By MAJ Eliann Carr (US Army) and SFC Dave Hargett (US Army).

The SOF environment is often idolized as a fast paced, quick response operational tempo, generated by the immediacy of events and the ramifications of inaction. Many SOF practitioners pride themselves in their ability to remain steadfast under excessive stress, which is a personal characteristic honed from the ability to sustain an immense amount of pressure and demonstrate the ability to complete the mission. A fallacy in thought; however, lies within the technique of the leader to manage their team and accomplish the mission, not specifically the accomplishment of the mission alone.

Efficient Leadership

The pressures placed on SOF practitioners are notably more dynamic than conventional forces, which is often why leaders take the approach to manage their teams with efficient leadership traits. These traits are garnered from having the need for immediate results and the constant sense of urgency. Leaders who choose to use this method to control their team have characteristics of often reordering priorities to meet the demand rather than set the demand to align with priorities. These leaders hold an excessive degree of frustration with an ambient stress level rating in mid to high. At this moment, it is important to understand that the efficient leader produces results, regardless of quality or impact on those around them.

This form of leader will constantly seek to do the right thing and rarely take time to reflect. Accolades and praise of a job well done motivates this leader to be considered mostly, a hard worker and strictly project focused. Efficient leaders formulate the continual praise of completed results (disregarding the assessment of effectiveness; only completion) into a predictive analysis. This analysis by the leader, generally, will ensure an emphasis on their ability to control results rather than the effect of the results controlled. This, however, will consistently occur at an exceptional cost.

For example: Lieutenant General Douglas Lute was interviewed by the Washington Post and during this interview was quoted, “We were devoid of a fundamental understanding of Afghanistan – we didn’t know what we were doing…What are we trying to do here? We didn’t have the foggiest notion of what we were undertaking.” These questions posed by a senior leader within the National Security Staff showcase the cost of years of efficient leadership and places onus on leaders at all levels to rectify this systemic problem within the military as a whole.

The efficient leader, to meet the next urgent issue or make an issue urgent if one does not exist, will typically use manipulation and threatening tactics to achieve the desired result of task completion. They will disregard input from others and see those that provide constructive feedback or question processes as confrontational or defiant followers. A revealing component of an efficient leader is that they often demand their subordinates to do what they are told, simply because of the rank or status of the person giving the direction. This demand is not for any effective outcome, but for the simple effect that someone must listen to them. The constant disregard for others eventually creates a toxic environment that perpetuates stagnation and apathy of team members. Although efficient-type leadership is necessary at times of extreme urgency; circumstances, not the leader’s priorities, must dictate the nature of urgency. When the need for urgency exists as the steady state form of leadership, it will initiate the disintegration of a team. This fragmentation of any team will rapidly lead to ineffective and at times disastrous outcomes, despite the leaders demands for results.

Effective Leadership

There is an alternative form of leadership counter to efficient leadership that allows leaders to develop a foundation of cohesion and trust that prepares teams to respond instead of react to emergent situations: effective leadership. An effective leader can balance between a job well done and the impact of results by complimenting sustained results with sustained relationships. The effective leader understands the emphasis of dynamic leadership and deliberate planning over the efficient leader who uses deliberate-type leadership and relies disproportionally on dynamic planning.

The efficient leader will seek to do the right things, as in performance, whereas the effective leader seeks to do things right, as in mastery. Through firmly established priorities, an effective leader can focus on fewer tasks and complete them to exceptional standard. Because the effective leader places relationships equal to mission success, he or she can garner the strength and support of a team instead of often having to work solo. General (Ret.) Schwarzkopf once said, “Leadership is a potent combination of strategy and character. But if you must be without one, be without the strategy.” It is through the comradery and quality an effective leader fosters the conceptualization to build a team, not merely manage it.

Due to the nature of the Special Operation environment, the determination of urgency should not be a comparative state. Rather, an assessment of this talented environment must emphasize the need for an increase in effective leadership to better prepare a team for the demand when called to action. From the deployed environment to preparation for deployment, leaders within the SOF community can foster resolute balance by using effective leadership to build the capability and competency of a team, while applying efficient leadership only in situations of extreme urgency. These moments of excessive pressure will ultimately demonstrate the superior power and stealth of the SOF team as the refiner’s fire, solidifying their metal, not the moment in which they break.

**********

References:

“At War With the Truth”, The Washington Post.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/investigations/afghanistan-papers/afghanistan-war-confidential-documents/

“Norman Schwarzkopf: 10 Quotes on Leadership and War”, Forbes.com, December 27, 2012.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kevinkruse/2012/12/27/norman-schwarzkopf-quotes/

Authors:

Major Eliann Carr is an Information Operations Planner and currently deployed in support of Operation Inherent Resolve. She holds a Doctoral degree in Human Development and Educational Psychology from the University of South Dakota. Previous research spans the array of social science spectrum, to include perspective of Muslim image, leadership development, and interpersonal conflict resolution in families.

Sergeant First Class David Hargett is a Psychological Operations Specialist and currently deployed in support of Operation Spartan Shield, as a Detachment Sergeant. He holds an associate degree in General Studies and is currently pursuing his Bachelor’s Degree in Political Science from the University of Maryland.

Photo: Members of Qwat al-Khasah, Special Forces Iraq, on an operation in the Hamrin Mountains. Photo by SGT Cambrin Bassett, Special Operations Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve (SOJTF-OIR), June 23, 2020.

The Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force -Crisis Response Africa or SPMAGTF-CR-AF is based in Spain but is responsible for missions and operations in Africa. The force, composed of Marines and Sailors, is provided by Marine units from across the Corps on a rotational basis. The expeditionary force is based at Moron Air Base, Spain. The SPMAGTF-CR-AF provides the U.S. Marine Corps Forces Africa (MARFORAF) and U.S. Africa Command with a balanced force with built-in ground, aviation, C2, and logistics elements that provide a wide range of capabilities.

Mission. The mission of the SPMAGTF-CR-AF includes disaster relief, support to U.S. embassies, non-combatant evacuation (NEO), humanitarian assistance, tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel (TRAP), and other military operations. The force has been active since 2003 and has approximately 850 personnel. The unit has responded to a number of critical events on the African continent over the past few years. One event was the South Sudan (Juba) evacuation operation that occurred in late December 2013 to January 2014 – assisting the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). Another important mission was the reinforcement of a U.S. Embassy in Tripoli.

Support to SOF. While not a special operations force (SOF) unit the Marines crisis response element does have some mission overlap with U.S. special operations units. In addition, the crisis response element provides capabilities that enhance and support the SOF mission. One excellent example is the integration with SOF in the Libya area of responsibility where SOF has been on the ground working with partner units. [1]

Aircraft. The organic air assets of the unit include MV-22B Osprey tiltrotor aircraft, UC-35, and KC-130J Hercules aerial refueling tankers. These aircraft allow the unit to self-deploy and self-sustain to many regions of Africa. The long reach of the KC-130Js coupled with the unique capabilities of the Osprey (vertical landings) provide enhanced mission postures in Africa and in the Mediterranean region. Originally the unit had twelve Ospreys and six C-130s; but operational requirements elsewhere caused a reduction in aircraft in 2017. [2]

Organization. The force has a reinforced company of infantry Marines as well as command, logistic, aviation, and sustainment elements. These elements come from a variety of Marine units on a rotational basis and are melded together into one composite unit. During the early stages of a crisis the unit may forward-deploy elements to Camp Lemonier in Djibouti, Naval Air Station in Sigonella, Italy, or Dakar, Senegal (where the U.S maintains a small complex on a Senegalese military base).

Training. The unit conducts training exercises and activities with other regional partners to include units from Spain, France, and the African continent. The unit participates in bilateral exercises as well as theater security cooperation (TSC) activities.

Unit Origins. The SPMAGTF-CR-AF was created (earlier Marine units had similar missions) in 2013 in response to the 2012 Benghazi, Libya attacks. On September 11, 2012 the US Consulate in Benghazi was attacked by a mob (some reports indicate it was a planned terrorist attack) and the US Ambassador to Libya as well as security personnel were killed. One of the lessons learned from this event was the need for a response force that could respond to similar incidents and other crisis on the continent of Africa in the future.

SP-MAGTF in Other Regions. Based on the success of the Africa-focused force other units have been established with the same mission for the CENTCOM and SOUTHCOM areas of responsibility. The formation of the crisis response unit fills a gap in mission coverage that the Marine Expeditionary Units based on Navy ships could not respond to.

Footnotes:

[1] In January 2017 the crisis response task force was called upon to evacuate an injured special operator from Libya. See “Marines Rescued Injured Operator from Libya in Emergency Mission”, Military.com, January 4, 2017.

[2] See “Marines’ Africa Crisis Task Force Gears for Change as It Shrinks”, Military.com, December 30, 2016.

References:

SPMAGTF-CR-AF, DVIDS
https://www.dvidshub.net/feature/SPMAGTFCRAF

SPMAGTF-CR-AF, U.S. AFRICOM
www.africom.mil/tags/special-purpose-marine-air-ground-task-force-crisis-response-africa

Australia faces a decision point. With the impending defeat of the Islamic State in Mosul, Iraq there may be a push to declare “Mission Accomplished” and withdraw Australia’s support and commitment in fighting ISIS in the Middle East. However, some observers say that Australia should stay the course.

Ash Collingburn writes in The Strategist for the Australian Strategic Policy Institute that it is in Australia’s national interests to make a long-term commitment to the Middle East. He states that the Islamic State won’t be defeated once Mosul is liberated – that the fight will continue against ISIS throughout the Middle East.

Collingburn lists four critical enablers that ISIS draws strength from: environmental factors, military capability, information operations, and economic power. These enablers constitute a ‘system’ – and nations opposing ISIS need to harness all the instruments of national power to defeat ISIS.

Even after the defeat of Mosul the Islamic State will still retain a significant amount of real estate. It has a robust presence in western Iraq and eastern Syria – the heartland of the Sunni population. It continues to recruit foreign fighters and acquire funding from wealthy patrons in the Middle East. And . . . it hasn’t completely lost the support of many Sunni in the Middle East.

The article by Collingburn provides some recommendations. One is to conduct a strategy review of how the Islamic State can threaten Australia. Another provides a viewpoint of how to look at the threat – “Deep (Middle East)”, “Close (SE Asia)”, and “Rear (home)”.

Ash Collingburn is a visiting fellow at ASPI’s Counter Terrorism Policy Centre. You can read his paper at “After Mosul: Australia’s long-term counterterrorism strategy”, The Strategist, December 20, 2016.

The idea or concept of using remotely piloted aircraft or RPA for reconnaissance purposes has been around for a long time. In the early 1980s the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) outfitted drones with modern-day technology. The early remotely piloted vehicles (RPAs) were the GNAT 750 – which led to the development and production of the RQ-1 Predator in the early 1990s. The Predators would soon be flying over the Balkans in the 1990s conducting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions.

The armed RPA (or drone as some refer to RPAs) came about in the early 2000’s. The MQ-1 Predator was retrofitted to carry the AGM-114 Hellfire anti-tank missile. It would soon see action in Afghanistan and later in Iraq, Somalia, Yemen, and . . . perhaps a few other locations around the world.

Read more about the history of armed drones in “The evolution of the combat RPA”, by Senior Airman Christian Clausen, 423nd Wing Air Expeditionary Public Affairs, December 18, 2016.

Pearl Harbor Day is observed every year on December 7th. The Japanese conducted a surprise attack against the United States at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii on this day in 1941. Numerous U.S. Navy ships were sunk and 2,403 military members and U.S. citizens were killed.

Military News – Females to take boxing at West Point, how to rebuild Mosul after the ISIS, to fix Syria look to Afghanistan, arming the Kurds, and more.

West Point Boxing – Women Required to Participate. Female cadets in their plebe year at the Army academy are now required to get in the ring. They will fight bouts with other women and probably spar a bit with men in their own weight class. Second year they take wrestling; probably against other women as well. Read more in “West Point women have a new, bloody requirement as the Army completes gender integration”, The Washington Post, September 21, 2016.

Rebuilding Mosul? Once the Iraqi military (aided by Shia militia groups and the Peshmerga) take Mosul from ISIS – what happens next? For starters basic government services need to be re-established. There are some ways that the U.S. government can assist in this huge endeavor. Read more in “After Mosul Falls, How Much Rebuilding Help Should the US Give?”, Defense One, September 19, 2016.

‘Noose Tightening’ in Mosul Battle. In other military news, General Dunford (CJCS), had some comments on the upcoming battle to retake Mosul. (U.S. DoD News Release, Sep 20, 2016).

Responding to Moscow’s Propaganda? Neutralizing Russia’s influence operations will need to be a priority over the near term and possibly into the future. Read more in “To Counter Russian Disinformation, Look to Cold War Tactics”, Defense One, September 20, 2016.

For a Clue on Syria Look to Afghanistan. One writer examines the Soviet experience in Afghanistan for the way forward in Syria. Read “What the Soviet Defeat in Afghanistan Tells Us about Syria”, The National Interest, September 19, 2016.

Arming the Kurds? The most dependable U.S. allies in the Middle East (besides Jordan, Israel, UAE, and a few others) are the Kurds. Read “Obama Administration Considers Arming Syrian Kurds Against ISIS”, The New York Times, September 21, 2016.

Military Update 20160825 – Strategic Landpower, taking care of our Infantry (by MG Scales – ret), more Reaper drones for the Air Force, debate about our military readiness, and more.

More Reapers for Air Force. The Air Force has contracted with General Atomics for more MQ-9 Reaper drones. The contract is worth over $370 million. Read more in a news story by Air Force Times, August 16, 2016.

U.S. Military’s Readiness – What is the Real Story? Some defense observers are saying that our military is suffering from a readiness crisis. They contend that the military is over-extended, too small, underfunded, and lacking proper equipment and training. Others say that we are doing just fine. Retired General David Petraeus argues that the military readiness is a myth (see news report in Military.com,  Aug 10, 2016). Retired General Carter Ham says that Petraeus is wrong and we do have some ‘Readiness Woes’ (see news report in DoD Buzz, Aug 17, 2016). Hmmmm.

What About Our Infantry? The majority of military deaths since World War II have come from the ranks of the infantry. The infantry is just a small part of our military but does the bulk of the fighting. Retired MG Robert Scales talks about the outcomes when we don’t prioritize the needs of the infantry. Read more in “Why Aren’t We Doing More for the Infantry”, Task & Purpose, August 18, 2016.

Strategic Landpower. ML Cavanaugh provides his thoughts on a neglected policy inititive in “Strategic Landpower is Dead. Long Live Strategic Landpower”, Modern War Institute, West Point, August 14, 2016.

At first the use of drones, referred to by the military as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) or Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPAs), was limited to aerial reconnaissance and surveillance. However, it wasn’t long before the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) put a missile on a Predator UAV that could take out targets on the ground. The targets were usually high-value terrorist targets in places like Afghanistan, Pakistan, or other parts of the world.

Shortly after the CIA weaponized their drones the U.S. Air Force followed suit – putting weapons systems on their Predators and later their Reapers. So not only could the UAVs conduct reconnaissance and surveillance for extended periods of time over a target area; it could now engage any targets that were in the area.

There are several advantages to the use of drones over aircraft piloted by people. There is less danger to the crew (there is none), the drones have an extended flying time far beyond that of a manned aircraft (except for refueling capable aircraft in extreme circumstances), and the drones are considered far less expensive to buy, maintain, and operate than manned aircraft.

The ability to use drones in place of conventional forces or aircraft is a strategic advantage for the United States. Drone flights can be conducted with a reduced military signature at overseas bases due to their significantly smaller personnel support requirement. The risk of a pilot being captured in hostile territory is greatly reduced.

Currently UAVs are known to operate (by the military and / or CIA) in the countries of Libya, Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Pakistan. Most times, the drones are used to eliminate high-value targets – terrorists. However, the military will use drones to support combat operations as well as to target terrorists.

For now, the United States enjoys a qualitative advantage in the use of UAVs. However, it won’t be long before other nations (and terrorist groups) close this technological gap.

Read more in “Drone strikes are best understood as part of the US’s grand strategy”, Business Insider, August 17, 2016.