The Office of Inspector General for the United States Department of State has published its quarterly report to the United States Congress on Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR). The report summarizes the overseas contingency operation to defeat the Islamic State in designated areas of Iraq and Syria. This quarterly report covers the period of October 1, 2022 to December 31, 2022. In the report are details of key events that took place in Iraq and Syria in the last three months of 2022.

The report states that ISIS capabilities remained “significantly degraded”. ISIS has seen a steady removal of its leaders in Iraq and Syria; however, the group continues to spread its ideology and conduct attacks. The group continues to recruit for its organization. ISIS is also indoctrinating and recruiting children at the al-Hol dispaced persons camp in Syria.

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IG Report on Operation Inherent Resolve, Department of State, February 2023, PDF, 116 pages.
https://www.stateoig.gov/report-256

Photo: Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service CTS, photo by PFC Anthony Zendejas, CJTF-OIR, Apri 4, 2018.

A panel discussion looks into the use of special operations forces to conduct partner operations in the Middle East. This panel examines the use of SOF in the Middle East – past and future. It reveals how SOF operated alongside local forces in Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere. Some of the topics addressed in this one-hour presentation include building CT and COIN capabilities of indigenous special forces, challenges of this approach to the U.S., and what lessons can be learned from the anti-ISIS fight.

The panelists are:

• General (Ret.) Joseph Votel, former commander of JSOC, USSOCOM, and CENTCOM
• Lt. Gen. (Ret) Michael Nagata, former commander of SOCCENT
• LTC Katie Crombe, Director of Strategy and Plans, USSOCOM

Some, but not all of the topics discussed by the panelists include:

Is SOF the Easy Button? Policy makers turn to SOF to advance U.S. interests. SOF operators look forward to solving ‘wicked problems’ associated with partner operations; and they want to continue to engage in these efforts. However, the strain on the force has become evident over the years. There are a lot of negative problems associated with continuous deployments. Policy makers must examine the other non-military ways to build partner relationships – without always turning to SOF.

Values vs. Interests. There is classic tension of protecting U.S. values and protecting U.S. interests; sometimes you can’t have both. It is a balancing act when interacting with our partners and partnership building. We can’t only work with ‘nice people’. A current case of this balancing problem is our relationship with Saudi Arabia.

127e Programs. This somewhat ‘obscure’ program is extremely important in advancing U.S. interests across the region and in fighting terrorism. The 127e programs can sometimes be, unwisely, a fast and easy solution for policy and decision makers. Where these programs are long-term, very significant gains and goals are achieved – as in the relationship and support of Iraqi SOF in the fight against ISIS after 2014.

Long-term Engagement. The use of SOF in the Middle East pays great dividends if used continuously over time. This is born out in the relationships built and nurtured over the past decades. Examples are the employment of the 10th Special Forces Group assisting the Kurds during Operation Provide Comfort in 1991 and the establishment of the Iraqi Counter Terrorism Task Force (ICTF) in late 2003. The ability to impart SOF culture (processes, networking, leadership, and use of technology) to partner forces is enhanced when the relationships last years. Developing long-term relationships with partners improves the ability to have candid discussions with them and advance U.S. interests.

Terrorist Threat in ME Remains. There still is a terrorist threat in the Middle East. Fighting terrorists requires highly trained counter-terrorist units. U.S. SOF remains the best ‘solution’ for assisting partner and allied nations in the development of these indigenous SOF units.

SOF Use in Times of Peace. Partner relationship building is important during conflicts as well as during times of peace. Trust is built over time with continuous engagement. The U.S. will need partner forces far into the future; especially given the competition for influence by near peer adversaries. The days of partner SOF relying exclusively on U.S. technology, firepower, ISR, and other capabilities have gone by. Partner SOF units are much more capable, have access to technology, ISR (especially drones), and other potential benefactors (Russia, China, etc.). There is the possibility that U.S. SOF can be ‘displaced’ in the Middle East, as well as in other regions of the world, by SOF of near-peer adversaries.

The topics above, and more, are discussed by the panelists in this informative and interesting event. Watching and listening to this panel is one hour well worth spent.

By, With and Through Partner Special Forces in the Middle East, Middle East Institute, November 8, 2022, YouTube, one hour.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5V_QtvLjvRU

The Lead Inspector General has published its quarterly report to the United States Congress on Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR). The report, released in early May 2022, covers the events and activities of the United States military during the period of January 1, 2022 to March 31, 2022.

The report summarizes the quarter’s key events related to the overseas contingency operation to advise, assist, and enable local partner forces in the fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.

Contents:

• Executive Summary.
• Status of OIR. Mission, funding, personnel, and facilities
• Iraq. Security, politics and economics, stabilization, and humanitarian assistance
• Syria. Security, stabilization, and humanitarian assistance
• Oversight activities. Strategic planning, audits and inspection, and investigations
• Appendices. Methodology, DoJ activities, acronyms, endnotes

Syria. The Syrian Democratic Front (SDF) conducted some independent operations against the Islamic State during the quarter. The SDF continues to rely on the Coalition for critical intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support. A big constraint and disruption are the forces aligned with the Syrian regime, Iran, Russia, and Turkey.

Iraq. The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are making incremental progress towards operational independence. Although the ISF has airpower and ISR, it still does not use it effectively. Iraqi politics has been delaying government reform efforts. Iran and Iran-aligned militias continue to threaten U.S. and Coalition forces; however, attacks during this period have been limited.

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Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, January 1, 2022 – March 31, 2022, published May 2022, PDF, 128 pages.
https://media.defense.gov/2022/May/03/2002988582/-1/-1/1/OIR_Q2_MAR2022_GOLD_508.PDF

Photo: Syrian Democratic Front (SDF) members working alongside U.S. military personnel in Syria in early 2022. U.S. Army photo.

The Lead Inspector General report to the United States Congress on Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) has been published online. The 136-page report covers the period of October 1 to December 31, 2020 – although there are some updates that cover significant events that took place in January 2021.

The report states that Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) continued to contain the Islamic State (IS). The insurgent group has been operating at a low level in Iraq and Syria. It has failed to execute complex attacks, seize territory, or conduct external attacks.

Militia groups in Iraq continue to pose a security threat to U.S. forces and the OIR mission. Iranian-aligned militias have increased violent acts against U.S. interests. The Baghdad regime is caught in the middle between the United States and Iran in attempting to curtail the activities of these militia groups.

In Syria the United States interests are threatened by Iranian and Syrian regime proxies that are operating in northeastern Syria. These groups continue their attacks against the Syrian Democratic Forces and are attempting to gain influence in territory previously held by the Islamic State.

The IG report provides an update on the status of ISIS, reviews major developments in the two countries, and outlines its IG oversight activities. In addition, it has sections (about both Iraq and Syria) on the following:

• Actions conducted against ISIS
• Partner force development
• Role of third parties
• Diplomacy and political developments
• Stabilization
• Humanitarian assistance

There are several appendices that cover the methodology for preparing the report, Department of Justice activities, actions against terrorist financing, acronyms, maps, and endnotes.

There is very little mention of U.S. special operations forces. One entry on page 60 of the report states that U.S. SOF sometimes accompany the SDF on targeted operations or support from a nearby mission support site. A “Ctrl-F” search of the document (PDF) for SOJTF, CSOJTF-S, or CSOJTF-I provides zero results. These three acronyms are not even listed in the two-page acronym appendix. Usually there is a classified appendix to this report that would likely provide some insight into SOF activities in Iraq and Syria for Congressional members (and others). However, due to constraints resulting from the coronavirus disease-2019 pandemic, the IG agencies did not prepare a classified appendix this quarter. If you are looking for an update on SOF activities in Iraq or Syria over the past few months you will need to go elsewhere.

There are some sections of the report that are very interesting and make for good reading if you are looking to increase your awareness of the current state of the conflicts in Iraq and Syria. For instance the map of Syria (page 56) reveals just how much of the territory once controlled exclusively by the SDF is now patrolled by Turkish, Syrian, and Russian forces. Coalition forces, for the most part, are reduced to operating on the eastern flank of northeastern Syria.

The report provides a good update (from the perspective of the DOD, State, and other agencies) on the overall situation in Iraq and Syria. There is a lot of information in the report on the situation and events taking place in the two countries that doesn’t get reported in the media.

Operation Inherent Resolve Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, covers October 1, 2020 to December 31, 2020, published online February 9, 2021, PDF, 136 pages.
View online or download here.

Recent news, analysis, and commentary about the Middle East – politics, conflict, Iraq withdrawal, and great power competition.

Security Overview

CENTCOM Now Has Israel. In his last week in office President Trump ordered that U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) add Israel to its area of responsibility (AOR). This moved Israel from the European Command (EUCOM) AOR. According to the DoD the “. . . easing of tensions between Israel and its Arab neighbors . . .” has provided a strategic opportunity for the US to align key partners against shared threats in the Middle East (that would be Iran). This puts CENTCOM in an awkward position – forcing it to work with both Israel and its Arab opponents. This move may strain relationships between CENTCOM officials and other nations in the region. This may prompt some realignment with SOCEUR, SOCCENT, 10th SFG, and 5th SFG, as well as other special operations forces. See “In waning days, Trump shakes up CENTCOM to increase Arab-Israeli efforts against Iran”, by Howard Altman, Military Times, January 15, 2021.

Great Power Competition. Russia continues to support the Syrian regime. This effort increases Russia’s prestige in the area, enhances the ability of Russia to project power in NATO’s southern flank, and puts the U.S. on notice that it doesn’t have free reign in the region. China continues its work to strengthen its economic ties in the region. Read more in “Great Power Rivalry in the Middle East”, Eurasia Review, January 20, 2021.

A Plan on How the US Could Withdraw from ME. Mike Sweeney, a fellow at Defense Priorities, presents a 4-year plan for significantly reducing the US military presence in the Middle East. “When It’s Over: An American Withdrawal Plan for the Middle East”, Modern War Institute at West Point, January 18, 2021.

Iraq

US Troop Levels Reduced. In accordance with instructions from President Trump there are now only 2,500 U.S. service members in Iraq. The reductions were longtime goals of the Trump administration. This drawdown in Iraq follows the successful Iraqi military campaign against ISIS. (The campaign is over?). The US will continue to provide support with air power, intelligence, and a counterterrorism platform.

Iraq’s Economy. Widespread instability and violence is likely in Iraq’s future if Baghdad’s finances are not addressed. Kenneth Pollack and Farhad Alaaldin believe that U.S. and international community must shore up Baghdad’s finances before it is too late. “Iraq’s economic collapse could be Biden’s first foreign policy headache”, AEI, December 14, 2020.

Iraqi Arrest Warrant for Trump. A judge in Baghdad’s investigative court tasked with probing the Washington-directed drone strike that killed Iranian General Qassim Soleimani in January 2020 has issued an arrest warrant for President Trump. Soleimani headed the expeditionary Quds force of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps. The warrant was a charge of premeditated murder. See “Iraq issues arrest warrant for Trump over Soleimani killing”, ABC News, January 7, 2021.

The Sinjar Agreement – It Needs Work. One of the knotty political problems facing Iraq is the population area near the border with Turkey and Syria. The Agreement on the Restoration of Stability and Normalization of the Situation in the District of Sinjar is a joint security agreement between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the federal government of Iraq. Sinjar is a Yazidi town in Iraq’s Nineveh Governate the fell to the Islamic State in 2014 and culminated in a genocide against its inhabitants. The October 2020 agreement neglects to include the local population of Sinjar. Shamiran Mako, a professor of international relations at Boston University, argues the agreement needs a recalibration. Read her essay “Negotiating Peace in Iraq’s Disputed Territories: Modifying the Sinjar Agreement”, Lawfare Blog, January 17, 2021.

Iraqi PMFs Explained. Renad Mansour of Chatham House provides a detailed and interesting look of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) of Iraq. The PMF is more than a group of militias – it is interwoven into Iraqi government and society. “The ‘Hybrid Armed Actors’ Paradox: A Necessary Compromise?”, War on the Rocks, January 21, 2021.

Iraqi Interpreters Face Death. Former interpreters for the British military advisors and British special forces in Iraq are terrified that Iraqi Shia militia members will track them down and kill them. See “Iraqi interpreters ‘stalked by death squads’ for helping the British”, BBC News, December 29, 2020.

Iraqi Air Force Readiness Problems. There are recent press accounts that suggest less than 20 percent of Iraq’s F-16s are fully airworthy. Poor jet maintenance and mismanagement are some of the causes of failing to meet maintenance standards. It is speculated that the poor maintenance record for the Iraqi Vipers is behind the decision to remove the F-16s from the air tasking orders in April 2020. Read “The Iraqi Air Force’s F-16 Fleet is on the Brink of Collapse Despite Showy Flybys”, The Drive War Zone, January 7, 2021.

Senior ISIS Leader Killed. A U.S.-led coalition air strike killed the top Islamic State leader in Iraq. Abu Yasir was the most senior Daesh leader and was killed near Kirkuk on January 27, 2021. (Military Times, Jan 29, 2021).

Syria

New US – Syria Policy Needed. The partnership between Russia and Syria since the outbreak of the civil war in 2011 has proved to be effective and successful in preventing the fall of the Assad regime. The US lost significant leverage due to its inaction when self-imposed red lines were crossed and an incoherent foreign policy ensued. A new US policy towards Syria should recognize the necessity of pragmatic engagement with Russia. A ten-paper provides more details in Reframing US Syria policy: The road to Damascus runs through Moscow, Brookings Institute, December 2020.

Few Attractive Options for US in Syria. Sam Heller, an independent researcher and analyst based in Beirut, offers his views on the way forward for the US in Syria. Read his article “Redefining Victory in America’s War Against the Islamic State in Syria”, War on the Rocks, January 5, 2021.

Syria’s Narrative War. The battle for physical territory in Syria is complemented with the battle of the narrative. The propaganda, activism, and disinformation of Syria’s warring factions is a major factor (and threat) that will have lasting consequences for the region. Read more in “Lessons From Syria’s Low-Profile Narrative War”, War Room, United States Army War College, January 7, 2021.

Northern Syria – Fighting Continues. The Syrian Democratic Front (SDF) is facing the prospect of a new Turkish offensive. Turkish-back proxy groups are continuing their operations trying to control SDF-held areas. Russia is putting the pressure on the SDF to vacate areas so Syrian government forces can move in. See “Fighting Continues Over Flashpoint in Northern Syria”, Voice of America, January 5, 2021.

Syria’s Humanitarian Crisis. The Syrian civil war is approaching its tenth anniversary. The country remains divided and the conflict has settled into a stalemate – for the time being. Left in the lurch are refugees in neighboring countries and internally displaced personnel (IDPs) – many in temporary camps. Shelly Culbertson describes the situation in “The Syrian Forever War Has Created Forever Refugees”, The National Interest, November 24, 2020.

Iran

Heightened Tensions. U.S. military forces in the Middle East remain on high alert due to concerns that Iran may take action against U.S. interests in the region. The aircraft carrier Nimitz was enroute to its home port when it was sent back to the region. The one year anniversary of the killing of the top Iranian general Qassem Soleimani could be a reason for Iran’s escalatory rhetoric. It is being reported that the Revolutionary Guard’s Quds Force (under new leadership) has reverted back to being a smaller clandestine fighting unit. (Ynet News, Jan 3, 2021).

Iran and al-Qa’ida. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo revealed that Iran has given a new operational headquarters to al-Qa’ida. He says that Iran is now the home base for the terrorist group. (DoS, Jan 12, 2021).

Attacks on Shipping. The Middle East remains a volatile area for merchant shipping. Tankers and other civilian ships face the risk of limpet mines, explosive boats, sea mines, piracy, and the risk of politically motivated seizure. Many of the incidents are tied to Iran or its proxies. Read “Spate of Attacks on Ships in Middle East Points to Iran-Backed Group”, USNI News, January 6, 2021.

Yemen

Iran’s Ally. For the past several years Iran has enjoyed the benefits of an alliance with the Houthis – a minority Shiite Muslim community in Yemen engaged in a long-running civil war. Since the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 the Houthi movement has come out against US interests in the Middle East. Iran has, for the past several years, provided advisors and equipment to the Houthi forces. The U.S. has backed Saudi Arabian and UAE forces that are fighting the Houthis with arms and diplomatic support. Bruce Riedel, a Senior Fellow with the Brookings Institute, advocates for a US policy change in “A pragmatic view on Yemen’s Houthis”, Brookings, January 11, 2021.

New Policy for Yemen. Katherine Zimmerman, a Resident Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), says that the policies of President Trump and Obama for Yemen were flawed. She believes the U.S. needs to retake a leadership role to secure U.S. interests, reduce Iranian influence, stabilize the region, and address humanitarian concerns. Read “US needs to take on a leadership role to secure its interests in Yemen”, AEI, December 16, 2020.

Podcasts

Video – Trends in ME in 2021. Middle East experts survey what lies ahead for the region in the year ahead – with particular attention to Yemen, Iran, Turkey, and Syria. Trends to watch in the Middle East in 2021, Middle East Focus, Middle East Institute, January 15, 2021, one hour.

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Photo: Map from Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

The Iranian regime maintains a network of proxies including Lebanese Hezbollah, various Shiite militias in Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen, and foreign fighters in Syria. This paper by the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) provides a look at the problem of states using proxy forces to advance their foreign policy objectives.

The three main chapters of the paper outline the different groups and factors that influence Iranian military and political strategy for Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. The proxy / host country relation is described. The report provides an assessment of vulnerabilities that could be exploited by U.S. special operations forces.

Iran will continue to use their proxy network to frustrate U.S. Middle East strategy and diminish U.S. influence. However, the U.S. is not without appropriate responses. This paper advances the argument that terrorism, counterterrorism, and proxy conflict are inherently political in nature and need not be addressed with a kinetic solution alone.

The authors of this paper are:

• Dr. Diane Zorri – an assistant professor of security studies at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
• Dr. Houman A. Sadri – deputy director of the International Policy and Analysis Center (IPAC)
• Dr. David Ellis – Resident Fellow at Joint Special Operations University (JSOU)

Iranian Proxy Groups in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen: A Principal-Agent Comparative Analysis, Joint Special Operations University, JSOU Report 20-5, 2020.
https://jsou.libguides.com/ld.php?content_id=58950053

The Department of Defense has identified three of the four Americans who died on Wednesday, January 16, 2019 in Manbji, Syria in a suicide bombing. The patrol was on an engagement patrol when the attack occurred. A suicide bomber detonated his explosive vest killing one Special Forces Warrant Officer, a Navy Sailor, and a DoD civilian. A DoD contractor also died in the attack. The contractor was a naturalized U.S. citizen who was working as a contract interpreter.

Three other U.S. servicemembers were wounded. Approximately nine Syrians were also killed and others wounded. Members of the Manbij Military Council (MMC) were also among the 16 people who were killed. The MMC has controlled the city since it was liberated from ISIS.

Chief Warrant Officer 2 Jonathan Farmer was a member of 3rd Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group. 5th SFGA has been rotating units into Syria to conduct operations and training with the Syrian Democratic Front.

Shannon Kent was a Navy Chief Cryptologic Technician based at Fort George Meade, Maryland. She was assigned to the Cryptologic Warfare Activity 66 (CWA 66). Chief Petty Officer Kent hailed from upstate New York and enlisted in the Navy in 2003.

Shannon was a wife and mother to two young boys. She had deployed multiple times, was a cancer survivor, and was to start a graduate program this year. Read more about Shannon Kent in “Navy Identifies Sailor Killed in Manbij, Syria”, Navy.mil, January 18, 2019.

The DoD Civilian was Scott Wirtz. He was assigned to the Defense Intelligence Agency as an operations support specialist. He was a former Navy SEAL. Wirtz, age 42, was a native of St. Louis. He had been assigned as an operations support specialist (HUMINT) since February 2017 and had served on multiple deployments. Read more about Scott in “Defense Intelligence Agency civilian killed in Syria identified”, Defense Intelligence Agency, January 18, 2019.

The Arabic interpreter was from East Point, Georgia. Ghadir Taher, age 27, immigrated with her family from Syria. She was employed by Valiant Integrated Services, a defense contractor. She was born and raised in Damascus and became an American citizen in 2001. She had studied international business at Georgia State University before going to work for Valiant. Read more in “East Point woman among 19 killed in suicide bombing in Syria”, Atlanta Journal-Constitution, January 18, 2019.

The Islamic State of Syria has claimed responsibility for the attack. ISIS controlled Manbij until it was forced out in 2016. Despite the proclamations of some Trump administration officials the Islamic State is far from defeated in Syria. The terrorist group has now shifted tactics and resumed its insurgent activities. It will continue to have a deep reach in Syria for some time.

A Sikorsky S-92 helicopter conducted the medical evacuation of the U.S. victims of the attack. The attack took place near the popular Palace of Princes restaurant.

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Edits: Additional information has been added to this article as it has come available.

Additional References:

January 21, 2019. “Parents of slain Navy SEAL finding comfort reading old emails”, KPLR 11.com.

January 18, 2019, “Green Beret, Navy linguist, SEAL-turned-DIA civilian among Americans killed in ISIS-claimed bombing in Syria”, Stars and Stripes.

January 18, 2019, “DoD Identifies Three Operation Inherent Resolve Casualties”, Department of Defense.

January 18, 2019, Statement by Valiant Integrated Services.

January 16, 2019, “Explosion Kills Four in Manbij”, CENTCOM.

​Chief Warrant Officer 2 Jonathan Farmer, age 37, of Boynton Beach, Florida died of wounds sustained during an attack while conducting a local engagement in Manbij, Syria, January 16, 2019.

Born April 27, 1981, Farmer joined the U.S. Army on March 30, 2005. He attended One Station Unit Training at Fort Benning, Georgia in 2005 followed by the Special Forces Qualification Course. He graduated in 2007 as a Special Forces Engineer Sergeant and was assigned to the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) based at Fort Campbell, Kentucky.  

Farmer earned his commission as a Special Forces Warrant Officer in 2016. Following graduation for the basic Special Forces Warrant Officer Course, he was selected to serve as an Assistant Detachment Commander.

Farmer served on six overseas combat tours. Twice in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom in October 2007 and January 2009; once in support of Operation New Dawn in August 2010; once in support of Operation Enduring Freedom from January 2012; and twice in support of Operation Inherent Resolve in January 2018 and January 2019 until his passing.  

Farmer’s military education includes One Station Unit Training, the Basic Airborne Course, Survival Evasion Resistance Escape Course, Special Forces Qualification Course, the Advanced Special Operations Technical Course, the Advanced Leader’s Course, Special Forces Warrant Officer Candidate School, the Special Forces Warrant Officer Basic Course, and the Warrant Officer Technical and Tactical Certification Course.

Farmer’s awards and decorations include the Bronze Star Medal with two Oak Leaf Clusters, Purple Heart, Army Commendation Medal with “C” Device, Army Commendation Medal with two Oak Leaf Clusters, Army Achievement Medal, Afghanistan Campaign Ribbon with one campaign star, Iraqi Campaign Medal with three campaign stars, Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal, Global War on Terrorism Service Medal, NATO medal, Special Forces Tab, Parachutist Badge, and Combat Infantryman’s Badge.

Jonathan Farmer was born in Boynton Beach, Florida. For part of his childhood he lived in Laconia, New Hampshire. He played on the high school’s baseball and basketball teams and completed his sophomore year before moving to Florida in 1997.

He returned to Florida as a teenager where he attended the Benjamin School in Palm Beach, Florida. He played baseball and basketball for this high school as well. He graduated from the Benjamin School in 1999. A statement on the prep school’s website talked about his time there:

“We remember Jon as a great student and athlete who truly excelled on the basketball team. The Benjamin School is proud of Jon’s service to our country, and we mourn with the rest of the nation at the loss of a true American warrior.”

He was a 2003 graduate of Bowdoin College in Maine where he starred on the basketball team playing the position of forward and in the role of Captain of the 2003-2004 men’s basketball team. He was a history major in college. In May 2004 Farmer was awarded the William J. Fraser Trophy given to the player “who best exemplifies the spirit of Bowdoin basketball.”

Farmer is survived by his spouse, four children, and his parents.​

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News Stories:

April 19, 2019. “Palm Beach County’s Jonathan Farmer interred at Arlington National Cemetery”, The Palm Beach Post.

February 7, 2019. “Body of Palm Beach County soldier killed in Syria to return Monday”, The Palm Beach Post.

January 25, 2019. “Jonathan R. Farmer ’03 among Americans killed in Syria”, The Bowdoin Orient.

January 24, 2019, “Fort Campbell Green Beret was loved for his fighting spirit and giant hugs”, Leaf Chronicle.

January 18, 2019. “Remembering Jonathan Farmer”, Palm Beach Post.

January 18, 2019, “Syria Bombing Victims Identified”, SOF News.

January 18, 2019. “Jonathan R. Farmer ’03 (1982-2019)”, Bowdoin College.

January 18, 2019. “Decorated soldier from Gardens one of four Americans killed in IS suicide bombing”, The Palm Beach Post.

January 18, 2019. “Former Laconia High School student killed in Syria”, The Laconia Daily Sun.

January 18, 2019. “Former N.H. Resident and Bowdoin College Grad Among Four Americans Killed in Syria Terror Blast”, The Boston Globe.

January 18, 2019, “DoD Identifies Three Operation Inherent Resolve Casualties”, Department of Defense.

January 16, 2019. “Explosion Kills Four in Manbij”, CENTCOM.

Photo: DoD. Biography provided by United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

Four Americans died on Wednesday, January 16, 2019 in Manbji, Syria while on an engagement patrol. A suicide bomber detonated his explosive vest killing two U.S. servicemembers, one DoD civilian, and DoD contractor. Three other U.S. servicemembers were wounded. Approximately nine Syrians were also killed and others wounded.

The Islamic State of Syria has claimed responsibility for the attack. ISIS controlled Manbij until it was forced out in 2016. Despite the proclamations of some Trump administration officials the Islamic State is far from defeated in Syria. The terrorist group has now shifted tactics and resumed its insurgent activities. It will continue to have a deep reach in Syria for some time.

A Sikorsky S-92 helicopter conducted the medical evacuation of the U.S. victims of the attack. The attack took place near the popular Palace of Princes restaurant.

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References:

“Explosion Kills Four in Manbij”, CENTCOM, January 16, 2019.

Once again the Kurds are cast aside. This is nothing new. Over the span of the past 100 years they have been used as proxy forces and then kicked to the side of the curb once their usefulness has run its course. The United States decision to abandon the Syrian Kurds is yet once more instance of history repeating itself.

On Thursday, December 19, 2018, President Trump declared that the fight against the Islamic State in Syria was over and that we had ‘won’. He announced the immediate withdrawal of the U.S. troops and diplomatic personnel in northeastern Syria that is controlled by the Syrian Democratic Front (SDF).

The biggest loser in this latest Trump decision are the Syrian Kurds. The SDF – with some Arab but mostly Kurdish fighters – have been instrumental in the degradation of the Islamic State in Syria. Other losers – in the long run – will be the Syrian people who will continue to suffer the abuses of the Assad regime, Iran proxy forces, and Hezbollah. The United States loses bargaining position and the ability to influence events in Syria and in the Middle East region.

The big winners in this debacle are the Assad regime, Iran, Russia, Turkey, and IS. It will be interesting to see how all this shakes out over the next few years. Turkey certainly will do everything it can to marginalize and / or destroy the Kurdish enclave in northeastern Syria. The Kurds – realizing now the mistake of trusting the United States – will likely come to an accommodation with the Assad regime. That would solidify the northeastern region of Syria for Assad. Then again – Assad and the Turks could come to an arrangement that would decimate the Kurdish enclave.

The 5th Special Forces along with many supporting U.S. military elements spent a lot of time and energy getting the SDF established, equipped, and trained to fight the Islamic State in Syria. Certainly there has to be some angst at Fort Campbell about the future of the Syrian Kurds. The abandonment of the Syrian Kurds is a tragic error on the part of the United States. And once again the Kurds realize that they have no friends but the mountains.