Over the last several days the security situation in Sudan has become worse. There is fighting in the capital city of Khartoum, the airport is closed, hundreds of lives have been lost, and thousands injured. Most of the essentials of living (food, water, electricity, medical care, etc.) are in short supply or no longer available. It is unclear which faction controls what part of the country. The fighting has interrupted what many had hoped would be a peaceful transition to civilian rule in the coming weeks; one that should have started at the beginning of April.

Fight Between Two Warring Parties. The clash between the warring parties began on or about April 14, 2023. The two factions are the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and a paramilitary group known as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Both commanded by opposing Sudanese generals. In addition, there are a host of other local warlords, militias, and violent groups within Sudan contributing to the chaos. The leaders of both factions have been jockeying for power in the soon to be formed civilian government.

Al-Burhan and SAF. Sudanese President Genearl Abdel Fattah al-Burhan is head of the country’s transitional governing Sovereign Council. Sudanese soldiers are loyal to army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan (Wikipedia). The situation has been, according to al-Burhan, characterized as a rebellion and coup against the government of Sudan.

Dagalo and RSF. The Rapid Support Forces forces or RSF are led by Vice President General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo; he is deputy head of the Sovereign Council. Dagalo is a former camel herder from the Darfur region and has economic interests in minerals and livestock. The RSF was created in 2013 by former President Omar Hassan al-Bashir. The roots of the RSF can be found in a pro-government Janjaweed militia that was active in Darfur in the early 2000s where a local rebellion was defeated. The RSF also sent fighters to Yemen in the battle against Iran-aligned rebels; on behalf of some Gulf region countries.

Background to the Conflict. The two generals had been sharing power since an October 2021 coup. Disagreements arose over the integration of the Rapid Support Forces into the Sudanese Armed Forces. In addition, members of the Sudanese military feared the loss of control over revenue generating functions in the government and in society with a move to civilian control. Corruption has always played a large role in Sudan. A breakdown of the origins of the current conflict is presented by Jelena Pejic in “The Fighting in Sudan is an Armed Conflict: Here’s What Law Applies”, Just Security, April 20, 2023. The Pejic article also explores the legal status of the SAF and RSF.

Other Actors. There are reports that some regional nations may be providing support to the combatant forces. Egypt is believed to have sent aircraft to Sudan and possibly tanks and military personnel to support the government forces. It has close ties with Sudan’s military as it sees it as an ally against Ethiopia. Some reports indicate that the Russian paramilitary organization – the Wagner Group – could be aiding the RSF (CNN, Apr 21, 2023). The PMC is reported to have operated in Sudan since 2017. Russia would like to set up a small naval contingent in Port Sudan on the Red Sea. In addition, international media sources say that General Dagalo and the RSF are backed by Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar. The United Arab Emirates has close ties with the RSF.

Embassy Staff. Nations around the world are worried about their diplomatic staffs and their nationals that are living and working in Sudan. The United States has Department of State (DoS) embassy personnel that need to be evacuated but no attempt has been made thus far. DoS is instructing embassy personnel to ‘shelter in place’. The Department of State says it has ‘full accountability’ of its embassy personnel.

U.S. Citizens. Thousands of U.S. citizens who live or work in Sudan are in danger as well; many of them dual citizens. There are reports that at least one American citizen has died in the violence (according to DoS). It is impossible to leave the country by air as the Khartoum International Airport is closed due to battle damage and battles occurring on or near the airport. The State Department has stated that it is not safe to undertake a U.S. government coordinated evacuation of private American citizens at this time. There are about 19,000 Americans in Sudan. A Department of State spokesman ‘waffled’ a bit on April 20th when asked by journalists at a press conference if the U.S. was prepared or planning to evacuate U.S. citizens who were not embassy employees.

Refugees, Displaced Civilians, and Humanitarian Issues. Thousands of Sudanese, most from the Darfur region (Wikipedia), have fled to neighboring countries; many to Chad (CIA map). They are traveling along the roads as air travel is nonexistent in Sudan at this time. There are reports that Sudan’s southern border with Chad has been closed. Many Sudanese have fled the areas of the fighting for safer regions of Sudan. They are suffering from lack of shelter and food. Delivery of humanitarian supplies by international organizations has been extremely curtained due to the security situation.

U.S. Response. Up to now, the United States response to the crisis has been to encourage the two opponents to cease hostilities and to engage regional powers close to Sudan to use their influence to end the conflict. Secretary of State Antony Blinken has spoken with (DoS) the two generals leading the forces in the conflict; asking for a ceasefire. Thus far, the diplomatic efforts have been a failure; at least from what can be gleaned from open source news reports.

International Response. Countries around the world are weighing in on the conflict – using their influence to negotiate a ceasefire and end to the hostilities. The United Nations has been very active in attempts to bring an end to the conflict as well. Germany and Norway made some initial attempts to evacuate embassy personnel but these did not pan out. Some other nations are positioning forces in the region (aircraft, etc.) but they have not entered Sudan as of yet. Most of the international response has been public comments and diplomacy behind the scenes.

Ceasefire. Two cessations to the fighting have occurred, but both were unsuccessful. There is hope that another ceasefire will take place over the Eid al-Fitr celebrations. This would allow citizens to escape the conflict zones, receive medical care, and find food and shelter. The U.S. Department of State said on April 20th (DoS) that the “24-hour ceasefire announced on April 19th has mostly held.” The statement that the ceasefire ‘has mostly held’ has been questioned by many observers of the conflict. The Department of State is hoping that the ceasefire can be extended (DoS) to Sunday, April 23rd, which would be the end of Eid.

NEO. At this point, the United States has determined that it can’t evacuate its embassy staff or any of the thousands of American citizens. That is, until the security situation improves. At some point, the United States may decide to conduct a non-combatant evacuation operation. A Sudan NEO would most likely be preceded with some intense negotiations between the United States and the two warring factions to ensure that the U.S. does not get dragged into a civil war. It is unlikely that the United States would conduct a ‘forcible entry’ into the airport.

Khartoum International Airport. The largest airport in Sudan, Khartoum International Airport (Wikipedia), is located in the capital city. As of April 20th it was closed to air traffic. Media reports indicate that the airport was a target of heavy shelling with destroyed airplanes on the runways and ramps.

U.S. Forces Moving. The U.S. is currently positioning military forces and assets at Camp Lemonnier (Wikipedia) in the country of Djibouti (CIA map). Camp Lemonnier is usually home to about 2,500 service members who belong to Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). This TF conducts a variety of operations in the Horn of Africa region. Forces in Djibouti are about 1,000 miles distant (1,700 kilometers); about a 4 hour and 40 minute flight. Camp Lemonnier is the best location from which to stage a NEO and to where evacuees would first be sent before their onward movement to another location.

U.S. Future Actions? The current administration has still not recovered from the chaotic Afghanistan non-combatant evacuation operation (Afghan War News) conducted in August 2021. One hopes that the Department of State has learned a few lessons since then. If it decides to conduct a NEO then hopefully the planning has already been done and the Department of Defense is ready to execute it.

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Maps: Derived from maps by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

U.S. Navy Rear Admiral Milton Sands assumed command of Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAFRICA) on July 1, 2021 at Kelley Barracks near Stuttgart, Germany.

SOCAFRICA is the operational command responsible for joint special operations on the continent of Africa. The headquarters is located in Stuttgart. These operations are conducted in support of U.S. Africa Command or AFRICOM. SOF is currently focused on countering violent extremist organizations, protecting U.S. interests in Africa, and strengthening the defense capabilities of African partners. The African continent is more than three times the size of the United States, with 54 countries. SOCAFRICA works on a routine basis in many of these countries.

The outgoing commander is U.S. Air Force Maj. Gen. Dagvin Anderson. He had taken command of SOCAFRICA in July 2019. His next position will be deputy operations officer for the joint staff at the Pentagon. Anderson has presided over special operations forces that have been combating violent extremist organizations throughout northern, east, and west Africa.

Sands had previously served as a joint planner with Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) before SOCAFRICA existed. At that time SOCEUR had responsibility for the European and African operational areas of responsibility. He has also worked in the Joint Special Operations Command on AFRICOM issues in the past. Prior to his SOCAFRICA assignment Sands was the commander of Naval Service Training Command (NSTC) at Great Lakes, Illinois. NSTC is the Navy’s only boot camp. He was the first Navy SEAL to command NSTC.

He has served in the SEAL community for many years. He has served two tours with SEAL Team 2, was assigned to a joint task force in Afghanistan, commanded SEAL Team 8, served as chief of staff of Naval Special Warfare Group 2, chief of staff at the Naval Special Warfare (NSW) Development Group, and as Commodore of NSW Group 2.

Some of his previous assignments include:

• Vice President of the Joint Special Operations University
• Director of Counter Terrorism and Operations at ASD SO/LIC
• Deputy Operations Officer with Joint Special Operations Command

SOCAFRICA is a sub-unified command of the United States Special Operations Command under the control of United States Africa Command. Subordinate SOCAFRICA organizations include:

• Special Operations Task Force East Africa
• Joint Special Operations Task Force – Somalia
• Special Operations Task Force North West Africa
• Joint Special Operations Air Component Africa
• Naval Special Warfare Unit Ten
• SOCAFRICA Signal Detachment

Sands is from Farmington, Connecticut. He graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 1992. He also holds a Master’s in Military Strategy and Planning from the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in Norfolk, Virginia.

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Photo: Rear Adm. Milton J. Sands III, Special Operations Command commander, speaks to SOCAF members during the change of command ceremony July 1, 2021 at Kelly Barracks, Stuttgart, Germany. (Photo by Master Sgt. Bryan Franks, July 1, 2021.

Video: Watch a video of the SOCAFRICA change of command ceremony conducted on July 1, 2021 in Stuttgart, Germany. DVIDS, 54 minutes.

African Lion is U.S. Africa Command’s largest annual exercise. This year’s event was hosted by Morocco, Tunisia, and Senegal from June 7-18, 2021. More than 7,000 participants from nine nations trained together with a focus on enhancing readiness for U.S. and partner nation forces. African Lion 2021 is multi-domain, multi-component, and multinational exercise, which employs a full array of mission capabilities with the goal to strengthen interoperability among participants.

In addition to the participating nations contributing troops and units, 20 nations sent international observers to the exercise. The training events included humanitarian assistance, command and control, air operations, medical readiness, maritime, and joint forcible entry. For the U.S. units African Lion 2021 provided an opportunity to mobilize, deploy, conduct operations, and then redeploy.

History of African Lion. The exercise was first conducted in 2002 – with the participation of the U.S. Marines and Royal Moroccan Armed Forces. U.S. Africa Command increased its involvement in the exercise with the inclusion of the U.S. Army Southern European Task Force, Africa based in Vicenza, Italy. African Lion 2021 is the 17th iteration of the exercise. SETF-A assumed lead responsibility of exercise African Lion in 2019 from the U.S. Marine Corps. The exercise is an annual event but was cancelled in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

A Big Exercise for a Big Continent. African Lion 2021 incorporated units and equipment from a variety of countries and services. Africa is a huge continent with a population that is expected to exceed two billion in three more decades. In this new era of ‘great power competition’ Africa has emerged as a zone of competition for the United States, Russia, and China. In addition, violent extremist groups such as the Islamic State, Al Qaeda, Boko Harem, and other affiliate jihadist organizations have been making headway in solidifying their hold on parts of Africa. Due to the current tension between Madrid and Rabat over the Morocco claims on the Western Sahara Spain decided not to participate in the African Lion 2021 exercise.

Scope of the Exercise. Some of the principal United States players included Africa Command and the U.S. Army Southern European Task Force – Africa. General Stephen Townsend commands AFRICOM and Maj. Gen. Andrew Rohling commands SETF-A. The Joint Chiefs of Staff-sponsored exercise was scheduled and supported by AFRICOM. SETF-A established the exercise’s combined joint task force headquarters. It integrated U.S. Africa Command components and international partners. Almost 4,000 U.S. service members took part alongside other international forces.

Participating Nations. African nations taking part in the exercise included Morocco, Senegal, and Tunisia. British paratroopers from the 16th Air Assault Brigade based in Colchester, United Kingdom (and an element of the U.S. 173rd Airborne Brigade) conducted a joint forcible entry airborne assault onto a drop zone in Grier Labouie, Morocco. Other NATO nations took part as well to include Morocco, Tunisia, Senegal, Brazil, Canada, Netherlands, Italy, and others. Multinational observers came from the African Union, Chad, Denmark, Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kenya, Malta, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Poland, Qatar, and the UAE.

Participating US Units. US naval, air, and ground forces took part in this exercise. A US naval contingent conducted maneuvers that included a naval gunfire exercise and multiple sea-based operations involving U.S. and Moroccan vessels. The various U.S. ground units conducted a variety of events including command post exercises and small unit tactical training.

Photo: Moroccan Special Forces alongside U.S. Army Special Forces Soldiers assigned to the 19th Special Forces Group (Airborne), Utah Army National Guard fast rope from a MH-47 Chinook of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment onto a rooftop and clear a building during a high value target training exercise at Tifnit, Morocco on June 17, 2021. (Photo by Sgt. James Garvin, 79th Theater Sustainment Command)

Air Operations. There were about 46 supporting aircraft, to include 21 mission aircraft. U.S. air units included F-16 Fighting Falcons, C-130J Super Hercules, MH-47 Chinooks, and KC-135 Stratotanker aircraft. The Moroccan Air Force took part in the air maneuvers as well. The U.S. Air Mobility Command deployed two airfield survey teams from the 621st Contingency Response Wing during April 2021 to conduct airfield surveys in preparation for the exercise. The F-16s conducted Agile Combat Employment (ACE) events during the exercise working alongside Moroccan fighters. C-130Js provided critical support by transporting weapons, support equipment, and essential personnel to and around the exercise region. In addition the propeller-driven transports conducted airdrops, airlift, and aeromedical evacuation operations. The KC-135s provided aerial refueling for the combined fighter operations throughout the exercise – to include the Moroccan fighters. MH-47s from the 160th SOAR conducted operations to include fast roping SOF operators onto complexes with high value targets. USAF Joint Terminal Attack Control (JTACs) Airmen supported the air operations and worked with their Moroccan counterparts.

Photo: Royal Moroccan Navy Commando. (Photo by Sgt. Jacob Jesperson, U.S. Army, June 14, 2021).

SOF Participants. A number of special operations forces units took part in the exercise including 19th Special Forces Group, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, Royal Moroccan Army paratroopers, and Royal Navy Commandos. The exercise strengthens the interoperability among SOF participants.

Georgia National Guard. The Georgia National Guard played a big role in this years exercise. More than 700 soldiers from the Georgian Army National Guard were present for the exercise – primarily from the 648th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade and the 48th IBCT. The Georgians contributed an infantry and artillery battalion. In total, Georgia sent over 100 vehicles and nine M109A6 Paladin howitzers. They conducted situational training exercise lanes, field training exercises, indirect fire gunnery table qualification, and participated in a combined and joint live-fire exercise.

Photo: U.S. Army Special Forces Soldiers assigned to 19th Special Forces Group, Utah Army National Guard conduct combined training with Royal Moroccan Army Soldiers during African Lion 2021 in Tifnit, Morocco June 8, 2021. (Photo courtesy of Southern European Task Force Africa)

Utah National Guard and SPP. Utah maintains relations with Morocco through the State Partnership Program (SPP). In 2004, the United States designated Morocco as major non-NATO ally. The Utah National Guard contingent included members of the 19th Special Forces Group and Air National Guard unit members. The Utah guardsmen were training in and around the Moroccan cities of Tifnit, Tantan, and Tafraoute. Through the SPP members of the National Guard can maintain relationships with partner country officials and military members for decades. This helps build long-term alliances that can respond to future challenges. Tunisia and Senegal are also SPP nations. There are 15 African nations in the SPP.

19th SFG. An element of the 19th Special Forces Group, Utah National Guard participated in the training event. Alongside special operations counterparts from other nations they conducted training activities to include airborne operations, fast roping, range firing, and tactical exercises.

Photo: A member of the 19th Special Forces Group conducts a Jumpmaster Personnel Inspection (JMPI) of a paratrooper in preparation for an Airborne Operation in Ben Guerir Airbase, Morocco, on June 10, 2021. (U.S. Army photo by SPC. Brendan Nunez)

Humanitarian Operations. Several different services were provided to Moroccan civilians including general medicine, dental, and optometry. Utah’s 151st Expeditionary Medical Group conducted medical training with Moroccan medical professionals as well as providing health services to local citizens. A temporary field hospital was set up to provide the services and conduct the humanitarian civic assistance (HCA). The hospital provided general medical care, level 2 surgical and dental care, as well as other medical specialties.

Photo: Members of the Utah Air National Guard provided medical care to patients at a surgical field hospital during African Lion 2021. (Photo by Colton Elliott June 7, 2021)

COVID Precautions. Most U.S. military exercises were cancelled or significantly downsized during 2020. This included the cancellation of African Lion 2020. This year U.S. service members were pre-screened and tested prior to deployment. Some units conduced a two-week self-quarantine as well. Once deployed to the exercise region many units conducted another COVID-19 test for their personnel. In addition, many member who deployed were vaccinated for COVID-19. Standard safety measures were employed where feasible to include physical distancing, face coverings, and much handwashing.

The African Lion 2021 exercise provided the opportunity for nations to employ a full array of mission capabilities that will strengthen interoperability among partner nations and enhance the ability of US and other partner nation forces to operate in the African theater of operations. The exercise also provided an example of the United States’ long-term commitment to Africa and the strategic importance of the continent to the United States.

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African Lion 2021 – Culminating Video. A quick video that highlights some of the training activities of the exercise. Video by Sgt. James Garvin, Southern European Task Force Africa, June 18, 2021, 2 minutes.
https://www.dvidshub.net/video/803004/african-lion-2021-culminating-video

African Lion 21 Wrap Up Video. U.S. Army soldiers explain their role in the exercise and the importance of the exercise. Video by Sgt. Jeron Walker, Georgia National Guard, June 28, 2021, 3 minutes.
https://www.dvidshub.net/video/805193/african-lion-21-wrap-up-video

U.S. Africa Command has announced the formation of Joint Task Force Quartz to oversee Operation Octave Quartz – a mission designated to reposition forces from Somalia and continue the assistance effort in Somalia. In early December President Trump and the Department of Defense announced that the United States would remove some 700 military personnel from Somalia. This is an action that Trump had mentioned several times over the past year but had not directed to take place.

Some national security observers applaud the action believing that the situation in Somalia is unsolvable. They point to decades of corruption and conflict and little to show for the millions of dollars and other sacrifices made in Somalia.

However, others say that we are ceding territory to an insurgent / terrorist group affiliated with al Qaeda. These critics say that the group poses a threat to the U.S. – pointing to the attack on Camp Simba in Kenya where Americans lost their lives and to the recent news of a potential plot by an al Shabaab member to hijack an aircraft to conduct an attack in the United States.

The withdrawal is being presented to the U.S. public as a ‘repositioning of forces’. Apparently some of these forces will move into neighboring countries. Djibouti and Kenya share a border with Somalia and have been hosts of U.S. military units and activities for many years.

Joint Task Force Quartz

Joint Task Force Quartz or JTF-Quartz is built around the headquarters of Special Operations Command – Africa. The mission is to oversee Operation Octave Quartz which will reposition U.S. forces from Somalia to other bases in East Africa. JTF Quartz is commanded by the Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAF) commander Maj. Gen. Dag Anderson.

JTF-Quartz components include:

• Joint Force Special Operations Component Command
• Joint Force Maritime Component Command
• Joint Air Component Coordination Element

JTF-Quartz priorities are:

• safely reposition U.S. forces
• protect U.S. forces through coordinated and increased force protection measures
• continue the mission to support regional partners and keep pressure on violent extremists

U.S. Army General Stephen Townsend, the commander of U.S. Africa Command, met with African partners to provide reassurance of a sustained commitment to East Africa security. He says that the U.S. will continue to support enduring partners while maintaining pressure on violent extremist organizations in the region.

“To be clear, the U.S. is not withdrawing or disengaging from East Africa. We remain committed to helping our African partners build a more secure future. We also remain capable of striking Al-Shabaab at any time and place of our choosing – they should not test us.”

General Stephen Townsend, commander of U.S. Africa Command, Dec 2020.

The U.S. and Somalia – Quick Timeline

Cold War. During the Cold War the Horn of Africa region was a focus of attention when it came to competition between the Soviet Union and the United States for influence and military presence. Somalia was a Soviet client state for many years (1970s).

Humanitarian Mission. In the early 1990s the United States committed US forces (including SOF) to Somalia in support of the United Nations humanitarian mission. This support ended when President Clinton ended the U.S. involvement in Somalia after the “Battle of Mogadishu” where 18 US. troops lost their lives during a raid on Somali militia leaders.

Failed State. Since the early 1990s Somalia has been a ‘failed state‘. It has suffered from famine, civil war, corruption, foreign intrigue and meddling, anarchy, and more. For many years it was the center of piracy operating from the coastal area of Somalia.

Fragile State. In 2012 the formation of a federal government provided a central authority that could provide services and security for the Somalia people. However, Somalia is still afflicted with division, political infighting, and corruption and remains a ‘fragile state’.

Al Shabaab. Somalia has been fighting an insurgency by an al Qaeda-affiliated group known as al Shabaab. The group controls much of Somalia – especially in the central and southern portions of the country. Its goal is to establish an Islamic state in Somalia.

US Support. The United States , along with other international partners, are working to stabilize the country and increase the effectiveness of the security forces. The US has been a key supporter of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), provides advice and training to the Somali security forces, and conducts counterterror (CT) missions within Somalia against al Shabaab and the local ISIS affiliate. U.S. Army Special Forces (and other organizations) have been instrumental in standing up the elite Danab Brigade.

Some Americans have lost their lives in the region including a CIA paramilitary officer (Nov 2020), a soldier assigned to 3rd Special Forces (June 2018), and contract pilots and an Army air traffic controller at Camp Simba (Jan 2020) just across the border in Kenya.

Security and Governance. The war in Somalia between government forces and al Shabaab has lasted almost 15 years. The prospects for peace is dismal. International donors are becoming reluctant to pay the expenses of the African Union forces that are deployed in Somalia to assist the government with security. Relations between Somalia and Kenya have frayed. Internal tensions exist between the different regions of Somalia are not good. The various clans and sub-clans in Somalia are constantly at odds with each other and may likely erupt into violence once again.

Great Power Competition. The Defense Department is now focused on strategic competition with China and Russia. To some, that means a shift to the Pacific and Eastern Europe with an emphasis on large conventional forces with the most modern ships, aircraft, and tanks. But to others, this means the competition is more likely to take place around the world in an environment where irregular warfare (some would say political warfare) is where the real competition is.

What Comes Next?

Future of Danab? The planned withdrawal of US forces will include the Special Forces contingent tasked with supporting the Danab special operations unit. Apparently a very small contingent of the US military will remain. The US has funded, trained, and partnered with this 1,000 man unit. It is commonly known that advisor work is best accomplished with person-to-person interaction. The premise that ‘advisor work’ can be accomplished remotely is largely dismissed by most members of the military that have been advisors. Certainly emails, Zoom sessions, video conferences, and phone calls have utility but nothing compares to an advisor on the ground sharing the battlespace.

It will be interesting (and perhaps disappointing) to observe the effectiveness of Danab over the next few years. There is the possibility that U.S. intelligence organizations will maintain a presence as well as private entities providing support, instruction, and advise through contract mechanisms with the State Department or Department of Defense.

Future Prospects? The Somali government has not met the milestones for the development of its security forces – goals set by the United States and the international community. In addition, it has not taken the steps for effective governance to alleviate the root causes of insurgent and tribal conflict. According to U.S. Africa Command al Shabaab remains adaptive, resilient, and capable of attacking US, Western, and partner interests in Somalia and East Africa.

The 19,000-man multinational African Union force will withdraw by the end of 2021. A withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Somalia accompanied by a reduction of ANISOM will likely increase the opportunity for al Shabaab to increase its influence and make further territorial gains. On January 20th a new president will occupy the White House. He may opt to reverse or adjust priorities in the region.

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References:

Task Force Quartz. “U.S. Africa Command stands up Joint Task Force – Quartz”, United States Africa Command, December 19, 2020.

IG Report on CT in Africa. The Defense Department posted the quarterly report for counterterrorism operations in East, North, and West Africa. This 98-page report provides information on the security situation in much of Africa to include Somalia. November 2020.

Recent Analysis and Commentary on Somalia.

“Why the Somali Danab SOF is Vital to the US and to Defeating Al-Shabaab”, by Steve Balestrieri, SOFREP, January 13, 2021.

“The Way Forward for the United States in Somalia”, by Stephen M. Schwartz, Foreign Policy Research Institute, January 12, 2021. Schwartz is a former U.S. Ambassador to Somalia (2016-2017).

Podcast – Proxies and American Strategy in Africa. The U.S. withdrawal from Somalia of 700 military personnel has put the U.S. military involvement in Africa back in the news. This podcast explores what US forces are doing when they’re deployed in countries across Africa. In many cases these US forces (SOF and conventional) are working with local partner forces. – which helps the United States to retain a degree of influence and situational awareness in the country. Two guests featured in this podcast provide an examination of proxy warfare in Africa.

Retired Maj. Gen. Marcus Hicks was the former commander of Special Operations Command Africa from 2017 to 2019. In that role he was responsible for all Special Operations Forces conducting counterinsurgency operations and foreign internal defense (FID) across the continent of Africa. Hicks is a command pilot with more than 3,000 flying hours in AC-130H Spectre and AC-130U Spooky aircraft. He has commanded units within the special operations community and conventional Air Force at all levels.

Dr. Eli Berman is the co-editor of the book Proxy Wars: Suppressing Violence through Local Agents. He is a professor at the University of California San Diego and has served as the Research Director for International Security Studies at the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation.

Irregular Warfare Podcast, December 23, 2020, 56 mins.
https://mwi.usma.edu/mwi-podcast-proxies-and-american-strategy-in-africa/

The FC-G5S Sahel Joint Task Force is an attempt (heavily influenced and supported by France) to counter terrorism and transnational organized crime in the Sahel region of Africa. In the media this organization is referred to in several different ways. It appears that the official name is Force Conjointe du G5 Sahel (FC-G5S) or in English – Group of Five Sahel Joint Force.

The Threat. Several insurgent and terrorist groups operate in the Sahel region. This area of Africa is huge – almost 3,000 miles wide. Some insurgent organizations are linked to al-Qaida and the Islamic State. The biggest groups appear to be the Nigeria-based Boko Haram (SOF News) and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

G5 Sahel Member Nations. Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Niger, and Mauritania are the nations working together to establish the “FC-G5S” military organization. The actual number of the multinational force is reported to be about 5,000 military and police personnel.

United Nations. In June 2017 the UN Security Council adopted a resolution (2359) that welcomed the deployment of the FC-G5S and endorsed the joint force’s strategic concept of operations. [1] The resolution also urged the joint force to coordinate with the MINUSMA [2] and French forces in the region. The UN is considering expanding the mandate of the MINUSMA peacekeeping mission in Mali – and possibly establishing a UN support office for logistics assistance. MINUSMA has a limited mandate and cannot take offensive action.

French Support. France is a huge supporter of the G5 Sahel – providing funding, logistical support, and air capability. The French operation in this region of Africa is known as Operation Barkhane. It consists of approximately 4,000 personnel. In addition, it has fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft both transport and combat.

U.S. Funding. The United States has pledge to provide $60 million to support the Group of Five Sahel Force. The funding pledge was announced on Monday, October 30, 2017, by Secretary of State Rex Tillerson. The funding would be provided on a bilateral basis – meaning it wouldn’t be channeled through a UN funding mechanism.

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Endnotes:

[1] See an explanation of UN Resolution 2359 (2017) in a UN Security Council press release (21 June 2017). www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc12881.doc.htm

[2] United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali.

References:

G5 Sahel. https://www.g5sahel.org

“The Joint Force of the G5 Sahel”, Accord.org.za, September 18, 2018.

“Understanding the G5 Sahel Joint Force”, Center for Strategic & International Studies, November 15, 2017.

Map: Map derived from CRS TE10044 Dec 2019.

Soldiers of the 5th Special Forces Group hosted members from the Egyptian Special Operations Unit 999 during a joint training event at Fort Campbell, Kentucky.

The two-week training event took place in early February 2020 and was focused on a variety of special operations tactics and procedures while strengthening the relationship and interoperability between both units.

“We’ve been training together on a number of tasks from shooting and moving to counter tactics,” said the team leader with 5th SFG(A). “This has been a great opportunity for us to learn from each other. After this training, we will operate together more effectively.”

The training focused on a number of tasks from shooting and moving to counter tactics. Information and ideas were exchanged in the classroom, while firing and movement tactics were executed in Fort Campbell’s training area.

From mission planning, firing multiple weapons systems, countering improvised explosive devices and unmanned aircraft systems, both units familiarized themselves with each other’s procedures.

One of 5th Group’s missions is to train with partner forces.

“Anytime we can get out and work with our partner forces it benefits all of us on the team. We had the opportunity to do it in our own backyard this time and it was great for us. Specifically for some of our younger guys who may not have had the opportunity to work with our partner forces before, this has been great for them to learn from this experience.”

5th Special Forces Warrant Officer

A farewell dinner and ceremony was held at Fort Campbell’s Smokehaus Restaurant where the units celebrated their hard work and friendship.

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Photo: A 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) Soldier assists an Egyptian Special Operations Soldier with Unit 999 with dialing in a scope on an M110 semi-automatic sniper rifle at a range on Fort Campbell, Ky., February 3, 2020. Identifying and engaging targets was one part of various tasks that both units trained on during a two-week training event. U.S. Army Photo by Sgt. Gregory T. Summers / 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) Public Affairs) .

Story: The above article adapted from an article posted by Technical Information Support Company, 4th Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group, DVIDS, February 13, 2020.

On January 5, 2020 militants from al-Shabaab attacked the U.S. airfield and base at Manda Bay Airfield in Kenya. Three Americans died in the attack. In addition, several aircraft were destroyed or damaged to include U.S. special operations aircraft. Two other Americans were wounded in the attack.

Despite losing fighters – estimated at five – in the attack, the insurgents likely consider this raid on Manda Bay a significant victory. Al Qaeda linked groups have been using social media to capitalize on the Manda Bay attack by Al Shabaab. Posters have been released in several languages congratulating the attackers of the Manda Bay raid.

A Successful Raid

Most press accounts reflect the prevailing view that this was a very successful attack by the terrorist group. On January 6, 2020 AFRICOM acknowledged that “the enemy achieved a degree of success in its attack.” The attackers took advantage of a fairly undefended base perimeter. The small base had been considered an ‘out of the way’ installation that seemed to not be at risk of attack. [1]

The attack began early on a Sunday morning on January 5th when it was still dark. Al-Shabaab fired mortar rounds onto Camp Simba while attacking the nearby airfield. Al Shabaab forces operate in some of Kenya’s dense forests just miles away from the base. However U.S. defense officials believe the attacking force originated from within Somalia’s borders. There are also indications that the attackers were supported by a component inside of Kenya. The size of the attacking force is not known – but it probably was in the range of 15 to 30 personnel. The attackers would have to transit over 50 to 70 miles once across the Somalia border to reach Camp Simba.

Americans Killed. Army Specialist Henry Mayfield Jr. and two U.S. Department of Defense contractors died in the attack. Two other defense contractors were injured. Specialist Mayfield, age 23, was working as an air traffic controller from a truck on the airfield. He was assigned to the 58th Aviation Regiment based at Fort Rucker, Alabama. Mayfield was deployed in support of Operation Octave Shield. Dustin Harrison and Bruce Triplett were private pilots for L3 Technologies. They were killed when their aircraft was hit with a rocket as it was taxiing on the runway.

Aircraft Destroyed. Six contractor-operated aircraft were destroyed in the attack. A few were highly sophisticated surveillance aircraft used by the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). One of the destroyed aircraft include a modified Havilland Canada Dash-8. The Dash-8 is believed to be equipped with wide-area sensors to carry out surveillance missions in support of SOF units. Some news reports indicate that one of the other destroyed aircraft was a MC12W used for ISR missions in support of SOF. Two or three helicopters are reported to be destroyed. One news report indicated the value of the equipment and aircraft destroyed is believed to be above $20 million. [2]

Where is Manda Bay?

Camp Simba is a very small outpost about a mile away from the Manda Bay Airfield. It is situated on the Kenya coast and near the Somali border. The camp and airfield are located on the Kenya Defense Military Base at Manda Bay. The small complex was established in 2004 as the United States established regional staging areas to combat terrorism around the world. If you do a check on the Internet you will find two airfields. One associated with Camp Simba and the other – just to the south – handles commercial and civilian air traffic.

Why is the U.S. at Manda Bay?

The U.S. military is in Kenya training the country’s military and conducting counterterrorism operations in the region. The U.S. is also assisting the Kenyan security forces in the fight against al-Shabaab. Camp Simba and the Manda Bay Airfield are used as a base and staging area for U.S. surveillance aircraft and for U.S. SOF working alongside Kenya security forces in the porous border area between Kenya and Somalia to the north. It is also a staging point for operations into Somalia.

There are a variety of training courses conducted at the Manda Bay complex. These include anti-piracy, human trafficking, explosive detonation, vessel boarding, and search and seizure. At first the US part of the camp was extremely small but in 2012 it was upgraded considerably with new facilities. [3]

For many years the base was relatively quiet with a small maritime training mission in place. There were at times no more than a dozen U.S military personnel with some DOD contractors. With the growth of the U.S. involvement in the fight against al Shabaab in Somalia, Manda Bay has increased in size. In 2017 the small camp started a base operating support-integrator (BOS-I) mission. Training, medical, and administrative support is provided to Kenya partner forces – Kenyan Rangers, law enforcement organizations, and the Kenyan Navy. [4]

One of the units based at Manda Bay Airfield is the 475th Expeditionary Air Base Squadron. The airfield serves as a launching location for air operations in the region – including Somalia. There are about 350 Defense Department personnel in Kenya at various locations.

U.S. Unprepared for Attack

Several news accounts stated that the base was lightly defended and unprepared for an attack. There very likely was a reliance on Kenyan security forces to provide overall security.

“I think it’s self-obvious we were not as prepared there at Manda Bay as we needed to be. Al-Shabab managed to penetrate onto that airfield . . . They were able to get access to that airfield, kill three Americans, and destroy six aircraft there. So we weren’t as prepared, and we’re digging into that to find out why that’s the case.”

General Townsend, Commander of AFRICOM, January 30, 2020 while testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee.

U.S Reaction to Attack

Initial Response. A Marine special operations team of about a dozen Marines located in Camp Simba responded to the airfield attack alongside some Kenyan Rangers. Al-Shabaab suffered at least five fatalities in the attack. At least one Marine Raider was injured in the fighting. The responding Marines were from the 3rd Marine Raider Battalion based at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. An AFRICOM statement said “. . . a timely and effective response to the attack reduced the number of casualties and eliminated the potential for further damage.” MARSOC has been sending Marine Raiders to Kenya on Foreign Internal Defense (FID) missions to train up the Kenyan Rangers for a number of years.

Additional Reinforcements – EARF. The Manda Bay facilities were quickly reinforced with U.S. troops. The responding unit were members of the U.S. Africa Command’s East Africa Response Force (EARF). They were deployed to the Manda Bay Airfield to augment security. Currently the EARF are comprised of soldiers from the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division. They were transported to Manda Bay via a C-130J Super Hercules assigned to the 75th Expeditionary Airlift Squadron on January 5, 2020. It is unknown how long these additional forces will remain at Manda Bay. A small Special Forces contingent arrived at Camp Lemonier, Djibouti as well. There are no details on the composition of this element at this time.

EARF Mission. The mission of the EARF, a company-sized element, is to protect U.S. citizens, diplomatic locations, and conduct other missions as appropriate. They are a combat-ready, rapid deployment force. While in theater they operate out of Djibouti under the control of the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (HOA).

Senior Commanders Visit. Senior U.S. Africa Command officials visited the Manda Bay Airfield and Camp Simba on January 9, 2020 to meet with troops and commanders on the ground about details of the attack by al-Shabaab. One of those was Major General Michael Turello – the commander of Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). Turello is a long-time Special Forces officer with previous deployments to the Horn of Africa. [5]

New Security Measures in Place. About 120 American infantrymen were securing the Camp Simba and Manda Bay Airfield area in the period immediately after the attack. Efforts are being made to upgrade the defense posture to ensure the small base can be properly defended. This will likely include additional troops to guard the two facilities (airfield and camp) and to patrol the immediate area. Patrols would likely be joint with units of the Kenyan security forces.

MD-530F Helicopters for Kenya. On January 23, 2020 – just days after the January 5 raid on Manda Bay – the United States delivered six Cayuse Warrior helicopters to Kenya security forces. Another six MD-530Fs are programmed for delivery in the future. The MD-530F’s will replace aging MD-500 utility helicopters currently in use. The small, agile attack helicopters carry machine gun pods, M260 rocket launchers, and other armament. The helicopters are ideal for scouting, reconnaissance, attack, and close air support for Kenya Defense Force ground operations. The U.S. has provided a number of MD-530F helicopters to the Afghan Air Force. The delivery of the helicopters are very likely not related to the Manda Bay raid and had been a long time in the planning process. [6]

US-Funded JTTF. Kenya has been chosen as the site for the first US-funded Joint Terrorism Task Force that will be located outside of the United States. Kenyan investigators will attend a 12-week intensive counter-terrorism course at the U.S. FBI Academy. They will form the nucleus of Kenya’s JTTF. The assistance provided is in response to the growing threat to Kenya posed by al Shabaab. [7]

Impact of the Raid

Immediate Impact. The successful raid by al-Shabaab will have some consequences. Of course the most important impact will be on the families of the three Americans who lost their lives. An immediate result of the raid will be the diversion of time and energy of some of the Americans based at Camp Simba and the Manda Bay Airfield from their normal responsibilities and duties to that of base defense and force protection. In addition, the complex will need to be augmented with additional personnel taken from their jobs somewhere else (Europe, Camp Lemonier, etc.) to heighten the security posture.

Strategic Impact. This raid took place at a time that the Department of Defense is attempting to reduce the number U.S. personnel based in the AFRICOM area of responsibility. The raid also points out the vulnerability of small bases from which U.S. SOF and conventional personnel are conducting training with partner mission forces and counterterrorism missions. While DOD is likely focused on cutting back its engagement in West Africa; there is the possibility that the mission in the Horn of Africa could also be downsized.

Future Prospects for Manda Bay?

Ugrading Security. AFRICOM, CJTF-HOA, and SOCAfrica are all very likely reviewing their force prevention plans, quick reaction force posture, MEDEVAC procedures, and personnel recovery plans. It is likely that some locations where training is conducted or CT missions supported from in Africa will be eliminated due to force protection concerns.

U.S. Will Remain in Manda Bay. The importance of Manda Bay cannot be overstated. The base is small, far from a U.S. military facility, and a long way from PR assets. However, it is an important base for the training of Kenya ground and maritime units. In addition, it is a staging base for mounting a variety of counterterrorism missions against al-Shabaab in the region. Camp Simba and the associated airfield will likely be reinforced with security personnel and the security and force protection posture will be significantly increased.

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Footnotes:

[1] An article by Katie Bo Williams provides more information about the lightly defended perimeter of the Manda Bay Airfield in “Kenya Base ‘Surprisingly’ Undefended During Attack, US Officials Say”, Defense One, January 29, 2020.

[2] For a detailed analysis of aircraft destroyed read an article published in The Aviationist.

[3] Read more in “US Military Base at Camp Simba Bay in Lamu”, Kenyans.co.ke, January 15, 2020.

[4] See “The U.S.’s overlooked counter-terrorism outpost in Kenya”, Conflict Geographies, November 29, 2016.

[5] “Senior U.S. Africa Command Officials Visit Troops at Manda Bay”, United States Africa Command, January 9, 2020.

[6] See “United States delivers MD-530F helicopters to Kenya Defense Force“, CJTF-HOA, January 23, 2020.

[7] See “Kenya, FBI partner on first anti-terror task force outside US”, The East African, February 11, 2020.

References:

[1] Camp Simba Attack, Wikipedia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Camp_Simba_attack

[2] Al Shabaab, Congressional Research Service (CRS), January 16, 2020.
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10170

[3] “Between Blackhawk Down and Simba”, International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, January 12, 2020.

[4] “U.S. Using Local Soldiers to Fight al-Qaida Allies in East Africa”, NTI, March 11, 2013.

Photo: EARF lands at Manda Bay Airfield following al-Shabaab attack in January 2020. Photo by USAF January 6, 2020.

Conflict in Africa – Niger investigation, France in the Sahel – do U.S. and French interests align, what is next for Libya, Belgium in Africa, rebellion in Congo, losing a SOF war in Africa, drone strikes in Somalia, counterterror strategy in sub-Saharan Africa, partnering with Somalia’s Police in CT fight, and video on Boko Haram.

Niger Investigation into SF Mission. A two-star general officer from U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) is heading a military investigation into the deaths of four members of the 3rd Special Forces Group in Niger. The investigation should be completed in early 2018. See “Pentagon: Niger investigation to be completed by January 2018”, Military Times, November 9, 2017. Other news reports indicate the SGT La David Johnson was found with his hands bound – indicating capture before his death.

French Dilemma in Africa. France is taking a leading role in affairs in the Sahel region of Africa. It has committed 4,000 personnel to assist Mali and other neighboring nations in dampening down the Islamic jihadist threat. The U.S., with a 800 man contingent in Niger and smaller elements operating in other nations in the region is working with the French. France is dependent on the ISR capability that the U.S. provides through its two drone bases in Niger. One worry that French observers have is that due to the reliance on US ISR assets the French may get sucked into operations that assist the US but that are contrary to French interests. Read more in “Just Say No: France struggles with dependency on US troops in Africa”, Defense News, November 10, 2017.

Rebellion Fears in the Congo. Small armed groups are contesting territory in remote areas of eastern Congo. While government officials describe these armed groups as ‘flash in the pan’ movements other observers state they may be around for a while. Read “Rebellion fears grow in eastern Congo”, IRIN News, October 31, 2017.

Losing a SOF War in Africa. One national security writer thinks that targeted killing by drones and SOF on the ground in Africa can be counterproductive. Read “How to Lose a Special Operations War in Africa”, The National Interest, November 12, 2017.

A Plan for Libya. Most members of the SOF community are aware of the participation of the U.S. military in Libya over the past few years. SOF units have assisted various factions in the Libyan conflict in the fight against the Islamic State fighters that took control of Sirte, Libya. The ISIS fighters have now fled to more remote areas of Libya and to some neighboring countries. However the Salafi-jihadi movement is still strong and demands attention. While limited SOF engagement and other military activities (drone attacks, etc.) are useful in keeping ISIS at bay, Emily Estelle of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) believes a more comprehensive approach is needed. Read her thoughts in a 110-page report entitled “A Strategy for Success in Libya”, Critical Threats, November 9, 2017.

Cattle Herders Turning to Jihad. A news report examines how common every-day cattle herders from Mali and Niger morph into Islamic jihadists. (Reuters, November 12, 2017).

Drone Strikes in Somalia. U.S. forces have conducted numerous drones strikes in the last few days in Somalia in a stepped-up campaign against the Islamic extremist rebels of al-Shabab and the Islamic State. Al-Shabab has pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda and has publicly committed to planning and conducting attacks against the U.S. and neighbors in the region. The U.S. is partnering with the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Somali National Security Forces (SNSF). (Time, Nov 12, 2017).

A Different Counter Terror Strategy for Africa. One writer thinks that the insertion of Special Forces teams throughout Africa to defeat terrorist groups and stop the spread of terrorism is overreaching. He believes that fostering good governance and development will go much further in halting the spread of terrorism. Read “American Amnesia: Counterterror Strategy in Sub-Saharan Africa”, Georgetown Security Studies Review, November 7, 2017.

U.S. State Dept Assisting Somalia Police Units. An elite Somalia Police Unit formed with funding and assistance from the State Department is playing a key role in stopping terror attacks in Somalia. Read “Partnering with Somalia’s Police to Build Counterterrorism Capacity”, DIPNOTE, November 7, 2017.

Belgian Military in Africa. Belgium has committed to assisting MINUSMA and other operations in Africa. (A L’Avant-Garde, Nov 11, 2017). (French language article).

Video Documentary on Nigeria’s Boko Haram. A 56-minute long online video documents the struggle in Nigeria against Boko Haram but provides an optimistic view of how all is not lost in Nigeria. Watch Journey From Evil, Voice of America (VOA), November 2017. https://projects.voanews.com/boko-haram-journey-from-evil/

SOF News Update 20171013 – Kurdistan flash point, SF in Syria, Niger attack, Chad travel ban, SOF suicide drones, more advisors for Afghanistan, AFRICOM at 10 years, SFABs and advising, JFK and the Green Beret, and more.

Chad Travel Ban Ramifications? The Trump administration, much to the amazement of many Africa observers, imposed a U.S. travel ban on its citizens. This perplexing move by the White House has upset a very strong counterterrorism partner of the U.S. in the region. Some suspect the White House wanted to put a non-Middle East country on the travel ban. The religious makeup of Chad is about 50% Muslim, 40% Christian, and then some others. So there seems to be some consequences. Chad has pulled out hundreds of its troops from Niger that were helping local forces fight Boko Haram Islamist militants operating in the Lake Chad Basin area. U.S. Special Forces teams have been in the area working with the military forces of Chad, Mali, Niger, and Nigerian to defeat Boko Haram. Read more in “Chad Pulls Troops From Fight Against Boko Haram in Niger”, Voice of America, October 12, 2017.

U.S. Volunteers with SDF. Two Americans who joined U.S.-backed Syrian fighters are seeking a return home. One is a former U.S. Marine and the other is a veteran of the French Foreign Legion. They first fought with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and then later with the Syriac Military Council (MFS). They now wish to return to the United States but don’t have a way out of the country (money, means to travel, etc.). It appears they showed up at a U.S. base to chat with a U.S. SF element but were turned away. Sounds like a poorly planned exfil plan. See “American volunteers trying to leave Syria turned away by US Special Forces”, Marine Corps Times, October 12, 2017.

SFABs and Advising. The Army is pushing the implementation of the Security Force Assistance Brigades or SFABs as a primary way forward to training with partner nations. So there is lots of buzz on the pros and cons and questions as well. One Army officer at West Point is weighing in with some recommendations on how to do advising the ‘right way’. Read “Fourth Time a Charm? The Army’s Chance to Get Advisory Operations Right”, Modern War Institute, October 13, 2017.

10 Years of AFRICOM. United States Africa Command was established by President Bush in 2007 as a combatant command focused more on partnership than fighting. The command has been busy dealing with Islamic militant groups in Libya, Somalia, and other countries of Africa. Read more in “AFRICOM at 10: Training partners is still the focus, but the fight has grown”, Stars and Stripes, October 12, 2017.

Video – JFK Visits SF at FBNC in 1961. In October 1961 President John F. Kennedy visited FBNC. Among the units he visited was the FB SF unit. A result of the visit was the declaration by JFK that the Green Beret would be the official headgear of U.S. Army Special Forces. Watch a 15-minute long video of his visit. In the first part of he video he spends time with the 82nd Airborne Division. At the 7:30 minute mark of the video he visits the Special Warfare Center where he learns more about Psychological Operations, Counterinsurgency, and Special Warfare. President John Fitzgerald Kennedy Visits Fort Bragg, North Carolina, October 12, 1961, posted on YouTube.com.

Update on Niger Attack on SF Soldiers. News reports indicate that some of the local residents of Tongo Tongo, Niger may have colluded with a militant group known as the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISIS-GS) in the recent attack on 3rd SFGA members.

SOF Suicide Drones. The U.S. Army is testing a small drone that carries an anti-personnel warhead and weighs less than 20 pounds. It has some possible use for SOF teams. Read more in “Suicide drone provides lethal punch for special operations forces”, Defense News, October 12, 2017.

More Advisors for Afghanistan. General Votel, CENTCOM commander, says that more U.S. and NATO advisors at the tactical level will make a difference. “US advisors will help break Afghan stalemate, top US commander says”, Military Times, October 12, 2017.