Advising Archives - SOF News

Video – AFSOC Combat Advisors in Kenya with C-145 Aircraft

SOF News — Mon, 07 Jun 2021 22:02:01 +0000

U.S. Air Force Combat Aviation Advisors assigned to Air Force Special Operations Command conducted a three-month long training event with members of the Kenyan Air Force. This video depicts scenes from a culmination exercise that showcases the wide range of capabilities of the C-145A Combat Coyote aircraft. This light mobility aircraft is used for a variety of missions to include airdrop of supplies, medical evacuation, combat search and rescue, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief operations, and transport of personnel and equipment. The aircraft was originally procured in 2009 to conduct non-standard aviation special air mobility missions. In 2010, AFSOC selected the C-145A to be operated primarily by CAAs.

U.S. Air Force video by Senior Airman Victoria Hadden, May 29, 2021, 3 minutes. Originally published by the Defense Visual Information Distribution System.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y7diCEtkEUc

Afghan Conflict – A Look Back at 2020

SOF News — Tue, 05 Jan 2021 06:00:00 +0000

News, analysis, and commentary about the war in Afghanistan from the past few months of 2020. Topics include security, ANDSF, Resolute Support, peace negotiations, governance, development, podcasts, videos, and more.

Afghan News Summary

The Taliban hold more territory than ever before – not since before September 2001 have they held this much of Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP) still have a presence in Afghanistan. Peace talks are continuing with no real progress and with the Taliban apparently driving the train. The U.S. troop complement is significantly down-sized and will be at 2,500 at some point in January 2020. It remains to be seen what President-elect Biden’s Afghanistan policy will be. He may opt for the situation that President Trump has left him – leaving 2,500 troops in country. He may decide to keep a counterterrorism capability within Afghanistan. Or he could withdraw completely in May 2021 in accordance with the U.S.-Taliban withdrawal agreement.

Security

The Afghan government’s ability to establish security within the much of the rural area of the country is limited. It’s ability to provide services at the sub-governance level is affected by the lack of security as well as corruption and inefficiency. Insurgent and terrorist attacks continue at a high level despite the peace talks. The implementation of an ANDSF checkpoint reduction plan has faltered.

Targeted Killings. Attacks against government officials, journalists, military personnel, civil society activists, and other high-profile figures has increased over the past several month. On the first day of 2021 an Afghan journalist was shot dead in an attack by gunmen in Ghor province. Insider attacks have been happening regularly. The latest took place on Monday, January 4, 2021 in the Arghandab district in Kandahar province where nine policemen were killed at a check point.

Afghan Pilot Assassinated. An Afghan air force pilot was killed by gunman in the southern Afghan province of Kandahar on December 30, 2020. The helicopter pilot had been trained in the Czech Republic and the United Arab Emirates. Afghan police say that the assassin and two other insurgents were killed by the ANP. “Afghan Pilot Gunned Down in Kandahar”, Voice of America, December 30, 2020.

“Sticky Bombs”. A troublesome tactic used by insurgents in the past has gained popularity among those targeting Afghan government and military officials. The use of magnetic bombs placed on vehicles that are in motion has taking place almost daily. Usually insurgents will use a two-man motorcycle team to emplace the magnetic car bomb. The use of these sticky bombs have become an important tool in a widespread assassination campaign. (Task & Purpose, Dec 17, 2020).

Chinese Spy Ring Busted. The Afghan National Directorate of Security (NDS) detained 10 Chinese citizens over espionage charges. (Khaama Press, Dec 26, 2020). They were allegedly operating a terror cell in Kabul city. Two of the members are said to have been in direct contact with the Haqqani network. See also a news article by Pajhwok Afghan News (Dec 28, 2020). An Indian Army officer provides his perspective of China’s interference in Afghan affairs in the South Asian Monitor. Some news reports indicate that the ten Chinese citizens have now departed Afghanistan on a chartered aircraft – thus quietly removing from the glare of the press a potentially embarrassing situation.

Chinese (and Russian) Bounties. The Democrats had a field day this past year criticizing the Trump administration for ignoring intelligence indictors (many say uncorroborated) that the Russians paid bounties to the Taliban to kill U.S. military personnel. Now the Trump administration has declassified unconfirmed intelligence on China bounties on U.S. forces in Afghanistan. (The Hill, Dec 30, 2020).

Taliban

Move of Taliban Leadership. The National Directorate of Security (NDS) has info that the Taliban group is attempting to move its leadership from its safe refuge in Pakistan to bases in southern and southwestern Afghanistan. (Reportedly, Jan 4, 2021).

The Taliban’s Drones. In the past year the insurgents have stepped up surveillance operations and attacks using modified commercial drones. “Taliban adopting drone warfare to bolster attacks”, The National News, January 4, 2021.

The Taliban’s Air Force. Apparently the U.S. has launched air strikes against ISIK fighters that were engaged in operations against the Taliban. While not coordinated with the Taliban the air strikes certainly helped the Taliban. “General confirms the US has helped the Taliban by launching drone strikes against ISIS“, Task & Purpose, December 10, 2020.

“But it was a common enemy. It was an opportunity to strike someone who is an implacable foe of the united States. We did it. It probably helped the Taliban, and that would be the way I would describe it.”
General McKenzie, Commander of Central Command (CENTCOM)

The Taliban’s Judiciary. The Taliban’s alternative justice system is gaining traction in may regions that the militants control. A lack of government courts, judges, and prosecutors have forced residents to go to the Taliban or local mosques to seek legal recourse. This is compounded by a corrupt Afghan government judicial system where bribes often determine the outcome of legal proceedings. “Taliban Courts Seek to Undermine Afghan Judiciary”, Gandhara Blog, December 14, 2020.

Gen Milley Meets With Taliban. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff met secretly with the Taliban in December. He also spent some time with President Ghani as well. No real news came out of this event.

ANDSF

A-29 Training Program in U.S. Ends. After nearly five years the USAF is now putting the brakes on the training program that teaches Afghan pilots how to fly the A-29 Super Tucano. The final class graduated in November 2020 at Moody Air Force Base in Georgia. The 81st Fighter Squadron has been training Afghan pilots and maintenance technicians. Training will now be done in Afghanistan with Afghan instructor pilots running the training program. There are currently 28 A-29s available in Afghanistan for close air support, air interdiction, escort, and armed reconnaissance missions. Read more in “Air Force Ends Program That Trained Afghan Pilots to Fly the A-29 Super Tucano”, Military.com, November 19, 2020.

Afghanistan’s Policing Failure? Karl Nicolas Lindenlaub is an independent researcher with a focus on asymmetric warfare, security force assistance, and sub-state militant groups. In a recent article he outlines some of the reasons that the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and Afghan National Police (ANP) have not been a reliable security organization. Read “Afghanistan’s Policing Failure and the Uncertain Way Forward”, The Strategy Bridge, October 20, 2020.

ALP Loses US Funding. The United States has ended its funding for the Afghan Local Police as of 30 Sep 2020. The ALP was set up by U.S. Army Special Forces to provide security at the local level in Afghanistan – working in conjunction with the Village Stability Operations (VSO) program. Much of the mission of the ALP as well as about 1/3 of its personnel has been transferred to the Afghan National Army Territorial Force. Another 1/3 of ALP members will go to the Afghan National Police and the remainder will ‘retire’ (or join a local militia . . . or join the Taliban). Local security is also provided in part by Afghan militias referred to as local uprising forces. (SOFREP, Dec 31, 2020). The Afghanistan Analysts Network provides more information on the final chapter of the ALP. (AAN, Oct 6, 2020) as well as a special report on the ANA-TF (AAN, Aug 20, 2020).

Afghan Government Death Squads. Andrew Quilty provides an interesting article about a U.S.-backed militia that has acquired a dubious reputation for unwarranted violence. Read “The CIA’s Afghan Death Squads”, The Intercept, December 18, 2020. (Editorial note: The Intercept has a history of publishing stories with a bit of an anti-U.S. slant so there’s that . . .)

New ‘Security Force Unit’? A new unit has been established comprised of police, army, and NDS personnel. It will expand in size and activity during the coming summer months and operate principally in Farah province. (Khaama Press, Jan 4, 2021).

Missing Equipment. The Defense Department failed to keep track of surveillance systems, controls for laser-guided bombs, night vision devices, and other equipment provided to the Afghan government. “Sensitive US military equipment given to local forces goes unaccounted for in Afghanistan, watchdog says”, Stars and Stripes, December 17, 2020.

Resolute Support

The RS mission is steadily being ‘down-sized’. Some NATO countries have pulled back its forces and the U.S. has significantly reduced its footprint – down from 13,000 in early 2020 to about 2,500 by mid-January 2021. COVID-19 has significantly affected the advisory effort as well as the ability to conduct oversight on the ANDSF institutions and forces.

U.S. Force Reduction. By December 2020 the U.S. troop level was down to 4,500 in Afghanistan. President Trump announced a further reduction of U.S. troops – the target number being 2,500 by early January. General Scott Miller, the Resolute Support commander, confirmed that the U.S. reduction will take place by January 15th. The reduction is facing opposition in the US House of Representatives and Senate. See “Miller Says He Has Orders to Reduce US Troop Levels”, Tolo News, December 14, 2020. At this point in time there are more NATO troops than US troops in Afghanistan. Many of the U.S. bases that held thousands of troops have been vacated. One of these is FOB Shank (also named “Rocket City”) that recently saw the last 300 U.S. troops depart. (Tolo News, Jan 4, 2020).

U.S. Air Strikes Continue. The United States is still using air strikes to hit ISIS and support the ANDSF that are attacked by the Taliban. Reports of civilian casualties frequently make the press.

Advising Effort. General Scott Miller recently explained how Resolute Support is continuing the advising effort. He said that the U.S. bases have closed or shrunk – and now the U.S. presence in parts of the country are ‘enclaves’ within an ANDSF base. RS is still able to advise at the ministerial level and down to the corps level in the northern parts of the country. Miller said that RS will be able to project advisors to ‘points of need’ by moving an advisor package by air. This is an expeditionary advisory effort with a lighter footprint.

Billions Wasted. By the end of January there will likely be about 2,500 U.S. troops left in Afghanistan. Very few of these troops will be involved in monitoring how the Afghans spend the money we provide them. Over the past 19 years the U.S. taxpayers have footed roughly $138 billion for Afghan relief, reconstruction, and security. Is it time to stop the money flow? “How US wasted billions on absurd errors in Afghanistan War”, by Hollie McKay, Fox News, December 9, 2020.

Turkey Extending Its Stay. Turkey has about 1,200 soldiers in Afghanistan supporting the RS mission. It is currently in the process of extending the mission for another 18 months. “Turkey Bids to Extend Military Presence in Afghanistan”, Khaama Press, December 17, 2020.

New RS Dep Cdr. Lieutenant General Nicola Zanelli of the Italian Army assumed the position of Deputy Commander of the NATO-led mission Resolute Support. He took over from Lieutenant General Giles Hill of the British Army. (NATO, Dec 16, 2020).

Peace Negotiations

U.S. – Taliban Withdrawal Agreement. The U.S. government and the Taliban insurgents signed a agreement in February 2020. The U.S. pledged to withdraw troops from Afghanistan if the Taliban would prevent terrorists from operating in Afghanistan and enter into talks with the Afghan government.

There were a lot of other components to the U.S.-Taliban agreement – some of them referred to as ‘secret annexes’. It was assumed by the U.S. that the Taliban would reduce the level of violence – hasn’t happened. Prisoners would be exchanged – this got drawn out over time. Eventually the Taliban released 1,000 prisoners while the Afghan government released 5,000 prisoners. The Taliban-Afghan government talks have finally started but thus far only ‘procedural rules’ have been hashed out.

Intra-Afghan Peace Talks. The Afghan government and the Taliban began their face-to-face peace discussions in September 2020 in Doha, Qatar. Representatives for the Taliban and Afghan government have finally agreed to the ‘rules of procedure‘ (AAN, Jan 3, 2021) for the talks – that only took about three months to iron out. The negotiating teams paused talks in mid-December. They plan to renew talks on January 5, 2021 in Doha, Qatar. The next major subject to be discussed will be the agenda for future talks.

On December 30, 2020, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated that Afghanistan’s “fragile peace process” has no “guarantee of success”. The U.S. continues to emphasize that the Taliban needs to reduce the level of violence . . . but to no avail. President Ghani named members of the High Council for National Reconciliation but his decree was met with resistance by many elements of the Afghan political elite.

Completion of U.S. Withdrawal and Victory for the Taliban? The U.S.-Taliban agreement calls for the complete U.S. and NATO military withdrawal by May 2021. The Taliban likely will view this as a ‘victory’ and will grow even more confident in their ability to topple the Afghan government.

Biden’s Decision Point. President-elect Biden’s administration will face a decision point in the next few months. The U.S. can opt to abide with the withdrawal agreement which may very likely see the Taliban gain power in Afghanistan (with no guarantee that al-Qaeda or ISKP will be diminished) or the U.S. can keep a small counterterrorism force backed by SOF advisors and air power (which Biden probably prefers) and face the prospect of the Taliban abandoning the peace process.

Lots of Commentary on the Peace Process. A host of writers and observers have contributed their ‘two cents’ on the prospect of success for the intra-Afghan peace negotiations. Some say it is the only way to resolve the long conflict while others maintain that it is a recipe for Taliban success. Rory Andrews argues that the current process is not inclusive of the various elements of Afghan society. (Small Wars Journal, Dec 3, 2020).

Commentary

Why the U.S. Lost in Afghanistan. MG (Ret) Don Bolduc explains what the United States did wrong in Afghanistan. He lists nine missteps by the U.S. Bolduc is a retired Special Forces officer with several tours of duty in Afghanistan. Read his perspective in “Short-Sighted Political Strategy and Other Reasons the War in Afghanistan Failed”, SOFREP, December 9, 2020.

Ending the War in Afghanistan. Admiral (Ret) James Stavridis was the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO from 2009 to 2013. Here are his thoughts on how to end the Afghan War. “I Commanded NATO Forces in Afghanistan: Here’s How We Could End This ‘Forever War'”, Time, December 9, 2020.

Suggestions for President Biden. Jonathan Schroden, of the CNA, assesses the situation in Afghanistan and offers suggestions for the new administration to secure a better peace and a more stable country. “Afghanistan Will Be the Biden Administration’s First Foreign Policy Crisis”, Lawfare Blog, December 20, 2020.

How US Leaves Matters. Gayle Tzemach Lemmon believes that America can’t stay in Afghanistan forever, but it matters how we leave. She believes it it in America’s interest to stand on the side of those who fight against extremism and for stability. (CNN, Dec 16, 2020).

CT or COIN in Afghanistan? Carlo J.V. Caro provides his perspective on the choices the Biden administration will have in Afghanistan. Read “Counterterrorism or Counterinsurgency? Biden’s Coming Afghanistan Dilemma”, The Diplomat, December 16, 2020.

Repeating History. Jose Miguel Alonso-Trabanco reviews the troubled past of Afghanistan – beginning with the Soviet invasion and continuing until the present day. Read “History on Repeat: War and Peace in Afghanistan”, Eurasia Review, December 16, 2020.

New Afghan Strategy Needed. CAPT Anthony Cowden, a US Naval officer, says it is time to think out of the box and turn to old solutions for a new strategy. He believes the current U.S. strategy is a path to precipitously leave Afghanistan and watch the Afghan government crumble to the Taliban. Read “A(other) New Afghanistan Strategy, Based on an Old Approach”, Real Clear Defense, December 21, 2020.

Governance, Economy and Development

The Afghanistan economy continues to falter due to the insecurity in the country, diminished foreign aid, decrease in foreign military presence, and the coronavirus pandemic. Afghanistan continues to dominate global opium cultivation and production. Cultivation remains nearly three times the pre-2002 average. Currently donor grants from the international community finance more than half the Afghan government budget and 3/4’s of total public expenditures. The country is suffering from the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic. there have been a total of 53,000 plus cases and the total number of reported deaths is 2,237.

Afghan Govt Anti-Corruption Efforts. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) provided a 13-page letter to leading U.S. government officials about the current state of Afghan government anti-corruption efforts. Not exactly good news but there has been some cases of limited progress. (SIGAR, Nov 6, 2020).
https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/alerts/SIGAR-21-09-AL.pdf

Human Development. Lutfi Rahimi, a lecturer at the American University of Afghanistan, provides his perspective on four human development factors. A recent (2019) human development index (HDI) ranked Afghanistan 169th out of 187 counters and in the lowest group in the gender inequality index (GII). “Thinking More Deeply About Human Development in Afghanistan”, The Diplomat, December 29, 2020.

Rail Links With Iran Improve. A rail line was recently opened between the Iranian city of Haf to Herat in western Afghanistan. This will increase the economic and transportation ties between Iran and Afghanistan – improving the economic prospects for Afghanistan. See “Iran Rapidly Expanding Rail Links with Central Asia and Caucasus”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, December 15, 2020.

Books, Reports, and Publications

SIGAR Report. The Quarterly Report to Congress (Nov 2020) by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction is available on line. Pages 83-95 cover Afghanistan’s SOF units (ANASOC, GCPSU, and SMW). (PDF, 255 pages).
https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2020-10-30qr.pdf

Lead IG Report on OFS. The 22nd quarterly report submitted to Congress by the Lead Inspector General for Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS) summarizes the quarter’s (Jul – Aug – Sep 2020) key events and oversight of the CT and advising mission in Afghanistan. The 84-page PDF is available online. Bryce Klehm provides a condensed version of the report in his essay on the Lawfare Blog (Nov 30, 2020).

Report – History of U.S. Army in Afghanistan. The U.S. Army Center of Military History has published a report that shows how the United States Army balanced its ongoing commitment to combating terrorist and insurgent activity in post-Taliban Afghanistan with the expanding American war in Iraq. Operation Enduring Freedom, May 2005 – January 2009, CMH Pub 70-131-1, Dec 2020. Contains 88 pages, illustrations, tables, maps, and further readings.
https://history.army.mil/catalog/pubs/70/70-131.html

Paper on ISKP. “IS Khorasan, the US-Taliban Deal, and the Future of South Asian Security”, ORF Occasional Paper No. 289, December 2020, Observer Research Foundation, pdf, 40 pages. By Kabir Tanej.
https://www.orfonline.org/research/is-khorasan-the-us-taliban-deal-and-the-future-of-south-asian-security/

The Last Platoon. Bing West’s latest novel is about a platoon in Afghanistan working with the CIA. Read an excerpt from his book. (Military Times, Dec 15, 2020).

Paper – Civilian Death Toll via Airstrikes. Neta C. Crawford has penned a 10-page report entitled Afghanistan’s Rising Civilian Death Toll Due to Airstrikes, 2017-2020, Costs of War, Brown University, December 7, 2020.

Podcasts, Webcasts, and Videos

Video – Afghan Commando Training. NATO’s Resolute Support HQs has produced a short video about the 14-week long training program that Afghan Commandos complete before being assigned to a Commando kandak. (Dec 29, 2020, 2 mins).
https://www.facebook.com/ResoluteSupport/videos/837244076820531/

Video – Afghanistan: The French legacy in Kapisa province. A 17 minute long explanation of the French military deployment of troops to Kapisa from 2008 to 2012. France 24, April 12, 2020.

Podcast – Jack Keane on Afghanistan. Gen (Ret) Keane on troop withdrawals in Iraq and Afghanistan. See “Jack Keane against the cut and run from Afghanistan”, American Enterprise Institute (AEI), December 11, 2020. (Apple podcast).

Podcast – CIA Official Remembers a Devastating Day in Afghanistan. A former senior CIA intelligence service officer looks back to the day that seven CIA service members were killed by a suicide bomber in Afghanistan. CBS News, December 30, 2020. 34 minutes.

Podcast – A Sniper Section’s Fight in Ghazni. Master Sgt. Brody Hall was a sniper section leader in a scout platoon in the 173rd Airborne Brigade deployed to Afghanistan’s Ghazni province. He describes a fight that highlights a range of lessons about combat and the leadership of NCO’s in the Army. The Spear, Modern War Institute at West Point, December 31, 2020, 53 minutes.
https://mwi.usma.edu/podcast-the-spear-a-sniper-sections-fight-in-ghazni/

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Photo / Image: Afghan Commandos, SIGAR.

No Such Thing as a Perfect Partner: The Challenges of “By, With, and Through”

SOF News — Thu, 25 Jun 2020 05:00:00 +0000

By Emily Knowles, PRISM Vol. 8, No. 4, June 2020.
The original article can be accessed here – PRISM or view the PDF.

In recent military campaigns against violent non-state actors, many states have reduced the risk to their own forces by conducting airstrikes or supporting allies rather than placing their own forces on the ground.¹ Small teams of special operation forces (SOF) and military advisers, as well as military training teams and intelligence support units, have supported host-nation security forces in doing the bulk of front-line fighting against groups like al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, and al-Qaeda. In some theaters, such as the campaign against the Islamic State, this has extended to include intensive air and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support. In other theaters, support may be limited to training and equipping local partners without conducting joint operations—like the support that the UK provides to Kenyan forces through the British Peace Support Team (Africa). This is a trend that the Oxford Research Group calls “remote warfare,”² although it goes by many other names, including “surrogate war,”³ “light-footprint,”⁴ “low-intensity war,”⁵ and “by, with, and through.”⁶

This article draws on field research conducted in Afghanistan (2017), Iraq (2017), Mali, (2018) and Kenya (2018) as well as a series of expert roundtables held in London between 2017–2019, and interviews held with militaries, diplomats, and civil society in Mali (2019) and Somalia (2016–2018). The purpose of the effort was to identify changes in military engagement following the drawdowns of large international military operations in Iraq (2011) and Afghanistan (2014) and to highlight the strategic implications of a shift towards remote warfare. This included considering the impact on mandates like the protection of civilians, transparency, and accountability, and long-term prospects for peace.

One of the things that surfaced quickly throughout the research was that remote warfare is not a specific approach to military operations in the same way that counter-terrorism,⁷ counter-insurgency,⁸ or peace support operations⁹ are, nor are these activities guided by an overarching “remote warfare” or “by, with, and through” strategy.¹⁰ While militaries might have specific units dedicated to some of these tasks—such as the American Security Force Assistance Brigades¹¹ or the British Specialised Infantry Group¹²—many other elements of training, advising, and assisting or conducting expeditionary warfare alongside local units are carried out by a range of regular, elite, and special forces. Air support increasingly falls to drone pilots as well as more traditional forms of air power,¹³ while intelligence sharing and targeting support can be provided by many different agencies. Remote warfare is therefore less of an approach and more of a spectrum of support relationships between international militaries and their partners.¹⁴

Similarly, there is no one driver of the trend but rather a few key factors that have increased the incentives for engaging in this way. Part of the picture involves the way in which technological innovation—particularly the rise in drone technology—has enabled western states to replace the need for boots on the ground in some theaters.¹⁵ When coupled with air superiority in these same environments, which has historically been used to avoid the deployment of ground troops, it is clear that technology is creating opportunities for modern militaries to substitute out intelligence and strike capabilities that might once have put troops in the line of fire.¹⁶ The U.S. drones program is perhaps the most high-profile example, but others include the UK’s strike against the Islamic State propagandist and British citizen Reyaad Khan, who was killed in Syria in August 2015,¹⁷ or the June 2019 U.S. cyber attacks against Iranian military computers that were aimed at disabling the systems that control missile and rocket launchers.¹⁸

Another driver is the perceived security threat of safe havens and the related weakness of local partners in the regions where terrorist groups tend to thrive. In the immediate aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, then-British Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, predicted the emergence of a “future in which unspeakable acts of evil are committed against us, coordinated from failed states in distant parts of the world.” ¹⁹ The strategic imperative of denying terrorist groups safe haven in fragile or failed states has been a pivotal part of the military and political rationale linking U.S. and allied military action against violent non-state groups back to core national security concerns of preventing further attacks on their soil. ²⁰ As then-commander of the NATO Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan General John Nicholson said in his February 2017 evidence to the U.S. Senate, “Our mission was to ensure that Afghanistan would never again be a safe haven for al-Qaeda or other terrorist groups to attack America or our allies and partners. That mission has been successful for 15 years, but it is not over.”²¹

Other drivers are more case-specific. For example, in a conference organized by the Peace Research Institute Oslo in December 2018 on small-state provision of security force assistance (SFA), many of the conversations focused on how states could ensure that they were good allies and partners for major military powers.²² Providing troops to coalition missions such as NATO Resolute Support in Afghanistan or the air campaign against the Islamic State are a few examples where participants spoke of signaling their support to the U.S., while many interviewees in Mali cited showing support to the French as a component of why they were contributing to the EU Training Mission.²³ In the UK’s 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), the government committed to “focus on areas of comparative national advantage valued by key allies, especially the United States, such as our intelligence capabilities and highly capable elite forces.”²⁴ This was echoed in the 2015 SDSR which stated, “our special relationship with the US remains essential to our national security. It is founded on shared values, and our exceptionally close defence, diplomatic, security and intelligence cooperation.”²⁵

Following large-scale military intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan, some countries have also experienced increases in legislative scrutiny of military operations and shifting attitudes towards the costs in both blood and treasure of military engagement. In the UK for example, because remote warfare can offer the government military options that don’t require recourse to Parliament under the War Powers Convention, it makes it an attractive option for risk-averse governments that fear losing a vote.²⁶ The government’s failure to gain parliamentary authorization for the principle of military action in Syria on August 29, 2013 has compounded this fear. While research suggests that it is far from clear that the 2013 Syria vote was a marker of parliamentary pacifism,²⁷ the acceleration of today’s information age has certainly opened up military activities to greater debate and raised the risks for governments hoping to carry out discreet operations.²⁸ Low popular support for, or awareness of, enduring NATO commitments in Afghanistan was one of the factors that interviewees in Kabul cited for frustration on the ground, while extreme political risk aversion was cited as leading to very low appetites for accepting casualties on the NATO side.²⁹

Photo: Instructors from the European Union Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM) take Somali National Army (SNA) soldiers through training drills at Jazeera Training Camp in Mogadishu. AMISOM (Ryamond Baguma, 25 March 2015)

No Such Thing as a Perfect Partner

International Burden Sharing

It would be wrong to suggest that the template for working by, with, and through local partners is a new phenomenon. Wars have been fought alongside and integrated with allies and partners since antiquity.³⁰ The arming and supporting of rival factions reached fever pitch in the Cold War, when proxy wars enabled great powers to clash indirectly and—crucially—below the threshold for nuclear retaliation. However, contemporary operations have moved on from these past templates of waging war, not least in terms of international parties’ restricted reach and influence over the forces they fight alongside, who are partners rather than merely proxies.

In addition, military operations now include a growing number of actors; both local and regional partner forces, international organizations like NATO, and coalitions of local, community, or sub-state allies like the Peshmerga or Syrian Democratic Forces. In these “coalitions of the willing,” where the mission determines the coalition rather than the other way around, ³¹ partnerships can be fluid, ambiguous, and complex. These ad-hoc coalitions do not possess any international legal personality, nor are they recognized as legal persons within the states’ domestic legal systems, unlike more traditional alliance structures such as the UN or NATO.³² They also challenge the way that militaries are set up to run operations, with multiple red-card holders who can opt their national forces out of particular activities, multiple sets of rules of engagement, and varying risk appetites.³³

However, it is far from clear that the current approach to sharing the burden of operations across coalition partners is working. In Kabul in March 2017, only the American contingent had expeditionary rules of engagement that allowed them to accompany the troops that they were training.³⁴ Stringent restrictions on troop movements had a huge effect on the ability of troops to get out and build relationships with the people that they were meant to be supporting. One described how going to the Afghan MOD—which is down the road from Resolute Support Headquarters (HQ)—would require them to be accompanied by armored cars and given cover. Even walking to the U.S. Embassy, which is opposite Resolute Support HQ, would have required top armor and escort.³⁵ Interviewers were told that 25 percent of advisors could not currently advise because they did not have force protection.³⁶

It also appeared that the act of pledging troops was more important to some contributing countries than the question of what they would be doing when they got there. Indeed, some countries had not fully honored their pledges, with only around 12,000 of the 15,000 NATO places that had been promised actually filled in March 2017.³⁷ The change from earlier points in the mission seemed stark. Interviewees talked about how staff who had been out in Afghanistan before the drawdown and were then deployed back as part of Resolute Support asked why no one was speaking to their old contacts. The conclusion seemed to be that the current contingent had not been able to build those relationships because they could not get meaningful access to their local partners.³⁸

This appears to be a problem shared by other western troops. While interviewing recent returnees from the British training mission to AMISOM in Somalia, it was clear that troops were very aware that if anyone had got shot the mission could have been ended as a result. However, this led to a dilemma on the ground for those that wanted to have a meaningful effect and saw that they would not be able to do so on their current permissions. Some recounted how they had operated outside of their authorities in order to do their jobs—obviously a high risk considering the potential implications had anything gone wrong.³⁹ In a recent article for the British military outlet the Wavell Room, a soldier described how only two British personnel routinely went out into Mogadishu, and that these were the Chief J3 and J4 advisors for the European Union (EU) Training Mission.⁴⁰ While signaling support for allies is not necessarily a bad reason to join a coalition, if everybody is signaling rather than meaningfully engaging in a mission then chances of success seem slim.

Lead nations can also introduce dynamics into coalition partnerships that prove problematic for their allies. Negative public perceptions of the U.S. drones program in countries like the UK and Germany have led to huge political sensitivities around providing intelligence support or access to national facilities.⁴¹ For example, U.S. Col Patrick Ryder told the Guardian that the U.S. and the UK had consulted each other regarding the targeting of Junaid Hussain, a British computer hacker, adding “both governments will continue to coordinate efforts to eliminate violent extremist organisations.”⁴² Lieutenant-Colonel Nicholas Mercer, the British Army’s chief legal adviser in Iraq in 2003, said the confirmation of a British link to Junaid Hussain’s death raised “disturbing questions.”⁴³ This is particularly true when you consider the fact that, while the UK has admitted involvement in this successful strike against Junaid, it has kept very quiet about whether or not it was similarly involved in the first strike attempt which missed its target, instead killing three civilians.⁴⁴

In March 2019 a German court ruled that Germany was not doing enough to ensure that the U.S. was respecting international law in its use of Ramstein military base to conduct drone strikes. The German airbase provides the U.S. with a satellite relay station and personnel, which was enough for the court to declare that Germany played a “central role” in the strikes and therefore had an obligation to protect the lives of the Yemenis who brought the case after their relatives were killed.⁴⁵ In September 2017, a week-long protest against the U.S. drones program drew over 5,000 people to Ramstein.⁴⁶ While the German government often maintained that it had “no knowledge” of U.S. operations taking place at the base,⁴⁷ their assumption that the U.S. has not violated German or international law was found by the court to be based on an “inadequate investigation of facts.”⁴⁸

Risk Reduction or Risk Transfer?

The March 2018 British Army Field Manual Tactics for Stability Operations Part 5: Military Support to Capacity Building notes that one of the advantages of using capacity building as part of combat operations is that it allows UK forces to overcome “the problems of achieving sufficient mass” when British troops cannot be deployed in combat roles.⁴⁹ However, while there may only be a “‘light footprint” of western troops involved in operations, the commitment required from local troops remains considerable. Attrition rates for local military partners have been extremely high in contemporary campaigns. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) does not release official statistics, but the death toll for its troops is estimated at over 4,000.⁵⁰ Since 2013, the UN mission in Mali has lost over 200 troops,⁵¹ while the Nigerian army is reportedly burying its own troops at night to conceal the toll of its fight against Islamist groups in the northeast.⁵² Attrition rates among Afghan forces have been consistently sky-high, with 6,700 deaths in just one year.⁵³ While remote warfare may seem low risk from the perspective of Western capitals, local troops are still paying heavily in these campaigns.

Photo: Devastation after the Battle for Mosul, July 9, 2017 (H. Mourdock)

Working “by, with, and through” can also transfer greater risks onto local populations. Many local militaries and armed groups are less equipped to mitigate civilian harm than their international counterparts. For example, senior British military personnel have recounted how Iraqi forces had been deeply traumatized by the experiences of 2014 and in many cases were reluctant to advance without heavier levels of international air support than might otherwise have been used in densely populated urban terrain. The consequences of this can be seen clearly in western Mosul, the final Islamic State stronghold in the city, where around 15 neighborhoods have been completely destroyed. These districts previously housed around 230,000 residents, leaving large numbers of internally displaced people who will not be able to return in the short- to mid-term.⁵⁴ The UN estimates that eight out of 10 buildings damaged in Mosul were residential buildings, with 8,475 houses destroyed—more than 5,500 of which were in west Mosul’s Old City.⁵⁵

Military coalitions can also be a “race to the bottom” when it comes to opening operations up to scrutiny.⁵⁶ The only member of the international anti-Islamic State coalition to consistently concede civilian casualties from its air campaign was the U.S., with other partners hesitant to distinguish their own strikes from those of the coalition as a whole.⁵⁷ Empowering local armed groups can also have negative long-term consequences for civilians when those forces are corrupt, abusive, or sectarian. A depressing 23 percent of the violent incidents against civilians recorded over the past 12 years was perpetrated by state forces rather than militia or rebel groups.⁵⁸ In some instances, building the capacity of predatory armed forces feeds a cycle of violence and conflict that contributes to the “forever wars” that define the contemporary international security environment.

For example, local security forces like the Afghan Local Police (ALP) were intended to address the growing problems of insurgency and lack of Afghan National Army legitimacy in the areas where the Taliban were drawing their support. However, reports of abuses against the local communities that they were meant to be protecting were also widespread. A survey of U.S. Special Operations Forces teams mentoring ALP units in 2011 found that 20 percent reported ALP colleagues were guilty of undefined “physical abuse/violence;” a further 12 percent reported bribe-taking. Between one-fifth and one-sixth reported that ALP indulged in salary fraud and theft. A smaller number witnessed rape, drug trafficking, drug abuse, and the selling or renting of ALP weapons and vehicles. Complaints of extortion and illegal taxation are commonplace. Some reports have even described ALP commanders selling the lives of their men: one allegedly accepted bribes equal to $500 per head to murder subordinates and killed six before capture. ALP in Faryab province were accused of raping, looting, and keeping a torture chamber with snakes at the bottom of a dry well.⁵⁹

In 2016/17 the UK spent £0.8 million delivering international humanitarian law (IHL) and preventing sexual violence modules through the EU Training Mission in Mali, with a further £0.87 million allocated for broader military and civilian support (with a focus on infantry, medical, and IHL) for 2018/19.⁶⁰ These master’s-degree level programs were optimistically delivered with the aim of professionalizing a force with limited education levels that has been linked to numerous violations including extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, torture, and arbitrary arrests.⁶¹ The Malian armed forces and the broader Malian government have also been accused of ethnic bias. In central Mali, Bambara and Dogon ethnic armed groups have recently been acquiring heavy, war-grade weaponry—some of which presumed to be coming from the armed forces—that has increased the lethality of localized disputes.⁶²

In July 2017, Amnesty International released a report documenting the cases of 101 individuals accused of supporting Boko Haram—often without evidence—who were held incommunicado and allegedly tortured by Cameroonian security forces, including the elite Rapid Intervention Battalion (BIR).⁶³ Created in 2001, the BIR is a special operations unit about 4,500 strong that has received security force assistance (SFA) from France, Israel, and the United States.⁶⁴ The BIR and other Cameroonian security institutions received IHL instruction as part of their technical training from the United States.⁶⁵ However, this has proven inadequate when it comes to altering heavy-handed approaches to countering terrorism and the politicization of the armed forces.

This is not to suggest that international partners should always cut assistance if their local partners prove to be corrupt or abusive. You can argue that increasing assistance and international presence in some of these environments would allow international partners to better scrutinize and influence behavior. However, there are also obligations that bind states to refrain from providing assistance that might cause or facilitate grave breaches of international humanitarian law.⁶⁶ Balancing the two is a dilemma, particularly if you subscribe to the view that donor states tend to overestimate the control they will have over their partners in the first place.⁶⁷

Taking A Peacebuilding Approach to Working with Local Partners

International military partners consistently misdiagnose poor behavior as stemming from a lack of training or capability.⁶⁸ There is a related assumption that improving the tactical proficiency of partner forces will address these concerns. While this logic may work in some places, a focus on military effectiveness as a criterion for partnership, or as a metric for success, creates its own dilemmas. This was captured by Frances Z. Brown and Mara Karlin:

“…the fact that it uses military criteria to choose a partner for a relationship that often evolves into a political one. If, as Clausewitz famously wrote, “war is a mere continuation of politics by other means,” the by-with-through model inverts this dictum, subordinating politics to … choices on the battlefield.”⁶⁹

For example, as soon as the Taliban government fell in 2001, armed groups within Afghanistan began competing for positions and influence. The international community came under immediate pressure to improve security and create the conditions for a transfer of power to a new Afghan administration. However, even as early as 2003, analysts were warning that, “Between September 2001 and June 2002 certain choices were made by national and international decisionmakers that have had long-lasting repercussions for the political process in Afghanistan.” ⁷⁰

In particular, the perceived capture of the process by powerful warlords who were then able to secure a place in the interim administration was seen as extremely damaging. Rather than pushing for a peace agreement in the sense of having a pact between warring parties, the Bonn process was geared at forging an agreement between leaders of four anti-Taliban groups that had been particularly instrumental to the international coalition that toppled the Taliban government.⁷¹ As early as 2002, experts were warning that “the Ministry of Defence [has become] a major obstacle to Demobilisation, Disarmament, and Reintegration (DDR) and the creation of the Afghan National Army (ANA).” ⁷²

Adopting a “winners take all” approach to engaging with local partners can exacerbate fragmentation on the ground in post-conflict societies. In many fragile contexts, governance and control is wielded through loose alliances between powerbrokers such as local strongmen, warlords, and militias.⁷³ These opaque and sometimes precarious relationships can dictate the development of political coalitions and lead to the intense politicization of armed groups, including the state armed forces. In weak states, the relative military might of different armed groups is one of the most crucial levers of power. In this context, foreign assistance can be an unintentional “kingmaker” as it strengthens parts of a fragmented system that may not serve the population or the stability of the state as a whole.⁷⁴ This creates incentives for elites to subvert assistance for their own purposes, while simultaneously engaging in corrupt or predatory behaviors that feed the instability that donors may be trying to address.⁷⁵

In other places, improving the tactical proficiency of units can create “islands of excellence” where small groups of elite forces are both willing and capable of protecting civilians,⁷⁶ but fail to deliver positive outcomes over the long-term. Efforts cannot be sustained unless the defense and security sector writ large also shares this ethos, and the political conditions on the ground support compatible values.⁷⁷ For example, one of the great international hopes from long-term international engagement in Iraq was the Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS)—a multi-ethnic elite unit that showed some promise as a template for the broader security forces.⁷⁸ The CTS were largely considered to be a professional, sustainable force by the time international trainers left in 2011.

However, even in the early days after the international withdrawal it was clear that being the exception to the rule of low Iraqi National Army capacity had its downsides. Tasking began to come directly from the Prime Minister’s office, mostly for activities not suited to an elite counter-terrorism unit like securing voting centers, guarding convoys, and manning checkpoints. Experienced officers began to be replaced by people with connections to the Prime Minister, and the promotions system began to revert to a system based on loyalty rather than competence.⁷⁹ They were also removed from the Ministry of Defense chain of command to sit under its own ministry, but were not allocated money from the Iraqi defense budget.⁸⁰ Pouring money into specific units while the rest of the sector remains dysfunctional can contribute to the creation of “Fabergé egg” armies that are expensive to build but easy for insurgents to crack because the military as a whole lacks cohesion.⁸¹ Rethinking this technical approach to remote warfare that prioritizes improving the tactical effectiveness of local troops on the frontlines is essential if the long-term outlook for peace is to improve.

One potential solution has its roots in the increasing focus on the importance of local ownership. In theory working by, with, and through local forces should lay the foundations for locally owned, locally responsive, and culturally attuned approaches to security. The UK’s Building Stability Overseas Strategy emphasizes the need for conflict-sensitive international engagement abroad, advising that;

“the starting point needs to be … analysing and understanding the situation to ensure that work designed to build stability does not unintentionally make things worse. The chances of success are greatest when the international community gets behind a political settlement that lays the foundations for tackling the causes of conflict in a country.”⁸²

In new stabilization guidance issued in 2019, the British government highlights the fact that “externally-backed peace processes and agreements that are significantly misaligned or out of sync with the underlying distribution of power and resources are likely to fail.”⁸³ The U.S. government’s 2018 Stabilization Assistance Review notes that “our national experience over the past two decades has taught us that it is not enough to win the battle; we must help our local partners secure the peace.”⁸⁴ One blueprint would be to approach assistance as a form of peacebuilding for fragmented security sectors, with assistance geared towards improving relationships between the many formal and informal groups that are often providing security in these environments, as well as between the security sector and the civilians that it is there to serve.⁸⁵

This means working with a wider range of groups based on their provision of legitimate, accountable security to the population as a whole. This also means letting go of or deprioritizing more traditional criteria like military effectiveness. Different communities will have different needs and different experiences of insecurity in a rapidly changing conflict or post-conflict environment. It is important to capture these concerns when deciding on the right course of action. For example, groups that are seen as corrupt and abusive in some areas can be seen as a lifeline in others:

“I know that people in Kabul are talking about cancelling the ALP, but you don’t understand”, said a provincial governor, gesturing at the barbed wire along his compound’s perimeter. “Without those guys, the Taliban will climb over that wall and cut my head off.”⁸⁶

The dynamics of legitimate and effective security provision will vary both across communities and across time. This is also the case for the dynamics of fear, and perceptions of risk associated with the courses of action chosen by policymakers. Both require frequent consultation and re-evaluation to make sure that policies adapt to changing circumstances. The international community must be careful to avoid quick assumptions about the extent to which local groups will use their knowledge and links with the community to solve problems and reduce support for violent actors. Just because groups are local, they should not be assumed to be a proxy for local legitimacy. This is where community consultation and detailed mapping become essential to avoid violent competition between different groups vying for assistance. Rather than allowing international actors to set the criteria for group inclusion, this should be a locally led process that is driven by community responses to the question of; who do you support to provide your security and why?

This means adopting a new vision for delivering military assistance in fragile states where success is evaluated against the long-term impact of programs on prospects for peace and security. Peacebuilding metrics could include; the ethnic diversity of course attendance, attendance rates for marginalized ethnicities or genders, hierarchies (informal and formal) between soldiers who attend courses, and the strength of positive and negative interactions between attendees. Efforts to maximize the exposure to each other of units or services who might have poor or problematic relations should be boosted and rewarded, rather than measuring basic attendance figures, or recall of tactical skills and concepts.

This may mean accepting a form of assistance that integrates leaders from the government and security forces but would also include informal actors who hold local legitimacy in providing security. While this creates a messier picture, what is lost in efficiency may be gained in sustainability. Compacts between elite groups and donors are fragile and open to abuse by groups seeking to entrench their own power rather than tackle instability. Fictionalizing a state apparatus and then refusing to deal outside of it only serves to mask the deep divisions that remain. These agreements often fail to address issues around representation in the security sector, or behavior that prioritizes the protection of some groups over the population as a whole. Using assistance to create opportunities for broad community engagement and wider relationship-building within fragmented security sectors is an approach that is anchored in local realities, starting where actors are, not where third parties want them to be.

Conclusion

Taking a peacebuilding approach to working with local militaries and armed groups means using assistance to fragmented security sectors to increase cooperation between various formal and informal elites in a weak state. This approach places less emphasis on developing conventional military power and more emphasis on facilitating and improving relations between the different factions within the security sector and between the security sector and the civilian population.⁸⁷ If international providers help local partners perform better at military tasks without ensuring that the forces have local legitimacy and strong accountability, progress is likely to be fleeting and could actually exacerbate civilian harm and the underlying drivers of violent conflict.

These negative outcomes are not inevitable. In theory, working by, with, and through local forces should lay the foundations for locally owned, locally responsive and culturally attuned approaches to security. Local, national, and regional armed groups have the potential to provide crucial support to peace processes and they bear ultimate responsibility for protecting local populations. Finding a way to support the emergence of legitimate, accountable, and effective local, national, and regional security forces is an essential part of setting the conditions for lasting peace.

However, this cannot happen without policies that account for the fact that these same partners have the potential to be major spoilers or perpetrators of harm. Rather than developing strong procedures to manage these risks and dilemmas, the tendency in western capitals is currently to approach partner operations as a low-cost, low-risk form of war. Debates within western militaries tend to ignore the transfer of risk onto partner forces and local civilians, and local partners and NGOs are often excluded from the international policy debate. Fixing this means doing more than trying to improve the way that international militaries work with local partners. It means adjusting the vision for what success would really mean.

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Notes

¹ “Remote War: Military, Legal and Political Issues,” Oxford Research Group, accessed March 14, 2019, https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/pages/category/remote-war-military-legal-and-political-issues; “Conceptual Series: Defining Remote Warfare,” Oxford Research Group, accessed June 26, 2019, .

² “Conceptual Series.”

³ Andreas Krieg and Jean-Marc Rickli, Surrogate Warfare: The Transformation of War in the Twenty-First Century (Georgetown University Press, 2019), .

⁴ “‘Light Footprint’ Operations Keep US Troops in the Dark,” Defense One, accessed June 26, 2019, ; Brad Stapleton, “The Problem with the Light Footprint: Shifting Tactics in Lieu of Strategy,” Cato Institute, June 7, 2016, .

⁵ Roger Carey, “Low-Intensity Warfare and Limited War,” in International Security in the Modern World, ed. Roger Carey and Trevor C. Salmon (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1996), 133–51, .

⁶ “Civilians and ‘By, With, and Through’ | Center for Strategic and International Studies,” accessed June 26, 2019, .

⁷ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and of Staff, “Counterterrorism,” October 24, 2014, .

⁸ Chairman of the Joint and Chiefs of Staff, “Counterinsurgency,” April 25, 2018, ; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Allied Joint Doctrine for Counter-Insurgency (COIN),” accessed August 20, 2019, .

⁹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Peace Support,” December 2014, .

¹⁰ Emily Knowles and Abigail Watson, “Remote Warfare: Lessons Learned from Contemporary Theatres,” Oxford Research Group, June 27, 2018, .

¹¹ Congressional Research Service, “Army Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs),” October 24, 2018, .

¹² “Specialised Infantry Group,” accessed August 20, 2019, .

¹³ “Drones and the Future of Aerial Combined Arms,” War on the Rocks, May 12, 2016, ; “The French Turn to Armed Drones,” War on the Rocks, September 22, 2017, ; “Rise of the Drones | Rudolph Herzog,” Lapham’s Quarterly, accessed August 27, 2019, .

¹⁴ Knowles and Watson, “Remote Warfare,” 2–3.

¹⁵ Thomas Bolland and Jan Andre Lee Ludvigsen, “‘No Boots on the Ground’: The Effectiveness of US Drones against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula,” Defense & Security Analysis 34, no. 2 (April 3, 2018): 127–43, ; “Planning for a U.S. Military Recessional From Africa,” Council on Foreign Relations, accessed August 20, 2019, .

¹⁶ Dr Sebastian Ritchie, “The RAF, Small Wars and Insurgencies in the Middle East, 1919-1939” (Air Historical Branch, 2011); Group Captain John Alexander, “The End of Air Power History and the Last Airman? Air Power, Liberal Democracy and the British Way of War,” in Air Power Review, vol. 14, 2, 2011.

¹⁷ Shiv Malik et al., “Ruhul Amin and Reyaad Khan: The Footballer and the Boy Who Wanted to Be First Asian PM,” The Guardian, September 7, 2015, sec. World news, .

¹⁸ Zak Doffman, “U.S. Attacks Iran With Cyber Not Missiles — A Game Changer, Not A Backtrack,” Forbes, accessed August 27, 2019, ; “US ‘launched Cyberattacks on Iran Weapons’ after Drone Downing,” accessed August 27, 2019, .

¹⁹ Harry Verhoeven, “The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy of Failed States: Somalia, State Collapse and the Global War on Terror,” Journal of Eastern African Studies 3, no. 3 (November 1, 2009): 405–25, .

²⁰ Anthony Dworkin, “Europe’s New Counter-Terror Wars” European Council on Foreign Relations, 2016, ; Brian Michael Jenkins, “Disrupting Terrorist Safe Havens,” RAND, August 18, 2014, . \\uc0\\u8221{} Time, June 4, 2017, http://time.com/4804640/london-attack-theresa-may-speech-transcript-full/.”,”plainCitation”:”Anthony Dworkin, Europe’s New Counter-Terror Wars (ECFR, 2016

²¹ John Nicholson, “Testimony on the Situation in Afghanistan,” § Senate Commitee on Armed Services (2017), .

²² SFAssist project hosted by the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), Norway, 5–7 December 2018.

²³ Author interviews, Koulikoro Training Camp, September 2018

²⁴ HMG, “Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review” (HM Government, 2010), 12, .

²⁵ HMG, “National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom” (HM Government, November 2015), para. 2.12, .

²⁶ Emily Knowles, “We Need to Talk about Yemen,” Remote Control Project (blog), December 9, 2016, ; Emily Knowles, “Briefing: We Need Greater Transparency on UK Military Operations in Libya” (London: Remote Control, May 2016), ; Emily Knowles, “Britain’s Culture of No Comment,” Remote Control Project (blog), July 4, 2016, ; Emily Knowles, “What British War on Terror?,” Remote Control Project (blog), October 26, 2016, ; Emily Knowles and Abigail Watson, “All Quiet On The ISIS Front : British Secret Warfare In The Information Age,” Remote Warfare Programme (blog), March 31, 2017, ; Liam Walpole, “Mind the Gap: Parliament in the Age of Remote Warfare,” Remote Warfare Programme, October 2017, .

²⁷ Abigail Watson, “Pacifism or Pragmatism? The 2013 Parliamentary Vote on Military Action in Syria,” Remote Warfare Programme (blog), May 29, 2018, .

²⁸ Knowles and Watson, “All Quiet On The ISIS Front.”

²⁹ Author interviews, NATO RS, March 2017.

³⁰ Cordula Droege and David Tuck, “Fighting Together: Obligations and Opportunities in Partnered Warfare,” Humanitarian Law & Policy, March 28, 2017, .

³¹ Matteo Tondini, “Coalitions of the Willing,” in The Practice of Shared Responsibility in International Law, ed. Andre Nollkaemper and Ilias Plakokefalos (Cambridge University Press, 2017), 703.

³² Tondini, 713.

³³ Paul A. L. Ducheine, Michael N. Schmitt, and Frans P. B. Osinga, Targeting: The Challenges of Modern Warfare (Springer, 2015), 254; Katja Lindskov Jacobsen and Rune Saugmann, “Optimizing Coalition Air Warfare: The Emergence and Ethical Dilemmas of Red Card Holder Teams,” Global Policy 0, no. 0, accessed August 27, 2019, ; M. C. Zwanenburg, Accountability Of Peace Support Operations (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005), 48; Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg and Volker Epping, International Humanitarian Law Facing New Challenges: Symposium in Honour of KNUT IPSEN (Springer Science & Business Media, 2007), 43.

³⁴ Author interviews, NATO RS, March 2017.

³⁵ Author interviews, NATO RS, March 2017.

³⁶ Author interviews, NATO RS, March 2017.

³⁷ Author interviews, NATO RS, March 2017

³⁸ Author interviews, NATO RS, March 2017.

³⁹ Author telephone interviews, Somalia, October 2016

⁴⁰ Ric Cole, “The Rebirth of ‘Frontier Soldiering’?,” The Wavell Room (blog), August 15, 2019, .

⁴¹ Louisa Brooke-Holland, “Research Briefings – Overview of Military Drones Used by the UK Armed Forces” (House of Commons, October 8, 2015), .

⁴² Alice Ross and Spencer Ackerman, “Former Navy Chief Expresses Concern over UK Role in Syria Drone Strikes,” The Guardian, September 10, 2015, sec. UK news, .

⁴³ Ross and Ackerman.

⁴⁴ Spencer Ackerman and Alice Ross, “Airstrike Targeting British Hacker Working for Isis Killed Three Civilians Instead, US Admits,” The Guardian, January 29, 2016, sec. US news, .

⁴⁵ “German Court Hands Partial Victory to Critics of U.S. Drone Deaths…,” Reuters, March 19, 2019, ; “Statement on UK Assistance to Partners Following Ground-Breaking German Court Ruling – All Party Parliamentary Group on Drones,” accessed August 27, 2019, ; “US Drone Attacks via Ramstein – ECCHR,” accessed August 27, 2019, .

⁴⁶ Deutsche Welle (www.dw.com), “Ramstein Air Base Anti-Drone Protests: The Germans Taking on the US Military | DW | 09.09.2017,” DW.COM, accessed August 27, 2019, .

⁴⁷ Deutsche Welle (www.dw.com), “Drones and Diplomacy: US Ramstein Air Base Stirs Controversy in Germany | DW | 14.03.2019,” DW.COM, accessed August 27, 2019, .\\uc0\\u8221{} DW.COM, accessed August 27, 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/drones-and-diplomacy-us-ramstein-air-base-stirs-controversy-in-germany/a-47926300.”,”plainCitation”:”Deutsche Welle (www.dw.com

⁴⁸ “German Court Says Potentially Illegal Drone Strikes Aided by Ramstein, despite USAF Denials,” Stars and Stripes, accessed August 27, 2019, .

⁴⁹ “Tactics for Stability Operations Part 5: Military Support to Capacity Building,” Army Field Manual, March 2018, paras. 2–13, .

⁵⁰ “The True Cost of the World’s Most Dangerous Peace Mission,” The East African, accessed August 27, 2019, .

⁵¹ “Fatalities,” United Nations Peacekeeping, accessed August 27, 2019, .

⁵² Joe Parkinson | Photographs by Jonathan Torgovnik for The Wall Street Journal, “Nigeria Buries Soldiers at Night in Secret Cemetery,” Wall Street Journal, July 31, 2019, sec. World, .

⁵³ Tony Walker, “We Should Not Commit Combat Troops to the Afghanistan Conflict – Here’s Why,” The Conversation, accessed June 8, 2017, .

⁵⁴ “Recovery in Iraq’s War-Battered Mosul Is a ‘tale of Two Cities,’ UN Country Coordinator Says,” UN News, August 8, 2017, .

⁵⁵ Lucy Rodgers, Nassos Stylianou, and Daniel Dunford, “What’s Left of Mosul?,” BBC News, accessed February 27, 2018, .

⁵⁶ “The Sum Of All Parts: Reducing Civilian Harm in Multinational Coalition Operations,” Center for Civilians in Conflict (blog), accessed August 27, 2019, .

⁵⁷ Airwars, “Limited Accountability: A Transparency Audit of the Anti-ISIL Coalition,” Remote Warfare Programme, December 2016, .

⁵⁸ Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), “ACLED Data Export,” ACLED Data, 13 April 2019, , accessed 22 April 2019. This figure is based on ACLED data from Africa, the Middle East, South East Asia for violent incidents against civilians recorded since 1997 by state forces, militia forces and rebel groups. Out of 57,982 recorded events, 13,195 of them were attributed to state forces.

⁵⁹ International Crisis Group, “The Future of the Afghan Local Police,” June 2015, 8, .

⁶⁰ Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF),
‘Sahel Support to Multilaterals: Annual Review’, HM Government, 2018, , accessed 2 April 2019; CSSF, ‘Sahel Defence and Security’, HM Government, 2019, , accessed 2 April 2019.

⁶¹ Human Rights Watch, ‘Mali: Unchecked Abuses in Military Operations’, 8 September 2017, , accessed 15 June 2019; France 24, ‘Twenty-Five Bodies Found in Central Mali After Army Sweep’, 18 June 2018, , accessed 19 June 2019; Afua Hirsch, ‘Mali’s Army Suspected of Abuses and Unlawful Killings as War Rages’, The Observer, 19 January 2013.

⁶² Human Rights Watch, ‘”We Used to be Brothers”: Self-Defense Group Abuses in Central Mali’, 7 December 2018; Anna Pujol-Mazzini, ‘How Mali is Pursuing Justice for a War That Never Really Ended’, World Politics Review, 29 January 2019.

⁶³ Amnesty International, ‘Cameroon’s Secret Torture Chambers: Human Rights Violations and War Crimes in the Fight Against Boko Haram’, 2017, , accessed 10 April 2019.

⁶⁴ BBC News, ‘Burning Cameroon: Images You’re not Meant to See’, 25 June 2018.

⁶⁵ Voice of Africa, ‘Cameroon: Armed Forces – BIR Commando Training Centre Graduates 1,850’, 26 December 2017, , accessed 14 June 2019; United States Army Africa, ‘Human Rights and Law Training’, 13 May 2019, , accessed 2 July 2019; Carla Babb, ‘US Keeps Training Cameroon Troops but Urges Accountability in Criminal Probe’, Voice of America, 27 September 2018, , accessed 14 June 2019.

⁶⁶ Emily Knowles and Abigail Watson, “Lawful But Awful? Legal and Political Challenges of Remote Warfare and Working with Partners” (Remote Warfare Programme, May 2018), .

⁶⁷ Stephen Biddle, “Building Security Forces & Stabilizing Nations: The Problem of Agency,” Daedalus 146, no. 4 (October 2017): 126–38, .many now see “small-footprint” security force assistance (SFA

⁶⁸ Emily Knowles and Jahara Matisek, “Western Security Force Assistance in Weak States,” The RUSI Journal 164, no. 3 (April 16, 2019): 10–21, .

⁶⁹ Mara Karlin and Frances Brown, “Friends With Benefits,” Foreign Affairs, May 8, 2018, .

⁷⁰ Rama Mani, “Ending Impunity and Building Justice in Afghanistan” (Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, December 2003), 1.

⁷¹ Emily Winterbotham, “The State of Transitional Justice in Afghanistan” (AREU, April 2010), 6.

⁷² Mani, “Ending Impunity and Building Justice in Afghanistan,” 2.

⁷³ William Reno, Warlord Politics and African States (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999); Joel S Migdal, State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

⁷⁴ Knowles and Matisek, “Western Security Force Assistance in Weak States.”

⁷⁵ Jahara Matisek and William Reno, ‘Getting American Security Force Assistance Right: Political Context Matters’, Joint Force Quarterly (No. 92, 1st Quarter, 2019), pp. 65–73.

⁷⁶ Knowles and Matisek, “Western Security Force Assistance in Weak States”; Knowles and Watson, “Remote Warfare.”

⁷⁷ “The Roots of Restraint in War,” Publication, International Committee of the Red Cross, June 6, 2018, .

⁷⁸ Knowles and Watson, ‘Remote Warfare’, p. 14.

⁷⁹ David M. Witty, “The Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service | Brookings Institution,” Brookings (blog), November 30, 2001, 28, .

⁸⁰ Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Department of Defense Budget FY2018,” May 2017, 6, .

⁸¹ Jahara Matisek, ‘The Crisis of American Military Assistance: Strategic Dithering and “Fabergé Egg” Armies’, Defense & Security Analysis (Vol. 34, No. 3, 2018), pp. 267–290.

⁸² HMG, “Building Stability Overseas Strategy” (HM Government, 2014), ; DFID, FCO, and MOD, “Building Stability Overseas Strategy” (HM Government, July 2011), .

⁸³ Stabilisation Unit, “The UK Government’s Approach to Stabilisation: A Guide for Policy Makers and Practitioners,” March 2019, .

⁸⁴ US Department of State, “Framework for Maximizing the Effectiveness of U.S. Government Efforts to Stabilize Conflict-Affected Areas,” Stabilization Assistance Review, 2018, .

⁸⁵ Knowles and Matisek, “Western Security Force Assistance in Weak States.”

⁸⁶ The International Crisis Group. “The Future of the Afghan Local Police,” June 2015, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/future-afghan-local-police.

⁸⁷ Lisa Schirch, Conflict Assessment and Peacebuilding Planning: A Strategic Participatory Systems-Based Handbook on Human Security (Boulder, CO: Kumarian Press, 2013).

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Download PDF, 15 pages.

The author, Emily Knowles, is an Associate Fellow at the Oxford Research Group.

Top Photo: Air Force air advisors assigned to the 409th Expeditionary Security Forces Squadron brief the Niger Armed Forces (FAN) before training exercises in Agadez, Niger, July 10, 2019. The FAN learned how to efficiently and safely clear a building. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Devin Boyer)

This article was first published in PRISM Vol. 8, No. 4, June 11, 2020 by the National Defense University Press. Re-posted by SOF News with the permission of the PRISM editorial staff. View the original article here.

SIGAR Quarterly Report on Afghanistan – April 2020

John Friberg — Sun, 03 May 2020 05:00:00 +0000

The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) has published its quarterly report to Congress covering the months of January through March of 2020. The report provides updates and assessments on the Afghan National Defense Security Forces (ANDSF), governance, economic and social development, and the effort to reduce the narcotics trade. In addition the report includes a section about the impact of COVID-19 in Afghanistan. The 217-page report (PDF) published on April 30, 2020 provides an independent assessment of U.S. efforts in Afghanistan.

COVID-19 in Afghanistan

The country of Afghanistan is uniquely vulnerable due to a number of factors to include an inadequate health care system, insecurity in many rural areas, and a national government that is ineffective in the deliverance of government services. Key urban centers are experiencing rising food prices. The coronavirus pandemic certainly complicates the peace process – providing more obstacles to an already shaky start in the Taliban – Afghan government negotiation process. The Taliban hinders the government effort at controlling the pandemic while it also has instituted some measures to contain the virus in areas it controls.

Resolute Support (RS) has curtailed many of its activities due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Advising, training, and engagement with Afghan counterparts have been reduced. Some troop contributing nations have pulled a portion of their contingents out of the country. Some advising and training is being conducted using ‘technical’ means rather than in-person meetings. RS is providing some critical personal protective equipment to the ANDSF to include gloves, masks, and claning supplies. The COVID-19 cases documented thus far are concentrated in Herat and Kabul.

“COVID-19 is something that affects the entire world, and it will affect Coalition forces and Afghan security forces as well. The focus on this particular virus has to be on preventing the spread, which is difficult under even normal circumstances, but almost impossible if we have violence.”
RS Command General Austin Scott Miller

U.S. – Taliban Withdrawal Agreement

On February 29, 2020 the U.S. and the Taliban signed an agreement calling for a conditions-based withdrawal of all military forces of the United States, its allies, and Coalition partners. This includes all non-diplomatic civilian personnel, private security contractors, trainers, advisors, and supporting services personnel. This will take place over 14 months. So by Spring 2021, next year, the U.S. will no longer have a presence in Afghanistan – other than its diplomatic mission in Kabul.

The agreement commits the Taliban to prevent its members and other groups from using Afghan soil to threaten the security of the United States or its allies. It commits the Taliban to enter into negotiations with the Afghan government and to reach an agreement on the future political roadmap of Afghanistan.

Taliban Steps up Attacks on ANDSF

There was, in mid-February, a week-long reduction in violence in the conflict. This reduction preceded the signing of the agreement between the US and the Taliban. The Taliban stepped up its attacks on the ANDSF almost immediately after the signing of the agreement. The U.S., in some instances, have responded to some of these attacks with air strikes and other types of support.

U.S. Withdrawal Underway

By July 2020 the United States will be down to 8,600 military personnel in Afghanistan. This will lead to the abandonment of some bases in parts of Afghanistan – most likely in the southwest and southeast of Afghanistan. Many of the U.S. advisor teams currently at the Afghan brigade and corps level will be (or have already been) withdrawn and returned to the U.S. Once the level of 8,600 is achieved, then the withdrawal will continue. But this further reduction in force levels is dependent on the Taliban living up to its commitments.

One unknown (or at least not publicly known) is whether contractors who provide mission-essential support to the ANDSF are included in the withdrawal agreement with the Taliban. These contractors provide training and assistance in a number of areas to include critical and costly programs supporting the Afghan Air Force (AAF) and the ANDSF ground vehicle programs.

Governance

The final results of the Afghan presidential election held in September 2019 were released by Afghan election authorities in February 2020. President Ghani was declared the winner with 50.64% of the votes cast. If the vote is less than 50% for any one candidate then no winner is declared and a follow-on election is held between the two top contenders. However, Ghani won with a very slim margin. The election was marred by corruption and irregularities.

The election results was contested by the former CEO Abdullah Abdullah and he threatened to establish a ‘parallel government’. This caused a severe disruption within the government at national and provincial levels which also affected the peace process. The U.S. expressed its deep concern with the elite politicians in Afghanistan for not forming an inclusive government that could participate in the peace process by withholding $1 billion in funding for the ANDSF.

ANDSF Data Classified

For the first time in the history of these SIGAR reports Resolute Support (RS) has restricted from public release all data on enemy-initiated attacks. In addition, the United States Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A) continues to classify or restrict from public release data about ANDSF casualties, ANDSF unit strengths, security ministry performance assessments, district control, and information about the operational readiness of the Afghan National Army.

Over the past several years many aspects of the SIGAR report that detail important information have migrated from the unclassified version to the classified version. This diminishes the ability of some observers of the Afghan conflict to make an assessment of the progress (or lack of) that the ANDSF is making in its capabilities and capacity.

Another New ANDSF Assessment Process

Once again Resolute Support has changed up how it assesses, monitors, and evaluates ANDSF performance. The new method, like some of the more recent ones, is integrated into the Advisor Network (ANET). This electronic system is used by RS advisors to track engagements with and assess the performance and progress of ANDSF counterparts. The new assessment system was scheduled to come online in the April – May 2020 timeframe.

Changing the ANDSF assessment process is almost a yearly event. The problems have remained the same in Afghanistan over the past decade and more. What has changed is how ISAF and now RS assesses and evaluates the problems and issues of the ANDSF and the security institutions.

Top Ten ANDSF Challenges – No Real Change

The top 10 challenges and opportunities list the focal points for the Train, Advise, and Assist effort for Resolute Support. There really has been no real change in the past decade to this list. Perhaps the order listed or the words used may be different – but an advisor from 2012 will be very familiar with this 2020 list.

leader development
reducing vulnerable checkpoints
countering corruption
improving logistics
improving accountability of equipment
reducing attrition of soldiers and police
standardization of training
better MOD and MOI budget execution
improving process for pay for ANDSF
improving ANDSF facilities

Afghan SOF

The Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) are the ANDSF’s primary offensive forces. The ASSF are the elite of the Afghan security forces and include units from the ANA Special Operations Corps (ANASOC), the General Command Police Special Units (GCPSU), and the Special Mission Wing (SMW). The ASSF have been on a multi-year program to double its size and capabilities since 2016. Historically the misuse of the ASSF has been the main impediment to their ability to successfully carry out their missions. Examples of misuse include using special forces to man checkpoints, hold terrain, or provide personal security for politicians and ANDSF general officers.

Additional Topics

The report covers a wide variety of topics. Some of the more interesting ones include the status of the Special Mission Wing, ANA training, the ANA Territorial Force, governance, counternarcotics, economy, and social development. The sections of the report are clearly identified allowing the reader to skip those that hold little interest and to easily find topics that would hold the readers attention.

Appendices and Endnotes

Appendix A cross-references the sections of the report to the quarterly reporting and related requirements under SIGAR’s enabling legislation. Some pretty dry reading here if you are looking for a sleeping pill substitute some late evening. For those with a fiscal inclination Appendix B lists the funds appropriated for Afghanistan reconstruction by agency and fund per year. This appendix lists the funds by category – security, governance and development, humanitarian, civilian operations, and international affairs operations.

Appendix C lists the many different performance audits conducted by SIGAR over the past several years. One SIGAR performance audit was completed during this reporting period on the funding and performance of the American University of Afghanistan. Several performance audits are ongoing. There are a few other types of audits ongoing or completed as well – all detailed in Appendix C.

Appendix D and E also provide more information on current investigations and other topics. Appendix F provides an updated list of abbreviations and acronyms – seven pages total! The report is well-documented with 663 total endnotes.

Once Again – Another Superb SIGAR Report

For the Afghan conflict observer or commentator this report is valuable reading and a good resource. SIGAR is not constrained by the DOD ‘info ops’ machine as it is a Congressional mandated organization. The report provides an up-to-date assessment of the US effort in Afghanistan and is one of the more accurate unclassified publications on the current security situation.

Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, April 30, 2020, PDF, 217 pages.
https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2020-04-30qr.pdf

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Photo: Marine Lt. Col. Wade Priddy, Regional Command-South Counter Insurgency Advisory and Assistance (CAAT) Team leader speaks with a member of the Afghan National Police in the Nawa Valley, Afghanistan, April 27, 2011. Priddy was participating in Operation Gryphon Hold, clearing the Mazgarey Mountain complex from Taliban activity. (Photo by Senior Airman Jessica Lockoski, 16th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment).

JSOU Report – Decision-Making Considerations in Support to Resistance

John Friberg — Tue, 14 Apr 2020 05:00:00 +0000

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) has published a new publication by Will Irwin that augments previous reports about ‘resistance’. This new monograph explores “. . . the variety of considerations facing decision makers, the approaches used in strategic- and operational-level decision making, and how . . .” to better inform and influence that process with regard to special warfare.

This report describes some of the factors that decision makers consider when exploring support to resistance as a foreign policy option. The report describes how national security officials have arrived at certain conclusions in the past and why (in some instances) presidents have directed actions that were especially risky.

Foreword. LTG Kenneth Tovo, U.S. Army (Ret SF) provides the foreword. Tovo describes the three pubs dealing with ‘resistance’ that Will Irwin has authored. He comments that UW options generated by a TSOC rarely get passed up the chain of command for consideration at the national decision-making level. He also argues that it is important to truly understand the operational environment before embracing any policy but especially one of support to resistance. Tovo also stresses the importance of nesting support to resistance to a strategic framework. He concludes the foreword stating that “. . . supporting resistance movements will be an increasingly attractive policy option as we seek to compete with our adversaries while avoiding general war.”

Report Contents. Irwin uses some past examples of unsuccessful and successful UW campaigns to illustrate the points of his report. The Bay of Pigs event is an example of support to a resistance gone wrong; while the successful removal of the Taliban regime in 2001 shows how to do it right. He then discusses two important aspects of supporting resistance movements – recognizing an opportunity and the role of timing. Once again Irwin provides historical examples to make his point. Later in the paper the elements of risk, planning considerations, and legality are explored.

The paper highlights many of the considerations that decision makers typically face when considering an unconventional or support to resistance course of action. This paper, and the two previous papers on support to resistance published by JSOU, are excellent references and tools for special warfare planners and leaders.

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Will Irwin is a Resident Senior Fellow at the Joint Special Operations University. He is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces officer with experience as a defense analyst, researcher, historian, instructor, and writer.

Decision-Making Considerations in Support to Resistance, by Will Irwin, JSOU Report 20-1, March 2020, 86 pages, PDF.
https://jsou.libguides.com/ld.php?content_id=53517726

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Image: Front cover of the JSOU report.

One Year Later – Physical Defeat of Daesh

SOF News — Mon, 23 Mar 2020 05:00:00 +0000

On March 23, 2019 the Pentagon announced the physical defeat of the Daesh caliphate in Syria. Over 110,000 square miles were liberated and 7.7 million people freed from Daesh oppression. The Syrian Democratic Front was assisted by U.S. airpower, ISR, and special operations forces in its defeat of the Islamic State fighters. The SDF had finally captured Baghouz – the last Islamic State physical enclave in Syria.

The Special Operations Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve (SOJTF-OIR) published this story below on March 18, 2020 summarizing the rise and fall of the Daesh in Iraq and Syria. The article details the final battle for the last ISIS enclave of Baghouz where the SDF defeated the ISIS fighters in their last piece of physical terrain.

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“At the height of their power, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, now referred to as Daesh, operated in 18 different countries and had an annual budget of $1 billion with an estimated 30,000 members. They conducted ground attacks on both government forces and any other force that opposed them. Their goal: to establish a so-called caliphate in the region.

On Aug. 7th, 2014, the U.S.-led coalition launched airstrikes against Daesh. On March 23rd, 2019, the Pentagon announced the physical defeat of the Daesh caliphate in Syria. Over 110,000 square miles were liberated. Approximately 7.7 million people were freed from Daesh oppression. In Baghouz, Syria, where the final battle took place, a yellow flag was flown atop a building by U.S.-backed Syrian forces as they celebrated their victory over Daesh.

US Artillery in Iraq fire at ISIS locations near Iraqi-Syrian border on June 5, 2018.
Photo by PFC Anthony Zendejas, US Army.

Founded in 1999 under the name Jamāʻat al-Tawḥīd wa-al-Jihād and changing to Islamic State of Iraq in 2006, and with an allegiance to al-Qaeda, the oppressive presence of Daesh in the region grew once Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi came to power in 2010. Al-Baghdadi became involved with Daesh while detained in Camp Bucca in the early 2000’s. When released from detainment, he quickly rose in prominence by being directly involved in the violent atrocities conducted by Daesh.

Throughout the next several years with al-Baghdadi as head, Daesh seized control of several major cities in Iraq. Kidnappings, mass murder, and extortion were common crimes committed by Daesh members. By declaring the creation of a so-called caliphate, Daesh gave al-Baghdadi self-proclaimed authority over the Muslims of the world. Their declaration as a caliphate was criticized and disputed by Middle Eastern governments. They were officially declared a terrorist organization by both Iraq and Syria, along with many other nations of the world.

US tactical vehicle provides security on roads near Manbij, Syria. Photo by Staff Sgt.
Timothy Koster, Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve, June 20, 2018.

Coalition troops were sent into Iraq to support the defeat of Daesh. In October of 2014, this combined effort was given the name Operation Inherent Resolve. Along with Iraqi and Syrian forces, over 30 countries combined together for the sole mission of defeating Daesh. The Combined Joint Task Force- Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) worked with partner forces to free the nearly 8 million people under the control of Daesh.

By mid-2015, Kurdish fighters expelled Daesh out of towns in Syria and reclaimed military bases that had fallen under Daesh control. In late 2015, Iraqi forces took control of Ramadi from Daesh and then Fallujah just six months later. After several years of combined assaults, Daesh was quickly losing control of central Iraq.

US SOF helped to establish defense forces throughout the Kurdish territories of Syria.
Picture depicts members of the Raqqa Internal Security Force hosting their flag.
(photo from Voice of America video).

Mosul was retaken from Daesh control toward the end of 2016. Mosul was considered by Daesh as their capital city in the two years since it fell under their control. By early 2017, Daesh had lost all control of central Iraq. At the end of July 2017, it was reported that Daesh had lost an estimated 73% of the territory they had once controlled in Iraq. By the end of the year, the Iraqi Army announced all of Iraq had been liberated and their people freed from Daesh oppression.

On March 23rd, 2019, the Syrian Democratic Forces announced that Daesh had lost its final stronghold in Syria, bringing an end to their so-called caliphate. On Oct. 26th, 2019, during a raid conducted by U.S. forces, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was killed in Northwest Syria.

CJTF-OIR continues its pursuit of Daesh remnants to this day. The remains still linger, but with few resources and the inability to project power to the same degree as they did in 2012, they have very little influence in the region. The continued training of partner forces within the scope of the Defeat Daesh mission is now the focus of Operation Inherent Resolve, along with preventing Daesh from re-emerging in the region and recruiting members to fight for them once again.

Iraq is working hard to establish a stable, unified government. After being devastated by the threat of Daesh, the Iraqi people are primed and ready for this transition, moving closer to being a free and sovereign nation withstanding against any third-party interference. Its military is ready to take a more active role in the safety and security of Iraq, and demonstrate its ability to protect the people and interests of Iraq.

The last of Daesh’s territory in Syria crumbled at the battle of Baghouz. The SDF were the critical land force in this offensive and through their significant sacrifice eliminated the last territorial stronghold held by Daesh. By taking a disciplined, incremental approach to the battle the SDF were able to spare the large civilian population that Daesh fighters used as human shields in the densely populated area. The tactical effectiveness of their approach mixed with the fair treatment of civilians showed the SDF to be an honorable and powerful fighting force.

Map depicts the last remaining enclaves of ISIS in Syria in November 2018.

After over a month of fighting, The SDF declared final victory over Daesh on March 23, 2019, marking the end of Daesh controlled territory in Syria. Their legacy: millions of people have been liberated from Daesh’s barbaric cruelty and fear, and over 900 Daesh fighters surrendering by the end of the battle.

In the last year, the role of the Coalition has been to work alongside partner forces in Iraq and Syria in preventing the remnants of Daesh from returning to power, and to keep the extremist ideologies of Daesh suppressed. The destruction of Daesh provides partners the space and time to recover from the physical and emotional damage that has been left behind in their wake.

The lessons of the rise and fall of Daesh have shown the international community the need to remain vigilant and prepared, to swiftly respond to any threat by third-party actors or violent extremist organizations. The fortitude of the Iraqi and Syrian people and the continued Coalition support of our partner forces, what was once darkened by Daesh, is rejuvenated with the aspirations of a free people.”

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The above article is from “The Defeat of Daesh: One Year Later”, Special Operations Joint Task force – Operation Inherent Resolve (SOJTF-OIR), by Specialist Brian Redmer, March 18, 2020.
https://www.dvidshub.net/news/365422/defeat-daesh-one-year-later-nemabuna-reva-dais-salek-pase

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Top Photo: Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) provide security for a Coalition mortar crew providing fires support to SDF against ISIS locations in Operation Round Up taking place in the Middle Euphrates River Valley (MERV) in Syria. (photo by SSG Timothy Koster, CJTF-OIR, May 13, 2018).

54th Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB) Activation

John Friberg — Sat, 14 Mar 2020 14:34:24 +0000

The 54th Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB) was formally activated by the U.S. Army during an official ceremony at Fort Bragg, North Carolina on March 5, 2020.

The establishment of the 54th SFAB has been in progress for over a year. The uncasing and display of the command and brigade colors marked the beginning of the unit’s history and lineage. The keynote speaker at the ceremony was General Michael Garrett – the commanding general of the United States Army Forces command.

The 54th SFAB is an Army National Guard unit composed of a brigade headquarters and six battalions. The brigade has units in Indiana, Georgia, Texas, Ohio, Illinois, and Florida. The 54th SFAB headquarters is part of the Indiana National Guard.

Mission. The mission of an SFAB is to carry out train, advise, and assist (TAA) missions with foreign nation military partners. Along with the U.S. Army’s Special Forces, the SFABs are the U.S. Army’s permanent and dedicated organizations specifically trained in the combat advisory role. The SFABs do not do the full range of missions assigned to Special Forces – such as counterterrorism (CT), direct action (DA), special reconnaissance (SR), unconventional warfare (UW), and other SOF missions.

Active Duty SFABs. The active Army has established five Security Force Assistance Brigades. The 1st SFAB completed a tour in Afghanistan in late 2018. The 2nd SFAB completed an Afghan tour in 2019. The 3rd SFAB is currently deployed to Afghanistan and a small element of the 3rd SFAB is in Iraq. Smaller elements of the SFABs have deployed to other locations around the world. The 4th and 5th SFABs are currently training up and are projected to deploy worldwide – most likely to the Pacific and Africa regions.

Training. Most members of the 54th must pass an assessment and selection process. Those personnel assigned to an advisor position attend the Combat Advisor Training Course at the Military Advisor Training Academy (MATA), Fort Benning. In addition, SFAB soldiers receive training on foreign weapons systems, driving, SERE, and medical subjects. SFAB soldiers also receive language and cultural training.

Unit Training. The national guard units in the individual states are conducting training events throughout the year. A typical training event is described in a November 2019 article published on DVIDS by the Georgia National Guard. Read “Georgia Guard’s 1-54th SFAB Conducts Team Assessment at Fort Benning, Georgia”, DVIDS, Nov 15, 2019.

OCONUS Missions. Some of the SFAB guard units have gotten an early start. Members of the Florida SFAB units deployed in the summer of 2019 to the Dominican Republic and trained up soldiers of Caribbean nations during a recent Tradewinds exercise. Soldiers from the 2nd Battalion, 54th SFAB (Florida) completed a five day exchange in the Commonwealth of Domica where they worked with the Dominica Police Force on tactics and techniques for policing operations and crime scene investigation.

Volunteers. The National Guard SFAB is accepting volunteers for advisor and non-advisor positions. The applicants for advisor positions are interviewed by commanders and senior NCOs. There is an assessment and selection process that applicants must pass. This consists of physical fitness tests, interviews, and other selection events. Learn more on how to become a National Guard SFAB combat advisor.

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References:

54th Security Force Assistance Brigade, SOF News, January 30, 2019
http://www.sof.news/sfa/54th-sfab/

54th Security Force Assistance Brigade Facebook
https://www.facebook.com/54SFAB/

Security Force Assistance Command (SFAC)
https://home.army.mil/bragg/index.php/units-tenants/SFAC

Photo: A Soldier from the Florida Army National Guard Security Forces Assistance Brigade (SFAB) advises a Haitian Soldier on the proper handling technique of a shotgun during Tradewinds 2019, at Las Calderas Naval Base, Dominican Republic. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Leia D. Tascarini, June 2019).

Report – Counterterrorism Operations in Africa – OIG Feb 2020

John Friberg — Wed, 12 Feb 2020 14:24:21 +0000

The Lead Inspector General has published an unclassified report to Congress entitled East Africa and North and West Africa Counterterrorism Operations. The 84-page report covers the period of October through December 2019. Congress requires (since 2013) the IGs of the Departments of State, Defense, and USAID to provide quarterly reports to Congress on active overseas contingency operations. The DoD Inspector General was designated the Lead IG for CT operations in Africa. The report also includes an appendix containing classified information that is provided to relevant agencies and congressional committees.

The report is timely given the desire of the U.S. to shift assets – military personnel and resources – from Africa to Europe and the Pacific. The shift in focus will allow the U.S. to counter threats from Russia and China. AFRICOM has presented its view that the threats in Africa remain and are growing – from jihadist groups and from Russia and China.

The threat by ISIS-Somalia and al Shabaab in East Africa remains high. The U.S. recently suffered three deaths and several aircraft destroyed in January 2020 in the al Shabaab raid at Manda Bay. In West Africa the U.S. is assisting French and Africa partner forces to conduct counterterrorism operations against jihadist groups. The attacks by these violent extremist organizations (VEOs) have been intensifying. In West Africa U.S. Africa Command has shifted its strategy from degrading the VEOs to one of containment. North Africa is not spared the threat from VEOs. These groups remain active and there is concern that they will once again rise up in Libya.

AFRICOM and SOCAfrica may soon be losing resources to employ in the counterterrorism fight. These lost resources will affect a host of other activities that ensure stability and security across the region. The ability to sustain or grow U.S. influence in the region may also diminish due to the loss of assets and resources. This is happening at the same time that China and Russia are seeking to expand their security cooperation efforts and their influence in Africa.

The report covers several topics to include the status of the conflicts, capacity building, diplomacy and political developments, humanitarian assistance, and strategic planning. In addition, there are two appendices. Appendix A is classified and Appendix B describes the methodology for preparing the Lead IG Quarterly Report. There is also an acronym list, several maps, and 152 endnotes.

Over six thousand U.S. military personnel are deployed at various locations in Africa. The U.S. efforts in Libya have diminished due to the instability, ongoing civil war, and muddled political and military environment. The French are appealing for continued assistance with their CT operations in Africa; but it is unlikely that the U.S. will heed their requests. The French may need to rely more on other European nations.

The threat in Africa remains high; yet the challenge presented from Russia and China cannot be ignored. The defense budget can only go so far and tough decisions will be made over the next several months that will have consequences around the globe.

The report can be accessed on the website of the Department of State Office of Inspector General:

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East Africa and North and West Africa Counterterrorism Operations
Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress
February 2020
https://www.stateoig.gov/system/files/q1fy2020_leadig_ea_nw_africa_cto.pdf

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Paper – Defense Institution Building . . . by Design (JSOU, 2019)

John Friberg — Wed, 15 Jan 2020 14:30:43 +0000

Dr. Richard D. Newton, an operational planner at the Special Operations Command Africa, has written a paper about Defense Institution Building (DIB). He describes how DIB helps “. . . to enhance the capacity of allies and partners to sustainably man, train, equip, and independently employ their own military and security forces in support of common strategic interests.

The author notes that Security Force Assistance (SFA), Foreign Internal Defense (FID), and Joint/Combined Exchange Training (JCETS) have a long history in the U.S. special operations community. However, he points out that these missions are often not effective in achieving paradigm shifts that cause organizational transformation.

In his 30-page paper, Dr. Newton describes the purpose of Defense Institution Building and how it is different from SFA, FID, and JCETs. The paper reviews the history of DIB, current literature on DIB, relevant doctrinal publications, and challenges to DIB programs.

He then goes on to recommend taking a design-thinking approach for “designing, developing, and implementing a sustainable DIB partnership with a willing nation.” Newton offers as an example the case study of the transformation of Romania’s special operations forces – which was a priority effort for the Special Operations Command Europe.

In the post 9/11 environment U.S. SOF was focused more at the tactical level (advising combat units) than at the national level (institution building). The author has seen a slow change in approach since 2010 – with an increased focus towards security cooperation intent on institution building. The author concludes his paper with . . . “Since 2015, design-thinking has offered SOF planners and commanders a practical tool for problem-solving in the human domain.”

Defense Institution Building . . . by Design
By Richard D. Newton, Ph.D.
Joint Special Operations University (JSOU)
Department of Strategic Studies
JSOU Press – Occasional Paper
December 2019
https://jsou.libguides.com/ld.php?content_id=51643902

Bio of Dr. Newton. Richard Newton has a long history in the special operations community. He served 22 years in the U.S. Air Force as a combat rescue and special operations helicopter pilot; as well as a combat aviation advisor, planner, and educator. Newton continued his service in the SOF community as a senior faculty member at the Joint Special Operations University. He is an educator, planner, researcher, and curriculum developer in the fields of air-ground integration, irregular and asymmetric warfare, and special operations.

Special Operations News Update for September 6, 2019

SOF News — Fri, 06 Sep 2019 05:00:00 +0000

Photo: A Lebanese Special Forces Regiment 5 member at a sniper range during Exercise Eager Lion 2019 at King Abdullah II Special Operations Training Center, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Rose Gudex, August 31, 2019.

Topics: Curated news, commentary, and analysis about special operations, national security, and conflicts around the world. Ethics guide for SOCOM, alienating allies, UAV contract for SOF, advising, political warfare, language training, and more.

Casualties in Afghanistan

Casualties. Two members of Resolute Support – one American and one Romanian – were killed in a suicide bombing near the U.S. embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan on Thursday, September 5, 2019. The names will not be released until 24 hours after the next of kin notification.

SOF News

Ethics Guide for SOCOM. The chaplains of the United States Special Operations Command will soon be kitted up with an ‘ethics field guide’. USSOCOM intends to negotiate and award a sole source contract to develop the guide which will help chaplains within SOCOM to reduce incidents of suicide as well as provide a moral compass for special operators. The high rate of suicides among SOF operators and recent incidents of unethical conduct has prompted the special operations command to field the guide. Read “SOCOM is in the hunt of a field ethics guide”, Military Times, September 3, 2019.

Former Wounded Navy SEAL Heads to Yale. A Navy SEAL who was involved in the search for Beau Bergdalh in Afghanistan – resulting in wounds requiring 18 surgeries – has been accepted to Yale University. He will start off, at age 52, as a freshman. (Fox News, Sep 3, 2019).

Online Biometrics and Exploitation by SOF. A research topic currently being explored by U.S. Special Operations Command is the use of applications to gather biometrics posted online for intelligence value. Fingerprints, voice recordings, and photographs (selfies) could be the next frontier in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Read more in “How special ops could exploit information people are already sharing online”, Military Times, September 4, 2019.

Former Army Ranger Enters Politics. A West Point graduate is running for the seat now held by Senator Jeanne Shaheen (NH). Read “Former Army Ranger challenging Shaheen for US Senate Seat”, Army Times, September 4, 2019.

UAV Contract Awarded by SOCOM. The U.S. Special Operations Command is upgrading its MQ-9 and MQ-1C fleet with special operations forces-unique mission kits, mission payloads, weapons, and other modifications. The UAVs are used to find, fix, finish, exploit, and analyse time-sensitive high-value targets. The contract has a potential maximum estimated value of $93 million. Read more in “GA-ASI Gets $93M Reaper / Gray Eagle Special Ops Contract”, UAS Vision, September 3, 2019.

Green Berets and Rangers Survive Mount St. Helens Eruption. Read the story of how a group of Green Berets and Rangers lived through the volcanic eruption that killed 57 people in 1980 and ejected hundreds of millions of tons of ash. (TDN.com, Sep 5, 2019).

Remembering Det – A. Eugene Piasecki tells of his experiences with his SF assignment in Berlin during the Cold War. Posted on 10th SFGA Facebook, September 5, 2019.

Changes for 27th Special Operations Medical Group. Two squadrons of the 27th SOMG have been renamed and restructured to ensure the group becomes more efficient in the care for patients and to increase the ability to support the overall mission. (DVIDS, Aug 29, 2019).

Oldest College Football Player is SOF Vet. The oldest player on a major college football team is still on active duty in the US Army (attending a two-year stint for a college degree). He is also a veteran of a few Army special operations units. (Coloradoan, Sep 4, 2019). (Editor’s note: When I played cornerback at Boston State College in the ’70s we had a placekicker who was a retired U.S. Army veteran).

International SOF

Kenya’s Female SOF Unit. A new special operations unit is on the scene in the capitol of Kenya. After five months of intensive training it has deployed for duty. Read more in “All-female commando unit hits Nairobi streets”, The Standard Media, September 5, 2019.

Indonesia’s CT War. One of Indonesia’s national security priorities is finding a strategy to deal wit terrorism. This article takes a look at the counterterrorism measures the country has adopted over the past two decades and judges the success of those measures. Read “Tracing Indonesia’s Counterterrorism Measures Since the 2002 Bali Bombings”, The Diplomat, September 4, 2019.

Publications

HR and Training Foreign Security Forces. The United States is involved in numerous efforts to train FSF in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. In addition, it is heavily involved in training up the security forces of Iraq and Afghanistan – as well as proxy forces such as the SDF in northeast Syria. However, it is falling short in the requirement to evaluate the effectiveness of their human rights training. This . . . according to a recent U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) 43-page report entitled U.S. Agencies Should Improve Oversight of Human Rights Training for Foreign Security Forces, August 12, 2019.

Paper – Air Advising and 6th SOS in OEF-P. Major Michael M. Trimble (USAF) has authored a 131-page paper (PDF) entitled Asymmetric Advantage: Air Advising in a Time of Strategic Competition. The paper is published by the USAF Air University Press, August 2019. There are several chapters on the current status of the USAF advising effort. Of note for SOF professionals is the chapter about the 6th Special Operations Squadron in Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines.

National Security

Sig Sauer Prototypes for Replacement M4 / M249. The arms manufacturer has released information on the prototypes that may replace the Army’s M4 carbine and M249 machine gun. Sig Sauer is one of three firms selected to develop prototypes for further testing. (Military.com, Sep 3, 2019).

Mattis on Women in Combat Units. Former SECDEF Mattis doesn’t seem to go all out in support of women in combat units. Read “Mattis Still Has Concerns About Women Serving in Combat Units”, Military.com, September 3, 2019.

Navy Takes the Cake. According to a recent DOD study 22 percent of our naval service is obese. Read “This branch takes the cake as the US military’s fattest”, Military Times, September 3, 2019.

Votel on Intel Challenges. The former commander of Central Command retired General Joe Votel recently spoke at an intelligence conference about intelligence challenges the U.S. military faces. Read “Former CENTCOM Boss Outlines Intel Challenges in Current, Future Fights”, Air Force Magazine, September 4, 2019.

Commentary

Mattis, Political Identity, and Tribalism. General James Mattis has a new book out and one of the themes is the importance of international alliances and the growing divisiveness in America to tribalism. But Jeff Goodson, a retired U.S. foreign service officer, believes that Mattis gets this point about domestic divisiveness wrong. Read “What Mattis gets wrong: Alliances also need rebuilding at home”, The Hill, September 3, 2019.

Australia and Political Warfare. Thomas Paterson, a writer covering national security and cyber policy issues (and an active Australian Army reservist), provides his view that Australia needs to recognize the importance of being able to practice and counter political warfare (hybrid warfare, gray zone activities, etc.) in the new digital age where controlling the narrative becomes increasingly important. Read “The ‘grey zone’: Political warfare is back”, The Interpreter, September 3, 2019.

Language Training and Advising. George Calhoun, an Army Captain and future foreign area officer, writes about the importance of cultural and language fluency for advisors working with foreign security forces. Read “Speak Fluently and Carry a Big Stick: Strengthening Language Training to Enhance Capability”, Modern War Institute at West Point, September 4, 2019.

Middle East

American Deminer Killed in Iraq. On Tuesday, September 3, 2019 Brandon Pinson, an American, was killed following the explosion of an IED near Mosul, Iraq. He was a supervisor of a team of Iraqi deminers. Pinson was a seasoned explosive ordnance disposal technician with ten years of experience in the field. He had been in Iraq for five months demining explosives left behind by the Islamic State. Pinson was working for FSD – a humanitarian NGO based in Geneva. He is survived by his wife and two young children. Read a statement by FSD (Sep 3, 2019).

Yemen Update. Saudi Arabia is struggling to keep the coalition fighting the Houthis together. Local allies in southern Yemen have turned on each other in power struggles and have caused some damage to the Saudi – UAE relationship. Meanwhile, al-Qaeda Arabia Peninsular (AQAP) is exploiting the strife by attempting to gather support. (Reuters, Sep 2, 2019).

U.S. Military Bases in Persian Gulf. The United States had military units stationed / based in many countries of the Middle East to include Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. There are also large and smaller ‘temporary’ bases in places like Jordan, Turkey, Syria, other locations in the Middle East region. Read “A Look at Foreign Military Bases Across the Persian Gulf”, The Washington Post, September 3, 2019.

Iran’s Expanding Militia in Iraq. Michael Knights dives into the pro-Iranian militias in Iraq and provides detailed information about the ‘special groups’ that are allied with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force (IRGC-QF). Read “Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: The New Special Groups”, CTC Sentinel, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, August 2019.

Africa

US CT Efforts in Somalia. The United States is engaged in a small war which currently has a light footprint approach. But increased involvement in the future is very possible. Read “Assessing the Goals of U.S. Counterterrorism Efforts in Somalia”, Small Wars Journal, September 5, 2019.

Europe and NATO

NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence. Beginning in 2017 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization deployed multi-national battlegroups to the Baltic region in an effort to deter Russian aggression. The four battlegroups were based in Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Poland. Many observers cite a RAND study that says Russia could take the Baltic nations in 60 hours. However, Steven Maquire – a British Army officer and associate editor at the Wavall Room – believes that the battlegroups are significant in the overall plan for deterring Russia. Read “The Positive Impact of NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence”, Real Clear Defense, September 3, 2019.

Denmark, Greenland, Trump, and More. Our president seems to be adept at alienating our best allies. Former Secretary of Defense James Mattis is right to point out that the U.S. needs friends overseas to assist us in pursuing our objectives around the world. Denmark has been an ally that has stood alongside the U.S. for the past 30 years. It lost many of its soldiers fighting alongside U.S. Marines in Helmand province, Afghanistan. Trump’s recent statements about Greenland and his abrupt decision to cancel a trip to Denmark may have an effect on Denmark’s foreign policy. Recently the small European country was asked to provide troops for northeast Syria (filling a vacancy by departing U.S. troops) and to participate in a naval force to ensure freedom of passage through the Strait of Hormuz. Hmmm. Read “Through Thick and Thin: Will Danish Military Engagements with the U.S. Endure in the Middle East?”, by Helle Malmvig, Foreign Policy Research Institute, August 27, 2019.

Videos and Movies

Video – U.S. Navy Rescue Swimmers Partner with Colombian Special Forces, DVIDS, August 29, 2019. Sailors assigned to Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron 28 on the hospital ship USNS Comfort participated in a 3-day aviation and search and rescue swimmer event with a Colombian Army Special Forces Battalion.
https://www.dvidshub.net/video/706174/us-navy-rescue-swimmers-partner-with-colombian-special-forces

Movie – Danger Close. In August 1966 approximately 100 Anzac troops found themselves in a fight for their life in South Vietnam. Read a review of the movie. (Stuff.co.nz, Sep 4, 2019).