(CENTCOM press release, 16 Jan 2024). On 11 January 2024, while conducting a flag verification, U.S. CENTCOM Navy forces conducted a night-time seizure of a dhow conducting illegal transport of advanced lethal aid from Iran to resupply Houthi forces in Yemen as part of the Houthis’ ongoing campaign of attacks against international merchant shipping.

U.S. Navy SEALs operating from USS Lewis B Puller (ESB 3), supported by helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), executed a complex boarding of the dhow near the coast of Somalia in international waters of the Arabian Sea, seizing Iranian-made ballistic missile and cruise missiles components. Seized items include propulsion, guidance, and warheads for Houthi medium range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), as well as air defense associated components. Initial analysis indicates these same weapons have been employed by the Houthis to threaten and attack innocent mariners on international merchant ships transiting in the Red Sea.

This is the first seizure of lethal, Iranian-supplied advanced conventional weapons (ACW) to the Houthis since the beginning of Houthi attacks against merchant ships in November 2023. The interdiction also constitutes the first seizure of advanced Iranian-manufactured ballistic missile and cruise missile components by the U.S. Navy since November 2019. The direct or indirect supply, sale, or transfer of weapons to the Houthis in Yemen violates U.N. Security Resolution 2216 and international law.

Two U.S. Navy SEALs previously reported as lost at sea were directly involved in this operation. “We are conducting an exhaustive search for our missing teammates,” said General Michael Erik Kurilla, USCENTCOM Commander.

The dhow was deemed unsafe and sunk by U.S. Navy forces. Disposition of the 14 dhow crewmembers is being determined in accordance with international law.

“It is clear that Iran continues shipment of advanced lethal aid to the Houthis. This is yet another example of how Iran actively sows instability throughout the region in direct violation of U.N. Security Resolution 2216 and international law,” said General Michael Erik Kurilla, “We will continue to work with regional and international partners to expose and interdict these efforts, and ultimately to reestablish freedom of navigation.”

****

This article was first published by U.S. Central Command on January 16, 2024.
https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3645241/uscentcom-seizes-iranian-advanced-conventional-weapons-bound-for-houthis/

Photos from CENTCOM Twitter account dated January 16, 2024. Map by SOF News derived from CIA maps (view larger version). Information about Vessel Boarding Search and Seizure (VBSS) operations. Also known as Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure.

The Iranian Embassy siege took place from April 30 to May 5, 1980. A group of six armed Arab men stormed the Iranian Embassy in London. They took 26 hostages – demanding safe passage out of the United Kingdom and the release of Arab prisoners held by the Iranian government in Khuzestan Province, Iran. On the sixth day the armed men killed a hostage and threw his body out of the embassy. Shortly afterward the elite Special Air Service conducted Operation Nimrod to rescue the remaining hostages.

Hostages. The hostages included embassy staff, several visitors, and a police officer who was guarding the embassy. The hostage takers demands were release of 91 Arab prisoners in Khuzestan Province, Iran and safe passage out of the United Kingdom. The British government did not accede to the demands and a standoff ensued. Negotiations resulted in the release of five hostages for some air time for the hostage takers on British television.

Hostage Takers. The Arabs who took the hostages were members of the Democratic Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of Arabistan (DRFLA). These were Iranian Arabs who wanted to establish an autonomous Arab state in the southern region of the Iranian province of Khuzestan (Google maps) on the border of southern Iraq and the Persian Gulf. The province was rich in oil. Some members of the hostage takers were politically active in Iran and had been subject to interrogations by the Iranian secret police – the SAVAK. The Arabs had arrived in Britain in March 1980 and while there acquired firearms, ammunition, and grenades – possibly provided by the Iraq embassy in London.

Rescue Force. The Special Air Service is a regiment of the British Army – part of the UK’s special forces. It was formed during the Second World War to conduct special operations and irregular warfare. After the Munich massacre at the 1972 Olympic Games in Germany and the many airline hijackings of the early 1970s, some western nations established or realigned special forces units to have a counter-terrorism capability. The SAS became the United Kingdom’s primary anti-hijacking and counter-terrorist unit. The raiding party of the SAS for Operation Nimrod numbered from 30 to 35 soldiers.

First Day. The hostage event took place at mid-day on April 30, 1980. Police responded immediately and within hours journalists and camera crews set up watch in front of the Embassy and began broadcasting live. The police were in charge of the overall response to the terrorist event and provided the negotiation team. Between the first day and the last day of the siege negotiations took place and some hostages were released. However, the hostage takers were becoming increasing frustrated – realizing their demands were not being met by the British authorities.

Sixth Day. On the sixth day of the siege, May 5, 1980, the Arabs killed a hostage and threw his body out of the embassy. The British government decided to attempt a rescue of the remaining hostages. The task was given to the Special Air Service (SAS). Members of the SAS rappelled from the roof of the embassy and entered the building through the windows. The raid lasted less than 20 minutes resulting in five of the six hostage takers killed and the rescue of the hostages; except one. A single hostage was killed during the rescue and two wounded. The one hostage taker who survived served 27 years in prison, was paroled in 2008, and lives in England. The raid took place in full view of journalists who were covering the event and it was broadcast in real time on live television.

Aftermath. Operation Nimrod brought the Special Air Service back into the public spotlight; enhancing its already stellar reputation. It also was a source of pride for Britain; as it occurred the same time that the U.S. Embassy in Tehran was held by Iranian revolutionary students and the failed U.S. rescue attempt – Operation Eagle Claw. The successful raid prompted many United Kingdom citizens to apply for the unit. The 22 SAS had multiple requests by other governments around the world for training its anti-terrorist forces. Members of the SAS were also requested by other nations for advise during hostage or terrorist events. The 22 SAS, as well as the 21 SAS and 23 SAS – two regiments from the volunteer Territorial Army, were safe from any force reductions and received increased funding as a result of the success of Operation Nimrod.

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References:

Iranian Embassy Siege – Wikipedia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iranian_Embassy_siege

Iranian Embassy Siege – National Army Museum
https://www.nam.ac.uk/explore/iranian-embassy-siege

Photo: The Iranian embassy in London, severely damaged by fire after the Iranian siege. Photo by Steve White, 2008. Creative Commons 2.0.

By CW4 Charles Davis, U.S. Army.

In 2014 Rand Corporation analysts stated: “The U.S. drawdown from Afghanistan may lead to greater instability and a vacuum in that country. The Islamic Republic of Iran, one the most powerful regional actors in Afghanistan, is poised to exercise substantial influence there after the U.S. drawdown.” [1] The Rand product also suggested Iran would likely leverage its influence to alleviate political and economic pressures associated with the country’s ongoing nuclear program. Seven years later these forecasts seem to be ringing true. Iranian political and military leadership are diligently shoring up old relationships to place the country in a position of strength throughout the region. 

The SOUFAN Center, a non-profit strategic analysis organization, also believes Iran is posturing to reinforce its influence base within the new Taliban government. In its August 26, 2021 INTELBRIEF [2], SOUFAN indicated “Iranian officials began meeting with Taliban insurgent leaders, and Iran hosted a senior Taliban delegation in Tehran in February 2021.” SOUFAN assesses Tehran is hoping to stabilize its borders and  reduce the flow of refugees into Iran, which hosts some 600,000 documented and two million undocumented Afghans. While many of these predominantly Shia refugees are not likely to rush home to a country led by staunch Sunni fundamentalists with a history of Shia abuses, Iran is probably hopeful stability in the western provinces might provide some relief within the camps.  The INTELBRIEF also reflects on Tehran’s past strategy in Afghanistan and suggests Tehran will hedge its engagement with a new Taliban regime with attempts to build leverage against the group, should the Taliban again become hostile to Iran and its Afghan allies.

Three individuals and one highly effective program are likely to provide Iran placement, access, and operational capability within Afghanistan, in the near future. These men are not on the interim government organizational chart, developed by US State Department Officials, and they are not likely to be as publicly known here in the United States. However, they are historic figures in Iranian, Pakistani and Afghan political and military circles. Their names are Gulbeddin Hekmatyar, Ismail Khan, and Esmail Qaani.   The program is Iran’s heavily recruited and highly effective Fatemiyoun network of soldiers.

Gulbeddin Hekmatyar made a public appearance on September 5^th 2021, in an Afghan news clip, when he met with Pakistan’s ISI commander General Faiz Hameed. News coverage suggested the meeting focused on Taliban’s approach to a more inclusive government. [3]  As a former Prime Minister for the country, in 1996, Hekmatyar anticipates an opportunity within this newly forming government. It will be interesting to see how this plays out, as Hekmatyar lost that position when the Taliban overthrew the Soviet supported government.

Hekmatyar fled Afghanistan and established residence in Mashhad Iran and ultimately in Pakistan. After the 2001 retreat of the Taliban Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force used Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e Islami militia to get Bin Laden back into Afghanistan via his loyalist, Hassan al-Turabi, [4] as well as helping them protect Bin Laden and the rest of Al-Qaeda’s leadership in both Iran and Pakistan. Hekmatyar was also instrumental in aiding IRGC Quds Force efforts in launching the insurgency of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq; an organization that eventually became the Islamic State. [5]

Hekmatyar’s relationship with Iran is much older though. In their book, Night Letters, Sands and Qazizai assert Khomeini and Hekmatyar established a connection in 1979, when the newly established IRGC provided weapons and funding for his Islamic Republic, which grew into Hizb-e Islami. [6] A Guantanamo Bay detainee interview [7] indicates in January of 2000 Hekmatyar, the detainee, Taliban officials, and Iranian representatives all met to discuss US intervention in the region as well as strengthening ties between the Taliban and Iran.

Ultimately, Iran’s long standing relationship with Hekmatyar will provide open lines of communication and situational awareness regarding the strength and presence of Islamic State/al Qaeda in Afghanistan and may eventually provide Tehran a voice within the governmental structure. Hekmatyar, in turn, will likely continue to receive Quds Force support, training, and financing to maintain his militia.

Ismail Khan‘s relationship with Iran has grown from his provincial governance of Herat. Like Hekmatyar, Khan fled to Mashhad Iran after the Taliban seized Herat in 1995. Khan also commands a militia and used these roughly 8,000 fighters to support US and Northern Alliance efforts against the Taliban. But, like Hekmatyar, Khan’s relationship with Iran began in 1979 when he pledged allegiance to Ruhollah Khomeini. [8] Khan, serving as a Captain in the Afghan Army, led a revolt in Herat that year. Using soldiers and civilians he attempted to seize control of the border province from the Soviet backed government. [9]

Khan served in several positions in the US backed Afghan government, first as the Provincial Governor of Herat and then as President Karzai’s Minister of Water and Energy. He was dismissed from both positions due to concerns regarding the depth of his relationship with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Khan was also known to withhold customs revenue and tax collections intended for the country’s national coffers. [10] While governor of Herat, Khan received fuel, ammunition, and arms from Tehran. In exchange, he provided access through Shindand District into the heart of Afghanistan’s Shia Hazara communities. A Los Angeles Times report from 2002 suggests between November and December of 2001 Khan received as many as 20 truckloads of money to secure his Iranian loyalty and support. [11]

In early 2012, the IRGC began reactivating its Fatemiyoun network under Khan in response to NATO’s drawdown. [12] Comprised of Afghan Shias, similar organizations have not fought outside Afghanistan since the Iran Iraq war. The program, which is supervised by IRGC Quds Force and maintains a primary recruitment office in Mashhad Iran, saw regular combat in Syria from 2013 through 2017, when Tehran began to draw down the numbers and encourage veterans to return home to Afghanistan. In 2016 Iran boasted Fatemiyoun numbers reached 20,000. [13]

A 2019 report by USIP indicates “The IRGC may have downsized the Fatemiyoun, but a committed core of the most loyal fighters remains, which suggests that Iran envisions a use for the outfit in a protracted, low-intensity fight in Syria or for deployment to other regional conflicts in the Middle East.” [14] In December 2020, Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif offered to coordinate with the Afghan government for the use of Fatemiyoun forces. [15] He framed this offer of support as an effort to combine forces to defeat Daesh [ISIS-K] and reaffirmed that Fatemiyoun forces would fight under the guidance/command of the Afghan government.

Coincidentally, Khan again raised his militia in an effort to protect Herat, during the Taliban advance in August of 2021. He was captured on August 13^th and held for questioning, only to resurface in Mashhad Iran several days later. Additionally, in the same TOLO news interview with Iran’s Foreign Minister, he was specifically asked about Taliban and Iranian connections in Mashhad. While acknowledging he has heard of the Mashhad Council, he was not familiar with it. [16] Historic and recent reporting continuously provide links back to the city of Mashhad. 

Most recently Khan has spoken out against former president Ashraf Ghani. Using Iranian media platforms, Khan is reestablishing his narrative as a Mujahedeen leader and central figure in Afghanistan’s long fight against occupation. [17] Khan is also playing on his prominence in Shia communities, even though he is a Sunni. He likely hopes this will provide an opportunity for political clout as more governmental positions are announced.

There is a common thread between the Fatemiyoun Brigade, Ismail Khan, and Gulbeddin Hekmatyar; it is the IRGC. This relationship is long standing, with origins to Ruhollah Khomeini and the Islamic movement of the late 70s and early 80s. The new face of the IRGC Quds Force is Esmail Qaani, former deputy to his predecessor Qasim Soleimani and expert on Afghanistan. Qaani, who was born in Mashhad Iran, once said of Soeimani “Those who become friends at times of hardship, have deeper and more lasting relations than those who become friends just because they are neighborhood friends.” [18]

This bond of hardship and combat likely extends to both Hekmatyar and Khan through their mutual ties to the United Islamic National Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan, also known as the Northern Alliance, against the Taliban in the late 1990s. [19] Furthermore, this affiliation to what Qaani calls the boys of Mashhad extends to the current Supreme leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei. A young Khamenei would lead mourning ceremonies for Imam Reza, the eighth Imam of the Shi’a buried in Khorasan, with “the boys from Mashhad,” who served in the Fifth Nasr Division during the war with Iraq. [20]

Qaani’s Quds Force experience in Afghanistan is first reported in Mohammad Mohaddessin’s “Islamic Fundamentalism: The New Global Threat” circa 1993 [21] and this expertise has solidified his point position on all things Afghan. On September 7, 2021, Qaani briefed the Majlis (Iranian parliament) focusing on the Taliban’s intention to form an inclusive government and the importance of avoiding a Sunni/Shia conflict in the country. This message is certainly in line with holding back on use of Hekmatyar and Khan’s militia groups in favor of political maneuvering up front.

Another key indicator of a common and unifying goal in Afghanistan comes from author Sadollah Zarei: “Worthy of note is that in the past two decades, the Taliban have been following the call of the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini on Muslims to strive to form governments that are independent of oppressing foreign powers, and fight against corruption at home.” [22] This thought resonates with another observation by Oved Lobel. In his paper, The Graveyard of Empires: The Causes and Consequences of American Withdrawal from Afghanistan, Oved Lobel states: “In reality, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), as its name implies, has absolutely no relation to Iran.  It is the army of a wholly integrated transnational clerical network that emerged out of the Iraqi Shia religious center of Najaf in the 1950sand 1960s.” Lobel further asserts it is not the leaders of Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan who call the shots, but pan-Islamic global crusade whose elements are inextricably intertwined and ultimately control Pakistan and Iran. [23]

Conclusion

Understanding Khomeini’s interpretation of velayat-e faqih (province or governorate) is the key to Iranian foreign policy. This is especially true since the players outlined in this work are all vehement followers of his movement. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini claimed both religious and political authority over jurists (those who make law) and the people. This is in direct contrast to Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani and current marji (religious reference) in Najaf. Sistani is a staunch believer in the separation of church and state, denouncing the idea of absolute guardianship. So, as the West continues to view current events as a move towards regional dominance, the East likely sees this as the next step in validating Khomeini’s interpretation of the Quran.

Endnotes:

[1] Alireza Nader, “Iran’s Influence in Afghanistan Implications for the U.S. Drawdown” Rand Corporation, 2014

[2] https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2021-august-26/

[3] https://www.geo.tv/latest/368929-isi-chief-meets-gulbuddin-hekmatyar-and-other-taliban-leaders-in-kabul

[4] Leah Farrall and Mustafa Hamid, The Arabs at War in Afghanistan, London: Hurst & Co., 2015

[5] Chris Sands with Fazelminallah Qazizai, Night Letters pp. 410-13.

[6] Sands and Qazizai, p. 343.

[7] https://kyleorton.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/khirullah-khairkhwa-2005-10-07-evidence-summary-links-with-iran.pdf

[8] Barnett R. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System p. 187

[9] Vasili Mitrokhin and Christopher Andrew, The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World (New York: Basic Books, 2005), pp. 391-2

[10] Philadelphia Inquirer, 5 October 2003. Significant revenue is raised by custom officials who demand as much as $300 for trucks to pass through the city

[11] Los Angeles Times, 6 Jan 2002 and The Guardian, 24 Jan 2002. Khan’s militia forces that not only wear uniforms supplied by Iran but are distinguished by their Palestinian-style black and white checkered keffiyehs

[12] Graham Bowley, “Afghan Warlord’s Call to Arms Rattles Officials,” New York Times, November 12, 2012

[13] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/1/22/iran-foreign-legion-leans-on-afghan-shia-in-syria-war

[14] https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2019-03/sr_443-the_fatemiyoun_army_reintegration_into_afghan_society-pdf_0.pdf

[15] https://tolonews.com/afghanistan-168674

[16] Ibid

[17] https://ifpnews.com/ismail-khan-recent-events-in-afghanistan-coup-ghani-committed-treason

[18] https://agsiw.org/who-is-the-new-chief-commander-of-irans-quds-force/

[19] Ibid

[20] “Mo’avenat-e Farhangi-ye Moassesseh-ye Revayat-e Sireh-ye Shohada: Jay-e Pa-ye Baran” [The Footprint of Rain], Qom: Moavenat-e Farhangi-ye Moassesseh-ye Revayat-e Sireh-ye Shohada, n.d., 10.

[21] Mohammad Mohaddessin, Islamic Fundamentalism—The New Global Threat (Washington DC: Seven Locks Press, 1993, 2001), 200

[22] https://iranintl.com/en/world/us-wary-iran-taliban-alliance-hardliner-newspaper-claims

[23] Oved Lobel “The Graveyard of Empires: The Causes and Consequences of American Withdrawal from Afghanistan” April 21, 2021

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Photos:

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar: BBC Persian, September 28, 2019. Creative Commons license, Wikipedia.

Ismail Khan: Ismail Khan at the 2010 National Conference on Water Resources, Development, and Management of Afghaninistan. By Employee of the United States Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan (U.S. State Department). Cropped by Officer – U.S Embassy Kabul Afghanistan, Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=14968711.

Esmail Ghaani: By Khamenei.ir, 2020, CC BY 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=98095340.

Map: Derived from CIA map.

The Biden administration wasted very little time in setting a course correction in the United States role in the Yemen conflict. Citing humanitarian issues (as well as other concerns) it has decided to eliminate support for offensive operations provided to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in their fight against the Iran-supported Ansarallah / Houthi rebels in Yemen. The conflict has raged for many years.

Humanitarian Crisis. The Yemen conflict has resulted in a humanitarian crisis – which the United Nations says is one of the worst in the world. There are widespread food shortages resulting in malnutrition. The economy is in a shambles and government services are operating in a very basic level. The aerial bombardment by Saudi and UAE aircraft has resulted in numerous civilian casualties. There is a significant lack of medical supplies and services for the civilian population. In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic and cholera are taking a toll among the population.

The Houthis. With a strong base in the north region of Yemen the Shia group has attempted to extend its reach south and east throughout the country. It controls the capital city (Sanaa). Other religious, ethnic, and political groups have joined their movement. Most of the civilian population (estimates vary from 70 to 80%) come under Houthi control. The Houthis enjoy a strong position in the conflict – with no sign of their impending defeat in the future.

Iranian Support. The Houthi rebels have been supported by Iran for a number of years. Many observers of the conflict believe that the Houthis are an Iranian proxy group. The Iranians provide funding, weapons, equipment, trainers, and advisors to the Houthis. Through its Qods Force, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is very involved in the support provided to the Houthis.

Iranian Weapons and Equipment. Weapons, equipment, supplies, money, and personnel are transported to Yemen on international air flights as well as sea movement to Yemen’s ports. These weapons include short-range ballistic missiles, surface-to-air missiles, drones, and other sophisticated equipment. The missile systems and components have been used by the Houthis against Saudi oil and infrastructure targets. These weapons shipments are in violation of the U.N. Security Council Resolution 2216.

Yemeni Government. The government of President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi was ousted from the capital city and surrounding areas in a 2014-2015 offensive – dividing the country. The United Nations- recognized Yemeni government has benefited from external support from Gulf nations. However, the government supporters are fragmented and often engaged in internal conflicts.

Saudi-led Coalition. Saudi Arabia and the UAE say that they are actively reducing Iran’s regional influence in their intervention in the Yemen conflict. The involvement by the Saudis and their allies began in 2015 after the Houthi rebels ousted the Republic of Yemen Government from the capital city Sanaa in 2014. The Saudi coalition was able to help the ousted government regain some territory to include the major city of Aden but the conflict soon turned into a stalemate.

United Arab Emirates. The UAE has stepped back on its military involvement – although it still conducts counter terrorism operations and provides support to the breakaway Southern Transitional Council. It withdrew ground forces from Yemen in 2019. Other nations that have supported the Saudi action in Yemen in the past include Kuwait and Sudan.

U.S. Support. For the past several years the U.S. has provided intelligence, logistics, precision-guided munitions, and other types of support to Saudi Arabia and its allies involved in the Yemen war. This support was increased after missile and drone attacks against Saudi oil facilities by the Houthis. The U.S. stopped providing aerial refueling support to Saudi and UAE aircraft in 2018. In the last few years U.S. support has been limited to intelligence sharing, targeting support, and training (in an attempt to limit civilian casualties). The U.S. has been criticized for its role in providing Saudi Arabia and UAE with arms and munitions used in the Yemen conflict.

U.S. SOF. In addition, the U.S. has had special operations forces advisors on the ground in Yemen providing training, advice, and assistance. U.S. SOF have worked with units from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) as well as Yemen governmental security forces. The U.S. has also conducted unilateral counter-terrorism operations in the country against al-Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates. In January 2017 a Navy SEAL (Ryan Owens) died during a counterterrorism raid in Yemen. In January 2020 U.S. SOF conducted an unsuccessful operation to kill or capture a key IRGC-QF operative in Yemen (Abdul Reza Shahlai).

Past activities of U.S. SOF in Yemen include foreign internal defense, counterterrorism, intelligence sharing, surveillance and reconnaissance, maritime interdiction, and drone strikes. U.S. SOF involvement in Yemen has also provided the opportunity to work with and assist in the development of GCC special operations capabilities. This also lends to increased interoperability of GCC SOF with U.S. SOF. In addition, the United Kingdom and France has also deployed its special operations forces to Yemen.

Trump and Yemen. Under the Trump administration the U.S. has taken a strong stance against Iran’s activities across the Middle East. This includes attempting to diminish Iran’s influence in Yemen. The Trump administration had declared the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). It appears that the Biden administration may reverse this designation. The humanitarian implications of an FTO designation are significant. It would become more difficult to get foreign aid and assistance into areas of Yemen controlled by the Houthis.

Biden and Yemen. The Biden administration is likely to give priority to the nuclear talks about the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreement with Iran over concerns about Iranian meddling in Middle East affairs. Some sales of aircraft and munitions to Saudi Arabia and the UAE are on hold and under review by the Biden administration. U.S. activities in Yemen are likely to be curtailed. This prohibition by the Biden administration does not include the actions the United States will take against al-Qaida affiliates in Yemen – to include al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsular (AQAP).

A Diplomatic Solution? The U.S. has now announced increased support to United Nations efforts for a political settlement of the conflict. In early February the United States named Tim Lenderking, a career member of the Senior Foreign Service, as U.S. Special Envoy to Yemen. However, a ceasefire and end to the conflict is unlikely. A United Nations Special Envoy to Yemen (established in June 2012) has failed in attempts to arrange a permanent ceasefire and political agreement. The Houthis are entrenched in Sanaa and the western highlands of Yemen. However, the opposition (Hadi government) and its supporters in the Gulf Cooperation Council insist that any political solution must include a Houthi departure from Sanaa.

U.S. Interests in the Yemen Conflict. There are reasons for the United States to be concerned with the events taking place at the southern end of the Arabian peninsular. There are fears that Yemen could become a sanctuary for transnational terrorist groups like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. The vital international shipping lanes near the Bab al Mandab Strait are at risk. In addition, Iran could possibly use Yemen in the future to threaten Saudi Arabia’s southern borders. How the Biden administration addresses these concerns while resetting the relationship with Iran will be watched with great interest.

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References:

Yemen: Civil and Regional Intervention, Congressional Research Service, CRS R43960, December 8, 2020.
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43960

Congress and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2020, Congressional Research Service, CRS R45046, June 19, 2020.
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45046

Recent news, analysis, and commentary about the Middle East – politics, conflict, Iraq withdrawal, and great power competition.

Security Overview

CENTCOM Now Has Israel. In his last week in office President Trump ordered that U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) add Israel to its area of responsibility (AOR). This moved Israel from the European Command (EUCOM) AOR. According to the DoD the “. . . easing of tensions between Israel and its Arab neighbors . . .” has provided a strategic opportunity for the US to align key partners against shared threats in the Middle East (that would be Iran). This puts CENTCOM in an awkward position – forcing it to work with both Israel and its Arab opponents. This move may strain relationships between CENTCOM officials and other nations in the region. This may prompt some realignment with SOCEUR, SOCCENT, 10th SFG, and 5th SFG, as well as other special operations forces. See “In waning days, Trump shakes up CENTCOM to increase Arab-Israeli efforts against Iran”, by Howard Altman, Military Times, January 15, 2021.

Great Power Competition. Russia continues to support the Syrian regime. This effort increases Russia’s prestige in the area, enhances the ability of Russia to project power in NATO’s southern flank, and puts the U.S. on notice that it doesn’t have free reign in the region. China continues its work to strengthen its economic ties in the region. Read more in “Great Power Rivalry in the Middle East”, Eurasia Review, January 20, 2021.

A Plan on How the US Could Withdraw from ME. Mike Sweeney, a fellow at Defense Priorities, presents a 4-year plan for significantly reducing the US military presence in the Middle East. “When It’s Over: An American Withdrawal Plan for the Middle East”, Modern War Institute at West Point, January 18, 2021.

Iraq

US Troop Levels Reduced. In accordance with instructions from President Trump there are now only 2,500 U.S. service members in Iraq. The reductions were longtime goals of the Trump administration. This drawdown in Iraq follows the successful Iraqi military campaign against ISIS. (The campaign is over?). The US will continue to provide support with air power, intelligence, and a counterterrorism platform.

Iraq’s Economy. Widespread instability and violence is likely in Iraq’s future if Baghdad’s finances are not addressed. Kenneth Pollack and Farhad Alaaldin believe that U.S. and international community must shore up Baghdad’s finances before it is too late. “Iraq’s economic collapse could be Biden’s first foreign policy headache”, AEI, December 14, 2020.

Iraqi Arrest Warrant for Trump. A judge in Baghdad’s investigative court tasked with probing the Washington-directed drone strike that killed Iranian General Qassim Soleimani in January 2020 has issued an arrest warrant for President Trump. Soleimani headed the expeditionary Quds force of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps. The warrant was a charge of premeditated murder. See “Iraq issues arrest warrant for Trump over Soleimani killing”, ABC News, January 7, 2021.

The Sinjar Agreement – It Needs Work. One of the knotty political problems facing Iraq is the population area near the border with Turkey and Syria. The Agreement on the Restoration of Stability and Normalization of the Situation in the District of Sinjar is a joint security agreement between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the federal government of Iraq. Sinjar is a Yazidi town in Iraq’s Nineveh Governate the fell to the Islamic State in 2014 and culminated in a genocide against its inhabitants. The October 2020 agreement neglects to include the local population of Sinjar. Shamiran Mako, a professor of international relations at Boston University, argues the agreement needs a recalibration. Read her essay “Negotiating Peace in Iraq’s Disputed Territories: Modifying the Sinjar Agreement”, Lawfare Blog, January 17, 2021.

Iraqi PMFs Explained. Renad Mansour of Chatham House provides a detailed and interesting look of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) of Iraq. The PMF is more than a group of militias – it is interwoven into Iraqi government and society. “The ‘Hybrid Armed Actors’ Paradox: A Necessary Compromise?”, War on the Rocks, January 21, 2021.

Iraqi Interpreters Face Death. Former interpreters for the British military advisors and British special forces in Iraq are terrified that Iraqi Shia militia members will track them down and kill them. See “Iraqi interpreters ‘stalked by death squads’ for helping the British”, BBC News, December 29, 2020.

Iraqi Air Force Readiness Problems. There are recent press accounts that suggest less than 20 percent of Iraq’s F-16s are fully airworthy. Poor jet maintenance and mismanagement are some of the causes of failing to meet maintenance standards. It is speculated that the poor maintenance record for the Iraqi Vipers is behind the decision to remove the F-16s from the air tasking orders in April 2020. Read “The Iraqi Air Force’s F-16 Fleet is on the Brink of Collapse Despite Showy Flybys”, The Drive War Zone, January 7, 2021.

Senior ISIS Leader Killed. A U.S.-led coalition air strike killed the top Islamic State leader in Iraq. Abu Yasir was the most senior Daesh leader and was killed near Kirkuk on January 27, 2021. (Military Times, Jan 29, 2021).

Syria

New US – Syria Policy Needed. The partnership between Russia and Syria since the outbreak of the civil war in 2011 has proved to be effective and successful in preventing the fall of the Assad regime. The US lost significant leverage due to its inaction when self-imposed red lines were crossed and an incoherent foreign policy ensued. A new US policy towards Syria should recognize the necessity of pragmatic engagement with Russia. A ten-paper provides more details in Reframing US Syria policy: The road to Damascus runs through Moscow, Brookings Institute, December 2020.

Few Attractive Options for US in Syria. Sam Heller, an independent researcher and analyst based in Beirut, offers his views on the way forward for the US in Syria. Read his article “Redefining Victory in America’s War Against the Islamic State in Syria”, War on the Rocks, January 5, 2021.

Syria’s Narrative War. The battle for physical territory in Syria is complemented with the battle of the narrative. The propaganda, activism, and disinformation of Syria’s warring factions is a major factor (and threat) that will have lasting consequences for the region. Read more in “Lessons From Syria’s Low-Profile Narrative War”, War Room, United States Army War College, January 7, 2021.

Northern Syria – Fighting Continues. The Syrian Democratic Front (SDF) is facing the prospect of a new Turkish offensive. Turkish-back proxy groups are continuing their operations trying to control SDF-held areas. Russia is putting the pressure on the SDF to vacate areas so Syrian government forces can move in. See “Fighting Continues Over Flashpoint in Northern Syria”, Voice of America, January 5, 2021.

Syria’s Humanitarian Crisis. The Syrian civil war is approaching its tenth anniversary. The country remains divided and the conflict has settled into a stalemate – for the time being. Left in the lurch are refugees in neighboring countries and internally displaced personnel (IDPs) – many in temporary camps. Shelly Culbertson describes the situation in “The Syrian Forever War Has Created Forever Refugees”, The National Interest, November 24, 2020.

Iran

Heightened Tensions. U.S. military forces in the Middle East remain on high alert due to concerns that Iran may take action against U.S. interests in the region. The aircraft carrier Nimitz was enroute to its home port when it was sent back to the region. The one year anniversary of the killing of the top Iranian general Qassem Soleimani could be a reason for Iran’s escalatory rhetoric. It is being reported that the Revolutionary Guard’s Quds Force (under new leadership) has reverted back to being a smaller clandestine fighting unit. (Ynet News, Jan 3, 2021).

Iran and al-Qa’ida. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo revealed that Iran has given a new operational headquarters to al-Qa’ida. He says that Iran is now the home base for the terrorist group. (DoS, Jan 12, 2021).

Attacks on Shipping. The Middle East remains a volatile area for merchant shipping. Tankers and other civilian ships face the risk of limpet mines, explosive boats, sea mines, piracy, and the risk of politically motivated seizure. Many of the incidents are tied to Iran or its proxies. Read “Spate of Attacks on Ships in Middle East Points to Iran-Backed Group”, USNI News, January 6, 2021.

Yemen

Iran’s Ally. For the past several years Iran has enjoyed the benefits of an alliance with the Houthis – a minority Shiite Muslim community in Yemen engaged in a long-running civil war. Since the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 the Houthi movement has come out against US interests in the Middle East. Iran has, for the past several years, provided advisors and equipment to the Houthi forces. The U.S. has backed Saudi Arabian and UAE forces that are fighting the Houthis with arms and diplomatic support. Bruce Riedel, a Senior Fellow with the Brookings Institute, advocates for a US policy change in “A pragmatic view on Yemen’s Houthis”, Brookings, January 11, 2021.

New Policy for Yemen. Katherine Zimmerman, a Resident Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), says that the policies of President Trump and Obama for Yemen were flawed. She believes the U.S. needs to retake a leadership role to secure U.S. interests, reduce Iranian influence, stabilize the region, and address humanitarian concerns. Read “US needs to take on a leadership role to secure its interests in Yemen”, AEI, December 16, 2020.

Podcasts

Video – Trends in ME in 2021. Middle East experts survey what lies ahead for the region in the year ahead – with particular attention to Yemen, Iran, Turkey, and Syria. Trends to watch in the Middle East in 2021, Middle East Focus, Middle East Institute, January 15, 2021, one hour.

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Photo: Map from Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

The Iranian regime maintains a network of proxies including Lebanese Hezbollah, various Shiite militias in Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen, and foreign fighters in Syria. This paper by the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) provides a look at the problem of states using proxy forces to advance their foreign policy objectives.

The three main chapters of the paper outline the different groups and factors that influence Iranian military and political strategy for Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. The proxy / host country relation is described. The report provides an assessment of vulnerabilities that could be exploited by U.S. special operations forces.

Iran will continue to use their proxy network to frustrate U.S. Middle East strategy and diminish U.S. influence. However, the U.S. is not without appropriate responses. This paper advances the argument that terrorism, counterterrorism, and proxy conflict are inherently political in nature and need not be addressed with a kinetic solution alone.

The authors of this paper are:

• Dr. Diane Zorri – an assistant professor of security studies at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
• Dr. Houman A. Sadri – deputy director of the International Policy and Analysis Center (IPAC)
• Dr. David Ellis – Resident Fellow at Joint Special Operations University (JSOU)

Iranian Proxy Groups in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen: A Principal-Agent Comparative Analysis, Joint Special Operations University, JSOU Report 20-5, 2020.
https://jsou.libguides.com/ld.php?content_id=58950053

A U.S. effort to rescue American hostages in the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, Iran ended in failure on April 24, 1980. The Army Special Forces unit tasked with the mission was to rescue 53 hostages being detained by Iran.

The secret mission was complicated, involving the movement of the ground force element – known as Delta Force – landing in three MC-130 fixed-wing aircraft at a location called Desert One. The rendezvous location was located southeast of Tehran. At this first location the ground force would link up with eight RH-53D Sea Stallion helicopters flown by Marine pilots that took off from a Navy carrier (Nimitz) in the Arabian Sea. Once the choppers refueled the ground force (Delta) would board the helicopters and fly to new locations closer to Tehran.

During the second night the rescue party would then enter Iran’s capital city, storm the embassy compound, free the hostages, and then move them to a nearby soccer stadium. From there the hostages would be transported to a seized airstrip outside Tehran where fixed-wing aircraft would evacuate them out of the country.

Two small teams had previously entered Iran to conduct a recon of the rendezvous site in the desert, the hide sites used for the second night, the embassy, and other locations. These teams also set up a network for the transport of men, equipment, and hostages in and around the city.

The primary assault force was Delta. A unit of the 75th Ranger Regiment would provide security at Desert One. An Army Special Forces team from Det A (Berlin) – specially trained in mountain operations – would assault the foreign ministry where three diplomats were being held. There was also a small Air Force combat control team to coordinate movements on the desert landing strip.

The planning and practice for the rescue mission had taken place in the previous months prior to the execution of the raid. The rescue was to take place over two days.

Operation Eagle Claw was cut short because one of the abort criteria had been reached. There was an insufficient number of helicopters with which to conduct the raid. The mission started with eight. Two never made it to the rendezvous location. One developed a maintenance problem on the ground. That left only five to conduct the mission – and the operation required six. The commander, Charlie Beckwith, aborted the mission and gave the order for withdrawal of the rescue party from Iran.

At that point disaster struck when one of the helicopters – while repositioning at Desert One – collided with a parked C-130 loaded with fuel bladders causing an explosion. The mission would cost the lives of eight men, seven helicopters, and a C-130.

The failure of Operation Eagle Claw was an embarrassment for the United States. The Carter administration certainly lost credibility – as it had failed to recover the hostages either through diplomatic or military means.

The failed rescue attempt prompted a review by the U.S. military and Congress. One result was the establishment of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and other specialized units that would bring ‘jointness’ to the U.S. special operations community.

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References:

Iran Hostage Rescue Mission Report, Naval History and Heritage Command, August 1980. Read the report online. Also known as the “Holloway Report”.

The Holloway Report: Did it Reflect all the Facts and Lessons Learned?, by William F. Kernan, Army War Collge, March 1987.
https://apps.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA182845

“The Desert One Debacle”, The Atlantic, by Mark Bowden, May 2006.
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/05/the-desert-one-debacle/304803/

Operation Eagle Claw – Special Forces History
http://www.specialforceshistory.info/opns/operation-eagle-claw.html

Videos:

40th Anniversary of Operation Eagle Claw. Operation Eagle Claw ended in tragedy and serves as the genesis of special operations forces reform and revitalization. (video by USSOCOM, April 24, 2020, 15 mins)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ogSMqag2kCg

Top photo: Damaged aircraft at Desert One.

The killing of General Qassem Soleimani by a U.S. drone just after he arrived at the Baghdad International Airport in Iraq on January 2, 2020, raised the stakes in the Middle East. The Iranians responded with rhetoric and a relatively ineffective missile attack against two military installations that housed U.S. and coalition forces. While it appears tensions have subsided and a ‘war’ has not ensued the conflict is not over yet. It will continue to be fought over the next months and years in the shadows, using proxy forces and engaging in ‘political warfare’.

Who Is Qasem Soleimani?

General Soleimani was the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – Quds Force (IRGC-QF). He was one of the most powerful and important figures in Iran and one of the leading generals of the Iranian military. Soleimani was considered the driving force behind Iran’s ‘external military operations’.

Increasing Tensions over Past Year

U.S. and Iranian relations have been mostly confrontational since 1979 when the Shah of Iran was removed from power and the U.S. embassy in Tehran was occupied and its embassy officials and workers held hostage for more than a year. Since 1979 the U.S. has regarded Iran as a threat to U.S. interests in the Middle East.

Iran Has Escalated Activities in Region. Relations have gotten more heated between the U.S. and Iran in the past few years. Iran’s escalating attacks against U.S. installations in Iraq since May 2019 are part of a campaign to secure sanctions relief and push the U.S. out of Iraq. Iran has been implicated in the attack on commercial shipping, oil facilities, and other terrorist activities. It recently downed a very expensive U.S. drone. It has backed the Houthis in Yemen and is allied with the Assad regime in Syria. It’s proxy forces in Lebanon, Iraq, and elsewhere are engaged in activities adverse to U.S. interests in the region.

The U.S. is engaged in a campaign of applying ‘maximum pressure’ on Iran. The intent of the U.S. is to block Iran’s path to the development of a nuclear weapon and limit the ability of Iran to export terrorism.

The United States has been increasing pressure on Iran over the past few years. In April 2019 it declared the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. It has incrementally increased sanctions against Iran. In addition, additional military forces (air, ground, and naval) have been sent to the Middle East region. Currently (Jan 2020) there are about 60,000 to 80,000 U.S. troops in the Central Command area of responsibility (including 5,200 in Iraq and 13,000 in Afghanistan). [1] These numbers include deployments during 2019 and early 2020.

Iran Attack on U.S. Bases In Dec 2019

Rockets launched by an Iranian-affiliated militia group attacked a U.S. base near Kirkuk in Northern Iraq on February 27, 2019 killing an American contractor. The contractor was a naturalized U.S. citizen who was born in Iraq. He was working as an interpreter for U.S. forces. The rocket attacked also wounded four American service members. The U.S. retaliated two days later with air strikes against five facilities located in Syria and Iraq killing members of the Iranian-backed Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH) militia group responsible for the attack.

Storming the Embassy

Iraqi ‘protesters’ (with very strong ties to Iran) swarmed the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad breaching the outer perimeter. The U.S. immediately responded sending 100 Marines to secure the Embassy. In addition, U.S. Rangers were flown to the region followed shortly after with the deployment of a significant number of troops from the 82nd Airborne Division.

Killing of Gen Qassem Soleimani

The U.S., going off intelligence indicators that Iranian proxy groups were going to continue attacks against U.S. personnel and facilities, took out a leading Iranian general – Qassem Soleimani – just after he arrived at the Baghdad airport on January 2, 2020. Also killed in the attack was KH founder and Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces leader Abu Mahdi Al Muhandis as well as other Iranian and Iraqi individuals.

Additional Targets in Region

The same day a U.S. drone attempted but failed to kill another top Iranian commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard’s elite Quds force in Yemen. the attack was directed at Abdul Reza Shahla’i – a commander and financier. He was reported by the State Department to be at the center of a botched 2011 plot to assassinate a Saudi ambassador on U.S. soil. (Fox News, Jan 10, 2020). He also is implicated in many other actions throughout the region. One of these was a January 20, 2007 attack in Karbala, Iraq that killed five American soldiers and wounded three others.

Missles: Iran’s Response

Iran responded to the killing of Qassem Soleimani with the launch of 16 missiles – eleven of which hit on or near the Al Asad airbase in Iraq. The attack caused no casualties (Gen Milley says defensive measures were key) and caused minimal material damage. The losses in the attacks on Al Asad included a Black Hawk, aerial drone, damaged runways, maintenance shelters, and some pickup trucks.

Token Response. Some observers believe it was a ‘token’ strike that would allow Iran to say it responded but which was intentionally conducted so as to not cause any deaths. Others believe that the strike was largely ineffective due to the inability of Iran to accurately put missiles on target. The end result, however, is that the tensions were ‘reduced’ for the time being and open conflict averted.

Additional Sanctions Against Iran

After the launch of the 16 missiles by Iran the White House intensified sanctions on Iran. The U.S. has a long history of using sanctions against Iran. [2] There are a number of ways to impose these ‘additional sanctions’ on Iran that affect its economy as well as its ability to export violence in the region. [3]

Iraq Caught in the Middle

Members of the Iraqi parliament were not happy with the U.S. air strikes and this could cause problems down the road. The Iraqi parliament quickly called for the departure of U.S. military forces from Iraq; however, Sunni and Kurd representatives did not vote. Rumors of a rapid departure by the U.S. from Iraq are being played down by the U.S. State Department. In the meantime NATO has suspended its training mission in Iraq. The U.S. has also stood down operations as it takes a protective posture in anticipate of future aggression by Iran. Time will tell how the Iraqi public and government will respond to this latest conflict between Iran and the U.S. on Iraqi soil.

2nd and 3rd Order of Effects. Although tensions are now reduced the strike has fostered a number of consequences throughout the region. Relations between the government of Iraq and the U.S. have significantly deteriorated. Some of this is rhetoric and some is substantive. Iraq lawmakers reacted quickly passing a non-binding resolution for the withdrawal of U.S. forces. Iraq’s government is exploring a larger role for the NATO training mission – moving away from dependence on the United States. The training mission suffered a temporary halt and some counterterrorism operations were put on hold. In addition, it is possible that the strike diluted the protest movement that was – in part – focused on Iran’s meddling in Iraq; and which then turned its attention to the U.S. activities in Iraq. [4]

Accidental Downing of Airliner by Iran

In the immediate aftermath of the killing of Qassem Soleimani a civilian airliner was downed near Tehran. Over 170 passengers and crew were killed when the Iranian military accidentally shot down a Ukrainian airliner that had just taken off from Tehran airport. At first the Iranians stated that there were technical difficulties but soon it was apparent to the regime that they would have to acknowledge their own military shot the airliner down.

Map: Iranian-supported groups in the Middle East. Source: “Iran Military Power: Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance,”, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), November 2019.

What Comes Next?

While America has the Air Force and Navy to outfight Iran some worry that Iran’s use of asymmetric, proxy-based warfare is the biggest threat. Iran has developed robust proxy armies and organizations throughout the Middle East. Most of these proxy groups will follow the lead of Iran although some may strike out against the United States even if Iran does not direct them to do so. U.S. personnel – government employees, members of the military, and U.S. civilians are at risk. There are a number of embassies and military bases scattered throughout the Middle East that are at risk.

Iranian retaliatory measures in the future will likely include the use of its regional militias to attack U.S. forces and U.S. interests across the region. It may increase its attacks on oil production facilities, disrupt shipping lanes, and use asymmetric or unconventional tactics to execute operations in other regions of the world. Iranian proxy groups and organizations include the Hezbollah in Lebanon, pro-Asad forces in Syria, armed Shia groups in Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen, and other groups in the region.

Hybrid Warfare. The United States is likely to be engaged in a hybrid, irregular conflict with Iran for many years. Iran will be able to have plausible deniability for the actions of its many proxy groups, criminal networks, and other nefarious actors in the Middle East region. One question that is raised by many national security observers is will the United States retain enough of a special operations and ‘irregular warfare’ capability in light of its strategic shift to ‘great power competition’ and focus on the Indo-Pacific region.

UW? An unconventional warfare capability is one thing to consider when sizing up the participants in ‘hybrid war’. Certainly, the United States has tremendous UW assets within USSOCOM, the CIA, and other agencies and organizations. However, having the capability and using that capability in a coherent and strategic fashion are two different things. Iran has established long-enduring relationships with its proxy forces throughout the region. Iran’s proxies can count on long-term support. Can America’s allies in the region do the same?

Iran may have satisfied domestic pressure to respond to the U.S. killing of General Qassem Soleimani with its launch of 16 missiles against targets in Erbil and Al Asas. However, its real response will be of a hybrid nature that involves the use of their proxy forces in the region.

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Footnotes:

[1] The 2019-2020 Iran Crisis and U.S. Military Deployments, Congressional Research Service (CRS), January 9, 2020.
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11403

[2] Iran Sanctions, Congressional Research Service (CRS), November 15, 2019. According to this 110-page report “Successive Administrations have used economic sanctions to try to change Iran’s behavior. U.S. sanctions, including “secondary sanctions” on firms that conduct certain transactions with Iran, have adversely affected Iran’s economy but have had little observable effect on Iran’s pursuit of core strategic objectives such as its support for regional armed factions and its development of ballistic and cruise missiles”.
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RS/RS20871

[3] Possible Additional Sanctions on Iran, Congressional Research Service (CRS), January 8, 2020. This 4-page CRS report outlines additional sanctions that the U.S. could impose upon Iran.
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10801

[4] Elias Yousif of the Center for International Policy explores the consequences in his article – “What it cost to kill Soleimani”, The Hill, February 9, 2020.

References:

“Can America Win an Unconventional War Against Iran?”, Haaretz, January 10, 2020.

“Iran’s Proxy Threat Is the Real Problem Now”, by Sulome Anderson, Foreign Policy, January 10, 2020.

U.S. Killing of Qasem Soleimani: Frequently Asked Questions, Congressional Research Service (CRS), January 8, 2020, 22 pages.
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46148

Photo:

Current news, analysis, and commentary on special operations, national security, and conflicts from around the world.

SOF News

New Acting SECDEF – Former Ranger. Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan has decided not to continue his pursuit of nomination for Secretary of Defense. (Read his statement). News reports indicate that a history of violent domestic disputes in 2010 and 2011 have taken his nomination off the table. He will be replaced by Army Secretary Mark Esper. He is a former Infantry officer who was Ranger qualified and who served in the 1990-1991 Gulf War with the 101st Abn Div.

New Acting Army Secretary – Former Ranger. The shuffling of leadership at the Defense Department will leave the Secretary of the Army position vacant. Under Secretary of the Army Ryan McCarthy will likely become the acting Secretary of the Army. He is a veteran of the Army’s 75th Ranger Regiment. He has been in this position once before. (Army Times, June 19, 2019).

Logan Melgar Murder Trial – This Story Keeps Getting Worse. Apparently a Navy SEAL who was involved in the attack on a Green Beret in Mali – Logan Melgar – that caused his death tried to develop a romantic relationship with his widow. The incident happened in January 2019 at the SHOT Show in Las Vegas. Read “Navy SEAL Who Attacked Green Beret Hit on His Widow”, The Daily Beast, June 18, 2019.

Navy SEAL Trial. The trial of Eddie Gallaher has begun (Tuesday) with the completion of jury selection, opening statements, and witness testimony. Revealed in the beginning proceedings is that drinking alcohol when deployed in Iraq was a common occurrence for some members of SEAL Team 7 Alpha Platoon. The trial is expected to last for about two weeks. (Task and Purpose, June 18, 2019.

Middle East

Mulroy on Support to Iraq. Michael Mulroy, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense of the Middle East, has renewed the U.S pledge to continue support to Iraq – and stresses the importance of the worldwide coalition and a long-term security partnership to support Iraq in the fight against the Islamic State. Read a June 14th statement by Mulroy. (PDF).

Tanker War. Tracy Wilkinson, a journalist who has covered conflicts around the world, explores what a ‘modern day’ oil tanker war in the Gulf would look like. In the ‘tanker war’ of the 1980s more than 200 boats were attacked (by either Iraq or Iran). Should Iran escalate in such a war against oil shipments in the Persian Gulf or Gulf of Oman it will likely use limpet mines and ‘fast boats’. This would complicate things. Read more in “A ‘tanker war’ with Iran would be more difficult than the 1980s version”, Los Angeles Times, June 18, 2019.

Africa

Jihadist Renew Pledge to Baghdadi. The Islamic State’s West Africa ‘province’ have once again pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghadadi – the current head of the Islamic State. (The Long War Journal, June 17, 2019).

Movies and Videos

13 Hours – Re-release. The movie depicting the fight at the consulate in Benghazi is now available in digital copy. Read “Spectacular New 4K ’13 Hours’ Release Revisits the ‘Secret Soldiers of Benghazi'”, Military.com, June 10, 2019.

Fuerzas Comando ’19 Opening Ceremony. Special Forces from 19 countries are participating in a SOF competition in Chile. Watch a video of the opening ceremonies. (DoD, June 18, 2019).
https://dod.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/Videos/?videoid=690562

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Photo: TACPs support air infiltration. U.S. Air Force Senior Airman Sean Meehan (left) and Staff Sgt. Kane Lawlor (right) provide cover after a tactical air insertion by a UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter from the New Jersey Army National Guard’s 1-150 Assault Helicopter Battalion on April 10, 2014 at Fort Dix, N.J. The New Jersey Army and Air National Guardsmen took part in a joint training exercise with the U.S. Marine Corps. Meehan and Lawlor are both tactical air control party airmen from the New Jersey Air National Guard’s 227th Air Support Operations Squadron. (U.S. Air National Guard photo by Tech. Sgt. Matt Hecht/Released)

Trump’s Surprise Announcement

On Thursday, December 19, 2018, President Trump tweeted that we had attained victory over the Islamic State (IS) and that all military personnel would depart immediately.

“We have defeated ISIS in Syria, my only reason for being there during the Trump Presidency.”

President Trump, Wednesday, December 19, 2018, 9:29 am.

This tweet seemed to have caught the Pentagon, Congress, and others by surprise. Republican Senators for the most part were quite unhappy with this reversal in policy. As of December 2018, there were about 2,000 U.S. military personnel in Syria. In addition, there were a smaller number of State Department and other governmental personnel in Syria as well.

The Winners

Turkish Delight. The Turks, of course, are excited with the prospects of finally being able to attack the Kurdish enclave in northeastern Syria. The Turks have been at war with the Kurds for decades. With a U.S. withdrawal from Syria the SDF’s main benefactor is out of the picture leaving the Kurds very vulnerable for a Turkish offensive.

Some argue that Turkey will take over the fight against the Islamic State. In fact, Turkey has done very little against ISIS. In addition, the Turkish military doesn’t have the ‘reach’ to get to the remaining pockets of ISIS in Syria. Turkey has little motivation to fight ISIS – as the terrorist group has been fighting the Kurds and the Assad regime – an enemy of Turkey.

It is also interesting that the Turks have agreed to a $3.5 billion purchase of the Patriot missile system. This is a huge boost to Raytheon’s bottom line and perhaps negates the Turkish deal with the Russians for the purchase of the S-400 surface-to-air missile system.

Russian Interest as Well. The Russians welcomed the news of the U.S. withdrawal from Syria. It described the move as a “real prospect for a political solution”. This move will solidify Russia’s relationship with Turkey, strengthen the Assad regime, and provide more security for Russia’s air and sea bases in western Syria.

Iranian Influence Grows. The U.S. leaving Syria provides more opportunity for Iran to expand its influence and power within the Middle East. A U.S. withdrawal would mean that Iran would have the ability to move men, equipment, and weapons more freely from Iran to Syria (and on into Lebanon) without constraints. The Iraqi Ramadi-Rutba route onto Syria’s Route 2 going to Damascus will possibly open with the withdrawal of US and Free Syria Army forces depart Al-Tanf where more than 200 U.S. personnel are based. Syria’s M4 and M20 highways will become more accessible for Iran as well.

Hezbollah. Iran’s proxy, Hezbollah, also benefits as well. Certainly its image is enhanced with an Assad regime victory. It will very likely retain control of many of the small Shia militias spread throughout Syria.

IS Wins as Well. The one organization that has been taking the fight to Islamic State has been the SDF. Now that U.S. support is leaving the SDF will have to fend off IS as well as be on guard against the Syrian government, Turkey, and the proxy forces (militias) of Russia, Turkey, and Iran.

The Losers

The Syrian Kurds come out as the biggest losers. The U.S. removal of troops mean that the door is open to a Turkish offensive against the Kurdish enclave. The Syrian people lose as well. This U.S. move leaves a political and security void that will cause a realignment of interests and loyalties.

Confusion in the Administration

The Pentagon was not the only organization caught off guard with Trump’s announcement. It appears that other senior advisors and officials in the administration did not see this coming. In the past week the National Security Advisor, John Bolton, said that the U.S. would stay in Syria until Iran ended its military presence. General Joe Dunford recently said that we still need to train up local security forces in northeastern Syria; indicating that it would take a long time to the security forces to the state where they could provide stability to the region.

CJTF-OIR.

“The Coalition mission in northeast Syria remains unchanged. We continue our normal operations, including observation posts in the border region to address the security concerns of our NATO ally Turkey. We remain committed to working with our partners on the ground to ensure an enduring defeat of ISIS. Any reports indicating a change in the U.S. position with respect to these efforts is false and designed to sow confusion and chaos.”

Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve, December 15, 2018.

Brett McGurk, Special Envoy to Iraq, was taken by surprise with the Trump reversal on Syria. He had been working the anti-ISIS campaign on behalf of President Bush, President Obama, and President Trump. McGurk would resign within days of making the remark below.

“It would be reckless if we were just to say, well, the physical caliphate is defeated, so we can just leave now. I think anyone who’s looked at a conflict like this would agree with that.”

Special Envoy to Iraq / Syria, Brett McGurk, December 11, 2018.

John Bolton seemed to be supportive of staying in Syria. He is especially worried about the spread of Iranian influence in the Middle East.

“We’re not going to leave as long as Iranian troops are outside Iranian borders, and that includes Iranian proxies and militias.”

National Security Advisor John Bolton, September 2018.

IS Still Operational

Despite the steady defeat of its forces and loss of almost all of the territory that IS previously held in Syria – the organization is far from defeated. It has reverted back to the insurgent operations that it was very adept at several years back. With the withdrawal of the U.S. and the Syrian Kurds ability to fight IS diminished (lack of U.S. air and artillery support and attacks by Turkey) the Islamic State catches a break.