By Michael A. Marra and Brett D. Weigle.

October 3, 2023, marked the somber 30th anniversary of the Battle of Mogadishu, Somalia – another tragic event in another “small war” waged far away from United States soil in a nation few American citizens could find on a map. On that fateful day, U.S. forces serving as part of the second United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) incurred 17 killed and 85 wounded in action in addition to an estimated 1,500 Somali casualties. [1] What was meant to be a routine special operations raid to capture several warlord leaders resulted in a bloody all-day firefight that coined the phrase “Blackhawk down” for future difficult interventions. Ironically, this battle was the culmination of a years-long United Nations effort to rectify a complex catastrophe of environmental, political, and social upheaval in Somalia.

Beginning in early 1992, the first UN effort, UNOSOM I, was unable to suppress the warlords to deliver humanitarian aid. In April 1992, the UN Security Council created the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), led by the United States with the authority to “use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.” [2] UNITAF accomplished this mission by early 1993 and was replaced by UNOSOM II in May with a new mandate. The establishing UN Security Council resolution included language about the importance of “a comprehensive and effective programme for disarming Somali parties, including movements and factions.” [3] This additional mandate departed from the initial UNITAF task of feeding a starving population by providing security for food distribution; instead, this expanded mission led to the raids by special operations forces that culminated in the Battle of Mogadishu. The United Nations and the United States unwillingly were drawn into conflict. How can such good intentions go so horribly wrong?

Can we continue to learn from small wars that provide strategically painful lessons from long ago? With the U.S. military now primarily focused on large scale combat operations in Europe and the Pacific, do small wars like Somalia still matter?

We think so. If the global competition during the first Cold War should be judged by the number of proxy wars it promulgated, then we need to pay attention now – not after we are deeply embedded in another armed intervention. Thinking through the externalities of a coming second Cold War as China, Russia, and the United States compete for their interests will help us campaign in competition and avoid conflicts like UNOSOM II in the future.

Chinese and Russian influence have spread across the Maghreb, the Sahel, and other regions of Africa; for example, China builds infrastructure projects under its Belt and Road Initiative while the Wagner Group’s military involvement destabilizes Libya, Central African Republic, Mali, and Sudan. [4] Seeing this, we understand the struggle for power and influence is an ongoing effort with no “end state,” only a “next state.” As coups and civil wars erupt along these fault lines in Africa, we will be tempted to intervene to preserve our investments and influence via diplomatic, development, and defense efforts. With U.S. military and civilian personnel currently stationed in several African fragile states, American policymakers and planners have a responsibility to continually assess our level of involvement and subsequent risk to U.S. personnel and national prestige.

The full history and internal political machinations of Somalia are well-documented elsewhere, and not the focus of this offering. [5] Rather, our argument concerns the strategic and operational aspects of the decisions to intervene and enforce a peace that was fiercely resisted by the very people the United States was trying to assist. We offer several reflections on lessons civilian and military leaders can learn from this small war for future interventions, since the application of military power to achieve national policies is a matter of supreme political judgement. Far different from other endeavors, failure in war has repercussions that reverberate through decades.

Somalia, like numerous hot spots around the world, is burdened by instability, environmental stress, and deep social fissures leading to violence for many decades. From the infamous Battle of Mogadishu thirty years ago to the present day, Somalia has ranked first or second since 2008 on the Fragile States Index published by the Fund for Peace. [6]  In 2023 alone, the U.S. military flew at least 14 airstrikes in Somalia and one special operations mission that killed Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) leader Bilal al-Sudani, according to Jeff Schogol writing in Task and Purpose. [7] Despite billions of dollars of assistance invested for decades in Somalia, there is a frustrating paucity of progress. The United States alone provided $818 million in humanitarian and military aid in FY2020 and $792 million to date in 2023, according to the Department of State. [8]

These eight lessons from Somalia are as relevant now as they were three decades ago.

Strategy is more difficult than policy or tactics. This intervention in 1993 required an overall strategy, not just a contingency plan. The value of the U.S. national security interest was never clearly defined; was this something we were going to pay for, fight for, kill for, or die for? It clearly ranked as a peripheral national interest but at times the United States acted as though Somalia’s situation were a vital interest. [9] A lack of deep and broad thinking on the “next state” of Somalia after the initial intervention created a “mission creep” due to lack of vision regarding where the operation was going after initial successes in stopping the worst of the famine. While the crisis did need immediate attention to save lives, U.S. policymakers and planners must think through their strategy to ensure all elements of national power are engaged when mapping how we want to help a nation reach its desired future state. After the United States forces departed in 1994, Somalia has struggled to defeat various insurgent groups that threaten the functioning of a Somali central government. [10].

It is more difficult to make peace than it is to make war. Peacemaking, peace-enforcement, and peacekeeping between factions in the same nation is complex, costly, and often contested. Somalia is still in desperate need of a lasting peace so that the rebuilding of society can begin in earnest. There is still a level of unacceptable violence in Somalia that belies the efforts of peacemakers. As the United States engages in African places of unrest, we must admit we will eventually favor one side over another, creating the appearance of partisanship. In areas of fractured societies where multiple groups are contesting for power, the danger of siding with one may mean unifying the remainder against the intervening force – as we saw on the streets of Mogadishu in 1993.

“Resistance = Means × Will” is an enduring axiom. While irregular Somali warlord forces had little training, inadequate equipment, and no real communications gear, their will compensated for their lack of means by multiplying their power of resistance. They were a worthy adversary who inflicted deep costs on U.S. military forces on 3 October 1993. While “will” is extremely hard to measure from afar, it is easy to recognize, and these highly motivated Somali warlords and foot soldiers were a dangerous adversary.

The enemy, regardless of size, gets a vote. Despite our highly motivated soldiers and aviators, exquisite plans, and special operations capabilities, the Somalis fought back hard. Irregular forces stymied our best efforts that day, and on other occasions before UNISOM II departed Somalia in 1994. The enemy always gets a vote, and when they are fighting at home, they have many advantages.

Friction during intervention is unavoidable. Going into complex catastrophes like Somalia requires adaptation because the myriad problems cannot all be anticipated. However, the United States must understand the strong African antipathy to unilateral Western interventions and must seek coalition partners with regional familiarity. Operating in a strong coalition, preferably with the full backing of the United Nations or African Union, is the right approach in Africa. As a corollary, coalition timelines must be more realistic – and that inevitably means longer. The United States must be careful to avoid unnecessary friction by the imposition of rigid timelines on a fluid environment. Speaking in terms of “years” instead of “months” is a smart way to telegraph U.S. commitment and ease friction.

Strategic history punishes good intentions. The turbulent and bloody history of Somalia was well known in 1993, yet the successful 1991 Persian Gulf War may have given false confidence to U.S. Central Command planners that UNITAF would also accomplish its mission according to plan. Having the best intentions for the entire Somali population was simply not enough to overcome the factions who did not appreciate the presence of foreign troops in their cities and villages.

Tragedy happens even in small wars. As the intervention bloomed into a shooting war, the number of civilian and military casualties soared. Firefights between UNISOM II soldiers and Somali fighters—or indiscriminate fires by warlords and rebels—inevitably caught civilians in crossfire. While American combatants survived most wounds during the Battle of Mogadishu, civilian casualties were not that fortunate. In recognition that this tragedy will most certainly recur, in 2022 the Department of Defense implemented its Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan. [11]

War is always a gamble – even a “small war.” We witnessed in Somalia a minor military operation that captured the headlines of every major newspaper and lead every television news program in the world. Suddenly, the risk of a small raid in a small war looked like a failed gamble by the United States in an intervention that seemed difficult to exit. A tactical operation was magnified into strategic consequences by flashing images and first-person descriptions delivered within hours of the event. Wars, even small ones, do not always go the way they are planned, and almost never adhere to sequential and compact timelines on PowerPoint slide shows.

In today’s increasingly fraught global security environment [12], we must acknowledge the hard lessons learned from past small wars like Somalia—lessons whose tuition was paid with blood and treasure. The nature of small wars will not change their root causes, and motivations of external actors to intervene will remain noble. However, the character of a U.S. response need not copy our experience in Somalia in 1992–1994.

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Illustration credit: “On the Alert,” Jeffrey Manuszak, 1994, reference [1], p. 17.

[1] Richard W. Stewart, The United States Army in Somalia (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center for Military History, December 2002), 19,
https://history.army.mil/html/books/070/70-81-1/cmhPub_70-81-1.pdf

[2] United Nations, Security Council Resolution 794 (1992), April 24, 1992, para. 3, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/794.

[3] United Nations, Security Council Resolution 814 (1993), March 26, 1993, para. 7, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/814.

[4] Alex Vines and Jon Wallace, “China-Africa relations,” Explainer, Chatham House, January 18, 2023, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/01/china-africa-relations; Joseph Siegle, “Inflection Point for Africa-Russia Relations after Prigozhin’s Death,” Africa Center for Strategic Studies, September 6, 2023, https://africacenter.org/spotlight/‌inflection-point-for-africa-russia-relations-after-prigozhins-death/.

[5] For example, see “Somalia profile – Timeline,” BBC News, January 4, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14094632.

[6] Fund for Peace, “Fragile States Index,” accessed September 9, 2023, https://fragilestatesindex.org/country-data/.

[7] Jeff Schogol, “US airstrike in Somalia kills 13 al-Shabab fighters,” Africa News, Task and Purpose, August 28, 2023, https://taskandpurpose.com/news/us-airstrike-somalia-13-fighters-killed/; Foundation for Defense of Democracies, “US airstrikes in Somalia,” Long War Journal, accessed September 9, 2023, https://www.longwarjournal.org/us-airstrikes-in-the-long-war; Lloyd J. Austin III, “Statement on Somalia Operation,” press release, Department of Defense, January 26, 2023, https://www.defense.‌gov/‌‌‌‌‌News/Releases/Release/Article/3279923/statement-by-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-on-somalia-operation/.

[8] Lauren Ploch Blanchard, Somalia (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, July 27, 2023), 2, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10155

[9] U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Strategy, Joint Doctrine Note 1-18 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 25, 2018), p. vii, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/jdn_jg/jdn1_18.pdf

[10] For example, see Adam Abdelmoula, “Somalia is on the path of recovery, but real challenges remain,” Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia, United Nations Somalia, December 21, 2021, accessed October 28, 2023, https://somalia.un.org/en/166388-somalia-path-recovery-real-challenges-remain; Ken Menkhaus, “Governance without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of Coping,” International Security 31(3) (2007): 74–106, doi: https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2007.31.3.74

[11] Lloyd J. Austin III, “Department of Defense Releases Memorandum on Improving Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response,” press release, Department of Defense, January 27, 2022, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2914764/department-of-defense-releases-memorandum-on-improving-civilian-harm-mitigation/

[12] National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2040: A More Contested World (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, March 2021), https://www.dni.gov/index.php/gt2040-home.

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The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. 

About the Authors

Professor Michael A. Marra, Colonel (retired), U.S. Air Force, is a veteran of conflicts in Central America, Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, Liberia, and served in major operations including Desert Shield/Storm/Calm, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom as a commander, staff officer and aviator. He is an Associate Professor at the U.S. Army War College in the Department of Military Strategy, Planning and Operations.

Dr. Brett D. Weigle is a retired U.S. Army logistics Colonel. He worked in joint, multinational, and Army command and staff positions in the United States, Bahrain, Germany, Turkey (NATO), Spain (NATO), North Macedonia (NATO), and twice in Korea. He is a veteran of Operations RESTORE HOPE (UNITAF) in Somalia (1992–1993) and JOINT ENDEAVOR in Bosnia (1995–1996). He is an Associate Professor at the U.S. Army War College in the Department of Military Strategy, Planning and Operations.

By Fiona G. Holter, USAICoE Staff Historian, October 13, 2022.

On 14 October 1993, CWO3 Michael Durant, a pilot with the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR), was released by Somali insurgents after being held captive for eleven days following the crash of his MH-60L Blackhawk. The Blackhawk, Super 64, was the second helicopter shot down in the Battle of Mogadishu after a high-risk raid by Task Force (TF) Ranger to capture two high value, Somali National Alliance (SNA) assets.

After successfully completing a high-risk raid to capture high-value SNA assets in the Habr Gedir sector of Mogadishu on 3 October, TF Ranger—a team of Army Special Operations Forces (SOF) and support elements—was faced with a new mission after enemy insurgents shot down Super 61, a Blackhawk piloted by CWO4 Clifton “Elvis” Wolcott and CWO3 Donovan “Bull” Briley, who were providing air support to the mission. As TF Ranger saw the helicopter crash, they diverted their resources to secure the crash site and rescue the crew.

As ground troops raced clan militias to the Super 61 crash site, in what became a baited ambush, Super 64, a second Blackhawk piloted by CWO3 Durant was shot down approximately twelve minutes later. A Quick Reaction Force (QRF) comprised of infantry from 2d Battalion, 14th Infantry and 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry were deployed as combat support as well as search and rescue. Supported by Pakistani tanks and Malaysian armored personnel carriers, the QRF teams eventually secured the Super 61 crash site, retrieved the dead and wounded, and provided support to elements of TF Ranger as they redeployed to safety. However, by the time they reached the Super 64 crash site, the crew was missing.

In the aftermath of the Battle of Mogadishu, casualties totaled thirteen dead, eighty-two wounded, and six missing. Lt. Col. (later Col.) James T. Faust, the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) J-2 Chief of Intelligence Operations, TF Ranger, explained that with six missing soldiers, TF Ranger quickly shifted their mission. He said, “everything we built for TF Ranger intelligence focused on Aideed and his infrastructure;” now their mission was to build a new collection plan, combining the efforts of human and signal intelligence and surveillance systems to find the soldiers missing in action.

Within a couple of days, HUMINT sources reported Somali insurgents were dragging dead American soldiers through the streets, which was later confirmed by CNN footage. They also recovered a soldier whose body was left at a roadblock within the city. Eventually, five of the missing were located and declared dead; however, the search for Durant continued.

Maj. Gen. (then Capt.) Robert Walters, the Assistant S-2, 1st Battalion, 160th SOAR, which deployed with TF Ranger, explained that after other search methods failed, the S-2 shop reached out to Durant’s wife for a list of his favorite songs, “divided the city into quadrants and then put speakers on [their] helicopters and played his favorite song, a different one in each of the four quadrants.” He explained their hope was Durant would hear the song and mention it in a Red Cross message, helping them narrow down the search. Unfortunately, none of Durant’s messages were mailed but, on 14 October 1993, after being held captive for eleven days, he was released to the International Committee of the Red Cross.

The events of 3-4 October 1993 prompted withdrawal of U.S. forces from Somalia. According to CWO4 (Retired) Gregory Peterson, a senior civilian analyst at JSOC at the time of the raid, “While the common legacy of TF Ranger is the casualties associated with the October raid, that operation survives today as [a] hallmark of surgical Special Operations units.”

Overall, it was a costly learning experience and one that also demonstrated the courage of SOF Soldiers who earned two Medals of Honor. In 2021, the Army and Congress approved upgrades for sixty awards for valor in the Battle of Mogadishu, including fifty-eight new Silver Stars and two Distinguished Flying Crosses.

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This story by Fiona G. Holter was first published on October 12, 2022 by the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence and posted by the Defense Visual Information Distribution System. DVIDS content is in the public domain.

Photo: Crew of Super 64, September 1993. From left: Winn Mahuron, Tommy Field, Bill Cleveland, Ray Frank, and Mike Durant. The crew served with TF Ranger in Operation Gothic Serpent in Somalia. Photo by Maj. Robin Cox.

Read more about “Operation Gothic Serpent” and the Battle of Mogadishu, SOF News, July 18, 2020.

U.S. Africa Command has announced the formation of Joint Task Force Quartz to oversee Operation Octave Quartz – a mission designated to reposition forces from Somalia and continue the assistance effort in Somalia. In early December President Trump and the Department of Defense announced that the United States would remove some 700 military personnel from Somalia. This is an action that Trump had mentioned several times over the past year but had not directed to take place.

Some national security observers applaud the action believing that the situation in Somalia is unsolvable. They point to decades of corruption and conflict and little to show for the millions of dollars and other sacrifices made in Somalia.

However, others say that we are ceding territory to an insurgent / terrorist group affiliated with al Qaeda. These critics say that the group poses a threat to the U.S. – pointing to the attack on Camp Simba in Kenya where Americans lost their lives and to the recent news of a potential plot by an al Shabaab member to hijack an aircraft to conduct an attack in the United States.

The withdrawal is being presented to the U.S. public as a ‘repositioning of forces’. Apparently some of these forces will move into neighboring countries. Djibouti and Kenya share a border with Somalia and have been hosts of U.S. military units and activities for many years.

Joint Task Force Quartz

Joint Task Force Quartz or JTF-Quartz is built around the headquarters of Special Operations Command – Africa. The mission is to oversee Operation Octave Quartz which will reposition U.S. forces from Somalia to other bases in East Africa. JTF Quartz is commanded by the Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAF) commander Maj. Gen. Dag Anderson.

JTF-Quartz components include:

• Joint Force Special Operations Component Command
• Joint Force Maritime Component Command
• Joint Air Component Coordination Element

JTF-Quartz priorities are:

• safely reposition U.S. forces
• protect U.S. forces through coordinated and increased force protection measures
• continue the mission to support regional partners and keep pressure on violent extremists

U.S. Army General Stephen Townsend, the commander of U.S. Africa Command, met with African partners to provide reassurance of a sustained commitment to East Africa security. He says that the U.S. will continue to support enduring partners while maintaining pressure on violent extremist organizations in the region.

“To be clear, the U.S. is not withdrawing or disengaging from East Africa. We remain committed to helping our African partners build a more secure future. We also remain capable of striking Al-Shabaab at any time and place of our choosing – they should not test us.”

General Stephen Townsend, commander of U.S. Africa Command, Dec 2020.

The U.S. and Somalia – Quick Timeline

Cold War. During the Cold War the Horn of Africa region was a focus of attention when it came to competition between the Soviet Union and the United States for influence and military presence. Somalia was a Soviet client state for many years (1970s).

Humanitarian Mission. In the early 1990s the United States committed US forces (including SOF) to Somalia in support of the United Nations humanitarian mission. This support ended when President Clinton ended the U.S. involvement in Somalia after the “Battle of Mogadishu” where 18 US. troops lost their lives during a raid on Somali militia leaders.

Failed State. Since the early 1990s Somalia has been a ‘failed state‘. It has suffered from famine, civil war, corruption, foreign intrigue and meddling, anarchy, and more. For many years it was the center of piracy operating from the coastal area of Somalia.

Fragile State. In 2012 the formation of a federal government provided a central authority that could provide services and security for the Somalia people. However, Somalia is still afflicted with division, political infighting, and corruption and remains a ‘fragile state’.

Al Shabaab. Somalia has been fighting an insurgency by an al Qaeda-affiliated group known as al Shabaab. The group controls much of Somalia – especially in the central and southern portions of the country. Its goal is to establish an Islamic state in Somalia.

US Support. The United States , along with other international partners, are working to stabilize the country and increase the effectiveness of the security forces. The US has been a key supporter of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), provides advice and training to the Somali security forces, and conducts counterterror (CT) missions within Somalia against al Shabaab and the local ISIS affiliate. U.S. Army Special Forces (and other organizations) have been instrumental in standing up the elite Danab Brigade.

Some Americans have lost their lives in the region including a CIA paramilitary officer (Nov 2020), a soldier assigned to 3rd Special Forces (June 2018), and contract pilots and an Army air traffic controller at Camp Simba (Jan 2020) just across the border in Kenya.

Security and Governance. The war in Somalia between government forces and al Shabaab has lasted almost 15 years. The prospects for peace is dismal. International donors are becoming reluctant to pay the expenses of the African Union forces that are deployed in Somalia to assist the government with security. Relations between Somalia and Kenya have frayed. Internal tensions exist between the different regions of Somalia are not good. The various clans and sub-clans in Somalia are constantly at odds with each other and may likely erupt into violence once again.

Great Power Competition. The Defense Department is now focused on strategic competition with China and Russia. To some, that means a shift to the Pacific and Eastern Europe with an emphasis on large conventional forces with the most modern ships, aircraft, and tanks. But to others, this means the competition is more likely to take place around the world in an environment where irregular warfare (some would say political warfare) is where the real competition is.

What Comes Next?

Future of Danab? The planned withdrawal of US forces will include the Special Forces contingent tasked with supporting the Danab special operations unit. Apparently a very small contingent of the US military will remain. The US has funded, trained, and partnered with this 1,000 man unit. It is commonly known that advisor work is best accomplished with person-to-person interaction. The premise that ‘advisor work’ can be accomplished remotely is largely dismissed by most members of the military that have been advisors. Certainly emails, Zoom sessions, video conferences, and phone calls have utility but nothing compares to an advisor on the ground sharing the battlespace.

It will be interesting (and perhaps disappointing) to observe the effectiveness of Danab over the next few years. There is the possibility that U.S. intelligence organizations will maintain a presence as well as private entities providing support, instruction, and advise through contract mechanisms with the State Department or Department of Defense.

Future Prospects? The Somali government has not met the milestones for the development of its security forces – goals set by the United States and the international community. In addition, it has not taken the steps for effective governance to alleviate the root causes of insurgent and tribal conflict. According to U.S. Africa Command al Shabaab remains adaptive, resilient, and capable of attacking US, Western, and partner interests in Somalia and East Africa.

The 19,000-man multinational African Union force will withdraw by the end of 2021. A withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Somalia accompanied by a reduction of ANISOM will likely increase the opportunity for al Shabaab to increase its influence and make further territorial gains. On January 20th a new president will occupy the White House. He may opt to reverse or adjust priorities in the region.

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References:

Task Force Quartz. “U.S. Africa Command stands up Joint Task Force – Quartz”, United States Africa Command, December 19, 2020.

IG Report on CT in Africa. The Defense Department posted the quarterly report for counterterrorism operations in East, North, and West Africa. This 98-page report provides information on the security situation in much of Africa to include Somalia. November 2020.

Recent Analysis and Commentary on Somalia.

“Why the Somali Danab SOF is Vital to the US and to Defeating Al-Shabaab”, by Steve Balestrieri, SOFREP, January 13, 2021.

“The Way Forward for the United States in Somalia”, by Stephen M. Schwartz, Foreign Policy Research Institute, January 12, 2021. Schwartz is a former U.S. Ambassador to Somalia (2016-2017).

On January 5, 2020 militants from al-Shabaab attacked the U.S. airfield and base at Manda Bay Airfield in Kenya. Three Americans died in the attack. In addition, several aircraft were destroyed or damaged to include U.S. special operations aircraft. Two other Americans were wounded in the attack.

Despite losing fighters – estimated at five – in the attack, the insurgents likely consider this raid on Manda Bay a significant victory. Al Qaeda linked groups have been using social media to capitalize on the Manda Bay attack by Al Shabaab. Posters have been released in several languages congratulating the attackers of the Manda Bay raid.

A Successful Raid

Most press accounts reflect the prevailing view that this was a very successful attack by the terrorist group. On January 6, 2020 AFRICOM acknowledged that “the enemy achieved a degree of success in its attack.” The attackers took advantage of a fairly undefended base perimeter. The small base had been considered an ‘out of the way’ installation that seemed to not be at risk of attack. [1]

The attack began early on a Sunday morning on January 5th when it was still dark. Al-Shabaab fired mortar rounds onto Camp Simba while attacking the nearby airfield. Al Shabaab forces operate in some of Kenya’s dense forests just miles away from the base. However U.S. defense officials believe the attacking force originated from within Somalia’s borders. There are also indications that the attackers were supported by a component inside of Kenya. The size of the attacking force is not known – but it probably was in the range of 15 to 30 personnel. The attackers would have to transit over 50 to 70 miles once across the Somalia border to reach Camp Simba.

Americans Killed. Army Specialist Henry Mayfield Jr. and two U.S. Department of Defense contractors died in the attack. Two other defense contractors were injured. Specialist Mayfield, age 23, was working as an air traffic controller from a truck on the airfield. He was assigned to the 58th Aviation Regiment based at Fort Rucker, Alabama. Mayfield was deployed in support of Operation Octave Shield. Dustin Harrison and Bruce Triplett were private pilots for L3 Technologies. They were killed when their aircraft was hit with a rocket as it was taxiing on the runway.

Aircraft Destroyed. Six contractor-operated aircraft were destroyed in the attack. A few were highly sophisticated surveillance aircraft used by the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). One of the destroyed aircraft include a modified Havilland Canada Dash-8. The Dash-8 is believed to be equipped with wide-area sensors to carry out surveillance missions in support of SOF units. Some news reports indicate that one of the other destroyed aircraft was a MC12W used for ISR missions in support of SOF. Two or three helicopters are reported to be destroyed. One news report indicated the value of the equipment and aircraft destroyed is believed to be above $20 million. [2]

Where is Manda Bay?

Camp Simba is a very small outpost about a mile away from the Manda Bay Airfield. It is situated on the Kenya coast and near the Somali border. The camp and airfield are located on the Kenya Defense Military Base at Manda Bay. The small complex was established in 2004 as the United States established regional staging areas to combat terrorism around the world. If you do a check on the Internet you will find two airfields. One associated with Camp Simba and the other – just to the south – handles commercial and civilian air traffic.

Why is the U.S. at Manda Bay?

The U.S. military is in Kenya training the country’s military and conducting counterterrorism operations in the region. The U.S. is also assisting the Kenyan security forces in the fight against al-Shabaab. Camp Simba and the Manda Bay Airfield are used as a base and staging area for U.S. surveillance aircraft and for U.S. SOF working alongside Kenya security forces in the porous border area between Kenya and Somalia to the north. It is also a staging point for operations into Somalia.

There are a variety of training courses conducted at the Manda Bay complex. These include anti-piracy, human trafficking, explosive detonation, vessel boarding, and search and seizure. At first the US part of the camp was extremely small but in 2012 it was upgraded considerably with new facilities. [3]

For many years the base was relatively quiet with a small maritime training mission in place. There were at times no more than a dozen U.S military personnel with some DOD contractors. With the growth of the U.S. involvement in the fight against al Shabaab in Somalia, Manda Bay has increased in size. In 2017 the small camp started a base operating support-integrator (BOS-I) mission. Training, medical, and administrative support is provided to Kenya partner forces – Kenyan Rangers, law enforcement organizations, and the Kenyan Navy. [4]

One of the units based at Manda Bay Airfield is the 475th Expeditionary Air Base Squadron. The airfield serves as a launching location for air operations in the region – including Somalia. There are about 350 Defense Department personnel in Kenya at various locations.

U.S. Unprepared for Attack

Several news accounts stated that the base was lightly defended and unprepared for an attack. There very likely was a reliance on Kenyan security forces to provide overall security.

“I think it’s self-obvious we were not as prepared there at Manda Bay as we needed to be. Al-Shabab managed to penetrate onto that airfield . . . They were able to get access to that airfield, kill three Americans, and destroy six aircraft there. So we weren’t as prepared, and we’re digging into that to find out why that’s the case.”

General Townsend, Commander of AFRICOM, January 30, 2020 while testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee.

U.S Reaction to Attack

Initial Response. A Marine special operations team of about a dozen Marines located in Camp Simba responded to the airfield attack alongside some Kenyan Rangers. Al-Shabaab suffered at least five fatalities in the attack. At least one Marine Raider was injured in the fighting. The responding Marines were from the 3rd Marine Raider Battalion based at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. An AFRICOM statement said “. . . a timely and effective response to the attack reduced the number of casualties and eliminated the potential for further damage.” MARSOC has been sending Marine Raiders to Kenya on Foreign Internal Defense (FID) missions to train up the Kenyan Rangers for a number of years.

Additional Reinforcements – EARF. The Manda Bay facilities were quickly reinforced with U.S. troops. The responding unit were members of the U.S. Africa Command’s East Africa Response Force (EARF). They were deployed to the Manda Bay Airfield to augment security. Currently the EARF are comprised of soldiers from the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division. They were transported to Manda Bay via a C-130J Super Hercules assigned to the 75th Expeditionary Airlift Squadron on January 5, 2020. It is unknown how long these additional forces will remain at Manda Bay. A small Special Forces contingent arrived at Camp Lemonier, Djibouti as well. There are no details on the composition of this element at this time.

EARF Mission. The mission of the EARF, a company-sized element, is to protect U.S. citizens, diplomatic locations, and conduct other missions as appropriate. They are a combat-ready, rapid deployment force. While in theater they operate out of Djibouti under the control of the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (HOA).

Senior Commanders Visit. Senior U.S. Africa Command officials visited the Manda Bay Airfield and Camp Simba on January 9, 2020 to meet with troops and commanders on the ground about details of the attack by al-Shabaab. One of those was Major General Michael Turello – the commander of Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). Turello is a long-time Special Forces officer with previous deployments to the Horn of Africa. [5]

New Security Measures in Place. About 120 American infantrymen were securing the Camp Simba and Manda Bay Airfield area in the period immediately after the attack. Efforts are being made to upgrade the defense posture to ensure the small base can be properly defended. This will likely include additional troops to guard the two facilities (airfield and camp) and to patrol the immediate area. Patrols would likely be joint with units of the Kenyan security forces.

MD-530F Helicopters for Kenya. On January 23, 2020 – just days after the January 5 raid on Manda Bay – the United States delivered six Cayuse Warrior helicopters to Kenya security forces. Another six MD-530Fs are programmed for delivery in the future. The MD-530F’s will replace aging MD-500 utility helicopters currently in use. The small, agile attack helicopters carry machine gun pods, M260 rocket launchers, and other armament. The helicopters are ideal for scouting, reconnaissance, attack, and close air support for Kenya Defense Force ground operations. The U.S. has provided a number of MD-530F helicopters to the Afghan Air Force. The delivery of the helicopters are very likely not related to the Manda Bay raid and had been a long time in the planning process. [6]

US-Funded JTTF. Kenya has been chosen as the site for the first US-funded Joint Terrorism Task Force that will be located outside of the United States. Kenyan investigators will attend a 12-week intensive counter-terrorism course at the U.S. FBI Academy. They will form the nucleus of Kenya’s JTTF. The assistance provided is in response to the growing threat to Kenya posed by al Shabaab. [7]

Impact of the Raid

Immediate Impact. The successful raid by al-Shabaab will have some consequences. Of course the most important impact will be on the families of the three Americans who lost their lives. An immediate result of the raid will be the diversion of time and energy of some of the Americans based at Camp Simba and the Manda Bay Airfield from their normal responsibilities and duties to that of base defense and force protection. In addition, the complex will need to be augmented with additional personnel taken from their jobs somewhere else (Europe, Camp Lemonier, etc.) to heighten the security posture.

Strategic Impact. This raid took place at a time that the Department of Defense is attempting to reduce the number U.S. personnel based in the AFRICOM area of responsibility. The raid also points out the vulnerability of small bases from which U.S. SOF and conventional personnel are conducting training with partner mission forces and counterterrorism missions. While DOD is likely focused on cutting back its engagement in West Africa; there is the possibility that the mission in the Horn of Africa could also be downsized.

Future Prospects for Manda Bay?

Ugrading Security. AFRICOM, CJTF-HOA, and SOCAfrica are all very likely reviewing their force prevention plans, quick reaction force posture, MEDEVAC procedures, and personnel recovery plans. It is likely that some locations where training is conducted or CT missions supported from in Africa will be eliminated due to force protection concerns.

U.S. Will Remain in Manda Bay. The importance of Manda Bay cannot be overstated. The base is small, far from a U.S. military facility, and a long way from PR assets. However, it is an important base for the training of Kenya ground and maritime units. In addition, it is a staging base for mounting a variety of counterterrorism missions against al-Shabaab in the region. Camp Simba and the associated airfield will likely be reinforced with security personnel and the security and force protection posture will be significantly increased.

**********

Footnotes:

[1] An article by Katie Bo Williams provides more information about the lightly defended perimeter of the Manda Bay Airfield in “Kenya Base ‘Surprisingly’ Undefended During Attack, US Officials Say”, Defense One, January 29, 2020.

[2] For a detailed analysis of aircraft destroyed read an article published in The Aviationist.

[3] Read more in “US Military Base at Camp Simba Bay in Lamu”, Kenyans.co.ke, January 15, 2020.

[4] See “The U.S.’s overlooked counter-terrorism outpost in Kenya”, Conflict Geographies, November 29, 2016.

[5] “Senior U.S. Africa Command Officials Visit Troops at Manda Bay”, United States Africa Command, January 9, 2020.

[6] See “United States delivers MD-530F helicopters to Kenya Defense Force“, CJTF-HOA, January 23, 2020.

[7] See “Kenya, FBI partner on first anti-terror task force outside US”, The East African, February 11, 2020.

References:

[1] Camp Simba Attack, Wikipedia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Camp_Simba_attack

[2] Al Shabaab, Congressional Research Service (CRS), January 16, 2020.
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10170

[3] “Between Blackhawk Down and Simba”, International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, January 12, 2020.

[4] “U.S. Using Local Soldiers to Fight al-Qaida Allies in East Africa”, NTI, March 11, 2013.

Photo: EARF lands at Manda Bay Airfield following al-Shabaab attack in January 2020. Photo by USAF January 6, 2020.

Somalia – A short history.

The country of Somalia located in the ‘Horn of Africa’ has been a troubled nation for decades. It has been caught up in the events of the Cold War, suffered through famines, experienced anarchy, dealt with poverty and corruption, and now confronts the Islamic jihadist threat.

End of Colonial Rule. The nation of Somalia is fairly new – established in 1960 from the territories formerly known as British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland. A coup in 1969 brought into power a socialist government – of interest to the United States since it was in the midst of the Cold War.

Cold War. For much of the 1970s Somalia was a Soviet client state. The USSR filled the country with 3,500 military advisors from Russia and East German; as well as troops from Cuba and Yemen. In addition, the country was flooded with a wide variety of weapons to include small arms, tanks, and artillery. With Soviet assistance the size of the Somali army was increased from 5,000 to over 22,000. This military assistance and lean to the Soviet bloc helped set the conditions for state collapse and civil war.

Civil War and Anarchy. In 1991 the socialist regime collapsed and Somalia descended into turmoil and anarchy – with some observers referring to Somalia as a ‘failed state’. Separate regions of the country fell into series of local governance arrangements – some headed by warlords

Humanitarian Crisis. In 1993 the United Nations led a humanitarian mission to alleviate famine conditions in Somalia. The United States took a leading role in this endeavor. Unfortunately, the warlords and the militias the warlords controlled stymied the efforts of the international relief effort. In addition, fighting broke out between the international forces and the militias. The U.S. began a series of raids to capture leaders of some of the militia groups. Engagements between militia factions and the international forces took place in Mogadishu – the Somali capital. One battle over a 24 hour period cost the United States 18 fatalities. The deaths put the Somali humanitarian mission under a microscope and resulted in U.S. disengagement from the mission.

Piracy. For several years Somali pirates operating from the coastal areas of Somalia posed a significant threat to merchant vessels transiting the waters nearby. It took a few years and a significant effort on the part of NATO and other countries to reduce the piracy threat. The U.S. Navy was part of this effort to counter the piracy and armed robbery of shipping vessels. Eventually the piracy problem subsided.

A Failed State. For the past few decades Somalia has been a failed state. Various governments have come and gone. Some lasting more than others. The country is not unified – with separate regions (Somaliland, Puntland, etc.) operating with various levels of autonomy.

Al Shabaab. A terrorist / insurgent group known as al Shabaab emerged in the past several years that has been able to control some of the Somali countryside and mount terrorist attacks in the major cities. Al Shabaab has aligned itself with al Qaeda. There has been some spillover of al Shabaab activity into Kenya – a neighboring country to the south. This has kept the special operations forces of Kenya busy.

Islamic State. In addition, the Islamic State has also established a small foothold in the country. This group has the potential to be a rival to al Shabaab as well as pose a threat to the Somali government and U.S. interests in the region.

Current U.S. Involvement. The United States – along with other international partners – is working to support Somali efforts to stabilize and rebuild the country along economic, governance, and security lines of effort. The U.S. has a robust presence in the country – with special operations and conventional forces conducting a ‘train, advise, and assist’ mission to professionalize the Somali forces and to stabilize the security situation of the country.

CT Mission. Over the past several years the U.S. has mounted raids into Somalia and used aircraft and drones to hit terrorist targets from the air. In addition to these unilateral actions the U.S. special operations in Somalia as well as U.S. conventional forces are engaged in the security force assistance mission to develop the Somalia security forces capability to conduct counterterrorist operations.

AMISOM. The African Union Mission in Somalia is a regional peacekeeping mission operated by the African Union with the approval of the United Nations. It was created in 2007 to reduce the threat posed by al Shabaab, provide security to enable the political process at all levels, and to eventually hand over security operations to the Somalia security forces. The United States (through its security cooperation programs) and some European nations are key supporters of the AMISOM mission (funding, logistics, training, etc.).

Future Prospects? The African country has been making some progress in the governance arena. AMISOM, although there is the possibility that it will soon downsize, has provided a measure of stability and security for Somalia. International efforts to train the Somali security forces are ongoing but far from complete. Al Shabaab continues to pose a threat to the Somalia government and its people. The conflict with terrorists and insurgents is far from over and will continue for many more years. With continued international support and cooperation – the threats may subside.

Reference:

Why the U.S. Military is in Somalia, United States Africa Command, November 29, 2017. www.africom.mil/media-room/article/30125/why-the-u-s-military-is-in-somalia

African Union Mission in Somalia – AMISOM
http://amisom-au.org/

Somalia, The World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency
www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html

Maps: Courtesy of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Defense Update – Revisiting FM 3-25, nation-building in Syria, South Asia strategy, Kilcullen on urban combat, Somalia’s 9/11, and more.

Re-visiting FM 3-24. General Petraeus is famous for many things. He is credited with winning the Iraq War, he was the CENTCOM commander, and later the ISAF commander in Afghanistan. Then he went on to head the Central Intelligence Agency; only to . . .  well, that’s another story. But also important is the role he played in the publication of a field manual on counterinsurgency. Many took this pub as the bible when it came to how the fight the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. But the manual has also had its detractors. Even today it is subject to commentary. Read “Savior General Petraeus Gave Us the Wrong Bible”, The American Conservative, October 23, 2017.

Nation-Building in Syria. Now that ISIS has been ‘almost’ defeated with the taking of Raqqa the hard work of solidifying the gains by the Syrian Democratic Front (SDF) begins. Competition with the Turks and the Syrian regime is one challenge as well as preventing the resurgence of the Islamic State insurgency (it will never truly go away). So how is this accomplished? Solidifying the gains? Some advocate a ‘trimmed down’ version of nation-building while others say ‘our work is done here’. Currently there are over 500 American military in Syria – most part of a Special Operations Task Force formed around the nucleus of a 5th Special Forces Group battalion. This task force is working with the SDF (a great majority of who are Kurds). The Syrian Kurds have seen how the U.S. has responded to the current situation in Iraq Kurdistan and may come to the conclusion that abandonment by the U.S. of Syrian Kurds is right around the corner with the next policy decision. Read more in “Areas freed from Islamic State will test U.S. policy on limiting overseas role“, Los Angeles Times, October 23, 2017.

South Asian Strategy. A special forces officer, Doug Livermore, provides his perspective on how the new South Asia strategy of the Trump administration is lacking. Apparently it’s all about the Durand Line. Read “Rethinking the South Asia Strategy – Addressing the Root Causes of Afghanistan / Pakistan Tensions”, Georgetown Security Studies Review, October 23, 2017.

Kilcullen on Urban Combat. The modern-day insurgent has shifted his focus from the rural areas to the urban city. Technology has made some strides that benefit both the insurgent and the counter-insurgent. More and more we will see urban conflict continue to be the most dynamic and dangerous of all types of conflict. Read David Kilcullen’s piece entitled “Urban Combat: Cities are Sponges That Soak Up Troops”, The Cipher Brief, October 22, 2017.

Somalia’s 9/11. A recent bombing in Somalia that killed almost 400 people has been described as the 9/11 of Somalia. Issac Kfir of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute provides more context in “Somalia’s 9/11”, The Strategist, October 23, 2017.

U.S. SOF has increased their activities in Somalia’s shadow war. The participation in the war torn country by U.S. special forces has largely
gone unnoticed by the American public. Most of the nation’s attention is focused on the U.S. presidential election, the Jolie – Pitt split up, and other topics such as the current offensive to take the city of Mosul, Iraq from ISIS. Smaller yet still important conflicts taking place in Libya, Yemen and Somalia where the U.S. is involved are not getting much attention.

The U.S. presence in Somalia has fluctuated over the years. Currently, we are very involved in training and advising Somalian government forces as well as troops from other Africa nations fighting insurgents in Somalia. The U.S. has a base close to Somalia in the Horn of Africa (HOA) called Camp Lemonier in Djibouti.

Read more in “In Somalia, U.S. Escalates a Shadow War”, The New York Times, October 16, 2016.

Kenya SOF is a recent addition to the Kenya armed forces. The largest of these units in the Kenya SOF is the Special Operations Regiment (SOR). The SOR is composed of the 20 Para, 30 Special Forces, and 40 Rangers Strike Force.

The Special Operations Regiment has been used very aggressively over the past five years. They have been actively engaged in Somalia the past several years. The SOR operators are highly trained, experts in special operations, and well-equipped.

Training is conducted within Kenya but the Kenya SOF also work with and train with commando units of the United States, United Kingdom, Jordan [1], and Belgium.

Another specialized unit is the General Service Unit (GSU) – the commando or paramilitary unit of the Kenya Police Service. The GSU has been in existence for many years – and is heavily involved in counter-terror operations, civil disorders, and special operations.

The Kenyan Special Boat Unit (KSBU) is a Kenya naval unit has been trained up by United States Navy Special Warfare Combatant-Craft Crewman (SWCC) personnel. The KSBU go through a thorough training course including combat medicine, navigation, boat handling, weapons proficiency, and ship boarding procedures. Some of the training takes place at Manda Bay. [2]

The Kenya Air Force is in the process of establishing (as of 2016) an Air Force unit that will operate behind enemy lines to conduct personnel recovery. This unit has been receiving training from the U.S. Air Force and is to be based at the Nanyuki Airbase. [3]

Read More:
“Kenya’s elite forces have become more lethal since Somalia entry”, Daily Nation, October 9, 2016.
“Special Operations: Kenyan Commandos”, Strategy Page, November 23, 2011.

Footnotes:
[1] See “Jordanian SOF Training Kenyan Defence Forces”, Special Operations International, September 22, 2016.
[2] A news release by the U.S. Navy describes a joint combined exchange training (JCET) for the training of the Kenya Special Boat Unit. “Naval Special Warfare Assists In Building Kenyan Special Boat Unit”, Navy.mil, June 10, 2000.
[3] “Kenyan Air Force Establishes Combat Rescue Unit”, Defense House, June 21, 2016.

SOF News Update: US SOF raid in Somalia, interesting facts on the WWII British SOE, IPB in the “Gray Zone”, and SOF in the ground war against ISIS in northern Iraq.

U.S. SOF in Raid in Somalia. United States special operations forces, along side Somali troops, conducted a raid against Shabab militants last week. The raid took place on Wednesday, August 10, 2016. Read more in “Somali Forces, Backed by U.S., Kill Shabab Militants in Raid”, The New York Times, August 16, 2016.

Ten Interesting Facts about WWII SOE. “World War II saw the creation of many spy organizations to battle the menace of the Axis powers. In addition to MI5 and MI6, another group created during this time was the Special Operations Executive.” The British SOE wa the model for the United States WWII spy organization – the Office of Strategic Services or OSS. The OSS was the forerunner of the CIA and the U.S. Army Special Forces. Learn more in “Ten Interesting Facts and Figures about the World War II Special Operations Executive”, The Anglotopia Magazine, August 15, 2016.

SOE Operative Who Refused to Give Up. He was a British war hero who escaped the Nazis and evaded the Japanese in WWII. But he couldn’t avoid his final defeat. Read “Dad, the guerrilla who refused to give up.“, The Guardian, August 20, 2016.

IPB and the Gray Zone. The special operations community defines conflict that takes place between the space of peace and war as the “Gray Zone”. In this conflict zone, where it is often problematic to interpret the meaning of a non-lethal act by friend or adversary, military intelligence teams struggle to define these actions. Read more in “The Gray Zone and Intelligence Preparation of the Battle Space”, Small Wars Journal, August 17, 2016.

Fed Charges against Navy SEAL Dropped. Matt Bissonnette wrote a ‘tell all’ book about the raid that killed Osama bin Laden that got him into trouble with the feds. The charges have been dropped but he will pay a very large sum of money. Read more in “Pentagon Drops Claim Against Navy SEAL That He Spilled Bin Laden Secrets”, The Daily Beast, August 19, 2016.

SOF and the Ground War on ISIS. Mike Giglio, a BuzzFeed News Middle East Correspondent, provides us an inside look of how the U.S. special operations forces are working alongside the Kurds in northern Iraq (Aug 16, 2016).

Air Force Pararescuemen. Read about the men that keep the flyers and others safe from injury and capture in this special article by National Geographic,  August 18, 2016 – Injured Behind Enemy Lines, This Guy Is Your Best Friend.

Callsign JAG 28 Retired. Senior Airman Mark Forester, a member of the 21st Special Tactics Squadron out of Pope Field, North Carolina, died on September 29, 2010 in Uruzgan province, Afghanistan. Read about his heroic actions with the Special Forces team that earned him the Silver Star in “The Airman Who Died Leading His Team in an Intense Ambush”, Task & Purpose, August 18, 2016.

A Tribute to Green Berets. A Special Forces Soldier remembers three very hard Green Berets that were “harder than woodpecker’s lips.” Read a story by Michael Gibson entitled “The Green Berets”, Pulse, August 14, 2016.

U.S. SOF at risk of Syrian Air Attack? A recent airstrike of Syrian fighters near U.S. SOF positions in Syria have some worried. Read more in this news report by The Washington Post, August 19, 2016. Read a DoD press release on this topic (Aug 19, 2016).

Want to work for the CIA? You will need to pass a security investigation. Read “How to Pass a C.I.A. Background Check”, The New York Times Magazine, Auguat 19, 2016.

Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan. Learn about the SOF organizations leading the fight against the Taliban and ISIS  – NSOCC-A and SOJTF-A in an article posted on SOFREP, Special Operations Forces – Afghanistan, July 6, 2016.

Korean General Receives USSOCOM Award. A retired South Korean general and former special warfare commander has been recognized by the United States Special Operations Command. Read “Retired general sets example for commanders”, Korea Times, August 17, 2016.

SAS – Are you tough enough? “The SAS selection course is one of the most physically and psychologically demanding special forces test in the world”. “Are you tough enough to join the SAS?”, BBC.

SOCEUR Assists in Diver Recovery. Two Georgian military divers have gone missing during a recent dive training exercise. Special Operations Command Europe is assisting in recovery efforts. Read more in “US involved in deep sea search for two missing Georgian soldiers”, Agenda.ge, August 17, 2016.

Canadian Special Forces in Kurdistan. Canadian SF troops have been advising the Kurds in northern Iraq for some time. The Canadian government recently tripled the number of Canadian SOF in Iraq. Read “Canadian-trained forces clearing the way to retake Mosul from ISIS”, CTV News (CA), August 16, 2016.

D.C.’s Use of Private Contractors in War. Sean McFate, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, writes on the use of private military contractors to fight its wars and how it is a strategic vulnerability. Read “The Hidden Costs of America’s Addition to Mercenaries”, The Atlantic, August 12, 2016.