and its allies (Kurdish Peshmerga, Iran proxy militias, etc.) have re-started the campaign to re-capture Mosul. Phase II kicked off on December 29th. Almost 1/3 of Mosul has already been taken but the Islamic State is putting up a determined defense of their remaining holdings. The first phase of the operation started in mid-October.

Counter Terrorism Service (CTS). The Iraqi special forces have been in the lead for the retaking of Iraqi’s second largest city but have suffered some significant losses. ISOF is being assisted by the 9th and 16th Divisions of the Iraq security forces. Militarized units of the Federal Police are also functioning as ‘hold forces’ in areas that have been ‘liberated’ by the military. The CTS is being reinforced with more personnel to ensure it is combat-ready once again. The level of training that these replacements possess is subject to question.

Militia Groups. The Iranian proxies – most of them part of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) – are for the most part, Shiite militia groups. There are a few PMF elements that are Sunni. There are also some unofficial militia groups (not part of the PMF). A few of these come from the Mosul region (Knights of Ninewa) and others from other regions of Iraq. Many of these unofficial militias are a composite of Arab Shiites, Sunnis, Yazidis, and Christians. [1] For now, the militia groups are being used on the outskirts of Mosul – fears of a backlash against the Shia militias are contributing to the governments decision to keep the militias out of the city. That . . . and the reputation of the militias in previous actions against Sunni population centers has kept them sidelined as well.

Peshmerga in Defensive Posture. The Kurds are also staying out of the city proper. They are now busy solidifying gains made against ISIS in the surrounding areas. Once again, the Iraqi government is concerned about Kurds advancing into the city during Phase II – worried on the likelihood that they could decide to keep what they gain.

Up to the CTS. This means the taking of Mosul during phase II is squarely on the shoulders of the Counter Terrorism Service. The CTS is not a urban fighting force. It isn’t trained for that mission – it is trained to conduct special operations. Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) is a conventional force mission. Unfortunately the Iraqi army isn’t up to the task so the CTS will be pressed into service once again.

Civilians at risk. There is an estimated one million civilians (perhaps more) still left in Mosul. Many thousands have been able to leave the city – desperate to find safety, food, and water. The densely packed civilian areas of Mosul preclude the level of air support that the U.S. and other Coalition nations were able to offer the CTS when it took Ramadi and Fallujah in 2016.

U.S. Forces. There is a big mix of United States military forces in the country. This includes special operations, medical, artillery, Army aviation, U.S. Air Force and training teams. According to the Pentagon there are about 5,000 U.S. troops in the country; although, the number is a few thousand higher if you count the folks there on temporary duty that flow in and out. [2] A decision was made to embed more U.S. advisors at lower levels within the Iraqi military during Phase II of the Mosul offensive – partnering with forces that had (up to this point) not seen Americans with their formations. [3]

Other Countries as Well. The United States is not in this alone. There are a host of other countries participating in the effort against the Islamic State. Some have offered air support (Britain, France, etc.), some have deployed special operations forces (Canada, Australia, etc.), and these countries have suffered personnel losses as well. [4]

Plan of Attack for Phase II? The plan to take Mosul is with an attack along three axes. The Iraqi army’s 16th Division is coming in from the north and advancing south. The Counter Terrorism Service is pushing west and south along two fronts (from its positions in the east), and on the southern edges of the city the Federal Police (the Federal Police are augmented by the MoI’s Emergency Response Division [5]) are clearing neighborhoods in a northerly direction. [6] The PMF (mostly Shia militia) hold the western edges of the city but have been restrained by the Iraqi government from proceeding further.

Timeline and Aftermath? Ultimately the city of Mosul will fall to the Iraqi government forces. The toll on the Counter Terrorism Service will be significant – and could render it combat ineffective for quite a while. This will deprive the Iraqi government of a loyal and highly trained counter terrorism and special operations force. Other units and militias will fill the security void – and there is the big concern.

Footnotes:

[1] “The Many Armies of Iraq: If ISIS Goes, Do They Turn on Each Other?”, by Kimberly Dozier, The Daily Beast, January 2, 2017.

[2] “US General Praises Iraqi Forces Fighting in Mosul“, The New York Times, January 1, 2017.

[3] See “U.S. forces embedding more to help Iraqis retake Mosul”, Reuters, December 24, 2016.

[4] The United Kingdom just lost a soldier from the 2nd Battalion of the Duke of Lancaster’s Regiment in early January. See “Ministry of Defence confirms death of British soldier in Iraq”, International Business Times, January 2, 2017.

[5] The Emergency Response Division of the MoI had it’s start in late 2003 / early 2004 as the Emergency Response Unit (ERU). At that time the ERU was a small but highly effective 30-man Iraqi police unit funded by the U.S. State Department and advised by two contract Americans who were reservists with (now deactivated) 12th Special Forces Group.

[6] For info on axes of attack see “Iraqi Forces Resume Mosul Offensive”, U.S. Central Command News Release, December 29, 2016.

The growth of the Islamic State in Afghanistan had a surprising beginning and then the size of the group quickly diminished. ISIS had a lot of opponents – including the United States (SOF, air attacks, and drones), the Afghan security forces, and . . . the Taliban. ISIS started up armed groups in Farah province, Zabul province, and Nangarhar province. It was only successful in Nangarhar and even there it has seen its territorial control significantly diminished.

Currently (January 2017), ISIS is probably about 1,000 strong with forces in Nangarhar and Kunar provinces (eastern Afghanistan). At the start of 2016 ISIS controlled – across the country – about 11 districts (398 in the country) but now are active in only three. The group is also known as the Islamic State in Khorasan Province or ISKP.

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Read more in “Resolute Support Warns of Intensified War Next Year”, Tolo News, December 30, 2016.

See also Islamic State in Khorasan Province by Afghan War News.

Middle East News Update – Obama’s Syrian legacy, seige of Aleppo, using hybrid warfare against Russia, research into Arab politics, U.S. support to Kurds could be better, and more.

Obama’s Syrian Legacy. A former NATO supreme allied commander – retired Admiral James Stavridis – has said that President Obama will regret not doing more to assist the Syrian rebels that fought against the Assad regime. He specifically mentioned the tragedy of Alleppo. Read more in “Ex-NATO supreme commander: Obama will look back in ‘shame’ on Syria”, The Hill Defense Blog, December 14, 2016.

U.S. Support to Kurds Questioned. While the United States has been providing training, advise, and assistance to the Kurds and their Peshmerga fighting forces once U.S. agency thinks more can be done. The Defense Department’s Inspector General (IG) has released a report that found some limitations to the program. Read “IG report: U.S. support to Kurds could be better”, Military Times, December 21, 2016.

Seige of Aleppo. The four year battle for Aleppo is nearing its final stages. The Syrian regime forces – backed by Russian military air power (and Russian SOF on the ground), as well as proxy forces of Iran – have the rebel forces on the ropes. The humanitarian disaster experience in Aleppo is significant and the fall of the city may in some ways alleviate the plight of the non-combatants. Peter Apps writing for Arab News provides his perspective in “Analysis: The lessons of Aleppo’s long, pointless siege”, December 14, 2016.

Siege of Eastern Ghouta, Syria. While Aleppo dominates the news about the conflict in Syria another rebel enclave is under attack. This one in the eastern outskirts of Damascus. Read about the rise and fall of Syria’s rebel enclave in “Into the Tunnels”, The Century Foundation, December 21, 2016.

Beyond the Arab Uprisings. The Century Foundation (TCF) is conducting a research project on “Arab Politics beyond the Uprisings”. It will result in a series of publications in 2017.

Using Hybrid War against Moscow. Max Boot, a defense commentator and author, has wrote that it is time for Obama to give Russia a taste of his own medicine – with the use of hybrid warfare. Russia’s aggression in Syria (as well as Eastern Europe) shows its ability to attain its national objectives with operations within the “Gray Zone”. Boot advocates the revival of “the political warfare skills it once possessed . . .” Read more in “How to Wage Hybrid War on the Kremlin”, Foreign Policy, December 13, 2016.

Photo credit: U.S. Army by Specialist Craig Jensen, December 1, 2016.

The newly-established Target Fusion Cell (TFC) works within the Combined Force Air Component Command (CFACC) in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR). The Target Fusion Cell is “. . . an integrated cell of intelligence analysts, targeting experts and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance tactical controllers . . .” The intent of the Target Fusion cell is to bring more information together faster, fuse it, and provide it to decision-makers to allow aircraft (and drones) to hit targets quicker.

Read more about the Target Fusion Cell (TFC) of the CFACC in “Coalition establishes new targeting capability, launches largest strike of the year”, DVIDS, December 17, 2016.