(CENTCOM press release, 16 Jan 2024). On 11 January 2024, while conducting a flag verification, U.S. CENTCOM Navy forces conducted a night-time seizure of a dhow conducting illegal transport of advanced lethal aid from Iran to resupply Houthi forces in Yemen as part of the Houthis’ ongoing campaign of attacks against international merchant shipping.

U.S. Navy SEALs operating from USS Lewis B Puller (ESB 3), supported by helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), executed a complex boarding of the dhow near the coast of Somalia in international waters of the Arabian Sea, seizing Iranian-made ballistic missile and cruise missiles components. Seized items include propulsion, guidance, and warheads for Houthi medium range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), as well as air defense associated components. Initial analysis indicates these same weapons have been employed by the Houthis to threaten and attack innocent mariners on international merchant ships transiting in the Red Sea.

This is the first seizure of lethal, Iranian-supplied advanced conventional weapons (ACW) to the Houthis since the beginning of Houthi attacks against merchant ships in November 2023. The interdiction also constitutes the first seizure of advanced Iranian-manufactured ballistic missile and cruise missile components by the U.S. Navy since November 2019. The direct or indirect supply, sale, or transfer of weapons to the Houthis in Yemen violates U.N. Security Resolution 2216 and international law.

Two U.S. Navy SEALs previously reported as lost at sea were directly involved in this operation. “We are conducting an exhaustive search for our missing teammates,” said General Michael Erik Kurilla, USCENTCOM Commander.

The dhow was deemed unsafe and sunk by U.S. Navy forces. Disposition of the 14 dhow crewmembers is being determined in accordance with international law.

“It is clear that Iran continues shipment of advanced lethal aid to the Houthis. This is yet another example of how Iran actively sows instability throughout the region in direct violation of U.N. Security Resolution 2216 and international law,” said General Michael Erik Kurilla, “We will continue to work with regional and international partners to expose and interdict these efforts, and ultimately to reestablish freedom of navigation.”

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This article was first published by U.S. Central Command on January 16, 2024.
https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3645241/uscentcom-seizes-iranian-advanced-conventional-weapons-bound-for-houthis/

Photos from CENTCOM Twitter account dated January 16, 2024. Map by SOF News derived from CIA maps (view larger version). Information about Vessel Boarding Search and Seizure (VBSS) operations. Also known as Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure.

Hamas terrorists crossed Israel’s border from the Gaza Strip (CIA Map) by land (including tunnels), sea, and air (hang gliders) to conduct surprise multipronged attacks against military and civilian targets in central and southern Israel early on Saturday, 7 October 9 (about 0630 Israeli time).

Hamas Attack on Israel

Sequence of Attack. The complex attack, named ‘Operation Al-Aqsa Flood’ by Hamas, began with a massive rocket, missile, and mortar barrage – thousands of launches. This was followed by a denial-of-service attacks (Strike Source) in Israel. Hamas then infiltrated across the border into Israel by air, sea, and land. Hang gliders, small boats, tunnels, and trucks were used. The rocket attacks continued throughout the day. The terrorist group also used drones to attack Israeli targets.

Extent of Attack. Hamas, numbering about 1,000, entered about 22 Israeli towns located along the border, taking temporary control of some of those communities. By Sunday most of these areas have been retaken by Israeli forces. Israeli casualties are steep, with hundreds dead and over 1,000 wounded. By Sunday morning the estimates of Israeli dead approached 600. As many as 260 may have been killed at a ‘Musical Festival for Peace’ (The Washington Post, Oct 8, 2023) that was held near the Gaza border in Southern Israel; and several hostages taken to Gaza.

Rockets. Thousands of rockets and mortar rounds were launched from the Gaza Strip into Israel attacking military and civilian targets. Hamas claims to have launched over 5,000 munitions into Israel. It is reported that the Iron Dome missile defense system has been effective but perhaps not able to handle the volume of rocket and mortar attacks in a concentrated time frame. Apparently, Hamas has been able to effectively use drones against Israeli tanks.

Hostages. Civilians and military members, estimated to be over one hundred, have been taken hostage and are now in the Gaza Strip (CIA Factbook). Many of the hostages are women and children. Among the hostages are German, UK, American, and Russian citizens. According to a Palestinian spokesman one of the goals of the Hamas operation in Israel was to take hostages. The rationale was to exchange the Israeli hostages for Palestinians in Israeli prisons and to deter Israeli ground operations in the Gaza Strip. The IDF says it has established a headquarters to focus on putting together accurate information on the Israeli hostages held by Hamas in the Gaza Strip. It has appointed Brigadier General Gal Hirsch to oversee the missing persons file. Israel has requested assistance from Egypt to help negotiate the release of the hostages.

Ongoing Fighting. The battles on Israeli territory in communities along the border of Gaza continued on Sunday. (map Twitter) Israeli residents remain in shelters in many communities waiting on the arrival of Israeli forces.

Assistance to Hamas. Various news reports indicate that Iran and Hezbollah provided significant assistance to Hamas in the form of advice, intelligence, planning, and support. (Wall Street Journal, October 8, 2023) (subscription)

Israeli Response

Intelligence Failure. Apparently, this massive attack by Hamas was not expected by the Israelis and some national security observers are calling it an intelligence failure. Just last week Biden’s National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan stated that “The Middle East Region is quieter today than it has been in two decades”. (The Atlantic, Oct 7, 2023) The attack was launched on the 50th anniversary of the 1973 War in which Arab states attacked Israel on Yom Kippur – the holiest day of the Jewish calendar. At the time of this current attack the Israelis were celebrating Simchat Torah, coming at the end of the weeklong Sukkot Festival. The IDF over the past few years have repositioned IDF battalions from the border along the Gaza Strip to the ‘territories’ – protecting settlers in the West Bank. (CIA Map) Instead, it relied on ‘hi-tech’ monitoring of the Gaza Strip border with sensors, cameras, and fencing.

Israeli Actions and Retaliation. Israel has declared war on Hamas and has called up many of the reserve Israeli Defense Forces. At 1200 noon (Israel time) on Saturday, October 7th it launched operation “Swords of Iron” (IDF, icon). Aerial, land, and sea attacks by Israel commenced against military targets in the Gaza Strip. There are reports that Israel has closed the border crossings with Jordan. Schools in many parts of Israel (if not all) have been temporarily closed. Israeli residents in areas along the Gaza Strip border area are being evacuated. The country is currently under a curfew. Some flights into and out of Israel have been cancelled. Ben Gurion International Airport (FlightAware map) is experiencing flight cancellations and delays.

Announcements by Israeli Government. The Security Cabinet announced that the supply of fuel, electricity, and other goods to the Gaza Strip will be stopped. Israel has interrupted electrical service to the Gaza Strip. About 63% of the electricity for the Gaza Strip comes from Israel, 14% from Egypt, and 23% is self-generated (Twitter). On Saturday night Israel announced the Declaration of War. The State Security Cabinet of Israel approved and ratified the Declaration of War (Article 40 Aleph) against Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. This is the first time since the 1973 Yon Kipper War that Israel has declared war.

Attacks on Gaza. The Israelis will likely attempt to completely destruct the military and governmental capabilities of Hamas and other militant Palestinian organizations in the Gaza Strip. Israel has provided civilians in Gaza with very specific evacuation instructions (Twitter) – telling them to move deeper into the Gaza Strip in designated areas due to ongoing and future military operations.

Israelis Strike Terrorist Targets. The IDF announced (Oct 8) that it had struck ten Hamas terrorist organization targets. These targets were located in multi-story buildings in the Gaza Strip. In addition, two banks used by Hamas were hit – the Islamic National Bank and the First Bank. Other targets that stored weapons and military equipment were also struck in Gaza. According to the Jerusalem Post (Oct 8) the IDF has conducted 500 airstrikes (Twitter) in the Gaza Strip by mid-day Sunday.

IDF Spokesperson Briefing. A member of the Israeli Defense Forces presented a 11-minute briefing (IDF Twitter) on the evening of 11 Oct 2023 on the situation. He states that hundreds of Hamas terrorists crossed over into Israel, executed civilians, and took Israelis captive. These captives are now held hostage by Hamas in Gaza.

Reserve Callup. Reservists are being mobilized and military units are being sent to the border with the Gaza Strip. Israelis who are in reserve military status living overseas are receiving phone calls calling them up for service.

International Response

International Reaction. Most nations are condemning the Hamas assault on Israel. Predictably, some countries are applauding the attack – Iran, of course, being one of them as well as several other Arab nations. National security observers are calling for the reoccupation of the Gaza strip (Middle East Forum) and disarming of Hamas. In Alexandria, Egypt, a policeman opened fire on a tourist group. Two Israelis and one Egyptian were killed.

U.S. Reaction. The U.S. Department of State has condemned (DoS) “. . . the appalling attacks by Hamas terrorists against Israel . . .” President Joe Biden issued a statement (White House, Oct 7, 2023) condemning the terrorist attacks. The U.S. has announced a security alert (DoS, Oct 7, 2023) for Israel and designated the Gaza Strip as a ‘Do Not Travel‘ area. (DoS Map) The U.S. Embassy in Jerusalem says that all diplomatic and military personnel in Israel are safe and accounted for. DoS has issued a ‘shelter in place’ advisory for diplomatic staff and American nationals.

And Hezbollah? There are concerns that Israel may soon be involved in hostilities along its northern border with Lebanon. Hezbollah announced that it has fired mortars into the Mount Dov (Google Maps) area of Israel from southern Lebanon. This location has a long-range radar installation used to detect and track missiles and rockets launched from Lebanon and Syria. The Israelis have responded with artillery fire and airstrikes against Hezbollah targets. Patriot missile systems (NSI) have been used to intercept incoming missiles from Lebanon. Some press reports say that several IDF bases have been hit with mortar and missile attacks coming from southern Lebanon. Iran is a strong supporter of Hezbollah and will likely provide assistance to the group in its operations against Israel. Israel has begun preparations in the event evacuations from areas near the Lebanon border are required. Israeli military units are reinforcing its northern border area. Israeli tanks, including the Merkava Mark III (Wikipedia) and IV as well as self-propelled artillery, are deploying to the northern border area.

And the Peace Talks? The White House had been working on an Israel-Saudi deal – acting as a third-party peace broker. With this ongoing conflict this effort will likely come to a screeching halt. There is the likelihood that Iran and Hamas saw the ongoing peace talks as a threat – as it was an attempt to isolate them in the international community. Part of the deal had Israel making concessions to the Palestinian Authority – an enemy of Hamas. So, Hamas striking Israel at this time could be a desire to disrupt the peace talks deal. There is also the likelihood that Russia has encouraged Hamas; certainly, the conflict in Israel-Gaza Strip will divert attention away from the Ukraine conflict. See “In Brief: The U.S.-Saudi-Israeli Deal”, War on the Rocks, October 4, 2023.

Background Information

Hamas Rule in Gaza. The origins of this terrorist group, the Islamic Resistance Movement, date back to 1987. It is an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood. In 2007 it took power in the Gaza Strip – a small area of land with a population of about two million.

History of the Gaza Strip. This land area has been inhabited since the 15th century B.C and has been dominated by many different peoples and empires throughout it history. It was part of the Ottoman Empire from the 16th century until the end of World War I. It became part of the British Mandate of Palestine after World War I. Egypt began administering the Gaza Strip following the 1948 Arab Israeli War. During the Six-Day war in 1967 it was captured by Israel. In the late 1990s Israel transferred many of the Palestinian-populated areas to the newly created Palestinian Authority (PA). In 2005 Israel unilaterally withdrew all of its settlers and military from the Gaza Strip.

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References:

Gaza Strip – CIA Fact Book
https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/gaza-strip/

Israel Palestine Interactive Map – With Battle Event Notations
https://israelpalestine.liveuamap.com/

Map – GeoConfirmed Israel
https://geoconfirmed.org/israel

IDF Real Time Operational Updates
https://www.idf.il/en/

U.N. Relief and Works Agency (Palestine)
https://www.unrwa.org/

IDF Twitter Feeds
@IDF and @IAFsite

The Biden administration wasted very little time in setting a course correction in the United States role in the Yemen conflict. Citing humanitarian issues (as well as other concerns) it has decided to eliminate support for offensive operations provided to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in their fight against the Iran-supported Ansarallah / Houthi rebels in Yemen. The conflict has raged for many years.

Humanitarian Crisis. The Yemen conflict has resulted in a humanitarian crisis – which the United Nations says is one of the worst in the world. There are widespread food shortages resulting in malnutrition. The economy is in a shambles and government services are operating in a very basic level. The aerial bombardment by Saudi and UAE aircraft has resulted in numerous civilian casualties. There is a significant lack of medical supplies and services for the civilian population. In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic and cholera are taking a toll among the population.

The Houthis. With a strong base in the north region of Yemen the Shia group has attempted to extend its reach south and east throughout the country. It controls the capital city (Sanaa). Other religious, ethnic, and political groups have joined their movement. Most of the civilian population (estimates vary from 70 to 80%) come under Houthi control. The Houthis enjoy a strong position in the conflict – with no sign of their impending defeat in the future.

Iranian Support. The Houthi rebels have been supported by Iran for a number of years. Many observers of the conflict believe that the Houthis are an Iranian proxy group. The Iranians provide funding, weapons, equipment, trainers, and advisors to the Houthis. Through its Qods Force, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is very involved in the support provided to the Houthis.

Iranian Weapons and Equipment. Weapons, equipment, supplies, money, and personnel are transported to Yemen on international air flights as well as sea movement to Yemen’s ports. These weapons include short-range ballistic missiles, surface-to-air missiles, drones, and other sophisticated equipment. The missile systems and components have been used by the Houthis against Saudi oil and infrastructure targets. These weapons shipments are in violation of the U.N. Security Council Resolution 2216.

Yemeni Government. The government of President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi was ousted from the capital city and surrounding areas in a 2014-2015 offensive – dividing the country. The United Nations- recognized Yemeni government has benefited from external support from Gulf nations. However, the government supporters are fragmented and often engaged in internal conflicts.

Saudi-led Coalition. Saudi Arabia and the UAE say that they are actively reducing Iran’s regional influence in their intervention in the Yemen conflict. The involvement by the Saudis and their allies began in 2015 after the Houthi rebels ousted the Republic of Yemen Government from the capital city Sanaa in 2014. The Saudi coalition was able to help the ousted government regain some territory to include the major city of Aden but the conflict soon turned into a stalemate.

United Arab Emirates. The UAE has stepped back on its military involvement – although it still conducts counter terrorism operations and provides support to the breakaway Southern Transitional Council. It withdrew ground forces from Yemen in 2019. Other nations that have supported the Saudi action in Yemen in the past include Kuwait and Sudan.

U.S. Support. For the past several years the U.S. has provided intelligence, logistics, precision-guided munitions, and other types of support to Saudi Arabia and its allies involved in the Yemen war. This support was increased after missile and drone attacks against Saudi oil facilities by the Houthis. The U.S. stopped providing aerial refueling support to Saudi and UAE aircraft in 2018. In the last few years U.S. support has been limited to intelligence sharing, targeting support, and training (in an attempt to limit civilian casualties). The U.S. has been criticized for its role in providing Saudi Arabia and UAE with arms and munitions used in the Yemen conflict.

U.S. SOF. In addition, the U.S. has had special operations forces advisors on the ground in Yemen providing training, advice, and assistance. U.S. SOF have worked with units from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) as well as Yemen governmental security forces. The U.S. has also conducted unilateral counter-terrorism operations in the country against al-Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates. In January 2017 a Navy SEAL (Ryan Owens) died during a counterterrorism raid in Yemen. In January 2020 U.S. SOF conducted an unsuccessful operation to kill or capture a key IRGC-QF operative in Yemen (Abdul Reza Shahlai).

Past activities of U.S. SOF in Yemen include foreign internal defense, counterterrorism, intelligence sharing, surveillance and reconnaissance, maritime interdiction, and drone strikes. U.S. SOF involvement in Yemen has also provided the opportunity to work with and assist in the development of GCC special operations capabilities. This also lends to increased interoperability of GCC SOF with U.S. SOF. In addition, the United Kingdom and France has also deployed its special operations forces to Yemen.

Trump and Yemen. Under the Trump administration the U.S. has taken a strong stance against Iran’s activities across the Middle East. This includes attempting to diminish Iran’s influence in Yemen. The Trump administration had declared the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). It appears that the Biden administration may reverse this designation. The humanitarian implications of an FTO designation are significant. It would become more difficult to get foreign aid and assistance into areas of Yemen controlled by the Houthis.

Biden and Yemen. The Biden administration is likely to give priority to the nuclear talks about the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreement with Iran over concerns about Iranian meddling in Middle East affairs. Some sales of aircraft and munitions to Saudi Arabia and the UAE are on hold and under review by the Biden administration. U.S. activities in Yemen are likely to be curtailed. This prohibition by the Biden administration does not include the actions the United States will take against al-Qaida affiliates in Yemen – to include al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsular (AQAP).

A Diplomatic Solution? The U.S. has now announced increased support to United Nations efforts for a political settlement of the conflict. In early February the United States named Tim Lenderking, a career member of the Senior Foreign Service, as U.S. Special Envoy to Yemen. However, a ceasefire and end to the conflict is unlikely. A United Nations Special Envoy to Yemen (established in June 2012) has failed in attempts to arrange a permanent ceasefire and political agreement. The Houthis are entrenched in Sanaa and the western highlands of Yemen. However, the opposition (Hadi government) and its supporters in the Gulf Cooperation Council insist that any political solution must include a Houthi departure from Sanaa.

U.S. Interests in the Yemen Conflict. There are reasons for the United States to be concerned with the events taking place at the southern end of the Arabian peninsular. There are fears that Yemen could become a sanctuary for transnational terrorist groups like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. The vital international shipping lanes near the Bab al Mandab Strait are at risk. In addition, Iran could possibly use Yemen in the future to threaten Saudi Arabia’s southern borders. How the Biden administration addresses these concerns while resetting the relationship with Iran will be watched with great interest.

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References:

Yemen: Civil and Regional Intervention, Congressional Research Service, CRS R43960, December 8, 2020.
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43960

Congress and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2020, Congressional Research Service, CRS R45046, June 19, 2020.
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45046

Recent news, analysis, and commentary about the Middle East – politics, conflict, Iraq withdrawal, and great power competition.

Security Overview

CENTCOM Now Has Israel. In his last week in office President Trump ordered that U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) add Israel to its area of responsibility (AOR). This moved Israel from the European Command (EUCOM) AOR. According to the DoD the “. . . easing of tensions between Israel and its Arab neighbors . . .” has provided a strategic opportunity for the US to align key partners against shared threats in the Middle East (that would be Iran). This puts CENTCOM in an awkward position – forcing it to work with both Israel and its Arab opponents. This move may strain relationships between CENTCOM officials and other nations in the region. This may prompt some realignment with SOCEUR, SOCCENT, 10th SFG, and 5th SFG, as well as other special operations forces. See “In waning days, Trump shakes up CENTCOM to increase Arab-Israeli efforts against Iran”, by Howard Altman, Military Times, January 15, 2021.

Great Power Competition. Russia continues to support the Syrian regime. This effort increases Russia’s prestige in the area, enhances the ability of Russia to project power in NATO’s southern flank, and puts the U.S. on notice that it doesn’t have free reign in the region. China continues its work to strengthen its economic ties in the region. Read more in “Great Power Rivalry in the Middle East”, Eurasia Review, January 20, 2021.

A Plan on How the US Could Withdraw from ME. Mike Sweeney, a fellow at Defense Priorities, presents a 4-year plan for significantly reducing the US military presence in the Middle East. “When It’s Over: An American Withdrawal Plan for the Middle East”, Modern War Institute at West Point, January 18, 2021.

Iraq

US Troop Levels Reduced. In accordance with instructions from President Trump there are now only 2,500 U.S. service members in Iraq. The reductions were longtime goals of the Trump administration. This drawdown in Iraq follows the successful Iraqi military campaign against ISIS. (The campaign is over?). The US will continue to provide support with air power, intelligence, and a counterterrorism platform.

Iraq’s Economy. Widespread instability and violence is likely in Iraq’s future if Baghdad’s finances are not addressed. Kenneth Pollack and Farhad Alaaldin believe that U.S. and international community must shore up Baghdad’s finances before it is too late. “Iraq’s economic collapse could be Biden’s first foreign policy headache”, AEI, December 14, 2020.

Iraqi Arrest Warrant for Trump. A judge in Baghdad’s investigative court tasked with probing the Washington-directed drone strike that killed Iranian General Qassim Soleimani in January 2020 has issued an arrest warrant for President Trump. Soleimani headed the expeditionary Quds force of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps. The warrant was a charge of premeditated murder. See “Iraq issues arrest warrant for Trump over Soleimani killing”, ABC News, January 7, 2021.

The Sinjar Agreement – It Needs Work. One of the knotty political problems facing Iraq is the population area near the border with Turkey and Syria. The Agreement on the Restoration of Stability and Normalization of the Situation in the District of Sinjar is a joint security agreement between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the federal government of Iraq. Sinjar is a Yazidi town in Iraq’s Nineveh Governate the fell to the Islamic State in 2014 and culminated in a genocide against its inhabitants. The October 2020 agreement neglects to include the local population of Sinjar. Shamiran Mako, a professor of international relations at Boston University, argues the agreement needs a recalibration. Read her essay “Negotiating Peace in Iraq’s Disputed Territories: Modifying the Sinjar Agreement”, Lawfare Blog, January 17, 2021.

Iraqi PMFs Explained. Renad Mansour of Chatham House provides a detailed and interesting look of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) of Iraq. The PMF is more than a group of militias – it is interwoven into Iraqi government and society. “The ‘Hybrid Armed Actors’ Paradox: A Necessary Compromise?”, War on the Rocks, January 21, 2021.

Iraqi Interpreters Face Death. Former interpreters for the British military advisors and British special forces in Iraq are terrified that Iraqi Shia militia members will track them down and kill them. See “Iraqi interpreters ‘stalked by death squads’ for helping the British”, BBC News, December 29, 2020.

Iraqi Air Force Readiness Problems. There are recent press accounts that suggest less than 20 percent of Iraq’s F-16s are fully airworthy. Poor jet maintenance and mismanagement are some of the causes of failing to meet maintenance standards. It is speculated that the poor maintenance record for the Iraqi Vipers is behind the decision to remove the F-16s from the air tasking orders in April 2020. Read “The Iraqi Air Force’s F-16 Fleet is on the Brink of Collapse Despite Showy Flybys”, The Drive War Zone, January 7, 2021.

Senior ISIS Leader Killed. A U.S.-led coalition air strike killed the top Islamic State leader in Iraq. Abu Yasir was the most senior Daesh leader and was killed near Kirkuk on January 27, 2021. (Military Times, Jan 29, 2021).

Syria

New US – Syria Policy Needed. The partnership between Russia and Syria since the outbreak of the civil war in 2011 has proved to be effective and successful in preventing the fall of the Assad regime. The US lost significant leverage due to its inaction when self-imposed red lines were crossed and an incoherent foreign policy ensued. A new US policy towards Syria should recognize the necessity of pragmatic engagement with Russia. A ten-paper provides more details in Reframing US Syria policy: The road to Damascus runs through Moscow, Brookings Institute, December 2020.

Few Attractive Options for US in Syria. Sam Heller, an independent researcher and analyst based in Beirut, offers his views on the way forward for the US in Syria. Read his article “Redefining Victory in America’s War Against the Islamic State in Syria”, War on the Rocks, January 5, 2021.

Syria’s Narrative War. The battle for physical territory in Syria is complemented with the battle of the narrative. The propaganda, activism, and disinformation of Syria’s warring factions is a major factor (and threat) that will have lasting consequences for the region. Read more in “Lessons From Syria’s Low-Profile Narrative War”, War Room, United States Army War College, January 7, 2021.

Northern Syria – Fighting Continues. The Syrian Democratic Front (SDF) is facing the prospect of a new Turkish offensive. Turkish-back proxy groups are continuing their operations trying to control SDF-held areas. Russia is putting the pressure on the SDF to vacate areas so Syrian government forces can move in. See “Fighting Continues Over Flashpoint in Northern Syria”, Voice of America, January 5, 2021.

Syria’s Humanitarian Crisis. The Syrian civil war is approaching its tenth anniversary. The country remains divided and the conflict has settled into a stalemate – for the time being. Left in the lurch are refugees in neighboring countries and internally displaced personnel (IDPs) – many in temporary camps. Shelly Culbertson describes the situation in “The Syrian Forever War Has Created Forever Refugees”, The National Interest, November 24, 2020.

Iran

Heightened Tensions. U.S. military forces in the Middle East remain on high alert due to concerns that Iran may take action against U.S. interests in the region. The aircraft carrier Nimitz was enroute to its home port when it was sent back to the region. The one year anniversary of the killing of the top Iranian general Qassem Soleimani could be a reason for Iran’s escalatory rhetoric. It is being reported that the Revolutionary Guard’s Quds Force (under new leadership) has reverted back to being a smaller clandestine fighting unit. (Ynet News, Jan 3, 2021).

Iran and al-Qa’ida. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo revealed that Iran has given a new operational headquarters to al-Qa’ida. He says that Iran is now the home base for the terrorist group. (DoS, Jan 12, 2021).

Attacks on Shipping. The Middle East remains a volatile area for merchant shipping. Tankers and other civilian ships face the risk of limpet mines, explosive boats, sea mines, piracy, and the risk of politically motivated seizure. Many of the incidents are tied to Iran or its proxies. Read “Spate of Attacks on Ships in Middle East Points to Iran-Backed Group”, USNI News, January 6, 2021.

Yemen

Iran’s Ally. For the past several years Iran has enjoyed the benefits of an alliance with the Houthis – a minority Shiite Muslim community in Yemen engaged in a long-running civil war. Since the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 the Houthi movement has come out against US interests in the Middle East. Iran has, for the past several years, provided advisors and equipment to the Houthi forces. The U.S. has backed Saudi Arabian and UAE forces that are fighting the Houthis with arms and diplomatic support. Bruce Riedel, a Senior Fellow with the Brookings Institute, advocates for a US policy change in “A pragmatic view on Yemen’s Houthis”, Brookings, January 11, 2021.

New Policy for Yemen. Katherine Zimmerman, a Resident Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), says that the policies of President Trump and Obama for Yemen were flawed. She believes the U.S. needs to retake a leadership role to secure U.S. interests, reduce Iranian influence, stabilize the region, and address humanitarian concerns. Read “US needs to take on a leadership role to secure its interests in Yemen”, AEI, December 16, 2020.

Podcasts

Video – Trends in ME in 2021. Middle East experts survey what lies ahead for the region in the year ahead – with particular attention to Yemen, Iran, Turkey, and Syria. Trends to watch in the Middle East in 2021, Middle East Focus, Middle East Institute, January 15, 2021, one hour.

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Photo: Map from Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

The Iranian regime maintains a network of proxies including Lebanese Hezbollah, various Shiite militias in Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen, and foreign fighters in Syria. This paper by the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) provides a look at the problem of states using proxy forces to advance their foreign policy objectives.

The three main chapters of the paper outline the different groups and factors that influence Iranian military and political strategy for Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. The proxy / host country relation is described. The report provides an assessment of vulnerabilities that could be exploited by U.S. special operations forces.

Iran will continue to use their proxy network to frustrate U.S. Middle East strategy and diminish U.S. influence. However, the U.S. is not without appropriate responses. This paper advances the argument that terrorism, counterterrorism, and proxy conflict are inherently political in nature and need not be addressed with a kinetic solution alone.

The authors of this paper are:

• Dr. Diane Zorri – an assistant professor of security studies at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
• Dr. Houman A. Sadri – deputy director of the International Policy and Analysis Center (IPAC)
• Dr. David Ellis – Resident Fellow at Joint Special Operations University (JSOU)

Iranian Proxy Groups in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen: A Principal-Agent Comparative Analysis, Joint Special Operations University, JSOU Report 20-5, 2020.
https://jsou.libguides.com/ld.php?content_id=58950053

A report to Congress by the Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve has been published online. The 136-page PDF covers the period of April 1 to June 30, 2020. The publication summarizes the quarter’s key events in the fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

Some key aspects of the report include the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on operations, Coalition force consolidation, uncertainty of a continued U.S. troop presence in Iraq and Syria, changes in advisor support to the ISF and SDF, and more. Much of the training and advising effort for the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the ISF took place by virtual means – phone calls, VTCs, emails, etc.

Iraqi Government. Five months of political deadlock ended after Iraq’s parliament approved a new government. The new government opened up the ability of the Iraqi government and the U.S. to begin talks to determine the future of their bilateral relationship.

SDF and It Alignment? The departure of U.S. troops from Syria is always a possibility. The Syrian Democratic Front may very well adapt to that reality with a new relationship with the Syrian regime. Since the October 2019 Turkish troop invasion of northeast Syria (territory held by the SDF) the SDF relationship with Russia and the Syrian government has warmed. Both have provided some protection to the Kurds against Turkish and Turkish-aligned forces. The Russians continue to build up in Syria. The CENTCOM commander said (June 2020) that Russia’s presence in Syria gives them the opportunity to “throw sand in our gears and make it harder for us” to operate in the region.

ISIS. The Islamic State conducted a brief surge of operations during Ramadan and took advantage in the slow-down of operations by the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Coalition troops due to COVID-19. However, the surge was not sustained. There is concern by some observers of the conflict that ISIS will recover and resurge once again if the Coalition reduces its efforts in the Middle East.

ISIS Prisoners. After the fall of the ‘physical’ Caliphate in Syria thousands of Islamic State fighters and their families were placed in detention camps set up and run by the SDF. Many of them are foreign fighters. Most of the countries of origin of these foreign fighters are unwilling to repatriate them or bring them to justice.

Internally Displaced Persons. There are thousands of internally displaced persons in camps throughout Syria living in rough conditions. The international community is struggling to maintain security and provide services in these IDP camps. The potential of coronavirus to spread through these camps is a huge concern.

Overall, the report points out that ISIS is contained and the U.S. is positioned to slowly downsize its forces. In the past few months several U.S. bases in Iraq have been turned over to the ISF. Dialogue with the Iraqi government continues to determine the future scope of U.S. involvement in Iraq.

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Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 1 – Jun 30, 2020.

Read online or download the report here. 136 pages, PDF.

The Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress on Operation Inherent Resolve that covers January to March 2020 has been published. This 134-page report provides a detailed summary of the conflict in Iraq and Syria.

The report is led by the Inspector General of the Department of Defense – assisted by the IGs of the Department of State, USAID, and other agencies. Congress requires this report every quarter. There usually is a classified appendix to this report; however, due to the coronavirus disease one has not been done for this reporting period.

Operation Inherent Resolve was established in 2014 to defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and to set the conditions for follow-on operations to increase regional stability. OIR consists of military operations, support for local security forces, diplomacy, stabilization, humanitarian aid, and governance. This report describes the activities of DoD, DoS, and USAID to achieve the US government’s goals in the region.

The situation in Iraq is in a state of flux. The coronavirus pandemic has reduced the activities of the U.S., Coalition, and its partner nation forces significantly. In fact, many of the troops have relocated to other bases in the Middle East, Europe, or have been redeployed to CONUS. The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and the Syrian Democratic Front (SDF) have paused operations and training due to the virus.

In addition, the U.S. has been conducting a ‘planned’ consolidation of bases within the two countries. This has reduced the visibility that the Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) has on the activities of the ISF and the SDF. The stepped up activities of Iran’s proxies in the region – especially in Iraq have presented some security concerns to the United States – also contributing to the need to consolidate bases and decrease activities.

A low-level insurgency continues to exist in both Syria and Iraq. The political environment in Iraq is mixed. Attempts to form a government have been stalled. Public protests have kept the security forces busy. The economic situation is less than ideal – compounded with the significant drop in oil prices. The situation in Syria is dire for the people of Syria. Turkey, Russia, and Iran – as well as the U.S. have been supported different warring factions and there are some dire humanitarian conditions in some parts of the country.

The report reviews the following topics in both Iraq and Syria:

• Status of OIR
• Status of ISIS
• Actions against ISIS
• Partner Force Development
• Role of Third Parties
• Stabilization
• Humanitarian Assistance

In addition there are several pages on oversight activities covering strategic planning, audit and inspections, and investigations. There are four appendices – acronyms, map of Iraq, map of Syria, and endnotes.

This report is a good read to come up to speed on the activities of the United States in both Syria and Iraq. There is not a lot of detailed reporting on the activities of the Special Operations Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve (SOJTF-OIR). Although . . . there is a discussion on how equipment and funding is managed by SOJTF-OIR. If you have an interest in Middle East conflicts then you will find this report informative.

Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, May 2020.
https://www.stateoig.gov/system/files/lig_oir_q2_mar2020_gold_508_0513.pdf

The killing of General Qassem Soleimani by a U.S. drone just after he arrived at the Baghdad International Airport in Iraq on January 2, 2020, raised the stakes in the Middle East. The Iranians responded with rhetoric and a relatively ineffective missile attack against two military installations that housed U.S. and coalition forces. While it appears tensions have subsided and a ‘war’ has not ensued the conflict is not over yet. It will continue to be fought over the next months and years in the shadows, using proxy forces and engaging in ‘political warfare’.

Who Is Qasem Soleimani?

General Soleimani was the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – Quds Force (IRGC-QF). He was one of the most powerful and important figures in Iran and one of the leading generals of the Iranian military. Soleimani was considered the driving force behind Iran’s ‘external military operations’.

Increasing Tensions over Past Year

U.S. and Iranian relations have been mostly confrontational since 1979 when the Shah of Iran was removed from power and the U.S. embassy in Tehran was occupied and its embassy officials and workers held hostage for more than a year. Since 1979 the U.S. has regarded Iran as a threat to U.S. interests in the Middle East.

Iran Has Escalated Activities in Region. Relations have gotten more heated between the U.S. and Iran in the past few years. Iran’s escalating attacks against U.S. installations in Iraq since May 2019 are part of a campaign to secure sanctions relief and push the U.S. out of Iraq. Iran has been implicated in the attack on commercial shipping, oil facilities, and other terrorist activities. It recently downed a very expensive U.S. drone. It has backed the Houthis in Yemen and is allied with the Assad regime in Syria. It’s proxy forces in Lebanon, Iraq, and elsewhere are engaged in activities adverse to U.S. interests in the region.

The U.S. is engaged in a campaign of applying ‘maximum pressure’ on Iran. The intent of the U.S. is to block Iran’s path to the development of a nuclear weapon and limit the ability of Iran to export terrorism.

The United States has been increasing pressure on Iran over the past few years. In April 2019 it declared the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. It has incrementally increased sanctions against Iran. In addition, additional military forces (air, ground, and naval) have been sent to the Middle East region. Currently (Jan 2020) there are about 60,000 to 80,000 U.S. troops in the Central Command area of responsibility (including 5,200 in Iraq and 13,000 in Afghanistan). [1] These numbers include deployments during 2019 and early 2020.

Iran Attack on U.S. Bases In Dec 2019

Rockets launched by an Iranian-affiliated militia group attacked a U.S. base near Kirkuk in Northern Iraq on February 27, 2019 killing an American contractor. The contractor was a naturalized U.S. citizen who was born in Iraq. He was working as an interpreter for U.S. forces. The rocket attacked also wounded four American service members. The U.S. retaliated two days later with air strikes against five facilities located in Syria and Iraq killing members of the Iranian-backed Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH) militia group responsible for the attack.

Storming the Embassy

Iraqi ‘protesters’ (with very strong ties to Iran) swarmed the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad breaching the outer perimeter. The U.S. immediately responded sending 100 Marines to secure the Embassy. In addition, U.S. Rangers were flown to the region followed shortly after with the deployment of a significant number of troops from the 82nd Airborne Division.

Killing of Gen Qassem Soleimani

The U.S., going off intelligence indicators that Iranian proxy groups were going to continue attacks against U.S. personnel and facilities, took out a leading Iranian general – Qassem Soleimani – just after he arrived at the Baghdad airport on January 2, 2020. Also killed in the attack was KH founder and Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces leader Abu Mahdi Al Muhandis as well as other Iranian and Iraqi individuals.

Additional Targets in Region

The same day a U.S. drone attempted but failed to kill another top Iranian commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard’s elite Quds force in Yemen. the attack was directed at Abdul Reza Shahla’i – a commander and financier. He was reported by the State Department to be at the center of a botched 2011 plot to assassinate a Saudi ambassador on U.S. soil. (Fox News, Jan 10, 2020). He also is implicated in many other actions throughout the region. One of these was a January 20, 2007 attack in Karbala, Iraq that killed five American soldiers and wounded three others.

Missles: Iran’s Response

Iran responded to the killing of Qassem Soleimani with the launch of 16 missiles – eleven of which hit on or near the Al Asad airbase in Iraq. The attack caused no casualties (Gen Milley says defensive measures were key) and caused minimal material damage. The losses in the attacks on Al Asad included a Black Hawk, aerial drone, damaged runways, maintenance shelters, and some pickup trucks.

Token Response. Some observers believe it was a ‘token’ strike that would allow Iran to say it responded but which was intentionally conducted so as to not cause any deaths. Others believe that the strike was largely ineffective due to the inability of Iran to accurately put missiles on target. The end result, however, is that the tensions were ‘reduced’ for the time being and open conflict averted.

Additional Sanctions Against Iran

After the launch of the 16 missiles by Iran the White House intensified sanctions on Iran. The U.S. has a long history of using sanctions against Iran. [2] There are a number of ways to impose these ‘additional sanctions’ on Iran that affect its economy as well as its ability to export violence in the region. [3]

Iraq Caught in the Middle

Members of the Iraqi parliament were not happy with the U.S. air strikes and this could cause problems down the road. The Iraqi parliament quickly called for the departure of U.S. military forces from Iraq; however, Sunni and Kurd representatives did not vote. Rumors of a rapid departure by the U.S. from Iraq are being played down by the U.S. State Department. In the meantime NATO has suspended its training mission in Iraq. The U.S. has also stood down operations as it takes a protective posture in anticipate of future aggression by Iran. Time will tell how the Iraqi public and government will respond to this latest conflict between Iran and the U.S. on Iraqi soil.

2nd and 3rd Order of Effects. Although tensions are now reduced the strike has fostered a number of consequences throughout the region. Relations between the government of Iraq and the U.S. have significantly deteriorated. Some of this is rhetoric and some is substantive. Iraq lawmakers reacted quickly passing a non-binding resolution for the withdrawal of U.S. forces. Iraq’s government is exploring a larger role for the NATO training mission – moving away from dependence on the United States. The training mission suffered a temporary halt and some counterterrorism operations were put on hold. In addition, it is possible that the strike diluted the protest movement that was – in part – focused on Iran’s meddling in Iraq; and which then turned its attention to the U.S. activities in Iraq. [4]

Accidental Downing of Airliner by Iran

In the immediate aftermath of the killing of Qassem Soleimani a civilian airliner was downed near Tehran. Over 170 passengers and crew were killed when the Iranian military accidentally shot down a Ukrainian airliner that had just taken off from Tehran airport. At first the Iranians stated that there were technical difficulties but soon it was apparent to the regime that they would have to acknowledge their own military shot the airliner down.

Map: Iranian-supported groups in the Middle East. Source: “Iran Military Power: Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance,”, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), November 2019.

What Comes Next?

While America has the Air Force and Navy to outfight Iran some worry that Iran’s use of asymmetric, proxy-based warfare is the biggest threat. Iran has developed robust proxy armies and organizations throughout the Middle East. Most of these proxy groups will follow the lead of Iran although some may strike out against the United States even if Iran does not direct them to do so. U.S. personnel – government employees, members of the military, and U.S. civilians are at risk. There are a number of embassies and military bases scattered throughout the Middle East that are at risk.

Iranian retaliatory measures in the future will likely include the use of its regional militias to attack U.S. forces and U.S. interests across the region. It may increase its attacks on oil production facilities, disrupt shipping lanes, and use asymmetric or unconventional tactics to execute operations in other regions of the world. Iranian proxy groups and organizations include the Hezbollah in Lebanon, pro-Asad forces in Syria, armed Shia groups in Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen, and other groups in the region.

Hybrid Warfare. The United States is likely to be engaged in a hybrid, irregular conflict with Iran for many years. Iran will be able to have plausible deniability for the actions of its many proxy groups, criminal networks, and other nefarious actors in the Middle East region. One question that is raised by many national security observers is will the United States retain enough of a special operations and ‘irregular warfare’ capability in light of its strategic shift to ‘great power competition’ and focus on the Indo-Pacific region.

UW? An unconventional warfare capability is one thing to consider when sizing up the participants in ‘hybrid war’. Certainly, the United States has tremendous UW assets within USSOCOM, the CIA, and other agencies and organizations. However, having the capability and using that capability in a coherent and strategic fashion are two different things. Iran has established long-enduring relationships with its proxy forces throughout the region. Iran’s proxies can count on long-term support. Can America’s allies in the region do the same?

Iran may have satisfied domestic pressure to respond to the U.S. killing of General Qassem Soleimani with its launch of 16 missiles against targets in Erbil and Al Asas. However, its real response will be of a hybrid nature that involves the use of their proxy forces in the region.

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Footnotes:

[1] The 2019-2020 Iran Crisis and U.S. Military Deployments, Congressional Research Service (CRS), January 9, 2020.
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11403

[2] Iran Sanctions, Congressional Research Service (CRS), November 15, 2019. According to this 110-page report “Successive Administrations have used economic sanctions to try to change Iran’s behavior. U.S. sanctions, including “secondary sanctions” on firms that conduct certain transactions with Iran, have adversely affected Iran’s economy but have had little observable effect on Iran’s pursuit of core strategic objectives such as its support for regional armed factions and its development of ballistic and cruise missiles”.
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RS/RS20871

[3] Possible Additional Sanctions on Iran, Congressional Research Service (CRS), January 8, 2020. This 4-page CRS report outlines additional sanctions that the U.S. could impose upon Iran.
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10801

[4] Elias Yousif of the Center for International Policy explores the consequences in his article – “What it cost to kill Soleimani”, The Hill, February 9, 2020.

References:

“Can America Win an Unconventional War Against Iran?”, Haaretz, January 10, 2020.

“Iran’s Proxy Threat Is the Real Problem Now”, by Sulome Anderson, Foreign Policy, January 10, 2020.

U.S. Killing of Qasem Soleimani: Frequently Asked Questions, Congressional Research Service (CRS), January 8, 2020, 22 pages.
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46148

Photo:

The Department of Defense Office of Inspector General has posted the quarterly report to Congress on OIR. The report covers the period of April 1, 2019 to June 30, 2019.

The report is entitled Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve | Quarterly Report to the United States Congress | April 1, 2019 – June 30, 2019. It covers the overseas contingency operation to combat the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and summarizes the quarter’s key events.

The report finds that ISIS is continuing its transition from a territory-holding force to an insurgency in Syria. It says that ISIS has solidified its insurgent capabilities in Iraq. ISIS is conducting suicide attacks, assassinations, abductions, and arson of crops in both countries.

ISIS personnel strength appears to be, according to the report, about 16,000 total – within Iraq and Syria. Some of these personnel are referred to as ‘foreign fighters’. In addition, ISIS has reestablished its financial networks in both countries. The jihadist group also continues to utilize an extensive worldwide social media effort for recruitment of fighters and to maintain and enhance support.

Syria Update

U.S. Reduction in Forces. The partial withdrawal of U.S. forces from Syria (known as Operation Deliberate Resolve) has decreased the support available to partner forces (SDF and other smaller groups). This withdrawal is taking place at a time that the SDF need additionally trained personnel and more equipment to defeat the ISIS insurgency. The nature of the conflict – now an insurgency – has changed the type of training and equipment needed by the SDF.

Coalition Assistance Requested. The U.S. is seeking increased coalition support to offset the reduction in U.S. forces. The U.S. has requested assistance from 30 other countries; the UK and France have agreed to help. Germany said ‘not so much’. Although not cited in the report, it is estimated that there are about 1,000 U.S. military personnel in Syria.

U.S. SOF. The bulk of these troops are likely members of U.S. Army Special Forces with their attached enablers. The SF teams are part of the Special Operations Joint Task Force – OIR – which is a component of the Combined Joint Task Force – OIR. One of the missions of the SOJTF-OIR is to perform “. . . partnered training, equipping, and reinforcing of the SDF to enable the SDF to conduct counterinsurgency operations.”

In addition, U.S. forces assist with security during raids of ISIS members or facilitators as well as in some detention operations. Other U.S. ground and air assets are also employed in support of the SDF.

SDF Needs More Assistance. The U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces are unable to sustain long-term operations against IS jihadists. The SDF is limited in personnel, equipment, and intelligence to confront the ‘resurgent cells’ of IS. In particular, it needs to further develop its human-based intelligence capabilities. There is the possibility, if further U.S. cutbacks take place, that the SDF may look for partnerships with Russia or the Syrian regime.

IDPs. The camps that host thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) – the two largest are Rukban and al Hol – are lacking basic services. The al Hol camp is a security concern due to the 45,000 ISIS family members and supporters that reside there. The U.S. is urging other nations to repatriate the ISIS foreign fighters and supporters – for security and humanitarian reasons. ISIS has established cells within the al Hol camp to spread its ideology as well as aid in recruitment. IDPs are prevented from leaving the camps to return home due to ongoing lawlessness and violence elsewhere in Syria.

Detained ISIS Fighters. With the defeat of the ‘territorial’ Caliphate the SDF captured thousands of ISIS fighters. There are about 10,000 detained fighters – 2,000 classified as ‘foreign fighters’. They are held in ‘pop-up prisons’ in northeast Syria. Most countries are reluctant to repatriate their citizens who have been captured by the SDF. This is putting a strain on the SDF and Kurdish administration.

Uncertainty. Not addressed in the DoD IG report is the political uncertainty of whether or not the United States is in Syria for the long haul. There is the possibility that the U.S. president would turn Syria over to the third party countries currently involved – Turkey, Iran, and Russia. In fact, several months ago he said that Turkey could finish off ISIS. This followed his announcement in December that the U.S. would withdraw all forces from Syria. Certainly the statements and ‘tweets’ of the U.S. president has caused deep concern within the SDF and YPG.

Iraq Update

IS Insurgency Continues. ISIS has regrouped in provinces north and west of Baghdad. IS has reorganized its leadership and has established safe havens in rural Sunni-majority areas. The strength of IS in Iraq got bumped up as a result of fighters fleeing the impending defeat of IS in the Middle Euphrates River Valley (MERV) in Syria this past spring. As ISIS saw the future demise of the ‘territorial’ Caliphate it began its transformation into an insurgency.

ISF. The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are still having difficulty getting on top of the IS insurgency that exists in Iraq. The ISF can conduct offensive operations to ‘clear’ an area of insurgents – but they lack the capability to ‘hold’ these areas. So the typical ISF operation, while successful, is a ‘short-term gain’ with a minimal effect. This is especially true in some of the more remote areas of Iraq – such as the Makhmour Mountains in Ninewa province and the Jazeera Desert in Anbar province. So the insurgents flow back in to the ‘cleared’ areas as soon as the security forces depart.

Diminished ISR Assets. The ISF has seen its organic ISR assets decrease by 50%. In addition, some U.S. ISR platforms have been diverted to monitor Iranian activity.

Iraqi Government Struggling. Politics and other factors are hindering the security efforts of the ISF. The government has seen changes in the leadership of the defense, interior, and justice ministries. There have been some significant protests over the lack of electricity and other basic government services – to which the ISF has to respond.

‘Peshmerga’ and ‘Kurdistan’. One of the U.S. most reliable allies in the Middle East continues to be the Kurds of both Syria and Iraq. However, the Kurds in Iraq have some deep-seated internal political divisions (KDP vs PUK). This results in separate administrative and intelligence organizations representing the two political parties. This division extends to the Peshmerga as well.

In addition, the Kurdish government is at odds with Iraq’s central government on a number of issues. One of these is some disputed territory lying between Arab and Kurdish regions. There is a security gap in this area and ISIS is taking advantage of this gap.

Departure of State Department Personnel. Threats against U.S. personnel working in Iraq prompted a severe cut-back in embassy and consulate strength. The threats are from Iran and some of its proxy forces in Iraq – principally the Iranian-backed Shia militias belonging to the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). This “. . . eroded the ability of the Embassy Baghdad and Consulate Erbil to manage humanitarian assistance and stabilization efforts in Iraq.” The number of personnel was reduced from 563 to 312. This evacuation order has also affected some of the almost 5,000 contractor personnel stationed in Iraq.

The ‘Takeaway’

Based on a reading of the report it would be easy to draw the conclusion that the drawdown of military forces (SOF included) in Syria has diminished the ability of the SDF to kill off ISIS. In addition, the reduction of State and USAID personnel in Iraq has reduced humanitarian and stabilization efforts in Iraq. From the report: “Despite the loss of physical territory, thousands of ISIS fighters remain in Iraq and Syria and are carrying out attacks and working to rebuild their capabilities.”

Read the 116-page report here:
DoD Quarterly Report on OIR – August 2019

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Photo: Iraqi soldiers move through a smokescreen that provides concealment during an assault exercise.
(U.S. Army photo, page 2, of OIR IG Report, August 2019).

ME Update 20171022 – Russia helping the Kurds, Iranian proxies gain ground in northern Iraq, Syrian Kurds advance into oil fields, stabilizing Mosul, Raqqa and governance, Iranian influence in Yemen, Salafism in Gaza, British jihadists, and more.

Iraq

Iranian Proxies Advancing into Northern Iraq. The Shia militias backed by Iran have been making headway into some of the ‘disputed areas’ formerly held by the Kurds.

Russia Coming to Aid of the Kurds? It appears that Russia is going to be helping out the Iraqi Kurds. The Russians are posturing to take a role in negotiations between the Iraqi central government and the Kurds of northern Iraq. In addition, it appears to have some economic interests – particularly in the significant oil fields found in parts of Kurdistan. Russia’s friendly (at this time) relationship with Iran and Turkey would seem to position the country favorably to wield greater influence in the region; which does, of course, undercut the U.S. standing across the area. The Kurds, having been spurned by the international community (and apparently by the United States) with their drive towards independence, are probably in the hunt for new friends.

Stabilizing Mosul. In the aftermath of major combat operations in Mosul that defeat ISIS what are the critical requirements for achieving lasting stability in that city and the surrounding region? Read a 98-page paper entitled Making Victory Count After Defeating ISIS,  RAND Corporation, 2017.

Syria

Syrian Kurds Capture Key Oil Field. The Kurds have made some advances into the oil-rich Deir Ezzor near the border of Iraq and captured some oil fields. This region is a Sunni Arab area and the Syrian regime wants to control this area as well. Read a detailed report about this region of Syria by Melissa G. Dalton – Empowering Sustainable Partners in the Fight and Aftermath in Syria’s Deir Ezzor, Center for Strategic & International Studies, October 16, 2017.

Victory in Raqqa. The Syrian Democratic Front (SDF) in enjoying their hard-won victory over the Islamic State with the capture of Raqqa. The city had served as the ‘Caliphate’s’ capital. “U.S.-backed Forces Tout ‘Historic Victory’ Over IS In Its Former Raqqa Capital”, Radio Free Europe, October 21, 2017.

Governing Raqqa. Now that the victory has taken place another phase begins. The success of the battlefield needs to be followed with a successful transition good governance. A report outlines the critical governance challenges that Raqqa will face and need to address if it is to prevent a return to lawlessness and extremism. See “Governance Challenges in Raqqa After the Islamic State”, United States Institute for Peace, October 19, 2017.

Islamic State in Defeat. The U.S. allies’ conquest of Raqqa, Syria has ended the so-called Caliphate; but the group and movement still exists. It will certainly carry on operations as an insurgency and terrorist group. Many European security officials are concerned that there will be an uptick in terrorist attacks in Europe as ISIS shifts focus. Some news reports below:

• “How the Islamic State will grapple with defeat in Raqqa”, Brookings.edu, October 19, 2017.
• “Why the Fall of Raqqa Doesn’t Signify The End of the Islamic State”, National Public Radio, October 21, 2017.
• “The Ignominious End of the ISIS Caliphate”, The New Yorker, October 17, 2017.

What to Do With British Jihadists? It appears that Brits are taking a hard line against its citizens who joined ISIS in Syria. Read “Killing British jihadists is only option, says Rory Stewart”, The Times, October 23, 2017.

Around the Region

Yemen – Iranian Influence? What is the true extent of Iran’s presence in Yemen – including both military and cultural aspects? Dr. Elisabeth Kendall answers the question. Read an issue brief entitled Iran’s Fingerprints in Yemen: Real or Imagined?”, Atlantic Council, 14 pages, October 2017.

Salafism Undercutting Gains in Gaza. Salafi jihadist groups have emerged that could potentially launch the Palestinians into another phase of conflict. Read “How Salafism’s Rise Threatens Gaza”, by Colin P. Clarke, The RAND Blog, October 2017.