On August 15, 2021, the Taliban entered Kabul and assumed the reigns of government. A few months earlier, the Biden administration announced the implementation of the February 2020 Doha agreement that had been negotiated by the Trump administration. This resulted in an announcement of a full withdrawal of U.S. forces and contractor support.

Defeat of the ANDSF. By the spring of 2021 the support provided to the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) was greatly diminished and it experienced defeat after defeat on the battlefield. There are number of reasons for the defeat of the ANDSF and these will be studied for decades to come by military analysts and national security ‘experts’. However, the bottom line is that the Taliban took district after district and province after province until it reached the gates of Kabul. However, the reasons for the loss of Afghanistan extends far beyond the defeat of the ANDSF. The successive Afghan governments were inept and corrupt and lack influence and capacity at the sub-national level. The United States is far from blame – having made many strategic errors in Afghanistan over the course of twenty years.

Kabul Airlift. As the Taliban advanced, the United States was withdrawing the last of its forces. By August 15th, the remaining troops were either located at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul or at the Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA). In the preceeding months the Department of State (DoS), despite urging from the Department of Defense (DoD), refused to evacuate the U.S. Embassy as the Taliban were steadily making progress across Afghanistan. The DoS, over the course of time, has a dismal record when initiating non-combatant evacuation operations in times of crisis. Finally, much too late, DoS declared a Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) and the DoD was presented with an almost impossible task of securing the Kabul airport and conducting operations in support of the Kabul NEO.

SIV Program. Over the course of the 20-year involvement of the United States in the long-running conflict in Afghanistan it received considerable support from Afghans. The military and other governmental agencies were very reliant on interpreters to conduct operations, activities, and implement programs in Afghanistan. In 2009, the Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) program was established to provide an opportunity for some of these interpreters and others who assisted the U.S. to re-locate to the United States. Eventually, this would lead to the ability to apply for a legal permanent resident (LPR) status (Green Card). However, the program was slow and bureaucratic.

At-Risk Afghans. With the rise to power of the Taliban these interpreters and others realized they and their families would be subject to reprisals by the victorious Taliban. In fact, this has been happening over the past two years – former interpreters have been singled out for detention, imprisionment, torture, and death. In addition, former members of the National Directorate of Security (NDS), Afghan National Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC), Afghan Air Force (AAF), and Special Mission Wing (SMW) have also been hunted down and faced reprisals. It is no wonder that these at-risk Afghans swarmed the Kabul airport seeking space on U.S. military aircraft conducting the evacuation of Americans, LPRs, foreign nations, and those who could prove they were holders of a Special Immigrant Visa. The airport was overwhelmed.

Two Weeks of Chaos. From August 15 to August 30 the world was captivated by the attempt of nations from across the world to evacute their embassy staff, foreign nationals, and at-risk Afghans that they could identify as having aided their country’s efforts in Afghanistan. During this two week period over 124,000 people were evacuated from the Kabul airport by the various nations. Unfortunately, by the end of the NEO, many U.S. citizens, LPRs, and SIV holders were left behind.

Volunteer Groups. Beginning in early August 2021 informal groups of U.S. veterans and others began to organize themselves in an effort to assist the thousands of Americans, LPRs, and at-risk Afghans (interpreters and others) get access to the interior of HKIA. While a few were actively on the ground in Kabul the vast majority were supporting the effort from their home offices or workspace using phones, WhatsApp, Signal, Zoom, and other messaging services. These volunteer groups – like No One Left Behind, Team America Relief, and others – stepped into the gap caused by the inadequate planning and preparation of the DoS. Thousands of people got onto the HKIA evacuation flights as a result of these hastily formed volunteer groups. Over time, these groups – hundreds of them, small and large – would be affiliated with larger umbrella organizations such as the Afghan Evac coalition, Evacuate our Allies, or the Moral Compass Federation.

The Aftermath of the Kabul NEO. After the conclusion of the Kabul airlift at the end of August these volunteer groups continued to operate for several months – assisting Americans, LPRs, and Afghans in departures from the Mazur-e-Sharif airport in northern Afghanistan and in overland movement to Pakistan and other neighboring countries. As Afghans made their way to the United States the efforts of many groups turned to the resettlement process – finding jobs, living arrangements, processing legal paperwork, and navigating the difficulties of adapting to a new country.

Afghan Adjustment Act. One of the more important efforts of the various volunteer groups is the advocating for Congressional legislation that would provide a legal pathway for Afghans who arrived in the U.S. after evacuation from Kabul. In addition, there are provisions in the proposed Afghan Adjustment Act (AAA) that would provide SIV status to members of ANASOC, AAF, and the SMW. Unfortunately, Congress has failed to support this important legislation. Organizations at the national level such as Evacuate Our Allies (EOA) are fighting hard in Washington, D.C. for Congressional support for the AAA. This advocacy effort is also found across the country at the local level – the Maine Vets for Afghans is one such example.

More Work Remains. The work of assisting at-risk Afghans continues today – two years after the fall of Kabul. Some volunteer groups have disbanded, the members having completed their mission of relocating the Afghans they were assisting. Some are no longer operating – the members returning to their normal lives – after depleting their financial resources, spending time away from their jobs, and sacrificing family life. Many U.S. veterans of the Afghan conflict and members of these Afghan Evac volunteer groups have suffered from moral injury. But many groups, like Team America Relief, continue to assist in the relocation of Afghans to the United States, resettlement efforts, and advocacy for Afghans.

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The author is a member of Team America Relief and Maine Vets for Afghans.

By Charles Davis.

“Nobody wants to sit where I am and think now about what ‘coulda, shoulda, woulda’ happened in order to avoid this.” – Secretary of State Hilary Clinton [1]

The Department of State has an abysmal record of conducting Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO), especially when it comes to emergency response to social unrest and instability in conflict zones. There are internal mechanisms in place for leaders to learn from these events and to take steps to strengthen their processes. However, whether an issue of not wanting to have written documentation of failures and shortcomings or general disregard for the requirements, Department of State (DoS) officials are slow to publish after-action documentation of past events and neglect to act on the recommendations of these reports. This calls into question DoS level of readiness as we face continued friction and instability over Taiwan.  

A memorandum of agreement between the Departments of State and Defense indicates the Department of State (DoS) will exercise overall responsibility for protecting U.S. citizens and nationals and designated other persons, to include, when necessary and feasible, their evacuation to and welfare in relatively safe areas.  DoS further assumes responsibility for minimizing their risk of death or seizure as hostages and reducing their presence in probable or actual combat areas, so that combat effectiveness of U.S. and allied forces is not impaired. [2]

This same memorandum tasks the Department of Defense (DoD) with monitoring the political, military, economic, and other conditions. DoD will assess levels of hostility; local national willingness to provide protections for US citizens, nationals and other designees; number and locations of the same persons abroad and evacuation and protection capabilities, including transportation/lift requirements and their availability as well as the availability of relatively safe holding or survival areas for staging evacuees during emergencies. [3] These are considered Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs).

While each agency has its own lines of effort, the DoS has ultimate responsibility to prepare plans for protection and evacuation of US citizens and DoD non-combatants. This includes coordination to maximize timely use of available military transportation assets and existing host nation support infrastructure. Given the significant failures of Benghazi and Afghanistan along with questionable decisions about non-government US citizens in Sudan, it is no wonder there is concern and apprehension in the DoS planning approach to Taiwan.

Concerns Over DoS Planning and Readiness for NEOs

National level concerns over DoS planning and readiness is not a new focus. In 2007 the Government Accountability Office (GAO) was tasked with assessing evacuation planning and preparations for overseas posts. As part of the evaluation, the team assessed DoS guidance and plans to prepare for evacuation, training and exercises to prepare post staff for crisis, and efforts to collect, analyze, and incorporate evacuation lessons learned into guidance and training. [4]

The findings stated, “Posts do not find State’s primary guidance particularly useful in preparing for evacuation. In addition, while State requires posts to update Emergency Action Plans (EAP)s annually, almost 40 percent of posts surveyed have not updated their plans in 18 months or longer. Post-produced estimates of American citizens in a country are best guesses and more than three-quarters of posts said their last estimate was, at best, only somewhat accurate. We also found weaknesses in a memorandum of agreement (MOA) between State and DoD that could limit these agencies’ ability to effectively work together during a large-scale evacuation.” [5]

Other findings, from the report, suggest Emergency Action Committee members have not been properly trained on their duties, new staff have gone untrained and, crisis management exercises do not reflect likely scenarios given the assignment locations. Furthermore, roughly 60% of posts evacuated between 2002-2007 did not produce the required after action report, so there are no lessons learned to be applied to future crisis management situations.

Several of the GAO findings and recommendations provided in the 2007 report surfaced again in the Final Report of The Select Committee on the Events Surrounding the 2012 Terrorist Attack in Benghazi (H. Rept. 114-848). Select Committee recommendations included “a clear designation of ‘who is in charge of managing and following up on response in emergent situations as well as the roles and responsibilities of involved departments and agencies. There needed to be greater interoperability and improved communications during contingencies. Additionally, relevant agencies need to be involved in each other’s emergency action plans and, where capability on the ground is insufficient and the DoD cannot respond immediately the DoS and other agencies adjust their plans to allow for local or regional resources to be identified ahead of time. [6]

Commonalities in the GOA report of 2007 and the planning and coordination failures in the 2012 Benghazi report suggest lessons learned were not being captured and shared. This is an indicator that recommendations from 2007 may not have gained traction over the proceeding five years. A final recommendation from the Benghazi report encourages agencies on the ground to plan for standby military support before a crisis occurs in high threat environments. The recommendation also suggests including feasible support from U.S. allies. “In addition, the coordinating body should provide for a specific mechanism to know and understand assets and capabilities actually available at any given time.” [7] It is evident from the failures in the Afghanistan evacuation, these recommendation also gained little or no traction in the proceeding 10 years.

In 2017 the GAO initiated a follow-on assessment of DoS emergency preparedness. GAO findings during this evaluation period indicate only 2 of the 20 evaluated posts, which were approved by DoS Bureau of Diplomatic Security, had updated all key EAPs. “GAO also found that EAPs are viewed as lengthy and cumbersome documents that are not readily usable in emergency situations”, suggesting that EAPs serve as a check the box requirement rather than a functional plan for implementation. [8] Another significant finding indicates only 36% of the posts reported completing their evacuation drills.

GAO report 17-174 reiterated what should be obvious from previous agency assessments and actual events. DoS needs to ensure posts complete EAP updates and training exercises. Because of the inconsistency in following requirements, DoS should more closely track the policy requirements and verify posts are following through during EAP cycles. Most importantly, “State could develop a more streamlined version of the EAP—consisting of key sections, checklists, and contact lists—that could be used [by staff in and emergency], in addition to the full EAP… and take steps to ensure overseas post complete required lessons learned reports…” [9] These are all items addressed in some form during the 2007 assessment of DoS readiness.

Kabul NEO – August 2021

Photo: U.S. Marines from the Special Purpose Marine Air-Gournd Task Force – Crisis Response Central Command provide security during the Kabul NEO on August 20, 2021. (Photo by Lance Cpl Nicholas Guevara).

Four years after GAO report 17-174 there was a systemic failure during the evacuation of Afghanistan. House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) Interim Report “A Strategic Failure: Assessing the Administration’s Afghanistan Withdrawal” asserts there was a failure to plan. Findings from the report indicate the “[DoS] took very few substantive steps to prepare for the consequences that were expected.” [10] The report further indicates “Military commanders have clearly stated there was an utter lack of urgency on the part of the White House, the National Security Council (NSC), and the State Department as it pertained to an evacuation, despite repeated dire warnings.” [11] These comments seem to be echoed by reports that Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Milley believed DoS waited too long to initiate evacuation efforts. [12]

The HFAC report also addresses key planning failures regarding NEOs. “[DoS] was unable to provide adequate assistance to U.S. citizens (AMCITs), lawful permanent residents (LPRs), Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) holders and applicants, and other at-risk Afghans who were attempting to evacuate the country during the NEO. Would be evacuees were sent conflicting messages, told they could not be helped, or left standing outside the gates of the airport…” [13] Given our adversaries use of Information Warfare, disinformation operations and deep fakes, DoS needs to be both mindful and prepared with a strong communications plan.

Additionally, “U.S. military personnel on the ground involved in the evacuation said they had been prohibited from coordinating evacuation planning with all allies except for the UK until early August 2021.” [14] This is an operational failure which was identified and addressed as a key planning consideration in the Benghazi Report. General Sullivan noted US forces weren’t even allowed to coordinate with the Turkish forces commanding a primary military contingency at the airport and Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman did not begin NEO coordination through her channels until August 22, 2021, which was nine days after the fall of Herat and Taliban seizing control of all national border crossings. [15] These types of coordination would have been critical to success given the more than 20 countries and organizations that were trying to conduct similar evacuations. Failing to heed this type of coordination in future NEOs, such as Taiwan, will also be disastrous. This is especially true given the number of countries who have a significant population of citizens working in Taiwan.

In early July 2023 the U.S. Department of State released its After Action Review on Afghanistan that covers the period of January 2020 to August 2021. The principal finding in the 87-page report was that the State Department acted too late to conduct the NEO and that there was a lack of coordination among the senior leadership of the State Department.

Sudan NEO – April 2023

Photo: Secretary of State Blinken monitoring the evacuation of diplomatic staff from Sudan on 22 April 2023. DoS photo.

On April 22, 2023 DoS initiated an evacuation of Embassy personnel and their dependents from Khartoum Sudan. This evacuation did not include civilians and other designees. Under Secretary for Management, Ambassador John Bass indicated the DoD took the lead on evacuation operations for the Embassy after it was determined that use of commercial air and access to the airport was no longer an option. He further applied to the loss of access to commercial air as a reason not to attempt a US government evacuation of other American citizens in the near term. [16]

Ambassador Bass did indicate the DoS was attempting to maintain contact with US citizens and provide them with a best assessment of the security environment, while encouraging them to take appropriate precautions. He further asserted the DoS was working with other countries and the United Nations, as well as international organizations to enable US citizens to make their way to safety. [17]  There was no indication that this was part of an EAP or that early coordination had been ongoing, with an expectation for the DoS to need the support of partner countries and non-government organizations. Given previous examples of planning failures and the number of posts that have not completed EAP requirements, it is likely these efforts were cobbled together as events unfolded.

Is DoS Prepared for a Future NEO in Taiwan?

Recent reporting from multiple news agencies suggests the United States is conducting advance planning for a potential NEO evacuation of the Taiwan DoS post. While the one China policy has dictated that the US not establish an embassy in Taiwan, DoS works out of the American Institute in Taiwan. A June 13, 2023 piece by dayFREURO suggest multiple sources provided perspective on US evacuation planning that began more than 6 months prior. Unnamed sources indicated the planning process was not a public topic due to its sensitive nature and the potential fear and apprehension it might evoke within the Taiwanese population. [18]  The fact that DoS is taking an active planning approach, suggests recommendations and lessons learned are finally being applied in EAP development for this post.

A Messenger report from December 2021 indicates roughly two thirds of the Taiwanese population identifies as Taiwanese rather than Chinese. This growing shift along with recent Taiwan and US efforts to shore up defenses may be contributing to China’s need to act sooner rather than later, on its claims to the island nation.  This is not the first time Taiwan and the US have drawn attention over evacuation training. A 2003 Taipei Times report on joint training exercise Han Kuang #19 indicated Deputy Defense Minister Chen Chao-ming specifically addressed the inaccurate perception the US military was participating in evacuation training. [19]

“China has unsuccessfully attempted military force against Taiwan before, in the 1950s and 1990s. For much of that period, Taiwan itself had a superior military to the People’s Republic, and U.S. naval dominance in the region was unquestioned.” [20] An example can be found in June 1950, when President Truman placed the 7th Fleet between mainland China and Taiwan. In this case deterrence through the neutralization of the Taiwan Strait discouraged Chinese forces from conducting an amphibious assault. However, the same policy of deterrence today may be speeding China’s decision-making timeline.

As DoS continues to develop NEO evacuation planning, the Philippines are likely to play a key role. The  country’s May 2022 presidential election significantly shifted Philippine relations with the US and China and allowed the US to reestablish democratic relationships that had deteriorated under Rodrigo Duterte. [21]  And, as recently as May 2023 the US has reaffirmed its 72 year defense alliance with the Philippines, through a defense treaty in the South China Sea. [22]  Just days after confirming this treaty, President Marcos indicated Philippine bases could play a key role if China were to attack Taiwan. [23]

An example of how DoS planning might leverage Philippine bases includes the Ports of Kaohsiung and Subic Bay. Kaohsiung is located on Taiwan’s southwestern coastline and Kaohsiung port is one of the biggest container handling facilities in the world. The port handles roughly 5000 vessels and 18,900,000 tonnes of cargo annually. [24] Along with the port, Kaohsiung boast one of the country’s largest international airports co-located just outside the port area. Subic Bay, Philippines is approximately 500 miles south and served as a US naval base until 1992. The Subic facilities also include an international airport. Given DoS intentions to rely on commercial transportation as a first alternative, these two facilities provide multiple avenues for departure and arrival, not only for US citizens but other countries as well.

A possible indicator to the approach above can be found in a DoS Joint Statement from April 11, 2023. “Mindful of the growing complexity of the Indo-Pacific security environment, including the multidimensional nature of modern challenges and threats to the peace and security of the Philippines and the United States, the Secretaries reaffirmed their shared determination to defend against external armed attack in the Pacific… Accelerate the implementation of [Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement] EDCA projects and increase investments in EDCA agreed Locations to further support combined training, exercises, and interoperability between the U.S. and Philippine Armed Forces, as well as the Philippines’ civilian-led disaster preparedness and response capacities. The United States expects to have allocated over $100 million by the end of fiscal year 2023 toward infrastructure investments at the existing five EDCA sites and to support swift operationalization of the four new sites.” [25]

Whether through learning from previous events or developing new approaches, DoS will face significant obstacles during a NEO event in Taiwan. Reliance on a variety of networks and resources will be paramount to conducting a successful NEO. This will include advance coordination and relationship building before the crisis and NGOs may play a substantial role. In early 2000 Taiwan established the Department of NGO International Relations, which falls under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is responsible for maintaining positive relationships with NGOs, through open dialogue on difficult topics such as political freedom and civil rights. Associations such as this provide early indicators of instability which may extend operational and execution timelines and in a potential crisis such as this time is a valuable commodity. 

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Top Photo: U.S. Marines provide security during drawdown of designated personnel in Afghanistan on August 18, 2021. (U.S. Marine Corps photo).

Map: Taiwan map derived from maps from the Central Intelligence Agency.

[1] https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/01/23/top-quotes-from-hillary-clintons-benghazi-hearings

[2] https://prhome.defense.gov/Portals/52/Documents/PR%20Docs/DOS-DOD%20Memo%20of%20Agreement%20on%20Protection%20and%20Evacuation.pdf

[3] Ibid.

[4] GAO-08-23 State Department: Evacuation Planning and Preparations for Overseas Posts Can Be Improved

[5] ibid

[6] https://www.congress.gov/114/crpt/hrpt848/CRPT-114hrpt848.pdf

[7] ibid

[8] https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-17-714.pdf

[9] https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-17-714.pdf

[10] https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/HFAC-Republican-Interim-Report-A-22Strategic-Failure22-Assessing-the-Administrations-Afghanistan-Withdrawal.pdf

[11] ibid

[12] General Mark Milley Privately Blamed the State Department for the Disorganized Evacuation of Afghanistan (sofrep.com)

[13] https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/HFAC-Republican-Interim-Report-A-22Strategic-Failure22-Assessing-the-Administrations-Afghanistan-Withdrawal.pdf

[14] Ibid

[15] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/afghan-commander-ismail-khan-captured-taliban-seize-herat-2021-08-13/

[16] https://www.state.gov/briefing-with-under-secretary-for-management-ambassador-john-bass-assistant-secretary-for-african-affairs-ambassador-molly-phee-assistant-secretary-of-defense-for-special-operations-and-low-intensit/

[17] ibid

[18] https://euro.dayfr.com/trends/352257.html

[19] https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2003/01/03/189539

[20] https://themessenger.com/grid/test-imagining-the-unimaginable-the-us-china-and-war-over-taiwan

[21] https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/2022-philippine-election-trouble-democracy-and-foreign-relations-ahead

[22] https://www.reuters.com/world/us-issues-guidelines-defending-philippines-south-china-sea-attack-2023-05-04/

[23] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/marcos-says-philippines-bases-could-be-useful-if-taiwan-attacked-2023-05-05/

[24] https://www.marineinsight.com/know-more/8-major-ports-of-taiwan/

[25] Joint Statement of the U.S.-Philippines 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue – United States Department of State

Over the last several days the security situation in Sudan has become worse. There is fighting in the capital city of Khartoum, the airport is closed, hundreds of lives have been lost, and thousands injured. Most of the essentials of living (food, water, electricity, medical care, etc.) are in short supply or no longer available. It is unclear which faction controls what part of the country. The fighting has interrupted what many had hoped would be a peaceful transition to civilian rule in the coming weeks; one that should have started at the beginning of April.

Fight Between Two Warring Parties. The clash between the warring parties began on or about April 14, 2023. The two factions are the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and a paramilitary group known as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Both commanded by opposing Sudanese generals. In addition, there are a host of other local warlords, militias, and violent groups within Sudan contributing to the chaos. The leaders of both factions have been jockeying for power in the soon to be formed civilian government.

Al-Burhan and SAF. Sudanese President Genearl Abdel Fattah al-Burhan is head of the country’s transitional governing Sovereign Council. Sudanese soldiers are loyal to army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan (Wikipedia). The situation has been, according to al-Burhan, characterized as a rebellion and coup against the government of Sudan.

Dagalo and RSF. The Rapid Support Forces forces or RSF are led by Vice President General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo; he is deputy head of the Sovereign Council. Dagalo is a former camel herder from the Darfur region and has economic interests in minerals and livestock. The RSF was created in 2013 by former President Omar Hassan al-Bashir. The roots of the RSF can be found in a pro-government Janjaweed militia that was active in Darfur in the early 2000s where a local rebellion was defeated. The RSF also sent fighters to Yemen in the battle against Iran-aligned rebels; on behalf of some Gulf region countries.

Background to the Conflict. The two generals had been sharing power since an October 2021 coup. Disagreements arose over the integration of the Rapid Support Forces into the Sudanese Armed Forces. In addition, members of the Sudanese military feared the loss of control over revenue generating functions in the government and in society with a move to civilian control. Corruption has always played a large role in Sudan. A breakdown of the origins of the current conflict is presented by Jelena Pejic in “The Fighting in Sudan is an Armed Conflict: Here’s What Law Applies”, Just Security, April 20, 2023. The Pejic article also explores the legal status of the SAF and RSF.

Other Actors. There are reports that some regional nations may be providing support to the combatant forces. Egypt is believed to have sent aircraft to Sudan and possibly tanks and military personnel to support the government forces. It has close ties with Sudan’s military as it sees it as an ally against Ethiopia. Some reports indicate that the Russian paramilitary organization – the Wagner Group – could be aiding the RSF (CNN, Apr 21, 2023). The PMC is reported to have operated in Sudan since 2017. Russia would like to set up a small naval contingent in Port Sudan on the Red Sea. In addition, international media sources say that General Dagalo and the RSF are backed by Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar. The United Arab Emirates has close ties with the RSF.

Embassy Staff. Nations around the world are worried about their diplomatic staffs and their nationals that are living and working in Sudan. The United States has Department of State (DoS) embassy personnel that need to be evacuated but no attempt has been made thus far. DoS is instructing embassy personnel to ‘shelter in place’. The Department of State says it has ‘full accountability’ of its embassy personnel.

U.S. Citizens. Thousands of U.S. citizens who live or work in Sudan are in danger as well; many of them dual citizens. There are reports that at least one American citizen has died in the violence (according to DoS). It is impossible to leave the country by air as the Khartoum International Airport is closed due to battle damage and battles occurring on or near the airport. The State Department has stated that it is not safe to undertake a U.S. government coordinated evacuation of private American citizens at this time. There are about 19,000 Americans in Sudan. A Department of State spokesman ‘waffled’ a bit on April 20th when asked by journalists at a press conference if the U.S. was prepared or planning to evacuate U.S. citizens who were not embassy employees.

Refugees, Displaced Civilians, and Humanitarian Issues. Thousands of Sudanese, most from the Darfur region (Wikipedia), have fled to neighboring countries; many to Chad (CIA map). They are traveling along the roads as air travel is nonexistent in Sudan at this time. There are reports that Sudan’s southern border with Chad has been closed. Many Sudanese have fled the areas of the fighting for safer regions of Sudan. They are suffering from lack of shelter and food. Delivery of humanitarian supplies by international organizations has been extremely curtained due to the security situation.

U.S. Response. Up to now, the United States response to the crisis has been to encourage the two opponents to cease hostilities and to engage regional powers close to Sudan to use their influence to end the conflict. Secretary of State Antony Blinken has spoken with (DoS) the two generals leading the forces in the conflict; asking for a ceasefire. Thus far, the diplomatic efforts have been a failure; at least from what can be gleaned from open source news reports.

International Response. Countries around the world are weighing in on the conflict – using their influence to negotiate a ceasefire and end to the hostilities. The United Nations has been very active in attempts to bring an end to the conflict as well. Germany and Norway made some initial attempts to evacuate embassy personnel but these did not pan out. Some other nations are positioning forces in the region (aircraft, etc.) but they have not entered Sudan as of yet. Most of the international response has been public comments and diplomacy behind the scenes.

Ceasefire. Two cessations to the fighting have occurred, but both were unsuccessful. There is hope that another ceasefire will take place over the Eid al-Fitr celebrations. This would allow citizens to escape the conflict zones, receive medical care, and find food and shelter. The U.S. Department of State said on April 20th (DoS) that the “24-hour ceasefire announced on April 19th has mostly held.” The statement that the ceasefire ‘has mostly held’ has been questioned by many observers of the conflict. The Department of State is hoping that the ceasefire can be extended (DoS) to Sunday, April 23rd, which would be the end of Eid.

NEO. At this point, the United States has determined that it can’t evacuate its embassy staff or any of the thousands of American citizens. That is, until the security situation improves. At some point, the United States may decide to conduct a non-combatant evacuation operation. A Sudan NEO would most likely be preceded with some intense negotiations between the United States and the two warring factions to ensure that the U.S. does not get dragged into a civil war. It is unlikely that the United States would conduct a ‘forcible entry’ into the airport.

Khartoum International Airport. The largest airport in Sudan, Khartoum International Airport (Wikipedia), is located in the capital city. As of April 20th it was closed to air traffic. Media reports indicate that the airport was a target of heavy shelling with destroyed airplanes on the runways and ramps.

U.S. Forces Moving. The U.S. is currently positioning military forces and assets at Camp Lemonnier (Wikipedia) in the country of Djibouti (CIA map). Camp Lemonnier is usually home to about 2,500 service members who belong to Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). This TF conducts a variety of operations in the Horn of Africa region. Forces in Djibouti are about 1,000 miles distant (1,700 kilometers); about a 4 hour and 40 minute flight. Camp Lemonnier is the best location from which to stage a NEO and to where evacuees would first be sent before their onward movement to another location.

U.S. Future Actions? The current administration has still not recovered from the chaotic Afghanistan non-combatant evacuation operation (Afghan War News) conducted in August 2021. One hopes that the Department of State has learned a few lessons since then. If it decides to conduct a NEO then hopefully the planning has already been done and the Department of Defense is ready to execute it.

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Maps: Derived from maps by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).