Several European nations are contributing special operations forces to Task Force Takuba to fight armed groups in the Sahel. The special operations task force will fight in the Liptako region alongside troops from Niger and Mali.

Most of the attacks in the Sahel are by Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslimeen (JNIM) – a group that formed up in 2017 from several smaller groups. The Sahel region of Africa has been in turmoil for several years and the security situation has been deteriorating. Attacks against government and civilian targets have increased fivefold in Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali since 2016.

Establishing Task Force Takuba

The French first began asking for European SOF to participate in early October 2019. The task force is expected to be established in the summer of 2020 and begin conducting some operations in late summer early fall. It appears that the task force will have two missions – one to conduct counterterrorism operations and the other to train local African forces. It is anticipated that Force Force Takuba will be fully operational by early next year. The lead nation for Task Force Tabuka is France. The task force was officially established on March 27, 2020.

Several nations have indicated their support of the SOF task force to include Sweden, Estonia, Czech Republic, Belgium, Denmark, Portugal, Italy, and others. Sweden will be contributing up to 150 special forces personnel and some helicopters. Germany, Norway, and the United States have stated that they will not participate in the SOF task force. European SOF – French, Dutch, Danish, and others – have been working in the Sahel region for several years supporting various initiatives.

Map depicts operating areas of AQIM, JNIM, and affiliates (red) and ISIS-Greater Sahara and affiliates.

The mission of the task force is to assist the Malian and Nigerien armed forces in countering terrorist groups and to complement the current efforts made by Operation Barkhane and the G5 Sahel Joint Force. The Takuba task force will be under the command of Operation Barkhane.

Operation Barkhane

There are currently about 4,500 French soldiers in the region as part of Operation Barkhane. This operation was established in 2014. The United Kingdom has Chinook helicopters providing support and Estonia is contributing force protection personnel. Denmark is supporting with EH101 medium-lift helicopters as well. The Barkhane force is focused on insurgent activity in the countries of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. France is in the process of sending an additional 600 troops to the Sahel region bringing Operation Barkhane’s troop count to 5,100. Operation Serval was the forerunner to Operation Barkhane.

MINUSMA

The United Nations has a 15,000 man peacekeeping force in Mali as well. The U.N. peacekeeping mission – established in 2013 – is known as United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). The organization provides operational and logistical support to the G5 Sahel Joint Force. Some of the European nations supporting MINUSMA include France, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Germany.

G5 Sahel Joint Force

Five African countries, assisted by France, set up the G5 Sahel framework in 2014. In 2017 Chad, Mali, Niger, Maruitania, and Burkina Faso established a joint force (Joint Force FC-G5S) to meet the threats from insurgents and terrorists. The region faces a number of challenges – terrorism, organized crime, and demographic growth. Climate change has degraded the ability of some of the population to make a living from agriculture or livestock – exasperating the economic well being of the regions’ citizens. It is planned that once fully operational the G5 Sahel force will have 5,000 soldiers in seven battalions that will be based across three zones: West, Center, and East.

U.S. Reducing Presence?

Africa Command and the U.S. Department of Defense are currently conducting a review of U.S. troop commitments in Africa – to include the Sahel region. The new National Defense Strategy (NDS) has DoD focused on the great power competition posed by China and Russia. The U.S. military is attempting to reduce its commitments to the counterterrorism campaign in Africa. France relies heavily on U.S. logistics, air support (transport), and intelligence for its West Africa mission. France’s efforts in the Sahel would be hurt by a reduction of U.S. support. A number of U.S. SOF units have been deployed over the years to Africa – complementing the efforts of the 3rd Special Forces Group in Africa.

Goals of Task Force Tukuba

If the efforts of Operation Barkane, MINUSMA, Task Force Tukbua, and the G5 Sahel Force are successful, the host nation military units will take over full responsibility for the conduct of the security mission and degrade the insurgent and terrorist capabilities. This will allow the departure of the military forces of the European nations from West Africa. Ideally, Task Force Tukuba will be successful in establishing host nation special operations units that can take over the counterterrorism mission. However, all indications are that the European nations are in for a long effort in helping the G5 Sahel nations stabilize the region and restoring security.

**********

References:

The West-Africa Special Operations Forces: Development and Integration in the Context of the Sub-Suharan Growing Threats, CGSC, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: 2016.
https://apps.dtic.mil/docs/citations/AD1024802

Learning from U.S. Counterterrorism Experience in the Sahel: A Springboard for the Sahel G5 Organization, Naval Post-graduate School, Monterey, CA: 2018.
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/AD1065353

USSOF Operations in Africa: Prospects for Future Engagements in the Sahel, Air War College, Maxwell AFB: 2017.
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/AD1037974

“Army Special Operations in Africa”, Special Warfare, USAJFKSWCS, January – March 2017.
https://www.soc.mil/SWCS/SWmag/archive/SW3001/JAN_MAR_2017.pdf

Violent extremism, organised crime and local conflicts in Liptako-Gourma, Institute for Security Studies (ISS), December 2019. Read report in French, report summary in English.

“Crisis in the Sahel Becoming France’s Forever War”, New York Times, by Ruth Maclean, March 29, 2020.

Top Map: Used under Creative Commons, Wikemedia.org. Map by Munion / CC BY-SA.

Map of Sahel states from CRS report TE10044, December 2019.

On March 23, 2019 the Pentagon announced the physical defeat of the Daesh caliphate in Syria. Over 110,000 square miles were liberated and 7.7 million people freed from Daesh oppression. The Syrian Democratic Front was assisted by U.S. airpower, ISR, and special operations forces in its defeat of the Islamic State fighters. The SDF had finally captured Baghouz – the last Islamic State physical enclave in Syria.

The Special Operations Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve (SOJTF-OIR) published this story below on March 18, 2020 summarizing the rise and fall of the Daesh in Iraq and Syria. The article details the final battle for the last ISIS enclave of Baghouz where the SDF defeated the ISIS fighters in their last piece of physical terrain.

**********

“At the height of their power, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, now referred to as Daesh, operated in 18 different countries and had an annual budget of $1 billion with an estimated 30,000 members. They conducted ground attacks on both government forces and any other force that opposed them. Their goal: to establish a so-called caliphate in the region.

On Aug. 7th, 2014, the U.S.-led coalition launched airstrikes against Daesh. On March 23rd, 2019, the Pentagon announced the physical defeat of the Daesh caliphate in Syria. Over 110,000 square miles were liberated. Approximately 7.7 million people were freed from Daesh oppression. In Baghouz, Syria, where the final battle took place, a yellow flag was flown atop a building by U.S.-backed Syrian forces as they celebrated their victory over Daesh.

Founded in 1999 under the name Jamāʻat al-Tawḥīd wa-al-Jihād and changing to Islamic State of Iraq in 2006, and with an allegiance to al-Qaeda, the oppressive presence of Daesh in the region grew once Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi came to power in 2010. Al-Baghdadi became involved with Daesh while detained in Camp Bucca in the early 2000’s. When released from detainment, he quickly rose in prominence by being directly involved in the violent atrocities conducted by Daesh.

Throughout the next several years with al-Baghdadi as head, Daesh seized control of several major cities in Iraq. Kidnappings, mass murder, and extortion were common crimes committed by Daesh members. By declaring the creation of a so-called caliphate, Daesh gave al-Baghdadi self-proclaimed authority over the Muslims of the world. Their declaration as a caliphate was criticized and disputed by Middle Eastern governments. They were officially declared a terrorist organization by both Iraq and Syria, along with many other nations of the world.

Coalition troops were sent into Iraq to support the defeat of Daesh. In October of 2014, this combined effort was given the name Operation Inherent Resolve. Along with Iraqi and Syrian forces, over 30 countries combined together for the sole mission of defeating Daesh. The Combined Joint Task Force- Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) worked with partner forces to free the nearly 8 million people under the control of Daesh.

By mid-2015, Kurdish fighters expelled Daesh out of towns in Syria and reclaimed military bases that had fallen under Daesh control. In late 2015, Iraqi forces took control of Ramadi from Daesh and then Fallujah just six months later. After several years of combined assaults, Daesh was quickly losing control of central Iraq.

Mosul was retaken from Daesh control toward the end of 2016. Mosul was considered by Daesh as their capital city in the two years since it fell under their control. By early 2017, Daesh had lost all control of central Iraq. At the end of July 2017, it was reported that Daesh had lost an estimated 73% of the territory they had once controlled in Iraq. By the end of the year, the Iraqi Army announced all of Iraq had been liberated and their people freed from Daesh oppression.

On March 23rd, 2019, the Syrian Democratic Forces announced that Daesh had lost its final stronghold in Syria, bringing an end to their so-called caliphate. On Oct. 26th, 2019, during a raid conducted by U.S. forces, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was killed in Northwest Syria.

CJTF-OIR continues its pursuit of Daesh remnants to this day. The remains still linger, but with few resources and the inability to project power to the same degree as they did in 2012, they have very little influence in the region. The continued training of partner forces within the scope of the Defeat Daesh mission is now the focus of Operation Inherent Resolve, along with preventing Daesh from re-emerging in the region and recruiting members to fight for them once again.

Iraq is working hard to establish a stable, unified government. After being devastated by the threat of Daesh, the Iraqi people are primed and ready for this transition, moving closer to being a free and sovereign nation withstanding against any third-party interference. Its military is ready to take a more active role in the safety and security of Iraq, and demonstrate its ability to protect the people and interests of Iraq.

The last of Daesh’s territory in Syria crumbled at the battle of Baghouz. The SDF were the critical land force in this offensive and through their significant sacrifice eliminated the last territorial stronghold held by Daesh. By taking a disciplined, incremental approach to the battle the SDF were able to spare the large civilian population that Daesh fighters used as human shields in the densely populated area. The tactical effectiveness of their approach mixed with the fair treatment of civilians showed the SDF to be an honorable and powerful fighting force.

After over a month of fighting, The SDF declared final victory over Daesh on March 23, 2019, marking the end of Daesh controlled territory in Syria. Their legacy: millions of people have been liberated from Daesh’s barbaric cruelty and fear, and over 900 Daesh fighters surrendering by the end of the battle.

In the last year, the role of the Coalition has been to work alongside partner forces in Iraq and Syria in preventing the remnants of Daesh from returning to power, and to keep the extremist ideologies of Daesh suppressed. The destruction of Daesh provides partners the space and time to recover from the physical and emotional damage that has been left behind in their wake.

The lessons of the rise and fall of Daesh have shown the international community the need to remain vigilant and prepared, to swiftly respond to any threat by third-party actors or violent extremist organizations. The fortitude of the Iraqi and Syrian people and the continued Coalition support of our partner forces, what was once darkened by Daesh, is rejuvenated with the aspirations of a free people.”

**********

The above article is from “The Defeat of Daesh: One Year Later”, Special Operations Joint Task force – Operation Inherent Resolve (SOJTF-OIR), by Specialist Brian Redmer, March 18, 2020.
https://www.dvidshub.net/news/365422/defeat-daesh-one-year-later-nemabuna-reva-dais-salek-pase

**********

Top Photo: Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) provide security for a Coalition mortar crew providing fires support to SDF against ISIS locations in Operation Round Up taking place in the Middle Euphrates River Valley (MERV) in Syria. (photo by SSG Timothy Koster, CJTF-OIR, May 13, 2018).

Captain Moises Navas, a special operations officer assigned to the 2nd Marine Raider Battalion, was killed in Iraq on March 8, 2020. He died from wounds suffered while accompanying Iraqi Security Forces during a mission to eliminate an ISIS stronghold in a mountainous area of north central Iraq. He was 34 years old.

Another Marine Raider – Gunnery Sergeant Diego Pongo – was also killed. Four other U.S. service members were wounded. Pongo was also assigned to the 2nd Marine Raider Battalion.

Navas died in an operation that took place in the mountains of northern Iraq more than 35 miles south of Erbil. The target was a terrorist training camp located in a tunnel and cave complex in the Qara Chockh mountains. Four other U.S. service members were wounded. The raid on the terrorist base was described as a partnered company-sized operation by ISOF.

Capt. Navas enlisted in the Marine Corps in 2004 and achieved the rank of sergeant before receiving his commission through the Marine Enlisted Commissioning Education Program in July 2010. Originally an administrative clerk, he was assigned to Marine Barracks Washington, D.C., before his selection to MECEP. Upon his commissioning and completion of The Basic School, he became an infantry officer and was assigned to 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment where he supported two Unit Deployments to Japan, and served as Company G’s Executive Officer.

In 2014, Navas was selected to attend the Army’s Maneuver Captain’s Career Course in Fort Benning, Georgia. While awaiting orders to school, he completed MARSOC’s Assessment and Selection process, securing his spot in a future ITC class, which he completed in the spring of 2016, earning the special operations officer MOS.

Captain Navas spent the last 4 years assigned to 2nd Marine Raider Battalion, where he served as a Team Commander and Company Executive Officer, deploying in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Inherent Resolve before this current deployment to Iraq.

Moise Navas was a graduate of the USMC Expeditionary Warfare School Non-Resident Course, the U.S. Army’s Maneuver Captain’s Career Course, the USMC Command and Staff College Non-Resident Course, Marine Combatant Diver Course, and Military Freefall Course.

His personal decorations include the Purple Heart, the Joint Service Commendation Medal, the Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal, the Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal, Combat Action Ribbon, two Good Conduct Medals, and the Military Outstanding Volunteer Service Medal, the Humanitarian Service Medal, the National Defense Service Medal, the Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal, the Global War on Terrorism Service Medal, and four Sea Service Deployment Ribbons.

He is survived by his wife, daughter, and three sons.

The Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command was created as a major command within the Corps and a co-equal component of United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM). The majority of the MARSOC units are based at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. The subunits of MARSOC include the Marine Raider Regiment, the Marine Raider Support Group, and the Marine Raider Training Center. The Marine Raider Regiment has a headquarters company and three Marine Raider Battalions. Two Marine Raider Battalions are located at Camp Lejeune and one at Camp Pendleton.

**********

References:

Two Marine Raiders KIA in Northern Iraq on March 8, 2020, SOF News, March 9, 2020.

DOD Identifies Marine Casualties, DOD, March 10, 2020.

Photo provided by Department of Defense.

Gunnery Sergeant Diego Pongo, a Marine Raider, was killed in action in Iraq on March 8, 2020 while conducting combat operations against the Islamic State.

Another Marine Raider – Captain Moises Navas – was also killed. Four other U.S. service members were wounded. Captain Navas was also assigned to the 2nd Marine Raider Battalion.

Pongo died in an operation that took place in the mountains of northern Iraq more than 35 miles south of Erbil. The target was a terrorist training camp located in a tunnel and cave complex in the Qara Chockh mountains. Four other U.S. service members were wounded. The raid on the terrorist base was described as a partnered company-sized operation by ISOF.

Gunnery Sergeant Pongo was a critical skills operator with MARSOC. He enlisted in the Marine Corps in 2004 and spent his initial years as a rifleman, deploying once with the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit before completing the Scout Sniper Basic Course in 2008. He then deployed to Helmand Province, Afghanistan with 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment as a Sniper Team Leader. Gunnery Sgt. Pongo was then selected to attend the grueling 9-month Individual Training Course to become a Critical Skills Operator and earned the coveted Marine Special Operator Insignia in December 2011. During his 8 years as a Marine Raider, Gunnery Sgt. Pongo completed deployments to both Iraq and Afghanistan, earning a Bronze Star Medal with Combat Distinguishing Device for heroic actions against the enemy in 2013 while deployed in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.

In addition to his Bronze Star, Gunnery Sgt. Pongo’s personal decorations also include: a Purple Heart, two Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medals, the Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal, two Combat Action Ribbons, the Army Valorous Unit Award, four Good Conduct Medals, two Humanitarian Service Medals, the National Defense Service Medal, the Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal, the Global War on Terrorism Service Medal, and four Sea Service Deployment Ribbons.

He is survived by his daughter and mother.

The Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command was created as a major command within the Corps and a co-equal component of United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM). The majority of the MARSOC units are based at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. The subunits of MARSOC include the Marine Raider Regiment, the Marine Raider Support Group, and the Marine Raider Training Center. The Marine Raider Regiment has a headquarters company and three Marine Raider Battalions. Two Marine Raider Battalions are located at Camp Lejeune and one at Camp Pendleton.

**********

References:

Two Marine Raiders KIA in Northern Iraq on March 8, 2020, SOF News, March 9, 2020.

DOD Identifies Marine Casualties, DOD, March 10, 2020.

Photo: Provided by Department of Defense.

In December 19, 2018 President Trump surprised just about everyone when he announced that the U.S. would begin immediately withdrawing its 2,200 military personnel from northeastern Syria. This decision was apparently the result of a phone call with the Turkish president that took place a few days earlier on December 14, 2018. This abrupt shift in policy was at odds with previous statements by administration, state, defense, and CJTF-OIR officials.

In the months prior to the phone call numerous officials had stressed the long-term commitment to helping the Syrian Democratic Front (SDF). In fact, the initial purpose of the phone call was to warn the Turkish president not to proceed with plans to attack U.S.-backed Kurdish forces in Syria. Instead Trump basically invited the Turks to do what they want in Syria. A part of the conversation included Trump asking the Turkish president if his forces were up to the task of cleaning up the remnants of ISIS.

In an attempt to alleviate concern about the unfinished fight against ISIS in Syria President Trump stated that Turkey can finish the job. On December 23, 2018 – just four days after announcing the U.S. military withdrawal from Syria – President Trump tweeted:

“President @RT_Erdogan of Turkey has very strongly informed me that he will eradicate whatever is left of ISIS in Syria . . . and he is a man who can do it plus, Turkey is right “next door”. Our troops are coming home!”

During a subsequent trip to visit U.S. troops in Iraq President Trump stated:

“We’ve knocked them silly. I will tell you I’ve had some very good talks with President Erdogan who wants to knock them out also, and he’ll do it.”

For the last few years, since early 2015, the United States has been providing training, advise, assistance, weapons, equipment, intelligence, and ‘enablers’ to the Syrian Democratic Front. The SDF has been the primary ground force in Syria that has been fighting ISIS. The SDF has been enabled by the U.S. and other Coalition partners with fires support (artillery and mortar) and airstrikes. As a result of SDF military operations the Islamic State has seen its territorial holdings in Syria diminish significantly. Currently, ISIS controls a few pockets of territory along the Middle Euphrates River Valley (MERV).

The SDF, assisted by the U.S. and Coalition nations, has liberated more than 20,000 square miles of previously held ISIS territory in Syria. More than 3 million civilians have been liberated from ISIS rule. The SDF is a local Arab and Kurdish military militia. However, the majority of the SDF is made up of fighters from the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG). There are also some smaller ethnic groups in the SDF such as the Yezidis and Syriac Christians.

Photo caption: US tactical vehicle provides security on roads near Manbij, Syria. Manbij is an SDF stronghold that separates the SDF enclave from areas held by Turkish-backed Syrian forces. Photo by Staff Sgt. Timothy Koster, Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve, June 20, 2018.

The Islamic State is not quite defeated. There are more military operations that need to be conducted to eliminate the few remaining pockets of IS resistance. In addition, IS has already shifted its strategy from that of a conventional force holding ground to an insurgency. It is now operating in the shadows with small groups of fighters, an intelligence apparatus, and a support structure hidden from view. It has adopted insurgent and terrorist tactics now that its conventional military capability has been significantly degraded.

President Trump’s decision to immediately start the withdrawal of U.S. military personnel from Syria puts the fight against IS in jeopardy. If the Kurds lose the support of the U.S. and the Coalition partners then it will be in danger of attacks by the Turkish military and its proxy Syrian militia forces. The Kurds will likely shift their attention from the remaining ISIS pockets and focus on the threat of Turkish incursions.

The situation in Syria is certainly complex. Russia, a key Assad ally, does not view the YPG as a terrorist organization. Russia considers Kurdish held territory as a future holding of the Syrian government; not territory that should be ceded to a Turkish occupation. The Syrian government sees any Turkish military presence in Syria as illegal and against its interests. Another major player, Iran, is concerned about ISIS regaining strength in Syria – which could affect the fight against ISIS in Iraq. Turkey would likely meet with varying degrees of resistance from these major players should it attempt to send military forces to the areas where ISIS is currently operating within Syria.

However, President Trump says to not worry about ISIS. He has the assurance from President Erdogan that Turkey’s military forces will clean up the remaining ISIS threat. Certainly, this statement will alleviate the concern that some Trump supporters have about abruptly leaving Syria without finishing the mission of killing off the remaining IS fighters. But . . .

A brief look at the map above that depicts which warring faction holds what territory in Syria quickly will cast doubt on Turkey’s ability to chase down and defeat ISIS fighters. Turkish forces are either in Turkey along the Turkish Syrian border or located in a small pocket of Syria (Afrin) to the west of the SDF held territory. The remaining pockets of ISIS are in the central eastern region of Syria along the Euphrates River. It would be extremely difficult for Turkish military forces to conduct operations in the part of Syria where ISIS is currently found without traversing territory (almost 250 kms) held by the Syrian government forces or the SDF.

Turkey views the YPG – the Kurdish element of the SDF – as an extension of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK). The PKK is a Kurdish resistance group in Turkey that has been labeled as a terrorist organization by both Ankara and Washington. The PKK has been conducting insurgent military operations within Turkey for several decades. The Turks would like to eliminate the Kurdish enclave in Syria and establish a buffer zone in Syria south of the Turkish border to provide greater security against possible Kurdish attacks and attempts to support the PKK.

Turkish desire to eliminate ISIS as a threat is certainly secondary to its aim to diminish the Kurdish control of northeastern Syria. The Turks are not that concerned about an ISIS organization that has been at war with the Syrian Kurds and the Assad regime. In addition, in order to reach the areas where ISIS now exists the Turks would have to traverse across areas of Syria now held by either the SDF or Syrian government forces. President Trump’s assertion that Turkey will finish the fight against ISIS is misplaced optimism.

**********

Top photo: SDF mortar team fires 120mm at ISIS target near Deir ez-Zor in the Middle Euphrates River Valley, Syria. Photo by SGT Matthew Crane, CJTF-OIR, November 16, 2018.

Conflict in Africa – Niger investigation, France in the Sahel – do U.S. and French interests align, what is next for Libya, Belgium in Africa, rebellion in Congo, losing a SOF war in Africa, drone strikes in Somalia, counterterror strategy in sub-Saharan Africa, partnering with Somalia’s Police in CT fight, and video on Boko Haram.

Niger Investigation into SF Mission. A two-star general officer from U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) is heading a military investigation into the deaths of four members of the 3rd Special Forces Group in Niger. The investigation should be completed in early 2018. See “Pentagon: Niger investigation to be completed by January 2018”, Military Times, November 9, 2017. Other news reports indicate the SGT La David Johnson was found with his hands bound – indicating capture before his death.

French Dilemma in Africa. France is taking a leading role in affairs in the Sahel region of Africa. It has committed 4,000 personnel to assist Mali and other neighboring nations in dampening down the Islamic jihadist threat. The U.S., with a 800 man contingent in Niger and smaller elements operating in other nations in the region is working with the French. France is dependent on the ISR capability that the U.S. provides through its two drone bases in Niger. One worry that French observers have is that due to the reliance on US ISR assets the French may get sucked into operations that assist the US but that are contrary to French interests. Read more in “Just Say No: France struggles with dependency on US troops in Africa”, Defense News, November 10, 2017.

Rebellion Fears in the Congo. Small armed groups are contesting territory in remote areas of eastern Congo. While government officials describe these armed groups as ‘flash in the pan’ movements other observers state they may be around for a while. Read “Rebellion fears grow in eastern Congo”, IRIN News, October 31, 2017.

Losing a SOF War in Africa. One national security writer thinks that targeted killing by drones and SOF on the ground in Africa can be counterproductive. Read “How to Lose a Special Operations War in Africa”, The National Interest, November 12, 2017.

A Plan for Libya. Most members of the SOF community are aware of the participation of the U.S. military in Libya over the past few years. SOF units have assisted various factions in the Libyan conflict in the fight against the Islamic State fighters that took control of Sirte, Libya. The ISIS fighters have now fled to more remote areas of Libya and to some neighboring countries. However the Salafi-jihadi movement is still strong and demands attention. While limited SOF engagement and other military activities (drone attacks, etc.) are useful in keeping ISIS at bay, Emily Estelle of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) believes a more comprehensive approach is needed. Read her thoughts in a 110-page report entitled “A Strategy for Success in Libya”, Critical Threats, November 9, 2017.

Cattle Herders Turning to Jihad. A news report examines how common every-day cattle herders from Mali and Niger morph into Islamic jihadists. (Reuters, November 12, 2017).

Drone Strikes in Somalia. U.S. forces have conducted numerous drones strikes in the last few days in Somalia in a stepped-up campaign against the Islamic extremist rebels of al-Shabab and the Islamic State. Al-Shabab has pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda and has publicly committed to planning and conducting attacks against the U.S. and neighbors in the region. The U.S. is partnering with the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Somali National Security Forces (SNSF). (Time, Nov 12, 2017).

A Different Counter Terror Strategy for Africa. One writer thinks that the insertion of Special Forces teams throughout Africa to defeat terrorist groups and stop the spread of terrorism is overreaching. He believes that fostering good governance and development will go much further in halting the spread of terrorism. Read “American Amnesia: Counterterror Strategy in Sub-Saharan Africa”, Georgetown Security Studies Review, November 7, 2017.

U.S. State Dept Assisting Somalia Police Units. An elite Somalia Police Unit formed with funding and assistance from the State Department is playing a key role in stopping terror attacks in Somalia. Read “Partnering with Somalia’s Police to Build Counterterrorism Capacity”, DIPNOTE, November 7, 2017.

Belgian Military in Africa. Belgium has committed to assisting MINUSMA and other operations in Africa. (A L’Avant-Garde, Nov 11, 2017). (French language article).

Video Documentary on Nigeria’s Boko Haram. A 56-minute long online video documents the struggle in Nigeria against Boko Haram but provides an optimistic view of how all is not lost in Nigeria. Watch Journey From Evil, Voice of America (VOA), November 2017. https://projects.voanews.com/boko-haram-journey-from-evil/

Islamic State Update – The Islamic State is suffering huge losses in Iraq and Syria yet the battle is far from over. The upper echelons of leadership have made their way out of the cities of Raqqa and Mosul and are sure to continue the battle (and war) on other fronts. ISIS will likely revert (where necessary) back to an insurgent and terrorist organization utilizing clandestine methods of operation. Over the past few years ISIS has opened several new fronts – to include Libya, Afghanistan, Philippines, and other locations. In addition, it has inspired many ‘Lone Wolf’ attacks in European cities and other locations. This article provides a review of recent articles, publications, papers, analysis, and commentary about the Islamic State.

M777 Howitzers Making a Difference in Iraq. ISIS militants are faced with a number of adversaries and weapons systems in Iraq and Syria. Aircraft bombing from above, snipers from opposing forces, and artillery of the U.S. Marines and U.S. Army. One of these artillery pieces is the 155-mm M777 Howitzer that can hit a target almost 19 miles away. The gun can be towed or airlifted (CH-53s, CH-47s, and MV-22 Ospreys). Read more in an article by James Clark entitled “This Is The Devastating Piece of Artillery Leading the Ground Fight Against ISIS”, Task and Purpose, June 29, 2017.

The Expendable Fighters of ISIS. Brian Jenkins, of the RAND Corporation, provides his analysis of how the Islamic State uses (and abuses) their rank and file. He points out that ISIS losses in Mosul and Raqqa have been staggering yet the organization will continue to exist. Read “The Islamic State’s Disposable Army”, The RAND Blog, June 20, 2017.

Who Takes Tal Afar? Powerful Iran-backed militias have surrounded the northern Iraq city of Tal Afar located to the west of Mosul. Once Mosul is fully liberated who will take the lead on Tal Afar? The Iranian-supported militias or the Iraqi government’s Army? Read “Iraq’s Dilemma: Who Will Lead the Next Big Fight Against ISIS?”, The Wall Street Journal, June 30, 2017.

Raqqa Encircled. U.S. backed Syrian forces (composed of Kurdish and Arab fighters) are slowly eating away at the defenses of the Islamic State in the Syrian city of Raqqa. While the top leadership of ISIS has left the city the ISIS fighters are still putting up a robust defense. Eventually, if you read the press releases of CJTF-OIR and other defense officials, the city of Raqqa will soon fall to the Syrian Democratic Front (SDF) forces. The large country to the north – that would be Turkey – is not pleased with these developments. It harbors deep distrust of the Kurdish fighters and would like to see the further expansion of Kurdish-held territory in Syria halted. Some observers believe that Turkey is about to embark on an anti-Kurd offensive in northern Syria. Read more in “U.S. Kurdish allies in final push to encircle Raqqa amid increasing threats from Turkey”, Military Times, June 29, 2017.

The ISIS Caliphate Crumbles. David Ignatius writes about the current state of ISIS and how it is facing defeat in the Middle East. Read “The Crumbling ISIS Caliphate”, Real Clear Politics, July 2, 2017.

Syria – U.S. Waging War on the Cheap. Frederic C. Hof provides his take on the Syrian conflict – saying that the U.S. has missed the boat on the opportunity to set things right. Read Operation Successful, Patient Dead posted on the Atlantic Council, June 29, 2017.

Post-Raqqa Problems. Once Raqqa falls to the Syrian Democratic Front (SDF) what will the political and security environment look like? See “New Conflicts Threaten Syria After Islamic State Defeat”, Reuters, June 30, 2017.

Syria – Mapping Out the Factions and Enclaves. Sam Heller, a Beirut-based writer and analyst focused on Syria, provides us with a primer of the various contestants in the Syrian conflict in “The Signal in Syria’s Noise”, War on the Rocks, June 30, 2017.

After the Fall – ISIS will Re-Emerge. Giorgio Cafiero and Daniel Wagner write about the realities of the Islamic State after the fall of Mosul and Raqqa. It isn’t going away. See Islamic State’s New Realities, the Atlantic Council, June 26, 2017.

Strategy of Occupation? Presumably the U.S. will maintain military forces in parts of Syria even after ISIS is defeated (although, to be certain, it will revert back to an insurgency). So what happens then? The U.S. should have a strategy to deal with the ‘liberated’ areas but . . . . . Read “The Closer We Get, the More Complex It Gets. White House Struggles with Strategy as ISIS Nears Defeat in Iraq and Syria”, Task and Purpose,  July 3, 2017.

Islamic State Will Fight On in Liberated Cities. ISIS is being dislodged from the major cities of Raqqa and Mosul but the fight with the Islamic State will continue well into the future. Although major and smaller cities are being liberated by the Iraqi security forces and the Syrian Democratic Front (SDF) the conflict within the cities will not end. Those who are involved in the planning and execution of “post-liberation security, reconstruction, and governance plans” are aware (at least they should be) that ISIS will continue the struggle by other means – presumably through terrorism, sabotage, suicide bombings, and guerrilla warfare. Daniel Milton and Muhammad al-Ubaydi have penned a 23-page tract entitled The Fight Goes On: The Islamic State’s Continuing Military Efforts in Liberated Cities, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, United States Military Academy, June 2017.

“Light Rollback Strategy” Against ISIS. Several writers have collaborated on a RAND Corporation paper entitled Rolling Back the Islamic State published in June 2017. The authors include Seth Jones, James Dobbins, Ben Connable, and others. The paper addresses the topics such as the ideology and objectives of ISIS, strategies the U.S. and allies should use against ISIS, specific steps to be taken against ISIS in areas where it controls territory and population centers, and steps to neutralize the Islamic States support mechanisms (recruiting, financing, propaganda) around the globe. This 297-page paper proposes that the U.S. has four possible strategies for dealing with the Islamic State: disengagement, containment, rollback “light”, and rollback “heavy”. The RAND authors conclude that rollback “light” is the best way forward – using special operations forces, the Central Intelligence Agency, intelligence assets, and airpower.

Additional Readings on SOF News about the Islamic State:
www.sof.news/?s=islamic+state

USARCENT’s periodical is titled Desert Voice. The Winter 2017 issue has been posted online. Some of the articles are listed below:

“Lucky 6: On Point”. The Central Army commander gives his assessment on how the past year has gone. He stresses some of the organizational adaptations that ARCENT has been through and outlines what will come in the future.

“Lucky 7: From My Foxhole”. The senior enlisted man chats about the huge impact Soldiers are having in the CENTCOM AOR and encourages to stay ready – mentally, physically, and medically.

Other articles are on the topics of live fire exercises at squad level, protecting the environment, NCOs, Army mariners based in Kuwait, and M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System training in CENTCOM.

You can view the 15-page publication online at DVIDS:

www.dvidshub.net/publication/issues/31381

Social Media and Conflict – selected articles, papers, analysis, and commentary on the role of social media in conflict and war.

The Importance of Counter Influence Operations. History has shown that the United States is vulnerable to an extent by propaganda and covert influence operations. The British used it to lead us into World War I, the Soviet Union used it effectively against us during the “Cold War”, and the North Vietnamese were effective in its use to paint the Tet Offensive in 1968 as a U.S. military failure. Unfortunately the United States no longer has the U.S. Information Agency which could mount counter influence operations. One observer thinks that the U.S. Congress needs to ” . . . use 21st-century policy means to wage the 21st-century information war. America needs a Strategic Information Agency.” Read “Laying Bare the Enemy’s Aims: Defending Public Opinion in the 21st Century”, War on the Rocks, January 2, 2017.

Shaping Opinions. “War Goes Viral”, by Emerson T. Booking and P.W. Singer, The Atlantic, November 2016. A great and comprehensive article about how social media shapes opinion and is used by warring parties in conflict.

The Virtual Caliphate. The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) has an approach to information warfare that represents a key component of its overall strategy. Even though it is under pressure on the ground in the virtual world ISIS continues to make headway. While it may not establish a Caliphate that holds territory (it does now but may not in the long-term) it certainly can carve out a slice of the virtual world for its Caliphate. The United States and its allies need to continue to diminish the ISIS threat in the physical world but must meet the challenge ISIS poses in the virtual world as well. Read more in “The Virtual Caliphate: ISIS’s Information Warfare”, Institute for the Study of War, December 20, 2016.

Lone Wolfs and ISIS Virtual Planners. The Islamic State has its physical caliphate (Syria and Iraq) with provinces in places like eastern Afghanistan and the Lake Chad Basin. It also operates in the ‘virtual world’ as well. Learn more in “ISIL’s Virtual Planners: A Critical Terrorist Innovation”, War on the Rocks, January 4, 2017.

DARPA, Social Media, and the ID of Terrorists. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency is moving ahead with a project that looks to develop automated software designed to identify terrorist threats through social media. Executive Biz Blog, January 3, 2017.

Soft Power and the Weaponized Narrative. The new battlespace (in part) can be found on the Internet. Almost all parties to every current conflict in the world uses social media to shape the fight. Read more in “Weaponized Narrative is the New Battlespace”, Defense One, January 3, 2017.

ISIS and Social Media: A Fatal Attraction. Cellphones, computers, and social media are used by terrorists, insurgents, and political dissidents to spread their message and sway the conversation. But their use also pose danger. Read “Fatal Attraction: ISIS Just Can’t Resist Social Media”, The Daily Beast, January 3, 2017.

National Security and Defense News – JSTARS, Syria, Iran, Iraq, fixing the Navy, fighting terrorism, counterinsurgency, state-building, foreign policy, and more.

JSTARS Over the Middle East. One reporter, Eric Schmitt, recently spent some time with the Air Force visiting a flying unit with the E-8C Joint Surveillance Target attack Radar System (JSTARS). Read “Aboard a U.S. Eye in the Sky, Staring Down ISIS in Iraq and Syria“, The New York Times, December 25, 2016.

Trump and Syria – What to do?. One can only wonder where U.S. policy will lead us in the Syrian conflict. While we are currently working with some rebel Syrian groups and the Kurdish YPG – that level of support may grow or diminish. Some want us to walk away from Syria saying the resistance to the Assad regime is too fragmented. Others (Turkey included) would like us to abandon the Kurds. Many worry about an escalation of the conflict with the Russians. What should be done? Frederic C. Hof provides some advice to the President-Elect in “Advising Trump on Syria”, The Atlantic Council, January 3, 2017.

Fighting Terrorism with the next President. Daniel Byman says that terrorism is here to stay and that it has evolved and “. . . counterterrorism must change to keep pace . . . ” requiring the U.S. to “reorient its counterrorism focus.” He goes on to say that “. . . the most effective counterterrorism effort could be fostering better governance in troubled parts of the Middle East.” In his extensive essay he describes the current and future terrorist threat and provides recommendations in “How to Fight Terrorism in the Donald Trump Era”, The National Interest, December 25, 2016.

Incoming Presidents and U.S. Foreign Policy. The concept of ‘nation building’ is a negative topic for newly-elected presidents but many fall victim to “America’s civil religion” of overseas engagement. Read “A History of U.S. Foreign Affairs in Which Grandiose Ambitions Trump Realism”, The New York Times, December 27, 2016.

Fixing the Navy. For one thing – getting rid of the ‘blueberries’ is a step forward. Beyond that the Navy needs to reverse some of the disastrous decisions of Secretary Mabus. Read more in “To Fix the Department of the Navy – Kill the Mabus Legacy”, Small Wars Journal, January 2, 2017.

Iran Expansion of Naval Power. It appears that Iran is seeking to expand its reach by way of the oceans. It is planning on building naval bases in Yemen (a fierce fight going on between Saudi and Iranian proxy forces in that country) and Syria (yet another proxy fight). Read more in “Iran’s Growing Naval Ambitions”, Foreign Affairs, January 1, 2017.

Too Much COIN? Not Enough? The U.S. military has spent the last decade and a half fighting counterinsurgencies – principally in Iraq and Afghanistan. Some senior military leaders worry that we became to “COIN Centric” and ignored conventional warfighting skills. Others say we need to keep COIN as a central function of the military because that is the most likely type of conflict we will face in the immediate future. Read a 98-page report on the topic in “The COIN Conundrum: The Future of Counterinsurgency and U.S. Land Power”, Strategic Studies Institute, December 14, 2016.

Statebuilding – Lessons Learned. In February 2010 the U.S. announced with great fanfare that it would re-take (along with Afghan forces) the district of Marjah in Helmand province. Once the Taliban were cleared the Afghan’s would move a “Government-In-A-Box” into the district to re-establish governance, police, development, services, and security. It didn’t work out so well. Read more in “A Better Approach to Statebuilding”, Foreign Affairs, January 2, 2017.

Females and Marine Boot Camp. The Marines will soon have females in combat arms military occupational specialties. Read more in “The First Female Infantry Marines Will Graduate Boot Camp This Month”, Task & Purpose, January 2, 2017.