At the conclusion of the Gulf War (Desert Storm) thousands of Iraqi Kurds – called Peshmerga – revolted against the Saddam Hussein regime. The rebellion was quickly squashed by Iraqi tanks and armed helicopters that had not been destroyed or damaged by Coalition forces during the 1991 conflict.

Millions of Iraqi Kurds fled to the border areas of Turkey and Iraq with very few belongings. The border areas were mountainous and snow covered. However, Turkey refused to allow refugees to enter their country and the Kurds had to encamp on the mountain terrain with no food or shelter. A humanitarian crisis soon ensued with thousands of Kurds dying each day from starvation, exposure, and disease.

At first the U.S. administration ignored the plight of the Kurds. But it didn’t take long for CNN and the international media to take notice and publish daily highlights of the suffering taking place along the border of Turkey. The Bush administration decided to conduct a humanitarian operation to relieve the suffering of Iraqi Kurds located in over 30 border camps.

Operation Provide Comfort began in mid-April 1991. A ‘no-fly zone’ was established – denying Iraqi use of the air space above the 36′ North line in northern Iraq. At first humanitarian supplies – tents and food – were airdropped by C-130s flown from Incirlik Air Base in eastern Turkey. This phase of the operation lasted about two weeks.

Soon, an advance element of the 10th Special Forces Group arrived in Silopi, Turkey to set up a forward operating base. Silopi was located in southeastern Turkey on the border with Iraq. Before long, the 10th SFG(A) had its entire group deployed along the entire border area. The SF unit provided a variety of missions to include administration of the refugee camps, medical assistance, and setting up secure helicopter landing zones (HLZs) within the camps for the delivery of food, water, and medical supplies. CH-53s, CH-47s, CH-46s, and other aircraft of the U.S. and international partners began a huge effort to deliver MREs to the refugee camps.

The task force headed by the 10th SFG(A) was augmented with units from all branches of the U.S. military and with military units from other nations as well. Eventually the humanitarian mission grew so big that a three star general, LTG Shalikashvili, would be placed in charge of CTF Provide Comfort located at Incirlik Air Base. The SOCEUR commander, BG Potter, would assume control of Task Force Alpha operating out of Silopi. TF Bravo was established in the Iraqi town of Zakho located south of the Turkish border under the command of another U.S. general officer.

In time, the humanitarian effort moved south of the border into northern Iraq. ‘Way stations’ and refugee camps were established in northern Iraq in more hospitable terrain. Humanitarian organizations from around the world joined the effort and slowly the Iraqi Kurds left the refugee camps in the border areas and returned to their homes in the Kurdish region of Iraq.

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Read more about Operation Provide Comfort (Iraq War News)
https://iraqwarnews.info/pc/provide-comfort.html

Map of Kurdistan – CIA, 1986

A recent book, The CIA War in Kurdistan, details the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in northern Iraq before and during the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in early 2003. The main ground effort of OIF would take place in the south of Iraq from countries along the southern Iraqi border. However, the overall conquest of Iraq would be aided by military action that would take place in northern Iraq.

Small contingents of the Central Intelligence Agency and U.S. Army Special Forces were sent in to northern Iraq before the ground war began to link up with the Kurds that lived in that region. The CIA and SF elements were to liaison with the Kurds, assess the situation, gather intelligence, train the Peshmerga, and later assist and advise them during combat operations. In addition, plans included providing assistance to the 4th Infantry Division (ID) as it rolled from Turkey into northern Iraq. This would open up a second front that the Iraqi army would have to contend with – tying down Iraqi ground troops in northern Iraq and preventing them from reinforcing the Baghdad area of operations.

The plan to assist the 4th ID went up in smoke when Turkey refused access to the unit. The 10th Special Forces did manage to get the bulk of its forces into the region via a high-risk air movement. Eventually the 173rd Airborne Brigade (based in Italy) also deployed to the region. The CIA and SF teams, linked up with formations of the Peshmerga, began operations to liberate the towns and cities of northern Iraq.

Sam Faddis, the author of The CIA War in Kurdistan, was named to head a CIA team that would enter Iraq, prepare the battlefield, work with US Special Forces teams, and assist with the entry of the 4th ID and other military units. He details the preparation of his team prior to deployment, the difficulties his team encountered in working with the Turks, and the initial reception and ultimate acceptance by the Peshmerga. His CIA team would be on the ground in Iraq for almost a year.

Much of his book is about working with the Kurds. He provides insight into the rivalry between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). A brief history of Kurdistan and its relationship with the central Iraqi government is provided. He also includes information about the past relationship between the Kurds and the US. There was some initial hesitation on the part of the Kurds to work with the CIA and SF teams – which he and others had to overcome.

Faddis details some of the significant mistakes made by the U.S. in the first year of the war. He believes that the Iraqi ground troops were ready to surrender its forces in northern Iraq but U.S. military officers spurned the offer. He also mentions the disastrous effects of de-Baathification and dismantling of the police and military units of the Iraqi security forces – decisions made by the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad. Faddis doesn’t pull any punches and is very blunt in his comments about the CIA bureaucracy back in Langley.

The 10th Special Force Group had established the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force – North (CJSOTF-N). The SF group was augmented with the 173rd and other conventional and unconventional organizations – totaling over 5,000 personnel. The unit, also referred to as Task Force Viking, conducted artillery observation, direct action, special reconnaissance, unconventional warfare missions, and other missions. Faddis provides his perspective on the activities and accomplishments of the 10th Special Forces Group in northern Iraq during this time. This includes comments on the working relationship between the CIA teams and the SF detachments and SF command structure.

The book is chronological in nature following the timeline of major events taking place in northern Iraq in 2002 and 2003. Faddis manages to cover most of the important aspects of those two years in his book. He recounts the hunt for weapons of mass destruction, difficulties in working with the Turks, the use of propaganda, promises made and not kept, the battle to defeat Ansar al-Islam, training the Kurdish forces, some intelligence activities conducted, the air war, and the taking of Kirkuk and Mosul.

The CIA War in Kurdistan is a good read. A conflict as large as Operation Iraqi Freedom will get a lot of media and book coverage over the course of time. However, thus far, the war that took place in northern Iraq during OIF has not received much print. Faddis provides an account of that aspect of OIF.

About the Author. Sam Faddis is a retired CIA officer and former US Army combat arms officer. He spent decades undercover in the Middle East and South Asia. He retired from the CIA in 2008 as head of the CIA’s WMD anti-terrorism unit.

The CIA War in Kurdistan: The Untold Story of the Northern Front in the Iraq War, by Sam Faddis, Casemate, Philadelphia & Oxford, 2020. Available in hardcover and audio.

This article was first published by SOF News on January 26, 2021.

The Office of Inspector General for the United States Department of State has published its quarterly report to the United States Congress on Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR). The report summarizes the overseas contingency operation to defeat the Islamic State in designated areas of Iraq and Syria. This quarterly report covers the period of October 1, 2022 to December 31, 2022. In the report are details of key events that took place in Iraq and Syria in the last three months of 2022.

The report states that ISIS capabilities remained “significantly degraded”. ISIS has seen a steady removal of its leaders in Iraq and Syria; however, the group continues to spread its ideology and conduct attacks. The group continues to recruit for its organization. ISIS is also indoctrinating and recruiting children at the al-Hol dispaced persons camp in Syria.

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IG Report on Operation Inherent Resolve, Department of State, February 2023, PDF, 116 pages.
https://www.stateoig.gov/report-256

Photo: Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service CTS, photo by PFC Anthony Zendejas, CJTF-OIR, Apri 4, 2018.

The Sentinel – a newsletter of the Quiet Professionals is published every month by Chapter 78 of the Special Forces Association serving the SF community in Southern California. Their monthly newsletter is available online and by subscription.

The March 2023 issue has a number of interesting articles and stories:

• SFACON 2023: High Speed – Low Drag. The Special Forces Association National Convention for 2023 will be held in Indianapolis. Read more about this upcoming event.
• Book Review: Budapest to Vietnam. A book by Nick Hun and Michael Jewell is reviewed. It is the story of Nick Hun – who served as an MP, a Green Beret, and in many other roles.
• A Journalist’s First Trip to a Communist Country. Marc Yablonka relates his trip to Laos in 1990.
• Saigon Memories – 1990. The experiences of traveling to Vietnam in 1990 is related in this article by Marc Yablonka.
• Value Added: A/1/19th SFG in Iraq. In September 2002, A/1/19th SFG arrived in Kuwait and immediately set to work. Its primary mission was training and conducting liaison duties with elements of the Kuwaiti Armed Forces.
• Alpha Company, 1/19th SFG(A) At War. A National Guard company went to war shortly supporting the invasion of Iraq.
• The Bolivian Rangers and the Capture of Che Guevara. The final episode of Che’s Bolivian adventure in October 1967 is detailed.
• MACV Recondo School. The history of the recondo school that ran in South Vietnam for a number of years.

Sentinel, March 2023, PDF, 20 pages. You can read online or download the PDF.

During Desert Storm several U.S. Army teams of Green Berets were infiltrated deep behind enemy lines to conduct surveillance and reconnaissance missions. Some of these Special Forces teams were compromised by civilians who discovered their location. A few of the SF teams had to fight enemy combatants until they were exfiltrated by helicopter.

On February 23, 1991, SFODA 525, led by CW2 Chad Balwanz, was inserted by helicopter at night and moved to a hide site to observe traffic moving south along Highway 7 at a location north of the Euphrates River. This 5th Special Forces team would soon find itself fighting for survival against an overwhelming enemy force.

On the night of the day before the ground offensive of Desert Storm began, Special Forces reconnaissance teams were inserted deep behind enemy lines in Iraq to gather and report intelligence of Iraqi troop movements. Many were put in areas over 150 miles inside Iraq – far from friendly forces. The teams had at least three members – sometimes 8 or more. Each team had at least one communicator responsible for sending and receiving messages from the command and control node.

These Special Reconnaissance (SR) teams were emplaced in enemy territory in support of both the XVIII Airborne Corps and the VII corps. They were on watch for movements of SCUD missiles, elements of the Republican Guard, and other significant enemy activities.

The teams would carry rucksacks that contained water, food, radios, ammunition, batteries for the radios, and more. In addition, other equipment such as a GPS, knife, compass, and medical kit were hung in various configurations on their combat vests. Rucks and other equipment could easily reach over 150 pounds. Add to that the equipment and materials needed to dig and camouflage the hide site.

Most teams would insert via MH-60 or MH-47 helicopters from the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) at a location far from the observation site yet within walking distance. Once infiltrated, at night, the team would move by foot overland to the target area, select the hide site, and begin the process to dig in and camouflage the area before early morning light.

ODA 525 had infiltrated in two MH-60 Black Hawks from Task Force 160 and moved overland with their heavy rucks (175 lbs) to the target area. The eight team members dug in at a location about 300 meters east of Highway 7 that offered a good observation point. The highway was one of the main routes that ran from Baghdad south through the Euphrates river valley. The team finished the process of building the hide site before dawn on the morning of February 24, 1991 and settled in to observe the highway.

As the morning sun came up the team could see and hear a lot of civilian activity in the area. There were people tending to cattle and sheep, women were collecting firewood, and children were playing. The area had more people in the area than the team had anticipated and intelligence reports had indicated. The soil was very difficult to dig into so the hide site was less than optimal.

The team was soon discovered by three children – a boy and two girls. The SF detachment reached a critical decision point – what to do with the children. The children left the team’s location unharmed. The team decided to change their location and began movement to another area. Not long after that an adult with Bedouin headdress approached the team with children . . . and saw members of the team. The unarmed adult was allowed to leave – which he did in haste.

Before long the team had armed Bedouin tribesmen in their immediate area and which was followed with the arrival of Iraqi soldiers. The team was in a tenuous position – miles behind enemy lines, lightly armed, and vastly outnumbered with no ground mobility vehicles to evade.

Within minutes the team was engaged in a battle with the 150-man Iraq force. In the first ten minutes of the battle 40 Iraqi soldiers lay dead and many more were wounded.

The battle continued through the day. The team leader, Balwanz, called in for air support. The team was supported with air strikes that kept the Iraqi troops from overrunning the team’s position. Many of the bombs were dropped ‘danger close’. Estimates of enemy deaths were from 100 to 300 personnel due to the SF team and supporting aircraft.

The SF soldiers used emergency PRC-90 radios and signal mirrors to communicate with the supporting aircraft during the battle. Although the fight had lasted hours none of the Green Berets were killed or wounded.

By nightfall the fight was under control – the team and supporting craft had kept the Iraqis at bay. The team moved to an area more suited for a helicopter exfiltration. That evening, after darkness settled in, two MH-60s from TF-160 landed near the team’s location and brought the team to safety and to King Fahd International Airport.

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References:

Thomas, Rhys. (2016). Danger Close: The Rescue of ODA-525. Lulu.
https://bookshop.org/a/753/9781365626548

Johnson, William M. (1996). U.S. Army Special Forces in Desert Shield / Desert Storm: How Significant an Impact. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, pages 68-70, PDF.
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA312864.pdf

“Voices in the Storm: Against all Odds”, Frontline, PBS. – The Gulf War. Chad Balwanz, the team leader of SFODA 525, is interviewed about the team’s mission.
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/voices/2.html

“Chad Balwanz”, Hazard Ground Podcast, Episode 140, October 31, 2019. Hear the firsthand account of ODA 525 and their fight to survive from the team leader of the Special Forces detachment.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ksmg0U2ILo8

Editor’s note: This article was first published by SOF News on February 24, 2021.

A panel discussion looks into the use of special operations forces to conduct partner operations in the Middle East. This panel examines the use of SOF in the Middle East – past and future. It reveals how SOF operated alongside local forces in Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere. Some of the topics addressed in this one-hour presentation include building CT and COIN capabilities of indigenous special forces, challenges of this approach to the U.S., and what lessons can be learned from the anti-ISIS fight.

The panelists are:

• General (Ret.) Joseph Votel, former commander of JSOC, USSOCOM, and CENTCOM
• Lt. Gen. (Ret) Michael Nagata, former commander of SOCCENT
• LTC Katie Crombe, Director of Strategy and Plans, USSOCOM

Some, but not all of the topics discussed by the panelists include:

Is SOF the Easy Button? Policy makers turn to SOF to advance U.S. interests. SOF operators look forward to solving ‘wicked problems’ associated with partner operations; and they want to continue to engage in these efforts. However, the strain on the force has become evident over the years. There are a lot of negative problems associated with continuous deployments. Policy makers must examine the other non-military ways to build partner relationships – without always turning to SOF.

Values vs. Interests. There is classic tension of protecting U.S. values and protecting U.S. interests; sometimes you can’t have both. It is a balancing act when interacting with our partners and partnership building. We can’t only work with ‘nice people’. A current case of this balancing problem is our relationship with Saudi Arabia.

127e Programs. This somewhat ‘obscure’ program is extremely important in advancing U.S. interests across the region and in fighting terrorism. The 127e programs can sometimes be, unwisely, a fast and easy solution for policy and decision makers. Where these programs are long-term, very significant gains and goals are achieved – as in the relationship and support of Iraqi SOF in the fight against ISIS after 2014.

Long-term Engagement. The use of SOF in the Middle East pays great dividends if used continuously over time. This is born out in the relationships built and nurtured over the past decades. Examples are the employment of the 10th Special Forces Group assisting the Kurds during Operation Provide Comfort in 1991 and the establishment of the Iraqi Counter Terrorism Task Force (ICTF) in late 2003. The ability to impart SOF culture (processes, networking, leadership, and use of technology) to partner forces is enhanced when the relationships last years. Developing long-term relationships with partners improves the ability to have candid discussions with them and advance U.S. interests.

Terrorist Threat in ME Remains. There still is a terrorist threat in the Middle East. Fighting terrorists requires highly trained counter-terrorist units. U.S. SOF remains the best ‘solution’ for assisting partner and allied nations in the development of these indigenous SOF units.

SOF Use in Times of Peace. Partner relationship building is important during conflicts as well as during times of peace. Trust is built over time with continuous engagement. The U.S. will need partner forces far into the future; especially given the competition for influence by near peer adversaries. The days of partner SOF relying exclusively on U.S. technology, firepower, ISR, and other capabilities have gone by. Partner SOF units are much more capable, have access to technology, ISR (especially drones), and other potential benefactors (Russia, China, etc.). There is the possibility that U.S. SOF can be ‘displaced’ in the Middle East, as well as in other regions of the world, by SOF of near-peer adversaries.

The topics above, and more, are discussed by the panelists in this informative and interesting event. Watching and listening to this panel is one hour well worth spent.

By, With and Through Partner Special Forces in the Middle East, Middle East Institute, November 8, 2022, YouTube, one hour.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5V_QtvLjvRU

Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Mark Grdovic shared stories about his time in Iraq with Task Force Viking while assigned to the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) in 2003. While conventional and special operations forces were pushing northward from the south and west of Iraq towards Baghdad, the 10th SFG(A) infiltrated Northern Iraq to open up a northern front against the forces of Saddam Hussein.

The 10th Special Forces Group formed the nucleus of Task Force Viking – more officially known as Joint Special Operations Task Force -North (JSOTF-N). Also assigned to JSOTF-N was an element of the Special Boat Service (UK SBS). The mission was to disrupt Iraqi forces in Northern Iraq.

A significant portion of Iraq’s military forces were deployed north of Baghdad and a front opened up in the north would tie down some of these forces and prevent their movement south to reinforce against the attacks coming from the south. Much of those forces were protecting oil reserves located between Kirkuk and Mosul. Saddam Hussein was worried about losing Kirkuk and Mosul and he had two Republican Guard divisions along with other divisions to protect the region. Part of Task Force Viking’s mission was to prevent the Republican Guard divisions from deploying south of Baghdad.

The presentation includes important aspects of the detailed planning that took place prior to the invasion, the insertion of a pilot team prior to the invasion, working with the Central Intelligence Agency, coordination with the Kurdish resistance, Turkey’s role, Romania’s role, the “Ugly Baby” infiltration, and more. A lot of the coordination that took place prior to the invasion saw a lot of twists and turns – and Grdovic presents an entertaining version of these events.

Mark Grdovic’s presentation took place at the Special Forces Association Convention held in the Colorado Springs area near Fort Carson in October 2022. The convention was held to honor, remember, and recognize Green Berets and enablers with multiple special events, panels of speakers, and Special Forces Medal of Honor guests.

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Special Forces Association Convention 2022 Task Force Viking LTC (Ret) Grdovic, 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), DVIDS, posted October 28, 2022, one hour and 15 minutes.
https://www.dvidshub.net/video/862289/special-forces-association-convention-2022-task-force-viking-ltc-ret-grdovic

The Lead Inspector General has published its quarterly report to the United States Congress on Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR). The report, released in early May 2022, covers the events and activities of the United States military during the period of January 1, 2022 to March 31, 2022.

The report summarizes the quarter’s key events related to the overseas contingency operation to advise, assist, and enable local partner forces in the fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.

Contents:

• Executive Summary.
• Status of OIR. Mission, funding, personnel, and facilities
• Iraq. Security, politics and economics, stabilization, and humanitarian assistance
• Syria. Security, stabilization, and humanitarian assistance
• Oversight activities. Strategic planning, audits and inspection, and investigations
• Appendices. Methodology, DoJ activities, acronyms, endnotes

Syria. The Syrian Democratic Front (SDF) conducted some independent operations against the Islamic State during the quarter. The SDF continues to rely on the Coalition for critical intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support. A big constraint and disruption are the forces aligned with the Syrian regime, Iran, Russia, and Turkey.

Iraq. The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are making incremental progress towards operational independence. Although the ISF has airpower and ISR, it still does not use it effectively. Iraqi politics has been delaying government reform efforts. Iran and Iran-aligned militias continue to threaten U.S. and Coalition forces; however, attacks during this period have been limited.

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Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, January 1, 2022 – March 31, 2022, published May 2022, PDF, 128 pages.
https://media.defense.gov/2022/May/03/2002988582/-1/-1/1/OIR_Q2_MAR2022_GOLD_508.PDF

Photo: Syrian Democratic Front (SDF) members working alongside U.S. military personnel in Syria in early 2022. U.S. Army photo.

Story by Senior Airman Christopher Storer.

The 16th Special Operations Squadron conducted a memorial flight over Cannon Air Force Base to honor the crew of Spirit 03, Jan. 31, 2022.

“Where there is Spirit, there is freedom” is seen on many plaques throughout the 16 SOS squadron building, memorializing the crew of Spirit 03. Commonly known as the last AC-130 gunship shot down in combat, Spirit 03 is a story of heroes, harrowing combat and sacrifice.

According to the Air Force Special Operations Command history office, the Iraqi army planned to invade Khafji, Saudi Arabia at the end of January, 1991, during Operation Desert Storm. Coalition intel reports showed large columns of Iraqi forces moving towards the border of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, influencing theater commander Army Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf’s decision to utilize air power as the primary force.

That night, two AC-130H Spectre gunships, Spirit 01 and Spirit 02 of the 16 SOS in Hurlburt Field, Florida, joined the battle. Providing close air support and air interdiction, the gunships were able to inflict large casualties against the invading Iraqi army, but the coalition forces were unable to completely stop the advance and the city of Khafji was briefly occupied by Saddam’s forces.

As the gunships conducted operations solely under the cover of darkness,the impending sunrise forced both Spirits back to base in order to refuel and reload ammunition. Ground forces continued to push the invasion back until the Spectres were unleashed once more into the night of January 30th.

Spirit 03 was fully loaded for combat and spent the night raining terror on Iraqi forces, answering the calls of multiple U.S. Marine forward air controllers (FAC) and slowing the movement of Saddam’s columns. As the daylight began to break, all AC-130H’s were recalled back to base once again. At the edge of the combat zone, the crew of Spirit 03 received a radio call from a U.S. Marine FAC asking for close air support to deal with an Iraqi rocket battery.

Spirit 03 made the split-second decision to turn around, despite being low on fuel and losing the valuable cover of darkness. Intent on saving more American lives, Spirit 03 flew back into the fray, but it was hit by a surface-to-air missile in the left wing. The aircraft began spiraling out of control before the left wing broke off completely, sending the gunship and her crew into the Persian Gulf.

All 14 Airmen on board perished with the aircraft. Their names are listed below:

Maj. Paul Weaver
Capt. Cliff Bland
Capt. Arthur Galvan
Capt. William Grimm
Capt. Dixon Walters
Senior Master Sgt. Paul Buege
Senior Master Sgt. James May
Tech. Sgt. Robert Hodges
Tech. Sgt. John Oelschlager
Staff Sgt. John Blessinger
Staff Sgt. Damon Kanuha
Staff Sgt. Mark Schmauss
Sergeant Barry Clark
Staff Sgt. Timothy Harrison

“Tim Harrison was my primary instructor in 1990,” said Retired Master Sgt. Kevin Stefanovksy. “It was a big loss for the entire squadron. After we pulled out of Khafji, they brought the left wing back for investigation and had us pull pieces of shrapnel out of the wing. Once the investigation was through, us doing what gunners do, we cut off pieces of the wing and made POW bracelets from it.”

There are still few stationed at Cannon AFB with a personal connection to Spirit 03. Most of the Airmen in the 16 SOS are only familiar with the story as it has been passed down through the years. Regardless, the 16 SOS ensures all who enter its doors know the story of Spirit 03 and understand the squadron’s heritage.

“I was in flight training the first time I heard the story back in 2017,” said Capt. Aaron Schuetze, 16 SOS AC-130W Stinger II pilot. “I just remember being awed that it happened in… the not so distant past.”

Walking through the 16 SOS squadron building, it is difficult not to feel amazed at the heroic actions of those who have come before. Through the years, Airmen have adorned their walls with memorabilia from past operations and crews. For some, they serve as a reminder. For others, they serve as a benchmark.

“Sometimes I still feel like I’m nothing here, compared to all the great things others have done before me,” said SrA Jason Baek, 16 SOS aerial gunner. “It’s hard to feel like I belong when everyone else has done such cool things. It keeps me motivated though for sure, gives me a goal to achieve.”

Even through tragedy, Airmen strive to make the most of every opportunity. The ability to learn from failures and expand in future operations is a large component of the United States Military’s 257 years of service.

“It definitely keeps you humble,” said Schuetze. “I feel like I have not yet reached the level that they [Spirit 03] had, and everyday I strive to get better and hope that if we were ever in a situation like they were, we could still perform like they did. That is what we train for everyday, to reach that level of peak excellence. It’s what we expect from the guys on the ground and we expect the same from ourselves.”

The story of Spirit 03 plays no small part in fueling the fire of motivation in Airmen from the 16th. Their squadron motto, “Always to Protect”, represents a sense of duty and service eternal.

“I’m truly honored and humbled to command a squadron of heroes who live by the USAF core values and continually strive to be the innovative and tactical experts in a squadron steeped in heritage,” said Lt. Col. Paul Andrews, 16 SOS commander. “The memorial flight and remembrance of the crew of Spirit 03 is important to all of us in the AC-130 enterprise… We are forever grateful for their service to our nation.”

The loss of all 14 men aboard Spirit 03 that early January morning was felt throughout the AFSOC community and the 16 SOS in particular. The 14 men were not just Airmen. They were fathers, brothers, sons and friends. It has been 31 years since they lost their lives doing what they did best – providing air support from the belly of a beast, protecting those who protect freedom, no matter the cost.

And yet, their legacy will never be forgotten. For where there is Spirit, there is freedom.

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Story: This story by Senior Airman Christopher Storer of the 27th Special Operations Air Wing was originally published on February 11, 2022 by the Defense Visual Information Distribution Service. DVIDS publishes content in the public domain.

Photo: AC-130 Stinger II Gunship. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Maxwell J. Daigle).

A ‘Quick Look’ report by the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) provides information that will help the special operations community understand the cyberspace domain and friendly and adversary cyberspace activities.

This report presents information about the formation and mission of CYBERCOM. It defines the cyberspace domain as the physical network layer, logical network layer, and cyber-persona layer. The activities of friendly and adversary actors in cyberspace are detailed as cyberspace security, cyberspace exploitation, and cyberspace attack.

The short pub also provides information about Joint Task Force (JTF)-ARES Operation Glowing Symphony (OGS) formed in May 2016 to counter ISIS in cyberspace by planning and executing cyberspace operations in the Operation Iraqi Resolve area of operations. OGS “started a continuous set of actions to counter ISIS in cyberspace by taking down accounts, websites, and infrastructure used to create and distribute propaganda. It also disrupted internal communication across ISIS leaders and followers, and gravely disrupted an ISIS publication which never resumed operations.”

The report goes on to explain why cyberspace operations matter to SOF, how cyber operations (CO) can support or enhance SOF missions on the ground, and how the shift to Great Power Competition highlights the usefulness of cyber operations. “Ultimately, SOF can use a foundational understanding of CO as both a planning consideration for force protection and operational enhancement to present opportunities to execute core mission areas.”

Cyber Fundamentals for SOF, JSOU Quick Look, Joint Special Operations University, March 2021, PDF, 4 pages.
https://jsou.libguides.com/ld.php?content_id=60465000