For many decades members of the special operations community awaited the periodic publication throughout the year of the Special Warfare magazine produced in print and online by the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJKFSWCS). The finely produced publication provided excellent commentary on doctrine, SOF history, current events, and more for the special operations community.

Over the past few years the frequency of the publication has diminished and there was quite a break between the last issue and this August 2023 issue. The current issue is only 13 pages long. Past issues were anywhere from 44 pages to over 100 pages long. So I suppose we should manage our expections! Time will tell.

Topics in the August 2023 issue of Special Warfare.

• TRADOC’s Training Revolution: TRADOC 50th Anniversary
• ARSOF Heritage Week
• Distinguished & Honorary Members of the Regiments
• Vietnam-era Medal of Honor Recipient Receives Special Forces Honor
• JFK Special Warfare Museum
• ARSOF Lineage or Legacy: Which is the right word?

Let’s hope the Special Warfare magazine comes back frequently and as robust as past issues have been over the years. It provided a valuable service to ARSOF members in the past and hopefully the magazine will do the same in the future.

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Past issues of Special Warfare can be accessed online at the links below. You will find that neither link has all of the past issues – just some of them.
https://www.swcs.mil/Resources/Special-Warfare/
Special Warfare – DVIDS

This video provides a history of Army SOF – Special Forces, Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, ARSOF aviation, and the Rangers. It covers the period of World War I to the present. The video was produced by the U.S. Army Special Operations History Office, United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) at Fort Liberty, N.C.

History of U.S. Army Special Operatons Forces, ARSOF History, YouTube, July 10, 2023, 13 minutes.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cHQtj7B9UwY

SWCS has a new website and it is chock full of some great information about training for Special Forces, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations. The U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS) or SWCS for short is one of the Army’s premier training and education centers.

At any given time during the year SWCS is host to over 3,000 students that are attending courses ranging from entry-level training to extremely advanced training for Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) soldiers. There are over 41 courses at the training center located at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

There are some great features available on the website:

• Academic Handbook
• Past Issues of Special Warfare Magazine
• Info on the JFK Special Warfare Museum
• Pineland Underground Podcast
• Special Operations Center of Excellence (SOCoE) Libraries

USAJFKSWCS website:
https://www.swcs.mil/

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Photo: A student from the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School who is in the Special Forces Combat Diver Qualification Course leaps off the tailgate of an MH-47 over the open ocean at dusk near Key West, Florida February 24, 2020. Students who attended the six-week course were qualified as basic military open-circuit and closed-circuit combat divers knowledgeable in waterborne surface infiltration and exfiltration tactics, techniques and procedures and qualified in waterborne operations including day and night ocean subsurface navigation swims, day and night infiltration dives, deep dives, search dives, diving physics, physiology and injuries, marine hazards, tides and currents. (U.S. Army photo by K. Kassens)

A hearing was held on “Disinformation in the Gray Zone: Opportunities, Limitations, and Challenges” by the House Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations. The purpose of the hearing was to receive testimony on the Department of Defense’s (DoD) efforts to address malign activities of our adversaries below the threshold of armed conflict.

Witnesses:

Mr. Christopher Maier
Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense
Special Operations / Low Intensity Conflict

Mr. Neil Tipton
Director of Defense Intelligence
Collections and Special Programs (DoD)

Mr. James Sullivan
Defense Intelligence Officer for Cyber
Defense Intelligence Agency

Hearing. The event was approximately one hour long. It began with opening statements by the Committee chairman, Representative Gallego, and the witnesses. The three witnesses had submitted one witness statement for the record that incorporated the comments of all three witnesses. Then the format moved to a question and answer session. This open session was followed by a closed session for more sensitive or classified topics.

Takeaways. Our defense information operations (IO) are not keeping up with those of Russia and China. Currently Russia is the main IO threat to the US but China will soon catch up and move ahead of Russia. The DoD has to relearn how to conduct IO (like we did during the Cold War). The conduct of IO falls primarily to the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). The various DoD cyber organizations are working IO into their activities. One of the limiting factors is personnel – recruiting and training an individual who is knowledgeable of language, culture, behavioral science and other disciplines is a time-consuming and long-range venture.

Four Lines of Effort. The DoD has organized its efforts to combat disinformation, misinformation, and propaganda in four areas.

• countering propaganda by adversaries
• force protection
• countering disinformation abroad
• deterring and disrupting adversarial malign influence capabilities

Conclusion. The hearing starts off a little slow but then gets more interesting during the question and answer period. If you are tracking events in the information operations world and USSOCOM’s involvement in IO activities then this hearing could be of interest. The 9-page witness statement is very informative.

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Video – Disinformation in the Gray Zone: Opportunities, Limitations, and Challenges
March 16, 2021, 57 minutes, YouTube.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N-RCBwyamdY&t=172s

Additional Products. The biographies of the witnesses and the opening witness statement are available on the Subcommittee’s portal at the link below. You can access them on the portal page via the zip file that allows you to download the meeting package. If you just want to read the witness statement – click here to access off SOF News website. (PDF, 9 pages).
https://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/ByEvent.aspx?EventID=111323

The Special Warfare Museum, currently located in a building on Ardennes Street on Fort Bragg, North Carolina, is slated to reopen on April 1, 2021 after having closed its doors for more than a year. This is good news for the Special Forces, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations community – organizations that have had its history on exhibit for decades in a building on Fort Bragg since the 1960s.

Troubled History Over Past Year. The Special Forces Museum has had an interesting history in the last few years. In December 2019 it was ‘closed for inventory’. Then in January 2020 it was announced that the history office of the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) would assume responsibility for the museum – so oversight was transferred from the US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS) to the United States Army Special Operations Command. The name was changed to the Army Special Operations Forces Museum (U.S. Army) and the plan was to incorporate the history of the Army Rangers and Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR). In April 2020 USASOC provided more details that revealed the physical facility of the Special Warfare Museum would be permanently closed (SOF News) and that it would be replaced with an ‘online presence’ and small, periodic ‘exhibit road trips’ to ARSOF units.

Resistance to the Closing of the Museum. The Special Warfare community, past and present, was not happy with the decision by USASOC to change the focus of the museum from special warfare to ARSOF, to have it run by USASOC, and to close the physical location of the museum. Pressure was mounted by a petition drive, social media, the Special Forces Association (SFA) and other organizations, senior officers and NCOs (serving and retired), and other interested parties to keep the museum open in a physical facility and to return it to its ‘Special Warfare’ roots.

USASOC Azimuth Check. In June 2020 the United States Special Operations Command formed an ‘advisory committee’ to study the situation and provide recommendations and courses of action. The members of the council came from serving and former officers and NCO’s of the Army’s special warfare community.

Museum Advisory Committee. A number of meetings were conducted by the committee, they visited the current museum location, and explored other locations on Fort Bragg. There were a host of issues to digest to include space limitations, funding constraints, staffing, who would have ‘ownership’ and oversight, and more. The council provided recommendations to USASOC for consideration later in mid-August 2020.

Back to SWCS. In the fall of 2020 USASOC directed that the museum would once again fall under the Special Warfare Center and School (SWCS). It also directed that a new location be found within Bank Hall (on Ardennes Street). The museum’s floor space in Bank Hall will have a significant increase over what the museum currently has for exhibits. Bank Hall is currently under renovation. A recent announcement by SWCS on Facebook indicates that the museum is (currently) called the JFK Special Warfare Museum. It is also being referred to as the USAJFKSWCS Heritage Center. The museum website on soc.mil has yet to be updated on the reopening or any other developments since January 2021.

Visiting the Museum. The museum will open to the public beginning April 1, 2021. The hours of operation will be from 1100 – 1600, Monday through Friday. Admission is free. COVID-19 precautions are being observed – to include mask and physical distancing. The museum is located on Fort Bragg, NC at 2815 Ardennes Street in Building D-2815, across the street from the JFK Chapel.

JFK Museum Store and Yarborough Knife. The JFK Museum Gift Shop, before its closure, was located in Bank Hall and fell under the JFKSWCS Museum Association. The Special Forces Association has assumed responsibility for the museums gift shop and providing of the Yarborough Knife (SFA). The gift shop is now located at SFA HQs on Doc Bennet Road in Fayetteville (near the airport). Merchandise can be bought online (SFA).

Future Outlook. Eventually the museum will be located in Bank Hall on Ardennes Street once the facility is upgraded. This is a positive move for the Army’s special warfare community. Those that took an active role in persuading USASOC to give this issue another look should be commended. Of course, USASOC gets some credit as well for doing the right thing. The staff at the museum should be recognized for its efforts over the past year to complete the extensive inventory that was conducted and to prepare the museum for reopening. The Special Warfare Museum will likely be a key institution preserving SF, CA, and PYSOP history while providing a mechanism for recruiting FBNC-based and visiting soldiers for the Army’s special warfare units.

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Top Image: Picture of the front of the Special Warfare Museum when it was located on the corner of Reilly Road and Ardennes Street during the last several decades.

Image of Museum Opening. Posted by USAJFKSWCS on Facebook March 30, 2021.

By Faruk Hadžić.

Download PDF

Abstract

Undemocratic processes of hybrid and psychological geopolitical warfare blurred relations and security paradigm. The legacy of conflicts and the applied Western policies to the region is the strengthening of ethnonational discourses and the activation of regional crises. The Anglo-American project of post-Cold War spatial planning in the Western Balkans is ineffective. It would be necessary to formulate new Western policies. Balkan nationalist and separatist ideas, which resurfaced with the former Yugoslavia’s break-up, should be reticent and transform within the European Union (EU).

Montenegro and, in particular, Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H) is vulnerable to destabilizing Russian influences, using a complicated social, political, and economic environment, a lack of strategic orientation, and divisions over NATO integration. As for China, Arab countries, and Israel, their influence in the Balkans remains limited, primarily – but not exclusively – to economic projects. However, these impacts will continue to grow unless more severe and concrete measures are taken by the US and EU. Further weakening or eventual disappearance of the EU perspective in the Balkans could lead to new attempts to establish “Greater”- Albania, Croatia, Serbia, or even Ottoman Turkey through violent border changes in the region. Instead of democratizing, the 21st century has brought fragility in the Balkans.

Author

Faruk Hadžić is an independent researcher and an author from Bosnia and Herzegovina. He holds the MSc in Security Studies, Criminal Justice and Law Enforcement Studies, BSc in Psychology & Economics, and Diploma (MBTA) in Mindfulness-Based Transactional Analysis. His research is multidisciplinary in Social and Political Psychology, Political Science, Socioeconomics, Critical Security Studies, and Criminal Justice.
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1158-7858
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Faruk_Hadzic2

The Phenomena and the Western Balkans

The new geopolitical climate has changed the character of conflicts in which wars are fought in the name and for the benefit of other actors supported by powerful forces, which can be terrorist groups, various revolutionary independence movements. When it comes to political pressures, one usually uses one’s position at the international level to force a political decision or influence one to give up already established attitudes. There is the possibility of providing support to specific groups or individuals in power to change the country’s political system or cause riots and conflicts, then political embezzlement that can help violate some international agreements. Psychological – propaganda activities are a form of special operations aimed at achieving psychological effects for their benefit. By carrying out psychological actions, it seeks to “weaken and overthrow the defense of the attacked party by encouraging internal divisions, provoking mistrust and suspicion in the ranks of the defense and encouraging internal enemies of the attacking system to initiate fear, insecurity, disorganization; it serves to spread bad promises, illusions, rumors.” [1] The use of psychology for war purposes dated back to the Chinese thinker Sun Tzu’s thoughts and received its real revelation in the 20th century through two worlds and the cold war. However, the form of use of psychological actions in the new information space has changed significantly. Likewise, psychological operations used to be the exclusive advantage of the state and the armed forces. However, today, in the new social information media, it is in the hands of non-governmental organizations, formal and informal groups, and individuals. In the socio-information framework, the primary means of war participation are becoming psychological activities and operations. Psychological techniques are used to realize numerous general goals of hybrid warfare, which are primarily aimed at avoiding the emergence or minimization of the duration of the regular (militarized) mode of leadership war. Confrontation in the information space has become of general importance and for the collapse of the political, economic, and social system. [2] Thus, psychological activities play a central role in hybrid geopolitical warfare.

The fact is that after the end of the Cold War, the world found itself at the epicenter of a hybrid war in which disinformation became the primary weapon of populism, right or left-wing. The penetration of fake news and various misinformation is becoming more and more powerful on social networks, and the users of these platforms are increasingly victims of deception and manipulation. The Balkans are witnessing the growing crisis of Western powers daily and the worsening populist, nationalist, and conservative US and European leaders’ policies, from US President Trump to Hungarian President Viktor Orban. They nullify any European Union (EU) and The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) attempts to reform Balkan countries.

Hybrid warfare is a new term by which they try to cover and emphasize all the specifics of contemporary conflicts in the first two decades of the twenty-first century. There is still no generally accepted definition of hybrid warfare, despite the great popularity in the professional field and scientific circles. Initially, hybrid warfare [3] was considered a combined application of conventional military capabilities and special forces, irregular acts, terrorist acts, and criminal activity. In the combined application of different forms, a synergistic effect is expected both in the conflict’s physical and psychological [4] domains. Later, the perception of hybrid warfare is extended to all other forms, means, and ways of endangering security. In the broadest sense, hybrid war is any action by any means that undermine, hinders, damages an opposing-rival-hostile state, its economy, people, and the entire social life. In a narrower sense, hybrid warfare undermines state order in the opposing state in any way and by any means. Within the category of hybrid warfare, hybrid action, it is necessary to mention the notion of “soft power” as a weapon that threatens universalist and inclusive elements better than the conventional one. I maintain that hybrid warfare is a term used uncritically today. The very expression as a peculiarity – sui generis – has existed since the Lebanese war in 2006 and Hezbollah’s strategy towards Israel and implies a combination of conventional, irregular, and information warfare. According to specific goals of interest and with the help of specific and psychological operations or the so-called, there are several traditional state strategies according to specific goals of interest, reflexive control operations to influence someone’s decision-making process.

The Balkan territorial-expansionist ethnopolitics’ destructive power has already shown that it can destroy states, peoples, religious institutions, educational systems, scientific plants, and human dignity. In the dominant diplomatic discourse, the Western Balkans’ stability and prosperity are viewed in the context of two integrative processes: the accession of the region to NATO and the EU regions and their targeted Europeanization. The newly formed countries of the region become an area of export of democracy, the object of geopolitics enlargement, political and security order, and the US and the EU’s engagement, which as external actors moderate the crisis in the region. In particular, the US’ policy toward the region, in which it has been active since the end of the Cold War, can be seen in the context of a complex diplomatic and military approach aimed at establishing a new geopolitical configuration in Southeast Europe. In the crisis area of Southeast Europe, the US has been present for almost three decades, and in resolving the crisis and stabilizing the region, it has continuously used a whole range of diplomatic, political, and military instruments to securely “encircle” the Western Balkans, geopolitically necessary for strategic control of the Adriatic Mediterranean and the Black Sea regions. However, after 2000, preoccupied with the “war on terror,” and thus the geopolitical restructuring of the Middle East, the US was present in the Western Balkans indirectly, through the actions of Allied actors pursuing a policy of expanding security (NATO) and economic (EU, IMF and other international financial institutions) order, and with the help of which the region is identity-shaped as a western value. [5]

The US geopolitician Robert Kaplan (2017) argued that peace in the Balkans could be achieved and maintained solely with “external imperial force.” According to Kaplan, in the times of the empires’ (Charlemagne, the Habsburg Monarchy, and the Ottoman Empire) collapse that ruled the Balkans, the region regularly turned into battlefields. [6] A logical question arises – did the European Union become a new empire that would maintain a peace order in the Balkans? The EU’s role in Southeast Europe is inconsistent between its normative potential and current problematic aspects of process implementation policies. Moreover, outside the ritual, political matrix framework, concentration on specific programs to stimulate economic, technological, social, human development, and regional integration is not progressive. [7] Although the EU adopted a new Enlargement Strategy for the Western Balkans in 2018, the potential of stability is not proven. Instead of liberalism and Europeanization, further Balkanization of the region resulted from the EU’s failure and the allies’ conflicting interests – the US and NATO. Such a constellation of relations has made it possible to strengthen many non-Western actors – Russia, Turkey, China, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, whose presence has strongly shaped the Western Balkans’ security climate for many years. After years of close cooperation, during which mostly followed EU and US peacekeeping solutions in the region, Montenegro decided to declare independence (2006), and Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence (2008) significantly damaged relations between Russia and the West. The unusually active role of the US and Western allies in the decomposition of Serbia and the region’s geopolitical transformation has resulted in increased Russian engagement with the region. Ever since the Ukrainian crisis outbreak in 2014, the US and the European Union have seen Russia’s presence in the Balkans as a security threat. The geopolitical clash between the West and Russia is gradually profiling itself into a conflict of interest of the great powers, which measure their influence on the region’s countries through diplomacy, significant investment, and confrontational energy infrastructure projects. [8]

Because NATO is still the strongest geopolitical alliance, Russia is increasingly turning to new allies who are actively working to create a counterweight to the US as a unipolar center of the post-Cold War world. China, Iran, and Turkey, which are increasingly moving away from Western countries’ influence and policies, are strengthening their own economic and political ties with Russia. Although not without risk to Turkey, the new alliance with Russia, Iran, and China has a significant impact on the region. In the Western Balkans, China is more present, especially in the sphere of economy. So far, Chinese investments in energy, roads, railways, and other 5.5 billion euros have come to Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H), Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia. Saudi Arabia finances numerous humanitarian centers and non-governmental organizations and provides several other investments in B&H, such as market centers and separate luxury resorts for Arab citizens. Investments are expanding widely in the region. Turkey has long strengthened its economic and political influence and seeks to establish itself as a dominant regional power. Besides, it is an indisputable fact that during the genocide and war crimes, and within the arms embargo, Iran provided the most significant possible military and diplomatic assistance to the B&H people during the war.

I maintain that “negative influence” threatens universalist and inclusive elements of Balkan societies, the political and national history of these countries, intercultural diversity, and sovereignty, strengthening regional pan-nationalisms’ irredentist aspirations. Based on credible data, analyzes, and estimates that after the failures in Montenegro and Macedonia, which are today within NATO, almost all Russia’s capacities in this area are directed, i.e., Russia’s hybrid action towards Macedonia, Montenegro, and BiH. In such hybrid activities, Serbia, one of the neighboring countries, gives Russia excellent aid and plays a significant role. The fact is that representatives of the Serbian state apparatus were active in Montenegro, Macedonia, at the events’ time, which was a clear sign. At the same time, we should not rule out that such activities are very intensive towards B&H. However, Russia should not be denigrated either. It is trying to use the same means, although it succeeds to a lesser extent than the US and Western Europe combined. We have had the Snowden case and the Prizma affair, and Western spying on the states and officials, with contractual cooperation with Facebook, Google, Twitter, and Microsoft. Russia did not invent such particular warfare, even though they are merely adopting Western techniques. They also have a significant learning capacity, with a high population having a university degree.

The Balkan security dilemma’s central discourse is “who will control the land,” a piece of a particular territory within the pressure of national hegemonist ideas (Greater Serbia and Croatia). Albanians in Macedonia did not get territory but rights (they changed the Constitution, the President of the Assembly is of Albanian nationality, the right to speak in Albanian was also introduced), while in B&H, ethnicity was gained, which means increased opportunities for monopoly and power over the territory. [9] According to Jadranka Polovic (2018), the Greater Albania concept, behind all the previous post-Cold War administrations of the US and UK, has already been practically-legally realized and becoming irrelevant. The borders between Kosovo and Albania and the borders between Kosovo and western Macedonia do not exist. Formal recognition of the creation of a “Greater Albania” that reaches beyond western Macedonia, the southern and eastern parts of Montenegro (Ulcinj and parts of the municipalities of Plav and Rozaje), the Presevo Valley in southern Serbia, and southern Greek Epirus, parts of foreign countries, would cause complete chaos and a new war in the region. The Greater Albania concept’s implementation is being achieved by drawing the entire region into NATO and the EU. [10] B&H and the former Yugoslavia area with a nationalist ethnopolitics and a continuous conflict, as a dangerous “barrel of gunpowder,” become a scene of competition, collisions, and competition between most influential actors of the modern world in the first decades of the 21st century. In this constellation, violent hegemonic nationalism in the Balkans partly serves as a space of displaced European horror in which clashes of “great powers” take place, while a small number of South Slavic peoples maniacally exterminate each other, demolish places of worship, expel the population, commit mass crimes, destroy the remaining ethnically homogeneous and clean spaces. [11]

Dominant perceptions in the countries of the Western Balkans are sometimes present. It narrows the framework for observing and understanding the behavior of great powers in this region, with an unargued overestimation of their significance and importance in the plans of these great powers, and the introduction of emotional elements in the field of international relations where only interests are most valued and measured. The great powers’ mutual relations are complex, multi-layered, and pragmatic above all. The great powers in some regions or on some issues agree, coordinate actions, and even help, while in other areas or issues, there is disagreement and confrontation. In pursuing their interests, the great powers have a wide range of opportunities and resources at their disposal. The various forms of contemporary conflict are often portrayed as the result of the projection of hybrid threats and termed hybrid warfare. The wide presence and topicality [12] of the phenomenon of hybrid warfare is the reason to problematize the concept of hybrid warfare by evaluating central questions and answers of practical interest to decision-makers at the strategic level. The Western Balkans region’s importance in the two elected great powers’ strategic agendas – Russia and Turkey are evident. For years, Montenegro and other countries in the region have been a testing ground for cyber attacks and the spread of false news by which some foreign powers, primarily Russia, are trying to undermine and slow down the Euro-Atlantic integration of the post-Yugoslav states. Indeed, other great powers are closely following the development of events in the Western Balkans and possible trends and scenarios [13] of future development. In addition to the “malignant” Russian influence, the West is increasingly facing Turkey’s arbitrary policy, which, especially after 2000, is questioning the possibilities of its action in the region. Namely, Turkey, a strategically important member of NATO, until recently an unquestionable ally of the US, is trying to renew its sphere of influence in the Balkans, a region that belonged to the Ottoman Empire until the First World War. Turkey is a unique, doubly “endowed” country – with the space of its geopolitical influence, especially the control of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles as internationally important straits and the successor to the Ottoman Empire. The mutual relations between Russia and Turkey have become very topical in recent times and is there much research in this area. [14] It is critical in the current time in the broader context of the relations of these two countries with other great powers and the conflicts in the Middle East and growing tensions in South America.

In Serbia, approaching NATO is taboo due to Serbia’s 1999 bombing to stop Kosovo’s conflict. This relationship is reflected in B&H politics. There is also a declarative commitment to European integration, which is burdened by the Kosovo syndrome. By the Kosovo syndrome, we mean Serbian politics’ burden with the belief that joining the EU means renouncing territorial sovereignty. In this way, the EU’s demands for better functioning of BiH are read in the Republic of Srpska RS (one of the B&H entities). In B&H and Kosovo’s relations, no aspect can be singled out to function at a satisfactory level. Relations remain in the realm of political rhetoric, and the problem of freedom of movement between BiH and Kosovo is directly linked to asymmetric and scarce economic cooperation. B&H is a permanent crisis state, with the world’s most complex political and public administration, the inability to create the minimum internal political cohesion needed to build a stable political identity. In the BiH’s ethnoreligious model formed by the Dayton Peace Accords (1995), the demographic remnant is unconstitutional. For the most part, a mere constitutional decor appropriately enshrined in the last indent of the discriminatory BiH Constitution’s Preamble. Therefore, the name “Others” is an unsentimental description of their position in this ethnoreligious divided society. [15] Furthermore, Chinese investments in the Western Balkans economies have brought the presence of the Chinese intelligence service MSS with them. This service deals with the interests of China’s state policy and the protection of Chinese investments. Moreover, the Chinese service, together with business people, operates not only in the Western Balkans but also throughout Europe. The German counterintelligence service has marked 10,000 German citizens in contact with fake intelligence officers from China. That is why the presence of the Chinese intelligence service on the territory of B&H, and especially in Serbia and Croatia, is very significant for the intelligence and security apparatus of B&H. [16]

The Western Balkans remain poorly connected in terms of infrastructure atomized energy market, burdened with political instability, which negatively affects the energy security of the region. The EU on the Western Balkans is focused on infrastructure projects that can significantly affect the energy sector’s decarbonization (hydropower, renewables, natural gas), while China prefers mining and thermal energy. Russia is focused on the gas and oil sector and currently fully controls areas in Serbia and B&H. [17] Some argue that strategic or religious goals drive the Arab Gulf countries’ investment interest in the Balkans. Others state that the reasons are strictly financial, a convenient location at the crossroads, competitive labor cost, and the EU joins the regions for investments. While the media’s attention is on companies from Arab countries, the crucial fact is that 80 percent of real estate investments in the region must be due to Israel. “Israel investors have concentrated on retail parks and shopping malls.” [18] 

Social media has become a platform for diversity in psychological activities and processes of a coercive, deceptive, alienating, and defensive nature. People receive most of their information daily via Facebook and other online platforms. If we briefly focus on B&H, 1,500 media outlets have been proven to have published false news at least once. During one-year research and analysis of the observed media, a whole network (hub), domestic and newspapers from the environment that spread false news in an organized manner, exists. “The hub is not actually in B&H, but it consists of 14 media from B&H and 15 media from Serbia, which have been proven to share misinformation and have over ten connections in spreading various misinformation. It is alarming because they work together and operationally. Among these media is Russian Sputnik.” [19] These are elements of information warfare, as a type of special warfare, which is an essential feature of the information-communication era in which information, misinformation, false information, deception, and propaganda are on the scene. However, it is not just the states that do it, but huge companies, non-governmental organizations, and formal and informal groups.

Conclusion

The legacy of conflicts and the applied Western policies to the region is the strengthening of ethnonational discourses and the activation of regional crises. The Anglo-American project of post-Cold War spatial planning in the Western Balkans is ineffective, so it would be necessary to formulate new Western policies. Undemocratic processes of hybrid and psychological geopolitical warfare blurred relations and security paradigm. Confrontation in the information space created the ground for numerous influences on the physical and the opponent’s cognitive sphere in the hybrid geopolitical warfare.

Balkan nationalist and separatist ideas, which resurfaced with the former Yugoslavia’s break-up, should be reticent and transform within the EU borders. Montenegro and, in particular, B&H is vulnerable to destabilizing Russian influences, using a complicated social, political, and economic environment, a lack of strategic orientation, and divisions over NATO integration. As for China, Arab countries, and Israel, their influence in the Balkans remains limited, primarily – but not exclusively – to economic projects. However, these impacts will continue to grow unless more severe and concrete US and EU replace them. Further weakening or eventual disappearance of the EU perspective in the Balkans could lead to new attempts to establish “Greater Albania,” “Greater Croatia,” “Greater Serbia,” or even “Greater Ottoman Turkey” through violent border changes, which would unquestionably lead to new violence in the region. Thus, instead of democratizing, the 21st century has brought fragility to the Balkans.

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References, Endnotes:

[1] Ranogajec, V. (2000). Psihološki rat [Psychological war]. Polemos, Casopis za interdisciplinarna istraživanja rata i mira. 3(5). https://hrcak.srce.hr/2999

[2] Hunter, E. & Pernik, P. (2015). The challenges of hybrid warfare. International Centre for Defence and Security EESTI-Estonia. https://www.icds.ee/fileadmin/media/icds.ee/failid/Eve_Hunter__Piret_Pernik_-_Challenges_of_Hybrid_Warfare.pdf

[3] Tagarev, T., (2018). Hybrid Warfare: Emerging Research Topics, Information & Security: An International Journal. 39. 289-300.

[4] Vučinić D., (2017). Psihološko ratovanje u prostoru društvenih informacionih medija – aspekt hibridnog ratovanja. Vojno delo.7

[5] Polović, J. and Frlan, J. (2019). Zapadni balkan: „divide et impera“ ili zašto suprotstavljeni interesi velikih sila generiraju trajnu nestabilnost regije [Western Balkans: “divide et impera” or why the conflicting interests of the great powers generate lasting instability in the region]. Acta Economica et turistica. 5(2)

[6] Kaplan, R. (2017). New York Times. The Necessary Empire. May 5

[7] Hadžić, F., (2020). Bosnia between the Dayton’s peace straightjacket, development, and power centers’ moral obligation; solicitation to Biden, Small Wars Journal

[8] Polović, J. & Frlan, J. (2019). Zapadni balkan: „divide et impera“ ili zašto suprotstavljeni interesi velikih sila generiraju trajnu nestabilnost regije [Western Balkans: “divide et impera” or why the conflicting interests of the great powers generate lasting instability in the region]. Acta Economica et turistica. 5(2)

[9] Niall M., (2017). NATO and the Western Balkans, From Neutral Spectator to Proactive Peacemaker. London: Palgrave Macmillan

[10] Polovic, J. (2018). Geopolitika. Velika Albanija: san ili realnost? [Great Albania: dream or reality?]. https://www.geopolitika.news/analize/dr-sc-jadranka-polovic-velika-albanija-san-ili-realnost/

[11] Nikolić N. (2017). Razmatranje inovativnosti koncepta hibridnog ratovanja [Consideration of the innovativeness of the concept of hybrid warfare]. Vojno delo. 2. 320-332.

[12] Graham, T., Levitsky, J., Munter C. & Wisner F. (2018).
Time for Action in the Western Balkans. Policy report, EastWest Institute

[13] Arbatova, N. (2018). The Russia-Turkey Relations: Strategic Partnership or Strategic Rivalry – Policy paper series 4/2018. Nicosia: Cyprus Center for European and International Affairs.

[14] Ünver, A. (2019). Russian Digital Media and Information Ecosystem in Turkey. Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies. 1-56. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep21042?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents

[15] Hadžić, F. (2020). Post-Yugoslav spaces between defective democracies, authoritarianism, and kleptocracies, International Affairs and Global Strategy. 86. 38-52. 10.7176/IAGS/86-04

[16] Kico, A. & Kapetanovic M. (2019). Bosna i Hercegovina i Zapadni Balkan – Aspekti geopolitike i hibridnog rata [Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Western Balkans – Aspects of Geopolitics and Hybrid Warfare]. Sarajevo: Atlantska incijativa.

[17] Turcalo, S. (2020). Energetska geopolitika na Balkanu. [Energy geopolitics in the Balkans], http://library.fes.de/pdf-giles/bueros/sarajevo/16147.pdf

[18] Dnevnik.hr. (2017). Financial times. https://dnevnik.hr/vijesti/svijet/financial-times-otkriva-zasto-bliskoistocni-investitori-ulazu-u-balkan—474690.html

[19] Brkan, D. (2020). Slobodna Europa. Hibridni rat dezinformacijama nad Balkanom [A hybrid war of disinformation over the Balkans]. https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/sajber-napadi-crna-gora/30230596.html

Paul Cobaugh’s book Modern Minutemen and Women provides a detailed look at the U.S. governments’ inability to conduct influence operations to counter the propaganda efforts of Russia, China, and other adversaries. His book outlines the deficiencies with the various organizations of the U.S. government – to include the State Department, Department of Defense, and other agencies. He also provides several important recommendations to improve our defensive and offensive capabilities when it comes to information operations or narrative warfare.

Using examples from the Cold War, the post-Cold War period, Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere Paul describes the failures of the U.S. information operations (IO) activities. He surveys the government’s information operations organizational structure (to include the military) and explains how this IO failure has taken place. His recommendations for the centralization of narrative warfare makes sense – many others have made similar recommendations.

The U.S. government failed in its attempts to halt Russian interference in the 2016 presidential elections. The Russians were at it again during the 2018 mid-term elections . . . and are now currently interfering in the 2020 presidential elections. But it isn’t just the Russians this time. China, Iran, and others are seeking to create diversion and confusion in the 2020 elections as well.

In his book he urges the political parties to put partisanship aside and join together as one nation to defend against the nefarious activities of Russia, China, and others. He provides a guide for government leaders and policy makers to put our narrative warfare capabilities (offense and defense) back on track.

The author believes that under the current political environment the various U.S. government agencies – and the respective political parties – are unable to effectively counter influence activities by our adversaries. So he calls on individual Americans to respond to this crisis – as the Minutemen did in the early days of this nation. There is an entire chapter of the book for the individual American that provides basic steps to sorting through real news and fake news. In his book he includes a complete annex of free election security tools and resources for government, business, and citizens.

The U.S. intelligence community has proven without a doubt that America is under attack domestically by our adversaries. In addition, after two decades of conflict, we have demonstrated an inability to provide an effective narrative to complement our counterterrorism and counterinsurgency campaigns overseas. Our federal government has only selectively addressed this threat to our domestic security and our lack of influence capability in overseas conflicts. This failure ranges from the lack of effort to defend our elections from attack to a structural and organizational inability to conduct influence operations around the world.

This book is primarily focused on Russian narrative warfare targeting the U.S. domestically as well as U.S. activities and interests overseas. However, the author sees the U.S. under continuous attack by China, Iran, and others as well. These adversaries will continue to conduct these influence activities until we address this critical gap in our national defense.

The book is a good read for those seeking to understand narrative warfare, how our elections are compromised by foreign interference, and how we can regain the initiative in offensive and defensive information operations in an era of great power competition in the future years ahead.

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Modern Minutemen and Women: or how to save the 2020 election, by Paul Cobaugh, 2020, 263 pages.
https://www.amazon.com/Modern-Day-Minutemen-Women-election-ebook/dp/B08BDZQCTJ

Paul Cobaugh retired in 2015 from the U.S. Army after a career in the U.S. Special Operations counterterrorism community. While with the Army he specialized in influence operations. His primary focus was on mitigating adversarial influence and advancing US objectives by way of influence. He is currently Vice President at Narrative Strategies.

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) hosted strategist and author Dr. Peter Singer for a webinar discussion on the weaponization of social media. He talked about how social media has profoundly affected every area of human society and commerce and, by default, the institution of war.

The conversation is based on the book LikeWar: The Weaponization of Social Media by authors P.W. Singer and Emerson Brooking published in 2018. The book outlines how the internet is changing war and politics . . . and how war and politics are changing the internet. War, tech, and politics have blurred into a new kind of battle space that plays out in social media.

The online interview (and question and answer session) is hosted by JSOU’s Kerry Roberts. Roberts is a member of JSOU’s Strategic Studies Department. Dr. Peter Singer is a strategist with New America, author, and defense analyst.

Singer explains why he and Emerson Brooking wrote the book. The internet is now just over 50 years old. It started out as a tool for Pentagon scientists to communicate, then evolved into a commercial and social tool, and now is used by some as weapon of war and conflict.

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This video was recorded on April 21, 2020 and posted on YouTube by JSOU “Think JSOU” on August 18, 2020, one hour long.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sr6vn_OScL8&t=17s

LikeWar: The Weaponization of Social Media, by P.W. Singer and Emerson Brooking, 2018.
https://www.amazon.com/LikeWar-Weaponization-P-W-Singer/dp/0358108470/

The United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) has decided to close the Special Warfare Museum located on Fort Bragg, North Carolina. This action is a very controversial move – especially within the Special Forces community.

Sign the Petition!

An online petition has been started to keep the JFK Special Warfare Museum open.
https://www.thepetitionsite.com/498/201/018/keep-the-jfk-special-warfare-musuem-open/

Current and former Green Berets are aghast at the closure of the museum that showcases past operations and missions of Special Forces individuals and units. Social media in particular has been overwhelmingly critical of the fate of a highly revered institution that has served the special warfare community since the early 1960s.

The Special Warfare Museum featured the past history of the Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, and Special Forces units and organizations. The exploits of members of this community were on graphic display in the small museum located on Ardennes Street, on Fort Bragg. The Museum was located at the long-time center of the special warfare community – and easily accessed by those Soldiers on Fort Bragg who wished to visit.

The reasons for the closure of the museum are unclear and USASOC has not been very forthcoming with information. The first instance of something happening was when the museum was closed ‘for inventory’. Then the rumors began to fly about what was happening to the museum.

Announcement of the ARSOF Museum

A January 24, 2020 press release by the USASOC Public Affairs Office provided an explanation of sorts. The article, entitled U.S. Army JFK Special Warfare Museum becomes Army Special Operations Forces Museum, said that the “. . . U.S. Army Special Operations Command initiated a plan to reinvigorate the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Museum.” It said the museum would temporarily close to the public while an inventory was conducted to identify and catalog items. The museum would reopen at the end of February 2020 after inventory was complete. The new museum would widen its focus to include other entities within USASOC – the 160th Special Operations Air Regiment based at Fort Campbell and the 75th Ranger Regiment based at Fort Benning.

This news of the establishment of the “ARSOF Museum” led to a great deal of consternation within the Special Forces community. It was felt that the SF heritage – as well as that of Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations would be diluted. The addition of exhibits and displays incorporating the Rangers and ARSOF aviation would take the place of some displays presenting the long history of SF and other special warfare units currently on display.

On January 25, 2020 SOF News published an article entitled Army Special Operations Forces Museum. The article acknowledged the concerns of the SF community. The article’s opening sentence was “Old time Special Forces Soldiers may be forgiven if they feel a little bit of history is slipping away.” The SOF News article goes on to describe the history of the Special Warfare Museum and the changes that would take place as it became the ARSOF Museum. The closing paragraph of the article, upon reflection, was off the mark – it was too optimistic of how SF and ARSOF history was to be remembered by USASOC.

There is No Museum

The museum has not reopened. It is doubtful if it ever will – even with the name of “ARSOF Museum”. The latest press release on this topic published on April 24, 2020 by the USASOC Public Affairs Office Army raises more questions than it provides answers. The article, entitled ARSOF History: Embracing the Future, does not mention the “ARSOF Museum” at all. It is as if the museum no longer exists.

The article basically says that USASOC will preserve ARSOF history by leveraging technology through “virtual historical exhibits and graphic displays” to make ARSOF history more accessible to everyone. In addition, “Mobile Assistance Teams” will advise units how to display significant artifacts through exported historical print products. The April article explains that the USASOC History Office will retain and preserve artifacts and will work with the Airborne and Special Operations Museum (ASOM) in downtown Fayetteville, North Carolina to display some exhibits.

The author spoke with someone with knowledge of the museum transformation. He cited that some of the factors considered in the closing of the Special Warfare Museum included cost savings, the expense of putting the museum in a new building, and the ability to provide greater accessibility to ARSOF history. He indicated that artifacts have been inventoried (the process could still be ongoing) and that there are no ‘current plans’ for the transfer of the items to other museums or organizations. When asked if there ever will be an ARSOF Museum he couldn’t say.

What Does the Future Look Like?

So apparently the USASOC History Office, utilizing assets available within the USASOC command, is going to set up a website with pictures of the displays that one used to be able to see in person at the Special Warfare Museum. Or perhaps they will just point us in the direction of the existing website they maintain called The ARSOF Story: US Army Special Operations History. It is hard telling not knowing. Let’s hope that they don’t take the step of renaming the online site the “ARSOF Museum”.

In addition, the USASOC History Office will, as much as a small staff is able to, export printed materials to ARSOF units for their use. They will likely be able to provide the occasional small team of personnel to units located at Fort Bragg and across the country that would help with the set up of displays of artifacts that had been part of the Special Warfare Museum. The downtown Fayetteville museum will likely benefit from the temporary displays of ARSOF historical items. While the ASOM is a fine museum it is basically about Airborne and not so much about ARSOF.

Certainly current and former members of Special Forces are being slighted. How the Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations community views the closing of the Special Warfare Museum is not known to this author. SOF News welcomes their feedback.

It would be refreshing to learn exactly what the plan is for the future of ARSOF history. Will there be a physical museum or is it destined to be a website? Will the artifacts be handed over to the downtown Fayetteville museum? [1] Perhaps the USASOC History Office could provide a little bit more information. Thus far, the office has been less than forthcoming. The Special Warfare community deserves better.

From this vantage point – it feels like a lot of history is slipping away.

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Footnotes:

[1] The John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Museum is part of the Army Museum Enterprise. So is the Airborne and Special Operations Museum in downtown Fayetteville.

Top Image: The original Special Warfare Museum on Ardennes Street, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

Old time Special Forces Soldiers may be forgiven if they feel a little bit of history is slipping away. The John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Museum located on Ardennes Street on Fort Bragg, North Carolina is no more. It has been replaced by the Army Special Operations Forces Museum.

History of the “Old” Museum

The John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Museum was established in 1963. The museum was the brainchild of Major General William P. Yarborough in 1961 – the commanding general of the U.S. Army Special Warfare School. It was housed in the one-story Colonel Arthur D. “Bull” Simons Hall located next to the John F. Kennedy Plaza in building D-2502. The building was situated on the corner of Ardennes Street and Riley Road. It was easily recognizable due to the small howitzers and mortars on display outside the building. The museum had a small Gift Shop with the proceeds from sales going to support museum operations.

For years the JFK Special Warfare Museum provided a historical record of Army special warfare units throughout all of this nation’s conflicts. Most members of Special Forces referred to it as the Special Forces museum although from its inception it always included PSYOP and CA. Many SF Soldiers contributed artifacts and donated money for the museum. [1] Those that visited often strolled through the museum’s gift shop to pick up challenge coins, t-shirts, books, souvenirs, and other SF memorabilia. These items are still available through the museum association’s web store.

Exhibits of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Museum included displays from World War I, World War II, the Korean Conflict, and the Vietnam War. Historical units represented included the First Special Service Force, Office of Strategic Services (OSS), and Detachment 101. ‘Modern conflicts’ were represented as well to include Operations Desert Storm, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom.

The old museum building (D-2502) had a small footprint – 1,800 square feet and could only house 20% of the artifacts. [2] The building has since been torn down to make way for the SWC campus. If you haven’t been to Ardennes Street for a few years you will not recognize it!

Currently the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Museum is located at building D-2815 on the corner of Zabitosky and Ardennes – directly across from the JFK Chapel. [3] Some may recall the building as the old TMC.

No Longer About “SF”

The Green Berets of past eras certainly have some concerns. They fear the history of Special Forces will become diluted as the new ARSOF museum becomes more inclusive of other Army special operations units. There is the strong possibility that many items exhibited that are ‘SF’ centric will be put into storage to make room for historical items from the Ranger Regiment and Special Operations Aviation Regiment. A brief visit to selected social media sites will reveal the concern expressed by the older generation of Green Berets.

The Green Berets that served in the 1960s and 1970s lived in a different time when many of them thought that special warfare mean’t Special Forces with a little bit of Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs mixed in (apologies to the PSYOP and CA crowd).

However, we now live in a new era. In the past the term special operations – if used at all – referred to Soldiers serving in the U.S. Army Special Forces Groups. [4] Now it is an umbrella term to refer to SOF units across all four services. Currently, U.S. Army SOF refers to several units to include Special Forces, Ranger Regiment, Psychological Operations, Civil Affairs, and Army special operations aviation units. Collectively these Army SOF units are referred to as ARSOF.

The “New” Museum

The ‘new’ museum will be reorganized under the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). While CA, PSYOP, and SF are trained at the USAJFKSWCS – Rangers and Army SOF aviators are trained elsewhere. Moving the ‘ownership’ of the museum from USAJFKSWCS to USASOC provides the ability to include the other two organizations. A recent press release by USASOC tells us that the new museum will “. . . fully represent all of USASOC’s equities.” [5]

The museum is one of 64 U.S. Army museums in the country and falls under the purview of the Center for Military History. According to an online post (accessed 25 Jan 2020) the museum had “. . . the mission to collect, preserve, exhibit and interpret significant historical property in support of the proponencies, training and educational mission of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School.” [6] This made it the regimental museum for the U.S. Army Special Forces, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations regiments – including predecessor organizations from the American colonial period to the present.

The new ARSOF Museum will open at the end of February 2020 once a complete historical inventory is conducted to identify and catalog items. In addition, there will be a reorganization and change of authority taking place. Until a permanent facility can be funded and built the new museum will likely occupy ‘several’ places on Fort Bragg. USAJFKSWCS issued a statement saying that the exhibits will be “. . . showcased throughout the command; however, instead of only having access to the history in one building, it will be available to our Soldiers, students, retirees and families throughout the command footprint.” Apparently, in the future, if you want to visit the museum you will have to drive to several sites on Fort Bragg. That does sound a bit problematic.

USASOC certainly has the organizational size to support the new ARSOF Museum. The museum will fall under the control of the USASOC Historians Office. If enough funding is available it will likely provide an improved experience to visitors in the future while equally representing the historical record of all five major components of ARSOF. Looks like another trip to Fort Bragg is on the calendar in a few years to see how this turns out!

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Footnotes:

[1] In the 70s the author donated $100 (big money back then) towards a Life Membership. With the passage of time I am sure my name has been lost on the roster; although there was a plaque at the front entrance years of the B-2502 building years ago with my name along with the many other Life Members. That is probably now stuffed in a cardboard box at this time. The museum was a special place for me starting with attendance at SFQC and later for the many return visits to FBNC.

[2] Letter from Major General Bennet Sacolic addressed to Museum Association Members, 2012.

[3] In researching this article it is not readily apparent where the ‘physical’ location of the museum will be. I suppose we will find out in the next few years. The museum has moved multiple times over the past several decades.

[4] The term ‘special operations’ was rarely used in early SF history. It may have seen its introduction in the early 80s when UW was deemphasized and SITCA (later SR) and DA became more prevalent in training exercises and doctrine. The term ‘special operator’ apparently was first used by SF in the 1950s. But then again, rarely used. See “The Special Forces Operator”, by Charles H. Brisco, PhD, Veritas, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2018.
https://www.soc.mil/ARSOF_History/articles/v14n1_creed_page_1.html

[5] “U.S. Army JFK Special Warfare Museum becomes Army Special Operations Forces Museum”, US Army, January 24, 2020.

[6] USASOC page on JFK Special Warfare Museum.

References:

John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Museum
https://www.soc.mil/SWCS/museum.html

US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Museum Association
https://www.jfkwebstore.com/

JFK Special Warfare Museum Facebook
https://www.facebook.com/pages/Jfk-Special-Warfare-Museum-Ft-Bragg-Nc/212706605444953

Bruce, Robert, “Hidden Treasures of the JFK Special Warfare Museum”, Small Arms Review, July 2006.

U.S. Army Airborne and Special Operations Museum. This museum is located in downtown Fayetteville, North Carolina. It was privately funded and then donated to the U.S. Army.
https://www.asomf.org/

Editorial Notes:

The USASOC Historian’s Office has been contacted for further information; the article will updated once we hear from them. (Update: crickets).

Some minor edits were made to further refine this story based on comments from the reading audience and other sources.

It seems some readers do not recall the use of the term ‘special operations’ in the earlier SF days. Determining when and how ‘special operations’ was introduced into our vocabulary would make for an interesting research project. See more in footnote [4].

One reader wrote in that he recalls an ‘informal’ museum (he believes it to be the very first museum) that was housed in one of the old Orderly Room -type buildings along Gruber Road – adjacent to where 7th Group was located. SF Soldiers donated a bunch of stuff to the collection. (time frame 1965-1966).

Photo:

John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Museum, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Photo credit to U.S. Army.