Counterinsurgency Archives - SOF News

Afghan Conflict – A Look Back at 2020

SOF News — Tue, 05 Jan 2021 06:00:00 +0000

News, analysis, and commentary about the war in Afghanistan from the past few months of 2020. Topics include security, ANDSF, Resolute Support, peace negotiations, governance, development, podcasts, videos, and more.

Afghan News Summary

The Taliban hold more territory than ever before – not since before September 2001 have they held this much of Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP) still have a presence in Afghanistan. Peace talks are continuing with no real progress and with the Taliban apparently driving the train. The U.S. troop complement is significantly down-sized and will be at 2,500 at some point in January 2020. It remains to be seen what President-elect Biden’s Afghanistan policy will be. He may opt for the situation that President Trump has left him – leaving 2,500 troops in country. He may decide to keep a counterterrorism capability within Afghanistan. Or he could withdraw completely in May 2021 in accordance with the U.S.-Taliban withdrawal agreement.

Security

The Afghan government’s ability to establish security within the much of the rural area of the country is limited. It’s ability to provide services at the sub-governance level is affected by the lack of security as well as corruption and inefficiency. Insurgent and terrorist attacks continue at a high level despite the peace talks. The implementation of an ANDSF checkpoint reduction plan has faltered.

Targeted Killings. Attacks against government officials, journalists, military personnel, civil society activists, and other high-profile figures has increased over the past several month. On the first day of 2021 an Afghan journalist was shot dead in an attack by gunmen in Ghor province. Insider attacks have been happening regularly. The latest took place on Monday, January 4, 2021 in the Arghandab district in Kandahar province where nine policemen were killed at a check point.

Afghan Pilot Assassinated. An Afghan air force pilot was killed by gunman in the southern Afghan province of Kandahar on December 30, 2020. The helicopter pilot had been trained in the Czech Republic and the United Arab Emirates. Afghan police say that the assassin and two other insurgents were killed by the ANP. “Afghan Pilot Gunned Down in Kandahar”, Voice of America, December 30, 2020.

“Sticky Bombs”. A troublesome tactic used by insurgents in the past has gained popularity among those targeting Afghan government and military officials. The use of magnetic bombs placed on vehicles that are in motion has taking place almost daily. Usually insurgents will use a two-man motorcycle team to emplace the magnetic car bomb. The use of these sticky bombs have become an important tool in a widespread assassination campaign. (Task & Purpose, Dec 17, 2020).

Chinese Spy Ring Busted. The Afghan National Directorate of Security (NDS) detained 10 Chinese citizens over espionage charges. (Khaama Press, Dec 26, 2020). They were allegedly operating a terror cell in Kabul city. Two of the members are said to have been in direct contact with the Haqqani network. See also a news article by Pajhwok Afghan News (Dec 28, 2020). An Indian Army officer provides his perspective of China’s interference in Afghan affairs in the South Asian Monitor. Some news reports indicate that the ten Chinese citizens have now departed Afghanistan on a chartered aircraft – thus quietly removing from the glare of the press a potentially embarrassing situation.

Chinese (and Russian) Bounties. The Democrats had a field day this past year criticizing the Trump administration for ignoring intelligence indictors (many say uncorroborated) that the Russians paid bounties to the Taliban to kill U.S. military personnel. Now the Trump administration has declassified unconfirmed intelligence on China bounties on U.S. forces in Afghanistan. (The Hill, Dec 30, 2020).

Taliban

Move of Taliban Leadership. The National Directorate of Security (NDS) has info that the Taliban group is attempting to move its leadership from its safe refuge in Pakistan to bases in southern and southwestern Afghanistan. (Reportedly, Jan 4, 2021).

The Taliban’s Drones. In the past year the insurgents have stepped up surveillance operations and attacks using modified commercial drones. “Taliban adopting drone warfare to bolster attacks”, The National News, January 4, 2021.

The Taliban’s Air Force. Apparently the U.S. has launched air strikes against ISIK fighters that were engaged in operations against the Taliban. While not coordinated with the Taliban the air strikes certainly helped the Taliban. “General confirms the US has helped the Taliban by launching drone strikes against ISIS“, Task & Purpose, December 10, 2020.

“But it was a common enemy. It was an opportunity to strike someone who is an implacable foe of the united States. We did it. It probably helped the Taliban, and that would be the way I would describe it.”
General McKenzie, Commander of Central Command (CENTCOM)

The Taliban’s Judiciary. The Taliban’s alternative justice system is gaining traction in may regions that the militants control. A lack of government courts, judges, and prosecutors have forced residents to go to the Taliban or local mosques to seek legal recourse. This is compounded by a corrupt Afghan government judicial system where bribes often determine the outcome of legal proceedings. “Taliban Courts Seek to Undermine Afghan Judiciary”, Gandhara Blog, December 14, 2020.

Gen Milley Meets With Taliban. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff met secretly with the Taliban in December. He also spent some time with President Ghani as well. No real news came out of this event.

ANDSF

A-29 Training Program in U.S. Ends. After nearly five years the USAF is now putting the brakes on the training program that teaches Afghan pilots how to fly the A-29 Super Tucano. The final class graduated in November 2020 at Moody Air Force Base in Georgia. The 81st Fighter Squadron has been training Afghan pilots and maintenance technicians. Training will now be done in Afghanistan with Afghan instructor pilots running the training program. There are currently 28 A-29s available in Afghanistan for close air support, air interdiction, escort, and armed reconnaissance missions. Read more in “Air Force Ends Program That Trained Afghan Pilots to Fly the A-29 Super Tucano”, Military.com, November 19, 2020.

Afghanistan’s Policing Failure? Karl Nicolas Lindenlaub is an independent researcher with a focus on asymmetric warfare, security force assistance, and sub-state militant groups. In a recent article he outlines some of the reasons that the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and Afghan National Police (ANP) have not been a reliable security organization. Read “Afghanistan’s Policing Failure and the Uncertain Way Forward”, The Strategy Bridge, October 20, 2020.

ALP Loses US Funding. The United States has ended its funding for the Afghan Local Police as of 30 Sep 2020. The ALP was set up by U.S. Army Special Forces to provide security at the local level in Afghanistan – working in conjunction with the Village Stability Operations (VSO) program. Much of the mission of the ALP as well as about 1/3 of its personnel has been transferred to the Afghan National Army Territorial Force. Another 1/3 of ALP members will go to the Afghan National Police and the remainder will ‘retire’ (or join a local militia . . . or join the Taliban). Local security is also provided in part by Afghan militias referred to as local uprising forces. (SOFREP, Dec 31, 2020). The Afghanistan Analysts Network provides more information on the final chapter of the ALP. (AAN, Oct 6, 2020) as well as a special report on the ANA-TF (AAN, Aug 20, 2020).

Afghan Government Death Squads. Andrew Quilty provides an interesting article about a U.S.-backed militia that has acquired a dubious reputation for unwarranted violence. Read “The CIA’s Afghan Death Squads”, The Intercept, December 18, 2020. (Editorial note: The Intercept has a history of publishing stories with a bit of an anti-U.S. slant so there’s that . . .)

New ‘Security Force Unit’? A new unit has been established comprised of police, army, and NDS personnel. It will expand in size and activity during the coming summer months and operate principally in Farah province. (Khaama Press, Jan 4, 2021).

Missing Equipment. The Defense Department failed to keep track of surveillance systems, controls for laser-guided bombs, night vision devices, and other equipment provided to the Afghan government. “Sensitive US military equipment given to local forces goes unaccounted for in Afghanistan, watchdog says”, Stars and Stripes, December 17, 2020.

Resolute Support

The RS mission is steadily being ‘down-sized’. Some NATO countries have pulled back its forces and the U.S. has significantly reduced its footprint – down from 13,000 in early 2020 to about 2,500 by mid-January 2021. COVID-19 has significantly affected the advisory effort as well as the ability to conduct oversight on the ANDSF institutions and forces.

U.S. Force Reduction. By December 2020 the U.S. troop level was down to 4,500 in Afghanistan. President Trump announced a further reduction of U.S. troops – the target number being 2,500 by early January. General Scott Miller, the Resolute Support commander, confirmed that the U.S. reduction will take place by January 15th. The reduction is facing opposition in the US House of Representatives and Senate. See “Miller Says He Has Orders to Reduce US Troop Levels”, Tolo News, December 14, 2020. At this point in time there are more NATO troops than US troops in Afghanistan. Many of the U.S. bases that held thousands of troops have been vacated. One of these is FOB Shank (also named “Rocket City”) that recently saw the last 300 U.S. troops depart. (Tolo News, Jan 4, 2020).

U.S. Air Strikes Continue. The United States is still using air strikes to hit ISIS and support the ANDSF that are attacked by the Taliban. Reports of civilian casualties frequently make the press.

Advising Effort. General Scott Miller recently explained how Resolute Support is continuing the advising effort. He said that the U.S. bases have closed or shrunk – and now the U.S. presence in parts of the country are ‘enclaves’ within an ANDSF base. RS is still able to advise at the ministerial level and down to the corps level in the northern parts of the country. Miller said that RS will be able to project advisors to ‘points of need’ by moving an advisor package by air. This is an expeditionary advisory effort with a lighter footprint.

Billions Wasted. By the end of January there will likely be about 2,500 U.S. troops left in Afghanistan. Very few of these troops will be involved in monitoring how the Afghans spend the money we provide them. Over the past 19 years the U.S. taxpayers have footed roughly $138 billion for Afghan relief, reconstruction, and security. Is it time to stop the money flow? “How US wasted billions on absurd errors in Afghanistan War”, by Hollie McKay, Fox News, December 9, 2020.

Turkey Extending Its Stay. Turkey has about 1,200 soldiers in Afghanistan supporting the RS mission. It is currently in the process of extending the mission for another 18 months. “Turkey Bids to Extend Military Presence in Afghanistan”, Khaama Press, December 17, 2020.

New RS Dep Cdr. Lieutenant General Nicola Zanelli of the Italian Army assumed the position of Deputy Commander of the NATO-led mission Resolute Support. He took over from Lieutenant General Giles Hill of the British Army. (NATO, Dec 16, 2020).

Peace Negotiations

U.S. – Taliban Withdrawal Agreement. The U.S. government and the Taliban insurgents signed a agreement in February 2020. The U.S. pledged to withdraw troops from Afghanistan if the Taliban would prevent terrorists from operating in Afghanistan and enter into talks with the Afghan government.

There were a lot of other components to the U.S.-Taliban agreement – some of them referred to as ‘secret annexes’. It was assumed by the U.S. that the Taliban would reduce the level of violence – hasn’t happened. Prisoners would be exchanged – this got drawn out over time. Eventually the Taliban released 1,000 prisoners while the Afghan government released 5,000 prisoners. The Taliban-Afghan government talks have finally started but thus far only ‘procedural rules’ have been hashed out.

Intra-Afghan Peace Talks. The Afghan government and the Taliban began their face-to-face peace discussions in September 2020 in Doha, Qatar. Representatives for the Taliban and Afghan government have finally agreed to the ‘rules of procedure‘ (AAN, Jan 3, 2021) for the talks – that only took about three months to iron out. The negotiating teams paused talks in mid-December. They plan to renew talks on January 5, 2021 in Doha, Qatar. The next major subject to be discussed will be the agenda for future talks.

On December 30, 2020, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated that Afghanistan’s “fragile peace process” has no “guarantee of success”. The U.S. continues to emphasize that the Taliban needs to reduce the level of violence . . . but to no avail. President Ghani named members of the High Council for National Reconciliation but his decree was met with resistance by many elements of the Afghan political elite.

Completion of U.S. Withdrawal and Victory for the Taliban? The U.S.-Taliban agreement calls for the complete U.S. and NATO military withdrawal by May 2021. The Taliban likely will view this as a ‘victory’ and will grow even more confident in their ability to topple the Afghan government.

Biden’s Decision Point. President-elect Biden’s administration will face a decision point in the next few months. The U.S. can opt to abide with the withdrawal agreement which may very likely see the Taliban gain power in Afghanistan (with no guarantee that al-Qaeda or ISKP will be diminished) or the U.S. can keep a small counterterrorism force backed by SOF advisors and air power (which Biden probably prefers) and face the prospect of the Taliban abandoning the peace process.

Lots of Commentary on the Peace Process. A host of writers and observers have contributed their ‘two cents’ on the prospect of success for the intra-Afghan peace negotiations. Some say it is the only way to resolve the long conflict while others maintain that it is a recipe for Taliban success. Rory Andrews argues that the current process is not inclusive of the various elements of Afghan society. (Small Wars Journal, Dec 3, 2020).

Commentary

Why the U.S. Lost in Afghanistan. MG (Ret) Don Bolduc explains what the United States did wrong in Afghanistan. He lists nine missteps by the U.S. Bolduc is a retired Special Forces officer with several tours of duty in Afghanistan. Read his perspective in “Short-Sighted Political Strategy and Other Reasons the War in Afghanistan Failed”, SOFREP, December 9, 2020.

Ending the War in Afghanistan. Admiral (Ret) James Stavridis was the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO from 2009 to 2013. Here are his thoughts on how to end the Afghan War. “I Commanded NATO Forces in Afghanistan: Here’s How We Could End This ‘Forever War'”, Time, December 9, 2020.

Suggestions for President Biden. Jonathan Schroden, of the CNA, assesses the situation in Afghanistan and offers suggestions for the new administration to secure a better peace and a more stable country. “Afghanistan Will Be the Biden Administration’s First Foreign Policy Crisis”, Lawfare Blog, December 20, 2020.

How US Leaves Matters. Gayle Tzemach Lemmon believes that America can’t stay in Afghanistan forever, but it matters how we leave. She believes it it in America’s interest to stand on the side of those who fight against extremism and for stability. (CNN, Dec 16, 2020).

CT or COIN in Afghanistan? Carlo J.V. Caro provides his perspective on the choices the Biden administration will have in Afghanistan. Read “Counterterrorism or Counterinsurgency? Biden’s Coming Afghanistan Dilemma”, The Diplomat, December 16, 2020.

Repeating History. Jose Miguel Alonso-Trabanco reviews the troubled past of Afghanistan – beginning with the Soviet invasion and continuing until the present day. Read “History on Repeat: War and Peace in Afghanistan”, Eurasia Review, December 16, 2020.

New Afghan Strategy Needed. CAPT Anthony Cowden, a US Naval officer, says it is time to think out of the box and turn to old solutions for a new strategy. He believes the current U.S. strategy is a path to precipitously leave Afghanistan and watch the Afghan government crumble to the Taliban. Read “A(other) New Afghanistan Strategy, Based on an Old Approach”, Real Clear Defense, December 21, 2020.

Governance, Economy and Development

The Afghanistan economy continues to falter due to the insecurity in the country, diminished foreign aid, decrease in foreign military presence, and the coronavirus pandemic. Afghanistan continues to dominate global opium cultivation and production. Cultivation remains nearly three times the pre-2002 average. Currently donor grants from the international community finance more than half the Afghan government budget and 3/4’s of total public expenditures. The country is suffering from the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic. there have been a total of 53,000 plus cases and the total number of reported deaths is 2,237.

Afghan Govt Anti-Corruption Efforts. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) provided a 13-page letter to leading U.S. government officials about the current state of Afghan government anti-corruption efforts. Not exactly good news but there has been some cases of limited progress. (SIGAR, Nov 6, 2020).
https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/alerts/SIGAR-21-09-AL.pdf

Human Development. Lutfi Rahimi, a lecturer at the American University of Afghanistan, provides his perspective on four human development factors. A recent (2019) human development index (HDI) ranked Afghanistan 169th out of 187 counters and in the lowest group in the gender inequality index (GII). “Thinking More Deeply About Human Development in Afghanistan”, The Diplomat, December 29, 2020.

Rail Links With Iran Improve. A rail line was recently opened between the Iranian city of Haf to Herat in western Afghanistan. This will increase the economic and transportation ties between Iran and Afghanistan – improving the economic prospects for Afghanistan. See “Iran Rapidly Expanding Rail Links with Central Asia and Caucasus”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, December 15, 2020.

Books, Reports, and Publications

SIGAR Report. The Quarterly Report to Congress (Nov 2020) by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction is available on line. Pages 83-95 cover Afghanistan’s SOF units (ANASOC, GCPSU, and SMW). (PDF, 255 pages).
https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2020-10-30qr.pdf

Lead IG Report on OFS. The 22nd quarterly report submitted to Congress by the Lead Inspector General for Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS) summarizes the quarter’s (Jul – Aug – Sep 2020) key events and oversight of the CT and advising mission in Afghanistan. The 84-page PDF is available online. Bryce Klehm provides a condensed version of the report in his essay on the Lawfare Blog (Nov 30, 2020).

Report – History of U.S. Army in Afghanistan. The U.S. Army Center of Military History has published a report that shows how the United States Army balanced its ongoing commitment to combating terrorist and insurgent activity in post-Taliban Afghanistan with the expanding American war in Iraq. Operation Enduring Freedom, May 2005 – January 2009, CMH Pub 70-131-1, Dec 2020. Contains 88 pages, illustrations, tables, maps, and further readings.
https://history.army.mil/catalog/pubs/70/70-131.html

Paper on ISKP. “IS Khorasan, the US-Taliban Deal, and the Future of South Asian Security”, ORF Occasional Paper No. 289, December 2020, Observer Research Foundation, pdf, 40 pages. By Kabir Tanej.
https://www.orfonline.org/research/is-khorasan-the-us-taliban-deal-and-the-future-of-south-asian-security/

The Last Platoon. Bing West’s latest novel is about a platoon in Afghanistan working with the CIA. Read an excerpt from his book. (Military Times, Dec 15, 2020).

Paper – Civilian Death Toll via Airstrikes. Neta C. Crawford has penned a 10-page report entitled Afghanistan’s Rising Civilian Death Toll Due to Airstrikes, 2017-2020, Costs of War, Brown University, December 7, 2020.

Podcasts, Webcasts, and Videos

Video – Afghan Commando Training. NATO’s Resolute Support HQs has produced a short video about the 14-week long training program that Afghan Commandos complete before being assigned to a Commando kandak. (Dec 29, 2020, 2 mins).
https://www.facebook.com/ResoluteSupport/videos/837244076820531/

Video – Afghanistan: The French legacy in Kapisa province. A 17 minute long explanation of the French military deployment of troops to Kapisa from 2008 to 2012. France 24, April 12, 2020.

Podcast – Jack Keane on Afghanistan. Gen (Ret) Keane on troop withdrawals in Iraq and Afghanistan. See “Jack Keane against the cut and run from Afghanistan”, American Enterprise Institute (AEI), December 11, 2020. (Apple podcast).

Podcast – CIA Official Remembers a Devastating Day in Afghanistan. A former senior CIA intelligence service officer looks back to the day that seven CIA service members were killed by a suicide bomber in Afghanistan. CBS News, December 30, 2020. 34 minutes.

Podcast – A Sniper Section’s Fight in Ghazni. Master Sgt. Brody Hall was a sniper section leader in a scout platoon in the 173rd Airborne Brigade deployed to Afghanistan’s Ghazni province. He describes a fight that highlights a range of lessons about combat and the leadership of NCO’s in the Army. The Spear, Modern War Institute at West Point, December 31, 2020, 53 minutes.
https://mwi.usma.edu/podcast-the-spear-a-sniper-sections-fight-in-ghazni/

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Photo / Image: Afghan Commandos, SIGAR.

Report – Counterterrorism in East, North and West Africa

SOF News — Thu, 23 Jul 2020 11:43:49 +0000

The Lead Inspector General quarterly report to the U.S. Congress on counterterrorism efforts in Africa has been published. The report details operations in North and West Africa against al Qaeda, ISIS affiliates, and other terrorist groups over the months of January, February, and March 2020.

A Late Publication of the Report. It would have been published in mid-May based on the quarterly schedule; however, there were some classification and operational security concerns of the original content. Of note: there is very little mention of U.S. special operations forces activity in the report. Congress also receives a classified version of this report.

BLUF: Violent extremist organization (VEO) activity “. . . appears to be outpacing, U.S., European, and African efforts to counter it.”

East Africa. The publication reports on the activities of al Shabaab in the Horn of Africa. It details the attack on Camp Simba, Kenya, increased airstrikes in Somali by the U.S., and the efforts of African Union and Somalian forces to degrade al Shabaab. It concludes that al Shabaab remains “. . . adaptive, resilient, and capable of attacking Western and partner interests in Somalia and East Africa.” Mention is made of the Danab Advanced Infantry Brigade – one of the more elite units in the Somali security forces.

West Africa. VEO attacks have increased in West Africa. The United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) continues to provide limited operational support to African, French, and other forces in the region. France is leading the international counterterrorism effort in that part of Africa. Task Force Takuba was recently deployed – consisting of NATO SOF units from several European countries.

North Africa. The U.S. presence in North Africa is small compared to its presence and activity in other regions of Africa. While VEOs have been relatively quiet the region is still a hotbed of military activity. Libya’s civil war continues – with involvement by a number of international actors from Europe and the Middle East intervening on each side of the conflict. Foreign mercenary forces introduced by Russia and Turkey have escalated the civil war. The classified version of this report most likely contains some interesting accounts of U.S. activity in North Africa.

COVID-19. The coronavirus disease pandemic has been a challenge to U.S. counterterrorism efforts in Africa. Advising to African forces by AFRICOM has been scaled back. The Department of State and USAID have sent many of its staff home to the United States. Two major multinational exercises scheduled to take place were cancelled due to COVID-19 – Exercise Phoenix Express and Exercise African Lion.

Numbers of U.S. Forces. There were approximately 5,100 U.S. military personnel and 1,000 contractors and DoD civilians in Africa during the 3-month period (Jan – Feb 2020). Most are based at Camp Lemonier in Djibiouti – the location of Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). Some personnel are serving in austere locations where the network of bases, supply chains, airlift, and medical evacuation is limited.

SFAB. Advisory teams from the 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade were scheduled to deploy to various locations in Africa. However, the coronavirus pandemic has scaled back some of the SFAB’s activities. Congress has expressed concern about the safety of SFAB personnel, available resources, and infrastructure required to support the SFAB.

SOF. The report covers the annual exercise conducted by Special Operations Command Africa – Exercise Flintlock. This special operations exercise is focused on enhancing the ability of Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership nations to plan and execute advanced counter-VEO operations. Not much else is mentioned about U.S. special operations in the report.

Reduced Focus on Africa? The Department of Defense is currently reviewing the posture of U.S. forces in Africa. The intent is to align DoD resources with the objectives of the 2018 National Defense Strategy which shifts focus from counterterrorism threats to competition with Russia and China.

Summary. The VEOs across the northern part of Africa continue to operate and grow their networks. Efforts to defeat the VEOs have thus far been ineffective. Several new initiatives to counter the VEOs are being implemented and are mentioned in the report. Many U.S. allies and African partner nations are waiting on a U.S. decision about its future security commitments to the continent.

East Africa Counterterrorism Operation – North and West Africa Counterterrorism Operation, Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, July 17, 2020, 90 pages, PDF.
View report online.

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Photo: Image: From Lead IG report. Members of a Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB) training Senegalese soldiers. U.S. Army photo.

JSOU Report: CT, SOF, Informal Governance in Burkina Faso

SOF News — Wed, 08 Jul 2020 11:48:24 +0000

A recent report published by the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) provides insights into the ways that special operations forces can assist indigenous governance structures to halt or reverse the growth of violent extremist organizations (VEOs).

The authors of the report argue that operating in the human domain requires a “. . . deep appreciation of local worldviews, modes and patterns of life, and organic institutional arrangements that make them viable”. SOF is adept at working with government leaders at the national and sub-national level; however, SOF – in many instances – is not knowledgeable about informal governance structures that can assist in the fight against VEOs.

The country faces several home-based and foreign-based terrorist groups to include Ansarul Islam, Islamic State of Iraq and ash-sham networks in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), al-Mulathamun Battalion, and the al-Qa’ida-affiliated Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). More than 500 militant attacks in the past four years have killed hundreds of people. Burkina Faso had over 500,000 internally displaced persons in 2019. Terrorist attacks have taken place in the country’s capital as well as in rural areas.

Burkina Faso has augmented the size of its special terrorism detachment – Groupement des Forces Anti-Terroristes (GFAT). It has also jointed the G5 Sahel Joint Force to fight terrorism and criminal trafficking groups with its regional neighbors (Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger). In addition, it participates in the annual Flintlock exercise conducted by Special Operations Command – Africa (SOCAfrica).

The authors use Burkina Faso as an example of how SOF can support a country in its counterterrorism fight against VEOs. Local political legitimacy can be enhanced – and the influence of VEOs diminished – by working with indigenous, informal governance structures.

Report Contents:

Chapter 1 – Governance Provides in Burkina Faso
Chapter 2 – Islamic VEOs in Burkina Faso
Chapter 3 – Governance Environment
Chapter 4 – Violence and Security in Burkina Faso
Conclusion
Survey Methodology
Acronyms and Endnotes

Informal Governance as a Force Multiplier in Counterterrorism: Evidence for Burkina Faso, by Margaret H. Ariotti and Kevin S. Fridy, JSOU Report 20-3, JSOU Press, July 2020, 110 pages, PDF.
https://jsou.libguides.com/ld.php?content_id=55754342

Image: Derived from photo on back cover of the JSOU report and CIA map of Burkina Faso.

No Such Thing as a Perfect Partner: The Challenges of “By, With, and Through”

SOF News — Thu, 25 Jun 2020 05:00:00 +0000

By Emily Knowles, PRISM Vol. 8, No. 4, June 2020.
The original article can be accessed here – PRISM or view the PDF.

In recent military campaigns against violent non-state actors, many states have reduced the risk to their own forces by conducting airstrikes or supporting allies rather than placing their own forces on the ground.¹ Small teams of special operation forces (SOF) and military advisers, as well as military training teams and intelligence support units, have supported host-nation security forces in doing the bulk of front-line fighting against groups like al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, and al-Qaeda. In some theaters, such as the campaign against the Islamic State, this has extended to include intensive air and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support. In other theaters, support may be limited to training and equipping local partners without conducting joint operations—like the support that the UK provides to Kenyan forces through the British Peace Support Team (Africa). This is a trend that the Oxford Research Group calls “remote warfare,”² although it goes by many other names, including “surrogate war,”³ “light-footprint,”⁴ “low-intensity war,”⁵ and “by, with, and through.”⁶

This article draws on field research conducted in Afghanistan (2017), Iraq (2017), Mali, (2018) and Kenya (2018) as well as a series of expert roundtables held in London between 2017–2019, and interviews held with militaries, diplomats, and civil society in Mali (2019) and Somalia (2016–2018). The purpose of the effort was to identify changes in military engagement following the drawdowns of large international military operations in Iraq (2011) and Afghanistan (2014) and to highlight the strategic implications of a shift towards remote warfare. This included considering the impact on mandates like the protection of civilians, transparency, and accountability, and long-term prospects for peace.

One of the things that surfaced quickly throughout the research was that remote warfare is not a specific approach to military operations in the same way that counter-terrorism,⁷ counter-insurgency,⁸ or peace support operations⁹ are, nor are these activities guided by an overarching “remote warfare” or “by, with, and through” strategy.¹⁰ While militaries might have specific units dedicated to some of these tasks—such as the American Security Force Assistance Brigades¹¹ or the British Specialised Infantry Group¹²—many other elements of training, advising, and assisting or conducting expeditionary warfare alongside local units are carried out by a range of regular, elite, and special forces. Air support increasingly falls to drone pilots as well as more traditional forms of air power,¹³ while intelligence sharing and targeting support can be provided by many different agencies. Remote warfare is therefore less of an approach and more of a spectrum of support relationships between international militaries and their partners.¹⁴

Similarly, there is no one driver of the trend but rather a few key factors that have increased the incentives for engaging in this way. Part of the picture involves the way in which technological innovation—particularly the rise in drone technology—has enabled western states to replace the need for boots on the ground in some theaters.¹⁵ When coupled with air superiority in these same environments, which has historically been used to avoid the deployment of ground troops, it is clear that technology is creating opportunities for modern militaries to substitute out intelligence and strike capabilities that might once have put troops in the line of fire.¹⁶ The U.S. drones program is perhaps the most high-profile example, but others include the UK’s strike against the Islamic State propagandist and British citizen Reyaad Khan, who was killed in Syria in August 2015,¹⁷ or the June 2019 U.S. cyber attacks against Iranian military computers that were aimed at disabling the systems that control missile and rocket launchers.¹⁸

Another driver is the perceived security threat of safe havens and the related weakness of local partners in the regions where terrorist groups tend to thrive. In the immediate aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, then-British Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, predicted the emergence of a “future in which unspeakable acts of evil are committed against us, coordinated from failed states in distant parts of the world.” ¹⁹ The strategic imperative of denying terrorist groups safe haven in fragile or failed states has been a pivotal part of the military and political rationale linking U.S. and allied military action against violent non-state groups back to core national security concerns of preventing further attacks on their soil. ²⁰ As then-commander of the NATO Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan General John Nicholson said in his February 2017 evidence to the U.S. Senate, “Our mission was to ensure that Afghanistan would never again be a safe haven for al-Qaeda or other terrorist groups to attack America or our allies and partners. That mission has been successful for 15 years, but it is not over.”²¹

Other drivers are more case-specific. For example, in a conference organized by the Peace Research Institute Oslo in December 2018 on small-state provision of security force assistance (SFA), many of the conversations focused on how states could ensure that they were good allies and partners for major military powers.²² Providing troops to coalition missions such as NATO Resolute Support in Afghanistan or the air campaign against the Islamic State are a few examples where participants spoke of signaling their support to the U.S., while many interviewees in Mali cited showing support to the French as a component of why they were contributing to the EU Training Mission.²³ In the UK’s 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), the government committed to “focus on areas of comparative national advantage valued by key allies, especially the United States, such as our intelligence capabilities and highly capable elite forces.”²⁴ This was echoed in the 2015 SDSR which stated, “our special relationship with the US remains essential to our national security. It is founded on shared values, and our exceptionally close defence, diplomatic, security and intelligence cooperation.”²⁵

Following large-scale military intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan, some countries have also experienced increases in legislative scrutiny of military operations and shifting attitudes towards the costs in both blood and treasure of military engagement. In the UK for example, because remote warfare can offer the government military options that don’t require recourse to Parliament under the War Powers Convention, it makes it an attractive option for risk-averse governments that fear losing a vote.²⁶ The government’s failure to gain parliamentary authorization for the principle of military action in Syria on August 29, 2013 has compounded this fear. While research suggests that it is far from clear that the 2013 Syria vote was a marker of parliamentary pacifism,²⁷ the acceleration of today’s information age has certainly opened up military activities to greater debate and raised the risks for governments hoping to carry out discreet operations.²⁸ Low popular support for, or awareness of, enduring NATO commitments in Afghanistan was one of the factors that interviewees in Kabul cited for frustration on the ground, while extreme political risk aversion was cited as leading to very low appetites for accepting casualties on the NATO side.²⁹

Photo: Instructors from the European Union Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM) take Somali National Army (SNA) soldiers through training drills at Jazeera Training Camp in Mogadishu. AMISOM (Ryamond Baguma, 25 March 2015)

No Such Thing as a Perfect Partner

International Burden Sharing

It would be wrong to suggest that the template for working by, with, and through local partners is a new phenomenon. Wars have been fought alongside and integrated with allies and partners since antiquity.³⁰ The arming and supporting of rival factions reached fever pitch in the Cold War, when proxy wars enabled great powers to clash indirectly and—crucially—below the threshold for nuclear retaliation. However, contemporary operations have moved on from these past templates of waging war, not least in terms of international parties’ restricted reach and influence over the forces they fight alongside, who are partners rather than merely proxies.

In addition, military operations now include a growing number of actors; both local and regional partner forces, international organizations like NATO, and coalitions of local, community, or sub-state allies like the Peshmerga or Syrian Democratic Forces. In these “coalitions of the willing,” where the mission determines the coalition rather than the other way around, ³¹ partnerships can be fluid, ambiguous, and complex. These ad-hoc coalitions do not possess any international legal personality, nor are they recognized as legal persons within the states’ domestic legal systems, unlike more traditional alliance structures such as the UN or NATO.³² They also challenge the way that militaries are set up to run operations, with multiple red-card holders who can opt their national forces out of particular activities, multiple sets of rules of engagement, and varying risk appetites.³³

However, it is far from clear that the current approach to sharing the burden of operations across coalition partners is working. In Kabul in March 2017, only the American contingent had expeditionary rules of engagement that allowed them to accompany the troops that they were training.³⁴ Stringent restrictions on troop movements had a huge effect on the ability of troops to get out and build relationships with the people that they were meant to be supporting. One described how going to the Afghan MOD—which is down the road from Resolute Support Headquarters (HQ)—would require them to be accompanied by armored cars and given cover. Even walking to the U.S. Embassy, which is opposite Resolute Support HQ, would have required top armor and escort.³⁵ Interviewers were told that 25 percent of advisors could not currently advise because they did not have force protection.³⁶

It also appeared that the act of pledging troops was more important to some contributing countries than the question of what they would be doing when they got there. Indeed, some countries had not fully honored their pledges, with only around 12,000 of the 15,000 NATO places that had been promised actually filled in March 2017.³⁷ The change from earlier points in the mission seemed stark. Interviewees talked about how staff who had been out in Afghanistan before the drawdown and were then deployed back as part of Resolute Support asked why no one was speaking to their old contacts. The conclusion seemed to be that the current contingent had not been able to build those relationships because they could not get meaningful access to their local partners.³⁸

This appears to be a problem shared by other western troops. While interviewing recent returnees from the British training mission to AMISOM in Somalia, it was clear that troops were very aware that if anyone had got shot the mission could have been ended as a result. However, this led to a dilemma on the ground for those that wanted to have a meaningful effect and saw that they would not be able to do so on their current permissions. Some recounted how they had operated outside of their authorities in order to do their jobs—obviously a high risk considering the potential implications had anything gone wrong.³⁹ In a recent article for the British military outlet the Wavell Room, a soldier described how only two British personnel routinely went out into Mogadishu, and that these were the Chief J3 and J4 advisors for the European Union (EU) Training Mission.⁴⁰ While signaling support for allies is not necessarily a bad reason to join a coalition, if everybody is signaling rather than meaningfully engaging in a mission then chances of success seem slim.

Lead nations can also introduce dynamics into coalition partnerships that prove problematic for their allies. Negative public perceptions of the U.S. drones program in countries like the UK and Germany have led to huge political sensitivities around providing intelligence support or access to national facilities.⁴¹ For example, U.S. Col Patrick Ryder told the Guardian that the U.S. and the UK had consulted each other regarding the targeting of Junaid Hussain, a British computer hacker, adding “both governments will continue to coordinate efforts to eliminate violent extremist organisations.”⁴² Lieutenant-Colonel Nicholas Mercer, the British Army’s chief legal adviser in Iraq in 2003, said the confirmation of a British link to Junaid Hussain’s death raised “disturbing questions.”⁴³ This is particularly true when you consider the fact that, while the UK has admitted involvement in this successful strike against Junaid, it has kept very quiet about whether or not it was similarly involved in the first strike attempt which missed its target, instead killing three civilians.⁴⁴

In March 2019 a German court ruled that Germany was not doing enough to ensure that the U.S. was respecting international law in its use of Ramstein military base to conduct drone strikes. The German airbase provides the U.S. with a satellite relay station and personnel, which was enough for the court to declare that Germany played a “central role” in the strikes and therefore had an obligation to protect the lives of the Yemenis who brought the case after their relatives were killed.⁴⁵ In September 2017, a week-long protest against the U.S. drones program drew over 5,000 people to Ramstein.⁴⁶ While the German government often maintained that it had “no knowledge” of U.S. operations taking place at the base,⁴⁷ their assumption that the U.S. has not violated German or international law was found by the court to be based on an “inadequate investigation of facts.”⁴⁸

Risk Reduction or Risk Transfer?

The March 2018 British Army Field Manual Tactics for Stability Operations Part 5: Military Support to Capacity Building notes that one of the advantages of using capacity building as part of combat operations is that it allows UK forces to overcome “the problems of achieving sufficient mass” when British troops cannot be deployed in combat roles.⁴⁹ However, while there may only be a “‘light footprint” of western troops involved in operations, the commitment required from local troops remains considerable. Attrition rates for local military partners have been extremely high in contemporary campaigns. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) does not release official statistics, but the death toll for its troops is estimated at over 4,000.⁵⁰ Since 2013, the UN mission in Mali has lost over 200 troops,⁵¹ while the Nigerian army is reportedly burying its own troops at night to conceal the toll of its fight against Islamist groups in the northeast.⁵² Attrition rates among Afghan forces have been consistently sky-high, with 6,700 deaths in just one year.⁵³ While remote warfare may seem low risk from the perspective of Western capitals, local troops are still paying heavily in these campaigns.

Photo: Devastation after the Battle for Mosul, July 9, 2017 (H. Mourdock)

Working “by, with, and through” can also transfer greater risks onto local populations. Many local militaries and armed groups are less equipped to mitigate civilian harm than their international counterparts. For example, senior British military personnel have recounted how Iraqi forces had been deeply traumatized by the experiences of 2014 and in many cases were reluctant to advance without heavier levels of international air support than might otherwise have been used in densely populated urban terrain. The consequences of this can be seen clearly in western Mosul, the final Islamic State stronghold in the city, where around 15 neighborhoods have been completely destroyed. These districts previously housed around 230,000 residents, leaving large numbers of internally displaced people who will not be able to return in the short- to mid-term.⁵⁴ The UN estimates that eight out of 10 buildings damaged in Mosul were residential buildings, with 8,475 houses destroyed—more than 5,500 of which were in west Mosul’s Old City.⁵⁵

Military coalitions can also be a “race to the bottom” when it comes to opening operations up to scrutiny.⁵⁶ The only member of the international anti-Islamic State coalition to consistently concede civilian casualties from its air campaign was the U.S., with other partners hesitant to distinguish their own strikes from those of the coalition as a whole.⁵⁷ Empowering local armed groups can also have negative long-term consequences for civilians when those forces are corrupt, abusive, or sectarian. A depressing 23 percent of the violent incidents against civilians recorded over the past 12 years was perpetrated by state forces rather than militia or rebel groups.⁵⁸ In some instances, building the capacity of predatory armed forces feeds a cycle of violence and conflict that contributes to the “forever wars” that define the contemporary international security environment.

For example, local security forces like the Afghan Local Police (ALP) were intended to address the growing problems of insurgency and lack of Afghan National Army legitimacy in the areas where the Taliban were drawing their support. However, reports of abuses against the local communities that they were meant to be protecting were also widespread. A survey of U.S. Special Operations Forces teams mentoring ALP units in 2011 found that 20 percent reported ALP colleagues were guilty of undefined “physical abuse/violence;” a further 12 percent reported bribe-taking. Between one-fifth and one-sixth reported that ALP indulged in salary fraud and theft. A smaller number witnessed rape, drug trafficking, drug abuse, and the selling or renting of ALP weapons and vehicles. Complaints of extortion and illegal taxation are commonplace. Some reports have even described ALP commanders selling the lives of their men: one allegedly accepted bribes equal to $500 per head to murder subordinates and killed six before capture. ALP in Faryab province were accused of raping, looting, and keeping a torture chamber with snakes at the bottom of a dry well.⁵⁹

In 2016/17 the UK spent £0.8 million delivering international humanitarian law (IHL) and preventing sexual violence modules through the EU Training Mission in Mali, with a further £0.87 million allocated for broader military and civilian support (with a focus on infantry, medical, and IHL) for 2018/19.⁶⁰ These master’s-degree level programs were optimistically delivered with the aim of professionalizing a force with limited education levels that has been linked to numerous violations including extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, torture, and arbitrary arrests.⁶¹ The Malian armed forces and the broader Malian government have also been accused of ethnic bias. In central Mali, Bambara and Dogon ethnic armed groups have recently been acquiring heavy, war-grade weaponry—some of which presumed to be coming from the armed forces—that has increased the lethality of localized disputes.⁶²

In July 2017, Amnesty International released a report documenting the cases of 101 individuals accused of supporting Boko Haram—often without evidence—who were held incommunicado and allegedly tortured by Cameroonian security forces, including the elite Rapid Intervention Battalion (BIR).⁶³ Created in 2001, the BIR is a special operations unit about 4,500 strong that has received security force assistance (SFA) from France, Israel, and the United States.⁶⁴ The BIR and other Cameroonian security institutions received IHL instruction as part of their technical training from the United States.⁶⁵ However, this has proven inadequate when it comes to altering heavy-handed approaches to countering terrorism and the politicization of the armed forces.

This is not to suggest that international partners should always cut assistance if their local partners prove to be corrupt or abusive. You can argue that increasing assistance and international presence in some of these environments would allow international partners to better scrutinize and influence behavior. However, there are also obligations that bind states to refrain from providing assistance that might cause or facilitate grave breaches of international humanitarian law.⁶⁶ Balancing the two is a dilemma, particularly if you subscribe to the view that donor states tend to overestimate the control they will have over their partners in the first place.⁶⁷

Taking A Peacebuilding Approach to Working with Local Partners

International military partners consistently misdiagnose poor behavior as stemming from a lack of training or capability.⁶⁸ There is a related assumption that improving the tactical proficiency of partner forces will address these concerns. While this logic may work in some places, a focus on military effectiveness as a criterion for partnership, or as a metric for success, creates its own dilemmas. This was captured by Frances Z. Brown and Mara Karlin:

“…the fact that it uses military criteria to choose a partner for a relationship that often evolves into a political one. If, as Clausewitz famously wrote, “war is a mere continuation of politics by other means,” the by-with-through model inverts this dictum, subordinating politics to … choices on the battlefield.”⁶⁹

For example, as soon as the Taliban government fell in 2001, armed groups within Afghanistan began competing for positions and influence. The international community came under immediate pressure to improve security and create the conditions for a transfer of power to a new Afghan administration. However, even as early as 2003, analysts were warning that, “Between September 2001 and June 2002 certain choices were made by national and international decisionmakers that have had long-lasting repercussions for the political process in Afghanistan.” ⁷⁰

In particular, the perceived capture of the process by powerful warlords who were then able to secure a place in the interim administration was seen as extremely damaging. Rather than pushing for a peace agreement in the sense of having a pact between warring parties, the Bonn process was geared at forging an agreement between leaders of four anti-Taliban groups that had been particularly instrumental to the international coalition that toppled the Taliban government.⁷¹ As early as 2002, experts were warning that “the Ministry of Defence [has become] a major obstacle to Demobilisation, Disarmament, and Reintegration (DDR) and the creation of the Afghan National Army (ANA).” ⁷²

Adopting a “winners take all” approach to engaging with local partners can exacerbate fragmentation on the ground in post-conflict societies. In many fragile contexts, governance and control is wielded through loose alliances between powerbrokers such as local strongmen, warlords, and militias.⁷³ These opaque and sometimes precarious relationships can dictate the development of political coalitions and lead to the intense politicization of armed groups, including the state armed forces. In weak states, the relative military might of different armed groups is one of the most crucial levers of power. In this context, foreign assistance can be an unintentional “kingmaker” as it strengthens parts of a fragmented system that may not serve the population or the stability of the state as a whole.⁷⁴ This creates incentives for elites to subvert assistance for their own purposes, while simultaneously engaging in corrupt or predatory behaviors that feed the instability that donors may be trying to address.⁷⁵

In other places, improving the tactical proficiency of units can create “islands of excellence” where small groups of elite forces are both willing and capable of protecting civilians,⁷⁶ but fail to deliver positive outcomes over the long-term. Efforts cannot be sustained unless the defense and security sector writ large also shares this ethos, and the political conditions on the ground support compatible values.⁷⁷ For example, one of the great international hopes from long-term international engagement in Iraq was the Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS)—a multi-ethnic elite unit that showed some promise as a template for the broader security forces.⁷⁸ The CTS were largely considered to be a professional, sustainable force by the time international trainers left in 2011.

However, even in the early days after the international withdrawal it was clear that being the exception to the rule of low Iraqi National Army capacity had its downsides. Tasking began to come directly from the Prime Minister’s office, mostly for activities not suited to an elite counter-terrorism unit like securing voting centers, guarding convoys, and manning checkpoints. Experienced officers began to be replaced by people with connections to the Prime Minister, and the promotions system began to revert to a system based on loyalty rather than competence.⁷⁹ They were also removed from the Ministry of Defense chain of command to sit under its own ministry, but were not allocated money from the Iraqi defense budget.⁸⁰ Pouring money into specific units while the rest of the sector remains dysfunctional can contribute to the creation of “Fabergé egg” armies that are expensive to build but easy for insurgents to crack because the military as a whole lacks cohesion.⁸¹ Rethinking this technical approach to remote warfare that prioritizes improving the tactical effectiveness of local troops on the frontlines is essential if the long-term outlook for peace is to improve.

One potential solution has its roots in the increasing focus on the importance of local ownership. In theory working by, with, and through local forces should lay the foundations for locally owned, locally responsive, and culturally attuned approaches to security. The UK’s Building Stability Overseas Strategy emphasizes the need for conflict-sensitive international engagement abroad, advising that;

“the starting point needs to be … analysing and understanding the situation to ensure that work designed to build stability does not unintentionally make things worse. The chances of success are greatest when the international community gets behind a political settlement that lays the foundations for tackling the causes of conflict in a country.”⁸²

In new stabilization guidance issued in 2019, the British government highlights the fact that “externally-backed peace processes and agreements that are significantly misaligned or out of sync with the underlying distribution of power and resources are likely to fail.”⁸³ The U.S. government’s 2018 Stabilization Assistance Review notes that “our national experience over the past two decades has taught us that it is not enough to win the battle; we must help our local partners secure the peace.”⁸⁴ One blueprint would be to approach assistance as a form of peacebuilding for fragmented security sectors, with assistance geared towards improving relationships between the many formal and informal groups that are often providing security in these environments, as well as between the security sector and the civilians that it is there to serve.⁸⁵

This means working with a wider range of groups based on their provision of legitimate, accountable security to the population as a whole. This also means letting go of or deprioritizing more traditional criteria like military effectiveness. Different communities will have different needs and different experiences of insecurity in a rapidly changing conflict or post-conflict environment. It is important to capture these concerns when deciding on the right course of action. For example, groups that are seen as corrupt and abusive in some areas can be seen as a lifeline in others:

“I know that people in Kabul are talking about cancelling the ALP, but you don’t understand”, said a provincial governor, gesturing at the barbed wire along his compound’s perimeter. “Without those guys, the Taliban will climb over that wall and cut my head off.”⁸⁶

The dynamics of legitimate and effective security provision will vary both across communities and across time. This is also the case for the dynamics of fear, and perceptions of risk associated with the courses of action chosen by policymakers. Both require frequent consultation and re-evaluation to make sure that policies adapt to changing circumstances. The international community must be careful to avoid quick assumptions about the extent to which local groups will use their knowledge and links with the community to solve problems and reduce support for violent actors. Just because groups are local, they should not be assumed to be a proxy for local legitimacy. This is where community consultation and detailed mapping become essential to avoid violent competition between different groups vying for assistance. Rather than allowing international actors to set the criteria for group inclusion, this should be a locally led process that is driven by community responses to the question of; who do you support to provide your security and why?

This means adopting a new vision for delivering military assistance in fragile states where success is evaluated against the long-term impact of programs on prospects for peace and security. Peacebuilding metrics could include; the ethnic diversity of course attendance, attendance rates for marginalized ethnicities or genders, hierarchies (informal and formal) between soldiers who attend courses, and the strength of positive and negative interactions between attendees. Efforts to maximize the exposure to each other of units or services who might have poor or problematic relations should be boosted and rewarded, rather than measuring basic attendance figures, or recall of tactical skills and concepts.

This may mean accepting a form of assistance that integrates leaders from the government and security forces but would also include informal actors who hold local legitimacy in providing security. While this creates a messier picture, what is lost in efficiency may be gained in sustainability. Compacts between elite groups and donors are fragile and open to abuse by groups seeking to entrench their own power rather than tackle instability. Fictionalizing a state apparatus and then refusing to deal outside of it only serves to mask the deep divisions that remain. These agreements often fail to address issues around representation in the security sector, or behavior that prioritizes the protection of some groups over the population as a whole. Using assistance to create opportunities for broad community engagement and wider relationship-building within fragmented security sectors is an approach that is anchored in local realities, starting where actors are, not where third parties want them to be.

Conclusion

Taking a peacebuilding approach to working with local militaries and armed groups means using assistance to fragmented security sectors to increase cooperation between various formal and informal elites in a weak state. This approach places less emphasis on developing conventional military power and more emphasis on facilitating and improving relations between the different factions within the security sector and between the security sector and the civilian population.⁸⁷ If international providers help local partners perform better at military tasks without ensuring that the forces have local legitimacy and strong accountability, progress is likely to be fleeting and could actually exacerbate civilian harm and the underlying drivers of violent conflict.

These negative outcomes are not inevitable. In theory, working by, with, and through local forces should lay the foundations for locally owned, locally responsive and culturally attuned approaches to security. Local, national, and regional armed groups have the potential to provide crucial support to peace processes and they bear ultimate responsibility for protecting local populations. Finding a way to support the emergence of legitimate, accountable, and effective local, national, and regional security forces is an essential part of setting the conditions for lasting peace.

However, this cannot happen without policies that account for the fact that these same partners have the potential to be major spoilers or perpetrators of harm. Rather than developing strong procedures to manage these risks and dilemmas, the tendency in western capitals is currently to approach partner operations as a low-cost, low-risk form of war. Debates within western militaries tend to ignore the transfer of risk onto partner forces and local civilians, and local partners and NGOs are often excluded from the international policy debate. Fixing this means doing more than trying to improve the way that international militaries work with local partners. It means adjusting the vision for what success would really mean.

**********

Notes

¹ “Remote War: Military, Legal and Political Issues,” Oxford Research Group, accessed March 14, 2019, https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/pages/category/remote-war-military-legal-and-political-issues; “Conceptual Series: Defining Remote Warfare,” Oxford Research Group, accessed June 26, 2019, .

² “Conceptual Series.”

³ Andreas Krieg and Jean-Marc Rickli, Surrogate Warfare: The Transformation of War in the Twenty-First Century (Georgetown University Press, 2019), .

⁴ “‘Light Footprint’ Operations Keep US Troops in the Dark,” Defense One, accessed June 26, 2019, ; Brad Stapleton, “The Problem with the Light Footprint: Shifting Tactics in Lieu of Strategy,” Cato Institute, June 7, 2016, .

⁵ Roger Carey, “Low-Intensity Warfare and Limited War,” in International Security in the Modern World, ed. Roger Carey and Trevor C. Salmon (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1996), 133–51, .

⁶ “Civilians and ‘By, With, and Through’ | Center for Strategic and International Studies,” accessed June 26, 2019, .

⁷ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and of Staff, “Counterterrorism,” October 24, 2014, .

⁸ Chairman of the Joint and Chiefs of Staff, “Counterinsurgency,” April 25, 2018, ; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Allied Joint Doctrine for Counter-Insurgency (COIN),” accessed August 20, 2019, .

⁹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Peace Support,” December 2014, .

¹⁰ Emily Knowles and Abigail Watson, “Remote Warfare: Lessons Learned from Contemporary Theatres,” Oxford Research Group, June 27, 2018, .

¹¹ Congressional Research Service, “Army Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs),” October 24, 2018, .

¹² “Specialised Infantry Group,” accessed August 20, 2019, .

¹³ “Drones and the Future of Aerial Combined Arms,” War on the Rocks, May 12, 2016, ; “The French Turn to Armed Drones,” War on the Rocks, September 22, 2017, ; “Rise of the Drones | Rudolph Herzog,” Lapham’s Quarterly, accessed August 27, 2019, .

¹⁴ Knowles and Watson, “Remote Warfare,” 2–3.

¹⁵ Thomas Bolland and Jan Andre Lee Ludvigsen, “‘No Boots on the Ground’: The Effectiveness of US Drones against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula,” Defense & Security Analysis 34, no. 2 (April 3, 2018): 127–43, ; “Planning for a U.S. Military Recessional From Africa,” Council on Foreign Relations, accessed August 20, 2019, .

¹⁶ Dr Sebastian Ritchie, “The RAF, Small Wars and Insurgencies in the Middle East, 1919-1939” (Air Historical Branch, 2011); Group Captain John Alexander, “The End of Air Power History and the Last Airman? Air Power, Liberal Democracy and the British Way of War,” in Air Power Review, vol. 14, 2, 2011.

¹⁷ Shiv Malik et al., “Ruhul Amin and Reyaad Khan: The Footballer and the Boy Who Wanted to Be First Asian PM,” The Guardian, September 7, 2015, sec. World news, .

¹⁸ Zak Doffman, “U.S. Attacks Iran With Cyber Not Missiles — A Game Changer, Not A Backtrack,” Forbes, accessed August 27, 2019, ; “US ‘launched Cyberattacks on Iran Weapons’ after Drone Downing,” accessed August 27, 2019, .

¹⁹ Harry Verhoeven, “The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy of Failed States: Somalia, State Collapse and the Global War on Terror,” Journal of Eastern African Studies 3, no. 3 (November 1, 2009): 405–25, .

²⁰ Anthony Dworkin, “Europe’s New Counter-Terror Wars” European Council on Foreign Relations, 2016, ; Brian Michael Jenkins, “Disrupting Terrorist Safe Havens,” RAND, August 18, 2014, . \\uc0\\u8221{} Time, June 4, 2017, http://time.com/4804640/london-attack-theresa-may-speech-transcript-full/.”,”plainCitation”:”Anthony Dworkin, Europe’s New Counter-Terror Wars (ECFR, 2016

²¹ John Nicholson, “Testimony on the Situation in Afghanistan,” § Senate Commitee on Armed Services (2017), .

²² SFAssist project hosted by the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), Norway, 5–7 December 2018.

²³ Author interviews, Koulikoro Training Camp, September 2018

²⁴ HMG, “Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review” (HM Government, 2010), 12, .

²⁵ HMG, “National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom” (HM Government, November 2015), para. 2.12, .

²⁶ Emily Knowles, “We Need to Talk about Yemen,” Remote Control Project (blog), December 9, 2016, ; Emily Knowles, “Briefing: We Need Greater Transparency on UK Military Operations in Libya” (London: Remote Control, May 2016), ; Emily Knowles, “Britain’s Culture of No Comment,” Remote Control Project (blog), July 4, 2016, ; Emily Knowles, “What British War on Terror?,” Remote Control Project (blog), October 26, 2016, ; Emily Knowles and Abigail Watson, “All Quiet On The ISIS Front : British Secret Warfare In The Information Age,” Remote Warfare Programme (blog), March 31, 2017, ; Liam Walpole, “Mind the Gap: Parliament in the Age of Remote Warfare,” Remote Warfare Programme, October 2017, .

²⁷ Abigail Watson, “Pacifism or Pragmatism? The 2013 Parliamentary Vote on Military Action in Syria,” Remote Warfare Programme (blog), May 29, 2018, .

²⁸ Knowles and Watson, “All Quiet On The ISIS Front.”

²⁹ Author interviews, NATO RS, March 2017.

³⁰ Cordula Droege and David Tuck, “Fighting Together: Obligations and Opportunities in Partnered Warfare,” Humanitarian Law & Policy, March 28, 2017, .

³¹ Matteo Tondini, “Coalitions of the Willing,” in The Practice of Shared Responsibility in International Law, ed. Andre Nollkaemper and Ilias Plakokefalos (Cambridge University Press, 2017), 703.

³² Tondini, 713.

³³ Paul A. L. Ducheine, Michael N. Schmitt, and Frans P. B. Osinga, Targeting: The Challenges of Modern Warfare (Springer, 2015), 254; Katja Lindskov Jacobsen and Rune Saugmann, “Optimizing Coalition Air Warfare: The Emergence and Ethical Dilemmas of Red Card Holder Teams,” Global Policy 0, no. 0, accessed August 27, 2019, ; M. C. Zwanenburg, Accountability Of Peace Support Operations (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005), 48; Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg and Volker Epping, International Humanitarian Law Facing New Challenges: Symposium in Honour of KNUT IPSEN (Springer Science & Business Media, 2007), 43.

³⁴ Author interviews, NATO RS, March 2017.

³⁵ Author interviews, NATO RS, March 2017.

³⁶ Author interviews, NATO RS, March 2017.

³⁷ Author interviews, NATO RS, March 2017

³⁸ Author interviews, NATO RS, March 2017.

³⁹ Author telephone interviews, Somalia, October 2016

⁴⁰ Ric Cole, “The Rebirth of ‘Frontier Soldiering’?,” The Wavell Room (blog), August 15, 2019, .

⁴¹ Louisa Brooke-Holland, “Research Briefings – Overview of Military Drones Used by the UK Armed Forces” (House of Commons, October 8, 2015), .

⁴² Alice Ross and Spencer Ackerman, “Former Navy Chief Expresses Concern over UK Role in Syria Drone Strikes,” The Guardian, September 10, 2015, sec. UK news, .

⁴³ Ross and Ackerman.

⁴⁴ Spencer Ackerman and Alice Ross, “Airstrike Targeting British Hacker Working for Isis Killed Three Civilians Instead, US Admits,” The Guardian, January 29, 2016, sec. US news, .

⁴⁵ “German Court Hands Partial Victory to Critics of U.S. Drone Deaths…,” Reuters, March 19, 2019, ; “Statement on UK Assistance to Partners Following Ground-Breaking German Court Ruling – All Party Parliamentary Group on Drones,” accessed August 27, 2019, ; “US Drone Attacks via Ramstein – ECCHR,” accessed August 27, 2019, .

⁴⁶ Deutsche Welle (www.dw.com), “Ramstein Air Base Anti-Drone Protests: The Germans Taking on the US Military | DW | 09.09.2017,” DW.COM, accessed August 27, 2019, .

⁴⁷ Deutsche Welle (www.dw.com), “Drones and Diplomacy: US Ramstein Air Base Stirs Controversy in Germany | DW | 14.03.2019,” DW.COM, accessed August 27, 2019, .\\uc0\\u8221{} DW.COM, accessed August 27, 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/drones-and-diplomacy-us-ramstein-air-base-stirs-controversy-in-germany/a-47926300.”,”plainCitation”:”Deutsche Welle (www.dw.com

⁴⁸ “German Court Says Potentially Illegal Drone Strikes Aided by Ramstein, despite USAF Denials,” Stars and Stripes, accessed August 27, 2019, .

⁴⁹ “Tactics for Stability Operations Part 5: Military Support to Capacity Building,” Army Field Manual, March 2018, paras. 2–13, .

⁵⁰ “The True Cost of the World’s Most Dangerous Peace Mission,” The East African, accessed August 27, 2019, .

⁵¹ “Fatalities,” United Nations Peacekeeping, accessed August 27, 2019, .

⁵² Joe Parkinson | Photographs by Jonathan Torgovnik for The Wall Street Journal, “Nigeria Buries Soldiers at Night in Secret Cemetery,” Wall Street Journal, July 31, 2019, sec. World, .

⁵³ Tony Walker, “We Should Not Commit Combat Troops to the Afghanistan Conflict – Here’s Why,” The Conversation, accessed June 8, 2017, .

⁵⁴ “Recovery in Iraq’s War-Battered Mosul Is a ‘tale of Two Cities,’ UN Country Coordinator Says,” UN News, August 8, 2017, .

⁵⁵ Lucy Rodgers, Nassos Stylianou, and Daniel Dunford, “What’s Left of Mosul?,” BBC News, accessed February 27, 2018, .

⁵⁶ “The Sum Of All Parts: Reducing Civilian Harm in Multinational Coalition Operations,” Center for Civilians in Conflict (blog), accessed August 27, 2019, .

⁵⁷ Airwars, “Limited Accountability: A Transparency Audit of the Anti-ISIL Coalition,” Remote Warfare Programme, December 2016, .

⁵⁸ Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), “ACLED Data Export,” ACLED Data, 13 April 2019, , accessed 22 April 2019. This figure is based on ACLED data from Africa, the Middle East, South East Asia for violent incidents against civilians recorded since 1997 by state forces, militia forces and rebel groups. Out of 57,982 recorded events, 13,195 of them were attributed to state forces.

⁵⁹ International Crisis Group, “The Future of the Afghan Local Police,” June 2015, 8, .

⁶⁰ Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF),
‘Sahel Support to Multilaterals: Annual Review’, HM Government, 2018, , accessed 2 April 2019; CSSF, ‘Sahel Defence and Security’, HM Government, 2019, , accessed 2 April 2019.

⁶¹ Human Rights Watch, ‘Mali: Unchecked Abuses in Military Operations’, 8 September 2017, , accessed 15 June 2019; France 24, ‘Twenty-Five Bodies Found in Central Mali After Army Sweep’, 18 June 2018, , accessed 19 June 2019; Afua Hirsch, ‘Mali’s Army Suspected of Abuses and Unlawful Killings as War Rages’, The Observer, 19 January 2013.

⁶² Human Rights Watch, ‘”We Used to be Brothers”: Self-Defense Group Abuses in Central Mali’, 7 December 2018; Anna Pujol-Mazzini, ‘How Mali is Pursuing Justice for a War That Never Really Ended’, World Politics Review, 29 January 2019.

⁶³ Amnesty International, ‘Cameroon’s Secret Torture Chambers: Human Rights Violations and War Crimes in the Fight Against Boko Haram’, 2017, , accessed 10 April 2019.

⁶⁴ BBC News, ‘Burning Cameroon: Images You’re not Meant to See’, 25 June 2018.

⁶⁵ Voice of Africa, ‘Cameroon: Armed Forces – BIR Commando Training Centre Graduates 1,850’, 26 December 2017, , accessed 14 June 2019; United States Army Africa, ‘Human Rights and Law Training’, 13 May 2019, , accessed 2 July 2019; Carla Babb, ‘US Keeps Training Cameroon Troops but Urges Accountability in Criminal Probe’, Voice of America, 27 September 2018, , accessed 14 June 2019.

⁶⁶ Emily Knowles and Abigail Watson, “Lawful But Awful? Legal and Political Challenges of Remote Warfare and Working with Partners” (Remote Warfare Programme, May 2018), .

⁶⁷ Stephen Biddle, “Building Security Forces & Stabilizing Nations: The Problem of Agency,” Daedalus 146, no. 4 (October 2017): 126–38, .many now see “small-footprint” security force assistance (SFA

⁶⁸ Emily Knowles and Jahara Matisek, “Western Security Force Assistance in Weak States,” The RUSI Journal 164, no. 3 (April 16, 2019): 10–21, .

⁶⁹ Mara Karlin and Frances Brown, “Friends With Benefits,” Foreign Affairs, May 8, 2018, .

⁷⁰ Rama Mani, “Ending Impunity and Building Justice in Afghanistan” (Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, December 2003), 1.

⁷¹ Emily Winterbotham, “The State of Transitional Justice in Afghanistan” (AREU, April 2010), 6.

⁷² Mani, “Ending Impunity and Building Justice in Afghanistan,” 2.

⁷³ William Reno, Warlord Politics and African States (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999); Joel S Migdal, State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

⁷⁴ Knowles and Matisek, “Western Security Force Assistance in Weak States.”

⁷⁵ Jahara Matisek and William Reno, ‘Getting American Security Force Assistance Right: Political Context Matters’, Joint Force Quarterly (No. 92, 1st Quarter, 2019), pp. 65–73.

⁷⁶ Knowles and Matisek, “Western Security Force Assistance in Weak States”; Knowles and Watson, “Remote Warfare.”

⁷⁷ “The Roots of Restraint in War,” Publication, International Committee of the Red Cross, June 6, 2018, .

⁷⁸ Knowles and Watson, ‘Remote Warfare’, p. 14.

⁷⁹ David M. Witty, “The Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service | Brookings Institution,” Brookings (blog), November 30, 2001, 28, .

⁸⁰ Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Department of Defense Budget FY2018,” May 2017, 6, .

⁸¹ Jahara Matisek, ‘The Crisis of American Military Assistance: Strategic Dithering and “Fabergé Egg” Armies’, Defense & Security Analysis (Vol. 34, No. 3, 2018), pp. 267–290.

⁸² HMG, “Building Stability Overseas Strategy” (HM Government, 2014), ; DFID, FCO, and MOD, “Building Stability Overseas Strategy” (HM Government, July 2011), .

⁸³ Stabilisation Unit, “The UK Government’s Approach to Stabilisation: A Guide for Policy Makers and Practitioners,” March 2019, .

⁸⁴ US Department of State, “Framework for Maximizing the Effectiveness of U.S. Government Efforts to Stabilize Conflict-Affected Areas,” Stabilization Assistance Review, 2018, .

⁸⁵ Knowles and Matisek, “Western Security Force Assistance in Weak States.”

⁸⁶ The International Crisis Group. “The Future of the Afghan Local Police,” June 2015, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/future-afghan-local-police.

⁸⁷ Lisa Schirch, Conflict Assessment and Peacebuilding Planning: A Strategic Participatory Systems-Based Handbook on Human Security (Boulder, CO: Kumarian Press, 2013).

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Download PDF, 15 pages.

The author, Emily Knowles, is an Associate Fellow at the Oxford Research Group.

Top Photo: Air Force air advisors assigned to the 409th Expeditionary Security Forces Squadron brief the Niger Armed Forces (FAN) before training exercises in Agadez, Niger, July 10, 2019. The FAN learned how to efficiently and safely clear a building. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Devin Boyer)

This article was first published in PRISM Vol. 8, No. 4, June 11, 2020 by the National Defense University Press. Re-posted by SOF News with the permission of the PRISM editorial staff. View the original article here.

U.S. Counterterrorism in Africa

John Friberg — Wed, 18 Mar 2020 05:00:00 +0000

Since 9/11 the United States has significantly scaled up its counterterrorism (CT) activities in Africa. The U.S. has conducted unilateral CT operations as well as extensive training for African partner forces involved in the CT fight. Despite this long counterterrorism campaign the growth of jihadist groups continues in Somalia, north Africa, and west Africa. Many of the violent extremist organizations (VEOs) are aligned with either al-Qa’ida or the Islamic State.

PSI and TSCTI. In 2002 the U.S. established its Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI) aimed to improve the intelligence and border security capability of some Sahelian countries. [1] Later, in 2005, a much larger program labeled the Trans-Saharan Counter Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI) involved economic, political, diplomatic, and military components. The military component of TSCTI was Operation Enduring Freedom – Trans Sahara. In 2002 the U.S. established a presence at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti – initially basing SOF elements to respond to counterterrorism events in the region. The base has grown and currently houses 3,000 troops that conduct operations throughout the Horn of Africa, east Africa, and beyond.

AFRICOM and SOCAFRICA. An annual special operations exercise (FLINTLOCK) was instituted in 2005 supported by SOCEUR and later by SOCAFRICA involving several nations in the region. In 2007 the U.S. established Africa Command (AFRICOM). For many years the United States has been deploying forces to Africa to conduct counterterrorism (CT) operations and to advise, assist, train, and accompany security forces of partner nations conducting CT operations.

Training Teams. U.S. Special Forces, MARSOC, other units have been providing training and assistance to countries in the Sahel, Lake Chad, and Horn of Africa regions. Over time many of these operations became known to the public. However some of these CT operations were ‘under the radar’. Other missions barely register in the press – such as the operation against the Lord’s Resistance Army in central Africa. A few became well-known due to unfavorable events.

Costly Operations. One example of an event that caught Americans by surprise includes the U.S. military involvement in Niger where four members of the 3rd Special Forces Group were killed in an ambush in October 2017. Another operation is the al Shabaab raid on Camp Simba at the Manda Bay Airfield where three Americans died in January 2020.

Support to Partners. In addition to ‘boots on the ground’ the United States has provided logistical and intelligence support to African and European nations in the CT fight – especially in west Africa. This includes three critical components to the CT campaign: in-flight refueling of European aircraft, airlift of European and African soldiers and vehicles, and all sources of U.S. intelligence. AFRICOMs efforts in CT in Africa is complemented by those of the U.S. State Department. [2]

Spotty Progress. There have been some successes in the counterterrorism fight in Africa but there have also been cases where progress has been very slow. Long running conflicts are in progress in Somalia, Libya, and the Sahel region of Africa and they are unlikely to end soon. The United States has had a presence in all of these areas – employing conventional and special operations forces for several years in these conflicts. However, it appears that insecurity and instability has gotten worse over the past decade despite efforts by the United States and other international actors.

Somalia

Somalia has been a failed state for many decades. Al-Shabaab militants have contributed to this state of insecurity and instability in Somalia. The group holds large areas of the rural countryside and conducts frequent attacks in the cities of Somalia. The al-Qaeda affiliated insurgent / terrorist group has been intent on toppling the UN-backed federal government. In addition to establishing a caliphate in Somalia, Al Shabaab has a stated desire to attack the U.S. homeland. The Defense Intelligence Agency has assessed that the threat from al Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia remains high. The strength of al Shabaab is estimated to be between 5,000 to 7,000. ISIS-Somalia is much smaller, estimated at 100 to 300 fighters.

In 2019 the U.S. conducted over 110 airstrikes in Central and Southern Somalia killing over 800 militants. U.S. military personnel (about 700) have been providing advise, assistance, and accompanying Somalia forces and partner nations of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). [3] SOF teams have been training select Somali units to include the Danab Advance Infantry Brigade.

Lake Chad Basin

The Boko Harem group has had a long presence in the Lake Chad Basin area of Africa. It’s area of operations straddles the border of Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, and Niger. ISIS-West Africa also operates in this region. The VEOs in the Lake Chad Basin area have not been significantly degraded. Other jihadist groups aligned with Middle Eastern organizations threaten to expand as well.

The VEOs are aided by the corruption and ineffectiveness of the regional governments – notably the Nigerian government. The Nigerian Army has not been able to defend remote locations and is now consolidating its forces onto larger more defendable bases yielding much of the Nigerian northeast countryside to Boko Harem. The US posture in this region has gone from a “degrade” strategy to one of “containment”.

Sahel Region

Islamist militants have been a source of insecurity in the Sahel area of Africa. The militants, aligned with al Qaeda, are fighting for control of the land along Niger’s western border with Mali and in other Sahel nations. The militants operate with basic weapons, pickup trucks, and motorcycles and are very mobile. They have been increasingly active the last several months in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. The VEOs in the Sahel region have not been degraded nor contained. There are indications that the VEOs will continue to expand their operational area. The most active and effective VEO in this region is Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM).

The U.S. currently has Special Forces teams operating in the region conducting a train, advise, and assist mission. An airfield was built and is now operational in Agadez, Niger to assist the regional government forces in providing security for its threatened areas. The airfield also functions as a U.S. drone base – beginning ISR operations in November 2019. However, there have been rumors that, having just completed the base, the U.S. may phase out or scale down operations at Air Base 201.

Libya

From 2014 to 2016 the Islamic State had a big presence in Libya but has since drifted south into the desert. The current civil war in Libya makes it difficult to truly assess the Islamic State in Libya. ISIS-Libya and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) have been a bit quiet in north Africa the last part of 2019.

Past and current CT efforts by the United States in Libya include drone strikes against ISIS leadership. A small contingent of U.S. SOF was withdrawn from Libya in April 2019 due to the unpredictable security environment. The presence of Russian mercenary forces impede U.S. counterterrorism operations in Libya. [4] Complicating the Libyan security environment has been the introduction of proxy forces from Syria, Sudan, and Chad.

U.S. Partners in Africa

France – the Sahel Lead. The United States is fortunate to have good international partners to work in the CT effort in Africa. The French have been in the lead for several years in the Sahel region. They currently have about 4,500 troops in this area of Africa supporting Operation Barkhane which started in 2014. In addition, France has (as of 2020) established a special operations task force – Operation Takuba will have several European countries participating.

G5 Sahel Joint Force. The five nations of Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Chad, and Mauritania are currently trying to secure the region and its borders but it is facing some challenges. The G5 Sahel, established in 2017, remains under resourced and lacks sufficient training. The French play a major role in assisting the G5 Sahel force. The U.S. provides a limited footprint of training and equipping activities to the G5 Sahel.

MINUSMA. The United Nations is assisting in the security effort. The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali is engaged in an important but difficult peacekeeping mission. It is assisted by the United States and other international partners.

AMISON. The countries of Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda, and others have been contributing troops for a number of years to this joint mission in Somalia. The troops of the African Union Mission in Somalia has begun its withdrawal. By 2021 the AMISON mission in Somalia should be finished; although the security situation in Somalia is unlikely to significantly improve by then.

Key African Allies. There are some key African nations who are important partners – including Kenya, Niger and others. U.S. special operations forces are working with selected African units to improve their capability to fight the terrorists and insurgents. These include the Danab in Somalia, the 11th and 51st Special Intervention Battalion in Niger, and the Kenya Special Forces and Rangers, and others.

Root Causes of Discontent

Some African nations are struggling with internal divisions in their country that are conducive to the growth of violent extremist organizations. Tribal grievances, disenfranchised minorities, conflicts between farmers and herdsmen, lack of government services in rural areas, ethnic divisions, poor governance, heavy-handed government reaction to VEOs and the general population, human rights abuses, and other factors are reasons why VEOs can recruit and maintain support within some members of African society.

SOCAFRICA has taken the position that the counterterrorism effort needs to be conducted in conjunction with programs that improve governance, development, and economic opportunity in these African nations at risk. The “three Ds”: defense, diplomacy, and development – are important components to defeating VEOs. [5]

Future U.S. CT Engagement in Africa?

Changing Focus and Resource Competition. The current national defense strategy mandates a shift in focus from the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism fight of the past two decades to a concentration on great power competition. This means resources and personnel applied to the threat posed by Russia and China in Europe, the Indo-Pacific, and elsewhere. AFRICOM and SOCAFRICA will be competing with other Combatant Commands for training teams (SOF, SFAB, etc.), ISR, medical evacuation assets, personnel recovery assets, and more. There is a finite amount of SOF, intelligence, and other resources – something has to give. In this case it appears that Africa may come up on the short end of the stick.

Downsizing the Africa Mission. The Department of Defense has recently indicated that it is planning to reduce the footprint for the newly established drone base in Niger. It plans to cut back back on SOF forces being deployed to Africa. Of note are plans to deploy elements of the newly formed Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs) to conduct training and advising missions. [6]

There is some Congressional resistance to this shift in resources away from Africa. Our European allies are also displeased with a loss of U.S. support for the counterterrorism fight in Africa. The U.S. commitment in Africa is currently ‘under review’ and we should see some policy shifts within the next few months that indicate which path the U.S. will take in Africa. Many national security observers that follow events in Africa recognize that in order to continue to contain or degrade VEOs the U.S. will need to provide long-term assistance and advising until partner forces can deal with jihadists threats on their own.

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Footnotes:

[1] In conjunction with the Pan Sahel Initiative detachments from the 10th Special Forces Group began training military forces in Africa.

[2] See Counterterrorism in Africa – Innovation, Lessons Learned and Staying Ahead of the Threat, address at UN CT Regional Conference, State.gov, July 2019.

[3] See “AFRICOM predicts mission training Somalia’s ‘Lightning Brigade’ will last until 2027”, Military Times, March 17, 2020.

[4] The intelligence community has assessed that Russian paramilitary forces fighting alongside the Libyan National Army (LNA) shot down a U.S. surveillance drone over Tripoli in the later part of 2019.

[5] From “A View from the CT Foxhole” below.

[6] There are no known numbers provided as to how many SFAB ‘teams’ will deploy; but it does make for a good soundbite. While a ’12-man’ SFAB team is specifically trained to train, advise, and assist (TAA) foreign conventional partner forces it is a poor choice to partner with foreign SOF partner forces.

References:

East Africa and North and West Africa Counterterrorism Operations, Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, February 2020.
https://www.dodig.mil/Reports/Lead-Inspector-General-Reports/Article/2080495/lead-inspector-general-for-east-africa-and-north-and-west-africa-counterterrori/

“A View from the CT Foxhole: Brigadier General Dagvin R.M. Anderson, Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command Africa”, CTC Sentinel, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, February 2020.
https://ctc.usma.edu/view-ct-foxhole-brigadier-general-dagvin-r-m-anderson-commander-u-s-special-operations-command-africa/

U.S. Counterterrorism Priorities and Challenges in Africa”, Congressional Research Service (CRS), December 16, 2019.
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/TE/TE10044

“The Future Role of U.S. Counterterrorism Operations in Africa”, CTC Sentinel, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, February 2014.
https://ctc.usma.edu/africa-special-issue/

Images: Top image derived from map found in CRS 2019 report cited above.

Report – Counterterrorism Operations in Africa – OIG Feb 2020

John Friberg — Wed, 12 Feb 2020 14:24:21 +0000

The Lead Inspector General has published an unclassified report to Congress entitled East Africa and North and West Africa Counterterrorism Operations. The 84-page report covers the period of October through December 2019. Congress requires (since 2013) the IGs of the Departments of State, Defense, and USAID to provide quarterly reports to Congress on active overseas contingency operations. The DoD Inspector General was designated the Lead IG for CT operations in Africa. The report also includes an appendix containing classified information that is provided to relevant agencies and congressional committees.

The report is timely given the desire of the U.S. to shift assets – military personnel and resources – from Africa to Europe and the Pacific. The shift in focus will allow the U.S. to counter threats from Russia and China. AFRICOM has presented its view that the threats in Africa remain and are growing – from jihadist groups and from Russia and China.

The threat by ISIS-Somalia and al Shabaab in East Africa remains high. The U.S. recently suffered three deaths and several aircraft destroyed in January 2020 in the al Shabaab raid at Manda Bay. In West Africa the U.S. is assisting French and Africa partner forces to conduct counterterrorism operations against jihadist groups. The attacks by these violent extremist organizations (VEOs) have been intensifying. In West Africa U.S. Africa Command has shifted its strategy from degrading the VEOs to one of containment. North Africa is not spared the threat from VEOs. These groups remain active and there is concern that they will once again rise up in Libya.

AFRICOM and SOCAfrica may soon be losing resources to employ in the counterterrorism fight. These lost resources will affect a host of other activities that ensure stability and security across the region. The ability to sustain or grow U.S. influence in the region may also diminish due to the loss of assets and resources. This is happening at the same time that China and Russia are seeking to expand their security cooperation efforts and their influence in Africa.

The report covers several topics to include the status of the conflicts, capacity building, diplomacy and political developments, humanitarian assistance, and strategic planning. In addition, there are two appendices. Appendix A is classified and Appendix B describes the methodology for preparing the Lead IG Quarterly Report. There is also an acronym list, several maps, and 152 endnotes.

Over six thousand U.S. military personnel are deployed at various locations in Africa. The U.S. efforts in Libya have diminished due to the instability, ongoing civil war, and muddled political and military environment. The French are appealing for continued assistance with their CT operations in Africa; but it is unlikely that the U.S. will heed their requests. The French may need to rely more on other European nations.

The threat in Africa remains high; yet the challenge presented from Russia and China cannot be ignored. The defense budget can only go so far and tough decisions will be made over the next several months that will have consequences around the globe.

The report can be accessed on the website of the Department of State Office of Inspector General:

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East Africa and North and West Africa Counterterrorism Operations
Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress
February 2020
https://www.stateoig.gov/system/files/q1fy2020_leadig_ea_nw_africa_cto.pdf

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1st SFAB in Afghanistan – A Successful Deployment?

John Friberg — Wed, 12 Dec 2018 21:27:55 +0000

The 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade or 1st SFAB has completed its Afghanistan tour. It was in Afghanistan for much of 2018 with the mission to train, advise, and assist (TAA) the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). The deployment began in March 2018. The brigade and its many advisor teams redeployed back to their home base at Fort Benning, Georgia during the month of November 2018. The SFAB is a specialized conventional unit built to train, advise, assist, accompany, and enable (TA3E) partner nation forces.

Editorial Note: This article was first published on December 12, 2018. Since that date the Department of Defense released a report on Afghanistan on December 20, 2018 that provided updated information on the 1st SFAB’s deployment. This article has been updated with that new information.

Thus far, the brigade’s deployment has been judged as a success. While there are a lot of news reports about the 1st SFAB there is a distinct lack of details in regards to disposition and employment of the SFAB in Afghanistan. There is very little open source information available (for someone on the outside looking in) to make a realistic assessment. Certainly, the Army has captured a lot of lessons learned over the past year; and in time these will surface and become available to those without access to NIPR and SIPR. There were some bumps along the way. This article takes a close look at the establishment, pre-deployment training, and employment in Afghanistan of the 1st Security Force Assistance Battalion.

Reasons for an SFAB

Professional Advisory Corps. Past advising efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan involved the forming up of temporary advisor teams. A study of the U.S. military’s Security Force Assistance (SFA) efforts would reveal some success and some failures in U.S. advisory efforts; and the Iraq and Afghanistan experiences were not out of the norm. Over the past two decades individuals from different units would be selected to deploy to theater on a ‘put together’ advisory team. Sometimes units would be tasked with providing advisor teams – forming them up from within their organic personnel.

In Iraq the teams were usually called Military Transition Teams (MiTTs); although there were a variety of advisor teams – sometimes with different types of names. Later in the Iraq war standard brigade combat teams (BCTs) – designated as Advise and Assist Brigades or AABs – were tasked with the advisory mission. The AABs were augmented with 48 field grade officers.

In Afghanistan there have been an even larger variety of advisor teams – some tailored for general advising and others for a specific function. Early in the conflict the U.S. Embedded Training Teams (ETTs) of Task Force Phoenix worked with Afghan army and police units at kandak and district level. NATO countries also provided their version of advisor teams as well. In 2012 – 2014 there was a big push of Security Force Assistance Advisory Teams (SFAATs); and later Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs). The 12- or 18-man SFAATs were working from Army corps and police zone down to kandak and district level.

However, a common denominator was that these advisor teams were mostly ad hoc formations. Many times deployed with no advisor, cultural, or language training. There was a rush to man the advisor teams and to deploy them to theater. Once the teams and advisor brigades completed their mission they returned to home station to carry on with their ‘real mission’.

The SFAB concept adopted by the U.S. Army in 2017 provides advisor teams on a permanent basis; a purpose-built organization designed for advising. The SFAB will be one of the initiatives the U.S. Army will use to build partner nation capacity. A permanent advisory corps is not a new concept – there were many supporters of a unit dedicated to advising, among them – John Nagl, a former infantry officer who served in Iraq. (Read his paper Institutionalizing Adaptation, CNAS, June 2007).

Retaining Experienced Advisors. Members of the advisor brigade will train, deploy, and then redeploy as part of an enduring organization. Ideally, the individuals will remain in the brigade, continue their advisor and language training, and redeploy once again to the same conflict or region of the world. This retains information at the individual and organizational level and eliminates the loss of continuity in the advising effort. Theoretically, the 1st SFAB, now that it is back at Fort Benning, would take a breath, refit, retrain, further develop its cultural, language, advisory skills, and other skills and then re-deploy to Afghanistan again.

Free Up BCTs. With the existence of the SFABs – once they are all up and running (2022) – the Army’s Brigade Combat Teams and divisional staffs will be partly relieved of the requirement to send advising and training teams to locations like Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. When a brigade combat team deployed to Afghanistan in the later stages of the war as an ad hoc SFAB it went with about 1,500 men; mostly officers and senior NCOs. The remainder of the 3,600 to 4,500 personnel (lower ranking Soldiers) stayed home. The SFABs would allow the BCTs to train for their wartime mission.

“The SFAB gives us purpose-built formations designed to execute the critical mission of security force assistance without having to rip apart conventional BCTs.”
Chief of Staff of the Army General Mark Milley, February 8, 2018.

BCT Generation. The SFABs, if necessary, could transition to a full-strength brigade combat team in a time of general war. The officers and senior NCOs are already in place. It would be a matter of flushing out the ranks with more personnel and units with equipment. Although not an easy task to do it certainly provides an expedited means of establishing six more BCTs. Or at least quicker than starting from scratch.

SFAB Concept

Need for Professional Advisors. The establishment of the SFABs was the brainchild of General Mark Milley, the Chief of Staff of the Army. In October of 2015 he began to vocalize the need for a professional advisory corps. In May 2016 the Army announced it would form up six Security Force Assistance Brigades. The new units would institutionalize the train, advise, and assist mission. In February 2017 the Army provided more information on the six SFABs and stated that an academy would stand up to train the members of these specialized units. Initial plans called for a 529-man SFAB but this was later increased to 800.

Critics. Many critics of this concept believe that conventional forces were already trained up sufficiently and could easily flex to an advisory mission. However, Milley had first-hand experience of the ad hoc SFAATs and SFABs at work in Afghanistan during his tour as commander of ISAF Joint Command and was on solid ground with his proposed plan.

SFAC and 6 SFABS. The Army plans to have a Security Force Assistance Command (SFAC) and six Security Force Assistance Brigades. This will allow the regular BCTs to concentrate on the ‘near peer’ competition and the ‘big fight’. [1]

Doctrine and TTPs

The SFAB is a new organization and the Army needed a pub for it. In November 2017 it published a draft pub for the SFAB entitled ATP 3-96.1, Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB). In May 2018 the final version was published. There is no shortage of publications, reports, and lessons learned on the Security Force Assistance mission in Afghanistan. See Annotated Bibliography for Resolute Support.

Establishment of 1st SFAB

Photo: 1st SFAB Activation, February 2, 2018.

The 1st SFAB was formed up in 2017 on Kelley Hill at Fort Benning, Georgia. It was officially activated on February 8, 2018. Throughout 2017 the Army recruited personnel to fill in the ranks of the SFAB. Before joining the unit the Soldiers had to undergo a two-day candidate assessment process or SFAB selection. Once joining the unit the personnel were integrated into the ongoing unit training program.

Leadership. The command team of the 1st SFAB has a lot of experience. The commander, BG Scott Jackson (he was promoted while in Afghanistan) had already served as a brigade commander at Fort Stewart, Georgia. The Command Sergeant Major Christopher Gunn is a former BCT CSM. The battalion commanders and staff were selected by a panel of general officers and had already served in similar positions within a brigade. Many of the senior NCOs have had multiple combat deployments and previous advisor experience. There are a sprinkling of SF and Ranger officers and NCOs in the SFAB as well.

Photo. Newly promoted BG Scott Jackson, 1st SFAB commander, Aug 2018.

Recruitment. There was and still is a big effort to recruit for the SFABs. A number of incentives are being offered to include bonuses, accelerated promotions, and choice of assignments for post-SFAB duty. Most of the positions within the SFAB are for officers and senior NCOs; it is definitely a rank-heavy unit. Army news releases would tell you that everyone within the SFAB was a volunteer. And for the most part that is likely true, but an earlier deployment of the 1st SFAB prompted some ‘non-volunteer’ assignments to the unit – as some Soldiers from the 10th Mountain Division discovered.

Logistics and Equipment. The SFAB had to set up house in a new compound on Fort Benning, receive incoming personnel, and develop and implement a training plan. In addition, it had to receive and process the brigade’s equipment and vehicles. It is estimated that the SFAB received more than 22,000 pieces of equipment. Some equipment was the standard Army stuff that the Soldiers had seen before; however, the SFAB was also given some ‘new stuff’. The new stuff – like off-the-shelf radios and networking equipment (SNAP and GRRIP) – required additional training. New radios (AN/PRC 148 and AN/PRC-152A) had to be issued and trained on by the Soldiers.

Initial Hiccups at Startup

But Isn’t Advising an SF Mission? Some critics – both within Special Forces and the conventional Army at large – felt that the advisory function was covered by U.S. Army Special Forces and that an SFAB unit was not needed. U.S. Army Special Forces has several primary missions – COIN, UW, DA, FID, SR, and SFA. Foreign Internal Defense (FID) and Security Force Assistance (SFA) are missions SF teams are ideally trained and equipped for.

Some SF officers worried that the SFABs would ‘steal’ the FID mission; but other SF officers said that it was an idea whose time has come. It would appear, however, that many senior leaders within the Special Forces community are on board with the SFAB concept. [2]

“There is no intent to replace Special Forces, or to compete with Special Forces.”
Army Chief of Staff General Mark Milley, October 2017.

Stealing the Heritage of SF? The SFAB concept suffered a temporary setback in acceptance by some in the Special Forces community when the ‘beret flap‘ transpired. [3] This unfortunate incident didn’t need to happen. Certainly there were some missteps on the part of big Army in this respect; but quick action by General Milley and the 1st SFAB was able to put that fire out (sort of). The Army put out a press release in February 2018 to try and dampen the angst in the SF community.

“The SFABs are not designed for irregular warfare, unconventional warfare, special reconnaissance, counterterrorism or any of the other missions that are unique to Special Forces. Only Special Forces have the capability to do those missions. Foreign Internal Defense (FID) and Security Force Assistance are the only mission areas that overlap. SFABs and Special Forces will be complementary. SFABs provide training in certain key competencies of conventional forces such as armor, artillery, or aviation for which Special Forces are too engaged with other missions to do on a large scale.”
“1st SFAB hosts activation ceremony: Heraldry announced”, U.S. Army, February 8, 2018.

Advising Capacity. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq soon exceeded the advising capacity of U.S. Army Special Forces and conventional ad hoc advisor teams were sent into the fray. The bottom line is that in order to keep U.S. combat forces from fighting other nations wars the foreign military forces need to be trained, advised, and assisted. There are just not enough SF ‘A teams’ to do this large-scale advising mission with indigenous forces.

What About the RAFs? Army BCTs have been implementing the Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) concept for a few years now. Where does the SFAB fit in? The BCTs doing the RAF mission in Asia and Europe are more focused on “larger-scale combined maneuver training with conventional forces of allies and partners”; although the BCT with the Africa RAF mission is doing more small-team advisory missions. So, it is possible that one of the six SFABs will have an Africa orientation.

Photo. 1st SFAB soldier on rifle range at Fort Benning, Ga. Photo by Markeith Horace.

Training

Home Station Training. Every unit that deploys to a combat zone has a checklist of pre-deployment training that has to be accomplished. This is usually done at home station (in this case Fort Benning). The usual events include range firing, medevac procedures, call for fire, small unit tactics, etc. Some unit members went through the Close Combat Tactical Training at the Clark Simulation Center at Ft. Benning. In addition to the ‘battlefield survival training’, some members of the SFAB received weeks of language, culture, and foreign weapons training.

Equipment Training. The SFAB was provided with new communications radios, UAVs, along with a variety of other equipment that had to be tested and for which training had to be conducted. Select members of the advisory teams trained on the RQ-11B Raven and RQ-20 Puma unmanned aircraft systems for 15 days at Ft. Benning.

Unit FTX. In October 2017 the 1st SFAB conducted a combined field training exercise at Fort Benning, Georgia that included all six battalions and the brigade headquarters. The exercise gave the SFAB the opportunity to focus on advise and assist tasks as members of advisory teams.

MATA. Some SFAB Soldiers attended the Combat Advisor Training Course (CATC) at the Military Advisor Training Academy (MATA) that was stood up in 2017 at Fort Benning, Georgia. Although the combat advisor course was intended to be six weeks long, the 1st SFAB Soldiers are reported to have attended an abbreviated two-week long course. The first course appears to have taken place in August with subsequent courses conducted through the remainder of the year. Two weeks just doesn’t seem like a long time to learn how to become an advisor. This is especially true when it comes to understanding the more complex aspects of human interaction (Kauffman, 2018) or how to leverage resources to persuade a counterpart into a specific course of action (Loidolt and Ballanco, 2018).

Photo. 1st SFAB personnel in training at MATA. Photo by SPC Noelle Wiehe, October 23, 2018.

JRTC. The SFAB conducted a Joint Readiness Training Center rotation at Fort Polk in January 2018. Usually JRTC rotations involve training in conventional warfighting tactics and functions that sharpen the skills of BCTs – with a focus on either counterinsurgency or ‘near-peer’ conflict. The conventional BCTs usually execute a decisive action training exercise that integrates forcible entry, defensive, and offensive operations.

Tailored Rotation. However, the 1st SFAB rotation (18-03) was specifically tailored for their Afghan deployment through various training, advising, assisting, accompanying, and enabling scenarios. The month-long event was geared for advisors and it put the advisor teams through several event lanes with different situational training events. A major training topic was the use of interpreters and interaction with Afghan counterparts. Other training activities provided opportunities to ‘negotiate’ with Afghan counterparts. About 1,000 Soldiers from the 10th Mountain Division based at Fort Drum, New York assisted the 1st SFAB with their mission readiness exercise. They served as exercise support and ANA role players.

Photo: B Co 3rd Bn 1st SFAB attends class at JRTC, January 2018.

CPX. While at JRTC the brigade and battalion staffs took part in a four-day Command Post Exercise designed to train the staffs on mission command as well as advising Afghan partners. The CPX exercised the SFAB’s staff on internal staff processes required for planning and preparing for current and future operations.

SFA Academy. Part of the JRTC training included the Security Force Assistance Academy – focused on Afghan culture and language. The course can be tailored for the unit attending. It is usually 8-10 days long.

Camp Buehring, Kuwait. The combat advisor teams of the 1st SFAB began their deployment in February and March 2018 – some of the personnel passing through Camp Buehring, Kuwait first. While in Kuwait selected personnel trained on the Egress Rollover Mine Resistant Ambush Protector (MRAP) Simulator and on Small Unmanned Arial Systems (SUAS) and Counter Unmanned Arial Systems (CUAS).

Force Disposition in Afghanistan

Once arriving in country in March 2018 the teams were spread across Afghanistan. The SFAB brigade headquarters was at FOB Lightening in Gardez in eastern Afghanistan. FOB Lightening is also the home base for NATO’s Task Force Southeast. Adjacent to FOB Lightening is FOB Thunder, the base of the ANA’s 203rd Corps. The subordinate battalions were dispersed across Afghanistan among the Train, Advise, and Assist Commands (TAACs) and worked primarily with brigade staffs.

The 1st SFAB brigade headquarters worked with the 203rd Corps. Assisting Task Force Southeast, the SFAB HQs worked along side their Afghan counterparts across all of the corps sections – advising and assisting where needed. At this level there are plenty of meetings, conferences, planning sessions, and daily battle update briefings to attend. These events are usually followed with discreet one-on-on meetings with Afghan counterparts. Typical of the type of work done with the 203rd Corps is the job description of Major Chris Welsh – who served as an advisor to Afghan intelligence personnel and found himself assisting in the 203rd’s Joint Operations Center (JOC).

The 1st Battalion was at Forward Operating Base Gamberi advising the 201st ANA Corps. The 201st Corps operates in Nuristan, Kunar, Nangarhar, Laghman, Panjshar, Parwan, and Kapisa. FOB Gamberi is the home of Train, Advise, and Assist Command – East (TAAC-East).

The 2nd Battalion was positioned in Kandahar province in southern Afghanistan. The battalion was tasked with advising elements of the ANA’s 205th Corps spread across three or four provinces. TAAC-South is the command in southern Afghanistan.

3rd Squadron, 1st SFAB was also based at FOB Lightning – from which it conducted ‘fly to advise‘ missions elsewhere in the 203rd Corps’ area of operations – such as FOB Altimur and other locations.

4th Battalion, 1st SFAB was based at Camp Arena in Herat province. This is the home of Train, Advise, and Assist Command – West (TAAC-West) which is led by the Italians. It is also where the Afghan National Army’s 207th Corps and the Afghan National Police’s 606 Zone is located. The 207th’s area included Ghor, Badghis, Farah, and Herat provinces.

The 5th Battalion was supposed to be in the south of Afghanistan but was diverted to assist in securing Kabul. The capital city was experiencing a high level of bombings conducted by the Taliban and Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP). The battalion advised Afghan police and army units responsible for the security of Kabul. While most of the SFAB advisor teams were advising the Afghan National Army (ANA), the 5th Battalion, due to its mission in Kabul, worked with many Afghan National Police (ANP) units that focused on the airport, roadways, and installation security. Initially five advisor teams were assigned to Kabul; but this number grew with the addition of eight more SFAB teams to combat the high profile attacks in the capital city.

The 6th Battalion worked in Helmand province advising the 215th Corps as well as other ANDSF organizations in other locations. The leading unit in Helmand province is the Marine Corps Task Force Southwest.

Photo. 4th Bn 1st SFAB attending a 3-day ops planning conference at Camp Arena, Herat. Advising Afghan counterparts on MDMP. Photo by Capt Adam Hendricks, July 9, 2018.

Some of the small advisory teams of the SFAB did not neatly follow the deployment and disposition as outlined above – there were some located in TAAC North’s area as well as ‘functional teams’ that traveled or worked throughout the country as the need arose. Some news reports stated that a few advisory teams were attached to NATO Special Operations Component Command – Afghanistan (NSOCC-A) assisting in the training of Afghan Commandos – although there is little information available in the public domain on that topic.

A DoD report issued in December 2018 stated that U.S. advisors ‘touched’ eight ANA brigades and 34 kandaks. SFAB Logistics Advisor Teams (LATs) provided training and assistance at all levels of the ANDSF. Of the 36 Combat Advising Teams (CATs), more than half were advising kandaks (probably more than one), several were advising brigades, and others were at the regional training centers.

Advising Below Corps Level

In January 2015 with the end of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission and beginning of the Resolute Support Mission (RSM) advising below Army corps and police zone level ceased. Tactical advising – a lower echelons of the ANDSF – was conducted by special operations forces and the Train, Advise, and Assist Command – Air (TAAC-Air). In time, it became apparent that some ANA brigades needed some help and Resolute Support HQs decided to employ Expeditionary Advisory Packages (EAPs) to deploy to Afghan brigade level on a temporary and as needed basis. The deployment of the 1st SFAB hopefully provided a more consistent advisory effort than the EAPs could provide at brigade level.

Advising at Kandak Level

SSG Christopher Humpheys, 1st SFAB, engages with Lt. Col. of 4th Kandak, 4th Bde, 203rd Corps. Aug 6, 2018. Photo by Lt. Aubrey Page, U.S. Navy, Aug 6, 2018.

The initial impression provided by the US Army while the 1st SFAB was forming up and training was that the 36 plus advisor teams would be located with and working at the kandak (battalion) level. This proved not to be the case once deployed to Afghanistan; at least not initially. Some news sources indicated that by June 2018 SFAB combat advisor teams were ’embedded’ with 26 Afghan army kandaks. This number likely grew as time went on. The term ’embedded’ can mean different things – it is likely that most of the teams were not truly ‘embedded‘. A DoD report issued in December 2018 indicates that teams did advise 34 kandaks.

According to ATP 3-96.1, Security Force Assistance Brigade, (May 2018) an SFAB is designed to field 36 advising teams at the company echelon and below. It also has the capability to form additional teams from its battalion and brigade staffs. These twelve-man teams have a variety of specialists in the operations, intelligence, fires, explosives, medical, logistics, communications, and maintenance fields. Some functional advisory elements were task organized to meet requirements and did not necessarily follow the 12-man construct.

There were a number of factors that limited advising at the kandak level during the initial deployment of the 1st SFAB in Afghanistan. One was the lack of adequate logistical preparation – to include lodging, transportation, and force protection. A second factor was the ‘vetting’ of Afghan units at kandak level to ensure that the insider threat would be mitigated. This included a process where Afghan and contract counterintelligence (CI) teams would interview brigade and kandak members – certainly a lengthy process.

The 1st SFAB stance is there was no delay due to CI vetting; that the kandak advisor teams had to wait until corps and brigade advisor teams were in place and functioning. That the delay in fielding advisor teams at kandak level was a natural progression from top down – and the CI vetting of Afghan units was slowly advancing downward to kandak level as necessary.

Photo. CPT David Zak 1st SFAB Afghanistan, advising ANA officer about security in Logar province, Afghanistan. Photo by Lt. Aubrey Page, U.S. Navy, Aug 7, 2018.

One of the more important functions of advising at the kandak level is to assist with synchronization of the effort. There are US and NATO advisors at the ministries and corps. In addition, some brigades are advised on a semi-permanent basis. But it is difficult to see if there is any positive effect of the advising effort at the institutional or operation level taking place at the kandak level. This is where the ‘fly-to-advise’ mission at the kandak level is helpful – having coalition eyes on the ground gauging the success of the advising effort at the higher levels. [4]

The frequency of advising at the kandak level is limited by a number of factors. Is the forward base secure enough for rotary wing to land in and to put a small contingent of advisors on the ground? Has the unit been vetted from a security standpoint (insider threat)? Other factors include the availability of an advisor team (there are more than 36 kandaks in the ANA), availability of helicopters, availability of ‘guardian angels’.

Fly to Advise

Photo: Advisors with the 1st SFAB in Afghanistan exit UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters during a routine fly-to-advise mission at FOB Altimur on Sep 9, 2018. Photo by Sean Kimmons, U.S. Army.

Initially most of the advisor teams from the 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade were working at corps or brigade level – but in time some were advising and assisting at the kandak level. The Afghan kandaks are usually located at forward bases which means the advisor teams have the option to embed full-time with the kandaks (as Special Forces teams are known to do, as the early Embedded Training Teams (ETTs) in the early 2000’s did, or as the SFAATs of the 2012-2014 era did). Usually the 1st SFAB teams did not embed – they visited on a periodic basis – (once referred to as Level II advising or Expeditionary Advising Package). The periodic visits could last for a couple of hours or several days. These visits are called “Fly to Advise” missions. [5] The latest DoD IG OFS report indicates that as many as 80% of the advisory missions to kandaks were ‘fly to advise’.

The majority of the fly-to-advise advisor teams were based on major U.S. or NATO bases and probably covered down on more than one kandak. The interaction at kandak level provides a glimpse – if only fleeting – of what is going on at that specific kandak.

Logistics Preparation

Some early news reports of the deployment indicate that the logistical preparation for the arrival of the 1st SFAB was not quite what it should have been. Housing, vehicles, and other aspects of logistics support are reported to have been inadequately prepared. Small, independent advisor teams spread out over a large area tend to rely on other units rather than their own internal and organic support. Sometimes the coordination and preparation of receiving advisor teams falls short; which, apparently happened in some cases with the 1st SFAB advisor teams. Many times the equipment, supplies, comms gear, and logistics caught up with the deployed teams.

Traveling the Roads

1st SFAB advisor teams working with higher level ANDSF units had the convenience (sometimes) of being located on bases adjacent to their ANDSF counterparts. Sometimes teams did a ‘fly-to-advise’ mission. But many times the advisor teams had to travel the roads. Improvised explosive devices set along the roadside are a constant threat to advisor teams traveling to and from the ANDSF location. To mitigate this the teams would either fly to that location or ride in armored vehicles (MRAPs, MATVs, etc.). In addition, units like the 509th Clearance Company, 5th Engineer Battalion would conduct route clearance missions ensuring safe travels along Afghanistan’s roads. [6]

Training TTPs

When a unit deploys to Afghanistan it will usually fall in on the TTPs of the previous unit that it replaced. But sometimes the new unit will develop some new TTPs that enhance its ability to do its mission. One such TTP is how the 1st SFAB produced videos to help train the ANDSF. The videos are a step-by-step method of training that are about five to ten minutes long and can be run on a laptop. Training topics include vehicle maintenance, functions check on weapons, how to set up a vehicle control point, and more. [7]

Insider Threat

Photo. SGT John White of 3rd ID provides security for 1st SFAB advisors in Pul-e Alam, Logar province, Afghanistan. Photo by U.S. Navy L. Aubrey Page, Aug 7, 2018.

Advisors in Afghanistan are at risk due to the insider threat that has taken the lives of many U.S. and NATO service members. In 2012 the number of attacks by Afghan security force members against Coalition service members reached its height. Advisor missions screeched to a halt until ISAF could develop and implement some procedures that could mitigate the threat. One of the steps taken was to implement the Guardian Angel process; where Soldiers were tasked with protection of advisor teams.

1st Battalion, 28th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Infantry Division took up this force protection mission and accompanied 1st SFAB to Afghanistan. The attached Soldiers from 1-28th coordinated and provided security for the combat advisor teams so the advisors could focus on interaction with their Afghan counterparts.

One member of the 1-28th, Corporal Joseph Maciel, died in July 2018 from wounds sustained during an apparent insider attack at Tarin Kowt airfield in Uruzgan province, Afghanistan while attached to 2nd Battalion, 1st SFAB. Command Sergeant Major Timothy Bolyard of 3rd Squadron, 1st SFAB, was killed in September 2018 by an Afghan policeman at Camp Maiwand – the base for 4th Brigade, 203rd Corps (located at the former FOB Shank in Logar province).

Lessons Learned

Photo: By Lt Aubrey Page, U.S. Navy, August 5, 2018.

The Army is famous for publishing ‘Lessons Learned’ and there are thousands of papers and publications with these lessons documented from the deployments of Army units to Afghanistan over the past 17 years. Many of these are on the topic of training the ANDSF. [8] No doubt there will be – in time – plenty of lessons learned from the 1st SFAB deployment. Unfortunately, many of these will have a classification of FOUO or higher and will not be available for public reading. Hopefully the lessons learned will not end up being just ‘lessons observed’. However, some information is slowly seeping out into the public domain and on social media. A few are noted below.

Rush to Deploy. The 1st SFAB was supposed to have a full year to gear up for its mission. However, the Trump administration’s new South Asia Strategy included an increase in U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan with an emphasis on advising at the tactical level – and the 1st SFAB got its deployment moved up so it would arrive prior to the 2018 summer fighting season. Unfortunately, this shortened its stand-up period by several months and the six-week long advisor academy (MATA) was reduced to two-weeks.

“As we began our training last summer, the United States announced the South Asia Strategy, a critical component of which was increased tactical-level advising. The Army directed our units to prepare for an early 2018 deployment to support that strategy, and we modified our recruiting and training programs to ensure we would be ready.”
Colonel Scott Jackson, 1st SFAB Commander, speaking during a teleconference from Kabul, Afghanistan on June 13, 2018.

Mortar Training. 1st SFAB advisors note that more time is needed to train up the ANDSF on the employment of mortars. This means more pre-deployment training on mortars and perhaps the attachment of additional infantry specialists. [9]

Photo: CORE IMS training for 209th Corps by 1st SFAB personnel at Kunduz.

Afghan Logistics. The Afghans still haven’t figured out how to run their logistics enterprise. The 1st SFAB found they needed to stress logistics training with the ANDSF. This should not have been a surprise – mountains of paperwork and terabytes of reports have documented the logistical woes of the logistical system from ministry level down to the kandak and police district beginning in 2002 up to the present day.

Leaving the Wire – Not so Much. The 1st SFAB found that it is not ‘going out on patrols’ as much as it had anticipated. This is probably due to the fact that much of the train, advise, and assist mission is on staff functions such as personnel, intelligence, operations planning, logistics, and communications – in the past referred to as ‘Functionally-Based Security Force Assistance’ or FB-SFA. These training activities are best done at the corps, brigade, or kandak headquarters on secure Afghan bases. (Of course, there is travel required to get to these bases). Most, except perhaps TAA by NSOCC-A and TAAC-Air, security force assistance activities now done in Afghanistan is on functional processes and systems and less on employment of the ANDSF in combat operations.

Photo. Member of 3rd Squadron advising on EOD techniques.

Old Problems. Some things never change in Afghanistan. The 1st SFAB found that many of the problems found in the Afghan security forces a decade ago continue to exist today. These include poor logistics, lack of communication, sustainment, ammunition resupply, vehicle repair, corruption, equipment maintenance, mission command, and a reliance on static checkpoints.

SFAB Advisory Network. One of the more important contributions the advisor teams could make is to help the Afghan chain of command resolve problems at the kandak level. Since advisor teams were observing the situation at the kandak level issues could be passed up the SFAB advisor network to advisor teams working at brigade and corps level. When the SFABs and SFAATs were deployed in 2012-2014 this was referred to as the “OC Net”; with hard to solve problems ending up at the Security Force Assistance Center (SFAC) in Kabul.

“By coming out here at the kandak level, we’re really integrating that advising network at all levels to make sure everything is synchronized and everyone is talking. That’s what really makes this mission unique.”
SFC Jeremiah Velex, Combat Advisor Team 1312, 3rd Squadron, 1st SFAB, Nov 5, 2018.

Flexibility. The SFAB deployed over 60 advisory elements throughout Afghanistan. Most advisor teams were 12 personnel strong although there were certainly smaller specialized advisory elements. The brigade had advisor elements with every Train, Advise, and Assist Command (TAAC) as well as with the Task Forces (TFs). Some teams operated at the corps level and in the Regional Military Training Centers (RMTC) while others were at brigade and kandak level.

The SFAB demonstrated the flexibility to tailor the advisory approach to changing ground conditions and provide advisor teams where it was needed. Midway through its deployment the brigade shifted assets to the Regional Military Training Centers (RMTCs) and the Kabul Security Force. Whether this was where the advisory teams were needed or if it was easier to support the teams at this location is a valid question.

ANDSF Reliance on Air Power. The inclination of the Afghan army in the conduct of offensive operations has been always to request and wait for air support from the U.S. (and now from the Afghan Air Force). This is still true today. The Afghan Air Force is slowly coming up to speed in its capability to support the army and police.

What Has the 1st SFAB Accomplished in Afghanistan?

There is not a lot of substantive news reports about the 1st SFAB in Afghanistan. Very few embeds by the media have taken place so the news stories on the mil blogs are quite infrequent. The US Army certainly has been active in spreading the ‘official’ word – providing vignettes showing that the advisor teams are doing great work. Some of the news stories provided by DoD and the U.S. Army indicate that the SFAB advisor teams assisted the Afghan National Army in the following areas.

Integration of Afghan air and ground assets
Logistical planning
Operational planning
Establishing or assisting in Artillery Leaders Courses
Training in land navigation

The presence of combat advisor teams at kandak and brigade level certainly provided an enhanced level of awareness on the status of the ANDSF. After the SFAATs of the 2012-2014 era were pulled off kandaks and brigades the accuracy of reporting from the Afghan army went downhill quickly. So did the combat effectiveness of those units. The ability of an advisor team to observe a kandak (even for a short period of time) is invaluable to assessing the status of the ANA.

The Chairman of the Chiefs of Joint Staff General Joe Dunford visited the SFAB in Afghanistan. Dunford is no stranger to the Security Force Assistance mission in Afghanistan. He was the commander of ISAF during the transition of U.S forces from combat operations to the functionally-based security force assistance mission. He seemed pleased with what he saw in the SFABs accomplishments.

“I am actually very encouraged by all the feedback from the Afghans and the SFAB. We have the right organizational construct for 2018, and the advisors we are bringing in are the right people, at the right level, with the right training.”
Gen Joe Dunford, FOB Gamberi, Afghanistan, March 21, 2018.

Conclusion

Photo: 1st SFAB Uncasing the Colors Ceremony at Fort Benning, Georgia. Dec 2018.

Using the information currently available it appears that the 1st SFAB had a successful deployment. The brigade formed, trained up for the mission, and deployed advisor teams across the country of Afghanistan. The SFAB deployed both ground-maneuver-focused teams as well as specialty teams focused on engineering, field artillery, intelligence, communications, and logistics. Many of these teams very likely improved the capability of their advised units to fight the Taliban. The impact, however, should not be overstated. The SFAB likely made an ‘incremental difference’ during its deployment; not a ‘strategic difference” The Afghan conflict is still ongoing and will continue for a long time.

“The natural question that comes after any combat deployment is ‘did I make a difference’. I will tell you, looking across the entire theater the last nine months, the answer is yes.”
General Scott Jackson, Fort Benning, December 3, 2018.

The employment of a professional advisor unit in Afghanistan, whose personnel were selected and trained for their job, is a step in the right direction for the U.S. Army. Hopefully the 2nd SFAB will integrate the lessons learned from the 1st SFAB deployment and continue with the fielding of professional combat advisors to Afghanistan.

Footnotes:

[1] For more on the rationale for SFABs see “All Things SFAB – Explainer of Security Force Assistance Brigades”, SOF News, October 10, 2017.

[2] For SF acceptance of the SFAB concept see “SOF and the Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs)”, SOF News, June 21, 2017.

[3] See “Beret for Soldiers of 1st SFAB – Concern in SF Community”, SOF News, October 29, 2017.

[4] There are three levels of advising in Afghanistan.
www.afghanwarnews.info/sfa/levels-of-advising.htm

[5] See Advising at the Corps and Below, Soldiers ensure Afghans are ready to fight, Army.mil, November 5, 2018.
https://www.army.mil/article/213367

[6] See “Home in time for the holidays”, Guidon, November 29, 2018 for more about the 509th Clearance Company assisting the 1st SFAB.

[7] For more on training videos see “1st SFAB Soldiers produce videos to help train Afghan defense forces”, Army Public Affairs, October 23, 2018.

[8] See Reconstructing the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), September 2017, 283 pages.
https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/lessonslearned/SIGAR-17-62-LL.pdf

[9] For the need to emphasize mortar and logistics training see “Afghan Forces Need More Mortar Training, Army Advisors Say”, Military.com, August 29, 2018.

References:

News Reports about 1st SFAB
http://www.afghanwarnews.info/sfa/1st-SFAB-news.htm

1st Security Force Assistance Brigade – Fort Benning
https://www.benning.army.mil/Tenant/1-SFAB/

1st SFAB Facebook
https://www.facebook.com/1SFAB/

1st SFAB Flickr
https://www.flickr.com/photos/1sfab/

1st SFAB DVIDS
https://www.dvidshub.net/unit/1sfab

Videos:

November 13, 2018. Shoulder to Shoulder, U.S. Army, 5 mins. An explanation of the 1st SFAB’s mission in Afghanistan.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UaP13PaWiEo

June 12, 2018. Assistance Brigade Commander Provides Resolute Support Update, Defense.gov, 34 mins. Army Col. Scott Jackson, 1st SFAB cdr, briefs Pentagon reporters on 1st SFAB in Afghanistan (100-day mark).
https://dod.defense.gov/Videos/videoid/607256/

March, 6, 2018. 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade, U.S. Army. A five-minute long video explaining the training and mission of the 1st SFAB.
www.sof.news/video/video-1st-sfab/

Photos:

All photos from U.S. Army or DoD, 2017 – 2018.

Cobra Strike Maneuver Course – ANASOC

SOF News — Fri, 28 Sep 2018 05:00:09 +0000

The Cobra Strike Maneuver Course (CSMC) conducted at Camp Scorpion is the Afghan National Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC) School of Excellence (SOE) training venue for developing the fighting skills of entire Commando Special Operations Kandak’s (SOKs). The Commandos learn to fight while mounted from the Mobile Strike Force Vehicle (MSFV) as well as when dismounted to conduct patrols and urban warfare. In early 2018 ANASOC fielded its first Cobra Strike Kandak.

The MSFVs are heavily armored, mine-resistant wheeled vehicles capable of employing a variety of heavy weapons from their 360-degree turrets. Hundreds of these vehicles have been deployed to Afghanistan over the past several years. The MSFV is a 4×4 armored vehicle that offers a high level of ballistic protection as well as blast protection.

Afghan Commandos training at the Cobra Strike Maneuver Course (CSMC) conducting night maneuvers near Kabul, Afghanistan. Commandos can operate at night with sophisticated night vision mounted on their Mobile Strike Vehicles (MSVs) that provide fire power during operations. (Photo by U.S. Army Master Sgt. Felix Figueroa, NSOCC-A, Sep 2018).

Some of the Mobile Strike Force kandaks that were part of the conventional side of the Afghan National Army were transferred to ANASOC. Initially these units, at the time called ANA Mobile Strike Force (MSF) Kandaks, were assigned to the ANA corps. The MSF Kandaks were designed to provide the ANA with a robust quick reaction force.

Since the start of CSMC, U.S. and NATO mentors forming ANASOC’s Special Operations Advisory Team (SOAT) have trained approximately 1,000 Commandos to plan and execute missions beyond the standard infantry Ranger training model taught at SOE Commando Qualification Course (CDOQC).

“Commandos here at CSMC learn to incorporate all available assets in order to maximize fire power against a very determined enemy.” (Maj. Trevor Phillips, ANASOC CSMC-SOAT Commander, Special Operations Detachment-North).

The 12-week Cobra Strike training course evaluates Commandos on 28 platoon and company-level collective tasks essential for combat operations. As graduation approaches, Commandos spend time conducting day and night live fire mission planning and execution, using the MSFV’s to support dismounted Commandos during training scenarios. Once the Commandos graduate, the Mobile Strike Kandaks (MSKs) earn the Cobra Strike Kandak (CSK) designation. Cobra Strike Kandaks are employed nation-wide, in concert with existing Commando forces, providing an unprecedented level of additional movement and lethality for the Commando force.

“This is a NATO effort to stabilize Afghanistan. [With] the training these Commandos receive, the Taliban and ISIS-K simply cannot stand up to them.” (Captain Mike, a Latvian team captain with the ANASOC CSMC-SOAT, Sep 2018).

Afghan Commandos assigned to a Mobile Strike Kandak (MSK) conduct dismounted movement towards a training objective during the Cobra Strike Maneuver Course (CSMC) near Kabul. (Photo by MSG Felix Figueroa, NSOCC-A, Sep 2018).

As a testament to the training Commandos receive, Fifth Mobile Strike Kandak (MSK), the group currently undergoing training, received activation orders, which interrupted training, to go fight and defeat the Taliban, assist in stabilizing, securing, and clearing operations in Ghazni, eventually returning a portion of the group to complete training.

Afghan Commandos training at the Cobra Strike Maneuver Course (CSMC) near Kabul, Afghanistan, test fire infrared (IR) smoke canisters from their Mobile Strike Vehicle (MSV). Daytime firing assists in understanding vehicle capabilities, for employment during night training and operations. (Photo by U.S. Army Master Sgt. Felix Figueroa, NSOCC-A, Sep 2018).

According to Phillips, many are still heavily involved in Ghazni operations against returning Taliban. Cadre in communication with Fifth MSK still in the fight, incorporate acquired combat information into on-going training, streamlining battle-drills and reaction time for new Commandos preparing to join the fight against Afghanistan’s threat.

“When employed properly, Cobra Strike Kandaks can bring forth the violence of action necessary to defeat enemy forces threatening the lives of Afghans, and Afghanistan’s security,” said Phillips. “My team is very lucky and grateful to have had the opportunity to partake in such an important mission, shaping the biggest game changer on the battlefield today.” (Maj Phillips).

The Afghan four-year modernization plan calls for the doubling of size of the Afghan Special Security Forces or ASSF. The Commando force will increase in size. According to DoD reports 70% of the offensive operations by the Afghan security forces are conducted by Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF).

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Top Photo: Latvian SOF officer is briefed by an Afghan officer assigned to an ANASOC Mobile Strike Kandak during the Cobra Strike Maneuver Course near Kabul. Photo by MSG Felix Figueroa, NSOCC-A, Sep 2018.

The Stabilization Assistance Review and Burden Sharing

SOF News — Thu, 13 Sep 2018 05:00:07 +0000

Members of NATO-ISAF DCOS-STAB, US Army Corps of Engineers, and Donors Conduct a Coordination Meeting with the Afghan Ministry of Energy and Water to Coordinate Projects (2011)

The Stabilization Assistance Review and Burden Sharing

“A Construct for Leveraging
Stabilization Actors and their Capabilities”

This is the third article in a three-part series published in SOF News and focused on implementing the Stabilization Assistance Review. It builds on the two previous articles; Implementing the Stabilization Assistance Review (SAR) and Stabilization Environments and the Range of Military Operations. The Stabilization Assistance Review will likely have a significant impact on how the Department of Defense (DoD) participates in stabilization activities. Embracing a common theme from the current administration, the Stabilization Assistance Review says that “there is no public appetite to repeat the large-scale reconstruction efforts of the past”; and goes on to proffer a requirement for, “a more purposeful division of labor and burden-sharing with multilateral bodies…”. The review recommends that DoD be relegated largely to a supporting role, and it is unlikely that the department will see the large funding streams authorized during the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq such as the Commander’s Emergency Response Program, and the Afghan Infrastructure Fund. For those of us within DoD who wish to continue to be active participants in stabilization, but are faced with significantly reduced stabilization funding, we will need to embrace the burden sharing concept articulated in the Stabilization Assistance Review by leveraging other stabilization actors to our advantage.

The 2019 NDAA did not include any Defense Support to Stabilization (DSS) language or associated funding. The failure of congress to include DSS in the 2019 NDAA is certainly not helpful, but neither is it a show stopper. DoD, either in the lead (usually a non-permissive environment) or in a supporting role (permissive environment), can continue to be a major player in stabilization activities. Whether executing our core stabilization tasks as articulated in DODI 3000.05 “Stability Operations” and the soon to be released DODD 3000.05 “Stabilization” of providing security, public order, and immediate needs; or by conducting our reinforcing stabilization tasks which include targeted basic services and critical infrastructure repair, DoD can play a significant role. But to do this we must adjust our processes in order to conform to the stabilization burden sharing concept and better leverage the stabilization contributions of various non-U.S. actors (our coalition partners both military and civilian, and to a lesser degree Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO), Private Volunteer Organizations (PVO), and other donors).

The following construct provides a framework for implementing the burden sharing concept. It can be employed in support of our current Joint Operations doctrine (Joint Publication 3-0), and would have its greatest impact during phases 2 “Seize the Initiative”, 3 “Dominate”, and 4 “Stabilize” when DoD might be the lead for stabilization and the environment might preclude DOS and USAID from having a meaningful presence (see figure 1). The construct has four steps; information gathering, requirements determination and prioritization, resource allocation, and synchronization.

Although the construct suggests a sequential execution, the reality is that changes in the environment will cause a constant review and updating of all steps simultaneously. A form of this construct can be executed at any level, strategic to tactical, but the primary location should be within the country that the stabilization activities are taking place. To implement the construct the USG should leverage either an existing Combined Joint Interagency Working Group (CJIAWG) type organization, or establish a CJIAWG if one does not exist. Civil Affairs officers can be particularly useful as members of this group given their in-depth understanding of the human terrain and their access.

In the information gathering step the CJIAWG reviews the DOS, DoD, and USAID strategies and plans for the country in question. This analysis results in the end states to be achieved, the milestones that lead to those end states, and the major areas or sectors within which stabilization activities will occur. This analysis will also produce priorities that will help guide the process. At the same time the group identifies various non-USG stabilization actors co-occupying the same space.

During the requirements determination and prioritization step the group develops a list of stabilization projects or initiatives that conforms to the strategies and plans reviewed in previous step. Sources of information can vary widely. Civil Affairs units offer especially insightful information based upon their understanding of the country and their time spent in the field. Each requirement should be submitted with amplifying information to include cost estimates. The initial product is a list of projects or initiatives, broken into sectors. The group then rank orders the list of requirements.

During the resource allocation step there may be select projects that the USG may wish to execute ourselves, so the appropriate department or agency can be aligned with those requirements. Our coalition partners may wish to focus their efforts on a particular area or region of the country, or on a specific sector of stabilization activities such as health care or electrical power. So those resources could be allocated accordingly. In addition, various NGOs and PVOs should also be considered. But the USG leads for coordinating with these organizations are DOS and USAID. They should seek to work with appropriate NGOs & PVOs in order to maximize their capabilities against the list of requirements. A possible lever the USG can use to facilitate cooperation is security. By offering security, these actors might be motivated to support our requirements. But we must understand that these organizations usually seek to keep their position neutral, therefore they tend to distance from the military. Engagements with NGOs and PVOs should be sensitive to this.

The final step of the construct is synchronization of the execution of the stabilization activities. Combat operations may take an extended period of time. The requirement for stabilization activities do not wait for conflict to end. The greater the gap between the end of combat operations and the start of stabilization activities, the greater the opportunity for malign actors to gain a competitive advantage. Therefore the CJIAWG should, to the greatest extent possible, coordinate the execution of stabilization activities with combat operations, ensuring requisite security is in place to support the execution of the projects, and that the stabilization activities are prepared to be executed as soon as practical on completion of the combat operations in order to consolidate gains. All of this information can be captured in a spreadsheet and sorted by priority, sector, implementer, timeframe, etc. as shown in Figure 2.

Despite the recommendations outlined in the Stabilization Assistance Review, DoD can be a more active participant in stabilization activities. But to do so we must become more adept at employing a burden sharing approach that leverages the capabilities of all stabilization actors, and reduces the costs to the USG.

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Photo and Images. All photos and images provided by the author.

About the Author: Charles Barham is a retired U.S. Army Colonel with 29 years of service (1981-2010). He also served for four years as a Department of the Army Civilian Management and Program Analyst in the Afghanistan/Pakistan Hands Program (2010-2014). He currently serves as a Department of the Air Force Civilian Management and Program Analyst at USCENTCOM in an Interagency Planner capacity.

He served for more than three years in Afghanistan as; Assistant Director of the Police Reform Directorate, Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan 2006-2007, Senior Socioeconomic Advisor in HQ ISAF-DCOS/STAB under Generals David Petraeus and John Allen 2011, as Deputy Director of the NATO/Afghan Transformation Task Force, HQ ISAF under General Joseph Dunford 2013, and as a Senior Planning, Programing and Budgeting Advisor to the Afghan National Army Special Operations Command.

He has served for over six years in HQCENTCOM in positions including Senior Socioeconomic Advisor and Interagency Planner. He has a Bachelor of Science in Business Administration from the University of Richmond, a Master of Business Administration from Oklahoma City University, and a Master of Strategic Studies from the U.S. Army War College.

Stabilization Environments and the Range of Military Operations

SOF News — Thu, 02 Aug 2018 05:00:13 +0000

Stabilization Environments and the Range of Military Operations

“Implementing the Stabilization Assistance Review”

This article is the second in a series of SOF News articles addressing the Stabilization Assistance Review. It discusses multiple stabilization environments in the context of implementing the Stabilization Assistance Review. At the same time it looks at current Department of Defense (DoD) doctrine which includes a range of military operations which can be overlaid on these environments. In order for the United States Government (USG) to be successful in implementing the Stabilization Assistance Review, Department of State (DOS), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and DoD must take a holistic approach that addresses stabilization activities across all stabilization environments and across the full range of military operations.

There are three basic “stabilization environments”. These environments are based on the similar “zones” (peace, gray zone, war) that are articulated in a USSOCOM White Paper “The Gray Zone”. The stabilization environments are: Stable, the Gray Zone, and Unstable environments. These environments are depicted in Figure 1 “Stabilization Environments”. What distinguishes countries in these environments is their capability in the stabilization functions of security, governance, and service delivery, which are drawn from Joint Publication 3-07 “Stability”. Countries in the stable environment demonstrate adequate capabilities across all three functions.

Countries in the gray zone environment are usually “fragile” countries who suffer shortfalls in one or more functions; while countries in the unstable environment are usually failed states who suffer significant issues across one or more functions.

Over time a country may move through more than one of these environments. As depicted in figure 1 by the black dashed line, a stable country may become unstable or fragile due to one or more issues within the three stabilization functions. If left unchecked, the country may suffer serious issues across these functions and slip into the unstable environment and become a failed state. If corrective actions are taken then it is possible this country may start to re-stabilize and eventually move back towards the stable environment. So what are DoD’s stabilization activities across these environments?

Ask most DoD members when stabilization activities occur in the range of military operations and they would say “Phase IV – Stabilize”. This is a sub-optimal response that fails to maximize stabilization activities and their effects. In reality, stabilization activities can be, and are conducted across the full range of military operations. To help explain what DoD’s stabilizations activities are across these environments we can overlay onto the stabilization environments the range of military operations mentioned earlier in this article (Figure 2). As discussed in Joint Publication 3-0 “Operations”, the range of military operations are; Phase 0 – Shaping, Phase 1 – Deter, Phase 2 – Seize the initiative, Phase 3 – Dominate, Phase 4 – Stabilize, and Phase 5 – Return to civilian control.

Countries we assess to be stable are in the green or stable zone in figure 1. In this situation, from a DoD perspective, this is our “shaping” phase of operations and our stabilization activities might only include our normal security cooperation activities as identified in our country plans, and perhaps an occasional instance of foreign humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

However, if a country is fragile it is normally in the gray zone where we would normally be conducting deterrence operations. In addition to the aforementioned Phase 0 stabilization activities, DoD would leverage assets such as Civil Affairs Teams who are deployed out amongst the population, seeing first-hand what the issues are and making recommendations for stabilization activities. Working through the country team, Civil Affairs Teams nominate these activities to insure they support DOS and USAID plans and strategies, and if concurred with, they can implement these activities. Working in close coordination with our USG interagency partners, as well as other international community actors, we could re-stabilize fragile countries. This is similar to the old saying of “an ounce of prevention …”. Activities in the Gray Zone Environment and Phase 1 is where the three main USG Organization (DoD, DOS and USAID) can offer the greatest return on our stabilization dollars.

Countries that are unstable or failed states are in the red or unstable environment. DoD will likely be called upon to conduct combat operations to initially seize the initiative (Phase 2), then dominate our opponent (Phase 3). It is important to remember that stabilization activities may occur throughout both of these phases as DoD leverages Civil Affairs capabilities as well as other assets to provide for security, public order, and human needs; and in support of DOS and USAID activities if they are present.

As combat operations terminate DoD transitions to Phase 4 and the focus is squarely on stabilizing the country. For countries that have undergone combat operations the scope of stabilization activities in this phase can be significant. This would be “… the pound of cure” that could have been prevented in Phase 1 mentioned earlier. These Phase IV stabilization activities should help drive the country back towards the gray zone environment initially and ultimately back into the stable environment.

The Stabilization Assistance Review is largely focused on Phase IV “Stabilize” activities conducted in “conflict affected” countries, rather than stabilization efforts during the earlier phases within the range of military operations. By focusing on conflict affected the Stabilization Assistance Review addresses the greatest stabilization challenge we might face, but it misses our greatest opportunity for success and our ability to achieve our highest return on stabilization investment by taking action sooner.

The Stabilization Assistance Review does mention “conflict prevention” but mostly in passing. In order for the USG to be successful in implementing the Stabilization Assistance Review we must take a more holistic approach to stabilization by planning and executing stabilization activities across all of the stabilization environments, and across the full range of military operations as demonstrated in Figure 3 “The Holistic Approach to Stabilization Activities” below.

By conducting a comparatively small amount of stabilization activities during Phases 0 and 1 we can keep stable countries stable and help guide fragile countries back to stability. At the same time we are reducing unstable environments where violent extremist organizations and insurgent groups can form and grow. This is in effect the “Ounce of Prevention”. If we focus our efforts in conflict affected countries we are forgoing this opportunity and will pay a far greater price, “the pound of cure”, later in Phase 4. Taking a holistic approach that considers all stabilization environments, and the full range of military operations offers the best chance for the USG to be successful in implementing the Stabilization Assistance Review.

Figures: All charts are by the author.

Editorial Note: The use of ‘gray zone’ and ‘grey zone’ is common and interchangeable among national security writers.

Counterinsurgency Archives - SOF News

Afghan Conflict – A Look Back at 2020

Afghan News Summary

Security

Taliban

ANDSF

Resolute Support

Peace Negotiations

Commentary

Governance, Economy and Development

Books, Reports, and Publications

Podcasts, Webcasts, and Videos

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Report – Counterterrorism in East, North and West Africa

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JSOU Report: CT, SOF, Informal Governance in Burkina Faso

No Such Thing as a Perfect Partner: The Challenges of “By, With, and Through”

No Such Thing as a Perfect Partner

Taking A Peacebuilding Approach to Working with Local Partners

Conclusion

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Notes

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U.S. Counterterrorism in Africa

Somalia

Lake Chad Basin

Sahel Region

Libya

U.S. Partners in Africa

Root Causes of Discontent

Future U.S. CT Engagement in Africa?

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Report – Counterterrorism Operations in Africa – OIG Feb 2020

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1st SFAB in Afghanistan – A Successful Deployment?

Reasons for an SFAB

SFAB Concept

Doctrine and TTPs

Establishment of 1st SFAB

Initial Hiccups at Startup

Training

Force Disposition in Afghanistan

Advising Below Corps Level

Advising at Kandak Level

Fly to Advise

Logistics Preparation

Traveling the Roads

Training TTPs

Insider Threat

Lessons Learned

What Has the 1st SFAB Accomplished in Afghanistan?

Conclusion

Footnotes:

References:

Videos:

Photos:

Cobra Strike Maneuver Course – ANASOC

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The Stabilization Assistance Review and Burden Sharing

The Stabilization Assistance Review and Burden Sharing

“A Construct for Leveraging Stabilization Actors and their Capabilities”

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Stabilization Environments and the Range of Military Operations

Stabilization Environments and the Range of Military Operations

“Implementing the Stabilization Assistance Review”

“A Construct for Leveraging
Stabilization Actors and their Capabilities”