By Riccardo Catalano.

In the rapidly evolving information environment of the 21st century, a new battlefield has emerged, one where influence operations have taken center stage. Transversal to the “Cognitive Dimension” of warfare, and the six domains, the Information Environment is a battleground that knows no geographic boundaries, and is accessible from any point around the globe through a few taps on a smartphone or keystrokes on a computer.

According to NATO’s doctrine, “the information environment is an aggregation of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information”.

While western democracies champion the virtues of a free and open Internet, certain adversarial nations are exploiting this openness to their advantage. China, Russia, and Iran have weaponized social media and press freedom in a sophisticated and strategic influence campaign, while maintaining a tightly controlled media environment within their own borders.

The openness of Western societies provides fertile ground for disinformation campaigns. Adversaries can easily disseminate false or misleading narratives through social media platforms and digital news outlets, exploiting freedom of speech to sow discord and confusion.

In contrast, the highly controlled media landscape in countries such as China, Russia, and Iran, effectively shields them from reciprocal influence operations.

One primary example is Russia’s activities during the conflict in Ukraine and more broadly across western democratic elections. With state-sponsored troll farms and the use of artificial intelligence bots, the Russian government has systematically spread disinformation to create societal divisions and challenge democratic values.

Similarly, China’s influence operations are not only aimed at promoting a positive image of China globally, but also at creating divisions within western societies. China’s combination of strict domestic censorship, such as the “Great Firewall,” and its prolific use of platforms like TikTok and WeChat for influence operations presents a particularly asymmetrical threat.

Iran, while technologically behind China and Russia, has also engaged in digital influence operations. Their efforts have focused on inciting discord among western allies and spreading anti-western propaganda.

Confronting this asymmetry requires a multi-pronged approach. The western alliance must prioritize the protection of their own information environment while developing capabilities to penetrate the adversaries’ information barriers. This includes investing in technologies to detect and counteract disinformation, and educating the public on how to recognize and respond to foreign influence efforts.

Civilian professionals with experience in digital marketing, social media, and information security can play a crucial role in this battle. Their expertise can be used to create compelling narratives that support democratic values, while their understanding of information flow and audience analysis can help identify and neutralize adversarial influence operations.

In an era where ‘the pen is mightier than the sword‘, we are in an arms race for narrative control. The challenge for western democracies is to strike a balance between protecting our information environment from adversarial influence operations while upholding the principles of freedom of speech and open information access that define us.

In this tug-of-war, the key is not to choose between one over the other, but rather to find a way to uphold both commitments simultaneously. This requires a nuanced and multi-faceted approach. A purely defensive posture, focused solely on identifying and countering disinformation, is not enough.

Democracies must go on the offensive, leveraging the skills and resources of both the government and private sectors to effectively communicate democratic values, reinforce societal resilience against disinformation, and promote critical thinking. Initiatives like digital literacy programs, fact-checking services (truly independent ones), and public awareness campaigns can go a long way towards equipping citizens with the tools to discern reliable from unreliable information.

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Author: Riccardo Catalano is a former SGT in the Italian Air Force. He is now a copywriter and editor. His writings can be found on his blog at https://www.narrazionistrategiche.net/.

By Charles Davis.

“Nobody wants to sit where I am and think now about what ‘coulda, shoulda, woulda’ happened in order to avoid this.” – Secretary of State Hilary Clinton [1]

The Department of State has an abysmal record of conducting Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO), especially when it comes to emergency response to social unrest and instability in conflict zones. There are internal mechanisms in place for leaders to learn from these events and to take steps to strengthen their processes. However, whether an issue of not wanting to have written documentation of failures and shortcomings or general disregard for the requirements, Department of State (DoS) officials are slow to publish after-action documentation of past events and neglect to act on the recommendations of these reports. This calls into question DoS level of readiness as we face continued friction and instability over Taiwan.  

A memorandum of agreement between the Departments of State and Defense indicates the Department of State (DoS) will exercise overall responsibility for protecting U.S. citizens and nationals and designated other persons, to include, when necessary and feasible, their evacuation to and welfare in relatively safe areas.  DoS further assumes responsibility for minimizing their risk of death or seizure as hostages and reducing their presence in probable or actual combat areas, so that combat effectiveness of U.S. and allied forces is not impaired. [2]

This same memorandum tasks the Department of Defense (DoD) with monitoring the political, military, economic, and other conditions. DoD will assess levels of hostility; local national willingness to provide protections for US citizens, nationals and other designees; number and locations of the same persons abroad and evacuation and protection capabilities, including transportation/lift requirements and their availability as well as the availability of relatively safe holding or survival areas for staging evacuees during emergencies. [3] These are considered Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs).

While each agency has its own lines of effort, the DoS has ultimate responsibility to prepare plans for protection and evacuation of US citizens and DoD non-combatants. This includes coordination to maximize timely use of available military transportation assets and existing host nation support infrastructure. Given the significant failures of Benghazi and Afghanistan along with questionable decisions about non-government US citizens in Sudan, it is no wonder there is concern and apprehension in the DoS planning approach to Taiwan.

Concerns Over DoS Planning and Readiness for NEOs

National level concerns over DoS planning and readiness is not a new focus. In 2007 the Government Accountability Office (GAO) was tasked with assessing evacuation planning and preparations for overseas posts. As part of the evaluation, the team assessed DoS guidance and plans to prepare for evacuation, training and exercises to prepare post staff for crisis, and efforts to collect, analyze, and incorporate evacuation lessons learned into guidance and training. [4]

The findings stated, “Posts do not find State’s primary guidance particularly useful in preparing for evacuation. In addition, while State requires posts to update Emergency Action Plans (EAP)s annually, almost 40 percent of posts surveyed have not updated their plans in 18 months or longer. Post-produced estimates of American citizens in a country are best guesses and more than three-quarters of posts said their last estimate was, at best, only somewhat accurate. We also found weaknesses in a memorandum of agreement (MOA) between State and DoD that could limit these agencies’ ability to effectively work together during a large-scale evacuation.” [5]

Other findings, from the report, suggest Emergency Action Committee members have not been properly trained on their duties, new staff have gone untrained and, crisis management exercises do not reflect likely scenarios given the assignment locations. Furthermore, roughly 60% of posts evacuated between 2002-2007 did not produce the required after action report, so there are no lessons learned to be applied to future crisis management situations.

Several of the GAO findings and recommendations provided in the 2007 report surfaced again in the Final Report of The Select Committee on the Events Surrounding the 2012 Terrorist Attack in Benghazi (H. Rept. 114-848). Select Committee recommendations included “a clear designation of ‘who is in charge of managing and following up on response in emergent situations as well as the roles and responsibilities of involved departments and agencies. There needed to be greater interoperability and improved communications during contingencies. Additionally, relevant agencies need to be involved in each other’s emergency action plans and, where capability on the ground is insufficient and the DoD cannot respond immediately the DoS and other agencies adjust their plans to allow for local or regional resources to be identified ahead of time. [6]

Commonalities in the GOA report of 2007 and the planning and coordination failures in the 2012 Benghazi report suggest lessons learned were not being captured and shared. This is an indicator that recommendations from 2007 may not have gained traction over the proceeding five years. A final recommendation from the Benghazi report encourages agencies on the ground to plan for standby military support before a crisis occurs in high threat environments. The recommendation also suggests including feasible support from U.S. allies. “In addition, the coordinating body should provide for a specific mechanism to know and understand assets and capabilities actually available at any given time.” [7] It is evident from the failures in the Afghanistan evacuation, these recommendation also gained little or no traction in the proceeding 10 years.

In 2017 the GAO initiated a follow-on assessment of DoS emergency preparedness. GAO findings during this evaluation period indicate only 2 of the 20 evaluated posts, which were approved by DoS Bureau of Diplomatic Security, had updated all key EAPs. “GAO also found that EAPs are viewed as lengthy and cumbersome documents that are not readily usable in emergency situations”, suggesting that EAPs serve as a check the box requirement rather than a functional plan for implementation. [8] Another significant finding indicates only 36% of the posts reported completing their evacuation drills.

GAO report 17-174 reiterated what should be obvious from previous agency assessments and actual events. DoS needs to ensure posts complete EAP updates and training exercises. Because of the inconsistency in following requirements, DoS should more closely track the policy requirements and verify posts are following through during EAP cycles. Most importantly, “State could develop a more streamlined version of the EAP—consisting of key sections, checklists, and contact lists—that could be used [by staff in and emergency], in addition to the full EAP… and take steps to ensure overseas post complete required lessons learned reports…” [9] These are all items addressed in some form during the 2007 assessment of DoS readiness.

Kabul NEO – August 2021

Photo: U.S. Marines from the Special Purpose Marine Air-Gournd Task Force – Crisis Response Central Command provide security during the Kabul NEO on August 20, 2021. (Photo by Lance Cpl Nicholas Guevara).

Four years after GAO report 17-174 there was a systemic failure during the evacuation of Afghanistan. House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) Interim Report “A Strategic Failure: Assessing the Administration’s Afghanistan Withdrawal” asserts there was a failure to plan. Findings from the report indicate the “[DoS] took very few substantive steps to prepare for the consequences that were expected.” [10] The report further indicates “Military commanders have clearly stated there was an utter lack of urgency on the part of the White House, the National Security Council (NSC), and the State Department as it pertained to an evacuation, despite repeated dire warnings.” [11] These comments seem to be echoed by reports that Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Milley believed DoS waited too long to initiate evacuation efforts. [12]

The HFAC report also addresses key planning failures regarding NEOs. “[DoS] was unable to provide adequate assistance to U.S. citizens (AMCITs), lawful permanent residents (LPRs), Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) holders and applicants, and other at-risk Afghans who were attempting to evacuate the country during the NEO. Would be evacuees were sent conflicting messages, told they could not be helped, or left standing outside the gates of the airport…” [13] Given our adversaries use of Information Warfare, disinformation operations and deep fakes, DoS needs to be both mindful and prepared with a strong communications plan.

Additionally, “U.S. military personnel on the ground involved in the evacuation said they had been prohibited from coordinating evacuation planning with all allies except for the UK until early August 2021.” [14] This is an operational failure which was identified and addressed as a key planning consideration in the Benghazi Report. General Sullivan noted US forces weren’t even allowed to coordinate with the Turkish forces commanding a primary military contingency at the airport and Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman did not begin NEO coordination through her channels until August 22, 2021, which was nine days after the fall of Herat and Taliban seizing control of all national border crossings. [15] These types of coordination would have been critical to success given the more than 20 countries and organizations that were trying to conduct similar evacuations. Failing to heed this type of coordination in future NEOs, such as Taiwan, will also be disastrous. This is especially true given the number of countries who have a significant population of citizens working in Taiwan.

In early July 2023 the U.S. Department of State released its After Action Review on Afghanistan that covers the period of January 2020 to August 2021. The principal finding in the 87-page report was that the State Department acted too late to conduct the NEO and that there was a lack of coordination among the senior leadership of the State Department.

Sudan NEO – April 2023

Photo: Secretary of State Blinken monitoring the evacuation of diplomatic staff from Sudan on 22 April 2023. DoS photo.

On April 22, 2023 DoS initiated an evacuation of Embassy personnel and their dependents from Khartoum Sudan. This evacuation did not include civilians and other designees. Under Secretary for Management, Ambassador John Bass indicated the DoD took the lead on evacuation operations for the Embassy after it was determined that use of commercial air and access to the airport was no longer an option. He further applied to the loss of access to commercial air as a reason not to attempt a US government evacuation of other American citizens in the near term. [16]

Ambassador Bass did indicate the DoS was attempting to maintain contact with US citizens and provide them with a best assessment of the security environment, while encouraging them to take appropriate precautions. He further asserted the DoS was working with other countries and the United Nations, as well as international organizations to enable US citizens to make their way to safety. [17]  There was no indication that this was part of an EAP or that early coordination had been ongoing, with an expectation for the DoS to need the support of partner countries and non-government organizations. Given previous examples of planning failures and the number of posts that have not completed EAP requirements, it is likely these efforts were cobbled together as events unfolded.

Is DoS Prepared for a Future NEO in Taiwan?

Recent reporting from multiple news agencies suggests the United States is conducting advance planning for a potential NEO evacuation of the Taiwan DoS post. While the one China policy has dictated that the US not establish an embassy in Taiwan, DoS works out of the American Institute in Taiwan. A June 13, 2023 piece by dayFREURO suggest multiple sources provided perspective on US evacuation planning that began more than 6 months prior. Unnamed sources indicated the planning process was not a public topic due to its sensitive nature and the potential fear and apprehension it might evoke within the Taiwanese population. [18]  The fact that DoS is taking an active planning approach, suggests recommendations and lessons learned are finally being applied in EAP development for this post.

A Messenger report from December 2021 indicates roughly two thirds of the Taiwanese population identifies as Taiwanese rather than Chinese. This growing shift along with recent Taiwan and US efforts to shore up defenses may be contributing to China’s need to act sooner rather than later, on its claims to the island nation.  This is not the first time Taiwan and the US have drawn attention over evacuation training. A 2003 Taipei Times report on joint training exercise Han Kuang #19 indicated Deputy Defense Minister Chen Chao-ming specifically addressed the inaccurate perception the US military was participating in evacuation training. [19]

“China has unsuccessfully attempted military force against Taiwan before, in the 1950s and 1990s. For much of that period, Taiwan itself had a superior military to the People’s Republic, and U.S. naval dominance in the region was unquestioned.” [20] An example can be found in June 1950, when President Truman placed the 7th Fleet between mainland China and Taiwan. In this case deterrence through the neutralization of the Taiwan Strait discouraged Chinese forces from conducting an amphibious assault. However, the same policy of deterrence today may be speeding China’s decision-making timeline.

As DoS continues to develop NEO evacuation planning, the Philippines are likely to play a key role. The  country’s May 2022 presidential election significantly shifted Philippine relations with the US and China and allowed the US to reestablish democratic relationships that had deteriorated under Rodrigo Duterte. [21]  And, as recently as May 2023 the US has reaffirmed its 72 year defense alliance with the Philippines, through a defense treaty in the South China Sea. [22]  Just days after confirming this treaty, President Marcos indicated Philippine bases could play a key role if China were to attack Taiwan. [23]

An example of how DoS planning might leverage Philippine bases includes the Ports of Kaohsiung and Subic Bay. Kaohsiung is located on Taiwan’s southwestern coastline and Kaohsiung port is one of the biggest container handling facilities in the world. The port handles roughly 5000 vessels and 18,900,000 tonnes of cargo annually. [24] Along with the port, Kaohsiung boast one of the country’s largest international airports co-located just outside the port area. Subic Bay, Philippines is approximately 500 miles south and served as a US naval base until 1992. The Subic facilities also include an international airport. Given DoS intentions to rely on commercial transportation as a first alternative, these two facilities provide multiple avenues for departure and arrival, not only for US citizens but other countries as well.

A possible indicator to the approach above can be found in a DoS Joint Statement from April 11, 2023. “Mindful of the growing complexity of the Indo-Pacific security environment, including the multidimensional nature of modern challenges and threats to the peace and security of the Philippines and the United States, the Secretaries reaffirmed their shared determination to defend against external armed attack in the Pacific… Accelerate the implementation of [Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement] EDCA projects and increase investments in EDCA agreed Locations to further support combined training, exercises, and interoperability between the U.S. and Philippine Armed Forces, as well as the Philippines’ civilian-led disaster preparedness and response capacities. The United States expects to have allocated over $100 million by the end of fiscal year 2023 toward infrastructure investments at the existing five EDCA sites and to support swift operationalization of the four new sites.” [25]

Whether through learning from previous events or developing new approaches, DoS will face significant obstacles during a NEO event in Taiwan. Reliance on a variety of networks and resources will be paramount to conducting a successful NEO. This will include advance coordination and relationship building before the crisis and NGOs may play a substantial role. In early 2000 Taiwan established the Department of NGO International Relations, which falls under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is responsible for maintaining positive relationships with NGOs, through open dialogue on difficult topics such as political freedom and civil rights. Associations such as this provide early indicators of instability which may extend operational and execution timelines and in a potential crisis such as this time is a valuable commodity. 

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Top Photo: U.S. Marines provide security during drawdown of designated personnel in Afghanistan on August 18, 2021. (U.S. Marine Corps photo).

Map: Taiwan map derived from maps from the Central Intelligence Agency.

[1] https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/01/23/top-quotes-from-hillary-clintons-benghazi-hearings

[2] https://prhome.defense.gov/Portals/52/Documents/PR%20Docs/DOS-DOD%20Memo%20of%20Agreement%20on%20Protection%20and%20Evacuation.pdf

[3] Ibid.

[4] GAO-08-23 State Department: Evacuation Planning and Preparations for Overseas Posts Can Be Improved

[5] ibid

[6] https://www.congress.gov/114/crpt/hrpt848/CRPT-114hrpt848.pdf

[7] ibid

[8] https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-17-714.pdf

[9] https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-17-714.pdf

[10] https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/HFAC-Republican-Interim-Report-A-22Strategic-Failure22-Assessing-the-Administrations-Afghanistan-Withdrawal.pdf

[11] ibid

[12] General Mark Milley Privately Blamed the State Department for the Disorganized Evacuation of Afghanistan (sofrep.com)

[13] https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/HFAC-Republican-Interim-Report-A-22Strategic-Failure22-Assessing-the-Administrations-Afghanistan-Withdrawal.pdf

[14] Ibid

[15] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/afghan-commander-ismail-khan-captured-taliban-seize-herat-2021-08-13/

[16] https://www.state.gov/briefing-with-under-secretary-for-management-ambassador-john-bass-assistant-secretary-for-african-affairs-ambassador-molly-phee-assistant-secretary-of-defense-for-special-operations-and-low-intensit/

[17] ibid

[18] https://euro.dayfr.com/trends/352257.html

[19] https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2003/01/03/189539

[20] https://themessenger.com/grid/test-imagining-the-unimaginable-the-us-china-and-war-over-taiwan

[21] https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/2022-philippine-election-trouble-democracy-and-foreign-relations-ahead

[22] https://www.reuters.com/world/us-issues-guidelines-defending-philippines-south-china-sea-attack-2023-05-04/

[23] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/marcos-says-philippines-bases-could-be-useful-if-taiwan-attacked-2023-05-05/

[24] https://www.marineinsight.com/know-more/8-major-ports-of-taiwan/

[25] Joint Statement of the U.S.-Philippines 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue – United States Department of State

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has failed for the most part – Kyiv still stands and Ukraine has recaptured much of the territory it had lost in the initial phases of the war. The remarkable resistance of Ukraine has surprised many national security observers, caused embarrassment to Russia, and have had many looking to apply lessons learned to a future Taiwan conflict.

In April 2022, General Richard Clarke (Ret.) – former commander of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), stated that many U.S. officials share the desire that “Taiwan, just like Ukraine has been, to be an indigestible porcupine.”

The U.S. and other nations have been reluctant to directly engage in open conflict with Russia or China. This leaves some strategic deterrence gaps – areas that special operations forces can fill. Many studies have been done on how the Ukraine conflict can provide some lessons on how to deter the People’s Republic of China from invading Taiwan. However, most of these are focused on conventional warfare and seem to omit the applicability of SOF.

This JSOU paper aims to fill that research gap by gathering lessons from SOF activities in Ukraine and applying them to Taiwan – adding quills to Taiwan’s defensive capability. The lessons gathered include the strengthening of resistance capabilities, fostering long-term alliances, and dominating the information war.

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SOF Quills for the Porcupine: Applying Lessons from Ukraine to Taiwan, by Scott Simeral, Lieutenant Colonel Steven Skipper, and Lieutenant Colonel Giovanna Espegio, Joint Special Operations University Press, March 2023, PDF, 18 pages.
https://www.jsou.edu/Press/PublicationDashboard/225

Image from the cover of the paper cited above. A porcupine with quills containing the Fairbairn-Sykes dagger, an international symbol for Special Operations Forces, against a backdrop of Ukraine and Taiwan flags. Claire Luke for JSOU Press.

By Michael J. Listner.

The passage of an intelligence-gathering balloon from the Peoples Republic of China through U.S. sovereign airspace earlier this month created a Sputnik-conundrum in terms of international law and national sovereignty. The balloon, which was first detected entering U.S. sovereign airspace around the Aleutian Island chain was permitted to transit this airspace unimpeded into Alaska and then reenter the continental U.S. where it was allowed to transit the continental U.S. unchecked until it was finally brought down within the 12-mile zone of the southeast coast of the U.S. Much is not publicly known what types or amount of intelligence was gathered by the balloon; however, aside from this the permissive entry and transit of the balloon raises questions about the effect of incident on international law and U.S. national sovereignty.

Hybrid Warfare and International Law

The term hybrid warfare was coined by Xu Sanfei, the editor of Military Forum and a senior editor in the Theory Department of Liberation Army News. Hybrid warfare “…refers to an act of war that is conducted at the strategic level; that comprehensively employs political, economic, military, diplomatic, public opinion, legal, and other such means; whose boundaries are blurrier, whose forces are more diverse, whose form is more mixed, whose regulation and control is more flexible, and whose objectives are more concealed.” The CCP’s Central Military Commission adopted the concept of hybrid warfare when it announced in 2003 three new types of warfare capabilities: legal warfare (lawfare), psychological warfare, and media warfare, which individually and collectively attain a political objective. This new strategy, which is called the Three Warfares, was subsequently adopted by the Peoples Liberation Army. This article will focus on the legal aspect of hybrid warfare.

Sovereign Airspace and Near Space          

The Federal Aviation Administration regulates territorial airspace up to 60,000 feet (approximately 18.288km), which makes this airspace unquestionably sovereign airspace. Beyond this altitude some question  whether the so-called “near-space” can be claimed as sovereign airspace. The non-legal spatial demarcation for where outer space begins is 60 miles (approximately 100km). The U.S. does not recognize the need for an international legal demarcation for where outer space begins and gives supports for a rule of international law that a nation’s sovereign airspace extends not only beyond the 60,000-foot altitude but up to where an aircraft or spacecraft would enter a full orbit of the Earth and unquestionably be in the sovereignless domain of outer space. This rule that a nations sovereign airspace extends past 60,000 feet into near-space and into outer space is borne out with high-flying reconnaissance aircraft that have operated in near-space altitudes. The U-2 operates at altitudes of 70,000 feet, and the CIA’s OXCART program and the Strategic Air Command’s SR-71 both operated at altitudes of 80,000+ feet, which is well within the alleged legal gray zone purported to exist. Moreover, all these aircraft encountered defensive actions while at these altitudes from nations as they overflew or flew in proximity to what these nations claimed as sovereign territory, including a U-2 shot downed over the Soviet Union on May 1, 1960 while flying over the Soviet Union and at least six U-2s operated by the Black Cat Squadron of the Taiwanese Air Force while flying at so-called near-space altitudes over the PRC.

Chinese Balloons and Hybrid Warfare

The transit of the PRC balloon over U.S. territory creates a larger question as to the purpose of the action. The primary purpose of the balloon was undoubtedly to collect intelligence; however, ancillary to that mission is whether the PRC was testing for a political response from the U.S. to see if it could use the legal aspect of hybrid warfare and the Three Warfares, which is called lawfare, to potentially test of a new rule of international law for near-space and assess the resolve of the U.S. to not only defend its territory but also support and assert its sovereign rights under international law. Two aspects of the intrusion are pertinent to this analysis.

First, the unimpeded transit of the balloon brings into question whether the PRC was seeking to establish an international rule of law for passing over sovereign territory at “near-space” altitudes. The balloon’s trek over U.S. territory began its violation of sovereign U.S. air space when it passed over the Aleutian Islands yet, no action was taken to intercept its course purportedly because it was not deemed a military threat. Regardless, no assertion in messaging by the U.S. was made the balloon was violating its sovereign airspace. This potentially gives the PRC the impression that if not creating a toe-hold for a rule of customary international law for overflights at near-space altitudes it at least shows a reluctance by the U.S. to push-back on implicit attempt to create a rule of international law. A repeat of the overflight that would give further credence to this claim would be difficult considering the political fallout following this incident. Yet, even if the PRC were to attempt to repeat the incursion and the U.S. intercepted, would the U.S. assert its sovereign rights as trigger for the intercept? This leads into the second legal aspect.

The second legal aspect of the incursion is whether it was a test by the PRC to see how the U.S. would respond to a violation of its sovereign airspace and whether it would assert international law or waiver politically. The intrusion into and passage through U.S. airspace was a direct challenge to this rule of international law and arguably could have been a lawfare action to dilute the precept itself. By failing to properly message the true nature of the incursion, the U.S. not only waivered on its defense of national airspace but signaled to the PRC it might waiver on asserting international law in other domains, which brings into questions the U.S. response to future geopolitical events.

The Strategic and Geopolitical Effect

The lack of coherent messaging to enunciate the violation of U.S. airspace and assert the violation of international law and instead down-playing the seriousness of the incident creates strategic problems for the U.S. This lack of messaging continued with the intercept of the objects subsequent to the intrusion where the Administration cites safety as the rationale for the interventions instead of the violation of sovereign U.S. airspace. This brings into question the U.S. commitment to not only defending the sovereign airspace of the U.S. but the rule of international law at home and abroad. This in turn has a psychological effect on the public perception of political leaders in the U.S. to uphold national security. More critically, it also creates shadows of doubt about the willingness of the U.S. to uphold international law and respond decisively to challenges to international law abroad, including both treaty commitments and political assurances. Moreover, the lack of decisive action and clear messaging by the U.S. dilutes the credibility of the U.S. not only enforcing and asserting international law in other domains but also it standing to conjure new standards of behavior in other domains, including outer space.

Conclusion

The reluctance of the U.S. to immediately deal with and unambiguously charge the incursion of the PRC surveillance balloon as a violation of its sovereign territorial rights under international law and the hesitancy to demonstrate resolve in intercepting the balloon eroded the credibility of the U.S. in the eyes of its domestic citizens and allies in the geopolitical sphere. More critically, the standing of the U.S in geopolitical adversaries in the context of great power competition has shifted as the PRC analyzes the U.S. response to the incursion and makes its next calculation in great power competition to shift the rule of international law to its world-view.

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Author: Michael J. Listner is a licensed attorney in the State of New Hampshire and the founder and principal of Space Law and Policy Solutions. He is a subject matter expert in outer space law, outer space policy and hybrid warfare/lawfare strategy and the author and editor of the space law and policy briefing-letter, The Précis.

Photo: A U.S. Air Force U-2 pilot looked down at the suspected Chinese surveillance balloon as it hovered over the Central Continental United States February 3, 2023. Recovery efforts began shortly after the balloon was downed. (Photo courtesy of the Department of Defense)

The September-October 2022 issue of the Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs has published a series of articles (15) on Arctic strategy and security. Three of these articles are focused on special operations forces activities in the high north.

“Special Operations Command North: Leading Special Operations Forces into the North American Arctic”, by BG Shawn Satterfield and Lt Col Sky Jensen, JIPA, Air University Press, October 3, 2022. View online.

“Special Operations Forces and Arctic Indigenous People: Partnering to Defend the North American Arctic Homeland”, by LTC James Morton and Dr. Ryan Burke, JIPA, Air University Press, October 3, 2022. View online.

“The Unconventional Approach to Arctic Security: Increasing Domain Awareness through the US Army Special Operations Forces’ Indigenous Approach”, by MAJ W. Barrett Martin, MAJ Michael Tovo, and MAJ Devin Kirkwood, JIPA, Air University Press, October 3, 2022. View online.

In addition to the three articles cited above, the JIPA issue has many more articles about Arctic security and strategy:

• Campaigning at the Top of the World
• Arctic Strategy Deterrence and Détente
• Forging the Arctic Warrior
• Landpower and Security in the European Arctic
• Alaska’s Strategic Importance
• The Russian Invasion of Ukraine Freezes Moscow’s Arctic Ambitions
• Securing a Blue Arctic Century
• Why China is Not a Peer Competitor in the Arctic
• Melting a Chinese Iceberg
• Above the Arctic (Cooperation in Space)
• Polar Nights, White Nights, and Normal Days and Nights
• The Three-Fold Path of the Snow Dragon

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The Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs (JIPA), Air University Press, September-October 2022, PDF, 176 pages.
https://media.defense.gov/2022/Sep/28/2003087081/-1/-1/1/_JIPA%20SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER%202022.PDF/_JIPA%20SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER%202022.PDF

Photo: Special Operations Winter Mountain Operator Course. 10th Special Forces Group, March 2022

A hearing was held on “Disinformation in the Gray Zone: Opportunities, Limitations, and Challenges” by the House Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations. The purpose of the hearing was to receive testimony on the Department of Defense’s (DoD) efforts to address malign activities of our adversaries below the threshold of armed conflict.

Witnesses:

Mr. Christopher Maier
Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense
Special Operations / Low Intensity Conflict

Mr. Neil Tipton
Director of Defense Intelligence
Collections and Special Programs (DoD)

Mr. James Sullivan
Defense Intelligence Officer for Cyber
Defense Intelligence Agency

Hearing. The event was approximately one hour long. It began with opening statements by the Committee chairman, Representative Gallego, and the witnesses. The three witnesses had submitted one witness statement for the record that incorporated the comments of all three witnesses. Then the format moved to a question and answer session. This open session was followed by a closed session for more sensitive or classified topics.

Takeaways. Our defense information operations (IO) are not keeping up with those of Russia and China. Currently Russia is the main IO threat to the US but China will soon catch up and move ahead of Russia. The DoD has to relearn how to conduct IO (like we did during the Cold War). The conduct of IO falls primarily to the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). The various DoD cyber organizations are working IO into their activities. One of the limiting factors is personnel – recruiting and training an individual who is knowledgeable of language, culture, behavioral science and other disciplines is a time-consuming and long-range venture.

Four Lines of Effort. The DoD has organized its efforts to combat disinformation, misinformation, and propaganda in four areas.

• countering propaganda by adversaries
• force protection
• countering disinformation abroad
• deterring and disrupting adversarial malign influence capabilities

Conclusion. The hearing starts off a little slow but then gets more interesting during the question and answer period. If you are tracking events in the information operations world and USSOCOM’s involvement in IO activities then this hearing could be of interest. The 9-page witness statement is very informative.

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Video – Disinformation in the Gray Zone: Opportunities, Limitations, and Challenges
March 16, 2021, 57 minutes, YouTube.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N-RCBwyamdY&t=172s

Additional Products. The biographies of the witnesses and the opening witness statement are available on the Subcommittee’s portal at the link below. You can access them on the portal page via the zip file that allows you to download the meeting package. If you just want to read the witness statement – click here to access off SOF News website. (PDF, 9 pages).
https://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/ByEvent.aspx?EventID=111323

A video produced by U.S. Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School explains “Great Power Competition” (GPC) and Army Special Operations Forces’ (ARSOF) role in support of the National Defense Strategy.

Colonel Bryan Groves and Major Steve Ferenzi from the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) G-5 Strategic Planning Division discuss how ARSOF’s strategy is designed to support the vision of the U.S. Army as well as the strategic guidance of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM).

In the video explanations are provided for what great power competition is and lays out the terms used when discussing GPC. The 2018 National Defense Strategy set the conditions for a shifting of focus from counterinsurgency and counterterrorism to competition with Russia and China. In this new strategy the military is a supporting effort in GPC. The video details how the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) will support the efforts of the U.S. government and the Department of Defense in GPC.

The implications of this shift to GPC for ARSOF are significant. However, it does not mean that ARSOF will cease engaging in irregular warfare (IW). The core missions of ARSOF remain valid. JCETs with partner nation forces will continue. Working with interagency partners conducting counter narcotic operations will not go away. The expertise that ARSOF brings to IW – such as competencies in the human domain (language, culture, etc.) are still important in GPC.

ARSOF provides low-risk, high-impact options across the spectrum of GPC. USASOC units contribute deterrence and compellence options for the US government using low visibility and discreet methods. These options help to influence and shape behavior, provide options other than the use of tanks, ships, and nukes, build resilience and the capacity to resist aggression in partner-nation in populations (think Baltic States), and much more.

ARSOF augments and complements the conventional force options in GPC. In addition, the use of irrregular warfare by ARSOF provides the U.S. government and Department of Defense a set of options that in many cases is cheaper and less escalatory than conventional options.

The video provides a great explanation of great power competition. It also helps the viewer to understand the role of PSYOP, Ranger, Civil Affairs, Special Forces, and other ARSOF units in employing irregular warfare in an era of great power competition.

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Knowledge Wins – Great Power Competition. This video presented by the U.S. Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School is Part I of three parts. Published on August 21, 2020, 21-minutes long.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qfjAuUkcg_s

Paul Cobaugh’s book Modern Minutemen and Women provides a detailed look at the U.S. governments’ inability to conduct influence operations to counter the propaganda efforts of Russia, China, and other adversaries. His book outlines the deficiencies with the various organizations of the U.S. government – to include the State Department, Department of Defense, and other agencies. He also provides several important recommendations to improve our defensive and offensive capabilities when it comes to information operations or narrative warfare.

Using examples from the Cold War, the post-Cold War period, Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere Paul describes the failures of the U.S. information operations (IO) activities. He surveys the government’s information operations organizational structure (to include the military) and explains how this IO failure has taken place. His recommendations for the centralization of narrative warfare makes sense – many others have made similar recommendations.

The U.S. government failed in its attempts to halt Russian interference in the 2016 presidential elections. The Russians were at it again during the 2018 mid-term elections . . . and are now currently interfering in the 2020 presidential elections. But it isn’t just the Russians this time. China, Iran, and others are seeking to create diversion and confusion in the 2020 elections as well.

In his book he urges the political parties to put partisanship aside and join together as one nation to defend against the nefarious activities of Russia, China, and others. He provides a guide for government leaders and policy makers to put our narrative warfare capabilities (offense and defense) back on track.

The author believes that under the current political environment the various U.S. government agencies – and the respective political parties – are unable to effectively counter influence activities by our adversaries. So he calls on individual Americans to respond to this crisis – as the Minutemen did in the early days of this nation. There is an entire chapter of the book for the individual American that provides basic steps to sorting through real news and fake news. In his book he includes a complete annex of free election security tools and resources for government, business, and citizens.

The U.S. intelligence community has proven without a doubt that America is under attack domestically by our adversaries. In addition, after two decades of conflict, we have demonstrated an inability to provide an effective narrative to complement our counterterrorism and counterinsurgency campaigns overseas. Our federal government has only selectively addressed this threat to our domestic security and our lack of influence capability in overseas conflicts. This failure ranges from the lack of effort to defend our elections from attack to a structural and organizational inability to conduct influence operations around the world.

This book is primarily focused on Russian narrative warfare targeting the U.S. domestically as well as U.S. activities and interests overseas. However, the author sees the U.S. under continuous attack by China, Iran, and others as well. These adversaries will continue to conduct these influence activities until we address this critical gap in our national defense.

The book is a good read for those seeking to understand narrative warfare, how our elections are compromised by foreign interference, and how we can regain the initiative in offensive and defensive information operations in an era of great power competition in the future years ahead.

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Modern Minutemen and Women: or how to save the 2020 election, by Paul Cobaugh, 2020, 263 pages.
https://www.amazon.com/Modern-Day-Minutemen-Women-election-ebook/dp/B08BDZQCTJ

Paul Cobaugh retired in 2015 from the U.S. Army after a career in the U.S. Special Operations counterterrorism community. While with the Army he specialized in influence operations. His primary focus was on mitigating adversarial influence and advancing US objectives by way of influence. He is currently Vice President at Narrative Strategies.

U.S. Central Command conducted Invincible Sentry 20, a bilateral exercise hosted by the government of Uzbekistan in military training facilities within the Tashkent region from February 24 to March 2, 2020.

Invincible Sentry 20 was a crisis response rehearsal designed to evaluate the command and control operations between U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), component command staffs (including SOCCENT), other U.S. Government agencies, and the host nation. It was also designed to build readiness and interoperability between U.S. and Uzbekistan forces in case the need arises for a combined response to regional crises or contingencies.

U.S. Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT) served as the command and control element for all U.S. Special Operations participating in the exercise. U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) worked closely with the Uzbekistan National Guard and other Uzbek security forces to train on critical tasks and realistic scenarios that provided an opportunity to pursue ways to better address common threats to regional security.

The exercise allowed for both American and Uzbek participants to improve operational agility when confronted with unfamiliar challenges. Each day of the exercise, U.S. and Uzbekistan forces rehearsed, executed and learned from each other as they went through various tactical maneuver scenarios.

The partnership opportunity served as another repetition for SOCCENT to apply capabilities and achieve validation to continue to provide SOF operational planning and support throughout the region. In addition, the exercise helps the U.S. to maintain a strong working relationship with Uzbekistan.

Uzbekistan Independence. With the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 the Central Asian country gained its independence. The U.S. was one of the first nations to recognize the country. After 9/11 the U.S. used a base called Karshi-Khanabad Airbase or K2 in southern Uzbekistan to launch air strikes and Special Forces teams into northern Afghanistan. The U.S. base was maintained until 2005 when relations between the two countries deteriorated because of Uzbek government human rights violations and an alleged massacre of protesters in May 2005.

Improved Diplomatic Relations. The U.S. and Uzbekistan have common interests and there has been an improvement in relations since 2018. There is a desire to prevent the movement of foreign terrorist fighters and narcotic traffickers. Uzbekistan shares a border with Afghanistan and can play a role in stabilizing the security environment. There is hope that Uzbekistan can play a big role in reintegrating Afghanistan into the Central Asian sphere.

“Our military cooperation with Uzbekistan is based on mutual respect and common interests. Training programs and joint response exercises such as Invincible Sentry show the depth and breadth of our security partnership with Uzbekistan.”

U.S. Ambassador to Uzbekistan, Daniel Rosenblum

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo visited Uzbekistan in February 2020 while touring the Central Asian states. He carried a message to the ex-Soviet Republics – “Beware of China”. He warned Uzbekistan and the other Central Asian countries to be wary of Chinese investment and influence. However Uzbekistan and its neighbors rely on China for much of their foreign trade and investment – so the U.S. will likely see some ‘gentle resistance’ to the message about China.

U.S and Uzbek Military Relationship. The relationship between the U.S. and Uzbek military has been growing over the past few years. The Uzbek Minister of Defense visited SECDEF Mark Esper in July 2019. The minister also visited several U.S. military sites across the country. The U.S. SECDEF was scheduled to visit Uzbekistan in March 2020 but his visit was cancelled due to the coronavirus events.

In August 2019 six Uzbek soldiers visited the Black Rapids Training Site in Alaska exchanging techniques on mountain operations. In September 2019 a number of visits were conducted by Uzbek military officers to explore collaboration on officer training and military research. In addition there have been visits to Uzbekistan by U.S. military members from the aviation and medical community.

SPP, Mississippi, and Uzbekistan. The State Partnership Program links the National Guard of the individual U.S. states with the militaries of other countries. Mississippi and Uzbekistan began their partnership in 2012. Over the past several years they have conducted a number of joint military events. Uzbek special forces participated in a SOF exercise in Mississippi in January 2019. In December 2019 members of the Uzbek Special Operations Battalion visited Camp Shelby, Mississippi taking part in the annual “Best Warrior” competition. The MS NG has plans to post a full-time officer in the Office of Military Cooperation (OMC) in the US Embassy in Tashkent.

The U.S. has an interest in the development of stronger diplomatic and military ties with Uzbekistan. The never-ending fight against terrorism, the situation in Afghanistan, and the great power competition with Russia and China places Uzbekistan in a key geographic position. Once the coronavirus threat has subsided it is expected that the U.S. and Uzbek will continue to conduct staff visits to each other’s countries, conduct joint exercises, and expand mil to mil relationships.

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References:

Parts of this article derived from story published on DVIDS on March 17, 2020 entitled “U.S. and Uzbek National Guard together in Central Asia”.

“Rethinking Uzbekistan: A Military View”, by Major Daniel O’Connor, U.S. Army, Military Review, Army University Press, March – April 2020.

United States Strategy for Central Asia: 2019-2025, Department of State, 2020. This 6-page document is posted on the website of the U.S. Embassy in Uzbekistan.

Photo: A U.S. special operator teaches a member of the Uzbekistan National Guard how to detonate a flash bang grenade while performing tactical movement procedures during exercise Invincible Sentry 20 in the Tashkent region of Uzbekistan. Photo by Staff Sergeant Steven Colvin, U.S. Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT), February 25, 2020.

News Update on the Afghan War 20161228 – Celebrated Afghan female Air Force pilot chooses to seek asylum in the United States, regional powers ‘threatened’ by Afghan insecurity, disposition of junk Afghan military vehicles, Taliban peace talks sabotaged by Pakistan, and more.

Regional Powers to Meet in Moscow. Russia is hosting a meeting with China and Pakistan on the ‘gradually growing threat’ posed to their borders by Islamic State extremists in Afghanistan. ISIS has established a foothold in the eastern regions of Afghanistan – principally in the provinces of Nangarhar, Kunar, and perhaps Nuristan as well. The status of the Taliban will also be discussed as well. Read more in “China, Pakistan, Russia to Meet on Afghanistan, Angering Kabul Leaders”, Voice of America, December 26, 2016.

(MY THOUGHTS) – Not much of a constructive nature is going to be coming out of this series of meetings. Russia seeks to continue the U.S. quagmire in Afghanistan, China is not opposed to the U.S. continuing difficulties (although from an economic perspective it probably would like more secure trade routes), and we all know that Pakistan likes the current situation exactly as it is.

Peace Talks Sabotaged by Pakistan. Mujib Mashal of the NYT has a piece describing the history of peaces talks with the Taliban. A senior Norwegian diplomat was at the center of the peace talks and he provides some behind the scenes details of the years-long effort.  “. . . Pakistan, in particular, has been a central obstacle to any negotiated peace with the Taliban”. See “How Peace Between Afghanistan and the Taliban Foundered”, The New York Times, December 26, 2016.

Disposing of Junk Military Vehicles of MoI / MoD. One huge problem that has yet to be fixed within the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) is the problem of junk, scrap, disabled, or destroyed vehicles. Many of these vehicles are still on the books sitting in the back of motor pools at the various echelons of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP). Fuel at one time (probably still is) was allocated based on the number of vehicles that are ‘operational’ on the books. If a vehicle is listed as non-FMC (not fully mission capable) or is turned in for repairs or disposal then the fuel allocation for the unit is reduced. If a unit declares 50% of its vehicles non-FMC then it loses 50% of its fuel allocation. One would argue that this impacts the units operational readiness. Yes, it does. But it also, more importantly from the Afghan commander’s point of view, impacts on how much of the fuel he can sell on the black market to pad his pockets with money. One program may help put a stop to the fuel corruption. Read “Demilitarization program re-quips Afghan Forces”, DVIDS, December 26, 2016.