(CENTCOM press release, 16 Jan 2024). On 11 January 2024, while conducting a flag verification, U.S. CENTCOM Navy forces conducted a night-time seizure of a dhow conducting illegal transport of advanced lethal aid from Iran to resupply Houthi forces in Yemen as part of the Houthis’ ongoing campaign of attacks against international merchant shipping.

U.S. Navy SEALs operating from USS Lewis B Puller (ESB 3), supported by helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), executed a complex boarding of the dhow near the coast of Somalia in international waters of the Arabian Sea, seizing Iranian-made ballistic missile and cruise missiles components. Seized items include propulsion, guidance, and warheads for Houthi medium range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), as well as air defense associated components. Initial analysis indicates these same weapons have been employed by the Houthis to threaten and attack innocent mariners on international merchant ships transiting in the Red Sea.

This is the first seizure of lethal, Iranian-supplied advanced conventional weapons (ACW) to the Houthis since the beginning of Houthi attacks against merchant ships in November 2023. The interdiction also constitutes the first seizure of advanced Iranian-manufactured ballistic missile and cruise missile components by the U.S. Navy since November 2019. The direct or indirect supply, sale, or transfer of weapons to the Houthis in Yemen violates U.N. Security Resolution 2216 and international law.

Two U.S. Navy SEALs previously reported as lost at sea were directly involved in this operation. “We are conducting an exhaustive search for our missing teammates,” said General Michael Erik Kurilla, USCENTCOM Commander.

The dhow was deemed unsafe and sunk by U.S. Navy forces. Disposition of the 14 dhow crewmembers is being determined in accordance with international law.

“It is clear that Iran continues shipment of advanced lethal aid to the Houthis. This is yet another example of how Iran actively sows instability throughout the region in direct violation of U.N. Security Resolution 2216 and international law,” said General Michael Erik Kurilla, “We will continue to work with regional and international partners to expose and interdict these efforts, and ultimately to reestablish freedom of navigation.”

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This article was first published by U.S. Central Command on January 16, 2024.
https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3645241/uscentcom-seizes-iranian-advanced-conventional-weapons-bound-for-houthis/

Photos from CENTCOM Twitter account dated January 16, 2024. Map by SOF News derived from CIA maps (view larger version). Information about Vessel Boarding Search and Seizure (VBSS) operations. Also known as Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure.

The Biden administration wasted very little time in setting a course correction in the United States role in the Yemen conflict. Citing humanitarian issues (as well as other concerns) it has decided to eliminate support for offensive operations provided to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in their fight against the Iran-supported Ansarallah / Houthi rebels in Yemen. The conflict has raged for many years.

Humanitarian Crisis. The Yemen conflict has resulted in a humanitarian crisis – which the United Nations says is one of the worst in the world. There are widespread food shortages resulting in malnutrition. The economy is in a shambles and government services are operating in a very basic level. The aerial bombardment by Saudi and UAE aircraft has resulted in numerous civilian casualties. There is a significant lack of medical supplies and services for the civilian population. In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic and cholera are taking a toll among the population.

The Houthis. With a strong base in the north region of Yemen the Shia group has attempted to extend its reach south and east throughout the country. It controls the capital city (Sanaa). Other religious, ethnic, and political groups have joined their movement. Most of the civilian population (estimates vary from 70 to 80%) come under Houthi control. The Houthis enjoy a strong position in the conflict – with no sign of their impending defeat in the future.

Iranian Support. The Houthi rebels have been supported by Iran for a number of years. Many observers of the conflict believe that the Houthis are an Iranian proxy group. The Iranians provide funding, weapons, equipment, trainers, and advisors to the Houthis. Through its Qods Force, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is very involved in the support provided to the Houthis.

Iranian Weapons and Equipment. Weapons, equipment, supplies, money, and personnel are transported to Yemen on international air flights as well as sea movement to Yemen’s ports. These weapons include short-range ballistic missiles, surface-to-air missiles, drones, and other sophisticated equipment. The missile systems and components have been used by the Houthis against Saudi oil and infrastructure targets. These weapons shipments are in violation of the U.N. Security Council Resolution 2216.

Yemeni Government. The government of President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi was ousted from the capital city and surrounding areas in a 2014-2015 offensive – dividing the country. The United Nations- recognized Yemeni government has benefited from external support from Gulf nations. However, the government supporters are fragmented and often engaged in internal conflicts.

Saudi-led Coalition. Saudi Arabia and the UAE say that they are actively reducing Iran’s regional influence in their intervention in the Yemen conflict. The involvement by the Saudis and their allies began in 2015 after the Houthi rebels ousted the Republic of Yemen Government from the capital city Sanaa in 2014. The Saudi coalition was able to help the ousted government regain some territory to include the major city of Aden but the conflict soon turned into a stalemate.

United Arab Emirates. The UAE has stepped back on its military involvement – although it still conducts counter terrorism operations and provides support to the breakaway Southern Transitional Council. It withdrew ground forces from Yemen in 2019. Other nations that have supported the Saudi action in Yemen in the past include Kuwait and Sudan.

U.S. Support. For the past several years the U.S. has provided intelligence, logistics, precision-guided munitions, and other types of support to Saudi Arabia and its allies involved in the Yemen war. This support was increased after missile and drone attacks against Saudi oil facilities by the Houthis. The U.S. stopped providing aerial refueling support to Saudi and UAE aircraft in 2018. In the last few years U.S. support has been limited to intelligence sharing, targeting support, and training (in an attempt to limit civilian casualties). The U.S. has been criticized for its role in providing Saudi Arabia and UAE with arms and munitions used in the Yemen conflict.

U.S. SOF. In addition, the U.S. has had special operations forces advisors on the ground in Yemen providing training, advice, and assistance. U.S. SOF have worked with units from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) as well as Yemen governmental security forces. The U.S. has also conducted unilateral counter-terrorism operations in the country against al-Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates. In January 2017 a Navy SEAL (Ryan Owens) died during a counterterrorism raid in Yemen. In January 2020 U.S. SOF conducted an unsuccessful operation to kill or capture a key IRGC-QF operative in Yemen (Abdul Reza Shahlai).

Past activities of U.S. SOF in Yemen include foreign internal defense, counterterrorism, intelligence sharing, surveillance and reconnaissance, maritime interdiction, and drone strikes. U.S. SOF involvement in Yemen has also provided the opportunity to work with and assist in the development of GCC special operations capabilities. This also lends to increased interoperability of GCC SOF with U.S. SOF. In addition, the United Kingdom and France has also deployed its special operations forces to Yemen.

Trump and Yemen. Under the Trump administration the U.S. has taken a strong stance against Iran’s activities across the Middle East. This includes attempting to diminish Iran’s influence in Yemen. The Trump administration had declared the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). It appears that the Biden administration may reverse this designation. The humanitarian implications of an FTO designation are significant. It would become more difficult to get foreign aid and assistance into areas of Yemen controlled by the Houthis.

Biden and Yemen. The Biden administration is likely to give priority to the nuclear talks about the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreement with Iran over concerns about Iranian meddling in Middle East affairs. Some sales of aircraft and munitions to Saudi Arabia and the UAE are on hold and under review by the Biden administration. U.S. activities in Yemen are likely to be curtailed. This prohibition by the Biden administration does not include the actions the United States will take against al-Qaida affiliates in Yemen – to include al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsular (AQAP).

A Diplomatic Solution? The U.S. has now announced increased support to United Nations efforts for a political settlement of the conflict. In early February the United States named Tim Lenderking, a career member of the Senior Foreign Service, as U.S. Special Envoy to Yemen. However, a ceasefire and end to the conflict is unlikely. A United Nations Special Envoy to Yemen (established in June 2012) has failed in attempts to arrange a permanent ceasefire and political agreement. The Houthis are entrenched in Sanaa and the western highlands of Yemen. However, the opposition (Hadi government) and its supporters in the Gulf Cooperation Council insist that any political solution must include a Houthi departure from Sanaa.

U.S. Interests in the Yemen Conflict. There are reasons for the United States to be concerned with the events taking place at the southern end of the Arabian peninsular. There are fears that Yemen could become a sanctuary for transnational terrorist groups like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. The vital international shipping lanes near the Bab al Mandab Strait are at risk. In addition, Iran could possibly use Yemen in the future to threaten Saudi Arabia’s southern borders. How the Biden administration addresses these concerns while resetting the relationship with Iran will be watched with great interest.

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References:

Yemen: Civil and Regional Intervention, Congressional Research Service, CRS R43960, December 8, 2020.
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43960

Congress and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2020, Congressional Research Service, CRS R45046, June 19, 2020.
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45046

Recent news, analysis, and commentary about the Middle East – politics, conflict, Iraq withdrawal, and great power competition.

Security Overview

CENTCOM Now Has Israel. In his last week in office President Trump ordered that U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) add Israel to its area of responsibility (AOR). This moved Israel from the European Command (EUCOM) AOR. According to the DoD the “. . . easing of tensions between Israel and its Arab neighbors . . .” has provided a strategic opportunity for the US to align key partners against shared threats in the Middle East (that would be Iran). This puts CENTCOM in an awkward position – forcing it to work with both Israel and its Arab opponents. This move may strain relationships between CENTCOM officials and other nations in the region. This may prompt some realignment with SOCEUR, SOCCENT, 10th SFG, and 5th SFG, as well as other special operations forces. See “In waning days, Trump shakes up CENTCOM to increase Arab-Israeli efforts against Iran”, by Howard Altman, Military Times, January 15, 2021.

Great Power Competition. Russia continues to support the Syrian regime. This effort increases Russia’s prestige in the area, enhances the ability of Russia to project power in NATO’s southern flank, and puts the U.S. on notice that it doesn’t have free reign in the region. China continues its work to strengthen its economic ties in the region. Read more in “Great Power Rivalry in the Middle East”, Eurasia Review, January 20, 2021.

A Plan on How the US Could Withdraw from ME. Mike Sweeney, a fellow at Defense Priorities, presents a 4-year plan for significantly reducing the US military presence in the Middle East. “When It’s Over: An American Withdrawal Plan for the Middle East”, Modern War Institute at West Point, January 18, 2021.

Iraq

US Troop Levels Reduced. In accordance with instructions from President Trump there are now only 2,500 U.S. service members in Iraq. The reductions were longtime goals of the Trump administration. This drawdown in Iraq follows the successful Iraqi military campaign against ISIS. (The campaign is over?). The US will continue to provide support with air power, intelligence, and a counterterrorism platform.

Iraq’s Economy. Widespread instability and violence is likely in Iraq’s future if Baghdad’s finances are not addressed. Kenneth Pollack and Farhad Alaaldin believe that U.S. and international community must shore up Baghdad’s finances before it is too late. “Iraq’s economic collapse could be Biden’s first foreign policy headache”, AEI, December 14, 2020.

Iraqi Arrest Warrant for Trump. A judge in Baghdad’s investigative court tasked with probing the Washington-directed drone strike that killed Iranian General Qassim Soleimani in January 2020 has issued an arrest warrant for President Trump. Soleimani headed the expeditionary Quds force of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps. The warrant was a charge of premeditated murder. See “Iraq issues arrest warrant for Trump over Soleimani killing”, ABC News, January 7, 2021.

The Sinjar Agreement – It Needs Work. One of the knotty political problems facing Iraq is the population area near the border with Turkey and Syria. The Agreement on the Restoration of Stability and Normalization of the Situation in the District of Sinjar is a joint security agreement between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the federal government of Iraq. Sinjar is a Yazidi town in Iraq’s Nineveh Governate the fell to the Islamic State in 2014 and culminated in a genocide against its inhabitants. The October 2020 agreement neglects to include the local population of Sinjar. Shamiran Mako, a professor of international relations at Boston University, argues the agreement needs a recalibration. Read her essay “Negotiating Peace in Iraq’s Disputed Territories: Modifying the Sinjar Agreement”, Lawfare Blog, January 17, 2021.

Iraqi PMFs Explained. Renad Mansour of Chatham House provides a detailed and interesting look of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) of Iraq. The PMF is more than a group of militias – it is interwoven into Iraqi government and society. “The ‘Hybrid Armed Actors’ Paradox: A Necessary Compromise?”, War on the Rocks, January 21, 2021.

Iraqi Interpreters Face Death. Former interpreters for the British military advisors and British special forces in Iraq are terrified that Iraqi Shia militia members will track them down and kill them. See “Iraqi interpreters ‘stalked by death squads’ for helping the British”, BBC News, December 29, 2020.

Iraqi Air Force Readiness Problems. There are recent press accounts that suggest less than 20 percent of Iraq’s F-16s are fully airworthy. Poor jet maintenance and mismanagement are some of the causes of failing to meet maintenance standards. It is speculated that the poor maintenance record for the Iraqi Vipers is behind the decision to remove the F-16s from the air tasking orders in April 2020. Read “The Iraqi Air Force’s F-16 Fleet is on the Brink of Collapse Despite Showy Flybys”, The Drive War Zone, January 7, 2021.

Senior ISIS Leader Killed. A U.S.-led coalition air strike killed the top Islamic State leader in Iraq. Abu Yasir was the most senior Daesh leader and was killed near Kirkuk on January 27, 2021. (Military Times, Jan 29, 2021).

Syria

New US – Syria Policy Needed. The partnership between Russia and Syria since the outbreak of the civil war in 2011 has proved to be effective and successful in preventing the fall of the Assad regime. The US lost significant leverage due to its inaction when self-imposed red lines were crossed and an incoherent foreign policy ensued. A new US policy towards Syria should recognize the necessity of pragmatic engagement with Russia. A ten-paper provides more details in Reframing US Syria policy: The road to Damascus runs through Moscow, Brookings Institute, December 2020.

Few Attractive Options for US in Syria. Sam Heller, an independent researcher and analyst based in Beirut, offers his views on the way forward for the US in Syria. Read his article “Redefining Victory in America’s War Against the Islamic State in Syria”, War on the Rocks, January 5, 2021.

Syria’s Narrative War. The battle for physical territory in Syria is complemented with the battle of the narrative. The propaganda, activism, and disinformation of Syria’s warring factions is a major factor (and threat) that will have lasting consequences for the region. Read more in “Lessons From Syria’s Low-Profile Narrative War”, War Room, United States Army War College, January 7, 2021.

Northern Syria – Fighting Continues. The Syrian Democratic Front (SDF) is facing the prospect of a new Turkish offensive. Turkish-back proxy groups are continuing their operations trying to control SDF-held areas. Russia is putting the pressure on the SDF to vacate areas so Syrian government forces can move in. See “Fighting Continues Over Flashpoint in Northern Syria”, Voice of America, January 5, 2021.

Syria’s Humanitarian Crisis. The Syrian civil war is approaching its tenth anniversary. The country remains divided and the conflict has settled into a stalemate – for the time being. Left in the lurch are refugees in neighboring countries and internally displaced personnel (IDPs) – many in temporary camps. Shelly Culbertson describes the situation in “The Syrian Forever War Has Created Forever Refugees”, The National Interest, November 24, 2020.

Iran

Heightened Tensions. U.S. military forces in the Middle East remain on high alert due to concerns that Iran may take action against U.S. interests in the region. The aircraft carrier Nimitz was enroute to its home port when it was sent back to the region. The one year anniversary of the killing of the top Iranian general Qassem Soleimani could be a reason for Iran’s escalatory rhetoric. It is being reported that the Revolutionary Guard’s Quds Force (under new leadership) has reverted back to being a smaller clandestine fighting unit. (Ynet News, Jan 3, 2021).

Iran and al-Qa’ida. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo revealed that Iran has given a new operational headquarters to al-Qa’ida. He says that Iran is now the home base for the terrorist group. (DoS, Jan 12, 2021).

Attacks on Shipping. The Middle East remains a volatile area for merchant shipping. Tankers and other civilian ships face the risk of limpet mines, explosive boats, sea mines, piracy, and the risk of politically motivated seizure. Many of the incidents are tied to Iran or its proxies. Read “Spate of Attacks on Ships in Middle East Points to Iran-Backed Group”, USNI News, January 6, 2021.

Yemen

Iran’s Ally. For the past several years Iran has enjoyed the benefits of an alliance with the Houthis – a minority Shiite Muslim community in Yemen engaged in a long-running civil war. Since the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 the Houthi movement has come out against US interests in the Middle East. Iran has, for the past several years, provided advisors and equipment to the Houthi forces. The U.S. has backed Saudi Arabian and UAE forces that are fighting the Houthis with arms and diplomatic support. Bruce Riedel, a Senior Fellow with the Brookings Institute, advocates for a US policy change in “A pragmatic view on Yemen’s Houthis”, Brookings, January 11, 2021.

New Policy for Yemen. Katherine Zimmerman, a Resident Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), says that the policies of President Trump and Obama for Yemen were flawed. She believes the U.S. needs to retake a leadership role to secure U.S. interests, reduce Iranian influence, stabilize the region, and address humanitarian concerns. Read “US needs to take on a leadership role to secure its interests in Yemen”, AEI, December 16, 2020.

Podcasts

Video – Trends in ME in 2021. Middle East experts survey what lies ahead for the region in the year ahead – with particular attention to Yemen, Iran, Turkey, and Syria. Trends to watch in the Middle East in 2021, Middle East Focus, Middle East Institute, January 15, 2021, one hour.

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Photo: Map from Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

The Iranian regime maintains a network of proxies including Lebanese Hezbollah, various Shiite militias in Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen, and foreign fighters in Syria. This paper by the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) provides a look at the problem of states using proxy forces to advance their foreign policy objectives.

The three main chapters of the paper outline the different groups and factors that influence Iranian military and political strategy for Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. The proxy / host country relation is described. The report provides an assessment of vulnerabilities that could be exploited by U.S. special operations forces.

Iran will continue to use their proxy network to frustrate U.S. Middle East strategy and diminish U.S. influence. However, the U.S. is not without appropriate responses. This paper advances the argument that terrorism, counterterrorism, and proxy conflict are inherently political in nature and need not be addressed with a kinetic solution alone.

The authors of this paper are:

• Dr. Diane Zorri – an assistant professor of security studies at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
• Dr. Houman A. Sadri – deputy director of the International Policy and Analysis Center (IPAC)
• Dr. David Ellis – Resident Fellow at Joint Special Operations University (JSOU)

Iranian Proxy Groups in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen: A Principal-Agent Comparative Analysis, Joint Special Operations University, JSOU Report 20-5, 2020.
https://jsou.libguides.com/ld.php?content_id=58950053

A writer, Andrea Filozof, has provided her thoughts on Unconventional Warfare (UW) and its use by the United States as a means of intervention. She believes that the Obama administration – having tried to scale back counterinsurgency and stabilization efforts – is attempting to use unconventional warfare as a means of achieving foreign policy goals.

Her basis premise is that unconventional warfare is not always a suitable avenue to achieve the foreign policy goals of the United States. To that extent the basis of her article is correct; UW doesn’t always fit. She believes that the operational success of proxy forces in a UW campaign does not mean that the U.S. interests are being taken care of. And she is correct in stating that the political aspect of a conflict needs to be taken into consideration when conducting UW.

However, where she misses the boat is in not explaining when and where unconventional warfare can work – and how it should work. And she assumes that the U.S. is doing UW in Syria and other parts in the Middle East – correctly; according to proven UW methodology and doctrine. There’s the rub. Most knowledgeable students of UW could easily point out that if we are doing UW in the Middle East then it is only one or two aspects of what a comprehensive UW campaign would actually look like.

UW can work in limited and unique circumstances – if properly planned and executed. Her article is thought provoking and worth a read. See “Unconventional Warfare Is Not The Answer To Your Problem”, War on the Rocks, September 28, 2016.

Middle East News Update. A combination of news reports over the past week about the Middle East, Syria, Libya, Yemen, State Department failure in Iraq, Russia bombing Syria from Iranian air bases, and (not so smart) recruits for the Islamic State.

CRS Report on al-Qaeda & U.S. Policy. Carla E. Humud, a Middle East and African Affairs analyst for the Congressional Research Service (CRS) has penned a report for Congress. Read Al Qaeda and U.S. Policy: Middle East and Africa, August 11, 2016 posted on the website of the U.S. Naval Institute.

State Dept Plan for Iraq Failed During OIF. In more Middle East news we learn the United States Department of State had a plan for the reconstruction of Iraq for the post-Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) era, but . . . Learn more in “Promises Unfulfilled: How a State Department Plan to Stabilize Iraq Broke Apart”, The Washington Post, August 15, 2016.

A Victory for the SDF in Syria. The Syrian Arab Coalition element of the Syrian Democratic Forces has seized control of the Syrian city Manbij from the Islamic State. This is a big victory to the U.S. aided rebel group. Manbij was a key transit point for ISIL fighters going into Syria and Iraq as well as for the flow of supplies, equipment and supplies. Read more in “Local Forces Clear Manbij in Syria After Seizing Control from ISIL”, DoD News, August 16, 2016.

Syria’s Warlords & U.S. Strategy. Paul Wood writes about the mess in Syria – how it started, the U.S. (lack of) strategy, who replaces ISIS, and why the conflict will not end soon in “Syria’s warlords were nobodies. Now they are rich men with sex slaves”, The Spectator (UK), August 6, 2016.

Proxy Warfare in Syria. The U.S. employment of proxy forces in Syria has not been entirely successful. While its alliance with the Syrian Kurds is going well (although alienating Turkey) the relationship with other Syrian groups is problematic. A U.S. Army Special Forces officer tells us how to improve. Read more in “Want to Build a Better Proxy in Syria? Lessons from Tibet”, War on the Rocks, August 17, 2016.

The Sunni Myth & Civil Wars in Middle East. War on the Rocks has posted (August 16, 2016) an interesting, lengthy, and controversial article entitled “Washington’s Sunni Myth and the Civil Wars in Syria and Iraq”.

Bodycounts? 45,000 ISIS killed? Hmmm. Read more about a U.S. general recently proclaiming the latest body count (as a measure of progress) in a Foreign Policy article (Aug 16, 2016).

Factors in Iraq War. This article explores the sinking morale of the ISIS fighters, the fight for Mosul, the success of the Kurds, and more. Read “Iraq: The Two Front War”, Strategy Page, August 17, 2016.

‘Islam for Dummies’: ISIS recruits have poor grasp of Muslim faith. A news report by Military Times, August 16, 2016 explains that new recruits for the Islamic Group seemed ignorant in their knowledge of Islam. This was a great opportunity for ISIS to ‘fill in the blanks’ and indoctrinate the new recruits with the ISIS brand of Islam.

Partitioning Libya? In Libya, the divisions between east and west are the problem – now and in the countries past. Federica Saini Fasanotti examines this past and comes up with some conclusions. Read “A house divided: Why partitioning Libya might be the only way to save it”, Brookings Institute, August 18, 2016.

Russia Bombing Syria from Iran Bases. Russia has been sending its bombers to Syria from Iranian air bases. Presumably they are flying through Iraqi air space with no interference from U.S. aircraft. Does this make the United States complicit with Russian bombing atrocities? Hmmm. Read more in “Russia uses Iran as base to bomb Syrian militants for first time”, Reuters, August 16,2016.

What is the Endstate of the Terror Wars? The United States is currently engaged in at least five conflicts. But some analysts say there is no path forward and there is a lack of a grand strategy. In addition, neither presidential candidate is addressing the current status or recommended strategy for the conflicts the U.S. is currently engaged in. Anthony Cordesman examines this topic in great detail in U.S. Wars in Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen: What are the Endstates?, Center for Strategic & International Studies, August 15, 2016.

The U.S. military conducted a counterterrorism strike against al-qaida operatives in Yemen – killing three. The strike took place on August 4th in the Shabwah Governate in central Yemen. The U.S. is putting pressure on the al-Qaida organization in Yemen to prevent them from plotting and executing attacks against the United States and Americans. Al-Qaida continues to be a significant threat and has had a destabilizing effect on Yemen. Read a news release about the strike by U.S. DoD, August 5, 2016.

U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) are once again operating in Yemen. The country has seen its share of turmoil recently and in the last few years has been in the midst of a civil war. The Iranians have been supporting the Houthi Shia rebellion and the Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsular (AQAP) has seen a resurgence in acquiring territory and growing membership. Other nations in the region have become involved in the conflict to include Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

For a short time, the United States had pulled out its special operations forces (in early 2015) but it now appears that a small contingent is back in Yemen. This U.S. SOF element is likely advising the Yemen governmental security forces as well as working in conjunction with units from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

Colin McElhinny, a program coordinator and research assistant at the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University has penned an article with lots of details of the current conflict and U.S. SOF involvement. For more info read “Assessing U.S. Special Operations in Yemen”, Small Wars Journal, July 15, 2016.