During Desert Storm several U.S. Army teams of Green Berets were infiltrated deep behind enemy lines to conduct surveillance and reconnaissance missions. Some of these Special Forces teams were compromised by civilians who discovered their location. A few of the SF teams had to fight enemy combatants until they were exfiltrated by helicopter.

On February 23, 1991, SFODA 525, led by CW2 Chad Balwanz, was inserted by helicopter at night and moved to a hide site to observe traffic moving south along Highway 7 at a location north of the Euphrates River. This 5th Special Forces team would soon find itself fighting for survival against an overwhelming enemy force.

On the night of the day before the ground offensive of Desert Storm began, Special Forces reconnaissance teams were inserted deep behind enemy lines in Iraq to gather and report intelligence of Iraqi troop movements. Many were put in areas over 150 miles inside Iraq – far from friendly forces. The teams had at least three members – sometimes 8 or more. Each team had at least one communicator responsible for sending and receiving messages from the command and control node.

These Special Reconnaissance (SR) teams were emplaced in enemy territory in support of both the XVIII Airborne Corps and the VII corps. They were on watch for movements of SCUD missiles, elements of the Republican Guard, and other significant enemy activities.

The teams would carry rucksacks that contained water, food, radios, ammunition, batteries for the radios, and more. In addition, other equipment such as a GPS, knife, compass, and medical kit were hung in various configurations on their combat vests. Rucks and other equipment could easily reach over 150 pounds. Add to that the equipment and materials needed to dig and camouflage the hide site.

Most teams would insert via MH-60 or MH-47 helicopters from the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) at a location far from the observation site yet within walking distance. Once infiltrated, at night, the team would move by foot overland to the target area, select the hide site, and begin the process to dig in and camouflage the area before early morning light.

ODA 525 had infiltrated in two MH-60 Black Hawks from Task Force 160 and moved overland with their heavy rucks (175 lbs) to the target area. The eight team members dug in at a location about 300 meters east of Highway 7 that offered a good observation point. The highway was one of the main routes that ran from Baghdad south through the Euphrates river valley. The team finished the process of building the hide site before dawn on the morning of February 24, 1991 and settled in to observe the highway.

As the morning sun came up the team could see and hear a lot of civilian activity in the area. There were people tending to cattle and sheep, women were collecting firewood, and children were playing. The area had more people in the area than the team had anticipated and intelligence reports had indicated. The soil was very difficult to dig into so the hide site was less than optimal.

The team was soon discovered by three children – a boy and two girls. The SF detachment reached a critical decision point – what to do with the children. The children left the team’s location unharmed. The team decided to change their location and began movement to another area. Not long after that an adult with Bedouin headdress approached the team with children . . . and saw members of the team. The unarmed adult was allowed to leave – which he did in haste.

Before long the team had armed Bedouin tribesmen in their immediate area and which was followed with the arrival of Iraqi soldiers. The team was in a tenuous position – miles behind enemy lines, lightly armed, and vastly outnumbered with no ground mobility vehicles to evade.

Within minutes the team was engaged in a battle with the 150-man Iraq force. In the first ten minutes of the battle 40 Iraqi soldiers lay dead and many more were wounded.

The battle continued through the day. The team leader, Balwanz, called in for air support. The team was supported with air strikes that kept the Iraqi troops from overrunning the team’s position. Many of the bombs were dropped ‘danger close’. Estimates of enemy deaths were from 100 to 300 personnel due to the SF team and supporting aircraft.

The SF soldiers used emergency PRC-90 radios and signal mirrors to communicate with the supporting aircraft during the battle. Although the fight had lasted hours none of the Green Berets were killed or wounded.

By nightfall the fight was under control – the team and supporting craft had kept the Iraqis at bay. The team moved to an area more suited for a helicopter exfiltration. That evening, after darkness settled in, two MH-60s from TF-160 landed near the team’s location and brought the team to safety and to King Fahd International Airport.

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References:

Thomas, Rhys. (2016). Danger Close: The Rescue of ODA-525. Lulu.
https://bookshop.org/a/753/9781365626548

Johnson, William M. (1996). U.S. Army Special Forces in Desert Shield / Desert Storm: How Significant an Impact. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, pages 68-70, PDF.
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA312864.pdf

“Voices in the Storm: Against all Odds”, Frontline, PBS. – The Gulf War. Chad Balwanz, the team leader of SFODA 525, is interviewed about the team’s mission.
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/voices/2.html

“Chad Balwanz”, Hazard Ground Podcast, Episode 140, October 31, 2019. Hear the firsthand account of ODA 525 and their fight to survive from the team leader of the Special Forces detachment.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ksmg0U2ILo8

Editor’s note: This article was first published by SOF News on February 24, 2021.

Story by Senior Airman Christopher Storer.

The 16th Special Operations Squadron conducted a memorial flight over Cannon Air Force Base to honor the crew of Spirit 03, Jan. 31, 2022.

“Where there is Spirit, there is freedom” is seen on many plaques throughout the 16 SOS squadron building, memorializing the crew of Spirit 03. Commonly known as the last AC-130 gunship shot down in combat, Spirit 03 is a story of heroes, harrowing combat and sacrifice.

According to the Air Force Special Operations Command history office, the Iraqi army planned to invade Khafji, Saudi Arabia at the end of January, 1991, during Operation Desert Storm. Coalition intel reports showed large columns of Iraqi forces moving towards the border of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, influencing theater commander Army Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf’s decision to utilize air power as the primary force.

That night, two AC-130H Spectre gunships, Spirit 01 and Spirit 02 of the 16 SOS in Hurlburt Field, Florida, joined the battle. Providing close air support and air interdiction, the gunships were able to inflict large casualties against the invading Iraqi army, but the coalition forces were unable to completely stop the advance and the city of Khafji was briefly occupied by Saddam’s forces.

As the gunships conducted operations solely under the cover of darkness,the impending sunrise forced both Spirits back to base in order to refuel and reload ammunition. Ground forces continued to push the invasion back until the Spectres were unleashed once more into the night of January 30th.

Spirit 03 was fully loaded for combat and spent the night raining terror on Iraqi forces, answering the calls of multiple U.S. Marine forward air controllers (FAC) and slowing the movement of Saddam’s columns. As the daylight began to break, all AC-130H’s were recalled back to base once again. At the edge of the combat zone, the crew of Spirit 03 received a radio call from a U.S. Marine FAC asking for close air support to deal with an Iraqi rocket battery.

Spirit 03 made the split-second decision to turn around, despite being low on fuel and losing the valuable cover of darkness. Intent on saving more American lives, Spirit 03 flew back into the fray, but it was hit by a surface-to-air missile in the left wing. The aircraft began spiraling out of control before the left wing broke off completely, sending the gunship and her crew into the Persian Gulf.

All 14 Airmen on board perished with the aircraft. Their names are listed below:

Maj. Paul Weaver
Capt. Cliff Bland
Capt. Arthur Galvan
Capt. William Grimm
Capt. Dixon Walters
Senior Master Sgt. Paul Buege
Senior Master Sgt. James May
Tech. Sgt. Robert Hodges
Tech. Sgt. John Oelschlager
Staff Sgt. John Blessinger
Staff Sgt. Damon Kanuha
Staff Sgt. Mark Schmauss
Sergeant Barry Clark
Staff Sgt. Timothy Harrison

“Tim Harrison was my primary instructor in 1990,” said Retired Master Sgt. Kevin Stefanovksy. “It was a big loss for the entire squadron. After we pulled out of Khafji, they brought the left wing back for investigation and had us pull pieces of shrapnel out of the wing. Once the investigation was through, us doing what gunners do, we cut off pieces of the wing and made POW bracelets from it.”

There are still few stationed at Cannon AFB with a personal connection to Spirit 03. Most of the Airmen in the 16 SOS are only familiar with the story as it has been passed down through the years. Regardless, the 16 SOS ensures all who enter its doors know the story of Spirit 03 and understand the squadron’s heritage.

“I was in flight training the first time I heard the story back in 2017,” said Capt. Aaron Schuetze, 16 SOS AC-130W Stinger II pilot. “I just remember being awed that it happened in… the not so distant past.”

Walking through the 16 SOS squadron building, it is difficult not to feel amazed at the heroic actions of those who have come before. Through the years, Airmen have adorned their walls with memorabilia from past operations and crews. For some, they serve as a reminder. For others, they serve as a benchmark.

“Sometimes I still feel like I’m nothing here, compared to all the great things others have done before me,” said SrA Jason Baek, 16 SOS aerial gunner. “It’s hard to feel like I belong when everyone else has done such cool things. It keeps me motivated though for sure, gives me a goal to achieve.”

Even through tragedy, Airmen strive to make the most of every opportunity. The ability to learn from failures and expand in future operations is a large component of the United States Military’s 257 years of service.

“It definitely keeps you humble,” said Schuetze. “I feel like I have not yet reached the level that they [Spirit 03] had, and everyday I strive to get better and hope that if we were ever in a situation like they were, we could still perform like they did. That is what we train for everyday, to reach that level of peak excellence. It’s what we expect from the guys on the ground and we expect the same from ourselves.”

The story of Spirit 03 plays no small part in fueling the fire of motivation in Airmen from the 16th. Their squadron motto, “Always to Protect”, represents a sense of duty and service eternal.

“I’m truly honored and humbled to command a squadron of heroes who live by the USAF core values and continually strive to be the innovative and tactical experts in a squadron steeped in heritage,” said Lt. Col. Paul Andrews, 16 SOS commander. “The memorial flight and remembrance of the crew of Spirit 03 is important to all of us in the AC-130 enterprise… We are forever grateful for their service to our nation.”

The loss of all 14 men aboard Spirit 03 that early January morning was felt throughout the AFSOC community and the 16 SOS in particular. The 14 men were not just Airmen. They were fathers, brothers, sons and friends. It has been 31 years since they lost their lives doing what they did best – providing air support from the belly of a beast, protecting those who protect freedom, no matter the cost.

And yet, their legacy will never be forgotten. For where there is Spirit, there is freedom.

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Story: This story by Senior Airman Christopher Storer of the 27th Special Operations Air Wing was originally published on February 11, 2022 by the Defense Visual Information Distribution Service. DVIDS publishes content in the public domain.

Photo: AC-130 Stinger II Gunship. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Maxwell J. Daigle).

On February 28, 1991, the Gulf War came to an end. A coalition of international military forces, led by the United States, conducted an offensive that removed Iraqi forces from Kuwait. In August 1990, Iraq had invaded Kuwait claiming that the country on its southern border was historically a part of Iraq.

President George Bush assembled a coalition of nations to defend Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States from further aggressive Iraqi action and to eventually oust Iraq from Kuwait. The defense of the Arabian peninsular was called Desert Shield. The offensive military action to relieve Kuwait from Iraqi occupation was called Desert Storm. The air campaign began in mid-January 1991 – lasting over a month. The ground offensive lasted just 100 hours ending on February 28, 1991.

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Photo: M-3 Bradley cavalry fighting vehicle. Desert Storm. Photograph from XVIII Airborne Corps History Office by SGT Randall M. Yackiel.

On August 2, 1990 Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait. The leader of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, claimed that Kuwait was historically a ‘province’ of Iraq and that Kuwait had been stealing Iraq’s oil (by way of ‘slant drilling’).

Desert Shield. While world leaders condemned the action, President George Bush formed an international coalition in response to Iraq’s attack on Kuwait. The intent was to defend Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states from further Iraqi aggression. The US and other nations immediately deployed air assets and ground troops to the Saudi Arabian peninsular in an operation called Desert Shield. Over several months a massive troop buildup occurred with the positioning of military forces in the Gulf region.

Desert Storm. Once it became apparent that Saddam Hussein would not withdraw from Kuwait, the coalition, with appropriate resolutions from the United Nations, began finalizing plans to conduct offensive air and ground operations. An air campaign began against Iraq in mid-January 1991. This air phase of the war would establish air superiority, destroy air defense systems, render ineffective command and control networks, and hit other strategic targets. The coalition ground offensive would begin a month later – lasting only 100 hours.

SCUDs. Iraq lacked offensive options against the coalition and the nations in the region. Its air force was destroyed on the ground, shot out of the skies, or remained hidden. Some Iraqi pilots flew their aircraft to safety in Iran. However, the Iraqis did have an inventory of missiles that could be launched against military and other targets that could reach Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. The SCUDs lacked a sophisticated guidance system but could deliver an explosive payload that could cause damage and casualties. [1] Once the coalition began its air campaign in January 1991 Iraq began launching SCUD missiles toward the Arabian Peninsular. Iraq also launched SCUDs into Israel from western Iraq.

SCUD Facts. The SCUD was first deployed by the Soviet Union in the mid-1960s. It could carry a nuclear warhead or a 2,000 pound conventional warhead. It also was an ideal weapon for chemical or biological agents. The missile was first used in the 1973 Arab-Israeli Yom Kippur War. It was later used in the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s. The Iraqis modified the missile to achieve greater range – by reducing the warhead weight, enlarging fuel tanks, and other modifications. These modifications reduced the accuracy of the missile.

The Iraqi variant of the Soviet missile carried a 350-pound warhead. It had enough range to hit most of Israel (from western Iraq) and the major cities of Saudi Arabia. The term SCUD came to be used for a variety of surface-to-surface missiles in the Iraqi inventory.

Estimates of the number of SCUDs that Iraq possessed varied – depending on whether it was a pre-war number or an assessment made during the conflict. Some initial intelligence estimates indicated Iraq had a little more than 100 missiles. This was revised to a higher figure of 400-800.

Photo: Members of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) wearing gas masks in a command post. Photo by IDF, 1991.

Israel Targeted. The launching of missiles toward Israel posed a problem for the coalition. The SCUDs landing in Tel Aviv and other cities unnerved the Israeli population. While the overall physical damage from the SCUD attacks were minimal there were fears that Saddam would put biological or chemical payloads on the SCUDs – causing numerous deaths and injuries. Israel informed Washington that it would respond. [2] There were concerns that if biological or chemical weapons were used against Israel by Iraq then Israel would respond with nuclear weapons. Most accounts say that Iraq launched 40 missiles against Israel (46 against targets in Saudi Arabia).

Saving the Coalition. The intent of Iraq was to prompt an Israeli retaliation. This would put the Arab members of the coalition in a bind. Would they then be allied with Israel fighting an Arab nation? If Israel began attacking Iraq the coalition might very well fall apart – making the task of wresting control of Kuwait from Iraq much more difficult. Washington promised Israel that finding and killing the SCUD missiles would become a top priority – which kept Israel on the sidelines.

Air Force Targeting and Kill Boxes. The fixed launch sites in western Iraq had been hit early in the air campaign. Some of the targets associated with the manufacture, storage, and maintenance of SCUDs had been already hit as well; those that hadn’t quickly moved up on the target list. It is believed that the Iraqis had moved the SCUDs from the fixed site launch locations prior to the start of the coalition air campaign. The coalition rapidly diverted air assets to searching for and destroying mobile SCUDs in western Iraq that could target Israel. The primary aircraft in the SCUD hunt were the A-10 Thunderbolt II, F-16, F-15E, Navy A-6Es, and British Tornados. [3]

Mobile Launchers – a Vexing Problem. The Iraqis had a number of mobile Transporter – Erection – Launch (TEL) vehicles that had been dispersed throughout western and southern Iraq. The exact number varies depending on which source you use – between 20 to 36 launchers are an approximate guess. They were difficult to find. The electronic signature of the TELs were not distinct enough for location purposes. The TELs were camouflaged and hidden to avoid observation from the air. They were frequently moved at night. Once the TELs launched their SCUDs they moved rapidly from the launch site to a different hide location. Sophisticated decoy vehicles were deployed throughout the region that attracted the attention of coalition aircraft. Coalition aircraft had a difficult time finding and targeting the mobile SCUDs. There was some confusion in obtaining the confirmation of ‘kills’ of SCUDs by aircraft. [4] The SCUD launches toward Israel continued.

Photo: Delta Force on SCUD Hunt. Photo by DoD, 1991.

SOF and Desert Storm. A wide variety of special operations units were deployed during the Gulf War. Coalition nations provided special operations forces to the fight – among these were the British Special Air Service (SAS) and Syrian Special Forces Regiment. The United States provided an array of SOF units to include Army Special Forces, Army Rangers, Army Special Operations Aviation Regiment, Navy SEALs and Special Boat Units, Air Force Special Operations squadrons and Combat Control Teams, Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs units, and Marine Force Reconnaissance.

These SOF units conducted a variety of missions. Navy SEALs were busy with special operations missions along the shores of the Persian Gulf. Army Special Forces units were conducting a number of different missions to include direct action, strategic reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, CSAR, border surveillance, and coalition warfare support. Some SOF units would be assigned a new mission – SCUD hunting. The SOF aviation units were very busy with infiltrations, exfiltration, combat search and rescue (CSAR), and other special operations missions.

SOF Teams Inserted. British Special Air Service and 1st SFOD-Delta teams were inserted into western Iraq to join the SCUD hunt. [5] Their mission in “SCUD Alley” was to search for and destroy the SCUDs, launchers, and associated equipment and vehicles. Some of the SOF teams infiltrated by air (usually helicopter) and others by vehicle. The 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment utilized armed MH-60s to insert SOF teams hundreds of miles inside western Iraq. The Air Force Special Operations squadrons also conducted operations in support of the SCUD hunt. U.S. and British SOF divided the operational area into two sectors – one for the U.S. and one for the British.

SOF On The Ground. The means of interdiction of the SCUDS by SOF teams would range from direct action against the targets to calling in air power to destroy the vehicles and sites associated with the SCUDs. The patrols usually moved at night by foot or vehicle and hid during the day. The British patrols tended to be longer in duration. Some of the SOF teams operating in western Iraq had other missions as well as the SCUD hunt. One of the methods for discovering SCUDs was to set up observation sites along main lines of communication (LOCs). US teams would use hand-held lasers pinpointing targets for aircraft to strike.

Bravo Two Zero. A British SAS team that was inserted by a Royal Air Force Chinook helicopter quickly ran into trouble. It was soon discovered and chased by Iraqi security forces. A few of the patrol members were killed. Some were captured. One patrol member managed to move on foot to the Syrian border avoiding capture. A few books were published and a movie made about Bravo Two Zero. [6]

Effectiveness of SCUD Hunt. The effectiveness of the SCUD hunt by both the Air Force and the SOF teams has been a topic of discussion following the war. How many SCUDs were found and destroyed was not immediately known. There were varying estimates of the effectiveness of the air strikes and the SOF teams on the ground. [7] Some sources indicate that many of the aircraft reported kills of SCUDs were in fact decoys or similar looking vehicles. [8]

Finding the SCUDs and their launchers were difficult. The SCUDs moved from site to site at night. They hid during the day. The SCUD crews could move the launchers to a pre-coordinated launch site, fire their missiles, and drive away in ten minutes.

It became apparent in post-war analysis that countering Iraq’s mobile short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) was a time and resource intensive endeavor. Although the SCUDs were highly inaccurate they did have an important psychological and political impact. In addition, they forced the coalition to divert resources to the SCUD hunt that otherwise could have been occupied with the main effort – the ousting of Iraqi forces from Kuwait.

Conclusion. What is known is that the air campaign and introduction of SOF teams into western Iraq to find and destroy the SCUDS kept Israel on the sidelines. The frequency of SCUD attacks against Israel diminished. This kept the Arab nations in the coalition and contributed to the overall success of Desert Storm’s objective of removing Iraqi troops from Kuwait.

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Top Photo: SCUD launcher, DoD photo.

Footnotes:

[1] On February 25, 1991, parts of an Iraqi Al Hussein SCUD missile destroyed barracks housing U.S. troops. 28 soldiers died and 99 were wounded.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/14th_Quartermaster_Detachment

[2] “We’re going to attack Iraq, Israel told the US. ‘Move your planes'”, The Times of Israel, January 18, 2018.

[3] The Air Force and the Gulf War, Air Force Association, December 2009, PDF, p. 22.
https://www.dvusd.org/cms/lib/AZ01901092/Centricity/Domain/2435/AFandGulfWar.pdf

[4] Operation Desert Storm: Evaluation of the Air Campaign, U.S. Government Accountability Office, NSIAD-97-134, June 12, 1997, page 31, 32.
https://www.gao.gov/assets/230/224366.pdf

[5] There is much more open source information about the participation of the SAS in the SCUD hunt than there is about Delta Force’s role in the operation. A few sources indicate that the Navy SEALs and U.S. Army Rangers may have participated as well.

[6] Two books have been published that tell the story of Bravo Two Zero – Bravo Two Zero and SAS in the Gulf War.

[7] RAND paper cited below by Rosenau, page 36.

[8] “Scud War, Round Two”, Air Force Magazine, April 1, 1991, by Stewart M. Powell.

References:

Rosenau, William, “Chapter Three: Coalition Scud-Hunting in Iraq, 1991”, Special Operations Forces and Elusive Enemy Ground Targets, RAND Corporation, 2001, PDF, 16 pages.
https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1408.html

Kipphut, Colonel Mark E., USAF, “The Great Scud Chase”, Crossbow and Gulf War Counter-Scud Efforts: Lessons from History, US Air Force Counterproliferation Center, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, February 2003, PDF, 48 pages.
https://media.defense.gov/2019/Apr/11/2002115481/-1/-1/0/15CROSSBOW.PDF

Story, William C., “Operation Desert Storm Scud Hunt – 1991”, Third World Traps and Pitfalls: Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles, and Land-Based Air Power, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, June 1994.
https://fas.org/man/eprint/story.htm

DIA, Mobile Short-range Ballistic Missile Targeting in Operation DESERT STORM, Defense Intelligence Assessment, OGA-1040-23-91, November 1991.
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB39/document8.pdf