By Charles Davis.

Much has been said about the global phenomena surrounding TikTok in America since President Trump’s August 2020 Executive Order 13943 was issued, then put on hold, and then altogether discarded with the change of presidential administrations. With roughly 87 million users in the United States there is a large support base for this entertaining social media platform. It is amazing what privacies we will willingly give away if the request is packaged right. Here is free entertainment and a way to engage with friends and like-minded people, just let us monitor what you like and give you more of it.

Its ascent to global phenomenon has been incredibly quick, more than doubling its worldwide user base between 2019 and 2021 (291.4 million to 655.9 million). TikTok will have 834.3 million monthly users worldwide in 2023. Meaghan Yuen April 24, 2023 [1]

TikTok’s appearance on the US social media scene began with Musical.ly, a company based in Shanghai with a headquarters in Santa Monica, California. The company allowed users to create short lip-sync videos and was released in 2014. ByteDance Ltd, a Chinese internet technology company headquartered in Beijing, purchased Musical.ly in 2017 as a means to get into the US market. [2] By 2018 ByteDance had pulled the subscriber base into the newly minted TikTok, with all the capabilities of ByteDance data mining and software enhancements.

Just one year later, the US Committee on Foreign Investment was calling for a review of the acquisition. At this point, the primary concern was censorship. As these concerns became evident Senators Schumer and Cotton called for an assessment of the national security risks associated with TikTok. The senators primary concern was ByteDance’s obligation to adhere to Chinese law first and foremost. [3]

In a Letter to the Acting Director of National Intelligence, the Senators stated: “China’s vague patchwork of intelligence, national security, and cybersecurity laws compel Chinese companies to support and cooperate with intelligence work controlled by the Chinese Communist Party… Questions have also been raised regarding the potential for censorship or manipulation of certain content. TikTok reportedly censors materials deemed politically sensitive to the Chinese Communist Party, including content related to the recent Hong Kong protests, as well as references to Tiananmen Square, Tibetan and Taiwanese independence, and the treatment of Uighurs.” [4]

While concern over Chinese censorship was growing in Congress, ByteDance was logging 700 million daily users globally and the first half revenues for 2019 were assessed to hit 7 billion US dollars. [5] Powerful US corporations were also seeing a windfall as a result of TikTok’s popularity. Susquehanna International Group (SIG) owns 15% of ByteDance. The Pennsylvania based investor group’s China arm invested 2 billion dollars across 260 companies in Shanghai. The total investment in ByteDance was only 5 million but it was valued at 15 billion at the time of President Trumps Executive Order 13942, which may explain the mixed political, corporate, and private responses to the order. [6]  

President Trump’s order specifically addressed TikTok, stating: “The spread in the United States of mobile applications developed and owned by companies in the People’s Republic of China (China) continues to threaten the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.  At this time, action must be taken to address the threat posed by one mobile application in particular, TikTok.” [7] The President’s concerns went deeper than content manipulation or removal, which was something he had personal experience with.

“TikTok automatically captures vast swaths of information from its users, including Internet and other network activity information such as location data and browsing and search histories.  This data collection threatens to allow the Chinese Communist Party access to Americans’ personal and proprietary information — potentially allowing China to track the locations of federal employees and contractors, build dossiers of personal information for blackmail, and conduct corporate espionage.” [8]

He specifically mentioned how TikTok videos spread debunked conspiracy theories of the origins of COVID 19, expressing concern how the platform would be used in future misinformation and disinformation campaigns that served Chinese interests.

The threat from TikTok is greater than information control though. TikTok is collecting biometrics and has been doing so since its release. ByteDance is providing facial recognition data that enables Chinese global video surveillance to distinguish age, gender, and ethnicity. In July 2021, Professors at the University of Melbourne specifically addressed these concerns in a piece published by the university’s magazine Pursuit.

Their research indicates, TikTok’s iOS app has the capability to access and copy from clipboard data, detect objects and scenery, and capture voice and facial recognition data. [9] Wouters and Paterson argue: “These biometrics are unique and personal digital replicas of appearance, behaviour and expression. They are comparable to fingerprints as they can help others identify, surveil and profile people of interest.” [10] Given the era of deepfake and AI integration, having access to hundreds of millions of audio and facial fingerprints presents significant global security concerns. Just consider how many citizens use facial recognition for secure assess or what people keep in their notes or on phone and computer clipboards.

An example of the potential threat this poses, on a global scale, can be found in a December 2020 report from the Washington Post. Harwell and Dou’s research indicates, another Chinese tech giant, Huawei is using facial recognition to establish alert mechanisms for the presence of ethnic Uighurs. “If the system detected the face of a member of the mostly Muslim minority group, the test report said, it could trigger an alarm, potentially flagging them for police in China, where members of the group have been detained en masse as part of a brutal government crackdown.” [11]

The concept went into test phase in 2018 and focused on identifying age, sex, and ethnicity using facial recognition and artificial intelligence. Given the close to 1 billion TikTok accounts, China has the ability to develop software to recognize and target any demographic in the world. SenseTime, China’s largest facial recognition company trades on the Hong Kong exchange and is currently on the US entity list (associated with the Defense Authorization Act) which bans US exports and investments. But we continue to allow TikTok to function as a primary data mining entity for the colossal database fueling this industry.

Taigusys is another Chinese company, likely benefiting from the data accumulated through TikTok. Taigusys is the leading developer of emotion recognition software. They are taking facial recognition and developing AI cues for the emotion associated with the expressions captured. As you can imagine, through shared videos, TikTok is capturing virtually every expression known to mankind.   A March 2021 article, by the Guardian’s Michael Standaert, indicates this is a 36-billion-dollar industry nested very effectively in an ideological campaign of positive energy, encouraged by Xi Jinping. Management at Taigusys laud this technology as a means to predict dangerous behavior within prison and mental health facilities, allowing faster and more appropriate response to crisis. [12] This same technology, implemented in large urban environments would allow for predictive assessments of crowd and protestor volatility, providing early response opportunities to quell unrest or descent.

Data collection for facial and emotional recognition companies is not the only use the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has found for TikTok. Initial Congressional concerns over disinformation seem to have been validated in recent months. A June 2023 Washington Times report identified video tracks purportedly from a Russian special operations soldier, which surfaced on TikTok, were actually created by China. The investigative report indicates the fictional personality “Baoer Kechatie” is associated with Chinese deepfake technology that was drawing approximately 400,000 followers.  An April 2023 report from the Defense Science Board indicates Identity Exploitation and Control (IEC) may be the most difficult of the five new dimensions of conflict. [13]

Probably the most concerning statement regarding IEC is the assessment China and Russia are working in tandem to maximize this capability.

“China is using these new means of identity exploitation and control to pursue dissidents and non-Han Chinese minorities including Mongols, Tibetans, and Uyghurs. China also is leveraging its global harvest of data on individuals to expand its reach to target and manipulate individuals on a global scale including more than 10,000 living outside of China. Russia is adopting key elements of China’s domestic surveillance system including Huawei telecom equipment. While this does not change the scale of China’s IEC, it leverages Russia’s cyber skill-sets and can propagate a worldwide China-Russia IEC threat.” [14]

All the examples provided correlate with China’s approach to Cognitive Warfare and present a new and dynamic threat to global stability.

The NATO allied Command Transformation defines Cognitive Warfare as “the activities conducted in synchronization with other instruments of power, to affect attitudes and behaviors by influencing, protecting, and/or disrupting individual and group cognitions to gain an advantage.” [15] Similarly, the Taiwan Institute of European and American Studies describes cognitive warfare as “…activities undertaken to manipulate environmental stimuli to control the mental states and behaviors of enemies as well as followers in both hot and cold wars.” [16] Combatant commanders have always sought out ways to erode an adversary’s moral. Now, our adversaries are seeking ways to stimulate emotional responses and affect critical decision-making through social media. 

Jana Mantua’s recent work “China’s Focus on the Brain Gives it an Edge in Cognitive Warfare” discusses decision dominance and winning hearts and minds. Mantua sees China’s approach on two fronts, cognition and subliminal cognition. The primary component of cognition is the ability to collect and analyze physiological signals. TikTok provides the platform for CCP collection and analysis, and it provides an avenue of approach for the subliminal cognition. During the subliminal cognition phase of Chinese cognitive warfare, content will be collected and pre-treated with new messages, while applying defensive technology against adversary information operations. [17]  Simply put, China is collecting data on what stimulates our brains and how, in an effort to determine the best approach to win hearts and minds through subliminal messaging.

It is likely the CCP is also developing techniques to stimulate mass behaviors based on target groups, since its facial recognition program can determine age, sex, ethnicity and its emotional recognition technology can determine the responses elicited. Combining these three initiatives (TikTok, facial recognition, emotional recognition) allows the CCP to use systems with built in cameras (phones and computers) to identify target groups, engage in cognitive warfare and evaluate the response rendered, without the target group realizing the attack is occurring.

Mantua asserts, “China continuously employs internet commentators, or ‘wumao,’ to spread propaganda online that is consistent with the state’s interests. They also selectively amplify the voices of influencers, including Westerners, who are promoting China of their own volition.” [18] Other researchers see similar issues with CCP exploitation of free speech. Lim and Bergin indicate, “While the CCP carefully polices its domestic walled garden, it exploits the freer spaces outside of China’s borders to project its influence on the world stage.” [19] China sees the cognitive domain as the next evolution in warfare. This battlespace is particularly significant to China, from a cultural perspective. Cognitive Warfare follows the teachings of Sun Tzu by affording and opportunity to defeat an adversary without armed conflict, while subliminal cognition provides plausible deniability, allowing China to save face on the global stage.

While TikTok may be a fun pastime for the American population, it is a strategic capability being leveraged globally by our greatest adversary.

[1] https://www.insiderintelligence.co010598m/charts/global-tiktok-user-stats/

[2] https://www.wsj.com/articles/lip-syncing-app-musical-ly-is-acquired-for-as-much-as-1-billion-1510278123

[3] https://www.cotton.senate.gov/news/press-releases/cotton-schumer-request-assessment-of-national-security-risks-posed-by-china-owned-video-sharing-platform-tiktok-a-potential-counterintelligence-threat-with-over-110-million-downloads-in-us-alone#:~:text=Leader%20Schumer%20and%20Senator%20Cotton,U.S.%2C%20as%20well%20as%20a

[4] https://www.democrats.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/10232019%20TikTok%20Letter%20-%20FINAL%20PDF.pdf

[5] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tiktok-cfius-exclusive/exclusive-u-s-opens-national-security-investigation-into-tiktok-sources-idUSKBN1XB4IL

[6] https://thehustle.co/10052020-sig/

[7] https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-addressing-threat-posed-tiktok/

[8] ibid

[9] https://pursuit.unimelb.edu.au/articles/tiktok-captures-your-face

[10] ibid

[11] https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/12/08/huawei-tested-ai-software-that-could-recognize-uighur-minorities-alert-police-report-says/

[12] https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/mar/03/china-positive-energy-emotion-surveillance-recognition-tech

[13] https://dsb.cto.mil/reports/2020s/DSB-SS2020_NewDimensionsofConflict_Executive%20Summary_cleared.pdf

[14] https://dsb.cto.mil/reports/2020s/DSB-SS2020_NewDimensionsofConflict_Executive%20Summary_cleared.pdf

[15] https://www.act.nato.int/article/cognitive-warfare-strengthening-and-defending-the-mind/#:~:text=Together%2C%20these%20two%20words%20paint,cognitions%20to%20gain%20an%20advantage

[16] https://academic.oup.com/jogss/article/7/4/ogac016/6647447

[17] https://irregularwarfare.org/articles/chinas-focus-on-the-brain-gives-it-an-edge-in-cognitive-warfare/

[18] https://irregularwarfare.org/articles/chinas-focus-on-the-brain-gives-it-an-edge-in-cognitive-warfare/

[19] https://www.ifj.org/fileadmin/user_upload/IFJ_Report_2020_-_The_ China_Story.pdf

*********

Note: Thoughts and assessments in this work are those of the author and are not meant to reflect organizational opinions of the Warrant Officer Career College or the U.S. Army.

This article by Charles Davis was first published by Small Wars Journal on July 18, 2023. Republished with permission of author and editor of SWJ.

By Charles Davis.

“Nobody wants to sit where I am and think now about what ‘coulda, shoulda, woulda’ happened in order to avoid this.” – Secretary of State Hilary Clinton [1]

The Department of State has an abysmal record of conducting Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO), especially when it comes to emergency response to social unrest and instability in conflict zones. There are internal mechanisms in place for leaders to learn from these events and to take steps to strengthen their processes. However, whether an issue of not wanting to have written documentation of failures and shortcomings or general disregard for the requirements, Department of State (DoS) officials are slow to publish after-action documentation of past events and neglect to act on the recommendations of these reports. This calls into question DoS level of readiness as we face continued friction and instability over Taiwan.  

A memorandum of agreement between the Departments of State and Defense indicates the Department of State (DoS) will exercise overall responsibility for protecting U.S. citizens and nationals and designated other persons, to include, when necessary and feasible, their evacuation to and welfare in relatively safe areas.  DoS further assumes responsibility for minimizing their risk of death or seizure as hostages and reducing their presence in probable or actual combat areas, so that combat effectiveness of U.S. and allied forces is not impaired. [2]

This same memorandum tasks the Department of Defense (DoD) with monitoring the political, military, economic, and other conditions. DoD will assess levels of hostility; local national willingness to provide protections for US citizens, nationals and other designees; number and locations of the same persons abroad and evacuation and protection capabilities, including transportation/lift requirements and their availability as well as the availability of relatively safe holding or survival areas for staging evacuees during emergencies. [3] These are considered Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs).

While each agency has its own lines of effort, the DoS has ultimate responsibility to prepare plans for protection and evacuation of US citizens and DoD non-combatants. This includes coordination to maximize timely use of available military transportation assets and existing host nation support infrastructure. Given the significant failures of Benghazi and Afghanistan along with questionable decisions about non-government US citizens in Sudan, it is no wonder there is concern and apprehension in the DoS planning approach to Taiwan.

Concerns Over DoS Planning and Readiness for NEOs

National level concerns over DoS planning and readiness is not a new focus. In 2007 the Government Accountability Office (GAO) was tasked with assessing evacuation planning and preparations for overseas posts. As part of the evaluation, the team assessed DoS guidance and plans to prepare for evacuation, training and exercises to prepare post staff for crisis, and efforts to collect, analyze, and incorporate evacuation lessons learned into guidance and training. [4]

The findings stated, “Posts do not find State’s primary guidance particularly useful in preparing for evacuation. In addition, while State requires posts to update Emergency Action Plans (EAP)s annually, almost 40 percent of posts surveyed have not updated their plans in 18 months or longer. Post-produced estimates of American citizens in a country are best guesses and more than three-quarters of posts said their last estimate was, at best, only somewhat accurate. We also found weaknesses in a memorandum of agreement (MOA) between State and DoD that could limit these agencies’ ability to effectively work together during a large-scale evacuation.” [5]

Other findings, from the report, suggest Emergency Action Committee members have not been properly trained on their duties, new staff have gone untrained and, crisis management exercises do not reflect likely scenarios given the assignment locations. Furthermore, roughly 60% of posts evacuated between 2002-2007 did not produce the required after action report, so there are no lessons learned to be applied to future crisis management situations.

Several of the GAO findings and recommendations provided in the 2007 report surfaced again in the Final Report of The Select Committee on the Events Surrounding the 2012 Terrorist Attack in Benghazi (H. Rept. 114-848). Select Committee recommendations included “a clear designation of ‘who is in charge of managing and following up on response in emergent situations as well as the roles and responsibilities of involved departments and agencies. There needed to be greater interoperability and improved communications during contingencies. Additionally, relevant agencies need to be involved in each other’s emergency action plans and, where capability on the ground is insufficient and the DoD cannot respond immediately the DoS and other agencies adjust their plans to allow for local or regional resources to be identified ahead of time. [6]

Commonalities in the GOA report of 2007 and the planning and coordination failures in the 2012 Benghazi report suggest lessons learned were not being captured and shared. This is an indicator that recommendations from 2007 may not have gained traction over the proceeding five years. A final recommendation from the Benghazi report encourages agencies on the ground to plan for standby military support before a crisis occurs in high threat environments. The recommendation also suggests including feasible support from U.S. allies. “In addition, the coordinating body should provide for a specific mechanism to know and understand assets and capabilities actually available at any given time.” [7] It is evident from the failures in the Afghanistan evacuation, these recommendation also gained little or no traction in the proceeding 10 years.

In 2017 the GAO initiated a follow-on assessment of DoS emergency preparedness. GAO findings during this evaluation period indicate only 2 of the 20 evaluated posts, which were approved by DoS Bureau of Diplomatic Security, had updated all key EAPs. “GAO also found that EAPs are viewed as lengthy and cumbersome documents that are not readily usable in emergency situations”, suggesting that EAPs serve as a check the box requirement rather than a functional plan for implementation. [8] Another significant finding indicates only 36% of the posts reported completing their evacuation drills.

GAO report 17-174 reiterated what should be obvious from previous agency assessments and actual events. DoS needs to ensure posts complete EAP updates and training exercises. Because of the inconsistency in following requirements, DoS should more closely track the policy requirements and verify posts are following through during EAP cycles. Most importantly, “State could develop a more streamlined version of the EAP—consisting of key sections, checklists, and contact lists—that could be used [by staff in and emergency], in addition to the full EAP… and take steps to ensure overseas post complete required lessons learned reports…” [9] These are all items addressed in some form during the 2007 assessment of DoS readiness.

Kabul NEO – August 2021

Photo: U.S. Marines from the Special Purpose Marine Air-Gournd Task Force – Crisis Response Central Command provide security during the Kabul NEO on August 20, 2021. (Photo by Lance Cpl Nicholas Guevara).

Four years after GAO report 17-174 there was a systemic failure during the evacuation of Afghanistan. House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) Interim Report “A Strategic Failure: Assessing the Administration’s Afghanistan Withdrawal” asserts there was a failure to plan. Findings from the report indicate the “[DoS] took very few substantive steps to prepare for the consequences that were expected.” [10] The report further indicates “Military commanders have clearly stated there was an utter lack of urgency on the part of the White House, the National Security Council (NSC), and the State Department as it pertained to an evacuation, despite repeated dire warnings.” [11] These comments seem to be echoed by reports that Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Milley believed DoS waited too long to initiate evacuation efforts. [12]

The HFAC report also addresses key planning failures regarding NEOs. “[DoS] was unable to provide adequate assistance to U.S. citizens (AMCITs), lawful permanent residents (LPRs), Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) holders and applicants, and other at-risk Afghans who were attempting to evacuate the country during the NEO. Would be evacuees were sent conflicting messages, told they could not be helped, or left standing outside the gates of the airport…” [13] Given our adversaries use of Information Warfare, disinformation operations and deep fakes, DoS needs to be both mindful and prepared with a strong communications plan.

Additionally, “U.S. military personnel on the ground involved in the evacuation said they had been prohibited from coordinating evacuation planning with all allies except for the UK until early August 2021.” [14] This is an operational failure which was identified and addressed as a key planning consideration in the Benghazi Report. General Sullivan noted US forces weren’t even allowed to coordinate with the Turkish forces commanding a primary military contingency at the airport and Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman did not begin NEO coordination through her channels until August 22, 2021, which was nine days after the fall of Herat and Taliban seizing control of all national border crossings. [15] These types of coordination would have been critical to success given the more than 20 countries and organizations that were trying to conduct similar evacuations. Failing to heed this type of coordination in future NEOs, such as Taiwan, will also be disastrous. This is especially true given the number of countries who have a significant population of citizens working in Taiwan.

In early July 2023 the U.S. Department of State released its After Action Review on Afghanistan that covers the period of January 2020 to August 2021. The principal finding in the 87-page report was that the State Department acted too late to conduct the NEO and that there was a lack of coordination among the senior leadership of the State Department.

Sudan NEO – April 2023

Photo: Secretary of State Blinken monitoring the evacuation of diplomatic staff from Sudan on 22 April 2023. DoS photo.

On April 22, 2023 DoS initiated an evacuation of Embassy personnel and their dependents from Khartoum Sudan. This evacuation did not include civilians and other designees. Under Secretary for Management, Ambassador John Bass indicated the DoD took the lead on evacuation operations for the Embassy after it was determined that use of commercial air and access to the airport was no longer an option. He further applied to the loss of access to commercial air as a reason not to attempt a US government evacuation of other American citizens in the near term. [16]

Ambassador Bass did indicate the DoS was attempting to maintain contact with US citizens and provide them with a best assessment of the security environment, while encouraging them to take appropriate precautions. He further asserted the DoS was working with other countries and the United Nations, as well as international organizations to enable US citizens to make their way to safety. [17]  There was no indication that this was part of an EAP or that early coordination had been ongoing, with an expectation for the DoS to need the support of partner countries and non-government organizations. Given previous examples of planning failures and the number of posts that have not completed EAP requirements, it is likely these efforts were cobbled together as events unfolded.

Is DoS Prepared for a Future NEO in Taiwan?

Recent reporting from multiple news agencies suggests the United States is conducting advance planning for a potential NEO evacuation of the Taiwan DoS post. While the one China policy has dictated that the US not establish an embassy in Taiwan, DoS works out of the American Institute in Taiwan. A June 13, 2023 piece by dayFREURO suggest multiple sources provided perspective on US evacuation planning that began more than 6 months prior. Unnamed sources indicated the planning process was not a public topic due to its sensitive nature and the potential fear and apprehension it might evoke within the Taiwanese population. [18]  The fact that DoS is taking an active planning approach, suggests recommendations and lessons learned are finally being applied in EAP development for this post.

A Messenger report from December 2021 indicates roughly two thirds of the Taiwanese population identifies as Taiwanese rather than Chinese. This growing shift along with recent Taiwan and US efforts to shore up defenses may be contributing to China’s need to act sooner rather than later, on its claims to the island nation.  This is not the first time Taiwan and the US have drawn attention over evacuation training. A 2003 Taipei Times report on joint training exercise Han Kuang #19 indicated Deputy Defense Minister Chen Chao-ming specifically addressed the inaccurate perception the US military was participating in evacuation training. [19]

“China has unsuccessfully attempted military force against Taiwan before, in the 1950s and 1990s. For much of that period, Taiwan itself had a superior military to the People’s Republic, and U.S. naval dominance in the region was unquestioned.” [20] An example can be found in June 1950, when President Truman placed the 7th Fleet between mainland China and Taiwan. In this case deterrence through the neutralization of the Taiwan Strait discouraged Chinese forces from conducting an amphibious assault. However, the same policy of deterrence today may be speeding China’s decision-making timeline.

As DoS continues to develop NEO evacuation planning, the Philippines are likely to play a key role. The  country’s May 2022 presidential election significantly shifted Philippine relations with the US and China and allowed the US to reestablish democratic relationships that had deteriorated under Rodrigo Duterte. [21]  And, as recently as May 2023 the US has reaffirmed its 72 year defense alliance with the Philippines, through a defense treaty in the South China Sea. [22]  Just days after confirming this treaty, President Marcos indicated Philippine bases could play a key role if China were to attack Taiwan. [23]

An example of how DoS planning might leverage Philippine bases includes the Ports of Kaohsiung and Subic Bay. Kaohsiung is located on Taiwan’s southwestern coastline and Kaohsiung port is one of the biggest container handling facilities in the world. The port handles roughly 5000 vessels and 18,900,000 tonnes of cargo annually. [24] Along with the port, Kaohsiung boast one of the country’s largest international airports co-located just outside the port area. Subic Bay, Philippines is approximately 500 miles south and served as a US naval base until 1992. The Subic facilities also include an international airport. Given DoS intentions to rely on commercial transportation as a first alternative, these two facilities provide multiple avenues for departure and arrival, not only for US citizens but other countries as well.

A possible indicator to the approach above can be found in a DoS Joint Statement from April 11, 2023. “Mindful of the growing complexity of the Indo-Pacific security environment, including the multidimensional nature of modern challenges and threats to the peace and security of the Philippines and the United States, the Secretaries reaffirmed their shared determination to defend against external armed attack in the Pacific… Accelerate the implementation of [Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement] EDCA projects and increase investments in EDCA agreed Locations to further support combined training, exercises, and interoperability between the U.S. and Philippine Armed Forces, as well as the Philippines’ civilian-led disaster preparedness and response capacities. The United States expects to have allocated over $100 million by the end of fiscal year 2023 toward infrastructure investments at the existing five EDCA sites and to support swift operationalization of the four new sites.” [25]

Whether through learning from previous events or developing new approaches, DoS will face significant obstacles during a NEO event in Taiwan. Reliance on a variety of networks and resources will be paramount to conducting a successful NEO. This will include advance coordination and relationship building before the crisis and NGOs may play a substantial role. In early 2000 Taiwan established the Department of NGO International Relations, which falls under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is responsible for maintaining positive relationships with NGOs, through open dialogue on difficult topics such as political freedom and civil rights. Associations such as this provide early indicators of instability which may extend operational and execution timelines and in a potential crisis such as this time is a valuable commodity. 

**********

Top Photo: U.S. Marines provide security during drawdown of designated personnel in Afghanistan on August 18, 2021. (U.S. Marine Corps photo).

Map: Taiwan map derived from maps from the Central Intelligence Agency.

[1] https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/01/23/top-quotes-from-hillary-clintons-benghazi-hearings

[2] https://prhome.defense.gov/Portals/52/Documents/PR%20Docs/DOS-DOD%20Memo%20of%20Agreement%20on%20Protection%20and%20Evacuation.pdf

[3] Ibid.

[4] GAO-08-23 State Department: Evacuation Planning and Preparations for Overseas Posts Can Be Improved

[5] ibid

[6] https://www.congress.gov/114/crpt/hrpt848/CRPT-114hrpt848.pdf

[7] ibid

[8] https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-17-714.pdf

[9] https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-17-714.pdf

[10] https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/HFAC-Republican-Interim-Report-A-22Strategic-Failure22-Assessing-the-Administrations-Afghanistan-Withdrawal.pdf

[11] ibid

[12] General Mark Milley Privately Blamed the State Department for the Disorganized Evacuation of Afghanistan (sofrep.com)

[13] https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/HFAC-Republican-Interim-Report-A-22Strategic-Failure22-Assessing-the-Administrations-Afghanistan-Withdrawal.pdf

[14] Ibid

[15] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/afghan-commander-ismail-khan-captured-taliban-seize-herat-2021-08-13/

[16] https://www.state.gov/briefing-with-under-secretary-for-management-ambassador-john-bass-assistant-secretary-for-african-affairs-ambassador-molly-phee-assistant-secretary-of-defense-for-special-operations-and-low-intensit/

[17] ibid

[18] https://euro.dayfr.com/trends/352257.html

[19] https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2003/01/03/189539

[20] https://themessenger.com/grid/test-imagining-the-unimaginable-the-us-china-and-war-over-taiwan

[21] https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/2022-philippine-election-trouble-democracy-and-foreign-relations-ahead

[22] https://www.reuters.com/world/us-issues-guidelines-defending-philippines-south-china-sea-attack-2023-05-04/

[23] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/marcos-says-philippines-bases-could-be-useful-if-taiwan-attacked-2023-05-05/

[24] https://www.marineinsight.com/know-more/8-major-ports-of-taiwan/

[25] Joint Statement of the U.S.-Philippines 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue – United States Department of State

By Charles Davis.

Much has been mentioned in the past few months, regarding Chechnya’s part in military operations in Ukraine. Most recently, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) asserted Chechen Akhmat (Spetsnaz) along with a Special Purpose Force Regiment were sent into the Donetsk region. [1] ISW suggests several possible reasons for Putin’s directing Ramzan Kadyrov to send forces to support this offensive and why Kadyrov may or may not be supportive. To understand where Kadyrov’s loyalties lie and ascertain his relationship with President Putin, we must review some significant events in Kadyrov’s rise to prominence.

On July 24, 2020 Sobesdnik, a popular Russian magazine, reported President Putin had awarded the rank of Major General in the National Guard Force to Ramzan Kadyrov. [2] Kadyrov was not an officer of any rank in the Russian military; he was and remains the current President of Chechnya, which is a federal subject of the Russian Federation. Kadyrov also maintains a highly negative profile within the US State Department. Just days before the announcement of his newest accolade, the United States placed him on restricted travel list, along with his wife and daughters. Kadyrov responded by posting a photo of himself with two AK-47s and a caption stating “[Mike] Pompeo, we accept the fight. Things are about to get more interesting.” [3]

Map: Location of Chechnya with the Russian Federation. Danloud, CC BY-SA 4.0 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0, via Wikimedia Commons

Estimating Putin’s motivations for this decision requires greater understanding of his relationship with Kadyrov and his desires for Chechnya.  Ramzan Akhmadovich Kadyrov is the son of former Chechen President Akhmad Kadyrov. The senior formed a militia (much like the mujahedeen of Afghanistan) during the First Chechen War, calling for Jihad against Russia. Akmad Kadyrov later supported Russia during the Second Chechen War and upon Russia’s victory was installed as the temporary leader by Vladimir Putin in 2000. [4] Akmad remained loyal to Russia and was officially elected to the position of President in 2003. In May 2004, when Akmad was assassinated in a bombing, Ramzan was twenty-seven years old and serving as the commander of the Kadyrovtsy (his father’s former militia group).

On the day of Akhmad’s death, Ramzan was flown to Moscow and received personal condolences from Putin, along with an appointment as the first Deputy Prime Minister. [5] In November 2005 he assumed the role of Acting Prime Minister and in March 2006 was officially installed as Prime Minister.  Throughout this period Ramzan retained the allegiance of and authority over an ever-growing Kadyrovtsy militia group.

One might liken Putin’s behavior to the Taliban’s acknowledgement of Jalaluddin Haqqani’s influence among the eastern provinces and the ultimate placement of his son Sirajuddin Haqqani as the Military Commander for Taliban. This comparison is strengthened by the fact that Putin is dealing with a Sunni Islamic state, heavily influenced by Sufism. Tribalism and patriarchal approaches are ingrained in the culture. Similar to the Afghan regional loyalties to their Mujahedeen heroes, Chechen loyalties are strong and lasting, developing through family and communal ties [6], especially in the mountainous northern regions of Chechnya.  

Photo: Image Credit Reliable henchman: Vladimir Putin with Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov in 2018. Image: kremlin.ru / Wikimedia Commons / CC BY 4.0.

Putin understands these similarities; leading him to invest in Kadyrov as a family dynasty best equipped to continue to provide Moscow with stability in Chechnya.   To this end, Putin removed Alu Alkhanov as President in February 2007 and promoted Ramzan from Prime Minister to acting President; ultimately securing parliamentary support and instatement as the President in March 2007. [7] This timing is not happenstance. Chechen law requires the President to be at least thirty years old. Ramzan turned thirty in October of 2006.

Hanna Zimnitskaya sheds some light on Putin’s personal thoughts/fears regarding the ongoing threat of insurgency from the region and what it would mean to the country. In his work “A State within a State: The Case of Chechnya” Zimnitskaya quotes Putin:

“If we don’t stop the extremists now, then some time later we’ll be faced with another Yugoslavia in the entire territory of Russia, the Yugoslavization of Russia…First Dagestan will be overrun. Then the entire Caucasus would separate; that’s clear.  Dagestan, Ingushetia, and then up the Volga River to Bashkorstan and Tatarstan. This means advancing right into the middle of the country.” [8]

Putin’s concerns are justified, especially when considering attacks like the October 23, 2002 seizing of a Moscow theater, taking up to 700 people hostage and resulting in the death of many of the 50 hostage takers along with 120 hostages. [9] The Beslan School siege serves as another example; with Chechen separatists taking ~1,000 hostages and resulting in the deaths of 340, many of them children. [10]

Putin has given almost unconditional personal support and tremendous financial resources to Ramzan, in an effort to rebuild and stabilize Chechnya. Ramzan has led massive infrastructure developments in the country, which now boasts the largest mosque in the Russian Federation. When asked about his relationship with Ramzan, Putin stated: “I look upon him as a son, we have in recent years developed friendly, really friendly, personal relations and I am convinced, this has played a tremendously positive role in the life of the Chechen nation and for Russia.” [11]

Ramzan’s influence in the Caucasus is derived from his political ties and his hardline Islamic Law approach to issues he finds distasteful.  He is a demigod for many, including his Kadyrovtsy militia group, which is ~30,000 strong and accountable directly to him. [12] However, he is not without criticism at home and abroad. He is accused of human rights abuses, most recently directed against Chechnya’s homosexual population. Additionally, critics assert he directed numerous assassinations of those who challenge his methods. [13]

While accusations of human rights violations continue and are echoed by the United States, Ramzan endures and is effectively consolidating both military and religious power in the Northern Caucus Region. Ramzan has co-opted the Qadiriya (Sufi Muslim brotherhood), shifting their message to ant-extremism. [14] In his work “Ramzan Kadyrov: Insecure Strongman?” Martin Breitmaier alludes to Ramzan’s effectiveness as Russia’s ambassador to the Muslim nations. 

“Ramzan contributes to diplomacy between Russia and Muslim countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). In what is rather unusual for Russian regional politicians, the Chechen president has received or visited many senior political leaders of the MENA on behalf of Moscow (the Saudi king or Afghan vice president last year, for example). His role as one of Russia’s ‘Muslim ambassadors’ is especially important since several countries in the region view Russia in a negative light and the fate of Moscow’s key regional ally Bashar al-Assad remains uncertain.” [15]

Ramzan’s Chechen militia has garnered a reputation of effectiveness and brutality. As such, during the color-revolutions and anti-regime demonstrations in Moscow throughout 2011, elements of the Chechen Presidents personal bodyguard regiment were reportedly stationed in Moscow. Reports indicated the force would be used to dispel protestors near the Interior Ministry building. [16] Other reporting indicates elements of Ramzan’s militia are able to travel armed throughout Russia, with little to no restriction. [17]

In response to Ramzan’s consolidation of power throughout the Northern Caucuses, the Russian Federation attempted to purge his military power through a consolidation of his forces under the Russian National Guard (NG) or Rosgvardiya. This element of Russia’s military arm has only been fully operational since 2018 and is identified as a security agency structure. A recent product from the Foreign Military Studies Office at Ft. Leavenworth describes the structure and responsibilities:

“The main tasks include joint protection of law and order together with the police; the fight against terrorism and extremism; the protection of state establishments and special freight; the protection of the territorial defense of the country; and the assistance to border guards to protect the state border. Powers included the ability to arrest lawbreakers, enter residential premises to conduct searches or arrests, cordon off terrain or residential areas, and use physical force, along with special weapons and equipment.” [18]

The NG which reports directly to the Russian President includes, Special Purpose Mobility Unit, Special Rapid Response Unit, Extra-departmental Protection Service of the Chechen Ministry of the Interior and totals ~250,000. [19] The perceived attempt to purge or reduce Ramzan’s influence over military elements of his country may be inaccurate as his cousin Sharip Delimkhanov was selected as Chief of the Russian Guard Directorate for Chechnya. [20] The Jamestown foundation argues that Kadyrovsty militia ties to the NG are not likely to reduce Ramzan’s control or influence even as his forces change appearance and formal affiliation. [21]

Establishment of the NG and its heavy reliance on Kadyrovsty militia brings us to the most recent announcement and some insight as to why Ramzan Kadyrov is now not only the President of Chechnya but also one of the most senior officers within the Russian National Guard. It is possible Putin experienced some resistance to leaving Kadyrovsty under Kadyrov’s direct control. This would explain Delimkhanov’s selection as Chief of the Russian Guard Directorate for Chechnya.

It is also worth noting, Putin appointed Viktor Zolotov as Director of the NG. The National Defense Academy of Latvia’s Strategic Research Department suggests: 

“The nomination of Viktor Zolotov as NG commander and the replacement of important persons could be a part of “another trend in recent appointments, with Mr. Putin naming former bodyguards and intelligence agents to important political posts, such as regional governors” as it ensures their “unquestioning loyalty.” [22]

Zolotov has served Putin since the 1990s, first as a personal bodyguard then as commander of the Presidential Security services. [23] Zolotov has a notable relationship with Ramzan. Both attended as part of Putin’s official party during a state dinner of the Syrian Arab Republic in May 2010. Additionally, the Nemtsov foundation and the Atlantic Council suggest both Zolotov and Ramzan Kadyrov were complicit in coordinating for the assassination of prominent political activist Boris Nemtsov in 2015. [24] This implication may reinforce Latvia’s assessment that Putin is ensuring his NG serves with unquestioning loyalty.

Ramzan’s reach into emigrated populations of Chechens in Poland, France, and Austria is of significant importance as is the security of the Northern Caucuses and oil pipelines running from the south. Additionally, the soft power influence Ramzan wields within the Islamic countries opens doors for Putin in a difficult region. Lastly, Putin has been a constant supporter of Ramzan and has strong personal ties to the leader, which is openly apparent to Putin’s cabinet and staff. Who else would he want under direct control of his 250 thousand strong security force in the event critics or the Russian people gain tractions in attempts to push him out of office?

From a strategic perspective, it will be important to monitor how Putin deploys the Russian National Guard and the level of involvement Ramzan Kadyrov maintains in operations and decision-making. As we have seen throughout Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Putin has relied heavily on the protections of his inner circle. The relationship he has cultivated with Kadyrov has paid dividends and his decision to assign Kadyrov military rank and a place within the National Guard has also provided Putin with options as his both his traditional military leadership and Wagner remain at odds with one another.

[1] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-31-2023

[2] https://sobesednik.ru/politika/20200724-gudkov-putin-dal-indulgenciyu

[3] https://meduza.io/en/feature/2020/07/24/the-u-s-sanctioned-ramzan-kadyrov-s-family-members-and-he-isn-t-taking-it-well

[4] http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/787811.stm

[5] https://frontline.thehindu.com/world-affairs/article30222673.ece

[6] https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2020/05/17/chechnya-the-ethno-political-flashpoint-plaguing-a-former-super-power/

[7] https://web.archive.org/web/20080308153448/http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,252203,00.html

[8] https://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1014&context=intlstudies_honors

[9] https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/hostage-crisis-in-moscow-theater

[10] https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/chechen-separatists-storm-russian-school

[11] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HEl4Mt1CtkQ

[12] https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/rnv99_m._laruelle_kadyrovism_en_2017.pdf

[13] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31794742

[14] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31794742

[15] https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Alert%2010%20Kadyrov.pdf

[16] https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/slavic-review/article/inside-russias-imperial-relations-the-social-constitution-of-putinkadyrov-patronage/FA38D6E2093711CD76250D5152FF7CED/core-reader

[17] https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2013/03/24/fsb-officers-go-on-strike-after-release-of-chechen-cops-report-says-a22672

[18] https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/fmso-books/197266

[19] https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/rnv99_m._laruelle_kadyrovism_en_2017.pdf

[20] https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/fmso-books/197266

[21] https://jamestown.org/program/creation-of-russian-national-guard-could-affect-kremlin-policies-in-the-north-caucasus-2/

[22] https://www.baltdefcol.org/files/files/publications/RussianNationalGuard.pdf

[23] http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35975840

[24] https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/who-wanted-boris-nemtsov-dead-new-book-offers-new-look-at-evidence/  https://nemtsovfund.org/en/our-projects/investigation-into-boris-nemtsov-s-murder/

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Top photo: Kremlin.ru, CC BY 4.0 , via Wikimedia Commons.

By CW4 Charles Davis.

Never before in modern human history has a state so powerful, so fundamentally put at risk the global institutional order, security, freedoms and prosperity of the rest, employing an approach that was so superficially benign, and disarming its targets from within by playing to their short-term material interests. – Evan Ellis 1/27/2021

In June 2022, the United States hosted its 9^th Summit of the Americas.  However, a summary Congressional Research Report indicates only 23 of the 35 member heads of state participated. [1] The decision to boycott, by so many leaders, hinged on President Biden’s decision to exclude Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. And while the leaders of Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela are undesirable partners for the United States, the response from other Latin American Countries reinforces a regional perception that only US interests are a priority for the United States.

Final commitments from the Americas Summit are firmly nested in the Biden Administration’s climate initiatives as it seeks to establish a resilient Caribbean region regarding natural disasters, catastrophic weather events, and migration. However, on a geo-political stage, China may have been the big winner at an event it didn’t even attend. With every American misstep, China’s influence in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) continues to expand.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative

Based on the Green Finance & Development Center reports, of the 33 countries in LAC, 20 state leaders have committed to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in the region. [2] Key among those participants are Argentina, Cuba, Venezuela, Panama, and Chile. While not a member, Brazil remains heavily tied to significant loan obligations as well. [3] These economic ties did not occur overnight, but the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has made significant inroads over the past 20 years while the United States remained focused on the Middle East. Chinese trade in LAC has continued to rise. In 2002 trade peaked at 18 billion USD, reaching 449 billion USD in 2021. [4]

From 2005 to 2020 the PRC has used state owned China Development Bank and the Import and Export Bank of China to secure an estimated 99 loans at a staggering 137 billion USD, with Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador and Argentina carrying 90% of that debt. [5] These same institutions are the leading lenders in the region while China holds voting interest in local financial institutions like the Inter-American Development Bank and the Caribbean Development Bank. [6] This financial strength has secured China’s place as South America’s top trading partner and primary lender in energy and infrastructure.

The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) asserts; China has invested $73 billion USD in LAC’s raw materials sector since 2008, establishing refineries and processing plants for coal, copper, natural gas, oil, and uranium. [7] The CFR also indicates China’s focus is now the Lithium Triangle countries of Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile, which the PRC believes accounts for more than half of the world’s lithium, a metal necessary to produce batteries. [8]

China in United States’s Backyard

During a June 2021 conference on US-China Strategic Competition, U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) Commander, Adm. Craig Faller, commented on the importance of the LAC: “I look at this region, our neighborhood here as a region of real promise. The proximity, location matters, the distance to the United States is key. The people, those values associated with the people and the cultural connections [are strategically important]”. [9]  He further spoke of concerns regarding Chinese presence and influence across the continent, commenting on the port of Ushuaia (the furthest port in the southern hemisphere) and the Panama Canal. Both are tied to key commercial navigation routes and of significant interest to China. With Panama a key BRI partner and Argentina a significant investment partner of China, his concerns are well founded.

Maps: Left Google Maps, right, Wikipedia (OpenStreetMap)

The pan-Asian professional services firm, Dezan Shira and Associates, produces the Silk Road Briefing, an online publication which focuses on China’s BRI globally. Their May 2022 assessment of Chinese interests in Ushuaia asserts: “Chinese involvement in the Beagle Channel would also mean that it would be capable of exerting some control of US commercial shipping both north and south of the South American continent.” [10] The Panama Canal is operated with assistance from Chinese logistics firms on both ends of the canal, at Margarita Island and the Colón Free Trade Zone. [11] Panama is also a member of the Belt and Road Initiative. Given China’s claim to be a near Artic partner, its relationship with the Russian Federation on northern projects and its interests and investment in Argentina and Panama, it seems likely China will be at least the gate keeper if not the key holder to global commercial shipping access.

In March of 2022, USSOUTHCOM CDR General Laura Richardson addressed specific concerns regarding Chinese presence and influence in Panama over activities associated with the Panama Canal. GEN Richardson expressed concern the US has not been as invested in projects important to Panama and this has allowed the PRC inroads with this key partner. She also mentioned joint Argentina and PRC space projects, which now allow the PRC to track US satellites. Richardson explained Beijing’s ongoing investments in Central and South American infrastructure, particularly ports, follow the patterns linked to debt trap financing in Africa. Right now, the “Chinese have 29 port projects” across the Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), including a major one in El Salvador that has economic implications for other Central American nations. [12]

Community of Latin American States

The Community of Latin American States (CELAC) provides additional insight into Chinese political influence in LAC. Founded in 2011 as a regional bloc of 32 member states, CELAC serves as an alternative to the Organization of American States (OAS), which is supported politically and economically by the United States. Mexico’s President, Manual Lopez Obrador, serves as the organization’s current President and is pursuing an agenda which would model the European Union, thus negating a need for the American led OAS. This vision is supported through affiliations with China, Russia, Turkey and several Arab States. [13]  

The China-CELAC Joint Action Plan for Cooperation in Key Areas addresses political and security cooperations as well as financial support. The plan includes initiatives on trade and links the previously discussed financial organizations to future partnerships through China-LAC Infrastructure Cooperation Forum. Other components of the plan emphasize agriculture, industry, and science and technology partnerships. [14]

Image: Latin American and Caribbean nations with diplomatic ties with Taiwan. (Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2023)

Through the PRC’s sustained presence in these organizations and LAC’s growing reliance on Chinese financial institutions, the PRC has shifted the region’s relationship away from Taiwan.  President Xi Jinping has visited the region eleven times since he took office in 2013, and now only eight countries in the region still recognize Taiwan’s sovereignty. The Dominican Republic and Nicaragua are the most recent countries to break ties with Taiwan. [15] It is not surprising that Nicaragua would demonstrate a willingness to partner with China as its relations with the United States have continued to deteriorate. In November 2021 President Biden addressed Nicaragua’s election, stating “What Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega and his wife, Vice President Rosario Murillo, orchestrated today was a pantomime election that was neither free nor fair, and most certainly not democratic.” [16]

Chinese Technology

While the United States is experiencing the cost of deteriorating partnerships and projects across the LAC, LAC states are also forced to exam the cost of partnering with the PRC. Chinese technology is being used to bolster surveillance throughout the hemisphere. While this capability aids in fighting crime and monitoring natural disasters, it also provides data and intelligence collection to the PRC. Evan Ellis, writer for The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), suggests integrators such as Huawei continue to leverage technologies, especially facial recognition and biometrics programs nested in big data repositories. These technologies originate in the PRC where individual privacy considerations are minimal. China then offers this capability to LAC, “where insecurity [and] the fight against corruption make Chinese solutions attractive”. [17] The United Kingdom, Australia, and the United States have already experienced the costs of allowing companies like Huawei access to national digital infrastructure.

Chinese Military Engagement

As in every other region of the PRC’s Belt and Road Initiative, economic and political relationships are followed by engagements with the military. Evans also asserts, “For the [People’s Liberation Army] PLA, engagement in Latin America supports multiple national and institutional objectives as a subset of its global engagement. One of the PRC’s economic and strategic goals is building strong all-around relationships with countries in the region, which includes forging bonds with Latin American militaries.” [18]  Just as with the US military industries, the PLA weapons sales allow for many continuing relationships through training, service contracts and equipment upgrades, and professional military education opportunities.

Defense is a key component of the CELAC Action Plan, incorporating a defense forum and fighting transnational organized crime, nuclear proliferation, and violent extremism. The plan also offers exchange opportunities for professional military education to LAC and includes opportunities for PLA members to attend jungle warfare instruction. Given how much of the PRC’s sub-Saharan playbook is being used towards goals in the LAC, the US should take lessons from China’s covert efforts to establish bases. In the United Arab Emirates, classified satellite imagery led U.S. officials to conclude that the Chinese were building some sort of military installation at the port. [19] Concerning Equatorial Guinea, the US Department of State indicated, “As part of our diplomacy to address maritime-security issues, we have made clear to Equatorial Guinea that certain potential steps involving [Chinese] activity there would raise national-security concerns.” [20]

Mr. Ellis also alluded to potential US security concerns regarding the PRC’s military goals being nested in infrastructure projects. “Some have speculated [PLA base construction] could occur as a product of construction work or port concessions going to Chinese companies in Panama, or through the port of La Union in El Salvador. Such caution in close proximity to the United States is consistent with PRC reluctance to acknowledge even the military character of its only current foreign military port facility, which is located in Djibouti, in Africa.” [21] The PRC continues to lead with Economics but will certainly shore up those efforts with its Diplomatic and Military elements of national power.

Consequences of Limited U.S. Interest in LAC

Of all the LAC countries, Peru has the region’s largest Chinese diaspora community, amounting to about 5 percent of the population, or one million people. The PRC’s presence in the LAC will only grow, and the United States will likely have to weigh the consequences of its limited interest in the LAC over the past 20 years. Professor Richard Kilroy recently presented potential scenarios for OAS and CELAC at the Homeland Defense Academic Symposium.  There is value in his argument:

“For the OAS to maintain its relevancy in a changing global security environment, it needs to adapt to address the concerns of its member states. President Manual Lopez Obrador’s call for CELAC to replace the OAS should not be dismissed. Rather it should serve as a wake-up call to the United States and the OAS bureaucracy to reimagine its future in the Western Hemisphere. Key drivers for this scenario would include: a new organization structure in the OAS, to include modeling the UN’s Security Council with six permanent members (Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Mexico, and the United States) and eight rotating members (two each) from the sub-regions (Caribbean, Central America, Southern Cone, Andean Ridge); movement of the headquarters out of Washington, D.C. to a more central location in the region, such as Panama, utilizing the former military facilities of the U.S. Southern Command which moved to Miami, Florida in 1999; creation of an office of military affairs to coordinate peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations by member states, to include disaster response, pandemics, and responding to transnational criminal threats; and an empowered Secretary General with the ability to act both regionally and globally in expanding the OAS’s ability to interact with other international governmental organizations in confronting trans-regional threats, to include climate change and environmental security.” [22]

Professor Richard Kilroy

Regardless of the chosen path forward, the US must re-evaluate the level of national interest placed on what SOUTHCOM leaders have framed as our back yard. Foreign policy in the region must include not only what is nested in the US National Security Strategy but also that which serves those relevant and specific issues of the member states of the LAC region.

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Top Image: Maps and flag from Central Intelligence Agency.

[1] https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN11934

[2] https://greenfdc.org/countries-of-the-belt-and-road-initiative-bri/

[3] https://asiatimes.com/2022/01/belt-road-encircles-latin-america-and-the-caribbean

[4] https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10982/15

[5] https://www.bloomberglinea.com/english/chinas-influence-in-latam-is-fueled-by-billions-of-usd-in-investments/

[6] Ibid

[7] China’s Growing Influence in Latin America | Council on Foreign Relations (cfr.org)

[8] Ibid

[9] https://www.southcom.mil/Media/Speeches-Transcripts/Article/2663184/adm-faller-remarks-project-2049-conference-on-us-china-strategic-competition-in/

[10] https://www.silkroadbriefing.com/news/2022/05/30/china-to-finance-development-logistics-of-argentinas-beagle-channel-around-south-america/

[11] https://www.csis.org/analysis/key-decision-point-coming-panama-canal

[12] https://news.usni.org/2022/03/24/chinese-investment-near-panama-canal-strait-of-magellan-major-concern-for-u-s-southern-command

[13] https://media.defense.gov/2022/Jul/14/2003035185/-1/-1/0/HDAS%202022%20-%20RICHARD%20KILROY%20-%20CHALLENGING%20THE%20COLOSSUS%20OF%20THE%20NORTH.PDF

[14] https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/202112/t20211207_10463459.html

[15] Nicaragua abandons Taiwan, recognizes China – The Washington Post

[16] Biden calls Nicaragua’s election a ‘pantomime’ that’s ‘neither free nor fair’ (yahoo.com)

[17] https://dialogo-americas.com/articles/chinas-digital-advance-in-latin-america/#.Y1vZOK9OlhE

[18] https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinese-security-engagement-latin-america

[19] https://www.wsj.com/articles/us-china-uae-military-11637274224

[20] https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-seeks-first-military-base-on-africas-atlantic-coast-u-s-intelligence-finds-11638726327

[21] https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinese-security-engagement-latin-america

[22] HDAS 2022 – RICHARD KILROY – CHALLENGING THE COLOSSUS OF THE NORTH.PDF (defense.gov)

By CW4 Charles Davis.

Information technology has significantly enhanced human interaction around the globe and elevated the importance of information as an instrument of power wielded by individuals and societies in politics, economics, and warfare. Advances in information technology have significantly changed the generation of, transmission of, reception of, and reaction to information. – Joint Concept for Operations in the Information Environment July 2018

The Russian concept of Information Warfare (IW) began to develop in the post WWII Soviet Union. However military theory on the concept gained traction with the USSR’s Military Research Institute (MRI), through the writings of Dr. Vladimir Lefebvre. [1]  Lefebvre is credited with developing Reflexive Control (RC) Theory in the 1960s, while working for the MRI. His book, “The Algebra of Consciousness”, was the foundation for classifying the theory and establishing a Soviet research institute to assess its applications. [2] 

Reflexive Control Theory requires a foundational understanding of the psychology of the target. Developing a targeted operation requires deep cultural understanding and occurs through modeling

Diagram: Lefebvres Reflexive Control Technique.

Lefebvre’s philosophy was reaffirmed in a 1976 paper by V Druzhinin and D Kontorov, titled “Problems with Military systems Engineering”. The work firmly asserts; control of the target’s decision process derives from a profound knowledge of the state of his forces, military doctrine, objectives, and personal qualities of his executive personnel. Additionally, an adversary’s politics, ideology, emotional state, and mutual relations can also be leveraged to influence decision-making. (Chotikul, 1986) [4] Putin’s approach to conducting Information Warfare through RC is firmly intrenched in these concepts, with global implications.

Russia does not distinguish Information Operations (IO) as a peacetime or conflict tool and there are no restrictions between leveraging RC against military or civilian targets. Therefore, adversaries such as the United States can expect IW to be a constant in competition, crisis, and conflict. As such, IW is conducted globally and indiscriminately. Putin affirmed this position in his 2006 address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation.  “We must take into account the plans and directions of development of the armed forces of other countries…. Our responses must be based on intellectual superiority, they will be asymmetric, and less expensive.” [5]

An early example of Soviet forces applying Lefebver’s Reflexive Control is evident in interviews with Vladimir Ryzhkov (Russian State Duma Deputy 1993-2007). Ryzhkov recalls conversations with KGB propaganda officers regarding their efforts in Afghanistan in the 1980s and several points can be taken. The Afghan population had to be convinced the government was acting in their interests and the enemy provoked the crisis. Operations also focused on fabricating incidents of persecution of Russian speaking populations, using just enough truth to draw social attention and outrage. Using these incidents, IOs focused on demonizing the adversary and masking Soviet aggression as humanitarian aid to those persecuted. Controlling the narrative was most important and crackdowns on all accessible media outlets secured their ability to direct the message. [6]

Later examples provided by Ryzhkov present RC in a new light. For example, in 1999 Russia used reports of Chechen attacks into Dagestan as a mechanism for driving public opinion in support of a second military incursion into Chechnya. None of the jihadist groups ever took responsibility for the August and September apartment bombings and there is broad speculation that Moscow conducted false flag reporting to justify a military presence.

Additionally, Russian press suggested as many as 100 foreign instructors participated in training Chechen terrorists. Other Russian press reporting indicated Usama Bin Laden was sending mercenaries from Afghanistan and Yemen. [7] Narrative control here provided popular support for elevated military operations in the region. Media influence during the second Chechen war was highlighted in a Newsline piece by Paul Goble: “Indeed, the Russian government’s own newspaper ‘Izvestiya’ noted rather critically that “the introduction of centralized military censorship regarding the war in the North Caucasus is the only new idea in the much-vaunted national security doctrine.” [8] These examples along with press observations suggesting a shift in tactic, reinforce the presence of RC as a recognized component of Russian political and military strategy.

Also in the 1990s, the Russian government started to see the value in state-sponsored think tanks. While Russia leveraged academia for research and analysis, it did not apply the concept of state sponsored institutes, like RAND in the United States. The Russian Institute for Strategic Studies (RISI) is one such organization, which was established by presidential decree in February of 1992. Atlantic Council Research indicates; by 2007 there were roughly seventy researchers, working on international security, the near abroad, military-strategic questions, international economic security, and market economic issues. [9]

RISI provides a unique view of how Lefebvre’s concepts for RC are studied and applied. A 2019 product by Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center provides an in-depth study of several think tanks in today’s Russia. According to Barbashin and Graef, in April of 2009 RISI was identified as a Federal Scientific Institution. Categorizing it in this manner solidified funding through the Presidential Administration. The increased funding allowed RISI to broaden its scope and add new departments. Putin also installed Lieutenant General (ret) Leonid Reshetnikov, formerly the Director of Foreign Intelligence Services, as administrator. [10]

Between 2011 and 2014 Reshetnikov was able to expand RISI research and analysis capabilities. In 2011, RISI established a Center for Regional and Ethno-Religious Studies. Then in March 2014 Reshetnikov hired representatives from Helsinki, Belgrade, and Warsaw to support his newly established Information Center in Tiraspol Transnistria. At the opening ceremony, he spoke of the importance of the Crimean vote for reunification with Russia. [11]  RISI remained supportive of the creation of Novorossiya (New Russia) and endorsed escalation of military operations in eastern Ukraine. [12]

RISI remained vocally supportive of Russian operations in Ukraine throughout 2014 and drafted a report in October framing the events as a western plot. In the October 2014 report, titled “The Ukrainian Crisis: Instrument of Geopolitics of the West”, RISI analysts asserted the United States was waging an information, economic, and political operation against Russia. Russia was portrayed as foiling US plots to establish a new world order of US “business and political elites”. [13] The October report also alluded to US intentions for American military bases on the Black Sea. The report and narratives to insight fear of the US and incompetence in Ukrainian governance all align with the primary concepts of RC.

Also in 2011, Russian Chief of General Staff Nikolai Makarov began to voice his reservations that Russia’s military had not successfully adopted to the requirements of modern warfare. Specifically, he did not believe the military would be successful in non-contact warfare such as Information Operations. Makarov’s concerns fueled General Valery Gerasimov’s efforts to address the question of how to describe/define modern war and frame operational concepts for Russian success in 2013. One key distinction in Gerasimov’s framing of Information Warfare (IW), and that of western generals is that Russia does not distinguish cyber warfare from other types of IO: it’s simply another tool in the box. [14]

Graphic from Gerasimov article in Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kurier, 26 February 2013 [15]

By 2014 there were two primary templates for IO. The first, “Red Web”, written by former KGB officers Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan centered on media control. But an article in the Journal of the Academy of Military Science, written by several Belarusian nationals approached the concept in much broader terms. The concept focused on 13 goals and more closely aligns with Reflexive Control Theory. They are described in an article by MITRE as:

• Changing the citizen’s moral values
• Creating a lack of spirituality
• Destroying traditions and cultivating a negative attitude toward cultural legacy
• Manipulating the social consciousness
• Disorganizing systems and creating obstacles
• Destabilizing political relations
• Exacerbating political struggles and provoking repression
• Reducing information support
• Misinforming, undermining, and discrediting administrative organs
• Provoking social, political, national, and religious conflicts
• Mobilizing protests and strikes
• Undermining authority
• Damaging interests of a state [16]

Where Soldatov and Borogan focused on a single platform, the Belarusian theorists addressed measurable objectives. Their approach has garnered more attention, and practical application of their concepts has appeared more recently in Russian IW efforts.

In 2014, Vladislav Surkov left his position of Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation for an appointment as Presidential Aide to Putin. Surkov assumed responsibilities for the Presidential Directorate for Social and Economic Cooperation with the CIS Member Countries. In this capacity, Surkov assumed the responsibility for developing policy towards Ukraine and began to receive daily updates focused on social, economic, and political issues in specific regions of the country. The data allowed Russia to frame a narrative and develop supporting disinformation that would manipulate Ukrainian public sentiment and political decision-making.

Graphic image from hacked Surkov emails, Euromaiden Press, March 26, 2020.

Hacked emails, associated with Surkov’s position during the annexation of Crimea, also provide supporting evidence Surkov relied on several Russian think tanks to assist with developing RC concepts to use in IW against Ukraine and NATO countries. This data provides a connection back to Reshetnikov and the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, supporting direct involvement in privately funded efforts to recruit and finance the separatist insurgency in eastern Ukraine. [17]   

 In 2019, The Royal United Service Institute was able to establish a chronology of Surkov- led activities during the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014.  The final paper was a direct result of hacked emails from Vladislav Surkov during this period. [18]  Authors, Alya Shandra and Robert Seely, assert Russia accomplished the seizure of Crimea through overt and covert activities, along with local ideologs and paid collaborators.

At the covert level, Russia interfered in Ukrainian elections, organized and funded a pan-Ukrainian campaign for a ‘soft federalization’ of the country, attempted to change Ukraine’s constitution and establish an alternative center of power, and created an illusion of widespread support for these activities…. The Kremlin conducted painstaking research into the intricacies of Ukrainian daily life to understand the Ukrainian world view and identify vulnerabilities that could be exploited. Then, using media, front groups, provocateurs, and paid rallies, it created a virtual reality designed to compel Ukraine into making decisions serving Russian objectives. [19]

Stark similarities can be drawn between Russian actions in the second Chechen war and that of the annexation of Ukraine. Pro-Russian proxies in the Donbas were inundated with fake news targeting Ukrainian government and military atrocities; while the Russian population was provided similar media coverage focused on stimulating their emotional support of the ethnic Russian people trapped in Ukraine. In the international community, Russia continued to distract, and deceive, creating information overload paralysis and indecision among the NATO partners.

The May 2nd, 2014, street fighting and fire in Odesa is an excellent example of Russian IO. Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed “Ukrainian nationalists drove defenseless people into the Trade Union building and burned them alive.” Reporting goes on to reassert the pro-Nazi position of the western backed Ukrainian government. [20] The Russian Federation continues to use the incident for propaganda purposes, through heavily financed exhibitions and select witness testimony in European countries.

Learning from IW activities in numerous other countries, Putin enhanced and refined Russia’s IO capabilities and turned his sights on the United States. Russia’s primary platforms to manipulate social consciousness, destabilize political relations; exacerbate political struggles; provoke repression; reduce information support and; misinform, undermined and discredit administrative organs were Facebook and Twitter.  The weapons he intended to use were Russian Troll Farms.

In Late 2014, Russia experienced a great deal of internal social unrest. Citizen protests regarding corruption and abuse of power seemed to appear without warning, fueled by social media. To manage domestic social unrest, he turned to the Internet Research Agency (IRA), financed and developed by Yevgeny Prigozhin in 2013. [21]  Christian Science Monitor correspondent Fred Weir states:

The IRA is a well-funded “internet marketing” operation that may perform commercial functions but has become notorious for its political activities. These include loading Russian social media with pro-Kremlin commentary, blogs, postings, and graphic content. Experts believe there are several such operations around Russia, some aimed at regional audiences. [22]

Russian expatriate and investigative reporter, Lyudmila Savchuk, describes IRA troll operations as mental bullying, explaining how lies are mixed with the truth to discredit and repress dissenting political opinions in Russia. In her Oslo Freedom Forum interview, Savchuk discusses her infiltration of IRA and the operational effectiveness of the Troll Farms, fake accounts, and fictitious activist groups. [23] Other interviews indicate she had daily quotas of 5 political posts, 10 non-political and 150-200 troll comments. [24]

Applying this very successful media exploitation weapon against the 2016 US presidential elections, Russia’s IRA was able to establish 3,184 Twitter accounts responsible for posting 175,993 election related tweets. [25] Additionally, Facebook assesses 126 million Americans received posts from roughly 470 IRA accounts and 3,000 IRA adds. [26] Investigations, by both the Justice and Treasury Departments, determined:

“The Internet Research Agency LLC (IRA) tampered with, altered, or caused a misappropriation of information with the purpose or effect of interfering with or undermining election processes and institutions. Specifically, the IRA tampered with or altered information in order to interfere with the 2016 U.S. election.  The IRA created and managed a vast number of fake online personas that posed as legitimate U.S. persons to include grassroots organizations, interest groups, and a state political party on social media.  Through this activity, the IRA posted thousands of ads that reached millions of people online.  The IRA also organized and coordinated political rallies during the run-up to the 2016 election, all while hiding its Russian identity.  Further, the IRA unlawfully utilized personally identifiable information from U.S. persons to open financial accounts to help fund IRA operations.” [27]  

Image: Department of Justice, Affidavit Press Release, September 28, 2018, page 23.

Additional details from federal investigations into the IRA operation known as “Project Lakhta” indicate a multimillion-dollar budget, financed by Prigozhin, and supervised by GRU officers assigned to Russia’s Unit 26165 and 74455. [28] In total four entities, seven individuals, three aircraft and a yacht were determined to be directly involved; resulting in asset seizures and sanctions. The Internet Research Agency was designated for directly or indirectly engaging in, sponsoring, concealing, or otherwise being complicit in foreign interference in a U.S. election. [29]

However, Russia’s attempts to apply RC measures against the American population continued, leading up to the 2020 elections. According to researchers from MIT Technology Review “Facebook’s most popular pages for Christian and Black American content were being run by Eastern European troll farms.” [30] Furthermore, content from troll farms was viewable to 140 million US accounts each month and these farms boasted the largest Christian American page, largest African American page, second largest Native American page and the fifth largest women’s’ page. Lastly, as of October 2019 roughly 15,000 Facebook Pages were being operated from Kosovo and Macedonia. [31]  

In March 2021, the Director of National Intelligence released assessments of malign Russian activities targeting the 2020 US elections. In this report, the Intelligence Community assessed Putin authorized influence operations to denigrate the Biden candidacy and the Democratic Party, through proxies. The intent was to disseminate influence narratives and misleading allegations to media and government officials as well as influential private citizens. Some activities intended to undermine public confidence, sow division, and exacerbate social tension were directly linked to Iran.  

More recently, a June 2022 Chatham House report indicates Russia’s IO efforts are targeting South Africa, India, Brazil, and Mexico; attempting to garner support and sympathy for Russia’s position on Ukraine. [32]  Chatham House concerns, along with July 2022 reporting from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, paint a stark picture for US relations with the Latin American Countries.  Russian IW in Venezuela, Nicaragua, Cuba, Mexico, Brazil and Argentina, will require significant counter-efforts from the US Department of State and with malign leadership in a number of these countries, it is likely to be a hard-fought war on perception. [33]   

As stated in the Department of State report, Pillars of Russia’s disinformation and Propaganda Ecosystem: “The perpetual conflict that Russia sees in the information environment also means that officials and state media may take one side of an issue, while outlets with a measure of independence will adopt their own variations on similar overarching false narratives. The ecosystem approach is fitting for this dynamic because it does not require harmonization among the different pillars. By simultaneously furthering multiple versions of a given story, these actors muddy the waters of the information environment in order to confuse those trying to discern the truth.” [34]

[1] https://sofrep.com/news/russian-reflexive-control-is-subverting-the-american-political-landscape/

[2] ibid

[3] ibid

[4] https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA170613.pdf

[5] http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/23577

[6] http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/thekremlins-war-propaganda/496779.html

[7] https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1289/RAND_MR1289.pdf

[8] http://www.hri.org/news/balkans/rferl/1999/99-10-12.rferl.html#28

[9] https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/thinking-foreign-policy-in-russia-think-tanks-and-grand-narratives/

[10] ibid

[11] https://mid.gospmr.org/en/DPj

[12] https://lithuaniatribune.com/russian-think-tank-that-pushed-for-invasion-of-ukraine-wants-moscow-to-overthrow-belarus-lukashenko

[13] https://riss.ru/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/AO_2014_ves-tekst.pdf

[14] https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1019062.pdf

[15] https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20160228_art009.pdf

[16] https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/2021-11/prs-19-1004-russian-military-thought-concepts-elements.pdf

[17] https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2017/03/04/kremlins-balkan-gambit-part/

[18] https://euromaidanpress.com/2020/03/26/a-guide-to-russian-propaganda-part-5-reflexive-control/

[19] https://static.rusi.org/201907_op_surkov_leaks_web_final.pdf

[20] https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2014/05/03/ukra-m03.html

[21] https://edition.cnn.com/2023/02/14/europe/russia-yevgeny-prigozhin-internet-research-agency-intl/index.html

[22] https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2018/0221/Before-Russia-s-troll-farm-turned-to-US-it-had-a-more-domestic-focus

[23] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z4OAQfoMyC8

[24] https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/magazine/the-agency.html

[25] https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2018/01/19/twitter-there-were-more-russian-trolls-than-we-thought/1050091001/

[26] https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2017/11/01/russians-used-facebook-way-other-advertisers-do-tapping-into-its-data-mining-machine/817826001/

[27] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm0312

[28] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm577

[29] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm787

[30] https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/09/16/1035851/facebook-troll-farms-report-us-2020-election/

[31] ibid

[32] https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/06/disinformation-fight-goes-beyond-ukraine-and-its-allies

[33] https://www.csis.org/analysis/russia-western-hemisphere-assessing-putins-malign-influence-latin-america-and-caribbean

[34] https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Pillars-of-Russia%E2%80%99s-Disinformation-and-Propaganda-Ecosystem_08-04-20.pdf

**********

Author’s Note: Thoughts and assessments in this work are those of the author and are not meant to reflect organizational opinions of the Warrant Officer Career College or the Army.

By CW4 Charles Davis, U.S. Army.

In 2014 Rand Corporation analysts stated: “The U.S. drawdown from Afghanistan may lead to greater instability and a vacuum in that country. The Islamic Republic of Iran, one the most powerful regional actors in Afghanistan, is poised to exercise substantial influence there after the U.S. drawdown.” [1] The Rand product also suggested Iran would likely leverage its influence to alleviate political and economic pressures associated with the country’s ongoing nuclear program. Seven years later these forecasts seem to be ringing true. Iranian political and military leadership are diligently shoring up old relationships to place the country in a position of strength throughout the region. 

The SOUFAN Center, a non-profit strategic analysis organization, also believes Iran is posturing to reinforce its influence base within the new Taliban government. In its August 26, 2021 INTELBRIEF [2], SOUFAN indicated “Iranian officials began meeting with Taliban insurgent leaders, and Iran hosted a senior Taliban delegation in Tehran in February 2021.” SOUFAN assesses Tehran is hoping to stabilize its borders and  reduce the flow of refugees into Iran, which hosts some 600,000 documented and two million undocumented Afghans. While many of these predominantly Shia refugees are not likely to rush home to a country led by staunch Sunni fundamentalists with a history of Shia abuses, Iran is probably hopeful stability in the western provinces might provide some relief within the camps.  The INTELBRIEF also reflects on Tehran’s past strategy in Afghanistan and suggests Tehran will hedge its engagement with a new Taliban regime with attempts to build leverage against the group, should the Taliban again become hostile to Iran and its Afghan allies.

Three individuals and one highly effective program are likely to provide Iran placement, access, and operational capability within Afghanistan, in the near future. These men are not on the interim government organizational chart, developed by US State Department Officials, and they are not likely to be as publicly known here in the United States. However, they are historic figures in Iranian, Pakistani and Afghan political and military circles. Their names are Gulbeddin Hekmatyar, Ismail Khan, and Esmail Qaani.   The program is Iran’s heavily recruited and highly effective Fatemiyoun network of soldiers.

Gulbeddin Hekmatyar made a public appearance on September 5^th 2021, in an Afghan news clip, when he met with Pakistan’s ISI commander General Faiz Hameed. News coverage suggested the meeting focused on Taliban’s approach to a more inclusive government. [3]  As a former Prime Minister for the country, in 1996, Hekmatyar anticipates an opportunity within this newly forming government. It will be interesting to see how this plays out, as Hekmatyar lost that position when the Taliban overthrew the Soviet supported government.

Hekmatyar fled Afghanistan and established residence in Mashhad Iran and ultimately in Pakistan. After the 2001 retreat of the Taliban Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force used Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e Islami militia to get Bin Laden back into Afghanistan via his loyalist, Hassan al-Turabi, [4] as well as helping them protect Bin Laden and the rest of Al-Qaeda’s leadership in both Iran and Pakistan. Hekmatyar was also instrumental in aiding IRGC Quds Force efforts in launching the insurgency of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq; an organization that eventually became the Islamic State. [5]

Hekmatyar’s relationship with Iran is much older though. In their book, Night Letters, Sands and Qazizai assert Khomeini and Hekmatyar established a connection in 1979, when the newly established IRGC provided weapons and funding for his Islamic Republic, which grew into Hizb-e Islami. [6] A Guantanamo Bay detainee interview [7] indicates in January of 2000 Hekmatyar, the detainee, Taliban officials, and Iranian representatives all met to discuss US intervention in the region as well as strengthening ties between the Taliban and Iran.

Ultimately, Iran’s long standing relationship with Hekmatyar will provide open lines of communication and situational awareness regarding the strength and presence of Islamic State/al Qaeda in Afghanistan and may eventually provide Tehran a voice within the governmental structure. Hekmatyar, in turn, will likely continue to receive Quds Force support, training, and financing to maintain his militia.

Ismail Khan‘s relationship with Iran has grown from his provincial governance of Herat. Like Hekmatyar, Khan fled to Mashhad Iran after the Taliban seized Herat in 1995. Khan also commands a militia and used these roughly 8,000 fighters to support US and Northern Alliance efforts against the Taliban. But, like Hekmatyar, Khan’s relationship with Iran began in 1979 when he pledged allegiance to Ruhollah Khomeini. [8] Khan, serving as a Captain in the Afghan Army, led a revolt in Herat that year. Using soldiers and civilians he attempted to seize control of the border province from the Soviet backed government. [9]

Khan served in several positions in the US backed Afghan government, first as the Provincial Governor of Herat and then as President Karzai’s Minister of Water and Energy. He was dismissed from both positions due to concerns regarding the depth of his relationship with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Khan was also known to withhold customs revenue and tax collections intended for the country’s national coffers. [10] While governor of Herat, Khan received fuel, ammunition, and arms from Tehran. In exchange, he provided access through Shindand District into the heart of Afghanistan’s Shia Hazara communities. A Los Angeles Times report from 2002 suggests between November and December of 2001 Khan received as many as 20 truckloads of money to secure his Iranian loyalty and support. [11]

In early 2012, the IRGC began reactivating its Fatemiyoun network under Khan in response to NATO’s drawdown. [12] Comprised of Afghan Shias, similar organizations have not fought outside Afghanistan since the Iran Iraq war. The program, which is supervised by IRGC Quds Force and maintains a primary recruitment office in Mashhad Iran, saw regular combat in Syria from 2013 through 2017, when Tehran began to draw down the numbers and encourage veterans to return home to Afghanistan. In 2016 Iran boasted Fatemiyoun numbers reached 20,000. [13]

A 2019 report by USIP indicates “The IRGC may have downsized the Fatemiyoun, but a committed core of the most loyal fighters remains, which suggests that Iran envisions a use for the outfit in a protracted, low-intensity fight in Syria or for deployment to other regional conflicts in the Middle East.” [14] In December 2020, Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif offered to coordinate with the Afghan government for the use of Fatemiyoun forces. [15] He framed this offer of support as an effort to combine forces to defeat Daesh [ISIS-K] and reaffirmed that Fatemiyoun forces would fight under the guidance/command of the Afghan government.

Coincidentally, Khan again raised his militia in an effort to protect Herat, during the Taliban advance in August of 2021. He was captured on August 13^th and held for questioning, only to resurface in Mashhad Iran several days later. Additionally, in the same TOLO news interview with Iran’s Foreign Minister, he was specifically asked about Taliban and Iranian connections in Mashhad. While acknowledging he has heard of the Mashhad Council, he was not familiar with it. [16] Historic and recent reporting continuously provide links back to the city of Mashhad. 

Most recently Khan has spoken out against former president Ashraf Ghani. Using Iranian media platforms, Khan is reestablishing his narrative as a Mujahedeen leader and central figure in Afghanistan’s long fight against occupation. [17] Khan is also playing on his prominence in Shia communities, even though he is a Sunni. He likely hopes this will provide an opportunity for political clout as more governmental positions are announced.

There is a common thread between the Fatemiyoun Brigade, Ismail Khan, and Gulbeddin Hekmatyar; it is the IRGC. This relationship is long standing, with origins to Ruhollah Khomeini and the Islamic movement of the late 70s and early 80s. The new face of the IRGC Quds Force is Esmail Qaani, former deputy to his predecessor Qasim Soleimani and expert on Afghanistan. Qaani, who was born in Mashhad Iran, once said of Soeimani “Those who become friends at times of hardship, have deeper and more lasting relations than those who become friends just because they are neighborhood friends.” [18]

This bond of hardship and combat likely extends to both Hekmatyar and Khan through their mutual ties to the United Islamic National Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan, also known as the Northern Alliance, against the Taliban in the late 1990s. [19] Furthermore, this affiliation to what Qaani calls the boys of Mashhad extends to the current Supreme leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei. A young Khamenei would lead mourning ceremonies for Imam Reza, the eighth Imam of the Shi’a buried in Khorasan, with “the boys from Mashhad,” who served in the Fifth Nasr Division during the war with Iraq. [20]

Qaani’s Quds Force experience in Afghanistan is first reported in Mohammad Mohaddessin’s “Islamic Fundamentalism: The New Global Threat” circa 1993 [21] and this expertise has solidified his point position on all things Afghan. On September 7, 2021, Qaani briefed the Majlis (Iranian parliament) focusing on the Taliban’s intention to form an inclusive government and the importance of avoiding a Sunni/Shia conflict in the country. This message is certainly in line with holding back on use of Hekmatyar and Khan’s militia groups in favor of political maneuvering up front.

Another key indicator of a common and unifying goal in Afghanistan comes from author Sadollah Zarei: “Worthy of note is that in the past two decades, the Taliban have been following the call of the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini on Muslims to strive to form governments that are independent of oppressing foreign powers, and fight against corruption at home.” [22] This thought resonates with another observation by Oved Lobel. In his paper, The Graveyard of Empires: The Causes and Consequences of American Withdrawal from Afghanistan, Oved Lobel states: “In reality, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), as its name implies, has absolutely no relation to Iran.  It is the army of a wholly integrated transnational clerical network that emerged out of the Iraqi Shia religious center of Najaf in the 1950sand 1960s.” Lobel further asserts it is not the leaders of Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan who call the shots, but pan-Islamic global crusade whose elements are inextricably intertwined and ultimately control Pakistan and Iran. [23]

Conclusion

Understanding Khomeini’s interpretation of velayat-e faqih (province or governorate) is the key to Iranian foreign policy. This is especially true since the players outlined in this work are all vehement followers of his movement. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini claimed both religious and political authority over jurists (those who make law) and the people. This is in direct contrast to Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani and current marji (religious reference) in Najaf. Sistani is a staunch believer in the separation of church and state, denouncing the idea of absolute guardianship. So, as the West continues to view current events as a move towards regional dominance, the East likely sees this as the next step in validating Khomeini’s interpretation of the Quran.

Endnotes:

[1] Alireza Nader, “Iran’s Influence in Afghanistan Implications for the U.S. Drawdown” Rand Corporation, 2014

[2] https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2021-august-26/

[3] https://www.geo.tv/latest/368929-isi-chief-meets-gulbuddin-hekmatyar-and-other-taliban-leaders-in-kabul

[4] Leah Farrall and Mustafa Hamid, The Arabs at War in Afghanistan, London: Hurst & Co., 2015

[5] Chris Sands with Fazelminallah Qazizai, Night Letters pp. 410-13.

[6] Sands and Qazizai, p. 343.

[7] https://kyleorton.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/khirullah-khairkhwa-2005-10-07-evidence-summary-links-with-iran.pdf

[8] Barnett R. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System p. 187

[9] Vasili Mitrokhin and Christopher Andrew, The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World (New York: Basic Books, 2005), pp. 391-2

[10] Philadelphia Inquirer, 5 October 2003. Significant revenue is raised by custom officials who demand as much as $300 for trucks to pass through the city

[11] Los Angeles Times, 6 Jan 2002 and The Guardian, 24 Jan 2002. Khan’s militia forces that not only wear uniforms supplied by Iran but are distinguished by their Palestinian-style black and white checkered keffiyehs

[12] Graham Bowley, “Afghan Warlord’s Call to Arms Rattles Officials,” New York Times, November 12, 2012

[13] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/1/22/iran-foreign-legion-leans-on-afghan-shia-in-syria-war

[14] https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2019-03/sr_443-the_fatemiyoun_army_reintegration_into_afghan_society-pdf_0.pdf

[15] https://tolonews.com/afghanistan-168674

[16] Ibid

[17] https://ifpnews.com/ismail-khan-recent-events-in-afghanistan-coup-ghani-committed-treason

[18] https://agsiw.org/who-is-the-new-chief-commander-of-irans-quds-force/

[19] Ibid

[20] “Mo’avenat-e Farhangi-ye Moassesseh-ye Revayat-e Sireh-ye Shohada: Jay-e Pa-ye Baran” [The Footprint of Rain], Qom: Moavenat-e Farhangi-ye Moassesseh-ye Revayat-e Sireh-ye Shohada, n.d., 10.

[21] Mohammad Mohaddessin, Islamic Fundamentalism—The New Global Threat (Washington DC: Seven Locks Press, 1993, 2001), 200

[22] https://iranintl.com/en/world/us-wary-iran-taliban-alliance-hardliner-newspaper-claims

[23] Oved Lobel “The Graveyard of Empires: The Causes and Consequences of American Withdrawal from Afghanistan” April 21, 2021

**********

Photos:

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar: BBC Persian, September 28, 2019. Creative Commons license, Wikipedia.

Ismail Khan: Ismail Khan at the 2010 National Conference on Water Resources, Development, and Management of Afghaninistan. By Employee of the United States Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan (U.S. State Department). Cropped by Officer – U.S Embassy Kabul Afghanistan, Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=14968711.

Esmail Ghaani: By Khamenei.ir, 2020, CC BY 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=98095340.

Map: Derived from CIA map.