By Michael J. Listner.

The passage of an intelligence-gathering balloon from the Peoples Republic of China through U.S. sovereign airspace earlier this month created a Sputnik-conundrum in terms of international law and national sovereignty. The balloon, which was first detected entering U.S. sovereign airspace around the Aleutian Island chain was permitted to transit this airspace unimpeded into Alaska and then reenter the continental U.S. where it was allowed to transit the continental U.S. unchecked until it was finally brought down within the 12-mile zone of the southeast coast of the U.S. Much is not publicly known what types or amount of intelligence was gathered by the balloon; however, aside from this the permissive entry and transit of the balloon raises questions about the effect of incident on international law and U.S. national sovereignty.

Hybrid Warfare and International Law

The term hybrid warfare was coined by Xu Sanfei, the editor of Military Forum and a senior editor in the Theory Department of Liberation Army News. Hybrid warfare “…refers to an act of war that is conducted at the strategic level; that comprehensively employs political, economic, military, diplomatic, public opinion, legal, and other such means; whose boundaries are blurrier, whose forces are more diverse, whose form is more mixed, whose regulation and control is more flexible, and whose objectives are more concealed.” The CCP’s Central Military Commission adopted the concept of hybrid warfare when it announced in 2003 three new types of warfare capabilities: legal warfare (lawfare), psychological warfare, and media warfare, which individually and collectively attain a political objective. This new strategy, which is called the Three Warfares, was subsequently adopted by the Peoples Liberation Army. This article will focus on the legal aspect of hybrid warfare.

Sovereign Airspace and Near Space          

The Federal Aviation Administration regulates territorial airspace up to 60,000 feet (approximately 18.288km), which makes this airspace unquestionably sovereign airspace. Beyond this altitude some question  whether the so-called “near-space” can be claimed as sovereign airspace. The non-legal spatial demarcation for where outer space begins is 60 miles (approximately 100km). The U.S. does not recognize the need for an international legal demarcation for where outer space begins and gives supports for a rule of international law that a nation’s sovereign airspace extends not only beyond the 60,000-foot altitude but up to where an aircraft or spacecraft would enter a full orbit of the Earth and unquestionably be in the sovereignless domain of outer space. This rule that a nations sovereign airspace extends past 60,000 feet into near-space and into outer space is borne out with high-flying reconnaissance aircraft that have operated in near-space altitudes. The U-2 operates at altitudes of 70,000 feet, and the CIA’s OXCART program and the Strategic Air Command’s SR-71 both operated at altitudes of 80,000+ feet, which is well within the alleged legal gray zone purported to exist. Moreover, all these aircraft encountered defensive actions while at these altitudes from nations as they overflew or flew in proximity to what these nations claimed as sovereign territory, including a U-2 shot downed over the Soviet Union on May 1, 1960 while flying over the Soviet Union and at least six U-2s operated by the Black Cat Squadron of the Taiwanese Air Force while flying at so-called near-space altitudes over the PRC.

Chinese Balloons and Hybrid Warfare

The transit of the PRC balloon over U.S. territory creates a larger question as to the purpose of the action. The primary purpose of the balloon was undoubtedly to collect intelligence; however, ancillary to that mission is whether the PRC was testing for a political response from the U.S. to see if it could use the legal aspect of hybrid warfare and the Three Warfares, which is called lawfare, to potentially test of a new rule of international law for near-space and assess the resolve of the U.S. to not only defend its territory but also support and assert its sovereign rights under international law. Two aspects of the intrusion are pertinent to this analysis.

First, the unimpeded transit of the balloon brings into question whether the PRC was seeking to establish an international rule of law for passing over sovereign territory at “near-space” altitudes. The balloon’s trek over U.S. territory began its violation of sovereign U.S. air space when it passed over the Aleutian Islands yet, no action was taken to intercept its course purportedly because it was not deemed a military threat. Regardless, no assertion in messaging by the U.S. was made the balloon was violating its sovereign airspace. This potentially gives the PRC the impression that if not creating a toe-hold for a rule of customary international law for overflights at near-space altitudes it at least shows a reluctance by the U.S. to push-back on implicit attempt to create a rule of international law. A repeat of the overflight that would give further credence to this claim would be difficult considering the political fallout following this incident. Yet, even if the PRC were to attempt to repeat the incursion and the U.S. intercepted, would the U.S. assert its sovereign rights as trigger for the intercept? This leads into the second legal aspect.

The second legal aspect of the incursion is whether it was a test by the PRC to see how the U.S. would respond to a violation of its sovereign airspace and whether it would assert international law or waiver politically. The intrusion into and passage through U.S. airspace was a direct challenge to this rule of international law and arguably could have been a lawfare action to dilute the precept itself. By failing to properly message the true nature of the incursion, the U.S. not only waivered on its defense of national airspace but signaled to the PRC it might waiver on asserting international law in other domains, which brings into questions the U.S. response to future geopolitical events.

The Strategic and Geopolitical Effect

The lack of coherent messaging to enunciate the violation of U.S. airspace and assert the violation of international law and instead down-playing the seriousness of the incident creates strategic problems for the U.S. This lack of messaging continued with the intercept of the objects subsequent to the intrusion where the Administration cites safety as the rationale for the interventions instead of the violation of sovereign U.S. airspace. This brings into question the U.S. commitment to not only defending the sovereign airspace of the U.S. but the rule of international law at home and abroad. This in turn has a psychological effect on the public perception of political leaders in the U.S. to uphold national security. More critically, it also creates shadows of doubt about the willingness of the U.S. to uphold international law and respond decisively to challenges to international law abroad, including both treaty commitments and political assurances. Moreover, the lack of decisive action and clear messaging by the U.S. dilutes the credibility of the U.S. not only enforcing and asserting international law in other domains but also it standing to conjure new standards of behavior in other domains, including outer space.

Conclusion

The reluctance of the U.S. to immediately deal with and unambiguously charge the incursion of the PRC surveillance balloon as a violation of its sovereign territorial rights under international law and the hesitancy to demonstrate resolve in intercepting the balloon eroded the credibility of the U.S. in the eyes of its domestic citizens and allies in the geopolitical sphere. More critically, the standing of the U.S in geopolitical adversaries in the context of great power competition has shifted as the PRC analyzes the U.S. response to the incursion and makes its next calculation in great power competition to shift the rule of international law to its world-view.

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Author: Michael J. Listner is a licensed attorney in the State of New Hampshire and the founder and principal of Space Law and Policy Solutions. He is a subject matter expert in outer space law, outer space policy and hybrid warfare/lawfare strategy and the author and editor of the space law and policy briefing-letter, The Précis.

Photo: A U.S. Air Force U-2 pilot looked down at the suspected Chinese surveillance balloon as it hovered over the Central Continental United States February 3, 2023. Recovery efforts began shortly after the balloon was downed. (Photo courtesy of the Department of Defense)

By Faruk Hadžić.

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Abstract

Undemocratic processes of hybrid and psychological geopolitical warfare blurred relations and security paradigm. The legacy of conflicts and the applied Western policies to the region is the strengthening of ethnonational discourses and the activation of regional crises. The Anglo-American project of post-Cold War spatial planning in the Western Balkans is ineffective. It would be necessary to formulate new Western policies. Balkan nationalist and separatist ideas, which resurfaced with the former Yugoslavia’s break-up, should be reticent and transform within the European Union (EU).

Montenegro and, in particular, Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H) is vulnerable to destabilizing Russian influences, using a complicated social, political, and economic environment, a lack of strategic orientation, and divisions over NATO integration. As for China, Arab countries, and Israel, their influence in the Balkans remains limited, primarily – but not exclusively – to economic projects. However, these impacts will continue to grow unless more severe and concrete measures are taken by the US and EU. Further weakening or eventual disappearance of the EU perspective in the Balkans could lead to new attempts to establish “Greater”- Albania, Croatia, Serbia, or even Ottoman Turkey through violent border changes in the region. Instead of democratizing, the 21st century has brought fragility in the Balkans.

Author

Faruk Hadžić is an independent researcher and an author from Bosnia and Herzegovina. He holds the MSc in Security Studies, Criminal Justice and Law Enforcement Studies, BSc in Psychology & Economics, and Diploma (MBTA) in Mindfulness-Based Transactional Analysis. His research is multidisciplinary in Social and Political Psychology, Political Science, Socioeconomics, Critical Security Studies, and Criminal Justice.
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1158-7858
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Faruk_Hadzic2

The Phenomena and the Western Balkans

The new geopolitical climate has changed the character of conflicts in which wars are fought in the name and for the benefit of other actors supported by powerful forces, which can be terrorist groups, various revolutionary independence movements. When it comes to political pressures, one usually uses one’s position at the international level to force a political decision or influence one to give up already established attitudes. There is the possibility of providing support to specific groups or individuals in power to change the country’s political system or cause riots and conflicts, then political embezzlement that can help violate some international agreements. Psychological – propaganda activities are a form of special operations aimed at achieving psychological effects for their benefit. By carrying out psychological actions, it seeks to “weaken and overthrow the defense of the attacked party by encouraging internal divisions, provoking mistrust and suspicion in the ranks of the defense and encouraging internal enemies of the attacking system to initiate fear, insecurity, disorganization; it serves to spread bad promises, illusions, rumors.” [1] The use of psychology for war purposes dated back to the Chinese thinker Sun Tzu’s thoughts and received its real revelation in the 20th century through two worlds and the cold war. However, the form of use of psychological actions in the new information space has changed significantly. Likewise, psychological operations used to be the exclusive advantage of the state and the armed forces. However, today, in the new social information media, it is in the hands of non-governmental organizations, formal and informal groups, and individuals. In the socio-information framework, the primary means of war participation are becoming psychological activities and operations. Psychological techniques are used to realize numerous general goals of hybrid warfare, which are primarily aimed at avoiding the emergence or minimization of the duration of the regular (militarized) mode of leadership war. Confrontation in the information space has become of general importance and for the collapse of the political, economic, and social system. [2] Thus, psychological activities play a central role in hybrid geopolitical warfare.

The fact is that after the end of the Cold War, the world found itself at the epicenter of a hybrid war in which disinformation became the primary weapon of populism, right or left-wing. The penetration of fake news and various misinformation is becoming more and more powerful on social networks, and the users of these platforms are increasingly victims of deception and manipulation. The Balkans are witnessing the growing crisis of Western powers daily and the worsening populist, nationalist, and conservative US and European leaders’ policies, from US President Trump to Hungarian President Viktor Orban. They nullify any European Union (EU) and The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) attempts to reform Balkan countries.

Hybrid warfare is a new term by which they try to cover and emphasize all the specifics of contemporary conflicts in the first two decades of the twenty-first century. There is still no generally accepted definition of hybrid warfare, despite the great popularity in the professional field and scientific circles. Initially, hybrid warfare [3] was considered a combined application of conventional military capabilities and special forces, irregular acts, terrorist acts, and criminal activity. In the combined application of different forms, a synergistic effect is expected both in the conflict’s physical and psychological [4] domains. Later, the perception of hybrid warfare is extended to all other forms, means, and ways of endangering security. In the broadest sense, hybrid war is any action by any means that undermine, hinders, damages an opposing-rival-hostile state, its economy, people, and the entire social life. In a narrower sense, hybrid warfare undermines state order in the opposing state in any way and by any means. Within the category of hybrid warfare, hybrid action, it is necessary to mention the notion of “soft power” as a weapon that threatens universalist and inclusive elements better than the conventional one. I maintain that hybrid warfare is a term used uncritically today. The very expression as a peculiarity – sui generis – has existed since the Lebanese war in 2006 and Hezbollah’s strategy towards Israel and implies a combination of conventional, irregular, and information warfare. According to specific goals of interest and with the help of specific and psychological operations or the so-called, there are several traditional state strategies according to specific goals of interest, reflexive control operations to influence someone’s decision-making process.

The Balkan territorial-expansionist ethnopolitics’ destructive power has already shown that it can destroy states, peoples, religious institutions, educational systems, scientific plants, and human dignity. In the dominant diplomatic discourse, the Western Balkans’ stability and prosperity are viewed in the context of two integrative processes: the accession of the region to NATO and the EU regions and their targeted Europeanization. The newly formed countries of the region become an area of export of democracy, the object of geopolitics enlargement, political and security order, and the US and the EU’s engagement, which as external actors moderate the crisis in the region. In particular, the US’ policy toward the region, in which it has been active since the end of the Cold War, can be seen in the context of a complex diplomatic and military approach aimed at establishing a new geopolitical configuration in Southeast Europe. In the crisis area of Southeast Europe, the US has been present for almost three decades, and in resolving the crisis and stabilizing the region, it has continuously used a whole range of diplomatic, political, and military instruments to securely “encircle” the Western Balkans, geopolitically necessary for strategic control of the Adriatic Mediterranean and the Black Sea regions. However, after 2000, preoccupied with the “war on terror,” and thus the geopolitical restructuring of the Middle East, the US was present in the Western Balkans indirectly, through the actions of Allied actors pursuing a policy of expanding security (NATO) and economic (EU, IMF and other international financial institutions) order, and with the help of which the region is identity-shaped as a western value. [5]

The US geopolitician Robert Kaplan (2017) argued that peace in the Balkans could be achieved and maintained solely with “external imperial force.” According to Kaplan, in the times of the empires’ (Charlemagne, the Habsburg Monarchy, and the Ottoman Empire) collapse that ruled the Balkans, the region regularly turned into battlefields. [6] A logical question arises – did the European Union become a new empire that would maintain a peace order in the Balkans? The EU’s role in Southeast Europe is inconsistent between its normative potential and current problematic aspects of process implementation policies. Moreover, outside the ritual, political matrix framework, concentration on specific programs to stimulate economic, technological, social, human development, and regional integration is not progressive. [7] Although the EU adopted a new Enlargement Strategy for the Western Balkans in 2018, the potential of stability is not proven. Instead of liberalism and Europeanization, further Balkanization of the region resulted from the EU’s failure and the allies’ conflicting interests – the US and NATO. Such a constellation of relations has made it possible to strengthen many non-Western actors – Russia, Turkey, China, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, whose presence has strongly shaped the Western Balkans’ security climate for many years. After years of close cooperation, during which mostly followed EU and US peacekeeping solutions in the region, Montenegro decided to declare independence (2006), and Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence (2008) significantly damaged relations between Russia and the West. The unusually active role of the US and Western allies in the decomposition of Serbia and the region’s geopolitical transformation has resulted in increased Russian engagement with the region. Ever since the Ukrainian crisis outbreak in 2014, the US and the European Union have seen Russia’s presence in the Balkans as a security threat. The geopolitical clash between the West and Russia is gradually profiling itself into a conflict of interest of the great powers, which measure their influence on the region’s countries through diplomacy, significant investment, and confrontational energy infrastructure projects. [8]

Because NATO is still the strongest geopolitical alliance, Russia is increasingly turning to new allies who are actively working to create a counterweight to the US as a unipolar center of the post-Cold War world. China, Iran, and Turkey, which are increasingly moving away from Western countries’ influence and policies, are strengthening their own economic and political ties with Russia. Although not without risk to Turkey, the new alliance with Russia, Iran, and China has a significant impact on the region. In the Western Balkans, China is more present, especially in the sphere of economy. So far, Chinese investments in energy, roads, railways, and other 5.5 billion euros have come to Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H), Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia. Saudi Arabia finances numerous humanitarian centers and non-governmental organizations and provides several other investments in B&H, such as market centers and separate luxury resorts for Arab citizens. Investments are expanding widely in the region. Turkey has long strengthened its economic and political influence and seeks to establish itself as a dominant regional power. Besides, it is an indisputable fact that during the genocide and war crimes, and within the arms embargo, Iran provided the most significant possible military and diplomatic assistance to the B&H people during the war.

I maintain that “negative influence” threatens universalist and inclusive elements of Balkan societies, the political and national history of these countries, intercultural diversity, and sovereignty, strengthening regional pan-nationalisms’ irredentist aspirations. Based on credible data, analyzes, and estimates that after the failures in Montenegro and Macedonia, which are today within NATO, almost all Russia’s capacities in this area are directed, i.e., Russia’s hybrid action towards Macedonia, Montenegro, and BiH. In such hybrid activities, Serbia, one of the neighboring countries, gives Russia excellent aid and plays a significant role. The fact is that representatives of the Serbian state apparatus were active in Montenegro, Macedonia, at the events’ time, which was a clear sign. At the same time, we should not rule out that such activities are very intensive towards B&H. However, Russia should not be denigrated either. It is trying to use the same means, although it succeeds to a lesser extent than the US and Western Europe combined. We have had the Snowden case and the Prizma affair, and Western spying on the states and officials, with contractual cooperation with Facebook, Google, Twitter, and Microsoft. Russia did not invent such particular warfare, even though they are merely adopting Western techniques. They also have a significant learning capacity, with a high population having a university degree.

The Balkan security dilemma’s central discourse is “who will control the land,” a piece of a particular territory within the pressure of national hegemonist ideas (Greater Serbia and Croatia). Albanians in Macedonia did not get territory but rights (they changed the Constitution, the President of the Assembly is of Albanian nationality, the right to speak in Albanian was also introduced), while in B&H, ethnicity was gained, which means increased opportunities for monopoly and power over the territory. [9] According to Jadranka Polovic (2018), the Greater Albania concept, behind all the previous post-Cold War administrations of the US and UK, has already been practically-legally realized and becoming irrelevant. The borders between Kosovo and Albania and the borders between Kosovo and western Macedonia do not exist. Formal recognition of the creation of a “Greater Albania” that reaches beyond western Macedonia, the southern and eastern parts of Montenegro (Ulcinj and parts of the municipalities of Plav and Rozaje), the Presevo Valley in southern Serbia, and southern Greek Epirus, parts of foreign countries, would cause complete chaos and a new war in the region. The Greater Albania concept’s implementation is being achieved by drawing the entire region into NATO and the EU. [10] B&H and the former Yugoslavia area with a nationalist ethnopolitics and a continuous conflict, as a dangerous “barrel of gunpowder,” become a scene of competition, collisions, and competition between most influential actors of the modern world in the first decades of the 21st century. In this constellation, violent hegemonic nationalism in the Balkans partly serves as a space of displaced European horror in which clashes of “great powers” take place, while a small number of South Slavic peoples maniacally exterminate each other, demolish places of worship, expel the population, commit mass crimes, destroy the remaining ethnically homogeneous and clean spaces. [11]

Dominant perceptions in the countries of the Western Balkans are sometimes present. It narrows the framework for observing and understanding the behavior of great powers in this region, with an unargued overestimation of their significance and importance in the plans of these great powers, and the introduction of emotional elements in the field of international relations where only interests are most valued and measured. The great powers’ mutual relations are complex, multi-layered, and pragmatic above all. The great powers in some regions or on some issues agree, coordinate actions, and even help, while in other areas or issues, there is disagreement and confrontation. In pursuing their interests, the great powers have a wide range of opportunities and resources at their disposal. The various forms of contemporary conflict are often portrayed as the result of the projection of hybrid threats and termed hybrid warfare. The wide presence and topicality [12] of the phenomenon of hybrid warfare is the reason to problematize the concept of hybrid warfare by evaluating central questions and answers of practical interest to decision-makers at the strategic level. The Western Balkans region’s importance in the two elected great powers’ strategic agendas – Russia and Turkey are evident. For years, Montenegro and other countries in the region have been a testing ground for cyber attacks and the spread of false news by which some foreign powers, primarily Russia, are trying to undermine and slow down the Euro-Atlantic integration of the post-Yugoslav states. Indeed, other great powers are closely following the development of events in the Western Balkans and possible trends and scenarios [13] of future development. In addition to the “malignant” Russian influence, the West is increasingly facing Turkey’s arbitrary policy, which, especially after 2000, is questioning the possibilities of its action in the region. Namely, Turkey, a strategically important member of NATO, until recently an unquestionable ally of the US, is trying to renew its sphere of influence in the Balkans, a region that belonged to the Ottoman Empire until the First World War. Turkey is a unique, doubly “endowed” country – with the space of its geopolitical influence, especially the control of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles as internationally important straits and the successor to the Ottoman Empire. The mutual relations between Russia and Turkey have become very topical in recent times and is there much research in this area. [14] It is critical in the current time in the broader context of the relations of these two countries with other great powers and the conflicts in the Middle East and growing tensions in South America.

In Serbia, approaching NATO is taboo due to Serbia’s 1999 bombing to stop Kosovo’s conflict. This relationship is reflected in B&H politics. There is also a declarative commitment to European integration, which is burdened by the Kosovo syndrome. By the Kosovo syndrome, we mean Serbian politics’ burden with the belief that joining the EU means renouncing territorial sovereignty. In this way, the EU’s demands for better functioning of BiH are read in the Republic of Srpska RS (one of the B&H entities). In B&H and Kosovo’s relations, no aspect can be singled out to function at a satisfactory level. Relations remain in the realm of political rhetoric, and the problem of freedom of movement between BiH and Kosovo is directly linked to asymmetric and scarce economic cooperation. B&H is a permanent crisis state, with the world’s most complex political and public administration, the inability to create the minimum internal political cohesion needed to build a stable political identity. In the BiH’s ethnoreligious model formed by the Dayton Peace Accords (1995), the demographic remnant is unconstitutional. For the most part, a mere constitutional decor appropriately enshrined in the last indent of the discriminatory BiH Constitution’s Preamble. Therefore, the name “Others” is an unsentimental description of their position in this ethnoreligious divided society. [15] Furthermore, Chinese investments in the Western Balkans economies have brought the presence of the Chinese intelligence service MSS with them. This service deals with the interests of China’s state policy and the protection of Chinese investments. Moreover, the Chinese service, together with business people, operates not only in the Western Balkans but also throughout Europe. The German counterintelligence service has marked 10,000 German citizens in contact with fake intelligence officers from China. That is why the presence of the Chinese intelligence service on the territory of B&H, and especially in Serbia and Croatia, is very significant for the intelligence and security apparatus of B&H. [16]

The Western Balkans remain poorly connected in terms of infrastructure atomized energy market, burdened with political instability, which negatively affects the energy security of the region. The EU on the Western Balkans is focused on infrastructure projects that can significantly affect the energy sector’s decarbonization (hydropower, renewables, natural gas), while China prefers mining and thermal energy. Russia is focused on the gas and oil sector and currently fully controls areas in Serbia and B&H. [17] Some argue that strategic or religious goals drive the Arab Gulf countries’ investment interest in the Balkans. Others state that the reasons are strictly financial, a convenient location at the crossroads, competitive labor cost, and the EU joins the regions for investments. While the media’s attention is on companies from Arab countries, the crucial fact is that 80 percent of real estate investments in the region must be due to Israel. “Israel investors have concentrated on retail parks and shopping malls.” [18] 

Social media has become a platform for diversity in psychological activities and processes of a coercive, deceptive, alienating, and defensive nature. People receive most of their information daily via Facebook and other online platforms. If we briefly focus on B&H, 1,500 media outlets have been proven to have published false news at least once. During one-year research and analysis of the observed media, a whole network (hub), domestic and newspapers from the environment that spread false news in an organized manner, exists. “The hub is not actually in B&H, but it consists of 14 media from B&H and 15 media from Serbia, which have been proven to share misinformation and have over ten connections in spreading various misinformation. It is alarming because they work together and operationally. Among these media is Russian Sputnik.” [19] These are elements of information warfare, as a type of special warfare, which is an essential feature of the information-communication era in which information, misinformation, false information, deception, and propaganda are on the scene. However, it is not just the states that do it, but huge companies, non-governmental organizations, and formal and informal groups.

Conclusion

The legacy of conflicts and the applied Western policies to the region is the strengthening of ethnonational discourses and the activation of regional crises. The Anglo-American project of post-Cold War spatial planning in the Western Balkans is ineffective, so it would be necessary to formulate new Western policies. Undemocratic processes of hybrid and psychological geopolitical warfare blurred relations and security paradigm. Confrontation in the information space created the ground for numerous influences on the physical and the opponent’s cognitive sphere in the hybrid geopolitical warfare.

Balkan nationalist and separatist ideas, which resurfaced with the former Yugoslavia’s break-up, should be reticent and transform within the EU borders. Montenegro and, in particular, B&H is vulnerable to destabilizing Russian influences, using a complicated social, political, and economic environment, a lack of strategic orientation, and divisions over NATO integration. As for China, Arab countries, and Israel, their influence in the Balkans remains limited, primarily – but not exclusively – to economic projects. However, these impacts will continue to grow unless more severe and concrete US and EU replace them. Further weakening or eventual disappearance of the EU perspective in the Balkans could lead to new attempts to establish “Greater Albania,” “Greater Croatia,” “Greater Serbia,” or even “Greater Ottoman Turkey” through violent border changes, which would unquestionably lead to new violence in the region. Thus, instead of democratizing, the 21st century has brought fragility to the Balkans.

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References, Endnotes:

[1] Ranogajec, V. (2000). Psihološki rat [Psychological war]. Polemos, Casopis za interdisciplinarna istraživanja rata i mira. 3(5). https://hrcak.srce.hr/2999

[2] Hunter, E. & Pernik, P. (2015). The challenges of hybrid warfare. International Centre for Defence and Security EESTI-Estonia. https://www.icds.ee/fileadmin/media/icds.ee/failid/Eve_Hunter__Piret_Pernik_-_Challenges_of_Hybrid_Warfare.pdf

[3] Tagarev, T., (2018). Hybrid Warfare: Emerging Research Topics, Information & Security: An International Journal. 39. 289-300.

[4] Vučinić D., (2017). Psihološko ratovanje u prostoru društvenih informacionih medija – aspekt hibridnog ratovanja. Vojno delo.7

[5] Polović, J. and Frlan, J. (2019). Zapadni balkan: „divide et impera“ ili zašto suprotstavljeni interesi velikih sila generiraju trajnu nestabilnost regije [Western Balkans: “divide et impera” or why the conflicting interests of the great powers generate lasting instability in the region]. Acta Economica et turistica. 5(2)

[6] Kaplan, R. (2017). New York Times. The Necessary Empire. May 5

[7] Hadžić, F., (2020). Bosnia between the Dayton’s peace straightjacket, development, and power centers’ moral obligation; solicitation to Biden, Small Wars Journal

[8] Polović, J. & Frlan, J. (2019). Zapadni balkan: „divide et impera“ ili zašto suprotstavljeni interesi velikih sila generiraju trajnu nestabilnost regije [Western Balkans: “divide et impera” or why the conflicting interests of the great powers generate lasting instability in the region]. Acta Economica et turistica. 5(2)

[9] Niall M., (2017). NATO and the Western Balkans, From Neutral Spectator to Proactive Peacemaker. London: Palgrave Macmillan

[10] Polovic, J. (2018). Geopolitika. Velika Albanija: san ili realnost? [Great Albania: dream or reality?]. https://www.geopolitika.news/analize/dr-sc-jadranka-polovic-velika-albanija-san-ili-realnost/

[11] Nikolić N. (2017). Razmatranje inovativnosti koncepta hibridnog ratovanja [Consideration of the innovativeness of the concept of hybrid warfare]. Vojno delo. 2. 320-332.

[12] Graham, T., Levitsky, J., Munter C. & Wisner F. (2018).
Time for Action in the Western Balkans. Policy report, EastWest Institute

[13] Arbatova, N. (2018). The Russia-Turkey Relations: Strategic Partnership or Strategic Rivalry – Policy paper series 4/2018. Nicosia: Cyprus Center for European and International Affairs.

[14] Ünver, A. (2019). Russian Digital Media and Information Ecosystem in Turkey. Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies. 1-56. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep21042?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents

[15] Hadžić, F. (2020). Post-Yugoslav spaces between defective democracies, authoritarianism, and kleptocracies, International Affairs and Global Strategy. 86. 38-52. 10.7176/IAGS/86-04

[16] Kico, A. & Kapetanovic M. (2019). Bosna i Hercegovina i Zapadni Balkan – Aspekti geopolitike i hibridnog rata [Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Western Balkans – Aspects of Geopolitics and Hybrid Warfare]. Sarajevo: Atlantska incijativa.

[17] Turcalo, S. (2020). Energetska geopolitika na Balkanu. [Energy geopolitics in the Balkans], http://library.fes.de/pdf-giles/bueros/sarajevo/16147.pdf

[18] Dnevnik.hr. (2017). Financial times. https://dnevnik.hr/vijesti/svijet/financial-times-otkriva-zasto-bliskoistocni-investitori-ulazu-u-balkan—474690.html

[19] Brkan, D. (2020). Slobodna Europa. Hibridni rat dezinformacijama nad Balkanom [A hybrid war of disinformation over the Balkans]. https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/sajber-napadi-crna-gora/30230596.html

The last several years the term Irregular Warfare (IW) has gained increased prominence within the national defense community. It has become a buzzword meaning different things to a variety of people and organizations. Irregular warfare consists of unconventional warfare (UW), counterinsurgency (COIN), counterterrorism (CT), foreign internal defense (FID), and stability operations (SO).

The U.S. recently published the Irregular Warfare Annex to the National Defense Strategy – which clarifies the role of IW within the Department of Defense and other government organizations. Since the IW annex has been published (Nov 2020) national security commentators have provided their perspective on what it means for the US defense establishment. Some of their more recent articles are provided below – with a brief synopsis of the article and link to the author’s article or publication.

Reimagining IW. A career Department of Defense civilian serving in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD SO/LIC), Kevin Bilms, expresses his views on how “Irregular Warfare” needs a new market strategy that will eliminate some misconceptions and assist others in recognizing IW’s potential value in great power competition. Read “What’s in a Name? Reimagining Irregular Warfare Activities for Competition”, War on the Rocks, January 15, 2021.

From CT to IW? Jason Criss Howk notes that the U.S. is moving from a narrow focus on counterterrorism (CT) to a broader focus on irregular warfare (IW). He says that the shift to a larger view of IW and all the tools in the government tool box is also part of a natural evolution of how CT is conducted. “From Counterterrorism to Irregular Warfare: What Does That Mean?”, Clearance Jobs, January 15, 2021.

Critical Thinking in the Military. Steve Ferenzi, a strategic planning officer at the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), shares his thoughts about red teaming and critical thinking in the military. He argues that “traditional American military culture diametrically opposes divergent thought.” For the US military to lead through influence and tools short of armed conflict it needs a tectonic cultural shift to harness the power of divergent thought. Read his article “The Death of Critical Thinking in the Military? Here’s How to Fix It”, Real Clear Defense, January 14, 2021.

IW and a Pentagon Bureaucracy Change. The introduction of great power competition has brought back (for some) the importance of irregular warfare (IW). The Defense Department has placed more emphasis on IW as part of a broader effort to counter Russia and China. Despite the emphasis on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency over the past two decades the US still has an overwhelming conventional force advantage with its near-peer adversaries. For that reason, Russia and others are using political warfare and irregular warfare to advance their strategic interests. It is time for the US to step up its IW game as well. The Pentagon has recently turned the Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office into the Irregular Warfare Technical Support Directorate. Read “A small bureaucratic change at the Pentagon hints at a major shift for US special-operations units”, Business Insider, January 11, 2021.

Dave Maxwell on IW, UW, PW, and CT. A retired Special Forces officer provides his perspective on the way forward when confronting Russia and China (as well as Iran and North Korea) in this new era of great power competition. He believes that SOF needs to focus on CT as well as on irregular warfare, unconventional warfare, and support to political warfare. He advocates some new principles both to frame special operations and communicate how the force supports the national strategy. “The Two Special Operations Trinities”, Small Wars Journal, January 6, 2021.

IW in Competition. Kevin Bilms states that “Irregular Warfare” is not a perfect term, but it helps to understand strategic competition short of an all-out war. He proposes that IW “. . . represents one way the military can apply its power complementarily with diplomatic, economic, financial and other elements of government power to secure strategic outcomes.” Read more in “Better Understanding irregular warfare in competition”, Military Times, January 1, 2021.

CA and IW. Three Army officers collaborate in an article on the role that Civil Affairs can play in bridging planning gaps and seams between convention and special operations forces in an irregular warfare environment. See “Building a Bridge: Cultivating an Irregular Warfare Mindset in the 83rd Civil Affairs Battalion”, Eunomia Journal, The Civil Affairs Association, December 28, 2020.

Podcast – Breaking the Boom-Bust Cycle of Irregular Warfare. David Maxwell (retired SF) and Deak Roh (of the ASD SO/LIC office) examine the IW Annex to the National Defense Strategy of 2018 and its relevance in an era defined by great power competition. Modern War Institute at West Point, December 18, 2020, 45 minutes.

Embracing IW. David H. Ucko, a professor at the National Defense University, believes that the release of the IW annex to the National Defense Strategy is insufficient to influence the reform and change needed to bring IW to the forefront within DoD and the US government at large. “Nobody Puts IW in an Annex: It’s Time to Embrace Irregular Warfare as a Strategic Priority“, Modern War Institute at West Point, October 14, 2020.

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Photo: A U.S. Army Special Forces Soldier assigned to 20th Special Forces Group and a Lithuanian National Defence Volunteer Forces (KASP) member conduct mission planning during exercise Saber Junction 2018 at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany. The exercise provided the opportunity to conduct irregular warfare in enemy occupied territory. Photo by 1st Lt. Benjamin Haulenbeek, SOCEUR, Sep 16, 2018.

References:

Summary of the Irregular Warfare Annex to the National Defense Strategy, DoD, 2020
https://media.defense.gov/2020/Oct/02/2002510472/-1/-1/0/Irregular-Warfare-Annex-to-the-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.PDF

Summary of the National Defense Strategy, DoD, 2018
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf

Special Forces and Irregular Warfare (IW)
https://specialforcestraining.info/topics/irregular-warfare.htm

“Book Review – The American Way of Irregular War”, SOF News, August 4, 2020. In this book LTG (Ret) Charles Cleveland provides an interesting look at the past 40 years of history of U.S. special operations. He provides recommendations for the restructuring of the U.S. special operations community and its approach to irregular warfare.
http://www.sof.news/publications/american-way-irregular-warfare/

The Iranian regime maintains a network of proxies including Lebanese Hezbollah, various Shiite militias in Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen, and foreign fighters in Syria. This paper by the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) provides a look at the problem of states using proxy forces to advance their foreign policy objectives.

The three main chapters of the paper outline the different groups and factors that influence Iranian military and political strategy for Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. The proxy / host country relation is described. The report provides an assessment of vulnerabilities that could be exploited by U.S. special operations forces.

Iran will continue to use their proxy network to frustrate U.S. Middle East strategy and diminish U.S. influence. However, the U.S. is not without appropriate responses. This paper advances the argument that terrorism, counterterrorism, and proxy conflict are inherently political in nature and need not be addressed with a kinetic solution alone.

The authors of this paper are:

• Dr. Diane Zorri – an assistant professor of security studies at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
• Dr. Houman A. Sadri – deputy director of the International Policy and Analysis Center (IPAC)
• Dr. David Ellis – Resident Fellow at Joint Special Operations University (JSOU)

Iranian Proxy Groups in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen: A Principal-Agent Comparative Analysis, Joint Special Operations University, JSOU Report 20-5, 2020.
https://jsou.libguides.com/ld.php?content_id=58950053

Two best-selling authors have a conversation about the future of irregular warfare and implications for policymakers, practitioners, and academics. August Cole and P.W. Singer have recently collaborated on a book – Burn-in: A Novel of the Real Robotic Revolution. Both authors, singly and together, provide action-packed fiction in short story and book form to describe the future of conflict.

The authors use fiction to explore how technology, social media, autonomy, artificial intelligence, weaponization of information, cyber, and other changes to society will have an impact on irregular warfare in the future. They explain how a suite of technologies available to the ‘strategic corporal’ will be integrated into the future operating environment.

Part of the discussion is about how Russia is once again a ‘great power competitor’. It isn’t because of their large conventional army, aircraft carriers (or lack of), and advanced combat aircraft – rather it is about other factors that the U.S. is not quite currently competing with. Also discussed is China’s centralized approach to artificial intelligence (AI) . . . and a comparison is made with the United State’s approach to AI (not focused or integrated).

Singer and Cole talk about how the special operations community will need to incorporate new technologies into its doctrine, organization, equipment, and training. SOF will continue to play a role in the future of irregular warfare and needs to stay abreast with the rapid technological revolution that is affecting society, economics, politics, and national security. The future SOF operator will need to be able to understand and leverage the coming technological changes of the future.

The Future of Irregular Warfare, Irregular Warfare Podcast, Modern War Institute at West Point, August 28, 2020, 52 minutes.
https://mwi.usma.edu/the-future-of-irregular-warfare/

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August Cole is a Non-Resident Fellow at the Brute Krulak Center of Innovation and Creativity at the Marine Corps University and Senior Fellow at the Brent Scowcroft Center on Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. He is an author of numerous short stories about the future of conflict.

P.W. singer is a Strategist at New America and Professor at Arizona State University. He conducts research about the future in the national security environment. Dr. Singer has also been proclaimed an official Mad Scientist for the U.S. Army’s Training and Doctrine Command.

Photo: From the podcast. Image credit: Cpl. Matthew Callahan, US Marine Corps.

Burn-in: A Novel of the Real Revolution.
https://www.amazon.com/Burn-Novel-Real-Robotic-Revolution/dp/1328637239/

NATO Update 20180720 – Provided below is a selection of recent media stories with news, analysis, and commentary about the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. With the recently held Brussels Summit 2018 now in the wraps and Trump’s visits to the UK, Helsinki conference with Putin, and SECDEF Mattis making the rounds there is an abundance of news about NATO.

“Keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down”
NATO’s first Secretary General, Lord Hastings Lionel Ismay
www.nato.int/cps/us/natohq/declassified_137930.htm

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NATO Developments

New Baltic Region Command. NATO plans to establish a new command HQs called the Multinational Division Headquarters North. Latvia will be the host nation for the command. To be established in 2019, it will have the responsibility of planning and coordinating the defense of the Baltic region. The group will manage two to four brigades under its command and coordinate exercises, training, and operations n the region. Another part of the command will be located in Karup, Denmark. Read “Latvia will host new NATO northern headquarters from 2019”, Latvian Public Broadcasting, July 12, 2018.

Commentary

Could ‘Hybrid Warfare’ Instigate a Major Conflict? On Thursday, during the occasion of the Brussels Summit 2018 NATO stated that Russian hybrid warfare aimed at a member state could trigger Article 5. This is a provision that requires all member nations to come to the aid on a member nation that is attacked. Some observers worry that this could lead to a major conflict with Russia. Read more in “How NATO Says Russian Hybrid Warfare Could Start a Real War”, Popular Mechanics, July 13, 2018. SECDEF Mattis also made some comments about hybrid warfare threats in the Balkans – See an article by Paul McLeary on this topic in Breaking Defense (July 13, 2018).

Russia’s Trump Card – Hybrid Warfare. Richard Bitzinger, associated with the Military Transformations Program of a university in Singapore, has a dim view of Russia’s military power. He says that while it does have a significant nuclear threat the rest of its military is a little behind the curve. Bitzinger believes that the threat from Russia is not from its tanks and motorized rifle regiments but from its ability to use unconventional warfare – fighting its conflicts “. . . in the informational, moral, psychological, ideological, diplomatic, and economic battlefields.” Moscow has been most successful in the influence operations area.

“Trump seems to have fallen for this already. And all the new military spending and state-of-the-art weapons acquisitions by NATO is not going to have any impact if Moscow keeps racking up victory after victory in the arena of hybrid warfare”.

Read “Russia’s trump card: hybrid warfare”, Asia Times, July 18, 2018.

Make NATO Great Again. Clifford D. May, the founder and president of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, says NATO’s mission needs to be updated to ensure that the jihadists are kept in check, the Americans remain in NATO, and the Russians stay within their borders. (FDD, July 18, 2018).

NATO Getting Bigger?

Georgia – Joining NATO? Georgia has been persisting in its efforts to join the Atlantic defense alliance. It is a big troop contributor to NATO’s Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan. NATO considers Georgia an important partner and a potential NATO member in the future. Read “Georgia Remains on Path to NATO”, Eurasia Daily Monitor – The Jamestown Foundation, July 16, 2018.

Macedonia – joining NATO? If a voter referendum to approve the proposed name change for the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia goes the right way then it would clear path towards Macedonia’s membership in NATO. The name, if approved in the voter referendum scheduled for this fall, would be the Republic of North Macedonia. This could make Macedonia the 30th member of the alliance. “Macedonia formally welcomed by NATO – but with a warning”, Defense News, July 12, 2018.

NATO and Maritime Conflict

Exercise Sea Breeze 2018. The annual exercise in the Ukraine region was once again held with U.S., Ukrainian, and other NATO military units participating. The multinational maritime exercise is designed to enhance interoperability and capabilities among participating forces. Read more in “Exercise Sea Breeze 2018 Kicks Off in Ukraine”, Department of Defense, July 13, 2018.

Out with GIUK and in with High North. Steve Wills, an analyst with the Center for International Maritime Security, has penned an analysis of the naval power contest between Russia and the NATO countries in the ‘north’ waters. He says the iconic Greenland, Iceland, United Kingdom (GIUK) gap is old news – a relic of the early and middle years of the first ‘cold war’. Read “A New Gap in the High North and Forward Defense Against Russian Naval Power”, CIMSEC.org, July 17, 2018.

Trump, NATO, Brussels, Helsinki, and More

President Trump covered a lot of ground in one week. He managed to upstage the NATO summit held in Brussels, caused discontent in the United Kingdom, and had quite a meeting and post-meeting with Putin in Finland. Read more about it below.

Suspend NATO Summits? The Brussels Summit held in July 2018 should have been a huge success for NATO. Instead it turned into a reality show with the heads of state reacting to one member nation’s leader who hijacked the summit. Some are advocating putting the summits on hold for the next few years. Read “Should NATO even hold summits under Trump?”, Brookings Institute, July 13, 2018.

Trump and SAS. President Trump departed the Brussels Summit 2018 and made his way to the UK where he continued his ‘presidential style’ of diplomacy. In addition to the usual meetings and golf session he also viewed a demonstration by the UK’s Special Air Service (SAS). Read “Trump visit: President all fired up by SAS hostage rescue display”, The Sunday Times, July 14, 2018.

Helsinki Meeting. President Trump and Russian President Putin met in Finland on Monday, July 16th. The two leaders have met before – both occurring on the sidelines – at the G-20 summit and APEC summit. Many observers say that Putin had everything to gain and nothing to lose. What was Trumps agenda going into the meeting? Hard telling not knowing. Some topics that might have popped up on the agenda include ending military exercises in the Baltics, global energy policy, Russian interference in U.S. elections, Crimea, Ukraine, and Syria.

Mattis Making the Rounds. SECDEF Jim Mattis followed up his attendance at the Brussels Summit 2018 with visits and sideline meetings with NATO counterparts. In a meeting with Frank Bakke-Jensen (Norway Minister of Defense) several topics were discussed including Norway’s commitment to increase defense spending to 2% of GNP by 2024 and the continuation of winter warfare training in Norway for hundreds of U.S. Marines.

Burden Sharing

President Trump says he forced the NATO European members to up their spending on defense during the Brussels Summit held this month (July 2018). Defenders of Trump say his disruptive manner was instrumental in achieving this goal. But the facts kind of get in the way. The Europeans had already agreed to this goal in 2014 with the Wales Summit Declaration – to reach the 2% of GNP by 2024. Nothing in the Brussels Summit 2018 communique changes that 2014 agreement – it is still 2%.

Dollars or Value? Kathleen H. Hicks et al provide some insight on how to assess NATO’s defense expenditures. Read Counting Dollars or Measuring Value, Center for Strategic & International Studies, July 3, 2018.

2% – Magic Number? It would seem that an important question / discussion should be is 2% of GNP a meaningful number? Marcus Hellyer explores this question in “NATO defence spending: is 2% the magic number?”, The Strategist – Australian Strategic Policy Institute, July 19, 2018.

Denmark – A Case Study for NATO Contributions. Two military researchers (scholars?) with universities in Copenhagen examine Denmark’s defense expenditures and contributions to NATO expeditionary adventures in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. Denmark has been a loyal ally to the United States and has been a long-time participant in the Afghan conflict where it has suffered numerous casualties. Read “Denmark in NATO: Paying for Protection, Bleeding for Prestige”, War on the Rocks, July 17, 2018.

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Photo: U.S. Soldiers assigned to the 2nd General Support Aviation Battalion, 4th Aviation Regiment, 4th Combat Aviation Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, conduct safety checks and prepare their UH-60 Blackhawk for air assault training at Mihail Koglniceanu Air Base, Romania, July 10, 2018. The Soldiers of 2nd GSAB are conducting similar training in multiple locations throughout Europe in support of Atlantic Resolve, a U.S. endeavor to fulfill NATO commitments by rotating U.S.-based units throughout the European theater to deter aggression against NATO allies and partners in Europe. (U.S. Army photo by Spc. Andrew McNeil / 22nd Mobile Public Affairs Detachment)

The Helsinki Summit between President Trump and President Putin took place on Monday, July 16, 2018. The meeting between the leader of the United States and the leader of Russia followed the tumultuous Brussels Summit held just a few days prior at NATO headquarters. The two presidents met for two hours privately and then both participants spoke during a joint press conference. This was an occasion for the two leaders to discuss important issues such as Syria, Ukraine, Crimea, the Baltic States, cyber warfare, and more. But . . .

Trump’s Comments on Russian
Interference with 2016 Election

The biggest news coming out of the press conference that captured the attention of the press and political commentators was concerning the accusation of Russian meddling in the 2016 election. The topics of Crimea, Ukraine, cyber warfare, Syria, the Baltic States, Russian hybrid warfare, and others seemed to take a backseat.

President Trump said during the press conference (Monday, July 16, 2018) that he believes Putin’s statement that Russia did not meddle with the U.S. election. He says that he doubts the information provided to him by U.S. intelligence agencies.

“I will tell you that President Putin was extremely strong and powerful in his denial today.”

“I have President Putin. He just said it’s not Russia. I will say this, I don’t see any reason why it would be.”

DNI Daniel Coats immediately issued a statement from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence published shortly after the Helsinki news conference (Monday, July 16, 2018):

“The role of the Intelligence Community is to provide the best information and fact-based assessments possible for the President and policymakers. We have been clear in our assessments of Russian meddling in the 2016 election and their ongoing, pervasive efforts to undermine our democracy, and we will continue to provide unvarnished and objective intelligence in support of our national security”.

Video of Joint Press Conference of Helsinki Summit, White House, July 16, 2018
www.youtube.com/watch?v=ujCa6QZCirU

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In other news, the Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs released (Monday, July 16, 2018) a notice that announced the arrest of a Russian national. She was charged with conspiracy to act as an agent of the Russian Federation and “. . . infiltrating organizations having influence in American politics, for the purpose of advancing the interests of the Russian Federation”.

On Tuesday, July 17, 2018 President Trump, recognizing the damage done, attempted to walk back some of his comments.

“In a key sentence in my remarks I said the word ‘would’ instead of ‘wouldn’t’ . . . the sentence should have been, ‘I don’t see any reason why it wouldn’t be Russia.’ Sort of a double-negative.”

Just a double negative, move along, nothing to not see here . . .

Damage Control of Helsinki Summit

President Trump would like you to think that he is protecting our future elections from Russian meddling and he is standing up to Russia’s malign activities. He is doing a little ‘walking back’ of his bizarre and insulting comments made on Monday. Read a statement issued from the White House today (Tuesday, July 17, 2018).
www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-protecting-elections-standing-russias-malign-activities/

Positive Results of the Helsinki Summit

It will take some time for things to shake out on any positive outcomes on the meeting between Trump and Putin. The State Department and White House will surely be putting out some official news releases. Supporters of Trump (I am thinking Fox News) will certainly look for some ‘good news’ aspects of the summit and let us know about it. Watch the video below if you want the White House version on the results of the Helsinki meeting.

Video of President Trump discussing his visit to NATO, United Kingdom, and Helsinki, White House, July 17, 2018.
www.youtube.com/watch?v=E_g2IKzEqms

Closing Comment

It would be awesome if Trump got some movement with Russia on settling the Syrian conflict, applying pressure on North Korea on the denuclearization issue, lowering the temperature in eastern Europe, or on a host of other issues. Hopefully we will soon hear some good news from what has been widely regarded as a political and diplomatic misstep on the part of President Trump.

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Photo: Department of State photo depicting President Trump and President Putin a joint press conference immediately after the Helsinki Summit, July 16, 2018.

]]> 7127 https://sof.news/uw/hybrid-warfare/ Thu, 27 Jul 2017 03:00:03 +0000 http://www.sof.news/?p=3128 Hybrid Warfare – Russian hybrid warfare and Finland, Germany victim of Russian moves, Russian UW in Ukraine, and more. Finland – a Target of Russian Hybrid Warfare. The Finns share a common border with Russia that puts it at risk [...]]]>

Hybrid Warfare – Russian hybrid warfare and Finland, Germany victim of Russian moves, Russian UW in Ukraine, and more.

Finland – a Target of Russian Hybrid Warfare. The Finns share a common border with Russia that puts it at risk and also ensures that it will forever need to endure a ‘special relationship’. Russia is very keen to protect its borders and keeping Finland in the ‘neutral corner’ is one of its aims. It does not want a robust North Atlantic Treaty Organization presence in Finland. Russia does not need to mount offensive military operations against Finland to attain its national interests; it can use hybrid warfare as a mechanism to achieve its aims. Read “Hybrid influence – lessons from Finland”, NATO Review, June 28, 2017.

Germany As a Target. Russia has used its manipulative ways with countries in addition to the United States. Germany has been a frequent target of Russian disinformation campaigns, cyber attacks, economic pressure, blackmail, use of proxies, and exploitation of minorities. And Why? One prime reason for Russia’s attacks against Germany is the German response to the Russian involvement in the Ukrainian conflict and its conquest of Crimea. Read more in “Germany Confronts Russian Hybrid Warfare”, Carnegie Europe, July 26,2017.

Russia’s Ukraine Moves. General (Ret) Charles Cleveland, former commander of the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), testified before the Senate Committee on Armed Services in March 2017. The topic was the unconventional warfare activities of Russia in the Ukraine. See “Russian Influence and Unconventional Warfare Operations in the “Grey Zone”: Lessons from Ukraine”, March 29, 2017.

Further Reading:

Read more articles posted on SOF News about hybrid warfare.
www.sof.news/?s=hybrid+warfare

Hybrid Warfare
www.specialforcestraining.info/topics/hybrid-warfare.htm

SOF News Update for 20161218 – Iraq’ Golden Division, OSS veterans honored by Congress, Navy SEALs in Serbia, Navy SEAL for Interior secretary, Fox News video on ‘shadow warriors’, Navy SEALs and what Hollywood gets wrong, SOCEUR re-enacts D-Day parachute drops, Russian SOF in Aleppo, and more.

Iraq’s 1st Special Operations Brigade. The “Golden Division” (once called the “Golden Brigade” and “Dirty Division) is part of the Iraq’s Counter Terrorism Service (CTS). It is in the lead for the fight for Mosul – as it has been in the lead for the fight against the Islamic State for other cities of Iraq over the past two years. However, there is a price for being good. The Iraqi regime continues to overuse the Golden Division and its losses are appalling. Soon it will be – some say by the end of the Mosul fight- combat ineffective. So while Mosul will go down as a political and military victory there is concern of what unit will exist to keep the peace among the different factions of Iraqi political landscape. Read more in “How Iraq’s Army Could Defeat ISIS in Mosul – But Lose Control of the Country”, Politico Magazine, December 15, 2015.

Fox News Video on “Gray Zone”. Watch a short (2 min) video by Fox News on the U.S. shadow warriors fighting across the globe.
http://video.foxnews.com/v/5251445694001/

Russians Targeting UK with ‘Hybrid Warfare’. It appears that senior members of the United Kingdom government are getting concerned with some aggressive maneuvering on the part of the Russians. Read more in “Russia wages unconventional warfare on Britain”, The Weekend Australian, December 17, 2016.

Russian SOF in Aleppo. Russian special operations forces are heavily engaged in the ground fight for Aleppo, Syria. Read “The elite Russian special forces who took over Crimea are doing the same thing in Aleppo”, Business Insider, December 16, 2016.

Navy SEALs train with Serbian Unit. Members of U.S. Naval Special Warfare Unit 2 – assigned to Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) – spent two weeks on a Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) with the Serbian Special Anti-Terrorist Unit (SAJ) this past November / December. Read more in “Navy SEALs builds relations with Serbian forces”, DVIDS, December 15, 2016.

SOCEUR and D-Day Jumps. Over a year ago, in July 2015, special operations forces from Special Operations Command Europe conducted parachute jumps over Sainte-Mere-Eglise, France in an observance of the D-Day parachute drop 71 years earlier. Watch a little bit of history and some present day parachuting in this 3-min long video in SOCEUR D-Day Drops, DVIDS, posted 16 Dec 2016.

Navy SEAL to be Secretary of Department of Interior. A retired Navy SEAL and congressional representative from Montana has been selected to be the secretary of Interior by President-Elect Trump. “Who is Ryan Zinke?”, Voice of America, December 15, 2016.

OSS Veterans Honored by Congress. President Obama signed legislation that honors veterans of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) with the Congressional Gold Medal for their service and contributions during World War II. The OSS was the predecessor to the Central Intelligence Agency and the U.S. Army Special Forces. Read more in a news report by Augusta Free Press, Dec 16, 2016.

Hollywood, Movies, and SEALs. There’s lots of movies that have been made about the U.S. Navy SEALs. Some are near factual while others are . . . well, entertaining. Listen to “Former Navy SEALs reveal what Hollywood gets wrong about them”, Business Insider, December 17, 2016.

SOCSouth Members Recognized by Colombia. Three SOCSouth members received the “Military Medal” during a ceremony at the U.S. Embassy in Bogota, Colombia for their efforts in supporting a Colombian military institute. DVIDS, Dec 6, 2016.

(Featured image at top from USSOCOM 2016 Factbook)

Hybrid Warfare is a term closely aligned with other terms that attempt to describe the area of conflict between peace and full spectrum warfare. The other terms that are similar include Unconventional Warfare, Political Warfare, Irregular Warfare, Gray Zone, and Asymmetric Warfare. Of course there are many more than just these terms. Russian hybrid warfare has been successfully used to advance the political and national interests of Russia.

Defining Hybrid Warfare

The U.S. Department of Defense has yet to publish an official definition of hybrid warfare. However, there is a common consensus within the military and foreign policy community on what hybrid warfare entails. Hybrid warfare is usually understood as a combination of the use of regular forces, irregular forces, proxy forces, criminal networks, political organizations, and insurgent groups that conduct a blend of traditional and non-traditional acts of warfare. This includes support of insurgencies, political pressure, economic pressure, information influence operations (through the media and Internet), and cyber operations.

Nations or groups that use hybrid warfare are either too weak to confront their opponent in a large-scale conventional fight, want to avoid the possibility of engaging in an all-out conflict, or wish to attain political goals or satisfy national interests with a reduced expenditure of effort, money and resources.

U.S. Army Special Forces has Unconventional Warfare (UW) as one of its core missions. UW and hybrid warfare are very similar but at times different. Many observers would say that the United States engaged in hybrid warfare during the Cold War. Some called the Cold War activities during the confrontation with the Soviet Union (and ‘Red China’) ‘Political Warfare’.

Russian Hybrid Warfare

Russia is an experienced practitioner of hybrid warfare. Recent examples are the use of “Little Green Men” in the Ukraine, occupation of Crimea, and acquisition of territory in the Republic of Georgia. There are other lesser known instances of Russia using hybrid warfare in other areas of the world.

Currently, one can define Russia’s national interests as creating a buffer zone between its national borders and those countries belonging to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In addition, Russia desires to increase its regional influence (hegemony) in eastern Europe and Central Asia.

Russia’s use of hybrid warfare will continue over the next several years. It has realized success in its application in the past and will certainly seek areas to utilize it in the future.

The Way Forward

The United States (and NATO) will need to develop a coherent and viable strategy to counter the use of hybrid warfare by Russia. The revitalization of the NATO alliance through increased defense expenditures, periodic military exercises, and forward stationing of air power and ground forces in Eastern Europe surely is part of the response to Russia’s aggression. However, NATO and the US has to look beyond these (conventional) measures and address the best way to counter Russia’s use of hybrid warfare. The ability of the United States to conduct unconventional warfare or – as some would say – conduct counter unconventional warfare needs to improve as well.

Resources on Russian Hybrid Warfare:

USASOC, Little Green Men: A Primer on Modern Unconventional Warfare, United States Army Special Operations Command.

Fox, Amos C. and Andrew J. Rossow, “Assessing Russian Hybrid Warfare: A Successful Tool for Limited War”, Small Wars Journal, August 8, 2016.

Klus, Adam, “Myatezh Voina: The Russian Grandfather of Western Hybrid Warfare”, Small Wars Journal, July 10, 2016.

Palagi, Jamie E., Wrestling the Bear: The Rise of Russian Hybrid Warfare, National Defense University, April 2015.

SOFREP, Political Warfare – Defining the Contemporary Environment, July 2, 2016.