Hamas terrorists crossed Israel’s border from the Gaza Strip (CIA Map) by land (including tunnels), sea, and air (hang gliders) to conduct surprise multipronged attacks against military and civilian targets in central and southern Israel early on Saturday, 7 October 9 (about 0630 Israeli time).

Hamas Attack on Israel

Sequence of Attack. The complex attack, named ‘Operation Al-Aqsa Flood’ by Hamas, began with a massive rocket, missile, and mortar barrage – thousands of launches. This was followed by a denial-of-service attacks (Strike Source) in Israel. Hamas then infiltrated across the border into Israel by air, sea, and land. Hang gliders, small boats, tunnels, and trucks were used. The rocket attacks continued throughout the day. The terrorist group also used drones to attack Israeli targets.

Extent of Attack. Hamas, numbering about 1,000, entered about 22 Israeli towns located along the border, taking temporary control of some of those communities. By Sunday most of these areas have been retaken by Israeli forces. Israeli casualties are steep, with hundreds dead and over 1,000 wounded. By Sunday morning the estimates of Israeli dead approached 600. As many as 260 may have been killed at a ‘Musical Festival for Peace’ (The Washington Post, Oct 8, 2023) that was held near the Gaza border in Southern Israel; and several hostages taken to Gaza.

Rockets. Thousands of rockets and mortar rounds were launched from the Gaza Strip into Israel attacking military and civilian targets. Hamas claims to have launched over 5,000 munitions into Israel. It is reported that the Iron Dome missile defense system has been effective but perhaps not able to handle the volume of rocket and mortar attacks in a concentrated time frame. Apparently, Hamas has been able to effectively use drones against Israeli tanks.

Hostages. Civilians and military members, estimated to be over one hundred, have been taken hostage and are now in the Gaza Strip (CIA Factbook). Many of the hostages are women and children. Among the hostages are German, UK, American, and Russian citizens. According to a Palestinian spokesman one of the goals of the Hamas operation in Israel was to take hostages. The rationale was to exchange the Israeli hostages for Palestinians in Israeli prisons and to deter Israeli ground operations in the Gaza Strip. The IDF says it has established a headquarters to focus on putting together accurate information on the Israeli hostages held by Hamas in the Gaza Strip. It has appointed Brigadier General Gal Hirsch to oversee the missing persons file. Israel has requested assistance from Egypt to help negotiate the release of the hostages.

Ongoing Fighting. The battles on Israeli territory in communities along the border of Gaza continued on Sunday. (map Twitter) Israeli residents remain in shelters in many communities waiting on the arrival of Israeli forces.

Assistance to Hamas. Various news reports indicate that Iran and Hezbollah provided significant assistance to Hamas in the form of advice, intelligence, planning, and support. (Wall Street Journal, October 8, 2023) (subscription)

Israeli Response

Intelligence Failure. Apparently, this massive attack by Hamas was not expected by the Israelis and some national security observers are calling it an intelligence failure. Just last week Biden’s National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan stated that “The Middle East Region is quieter today than it has been in two decades”. (The Atlantic, Oct 7, 2023) The attack was launched on the 50th anniversary of the 1973 War in which Arab states attacked Israel on Yom Kippur – the holiest day of the Jewish calendar. At the time of this current attack the Israelis were celebrating Simchat Torah, coming at the end of the weeklong Sukkot Festival. The IDF over the past few years have repositioned IDF battalions from the border along the Gaza Strip to the ‘territories’ – protecting settlers in the West Bank. (CIA Map) Instead, it relied on ‘hi-tech’ monitoring of the Gaza Strip border with sensors, cameras, and fencing.

Israeli Actions and Retaliation. Israel has declared war on Hamas and has called up many of the reserve Israeli Defense Forces. At 1200 noon (Israel time) on Saturday, October 7th it launched operation “Swords of Iron” (IDF, icon). Aerial, land, and sea attacks by Israel commenced against military targets in the Gaza Strip. There are reports that Israel has closed the border crossings with Jordan. Schools in many parts of Israel (if not all) have been temporarily closed. Israeli residents in areas along the Gaza Strip border area are being evacuated. The country is currently under a curfew. Some flights into and out of Israel have been cancelled. Ben Gurion International Airport (FlightAware map) is experiencing flight cancellations and delays.

Announcements by Israeli Government. The Security Cabinet announced that the supply of fuel, electricity, and other goods to the Gaza Strip will be stopped. Israel has interrupted electrical service to the Gaza Strip. About 63% of the electricity for the Gaza Strip comes from Israel, 14% from Egypt, and 23% is self-generated (Twitter). On Saturday night Israel announced the Declaration of War. The State Security Cabinet of Israel approved and ratified the Declaration of War (Article 40 Aleph) against Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. This is the first time since the 1973 Yon Kipper War that Israel has declared war.

Attacks on Gaza. The Israelis will likely attempt to completely destruct the military and governmental capabilities of Hamas and other militant Palestinian organizations in the Gaza Strip. Israel has provided civilians in Gaza with very specific evacuation instructions (Twitter) – telling them to move deeper into the Gaza Strip in designated areas due to ongoing and future military operations.

Israelis Strike Terrorist Targets. The IDF announced (Oct 8) that it had struck ten Hamas terrorist organization targets. These targets were located in multi-story buildings in the Gaza Strip. In addition, two banks used by Hamas were hit – the Islamic National Bank and the First Bank. Other targets that stored weapons and military equipment were also struck in Gaza. According to the Jerusalem Post (Oct 8) the IDF has conducted 500 airstrikes (Twitter) in the Gaza Strip by mid-day Sunday.

IDF Spokesperson Briefing. A member of the Israeli Defense Forces presented a 11-minute briefing (IDF Twitter) on the evening of 11 Oct 2023 on the situation. He states that hundreds of Hamas terrorists crossed over into Israel, executed civilians, and took Israelis captive. These captives are now held hostage by Hamas in Gaza.

Reserve Callup. Reservists are being mobilized and military units are being sent to the border with the Gaza Strip. Israelis who are in reserve military status living overseas are receiving phone calls calling them up for service.

International Response

International Reaction. Most nations are condemning the Hamas assault on Israel. Predictably, some countries are applauding the attack – Iran, of course, being one of them as well as several other Arab nations. National security observers are calling for the reoccupation of the Gaza strip (Middle East Forum) and disarming of Hamas. In Alexandria, Egypt, a policeman opened fire on a tourist group. Two Israelis and one Egyptian were killed.

U.S. Reaction. The U.S. Department of State has condemned (DoS) “. . . the appalling attacks by Hamas terrorists against Israel . . .” President Joe Biden issued a statement (White House, Oct 7, 2023) condemning the terrorist attacks. The U.S. has announced a security alert (DoS, Oct 7, 2023) for Israel and designated the Gaza Strip as a ‘Do Not Travel‘ area. (DoS Map) The U.S. Embassy in Jerusalem says that all diplomatic and military personnel in Israel are safe and accounted for. DoS has issued a ‘shelter in place’ advisory for diplomatic staff and American nationals.

And Hezbollah? There are concerns that Israel may soon be involved in hostilities along its northern border with Lebanon. Hezbollah announced that it has fired mortars into the Mount Dov (Google Maps) area of Israel from southern Lebanon. This location has a long-range radar installation used to detect and track missiles and rockets launched from Lebanon and Syria. The Israelis have responded with artillery fire and airstrikes against Hezbollah targets. Patriot missile systems (NSI) have been used to intercept incoming missiles from Lebanon. Some press reports say that several IDF bases have been hit with mortar and missile attacks coming from southern Lebanon. Iran is a strong supporter of Hezbollah and will likely provide assistance to the group in its operations against Israel. Israel has begun preparations in the event evacuations from areas near the Lebanon border are required. Israeli military units are reinforcing its northern border area. Israeli tanks, including the Merkava Mark III (Wikipedia) and IV as well as self-propelled artillery, are deploying to the northern border area.

And the Peace Talks? The White House had been working on an Israel-Saudi deal – acting as a third-party peace broker. With this ongoing conflict this effort will likely come to a screeching halt. There is the likelihood that Iran and Hamas saw the ongoing peace talks as a threat – as it was an attempt to isolate them in the international community. Part of the deal had Israel making concessions to the Palestinian Authority – an enemy of Hamas. So, Hamas striking Israel at this time could be a desire to disrupt the peace talks deal. There is also the likelihood that Russia has encouraged Hamas; certainly, the conflict in Israel-Gaza Strip will divert attention away from the Ukraine conflict. See “In Brief: The U.S.-Saudi-Israeli Deal”, War on the Rocks, October 4, 2023.

Background Information

Hamas Rule in Gaza. The origins of this terrorist group, the Islamic Resistance Movement, date back to 1987. It is an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood. In 2007 it took power in the Gaza Strip – a small area of land with a population of about two million.

History of the Gaza Strip. This land area has been inhabited since the 15th century B.C and has been dominated by many different peoples and empires throughout it history. It was part of the Ottoman Empire from the 16th century until the end of World War I. It became part of the British Mandate of Palestine after World War I. Egypt began administering the Gaza Strip following the 1948 Arab Israeli War. During the Six-Day war in 1967 it was captured by Israel. In the late 1990s Israel transferred many of the Palestinian-populated areas to the newly created Palestinian Authority (PA). In 2005 Israel unilaterally withdrew all of its settlers and military from the Gaza Strip.

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References:

Gaza Strip – CIA Fact Book
https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/gaza-strip/

Israel Palestine Interactive Map – With Battle Event Notations
https://israelpalestine.liveuamap.com/

Map – GeoConfirmed Israel
https://geoconfirmed.org/israel

IDF Real Time Operational Updates
https://www.idf.il/en/

U.N. Relief and Works Agency (Palestine)
https://www.unrwa.org/

IDF Twitter Feeds
@IDF and @IAFsite

Curated news, analysis, and commentary about special operations, national security, and conflicts around the world.

Photo / Image: An Army Special Forces soldier parachutes during Exercise Super Garuda Shield in Banyuwangi, Indonesia, Aug. 30, 2023. The annual exercise is a joint, multinational event focused on maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific. Photo by Sgt. 1st Class Austin Berner.

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9/11 Anniversary. The terrorist attack against the United States on September 11, 2001, thrust the U.S. into a 20-year Global War on Terror (GWOT). The terrorists killed nearly 3,000 people and injured more than 6,000 in the worst terrorist attack against the homeland in our nation’s history.

SOF News

New SOJTF-C Cdr. Rear Adm. (lower half) Mark A. Schafer, is assigned as commanding general, Special Operations Joint Task Force-Central, U.S. Central Command, Doha, Qatar.  Schafer recently served as commander, Navy Region Korea; commander, U.S. Naval Forces Korea; commander, Naval Component, United Nations Commander, Korea, Pusan, Korea.

SOF and Psychedelic Treatment. A prior study demonstrated that psychedelic-assisted therapy was related to reductions in mental health symptoms and associated consequences among U.S. Special Operations Forces Veterans seeking treatment in Mexico. A new study extends this analysis to explore the prospective associations of baseline predictors on treatment outcomes and whether changes in psychological flexibility mediate the relationship between acute changes in consciousness and clinical outcomes. “Predictors of psychedelic treatment outcomes among special operations veterans”, American Psychological Association, September 2023.

MC-12W Aircrew Honored. An aircraft with the callsign Independence 08 was lost on April 27, 2013, in a crash near Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan, killing four. “MC-12W Liberty aircrew honors fellow Airmen who died in 2013 crash”, DVIDS, September 6, 2023.

NAVSCIATTS SLIC. The Strategic Leaders International Course offered by the Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training School (part of USSOCOM) is a four week in-resident professional development curriculum held at Stennis Space Center, MS. The course is designed for partner nation senior military leaders, diplomats, and senior government officials, introduces the participants to leading-edge methodologies actively used in both the public and private sectors to address the complexities of today’s “gray and green” zone challenges. Read more in “Bridging the Gaps Between Partner Nations”, DVIDS, September 5, 2023.

MoH Recipient – Sgt. 1st Class Chris Celiz. Celiz was selected to join the 75th Ranger Regiment in 2013, and by 2018, he’d deployed several times to both Iraq and Afghanistan. During those deployments, he was always inclusive of others and known to encourage camaraderie. His selflessness was put to the ultimate test on July 12, 2018, when Celiz was leading a special purpose unit that included 1st Battalion Rangers and partner forces in Afghanistan. “Medal of Honor Monday: Army Sgt. 1st Class Christopher A. Celiz”, U.S DoD, September 11, 2023.

SOF Medics and Their Egos. Medicine is an environment where egotistical behavior often reigns supreme; SOF medicine is far from exempt from this phenomenon. “Healthy Humility in Special Operations Forces (SOF) Medicine . . . and Beyond”, by Sam Patrick, LinkedIn Pulse, November 22, 2019.

SEALs Face Charges. An investigation into the death of a SEAL candidate in February 2022 has revealed that medical teams at BUD/S were “poorly organized, poorly integrated and poorly led.” “Three Navy SEAL commanders face charges in Hell Week death”, Task & Purpose, September 8, 2023. Read more about this incident in “The Navy SEALs Hell Week Turns Deadly”, by Seeth Hettena, Rolling Stone, September 7, 2023.

MoH Recipient – Master Sgt. Earl Plumlee. The heroic actions of MSG Plumlee, a member of the 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne), on 28 August 2013 in Afghanistan earned him the award of the Medal of Honor. He was based at Forward Operating Base Ghazni when Afghan insurgents attacked the FOB with a massive explosion against the FOB perimeter wall. Insurgents wearing suicide vests poured through the hole in the wall. Plumlee’s actions that day was key to saving the lives of many. Read more in “Medal of Honor: Master Sgt. Earl D. Plumlee”, Military Review, September – October 2023.

International SOF

Russian SOF – Lessons Not Learned. A recent article about Russian special operations forces provides some interesting perspectives on the historical use of Russian SOF over the past century. “The Fall from Grace of Russian SOF: The Danger of Forgetting Lessons Learned“, Irregular Warfare Center, September 5, 2023.

Estonia SOF. Analysis suggests that Estonia has the most developed total defense and unconventional warfare processes and capabilities of any Baltic state [RAND source]. Much of this is due to the Estonian Special Operation Forces; a highly specialized unit responsible for all manner of special operations. “ESTSOF: Estonian Special Operations Forces”, by Ahmad Hassan, Grey Dynamics, September 4, 2023.

El Sal SF Participate in Fort Devens Shooting Competition. FORT DEVENS, Massachusetts – Team El Salvador won the Remington “Vulcan” Trophy as Team Grand Aggregate Champion in the New Hampshire National Guard Adjutant General (NHNG TAG)’s 2023 Combat Marksmanship Match on Sept. 8, Ft. Devens, Mass. (DVIDS, Sep 10, 2023)

New Rifle for UK SOF. Special operations elements of the British Army and Royal Marines are getting a new rifle – the KS-1. An order for 1,640 Knight’s Stoner 1 (KS-1) rifles, designated the L403A1 in UK service, has been placed, with an option to acquire a further 10,000 falling under a new £90m contract over the next decade. “KS-1: All the gen on the British Army and Royal Marines’ new rifle”, Forces.net, September 7, 2023. See also “New advanced rifle for Ranger Regiment”, army.mod.uk, September 7, 2023.

SOF History

Bin Laden Raid. In May 2011 members of SEAL Team Six infiltrated into Pakistan and killed Osama bin Laden. The al-Qaeda founder was the mastermind of the 9/11 terrorist attacks that killed over 3,000 people. “Operations Neptune Spear: 7 Sizzling Secrets About the Bin Laden Mission”, Spyscape, September 9, 2023.

Operation BARRAS. On 10 September 2000, 1 PARA, the RAF, and the SAS conducted Operation BARRAS to free five British soldiers held captive in the war-torn West African country of Sierra Leone. They were held by the West Side Boys. Lynx, Chinook, and Hind helicopters took part in the successful operation. https://www.nam.ac.uk/explore/operation-barras

Ukraine Conflict

Guarded Optimism. Many observers of the Ukraine conflict have noticed that the Ukrainians have yet to score a significant breakthrough of the Russian defensive lines that would lead to a severing of the Russian logistical lines of communication. However, some assessments are now moving from pessimistic to a more promising outcome – with a possible penetration of Russia’s third line of defense taking place before the harsh winter weather sets in. A senior official of the Defense Intelligence Agency provides more in an interview. “How the Pentagon assesses Ukraine’s progress”, The Economist, September 6, 2023. (subscription).

Cluster Munitions. Cluster munitions are air-dropped or ground-launched weapons that release a number of smaller submunitions intended to kill enemy personnel or destroy vehicles. Cluster munitions were developed in World War II and are part of many governments’ weapons stockpiles. Cluster munitions have been used frequently in combat, including the early phases of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Cluster munitions have been criticized for causing a significant number of civilian deaths. The Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), which bans the use of cluster munitions, entered into force in 2010; the United States is not a party to this convention. A number of governments, UN agencies, and nongovernmental organizations have accused Russia of using cluster munitions during its 2022 invasion. Cluster Munitions: Backgrounds and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, CRS RS22907, updated September 6, 2023, PDF, 17 pages. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RS/RS22907

SFA and Ukraine. The United States can learn from what has worked in its effort to support the Ukrainian military. Why did security force assistance work in Ukraine but fail in Afghanistan? Alexandra Chinchilla of Texas A&M’s Bush School unpacks this question, examining the factors that led assistance to work—at least somewhat—in Ukraine and explaining the lessons we should learn about when and how to use this tool in the future. “Lessons From Ukraine for Security Force Assistance”, Lawfare Blog, September 10, 2023.

Commentary

SOF and South America. Cole Herring, a Special Forces officer in the US Army with time in the 7th Special Forces Group and Special Operations Command South, writes on countering China in South America. He says that special operations forces are uniquely suited to build partnerships that will help counter the malign influence of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in America’s backyard. “SOF Can Help Win the Competition for Influence in South America”, Irregular Warfare Initiative, September 1, 2023.

Paper – Urban Resistance to Occupation. This paper illustrates the feasibility of overt, guerrilla-based activity in urban environments during the final phase of a conflict and offers insight into an understudied Landpower activity that modern at-risk countries should develop and hone. “Urban Resistance to Occupation: An Underestimated Element of Land Warfare”, Parameters, August 2023, by Kevin D. Stringer and Jell J.H. Hooiveld, 19 pages.

National Security

Tanks in the 21st Century. A nine-page essay details the persistent value of armored combined arms teams in the modern era. “The Tank is Dead . . . Long Live the Tank”, Military Review, August 2023, PDF.

11th Airborne Division – With a Mission in the “High North”. During World War II the 11th Airborne Division saw extensive duty in the Pacific theater. It would later deploy to Vietnam as the 11th Air Assault Division. In 2022, the 11th Airborne Division was reactivated. Today, the “Arctic Angels” of the 11th build capability to operate in the Arctic, mountain terrain, and other extreme cold weather (ECW) areas while maintaining readiness for global deployments. “The 11th Airborne Division Reborn”, Military Review, September – October 2023.

Infantry. The Fall 2023 edition of Infantry is online. Lots of articles to include several on jungle warfare. Published on DVIDS by the U.S. Army Infantry School, PDF, 52 pages. https://www.dvidshub.net/publication/issues/67501

DoD Going ‘Woke’. Change 5 to the Manual of Military Decorations and Awards took effect on August 7, 2023. Because of this change citations for prestigious joint awards must now use gender-neutral language. So instead of a fellow getting an award saying ” . . . distinguished himself by superior meritorious service . . .”; it will now say ” . . . distinguished themself by superior meritorious service . . .” Things that make you go “Hmmm”. “New Department of Defense Rule Neuters the Brave Men and Women Who Served in the Armed Forces”, The Daily Signal, September 1, 2023.

Help Special Operations Forces (SOF) personnel with spine injuries receive the healthcare options, education, and care they need.

Afghanistan

Kabul Airlift. A Congressional aide recounts the ups and downs of assisting U.S. citizens, lawful permanent residents (LPRs), and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa holders onto Hamid Karzai International Airport during the frantic days of August 2021. He also writes on the despair and disappointment he felt in the aftermath. “The Education of a Soldier”, Special Operations Association of America, August 31, 2023.

Afghan SIVs Lost in Red Tape. Processing rates by the U.S. Department of State of Afghan Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) applicants is very slow. Critics claim this is threatening the lives of more than 152,000 SIV applicants remaining in Afghanistan. “Afghan allies who risked lives to help US lost in red tape”, Fox News, September 3, 2023.

Failure of August 2021. The U.S. military did a phenomenal job in conducting the Kabul Airlift two years ago. Over 120,000 people were airlifted out of Kabul in a two-week period by the U.S. and other nations. Many of these people were foreign nationals. Some were at-risk Afghans who had assisted the U.S., NATO, and other partner nations during the 2001 to 2021 timeframe. However, many of the evacuated Afghans were simply people who swarmed the airport during the initial days of the chaotic non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO) and managed to get on a flight out of the country. Most of the at-risk Afghans who qualify for a Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) due to their working relationship with the U.S. military have been left behind in Afghanistan. “Helping the Afghan Allies America Left Behind”, by Luke Coffey, Hudson Institute, September 8, 2023.

Old Salt Coffee is a corporate sponsor of SOF News. The company offers a wide range of coffee flavors to include Green Eyes Coffee, a tribute to those Navy special operations personnel who operate in the night.

Africa

The Coups Keep Coming. There have been several countries in Africa that have had coups in the past few years. This graphic depicts the African countries that have had coups between 2020 and 2023. (Wikimedia.org, Creative Commons, 31 July 2023)

DoD Leaving Niger? Just prior to the coup in Niger the U.S. had about 1,100 troops at two main bases in the country. There now may less than that as the DoD has stated it is ‘repositioning’ troops. The DoD says (DoD News) that some contractors and non-essential personnel have left Niger while others have left the capital region’s Air Base 101 in Niamey for Air Base 201 in the Agadez area of Niger. “US repositioning forces in Niger in ‘precautionary’ move”, The Hill, September 7, 2023. See also “US Drone Flights Limited Since Niger Coup”, Voice of America, September 8, 2023.

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Upcoming Events

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September 24-28, 2023
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October 3, 2023
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October 16-20, 2023
SOAR XLVII
Special Operations Association

December 8, 2023
Winter Cruise
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Podcasts, Videos, and Movies

CIA Recruitment Video. The CIA released a new recruiting video targeting employees of the Russian security services and the military. (CIA, YouTube, Sep 8, 2023, 2 mins).
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FJYy8MMWLDI

Video – Spy Ops Official Trailer – Netflix. In this intense true crime series, intelligence operatives from MI6 to the CIA share insider stories of spy craft, Cold War campaigns, and coups carried out by covert agents. Featuring interviews with real officials, officers, and spies. Netflix, YouTube, August 11, 2023, 2 minutes. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0N0R50cu-P0

The first episode aired a few days ago – Operation Jawbreaker – about the first Central Intelligence Teams to enter Afghanistan after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in September 2001. Read a recap of the episode by Film Fugitives, September 9, 2023.

Video – Hon. Christopher Maier, ASD SO/LIC. Chris Maier, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict – ASD SO/LIC, is interviewed on the SOFcast Podcast. USSOCOM, YouTube, September 1, 2023, 52 minutes. The interview took place during SOF Week in Tampa, Florida in May 2023. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dAmmqC–A_Q

Video – Interview with AC-130 Gunship Crew Member. The Reconnaissance Cast, August 30, 2023, YouTube, 2 hours. The Vietnam War years of the AC-47 and AC-130 Gunship programs – from South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YQKNrURBdcU

Video – AFSOC Mission Video 2023. Air Force Special Operations Command is defined by its Air Commandos: highly trained Airmen who are made up by character and adaptability. Airmen who are ready to take on any challenge and find a way for mission success, any place, anytime, anywhere. Air Force Special Operations Command Public Affairs, DVIDS, September 6, 2023. https://www.dvidshub.net/video/896110/afsoc-mission-video-2023

Podcasts

SOFCAST. United States Special Operations Command
https://linktr.ee/sofcast

Prep for Impact by Matt Parrish (Green Beret Foundation)
https://open.spotify.com/show/54j9y7oFsvZQonqzgLebZp

The Pinelander. Blacksmith Publishing
https://www.thepinelander.com/

The Indigenous Approach. 1st Special Forces Command
https://open.spotify.com/show/3n3I7g9LSmd143GYCy7pPA

Irregular Warfare Initiative
https://irregularwarfare.org/category/podcasts/

Irregular Warfare Podcast. Modern War Institute at West Point
https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/irregular-warfare-podcast/id1514636385

SOF News is not a ‘money making’ enterprise; but we do have administrative, operating, and publishing expenses. Individuals and businesses provide the funds to defray these expenses. Their contributions are deeply appreciated. Learn how you can support SOF News.

The March 2023 issue of the CTC Sentinel has an article entitled “The Enduring Counterterrorism Challenge in Mozambique”. The article traces the history of a growing insurgency in the Cabo Delgada Province in northern Mozambique. The world took notice when the group launched an attack in March 2021 against a coastal town that was considered secure. The capture of the town threatened a huge liquified natural gas project.

International and regional military and police forces, beginning in the spring of 2021, began deploying to the country to assist in the counterinsurgency effort against the jihadi group. Among these advisory and training efforts was the introduction of U.S. Special Forces in Mozambique.

After a period of reduced activity in the last part of 2021 and early 2022 the jihadi group increased its operations and moved into new areas of the northern province. The insurgents revised their strategic approach to targets and civilians. It began attempts at winning the hearts and minds of the population. The use of the media by both the insurgents and the government has increased in frequency and in importance.

The long term outlook for the security situation in Mozambique will not be affected by the introduction of security force assistance alone. A comprehensive approach to the insurgency has to include addressing of unresolved grievances, providing security to not just economic zones but areas where the insurgents are active, and improved coordination and communication among the various security entities (domestic and foreign),

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“The Enduring Counterterrorism Challenge in Mozambique”, CTC Sentinel, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, March 23, 2023, pages 1-6.
https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-enduring-counterterrorism-challenge-in-mozambique/

Author. Emilia Columbo is a Senior Associate with the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Africa Program. She is a former senior intelligence analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency.

Map. Source Central Intelligence Agency.

Related Article. In early 2021 the United States deployed Green Berets in response to the growth of insurgent activity in northern Mozambique. Read more on this in “US SF Training Mozambique Military in Fight Against Insurgents”, SOF News, March 24, 2021.

By; LtCol Chris Howard (UK Army), LtCol Rolf Starosta (DEU Army), Maj Eliann Carr (US Army), and Cpt Philipp Nebgen (DEU Army).

Modern warfare requires abrupt adaptation to dynamic developments of circumstances in which the use of special operations forces to counter violent extremism has become increasingly essential to provide the required immediate response. After decades of reaction to each action in the physical environment, patterns of behavior are emerging in the information environment that lead to the predictability of how both adversary and ally respond to kinetic action.

The momentum of information has accelerated through the evolution of social media and real time messaging. This developed capability integrated an ancient perspective of the “war on influence” using modern day platforms. The nearly instantaneous nature of information flow illuminates one single source being the strongest point influence—the mind.

As seen in current campaigns, we are fighting a networked non-state enemy with highly professional and advanced propaganda that exploits modern media, most notably through the internet, to disseminate messages globally. There messages are simple in presentation but deep in influence as they bolster recruitment and propagate extremist ideology. Because the enemy’s center of gravity exists in the information domain, it is there that we must engage.

This places a stronger emphasis on the role of special operations forces within every military campaign due to their inherent nature of expedient adaptation and ability to shape the environment through integration of kinetic and non-kinetic actions. This integration of effects propels special operations into the modern warfare front where conventional forces continue to remain fixated on predominately-kinetic actions.

The next evolutionary in the application of combined kinetic and non-kinetic action is toward the predictive nature of human behavior, such as the emerging pattern of how adversaries respond to kinetic action. Through intentionally applying combined effects to this strategic intercept is what will ultimately disrupt adversarial decision-making, resulting in our more dominant positioning within the information environment. Although kinetic actions are a form of messaging, alone they will only evoke a primal response, which will likely lead to continued escalation of action and reaction. To attain sustainable success for military operations is through the prevention of retaliatory escalation leading to direct de-escalation. All of which is achieved through the integration of both kinetic and non-kinetic planning in conjunction to the primary kinetic action.

Special operations house highly skilled men and women with unique abilities tailored toward this form of tangible and intangible warfare. It is through the orchestration of each generated effect of these skills that will mitigate the degree of adversarial response. Furthermore, it is the application of these same effects into the information environment in the time leading up to a kinetic strike that may potentially mitigate adversarial kinetic response altogether in the physical environment.

As warfare advances in stride with technology, so does the methods of how to analyze and assess the environments of wartime operations. Through these advancements, evidence of existing algorithms of predictable behavior surface giving way to the development of revised protocols. Existing research in the predictability of criminal behavior and the time-sequenced escalation of retaliation are the theoretical framework applied to understand the predictableness of adversarial behavior. Through the indicated points of predicted response are the points of intercept where non-kinetic effects are most potent in eliciting an intended response from adversarial decision-makers.

The key to achieve this level of interdiction is a purposeful approach to the development and distribution of strategic communication that will guide the synchronization of both kinetic and non-kinetic efforts. Unlike conventional war strategies, it is the understanding that non-kinetic actions are essential to surgically shaping the information environment leading to tangible operations. To say that the pen is mightier than the sword, is certainly not entirely wrong. However, to address the concerns of violent extremism and wartime threats, we need both.

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Photo:

Selected from https://pixabay.com/de/; a free to use website.

Authors:

Lieutenant Colonel Christian L Howard. Adjutants General’s Corps (Educational and Training Services) (AGC(ETS)) BSc (Hons), MSc, PGCE.

Lieutenant Colonel Rolf Starosta. Chief Operations 1st German Armored Division. Currently deployed with CJTF-OIR.

Major Eliann Carr. Ph.D., Human Dev & Ed Psych. Presently serving as an Information Operations Analyst.

Captain Philipp Nebgen is an intelligence officer for the Strategic Reconnaissance Command of the German Armed Forces and currently on duty for the Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve.

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) has released a new publication entitled Re-Evaluating Special Operations Forces-Led Counterterrorism Efforts. The 20-page report by Barnett S. Koven ” . . . posits that kinetic counterterrorism (CT) actions undertaken by the state to kill, capture, or otherwise disrupt terrorist groups are ineffective in isolation.”

The report on SOF-led CT efforts argues that while kinetic actions may work in the immediate term, they have little long-term effect on the ability of terrorist groups to operate. Dr. Koven’s research suggests that successful counterterrorism approaches require sequenced kinetic and non-kinetic approaches.

Barnett Koven is an adjunct faculty member of the Joint Special Operations University. He is also a researcher at the University of Maryland’s National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism (START).

Counterterrorism is one of the 12 core U.S. Special Operations Command activities. Currently, according to the author, the US government has a preference for kinetic responses to terrorism. Koven believes that rigorous evaluations of the effectiveness of kinetic approaches to CT are lacking.

His paper provides an evaluation of U.S. SOF CT efforts. The first section provides a review of current studies on CT, the second introduces the research hypotheses, and the third on methodology. The results are then presented and discussed in the fourth section and the conclusion is within the fifth and last section.

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Re-Evaluating Special Operations Forces-Led Counterterrorism Efforts, by Barnett S. Koven, Joint Special Operations University (JSOU), Occasional Paper, March 2020.
https://jsou.libguides.com/ld.php?content_id=53631174

On January 5, 2020 militants from al-Shabaab attacked the U.S. airfield and base at Manda Bay Airfield in Kenya. Three Americans died in the attack. In addition, several aircraft were destroyed or damaged to include U.S. special operations aircraft. Two other Americans were wounded in the attack.

Despite losing fighters – estimated at five – in the attack, the insurgents likely consider this raid on Manda Bay a significant victory. Al Qaeda linked groups have been using social media to capitalize on the Manda Bay attack by Al Shabaab. Posters have been released in several languages congratulating the attackers of the Manda Bay raid.

A Successful Raid

Most press accounts reflect the prevailing view that this was a very successful attack by the terrorist group. On January 6, 2020 AFRICOM acknowledged that “the enemy achieved a degree of success in its attack.” The attackers took advantage of a fairly undefended base perimeter. The small base had been considered an ‘out of the way’ installation that seemed to not be at risk of attack. [1]

The attack began early on a Sunday morning on January 5th when it was still dark. Al-Shabaab fired mortar rounds onto Camp Simba while attacking the nearby airfield. Al Shabaab forces operate in some of Kenya’s dense forests just miles away from the base. However U.S. defense officials believe the attacking force originated from within Somalia’s borders. There are also indications that the attackers were supported by a component inside of Kenya. The size of the attacking force is not known – but it probably was in the range of 15 to 30 personnel. The attackers would have to transit over 50 to 70 miles once across the Somalia border to reach Camp Simba.

Americans Killed. Army Specialist Henry Mayfield Jr. and two U.S. Department of Defense contractors died in the attack. Two other defense contractors were injured. Specialist Mayfield, age 23, was working as an air traffic controller from a truck on the airfield. He was assigned to the 58th Aviation Regiment based at Fort Rucker, Alabama. Mayfield was deployed in support of Operation Octave Shield. Dustin Harrison and Bruce Triplett were private pilots for L3 Technologies. They were killed when their aircraft was hit with a rocket as it was taxiing on the runway.

Aircraft Destroyed. Six contractor-operated aircraft were destroyed in the attack. A few were highly sophisticated surveillance aircraft used by the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). One of the destroyed aircraft include a modified Havilland Canada Dash-8. The Dash-8 is believed to be equipped with wide-area sensors to carry out surveillance missions in support of SOF units. Some news reports indicate that one of the other destroyed aircraft was a MC12W used for ISR missions in support of SOF. Two or three helicopters are reported to be destroyed. One news report indicated the value of the equipment and aircraft destroyed is believed to be above $20 million. [2]

Where is Manda Bay?

Camp Simba is a very small outpost about a mile away from the Manda Bay Airfield. It is situated on the Kenya coast and near the Somali border. The camp and airfield are located on the Kenya Defense Military Base at Manda Bay. The small complex was established in 2004 as the United States established regional staging areas to combat terrorism around the world. If you do a check on the Internet you will find two airfields. One associated with Camp Simba and the other – just to the south – handles commercial and civilian air traffic.

Why is the U.S. at Manda Bay?

The U.S. military is in Kenya training the country’s military and conducting counterterrorism operations in the region. The U.S. is also assisting the Kenyan security forces in the fight against al-Shabaab. Camp Simba and the Manda Bay Airfield are used as a base and staging area for U.S. surveillance aircraft and for U.S. SOF working alongside Kenya security forces in the porous border area between Kenya and Somalia to the north. It is also a staging point for operations into Somalia.

There are a variety of training courses conducted at the Manda Bay complex. These include anti-piracy, human trafficking, explosive detonation, vessel boarding, and search and seizure. At first the US part of the camp was extremely small but in 2012 it was upgraded considerably with new facilities. [3]

For many years the base was relatively quiet with a small maritime training mission in place. There were at times no more than a dozen U.S military personnel with some DOD contractors. With the growth of the U.S. involvement in the fight against al Shabaab in Somalia, Manda Bay has increased in size. In 2017 the small camp started a base operating support-integrator (BOS-I) mission. Training, medical, and administrative support is provided to Kenya partner forces – Kenyan Rangers, law enforcement organizations, and the Kenyan Navy. [4]

One of the units based at Manda Bay Airfield is the 475th Expeditionary Air Base Squadron. The airfield serves as a launching location for air operations in the region – including Somalia. There are about 350 Defense Department personnel in Kenya at various locations.

U.S. Unprepared for Attack

Several news accounts stated that the base was lightly defended and unprepared for an attack. There very likely was a reliance on Kenyan security forces to provide overall security.

“I think it’s self-obvious we were not as prepared there at Manda Bay as we needed to be. Al-Shabab managed to penetrate onto that airfield . . . They were able to get access to that airfield, kill three Americans, and destroy six aircraft there. So we weren’t as prepared, and we’re digging into that to find out why that’s the case.”

General Townsend, Commander of AFRICOM, January 30, 2020 while testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee.

U.S Reaction to Attack

Initial Response. A Marine special operations team of about a dozen Marines located in Camp Simba responded to the airfield attack alongside some Kenyan Rangers. Al-Shabaab suffered at least five fatalities in the attack. At least one Marine Raider was injured in the fighting. The responding Marines were from the 3rd Marine Raider Battalion based at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. An AFRICOM statement said “. . . a timely and effective response to the attack reduced the number of casualties and eliminated the potential for further damage.” MARSOC has been sending Marine Raiders to Kenya on Foreign Internal Defense (FID) missions to train up the Kenyan Rangers for a number of years.

Additional Reinforcements – EARF. The Manda Bay facilities were quickly reinforced with U.S. troops. The responding unit were members of the U.S. Africa Command’s East Africa Response Force (EARF). They were deployed to the Manda Bay Airfield to augment security. Currently the EARF are comprised of soldiers from the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division. They were transported to Manda Bay via a C-130J Super Hercules assigned to the 75th Expeditionary Airlift Squadron on January 5, 2020. It is unknown how long these additional forces will remain at Manda Bay. A small Special Forces contingent arrived at Camp Lemonier, Djibouti as well. There are no details on the composition of this element at this time.

EARF Mission. The mission of the EARF, a company-sized element, is to protect U.S. citizens, diplomatic locations, and conduct other missions as appropriate. They are a combat-ready, rapid deployment force. While in theater they operate out of Djibouti under the control of the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (HOA).

Senior Commanders Visit. Senior U.S. Africa Command officials visited the Manda Bay Airfield and Camp Simba on January 9, 2020 to meet with troops and commanders on the ground about details of the attack by al-Shabaab. One of those was Major General Michael Turello – the commander of Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). Turello is a long-time Special Forces officer with previous deployments to the Horn of Africa. [5]

New Security Measures in Place. About 120 American infantrymen were securing the Camp Simba and Manda Bay Airfield area in the period immediately after the attack. Efforts are being made to upgrade the defense posture to ensure the small base can be properly defended. This will likely include additional troops to guard the two facilities (airfield and camp) and to patrol the immediate area. Patrols would likely be joint with units of the Kenyan security forces.

MD-530F Helicopters for Kenya. On January 23, 2020 – just days after the January 5 raid on Manda Bay – the United States delivered six Cayuse Warrior helicopters to Kenya security forces. Another six MD-530Fs are programmed for delivery in the future. The MD-530F’s will replace aging MD-500 utility helicopters currently in use. The small, agile attack helicopters carry machine gun pods, M260 rocket launchers, and other armament. The helicopters are ideal for scouting, reconnaissance, attack, and close air support for Kenya Defense Force ground operations. The U.S. has provided a number of MD-530F helicopters to the Afghan Air Force. The delivery of the helicopters are very likely not related to the Manda Bay raid and had been a long time in the planning process. [6]

US-Funded JTTF. Kenya has been chosen as the site for the first US-funded Joint Terrorism Task Force that will be located outside of the United States. Kenyan investigators will attend a 12-week intensive counter-terrorism course at the U.S. FBI Academy. They will form the nucleus of Kenya’s JTTF. The assistance provided is in response to the growing threat to Kenya posed by al Shabaab. [7]

Impact of the Raid

Immediate Impact. The successful raid by al-Shabaab will have some consequences. Of course the most important impact will be on the families of the three Americans who lost their lives. An immediate result of the raid will be the diversion of time and energy of some of the Americans based at Camp Simba and the Manda Bay Airfield from their normal responsibilities and duties to that of base defense and force protection. In addition, the complex will need to be augmented with additional personnel taken from their jobs somewhere else (Europe, Camp Lemonier, etc.) to heighten the security posture.

Strategic Impact. This raid took place at a time that the Department of Defense is attempting to reduce the number U.S. personnel based in the AFRICOM area of responsibility. The raid also points out the vulnerability of small bases from which U.S. SOF and conventional personnel are conducting training with partner mission forces and counterterrorism missions. While DOD is likely focused on cutting back its engagement in West Africa; there is the possibility that the mission in the Horn of Africa could also be downsized.

Future Prospects for Manda Bay?

Ugrading Security. AFRICOM, CJTF-HOA, and SOCAfrica are all very likely reviewing their force prevention plans, quick reaction force posture, MEDEVAC procedures, and personnel recovery plans. It is likely that some locations where training is conducted or CT missions supported from in Africa will be eliminated due to force protection concerns.

U.S. Will Remain in Manda Bay. The importance of Manda Bay cannot be overstated. The base is small, far from a U.S. military facility, and a long way from PR assets. However, it is an important base for the training of Kenya ground and maritime units. In addition, it is a staging base for mounting a variety of counterterrorism missions against al-Shabaab in the region. Camp Simba and the associated airfield will likely be reinforced with security personnel and the security and force protection posture will be significantly increased.

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Footnotes:

[1] An article by Katie Bo Williams provides more information about the lightly defended perimeter of the Manda Bay Airfield in “Kenya Base ‘Surprisingly’ Undefended During Attack, US Officials Say”, Defense One, January 29, 2020.

[2] For a detailed analysis of aircraft destroyed read an article published in The Aviationist.

[3] Read more in “US Military Base at Camp Simba Bay in Lamu”, Kenyans.co.ke, January 15, 2020.

[4] See “The U.S.’s overlooked counter-terrorism outpost in Kenya”, Conflict Geographies, November 29, 2016.

[5] “Senior U.S. Africa Command Officials Visit Troops at Manda Bay”, United States Africa Command, January 9, 2020.

[6] See “United States delivers MD-530F helicopters to Kenya Defense Force“, CJTF-HOA, January 23, 2020.

[7] See “Kenya, FBI partner on first anti-terror task force outside US”, The East African, February 11, 2020.

References:

[1] Camp Simba Attack, Wikipedia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Camp_Simba_attack

[2] Al Shabaab, Congressional Research Service (CRS), January 16, 2020.
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10170

[3] “Between Blackhawk Down and Simba”, International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, January 12, 2020.

[4] “U.S. Using Local Soldiers to Fight al-Qaida Allies in East Africa”, NTI, March 11, 2013.

Photo: EARF lands at Manda Bay Airfield following al-Shabaab attack in January 2020. Photo by USAF January 6, 2020.

“Wilayah of Hind”

ISIS Attempting to Put Global Meaning on a Regional Conflict

By Ajit Maan

In mid-May 2019 ISIS announced the establishment of a province in India. The newly dubbed “Wilayah of Hind” (Indian Province) was announced by its Amaq News Agency. The same statement claimed the infliction of casualties on the Indian Army in Amshipora in the Shopian district of Kashmir.

There are at least five things that are clear:

1. There is no physical geographical “province” called “Wilayah of Hind.” The claim is not true and the so-called province is not real.
2. While the claim of provincial establishment may seem preposterous, it is not so in light of the larger strategy. An austere and hardline form of Islam has roots in India as far back as the mid 18^th century, often centered around the teachings of Shah Waliullah Dehlawi. ISIS is very likely attempting to inspire Indian Muslims with a very personal narrative regarding this iconic Shah.
3. The combined statement of the very real and confirmed strike in Kashmir along with the illusory claim to have established a province in India are a continuation of the ISIS strategy of attempting to establish global meaning of regional conflicts and also to reinvigorate their ultimate victory narrative recently suffering dramatic setbacks in the Levant.
4. The fact that ISIS claimed a province in India rather than Kashmir may indicate the interests of its financiers. The group’s report card is not looking good as a result of its territorial withdrawals and its financiers may be re-enthused by in-roads into India.
5. The group is recruiting in Kashmir for strikes in India.

ISIS leadership is looking for foot soldiers to activate the kinetic tactics that will serve the larger psychological strategy. And it knows that local Kashmiri populations vulnerable to exploitation will be motivated primarily by the potential for territorial defense. Tribal defense narratives are common and effective for rallying support for the group portrayed as “under attack”, true or not. The mythological province is designed for the ears of its financiers and for an audience that is recruitable primarily through appeal to defense of territory and more foundationally – the defense of the identity that is associated with the physical territory. By re-framing the regional conflict as a small instance of a global Salafi-jihadism, ISIS is trying to put a global brand on a regional conflict by attempting to swallow up the conflict and re-define it.

Notice that ISIS is not engaging in counter-narrative (it is not addressing this regional conflict in the terms of the conflict itself and then taking a side and defending it) rather it is re-defining the conflict as a small part of something larger. 

Kashmiris are worried about Kashmir. India wants to retain it. Pakistan wants to own it. Other players have their own vested interests. But ISIS is not interested in Kashmiri independence nor in Kashmir as anything more than recruitment grounds for a mythological re-mapping of the caliphate. They are seizing opportunistically on violence driven by factors mostly unrelated to jihadism.

That hard truth will not win recruits from within Kashmir.

In order to get recruits to strike India or even to get civilian support for ISIS operatives in Kashmir, ISIS will have to re-define the nature of the fight, changing it from a dispute over territorial rights to a fight between them and the rest of the world. Doing that will require an alteration in Kashmiri identities from Kashmiri nationalists to global jihadists. 

Up until this point Kashmiri separatists have either wanted independence or they want Pakistan to take Kashmir. They have not aspired to anything like a global empire. 

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Ajit Maan, Ph.D. is author of Counter-Terrorism: Narrative Strategies, Narrative Warfare, and co-author of Introduction to Narrative Warfare. She is Affiliate Faculty, Center for the Study of  Narrative and Conflict Resolution at George Mason University, member of the Brain Trust of the Weaponized Narrative Initiative at Arizona State University, and Founder of Narrative Strategies, LLC.

by Chris Martin

In February 2018, I met with the House Committee on Foreign Affairs to discuss irregular warfare concerns, more specifically, the intrusive and merciless groups that are currently destabilizing Nigeria. Boko Haram is located in the North East, the Fulani Herdsmen in the middle belt states, and the Niger Delta Avengers [1] are situated in the south. Another emerging threat group is the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN) – a Shiite Muslim organization. A developing situation surrounds the future employment by Iran of Hezbollah in Nigeria (or perhaps present employment). My concerns surround the possibility of the Hezbollah providing training to the Nigerian Shiites; resulting in more devastation to the country. Should this occur, it is my estimation that the security situation will be alarmingly more serious to Nigeria than the havoc of Boko Haram. Further substantiating my concerns, it was recently reported in the Daily Nigerian [2] and Amebo Nation [3] that the Hezbollah are training select Shiite Muslims in Lebanon and Hezbollah wants to expand its operations in Nigeria and West Africa. The introduction of Hebollah in Nigeria has some serious security implications for Nigeria’s stability.

Leadership of the Shiite Movement

As is the case with many religions, Islam cannot be declared monolithic. Numerous traditional branches of Islam exist. For example, the Sunni Muslims are the majority Islamic faction in Nigeria. The Shiite Muslims are the minority. Many of the Shia in Nigeria are currently under the aggressive leadership of Sheikh Ibrahim Zakzaky, who is the primary cleric leading the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN). Zakzaky established this religious society in the late 1970s during the time of the Iranian revolution was led by the influential religious and political leader, Ayatollah Khomeini.  In the subsequent decades, discontent between the opposing religious groups in Nigeria has escalated. In addition, Zakzaky’s promotion of pro-Palestinian idealism was characterized by the Nigerian military as rebellious and threatening. [4]

It has been reported in the Nigerian media, that the Nigerian military targeted Zakzaky during the 2014 Zaria Quds procession and in a raid of his home in December 2015. In 2015 Zakzaky and his wife, both suffered seriously bodily harm, and three of his sons along with countless followers were massacred. The Nigerian military detained Zakzaky following the 2015 raid. The President of Iran publicly reproached the Nigerian government on their heavy-handed tactics and indicated that he hopes the Nigerian government will release Zakzaky and compensate the Shiite family members for their losses.

Tactics

Grasping the complex intricacies of irregular warfare is a challenging, yet necessary task. Essentially, when opponents clash, a small war ensues but not always along conventional norms. Many factors need to be considered when attempting to understand the tactics of insurgent and violent groups or movements. The history, geographical location, religion, ethnic alignment, and politics of a particular group should be studied when attempting to understand insurgent groups or violent extremist movements. Another consideration is recognizing that the practitioners of irregular warfare (especially insurgents, terrorists, etc.) enjoy several tactical advantages – travelling short distances swiftly on familiar territory, agile mobility due to lack of heavy weapons (artillery), equipment, and supplies, and operating with a reduced amount of technological dependency.

In Nigeria there are several groups using irregular warfare tactics to further their goals and objectives. For instance, in the northeast Boko Haram uses basic guerrilla warfare tactics and weapons including Improvised Explosive Devices (IED), Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIED), suicide bombers, kidnappings, attacks on villages, attacks on military/police installations, and the use of propaganda and information operations (IO). The Fulani Herdsmen attack villages and shoot security forces at will in central Nigeria. Niger Delta Avengers attack oil pipelines and, occasionally, attack urban centers like Abuja with IEDs.

Hezbollah in Nigeria

Hezbollah in conjunction with Iran will likely deploy all of the above tactics as well as utilize sniper attacks on police and military. Hezbollah are masters of guerrilla warfare tactics – and can pass on lessons on how to attack police and military leadership in Nigeria. If the Nigerian security forces are powerless against Boko Haram, the Niger Delta Avengers, and the Fulani Herdsmen, how will they counter militant Shiite Muslims (the IMN perhaps)? This is especially troubling given the sophisticated training they are receiving or will likely receive in the future.

U.S. and Israeli Interests at Risk in Nigeria

In the event of a strike on Iran by either Israel or the United States, Iran will certainly retaliate. One retaliation option is with the use of surface to surface missiles against Israel or U.S. targets in the Middle East. Certainly Syria and Hezbollah would be likely allies in such a retaliation (or larger conflict). While this conventional response is an option; so is the use of asymmetrical warfare or irregular warfare. There are U.S. and Israeli citizens located in Nigeria who live and / or work there, including government employees. Many of these citizens (U.S. and Israeli) are ‘soft targets’ frequenting hotels, eateries, and venues in Abuja – Nigeria’s capital city. Hezbollah in Nigeria and Iran (assisting from afar) could use the IMG to conduct attacks on Israeli and US targets and citizens in Nigeria.

Nigerian Security Forces and Hezbollah in Nigeria

The Nigerian Security forces are reactive or ‘right of bang’. They need to be ‘left of bang’ or proactive. The potential of Hezbollah in Nigeria working with the IMN warrants closer monitoring. If the Nigerian government does not want a more serious and deadly problem on their hands, they need to put a halt to this the IMN’s questionable activities immediately. Keeping the leader detained is not the complete answer to the problem; leaders can be replaced. When the Nigerian security forces killed Yousef Mohammed, the founder of Boko Haram, he was replaced with another leader. The new leader of Boko Haram – Shekau – proved to be very brutal and not restrained in the deadly use of force. So taking out the leadership of the IMN is not the fix to the potential problem. The entire group has to be reckoned with and possibly dismantled.

Conclusion

In closing, Nigeria is a powder keg ready to explode. Economic issues, high unemployment rates, people angry with the government of Nigeria, and several insurgent groups in existence all contribute to a serious security situation. If this Shiite Muslim group – the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN) – becomes active it will possibly be more deadly than Boko Haram, especially with the possibility of Hezbollah in Nigeria providing advice, training, and assistance. Nigeria with all of its instability has the potential of collapsing into a failed state.

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About the Author: Chris Martin was a Police Officer with the Metropolitan Police Department of Washington D.C. He has 25 years of law enforcement experience domestically and internationally. He was assigned to Special Operations Task Force South in Afghanistan, working as a Law Enforcement Advisor for the United States Department of State. He was also a United States Department of Defense Advisor / Law Enforcement Professional (LEP) assigned to ISAF- SOF in Afghanistan. He has worked as a Tactics / Training specialist for Academi Training Center, training Nigerian Security forces on a Department of State Contract. He is the President of Martin Group International LLC, an irregular warfare consulting firm from the Washington D.C. area. He has spent the last 19 months in Nigeria, the last eight in Abuja.

Footnotes:

[1] The Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) is a Nigerian militant group that has been attacking oil-producing facilities. The groups aim is to create a sovereign state in the Niger Delta. Read more in a Wikipedia entry.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Niger_Delta_Avengers

[2] “Hezollah gives military training to Nigerian Shiites – MEI report”, Daily Nigerian, July 5, 2018.

[3] “Militant Group, Hezbollah gives military training to Nigerian Shiites in Lebanon”, Amebo Nation, July 7, 2018.

[4] For a more detailed description of Ibrahim Zakzaky see a Wikipedia webpage.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ibrahim_Zakzaky

Photo: Map image by SOF News, derived from maps of Nigeria from Central Intelligence Agency, July 28, 2018.

U.S. Army Special Forces in Niger have been working with host nation security forces to help counter the activities of several terrorist and insurgent groups operating in the region. The most well-known of these groups is Boko Haram. This terrorist group has been around for some time and has been responsible for a significant amount of violence. Boko Haram has turned out to be a long-term insurgent and terrorism problem for Nigeria. [1] In addition, al Qaeda in the Islamic Mahgreb (AQIM) and the Islamic State have a presence in adjacent countries in northern Africa and there is spillover into the country of Niger.

Niger. This former French colony is one of the poorest in the world. Located in West Africa it is a land-locked country. It is bordered by Nigeria, Chad, Libya, Algeria, Mali, Bukina Faso, and Benin.

Regional Assistance. As part of a long-term effort to assist Nigeria and neighboring countries to counter Boko Haram U.S. special operations forces have been providing training and assistance to not only Nigeria but to Chad, Mali, Cameroon, and Niger. In addition, Niger is one of the five countries comprising ‘Africa’s G5’ – Mali, Niger, Burkino Faso, Chad, and Mauritania. The G5 is working with France to fight militant groups in the region. France has been conducting a major campaign in the region called Operation Barkhane. To a degree, U.S. forces (SOF and CF) are working with the French forces.

SOF in Niger. For a few years the U.S. has had special operations forces working with local Niger forces to enhance security measures against Boko Haram incursions and operations as well as other terrorist and insurgent groups. SOF personnel have worked in the past with Niger’s 3rd Antiterrorist Company as well as with recently established civil-military affairs units of the Niger military. Most of these operations take place along the lightly-patrolled border with Nigeria along the Komadougou Yobe River; although operations also take place along border regions of other neighboring countries. The Mali – Niger border is an area with a lot of activity from elements of al-Qaida in the Islamic Magheb. The presence of SOF in Niger is part of an overall global campaign against violent extremists.

Military Personnel in Niger. Including SOF, there are approximately 600-800 U.S. military personnel in Niger. Many are logistics personnel, trainers, intelligence analysts, and drone operators and support personnel.

Drone Bases. in 2013 the United States set up a drone base that provided ISR support to the U.S. SOF working in the greater region – the Sahel and Chad Lake Basin. Some of the Intel gathered by the UAV is probably passed on to the counterinsurgent forces of Chad, Niger, Nigerian, Mali, and Cameroon. In addition, France – with a large counterterrorism force working in Mali and smaller force stationed in Niger – is likely receiving intel provided by the drones. One drone base is located in Niamey, the nations capital and a second in Agadez, Niger. The Aqadez base reportedly cost in the vicinity of $100 million. The two locations are described by the U.S. military as “security cooperation locations”.

SOCAfrica. The lead agency responsible for coordinating special operations activities in Africa is Special Operations Command – Africa. SOCAfrica is a subordinate unit of Africa Command or AFRICOM. There are a great number of special operations unit from all service components that operate in Africa (it is a huge continent). The 3rd Special Forces Group is the lead SF organization for Africa although 10th Group and 20th Group play significant roles as well. [2]

Footnotes:

[1] See SOF and Boko Haram – Nigeria’s Long-Term Insurgent Nightmare, SOF News, December 28, 2016.

[2] See Africa and 3rd Special Forces Group, SOF News, July 9, 2017.

References:

The World Factbook – Niger, Central Intelligence Agency.

In the Eye of the Storm: Niger and its unstable neighbors, by Vanda Felbab-Brown, Brookings Institution, June 13, 2017.

“Army Special Operations in Africa”, Special Warfare, January – March 2017, Volume 30 Issue 1.
www.soc.mil/swcs/SWmag/archive/SW3001/JAN_MAR_2017.pdf

Edited: On Wednesday, October 4, 2017, three Green Berets were killed in an ambush of a joint U.S.-Nigerien patrol near the border with Mali. See Three Green Berets Killed in Niger, SOF News, October 4, 2017.

Update: See an article wrote by Jared Keller entitled Niger: The Quiet War on Terror Americans Rarely Hear About, Task and Purpose, October 5, 2017.

Islamic State Update – The Islamic State is suffering huge losses in Iraq and Syria yet the battle is far from over. The upper echelons of leadership have made their way out of the cities of Raqqa and Mosul and are sure to continue the battle (and war) on other fronts. ISIS will likely revert (where necessary) back to an insurgent and terrorist organization utilizing clandestine methods of operation. Over the past few years ISIS has opened several new fronts – to include Libya, Afghanistan, Philippines, and other locations. In addition, it has inspired many ‘Lone Wolf’ attacks in European cities and other locations. This article provides a review of recent articles, publications, papers, analysis, and commentary about the Islamic State.

M777 Howitzers Making a Difference in Iraq. ISIS militants are faced with a number of adversaries and weapons systems in Iraq and Syria. Aircraft bombing from above, snipers from opposing forces, and artillery of the U.S. Marines and U.S. Army. One of these artillery pieces is the 155-mm M777 Howitzer that can hit a target almost 19 miles away. The gun can be towed or airlifted (CH-53s, CH-47s, and MV-22 Ospreys). Read more in an article by James Clark entitled “This Is The Devastating Piece of Artillery Leading the Ground Fight Against ISIS”, Task and Purpose, June 29, 2017.

The Expendable Fighters of ISIS. Brian Jenkins, of the RAND Corporation, provides his analysis of how the Islamic State uses (and abuses) their rank and file. He points out that ISIS losses in Mosul and Raqqa have been staggering yet the organization will continue to exist. Read “The Islamic State’s Disposable Army”, The RAND Blog, June 20, 2017.

Who Takes Tal Afar? Powerful Iran-backed militias have surrounded the northern Iraq city of Tal Afar located to the west of Mosul. Once Mosul is fully liberated who will take the lead on Tal Afar? The Iranian-supported militias or the Iraqi government’s Army? Read “Iraq’s Dilemma: Who Will Lead the Next Big Fight Against ISIS?”, The Wall Street Journal, June 30, 2017.

Raqqa Encircled. U.S. backed Syrian forces (composed of Kurdish and Arab fighters) are slowly eating away at the defenses of the Islamic State in the Syrian city of Raqqa. While the top leadership of ISIS has left the city the ISIS fighters are still putting up a robust defense. Eventually, if you read the press releases of CJTF-OIR and other defense officials, the city of Raqqa will soon fall to the Syrian Democratic Front (SDF) forces. The large country to the north – that would be Turkey – is not pleased with these developments. It harbors deep distrust of the Kurdish fighters and would like to see the further expansion of Kurdish-held territory in Syria halted. Some observers believe that Turkey is about to embark on an anti-Kurd offensive in northern Syria. Read more in “U.S. Kurdish allies in final push to encircle Raqqa amid increasing threats from Turkey”, Military Times, June 29, 2017.

The ISIS Caliphate Crumbles. David Ignatius writes about the current state of ISIS and how it is facing defeat in the Middle East. Read “The Crumbling ISIS Caliphate”, Real Clear Politics, July 2, 2017.

Syria – U.S. Waging War on the Cheap. Frederic C. Hof provides his take on the Syrian conflict – saying that the U.S. has missed the boat on the opportunity to set things right. Read Operation Successful, Patient Dead posted on the Atlantic Council, June 29, 2017.

Post-Raqqa Problems. Once Raqqa falls to the Syrian Democratic Front (SDF) what will the political and security environment look like? See “New Conflicts Threaten Syria After Islamic State Defeat”, Reuters, June 30, 2017.

Syria – Mapping Out the Factions and Enclaves. Sam Heller, a Beirut-based writer and analyst focused on Syria, provides us with a primer of the various contestants in the Syrian conflict in “The Signal in Syria’s Noise”, War on the Rocks, June 30, 2017.

After the Fall – ISIS will Re-Emerge. Giorgio Cafiero and Daniel Wagner write about the realities of the Islamic State after the fall of Mosul and Raqqa. It isn’t going away. See Islamic State’s New Realities, the Atlantic Council, June 26, 2017.

Strategy of Occupation? Presumably the U.S. will maintain military forces in parts of Syria even after ISIS is defeated (although, to be certain, it will revert back to an insurgency). So what happens then? The U.S. should have a strategy to deal with the ‘liberated’ areas but . . . . . Read “The Closer We Get, the More Complex It Gets. White House Struggles with Strategy as ISIS Nears Defeat in Iraq and Syria”, Task and Purpose,  July 3, 2017.

Islamic State Will Fight On in Liberated Cities. ISIS is being dislodged from the major cities of Raqqa and Mosul but the fight with the Islamic State will continue well into the future. Although major and smaller cities are being liberated by the Iraqi security forces and the Syrian Democratic Front (SDF) the conflict within the cities will not end. Those who are involved in the planning and execution of “post-liberation security, reconstruction, and governance plans” are aware (at least they should be) that ISIS will continue the struggle by other means – presumably through terrorism, sabotage, suicide bombings, and guerrilla warfare. Daniel Milton and Muhammad al-Ubaydi have penned a 23-page tract entitled The Fight Goes On: The Islamic State’s Continuing Military Efforts in Liberated Cities, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, United States Military Academy, June 2017.

“Light Rollback Strategy” Against ISIS. Several writers have collaborated on a RAND Corporation paper entitled Rolling Back the Islamic State published in June 2017. The authors include Seth Jones, James Dobbins, Ben Connable, and others. The paper addresses the topics such as the ideology and objectives of ISIS, strategies the U.S. and allies should use against ISIS, specific steps to be taken against ISIS in areas where it controls territory and population centers, and steps to neutralize the Islamic States support mechanisms (recruiting, financing, propaganda) around the globe. This 297-page paper proposes that the U.S. has four possible strategies for dealing with the Islamic State: disengagement, containment, rollback “light”, and rollback “heavy”. The RAND authors conclude that rollback “light” is the best way forward – using special operations forces, the Central Intelligence Agency, intelligence assets, and airpower.

Additional Readings on SOF News about the Islamic State:
www.sof.news/?s=islamic+state