A new publication, SFA Operator Profile, by NATO offers a information about advisors, mentors, and trainers in the security force assistance environment. The report is published by the NATO Security Force Assistance Centre of Excellence (NATO SFA COE) located in Italy.

The document identifies lessons learned and best practices to enhance NATO HQs and NATO nations’ abilities to select, recruit, train, and deploy personnel in security force assistance operations. The project focuses on the job descriptions as well as the human and professional requirements necessary in a strategic, operational, and tactical environment. The publication aims to be a tool in understanding the complexity of the SFA field and the pivotal role of the human dimension in the SFA environment.

The recommendations in the report will assist in elaborating the profile and job description of the SFA operator. The report examines three broad topics:

• Address the differences and peculiarities of the SFA functions of advising, mentoring, and training
• Outline considerations concerning SFA training
• Focus on the analysis of behavioral aspects and core competencies of the SFA population

There are two main chapters in the report – “Research Outcomes Analysis” and “Psychological Profile”. The SFA Operator Profile has a conclusion and recommendation for each chapter. The end of the report includes a list of acronyms and biographies of the authors. This is a good read for those who are training officers and NCOs to become advisors, mentors, or trainers as well as military personnel who are or will be serving in those roles.

**********

The NATO SFA COE is a multinational entity accredited by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a “Centre of Excellence”. It is sponsored by the countries of Italy, Albania, and Slovenia. The Centre is recognized as a hub of reference in the Security Force Assistance field by NATO and other countries around the world.

SFA Operator Profile, NATO SFA COE, April 2022, PDF, 62 pages.
https://www.nsfacoe.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/SFA-OPERATOR-PROFILE.pdf

**********

Reference: Watch a two-minute long video that describes the intent of the report cited above. “SFA Operator Profile Analysis Report”, NATO SFA COE, April 12, 2022, YouTube.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cVhazEQ8d_8

The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) has published it’s Afghanistan Study Group Final Report: A Pathway for Peace in Afghanistan. This 88-page document is the result of work that began in April 2020 – shortly after the United States and Taliban signed the Doha agreement that set the conditions for the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the current negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban.

The study group was established by Congress in December 2019 and tasked with identifying policy recommendations for U.S. policy, resources and commitments in Afghanistan. The Co-chairs for the study group were Senator Kelly Ayotte, General Joseph Dunford (Ret.), and Ms. Nancy Lindborg. Other study group members included Ms. Michele Flournoy, Ambassador James Dobbins, and others.

Contents:

• Executive Summary
• Introduction
• Interests and Key Judgements
• Analytical Assessments
• Strategic Logic behind a New Approach
• Recommendations
• Alternative Pathways
• Conclusion

The study group believes that a significant revision of U.S. policy is needed – which includes:

• extending the current May 2021 withdrawal date
• make creating conditions for an acceptable peace agreement a key objective of the ongoing U.S. military presence (in addition to CT opns and assisting the ANDSF)
• continued support for the Afghan govt and security institutions
• continued support for members of Afghan civil society
• a reemphasis on diplomacy and negotiation
• continued support for a post-agreement Afghan state

The report finds that:

“The United States is in a position where effective diplomacy, modest continuing aid levels, and strong coordination across civilian and military lines of efforts against a clear and unified objective can create the conditions for a responsible exit from Afghanistan that does not endanger our national security.”

**********

Afghanistan Study Group Final Report, United States Institute of Peace (USIP), February 2021.
View online or download, PDF, 88 pages.

News, analysis, and commentary about the war in Afghanistan from the past few months of 2020. Topics include security, ANDSF, Resolute Support, peace negotiations, governance, development, podcasts, videos, and more.

Afghan News Summary

The Taliban hold more territory than ever before – not since before September 2001 have they held this much of Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP) still have a presence in Afghanistan. Peace talks are continuing with no real progress and with the Taliban apparently driving the train. The U.S. troop complement is significantly down-sized and will be at 2,500 at some point in January 2020. It remains to be seen what President-elect Biden’s Afghanistan policy will be. He may opt for the situation that President Trump has left him – leaving 2,500 troops in country. He may decide to keep a counterterrorism capability within Afghanistan. Or he could withdraw completely in May 2021 in accordance with the U.S.-Taliban withdrawal agreement.

Security

The Afghan government’s ability to establish security within the much of the rural area of the country is limited. It’s ability to provide services at the sub-governance level is affected by the lack of security as well as corruption and inefficiency. Insurgent and terrorist attacks continue at a high level despite the peace talks. The implementation of an ANDSF checkpoint reduction plan has faltered.

Targeted Killings. Attacks against government officials, journalists, military personnel, civil society activists, and other high-profile figures has increased over the past several month. On the first day of 2021 an Afghan journalist was shot dead in an attack by gunmen in Ghor province. Insider attacks have been happening regularly. The latest took place on Monday, January 4, 2021 in the Arghandab district in Kandahar province where nine policemen were killed at a check point.

Afghan Pilot Assassinated. An Afghan air force pilot was killed by gunman in the southern Afghan province of Kandahar on December 30, 2020. The helicopter pilot had been trained in the Czech Republic and the United Arab Emirates. Afghan police say that the assassin and two other insurgents were killed by the ANP. “Afghan Pilot Gunned Down in Kandahar”, Voice of America, December 30, 2020.

“Sticky Bombs”. A troublesome tactic used by insurgents in the past has gained popularity among those targeting Afghan government and military officials. The use of magnetic bombs placed on vehicles that are in motion has taking place almost daily. Usually insurgents will use a two-man motorcycle team to emplace the magnetic car bomb. The use of these sticky bombs have become an important tool in a widespread assassination campaign. (Task & Purpose, Dec 17, 2020).

Chinese Spy Ring Busted. The Afghan National Directorate of Security (NDS) detained 10 Chinese citizens over espionage charges. (Khaama Press, Dec 26, 2020). They were allegedly operating a terror cell in Kabul city. Two of the members are said to have been in direct contact with the Haqqani network. See also a news article by Pajhwok Afghan News (Dec 28, 2020). An Indian Army officer provides his perspective of China’s interference in Afghan affairs in the South Asian Monitor. Some news reports indicate that the ten Chinese citizens have now departed Afghanistan on a chartered aircraft – thus quietly removing from the glare of the press a potentially embarrassing situation.

Chinese (and Russian) Bounties. The Democrats had a field day this past year criticizing the Trump administration for ignoring intelligence indictors (many say uncorroborated) that the Russians paid bounties to the Taliban to kill U.S. military personnel. Now the Trump administration has declassified unconfirmed intelligence on China bounties on U.S. forces in Afghanistan. (The Hill, Dec 30, 2020).

Taliban

Move of Taliban Leadership. The National Directorate of Security (NDS) has info that the Taliban group is attempting to move its leadership from its safe refuge in Pakistan to bases in southern and southwestern Afghanistan. (Reportedly, Jan 4, 2021).

The Taliban’s Drones. In the past year the insurgents have stepped up surveillance operations and attacks using modified commercial drones. “Taliban adopting drone warfare to bolster attacks”, The National News, January 4, 2021.

The Taliban’s Air Force. Apparently the U.S. has launched air strikes against ISIK fighters that were engaged in operations against the Taliban. While not coordinated with the Taliban the air strikes certainly helped the Taliban. “General confirms the US has helped the Taliban by launching drone strikes against ISIS“, Task & Purpose, December 10, 2020.

“But it was a common enemy. It was an opportunity to strike someone who is an implacable foe of the united States. We did it. It probably helped the Taliban, and that would be the way I would describe it.”

General McKenzie, Commander of Central Command (CENTCOM)

The Taliban’s Judiciary. The Taliban’s alternative justice system is gaining traction in may regions that the militants control. A lack of government courts, judges, and prosecutors have forced residents to go to the Taliban or local mosques to seek legal recourse. This is compounded by a corrupt Afghan government judicial system where bribes often determine the outcome of legal proceedings. “Taliban Courts Seek to Undermine Afghan Judiciary”, Gandhara Blog, December 14, 2020.

Gen Milley Meets With Taliban. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff met secretly with the Taliban in December. He also spent some time with President Ghani as well. No real news came out of this event.

ANDSF

A-29 Training Program in U.S. Ends. After nearly five years the USAF is now putting the brakes on the training program that teaches Afghan pilots how to fly the A-29 Super Tucano. The final class graduated in November 2020 at Moody Air Force Base in Georgia. The 81st Fighter Squadron has been training Afghan pilots and maintenance technicians. Training will now be done in Afghanistan with Afghan instructor pilots running the training program. There are currently 28 A-29s available in Afghanistan for close air support, air interdiction, escort, and armed reconnaissance missions. Read more in “Air Force Ends Program That Trained Afghan Pilots to Fly the A-29 Super Tucano”, Military.com, November 19, 2020.

Afghanistan’s Policing Failure? Karl Nicolas Lindenlaub is an independent researcher with a focus on asymmetric warfare, security force assistance, and sub-state militant groups. In a recent article he outlines some of the reasons that the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and Afghan National Police (ANP) have not been a reliable security organization. Read “Afghanistan’s Policing Failure and the Uncertain Way Forward”, The Strategy Bridge, October 20, 2020.

ALP Loses US Funding. The United States has ended its funding for the Afghan Local Police as of 30 Sep 2020. The ALP was set up by U.S. Army Special Forces to provide security at the local level in Afghanistan – working in conjunction with the Village Stability Operations (VSO) program. Much of the mission of the ALP as well as about 1/3 of its personnel has been transferred to the Afghan National Army Territorial Force. Another 1/3 of ALP members will go to the Afghan National Police and the remainder will ‘retire’ (or join a local militia . . . or join the Taliban). Local security is also provided in part by Afghan militias referred to as local uprising forces. (SOFREP, Dec 31, 2020). The Afghanistan Analysts Network provides more information on the final chapter of the ALP. (AAN, Oct 6, 2020) as well as a special report on the ANA-TF (AAN, Aug 20, 2020).

Afghan Government Death Squads. Andrew Quilty provides an interesting article about a U.S.-backed militia that has acquired a dubious reputation for unwarranted violence. Read “The CIA’s Afghan Death Squads”, The Intercept, December 18, 2020. (Editorial note: The Intercept has a history of publishing stories with a bit of an anti-U.S. slant so there’s that . . .)

New ‘Security Force Unit’? A new unit has been established comprised of police, army, and NDS personnel. It will expand in size and activity during the coming summer months and operate principally in Farah province. (Khaama Press, Jan 4, 2021).

Missing Equipment. The Defense Department failed to keep track of surveillance systems, controls for laser-guided bombs, night vision devices, and other equipment provided to the Afghan government. “Sensitive US military equipment given to local forces goes unaccounted for in Afghanistan, watchdog says”, Stars and Stripes, December 17, 2020.

Resolute Support

The RS mission is steadily being ‘down-sized’. Some NATO countries have pulled back its forces and the U.S. has significantly reduced its footprint – down from 13,000 in early 2020 to about 2,500 by mid-January 2021. COVID-19 has significantly affected the advisory effort as well as the ability to conduct oversight on the ANDSF institutions and forces.

U.S. Force Reduction. By December 2020 the U.S. troop level was down to 4,500 in Afghanistan. President Trump announced a further reduction of U.S. troops – the target number being 2,500 by early January. General Scott Miller, the Resolute Support commander, confirmed that the U.S. reduction will take place by January 15th. The reduction is facing opposition in the US House of Representatives and Senate. See “Miller Says He Has Orders to Reduce US Troop Levels”, Tolo News, December 14, 2020. At this point in time there are more NATO troops than US troops in Afghanistan. Many of the U.S. bases that held thousands of troops have been vacated. One of these is FOB Shank (also named “Rocket City”) that recently saw the last 300 U.S. troops depart. (Tolo News, Jan 4, 2020).

U.S. Air Strikes Continue. The United States is still using air strikes to hit ISIS and support the ANDSF that are attacked by the Taliban. Reports of civilian casualties frequently make the press.

Advising Effort. General Scott Miller recently explained how Resolute Support is continuing the advising effort. He said that the U.S. bases have closed or shrunk – and now the U.S. presence in parts of the country are ‘enclaves’ within an ANDSF base. RS is still able to advise at the ministerial level and down to the corps level in the northern parts of the country. Miller said that RS will be able to project advisors to ‘points of need’ by moving an advisor package by air. This is an expeditionary advisory effort with a lighter footprint.

Billions Wasted. By the end of January there will likely be about 2,500 U.S. troops left in Afghanistan. Very few of these troops will be involved in monitoring how the Afghans spend the money we provide them. Over the past 19 years the U.S. taxpayers have footed roughly $138 billion for Afghan relief, reconstruction, and security. Is it time to stop the money flow? “How US wasted billions on absurd errors in Afghanistan War”, by Hollie McKay, Fox News, December 9, 2020.

Turkey Extending Its Stay. Turkey has about 1,200 soldiers in Afghanistan supporting the RS mission. It is currently in the process of extending the mission for another 18 months. “Turkey Bids to Extend Military Presence in Afghanistan”, Khaama Press, December 17, 2020.

New RS Dep Cdr. Lieutenant General Nicola Zanelli of the Italian Army assumed the position of Deputy Commander of the NATO-led mission Resolute Support. He took over from Lieutenant General Giles Hill of the British Army. (NATO, Dec 16, 2020).

Peace Negotiations

U.S. – Taliban Withdrawal Agreement. The U.S. government and the Taliban insurgents signed a agreement in February 2020. The U.S. pledged to withdraw troops from Afghanistan if the Taliban would prevent terrorists from operating in Afghanistan and enter into talks with the Afghan government.

There were a lot of other components to the U.S.-Taliban agreement – some of them referred to as ‘secret annexes’. It was assumed by the U.S. that the Taliban would reduce the level of violence – hasn’t happened. Prisoners would be exchanged – this got drawn out over time. Eventually the Taliban released 1,000 prisoners while the Afghan government released 5,000 prisoners. The Taliban-Afghan government talks have finally started but thus far only ‘procedural rules’ have been hashed out.

Intra-Afghan Peace Talks. The Afghan government and the Taliban began their face-to-face peace discussions in September 2020 in Doha, Qatar. Representatives for the Taliban and Afghan government have finally agreed to the ‘rules of procedure‘ (AAN, Jan 3, 2021) for the talks – that only took about three months to iron out. The negotiating teams paused talks in mid-December. They plan to renew talks on January 5, 2021 in Doha, Qatar. The next major subject to be discussed will be the agenda for future talks.

On December 30, 2020, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated that Afghanistan’s “fragile peace process” has no “guarantee of success”. The U.S. continues to emphasize that the Taliban needs to reduce the level of violence . . . but to no avail. President Ghani named members of the High Council for National Reconciliation but his decree was met with resistance by many elements of the Afghan political elite.

Completion of U.S. Withdrawal and Victory for the Taliban? The U.S.-Taliban agreement calls for the complete U.S. and NATO military withdrawal by May 2021. The Taliban likely will view this as a ‘victory’ and will grow even more confident in their ability to topple the Afghan government.

Biden’s Decision Point. President-elect Biden’s administration will face a decision point in the next few months. The U.S. can opt to abide with the withdrawal agreement which may very likely see the Taliban gain power in Afghanistan (with no guarantee that al-Qaeda or ISKP will be diminished) or the U.S. can keep a small counterterrorism force backed by SOF advisors and air power (which Biden probably prefers) and face the prospect of the Taliban abandoning the peace process.

Lots of Commentary on the Peace Process. A host of writers and observers have contributed their ‘two cents’ on the prospect of success for the intra-Afghan peace negotiations. Some say it is the only way to resolve the long conflict while others maintain that it is a recipe for Taliban success. Rory Andrews argues that the current process is not inclusive of the various elements of Afghan society. (Small Wars Journal, Dec 3, 2020).

Commentary

Why the U.S. Lost in Afghanistan. MG (Ret) Don Bolduc explains what the United States did wrong in Afghanistan. He lists nine missteps by the U.S. Bolduc is a retired Special Forces officer with several tours of duty in Afghanistan. Read his perspective in “Short-Sighted Political Strategy and Other Reasons the War in Afghanistan Failed”, SOFREP, December 9, 2020.

Ending the War in Afghanistan. Admiral (Ret) James Stavridis was the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO from 2009 to 2013. Here are his thoughts on how to end the Afghan War. “I Commanded NATO Forces in Afghanistan: Here’s How We Could End This ‘Forever War'”, Time, December 9, 2020.

Suggestions for President Biden. Jonathan Schroden, of the CNA, assesses the situation in Afghanistan and offers suggestions for the new administration to secure a better peace and a more stable country. “Afghanistan Will Be the Biden Administration’s First Foreign Policy Crisis”, Lawfare Blog, December 20, 2020.

How US Leaves Matters. Gayle Tzemach Lemmon believes that America can’t stay in Afghanistan forever, but it matters how we leave. She believes it it in America’s interest to stand on the side of those who fight against extremism and for stability. (CNN, Dec 16, 2020).

CT or COIN in Afghanistan? Carlo J.V. Caro provides his perspective on the choices the Biden administration will have in Afghanistan. Read “Counterterrorism or Counterinsurgency? Biden’s Coming Afghanistan Dilemma”, The Diplomat, December 16, 2020.

Repeating History. Jose Miguel Alonso-Trabanco reviews the troubled past of Afghanistan – beginning with the Soviet invasion and continuing until the present day. Read “History on Repeat: War and Peace in Afghanistan”, Eurasia Review, December 16, 2020.

New Afghan Strategy Needed. CAPT Anthony Cowden, a US Naval officer, says it is time to think out of the box and turn to old solutions for a new strategy. He believes the current U.S. strategy is a path to precipitously leave Afghanistan and watch the Afghan government crumble to the Taliban. Read “A(other) New Afghanistan Strategy, Based on an Old Approach”, Real Clear Defense, December 21, 2020.

Governance, Economy and Development

The Afghanistan economy continues to falter due to the insecurity in the country, diminished foreign aid, decrease in foreign military presence, and the coronavirus pandemic. Afghanistan continues to dominate global opium cultivation and production. Cultivation remains nearly three times the pre-2002 average. Currently donor grants from the international community finance more than half the Afghan government budget and 3/4’s of total public expenditures. The country is suffering from the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic. there have been a total of 53,000 plus cases and the total number of reported deaths is 2,237.

Afghan Govt Anti-Corruption Efforts. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) provided a 13-page letter to leading U.S. government officials about the current state of Afghan government anti-corruption efforts. Not exactly good news but there has been some cases of limited progress. (SIGAR, Nov 6, 2020).
https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/alerts/SIGAR-21-09-AL.pdf

Human Development. Lutfi Rahimi, a lecturer at the American University of Afghanistan, provides his perspective on four human development factors. A recent (2019) human development index (HDI) ranked Afghanistan 169th out of 187 counters and in the lowest group in the gender inequality index (GII). “Thinking More Deeply About Human Development in Afghanistan”, The Diplomat, December 29, 2020.

Rail Links With Iran Improve. A rail line was recently opened between the Iranian city of Haf to Herat in western Afghanistan. This will increase the economic and transportation ties between Iran and Afghanistan – improving the economic prospects for Afghanistan. See “Iran Rapidly Expanding Rail Links with Central Asia and Caucasus”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, December 15, 2020.

Books, Reports, and Publications

SIGAR Report. The Quarterly Report to Congress (Nov 2020) by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction is available on line. Pages 83-95 cover Afghanistan’s SOF units (ANASOC, GCPSU, and SMW). (PDF, 255 pages).
https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2020-10-30qr.pdf

Lead IG Report on OFS. The 22nd quarterly report submitted to Congress by the Lead Inspector General for Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS) summarizes the quarter’s (Jul – Aug – Sep 2020) key events and oversight of the CT and advising mission in Afghanistan. The 84-page PDF is available online. Bryce Klehm provides a condensed version of the report in his essay on the Lawfare Blog (Nov 30, 2020).

Report – History of U.S. Army in Afghanistan. The U.S. Army Center of Military History has published a report that shows how the United States Army balanced its ongoing commitment to combating terrorist and insurgent activity in post-Taliban Afghanistan with the expanding American war in Iraq. Operation Enduring Freedom, May 2005 – January 2009, CMH Pub 70-131-1, Dec 2020. Contains 88 pages, illustrations, tables, maps, and further readings.
https://history.army.mil/catalog/pubs/70/70-131.html

Paper on ISKP. “IS Khorasan, the US-Taliban Deal, and the Future of South Asian Security”, ORF Occasional Paper No. 289, December 2020, Observer Research Foundation, pdf, 40 pages. By Kabir Tanej.
https://www.orfonline.org/research/is-khorasan-the-us-taliban-deal-and-the-future-of-south-asian-security/

The Last Platoon. Bing West’s latest novel is about a platoon in Afghanistan working with the CIA. Read an excerpt from his book. (Military Times, Dec 15, 2020).

Paper – Civilian Death Toll via Airstrikes. Neta C. Crawford has penned a 10-page report entitled Afghanistan’s Rising Civilian Death Toll Due to Airstrikes, 2017-2020, Costs of War, Brown University, December 7, 2020.

Podcasts, Webcasts, and Videos

Video – Afghan Commando Training. NATO’s Resolute Support HQs has produced a short video about the 14-week long training program that Afghan Commandos complete before being assigned to a Commando kandak. (Dec 29, 2020, 2 mins).
https://www.facebook.com/ResoluteSupport/videos/837244076820531/

Video – Afghanistan: The French legacy in Kapisa province. A 17 minute long explanation of the French military deployment of troops to Kapisa from 2008 to 2012. France 24, April 12, 2020.

Podcast – Jack Keane on Afghanistan. Gen (Ret) Keane on troop withdrawals in Iraq and Afghanistan. See “Jack Keane against the cut and run from Afghanistan”, American Enterprise Institute (AEI), December 11, 2020. (Apple podcast).

Podcast – CIA Official Remembers a Devastating Day in Afghanistan. A former senior CIA intelligence service officer looks back to the day that seven CIA service members were killed by a suicide bomber in Afghanistan. CBS News, December 30, 2020. 34 minutes.

Podcast – A Sniper Section’s Fight in Ghazni. Master Sgt. Brody Hall was a sniper section leader in a scout platoon in the 173rd Airborne Brigade deployed to Afghanistan’s Ghazni province. He describes a fight that highlights a range of lessons about combat and the leadership of NCO’s in the Army. The Spear, Modern War Institute at West Point, December 31, 2020, 53 minutes.
https://mwi.usma.edu/podcast-the-spear-a-sniper-sections-fight-in-ghazni/

**********

Photo / Image: Afghan Commandos, SIGAR.

Dr. Richard D. Newton, an operational planner at the Special Operations Command Africa, has written a paper about Defense Institution Building (DIB). He describes how DIB helps “. . . to enhance the capacity of allies and partners to sustainably man, train, equip, and independently employ their own military and security forces in support of common strategic interests.

The author notes that Security Force Assistance (SFA), Foreign Internal Defense (FID), and Joint/Combined Exchange Training (JCETS) have a long history in the U.S. special operations community. However, he points out that these missions are often not effective in achieving paradigm shifts that cause organizational transformation.

In his 30-page paper, Dr. Newton describes the purpose of Defense Institution Building and how it is different from SFA, FID, and JCETs. The paper reviews the history of DIB, current literature on DIB, relevant doctrinal publications, and challenges to DIB programs.

He then goes on to recommend taking a design-thinking approach for “designing, developing, and implementing a sustainable DIB partnership with a willing nation.” Newton offers as an example the case study of the transformation of Romania’s special operations forces – which was a priority effort for the Special Operations Command Europe.

In the post 9/11 environment U.S. SOF was focused more at the tactical level (advising combat units) than at the national level (institution building). The author has seen a slow change in approach since 2010 – with an increased focus towards security cooperation intent on institution building. The author concludes his paper with . . . “Since 2015, design-thinking has offered SOF planners and commanders a practical tool for problem-solving in the human domain.”

Defense Institution Building . . . by Design
By Richard D. Newton, Ph.D.
Joint Special Operations University (JSOU)
Department of Strategic Studies
JSOU Press – Occasional Paper
December 2019
https://jsou.libguides.com/ld.php?content_id=51643902

Bio of Dr. Newton. Richard Newton has a long history in the special operations community. He served 22 years in the U.S. Air Force as a combat rescue and special operations helicopter pilot; as well as a combat aviation advisor, planner, and educator. Newton continued his service in the SOF community as a senior faculty member at the Joint Special Operations University. He is an educator, planner, researcher, and curriculum developer in the fields of air-ground integration, irregular and asymmetric warfare, and special operations.

The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) has published a new report on Afghanistan – with a focus on security sector assistance efforts. This 210-page report, published on June 14, 2019, is entitled Divided Responsibility: Lessons From U.S. Security Sector Assistance Efforts in Afghanistan.

The report  examines the various security sector assistance activities and programs undertaken by dozens of U.S. entities and international partners to develop the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), Ministry of Defense (MOD), and Ministry of Interior (MOI) since 2001. The report looks critically at five core SSA efforts: field advising, ministerial-level advising, equipping the force, U.S.-based training, and working as part of a NATO coalition.

The report describes how advisor and staff personnel were selected, trained, and assigned to fulfill these key functions. It also examines the consequences associated with the US and NATO approach to SSA in Afghanistan, such as not assigning organizations responsibility for key functions; implementing a command and control relationship that did not consistently link ministerial and tactical advising efforts; not having a comprehensive, enduring plan to guide all efforts; and relying on a NATO command that strained unity of effort and hindered the standardization of SSA activities.

Chapter 1: “Introduction”. Provides an overview for policy makers, explains what Security Sector Assistance is, and provides information on SSA’s role in U.S. history.

Chapter 2: “Field Advising”. Contains information and descriptions of the early Embedded Training Teams (ETTs), augmented Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), SFATs, SFAATs, SFABs (the early ones), and air advising.

Chapter 3: “Ministerial Advising”. Explains the role of the ministerial-level advisor, selection and training for advisors, and Afghan input to the advising and training process.

Chapter 4 : “Equipping the Force”. Covers the nuts and bolts (and processes) of providing equipment to the ANDSF.

Chapter 5: “U.S.-Based Training”. Explores the different programs used to train Afghan military personnel. This includes a section on the high rate of ‘AWOLs’ that disappear from U.S. training bases while attending training schools and courses.

Chapter 6: “By, With, and Through NATO”. Provides information of how NATO became involved with Afghanistan, the policies and processes that created challenges in establishing unity of effort, how the U.S. enabled and optimized NATO involvement in Afghanistan, and more.

Chapter 7: “Conclusions”. Each chapter ends with “Key Findings” and “Recommendations”. This chapter provides a summary of “Lessons” and “Recommendations”.

Chapter 8: “Appendices and Endnotes”. This extensive section provides the resources used to research Divided Responsibility: Lessons From U.S. Security Sector Assistance Efforts in Afghanistan . It provides an explanation of the methodology for writing the report and a listing of acronyms.

This document is a good read for those interested in security sector reform, security force assistance, or the effort to organize, equip, and train the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces.

To read or download (PDF) Divided Responsibility: Lessons From U.S. Security Sector Assistance Efforts in Afghanistan visit the website of SIGAR:
https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/lessonslearned/SIGAR-19-39-LL.pdf

**********

Photo: From the cover of the SIGAR report.

The 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade or 1st SFAB has completed its Afghanistan tour. It was in Afghanistan for much of 2018 with the mission to train, advise, and assist (TAA) the Afghan National Defense and Security  Forces (ANDSF). The deployment began in March 2018. The brigade and its many advisor teams redeployed back to their home base at Fort Benning, Georgia during the month of November 2018. The SFAB is a specialized conventional unit built to train, advise, assist, accompany, and enable (TA3E) partner nation forces.

Editorial Note: This article was first published on December 12, 2018. Since that date the Department of Defense released a report on Afghanistan on December 20, 2018 that provided updated information on the 1st SFAB’s deployment. This article has been updated with that new information.

Thus far, the brigade’s deployment has been judged as a success. While there are a lot of news reports about the 1st SFAB there is a distinct lack of details in regards to disposition and employment of the SFAB in Afghanistan. There is very little open source information available (for someone on the outside looking in) to make a realistic assessment. Certainly, the Army has captured a lot of lessons learned over the past year; and in time these will surface and become available to those without access to NIPR and SIPR. There were some bumps along the way. This article takes a close look at the establishment, pre-deployment training, and employment in Afghanistan of the 1st Security Force Assistance Battalion.

Reasons for an SFAB

Professional Advisory Corps. Past advising efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan involved the forming up of temporary advisor teams. A study of the U.S. military’s Security Force Assistance (SFA) efforts would reveal some success and some failures in U.S. advisory efforts; and the Iraq and Afghanistan experiences were not out of the norm. Over the past two decades individuals from different units would be selected to deploy to theater on a ‘put together’ advisory team. Sometimes units would be tasked with providing advisor teams – forming them up from within their organic personnel.

In Iraq the teams were usually called Military Transition Teams (MiTTs); although there were a variety of advisor teams – sometimes with different types of names. Later in the Iraq war standard brigade combat teams (BCTs) – designated as Advise and Assist Brigades or AABs – were tasked with the advisory mission. The AABs were augmented with 48 field grade officers.

In Afghanistan there have been an even larger variety of advisor teams – some tailored for general advising and others for a specific function. Early in the conflict the U.S. Embedded Training Teams (ETTs) of Task Force Phoenix worked with Afghan army and police units at kandak and district level. NATO countries also provided their version of advisor teams as well.  In 2012 – 2014 there was a big push of Security Force Assistance Advisory Teams (SFAATs); and later Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs). The 12- or 18-man SFAATs were working from Army corps and police zone down to kandak and district level.

However, a common denominator was that these advisor teams were mostly ad hoc formations. Many times deployed with no advisor, cultural, or language training. There was a rush to man the advisor teams and to deploy them to theater. Once the teams and advisor brigades completed their mission they returned to home station to carry on with their ‘real mission’.

The SFAB concept adopted by the U.S. Army in 2017 provides advisor teams on a permanent basis; a purpose-built organization designed for advising. The SFAB will be one of the initiatives the U.S. Army will use to build partner nation capacity. A permanent advisory corps is not a new concept – there were many supporters of a unit dedicated to advising, among them – John Nagl, a former infantry officer who served in Iraq. (Read his paper Institutionalizing Adaptation, CNAS, June 2007).

Retaining Experienced Advisors. Members of the advisor brigade will train, deploy, and then redeploy as part of an enduring organization. Ideally, the individuals will remain in the brigade, continue their advisor and language training, and redeploy once again to the same conflict or region of the world. This retains information at the individual and organizational level and eliminates the loss of continuity in the advising effort. Theoretically, the 1st SFAB, now that it is back at Fort Benning, would take a breath, refit, retrain, further develop its cultural, language, advisory skills, and other skills and then re-deploy to Afghanistan again.

Free Up BCTs. With the existence of the SFABs – once they are all up and running (2022) – the Army’s Brigade Combat Teams and divisional staffs will be partly relieved of the requirement to send advising and training teams to locations like Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. When a brigade combat team deployed to Afghanistan in the later stages of the war as an ad hoc SFAB it went with about 1,500 men; mostly officers and senior NCOs. The remainder of the 3,600 to 4,500 personnel (lower ranking Soldiers) stayed home. The SFABs would allow the BCTs to train for their wartime mission.

“The SFAB gives us purpose-built formations designed to execute the critical mission of security force assistance without having to rip apart conventional BCTs.”

Chief of Staff of the Army General Mark Milley, February 8, 2018.

BCT Generation. The SFABs, if necessary, could transition to a full-strength brigade combat team in a time of general war. The officers and senior NCOs are already in place. It would be a matter of flushing out the ranks with more personnel and units with equipment. Although not an easy task to do it certainly provides an expedited means of establishing six more BCTs. Or at least quicker than starting from scratch.

SFAB Concept

Need for Professional Advisors. The establishment of the SFABs was the brainchild of General Mark Milley, the Chief of Staff of the Army. In October of 2015 he began to vocalize the need for a professional advisory corps. In May 2016 the Army announced it would form up six Security Force Assistance Brigades. The new units would institutionalize the train, advise, and assist mission.  In February 2017 the Army provided more information on the six SFABs and stated that an academy would stand up to train the members of these specialized units. Initial plans called for a 529-man SFAB but this was later increased to 800.

Critics. Many critics of this concept believe that conventional forces were already trained up sufficiently and could easily flex to an advisory mission. However, Milley had first-hand experience of the ad hoc SFAATs and SFABs at work in Afghanistan during his tour as commander of ISAF Joint Command and was on solid ground with his proposed plan.

SFAC and 6 SFABS. The Army plans to have a Security Force Assistance Command (SFAC) and six Security Force Assistance Brigades. This will allow the regular BCTs to concentrate on the ‘near peer’ competition and the ‘big fight’. [1]

Doctrine and TTPs

The SFAB is a new organization and the Army needed a pub for it. In November 2017 it published a draft pub for the SFAB entitled ATP 3-96.1, Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB). In May 2018 the final version was published. There is no shortage of publications, reports, and lessons learned on the Security Force Assistance mission in Afghanistan. See Annotated Bibliography for Resolute Support.

Establishment of 1st SFAB

The 1st SFAB was formed up in 2017 on Kelley Hill at Fort Benning, Georgia. It was officially activated on February 8, 2018. Throughout 2017 the Army recruited personnel to fill in the ranks of the SFAB. Before joining the unit the Soldiers had to undergo a two-day candidate assessment process or SFAB selection. Once joining the unit the personnel were integrated into the ongoing unit training program.

Leadership. The command team of the 1st SFAB has a lot of experience. The commander, BG Scott Jackson (he was promoted while in Afghanistan) had already served as a brigade commander at Fort Stewart, Georgia. The Command Sergeant Major Christopher Gunn is a former BCT CSM. The battalion commanders and staff were selected by a panel of general officers and had already served in similar positions within a brigade. Many of the senior NCOs have had multiple combat deployments and previous advisor experience. There are a sprinkling of SF and Ranger officers and NCOs in the SFAB as well.

Recruitment. There was and still is a big effort to recruit for the SFABs. A number of incentives are being offered to include bonuses, accelerated promotions, and choice of assignments for post-SFAB duty. Most of the positions within the SFAB are for officers and senior NCOs; it is definitely a rank-heavy unit. Army news releases would tell you that everyone within the SFAB was a volunteer. And for the most part that is likely true, but an earlier deployment of the 1st SFAB prompted some ‘non-volunteer’ assignments to the unit – as some Soldiers from the 10th Mountain Division discovered.

Logistics and Equipment. The SFAB had to set up house in a new compound on Fort Benning, receive incoming personnel, and develop and implement a training plan. In addition, it had to receive and process the brigade’s equipment and vehicles. It is estimated that the SFAB received more than 22,000 pieces of equipment. Some equipment was the standard Army stuff that the Soldiers had seen before; however, the SFAB was also given some ‘new stuff’. The new stuff – like off-the-shelf radios and networking equipment (SNAP and GRRIP) – required additional training. New radios (AN/PRC 148 and AN/PRC-152A) had to be issued and trained on by the Soldiers.

Initial Hiccups at Startup

But Isn’t Advising an SF Mission? Some critics – both within Special Forces and the conventional Army at large – felt that the advisory function was covered by U.S. Army Special Forces and that an SFAB unit was not needed. U.S. Army Special Forces has several primary missions – COIN, UW, DA, FID, SR, and SFA. Foreign Internal Defense (FID) and Security Force Assistance (SFA) are missions SF teams are ideally trained and equipped for.

Some SF officers worried that the SFABs would ‘steal’ the FID mission; but other SF officers said that it was an idea whose time has come. It would appear, however, that many senior leaders within the Special Forces community are on board with the SFAB concept. [2]

“There is no intent to replace Special Forces, or to compete with Special Forces.”

Army Chief of Staff General Mark Milley, October 2017.

Stealing the Heritage of SF? The SFAB concept suffered a temporary setback in acceptance by some in the Special Forces community when the ‘beret flap‘ transpired. [3] This unfortunate incident didn’t need to happen. Certainly there were some missteps on the part of big Army in this respect; but quick action by General Milley and the 1st SFAB was able to put that fire out (sort of). The Army put out a press release in February 2018 to try and dampen the angst in the SF community. 

“The SFABs are not designed for irregular warfare, unconventional warfare, special reconnaissance, counterterrorism or any of the other missions that are unique to Special Forces. Only Special Forces have the capability to do those missions. Foreign Internal Defense (FID) and Security Force Assistance are the only mission areas that overlap. SFABs and Special Forces will be complementary. SFABs provide training in certain key competencies of conventional forces such as armor, artillery, or aviation for which Special Forces are too engaged with other missions to do on a large scale.”

“1st SFAB hosts activation ceremony: Heraldry announced”, U.S. Army, February 8, 2018.

Advising Capacity. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq soon exceeded the advising capacity of U.S. Army Special Forces and conventional ad hoc advisor teams were sent into the fray. The bottom line is that in order to keep U.S. combat forces from fighting other nations wars the foreign military forces need to be trained, advised, and assisted. There are just not enough SF ‘A teams’ to do this large-scale advising mission with indigenous forces.

What About the RAFs? Army BCTs have been implementing the Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) concept for a few years now. Where does the SFAB fit in? The BCTs doing the RAF mission in Asia and Europe are more focused on “larger-scale combined maneuver training with conventional forces of allies and partners”; although the BCT with the Africa RAF mission is doing more small-team advisory missions. So, it is possible that one of the six SFABs will have an Africa orientation. 

Training

Home Station Training. Every unit that deploys to a combat zone has a checklist of pre-deployment training that has to be accomplished. This is usually done at home station (in this case Fort Benning). The usual events include range firing, medevac procedures, call for fire, small unit tactics, etc. Some unit members went through the Close Combat Tactical Training at the Clark Simulation Center at Ft. Benning. In addition to the ‘battlefield survival training’, some members of the SFAB received weeks of language, culture, and foreign weapons training.

Equipment Training. The SFAB was provided with new communications radios, UAVs, along with a variety of other equipment that had to be tested and for which training had to be conducted. Select members of the advisory teams trained on the RQ-11B Raven and RQ-20 Puma unmanned aircraft systems for 15 days at Ft. Benning.

Unit FTX. In October 2017 the 1st SFAB conducted a combined field training exercise at Fort Benning, Georgia that included all six battalions and the brigade headquarters. The exercise gave the SFAB the opportunity to focus on advise and assist tasks as members of advisory teams.

MATA. Some SFAB Soldiers attended the Combat Advisor Training Course (CATC) at the Military Advisor Training Academy (MATA) that was stood up in 2017 at Fort Benning, Georgia. Although the combat advisor course was intended to be six weeks long, the 1st SFAB Soldiers are reported to have attended an abbreviated two-week long course. The first course appears to have taken place in August with subsequent courses conducted through the remainder of the year. Two weeks just doesn’t seem like a long time to learn how to become an advisor. This is especially true when it comes to understanding the more complex aspects of human interaction (Kauffman, 2018) or how to leverage resources to persuade a counterpart into a specific course of action (Loidolt and Ballanco, 2018).

JRTC. The SFAB conducted a Joint Readiness Training Center rotation at Fort Polk in January 2018. Usually JRTC rotations involve training in conventional warfighting tactics and functions that sharpen the skills of BCTs – with a focus on either counterinsurgency or ‘near-peer’ conflict. The conventional BCTs usually execute a decisive action training exercise that integrates forcible entry, defensive, and offensive operations.

Tailored Rotation. However, the 1st SFAB rotation (18-03) was specifically tailored for their Afghan deployment through various training, advising, assisting, accompanying, and enabling scenarios.  The month-long event was geared for advisors and it put the advisor teams through several event lanes with different situational training events. A major training topic was the use of interpreters and interaction with Afghan counterparts. Other training activities provided opportunities to ‘negotiate’ with Afghan counterparts. About 1,000 Soldiers from the 10th Mountain Division based at Fort Drum, New York assisted the 1st SFAB with their mission readiness exercise. They served as exercise support and ANA role players.

CPX. While at JRTC the brigade and battalion staffs took part in a four-day Command Post Exercise designed to train the staffs on mission command as well as advising Afghan partners. The CPX exercised the SFAB’s staff on internal staff processes required for planning and preparing for current and future operations.

SFA Academy. Part of the JRTC training included the Security Force Assistance Academy – focused on Afghan culture and language. The course can be tailored for the unit attending. It is usually 8-10 days long.

Camp Buehring, Kuwait. The combat advisor teams of the 1st SFAB began their deployment in February and March 2018 – some of the personnel passing through Camp Buehring, Kuwait first. While in Kuwait selected personnel trained on the Egress Rollover Mine Resistant Ambush Protector (MRAP) Simulator and on Small Unmanned Arial Systems (SUAS) and Counter Unmanned Arial Systems (CUAS).

Force Disposition in Afghanistan

Once arriving in country in March 2018 the teams were spread across Afghanistan. The SFAB brigade headquarters was at FOB Lightening in Gardez in eastern Afghanistan. FOB Lightening is also the home base for NATO’s Task Force Southeast. Adjacent to FOB Lightening is FOB Thunder, the base of the ANA’s 203rd Corps. The subordinate battalions were dispersed across Afghanistan among the Train, Advise, and Assist Commands (TAACs) and worked primarily with brigade staffs.

The 1st SFAB brigade headquarters worked with the 203rd Corps. Assisting Task Force Southeast, the SFAB HQs worked along side their Afghan counterparts across all of the corps sections – advising and assisting where needed. At this level there are plenty of meetings, conferences, planning sessions, and daily battle update briefings to attend. These events are usually followed with discreet one-on-on meetings with Afghan counterparts. Typical of the type of work done with the 203rd Corps is the job description of Major Chris Welsh – who served as an advisor to Afghan intelligence personnel and found himself assisting in the 203rd’s Joint Operations Center (JOC).

The 1st Battalion was at Forward Operating Base Gamberi advising the 201st ANA Corps. The 201st Corps operates in Nuristan, Kunar, Nangarhar, Laghman, Panjshar, Parwan, and Kapisa. FOB Gamberi is the home of Train, Advise, and Assist Command – East (TAAC-East).

The 2nd Battalion was positioned in Kandahar province in southern Afghanistan. The battalion was tasked with advising elements of the ANA’s 205th Corps spread across three or four provinces. TAAC-South is the command in southern Afghanistan.

3rd Squadron, 1st SFAB was also based at FOB Lightning – from which it conducted ‘fly to advise‘ missions elsewhere in the 203rd Corps’ area of operations – such as FOB Altimur and other locations.

4th Battalion, 1st SFAB was based at Camp Arena in Herat province. This is the home of Train, Advise, and Assist Command – West (TAAC-West) which is led by the Italians. It is also where the Afghan National Army’s 207th Corps and the Afghan National Police’s 606 Zone is located. The 207th’s area included Ghor, Badghis, Farah, and Herat provinces.

The 5th Battalion was supposed to be in the south of Afghanistan but was diverted to assist in securing Kabul. The capital city was experiencing a high level of bombings conducted by the Taliban and Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP). The battalion advised Afghan police and army units responsible for the security of Kabul. While most of the SFAB advisor teams were advising the Afghan National Army (ANA), the 5th Battalion, due to its mission in Kabul, worked with many Afghan National Police (ANP) units that focused on the airport, roadways, and installation security. Initially five advisor teams were assigned to Kabul; but this number grew with the addition of eight more SFAB teams to combat the high profile attacks in the capital city.

The 6th Battalion worked in Helmand province advising the 215th Corps as well as other ANDSF organizations in other locations. The leading unit in Helmand province is the Marine Corps Task Force Southwest.

Some of the small advisory teams of the SFAB did not neatly follow the deployment and disposition as outlined above – there were some located in TAAC North’s area as well as ‘functional teams’ that traveled or worked throughout the country as the need arose. Some news reports stated that a few advisory teams were attached to NATO Special Operations Component Command – Afghanistan (NSOCC-A) assisting in the training of Afghan Commandos – although there is little information available in the public domain on that topic.

A DoD report issued in December 2018 stated that U.S. advisors ‘touched’ eight ANA brigades and 34 kandaks. SFAB Logistics Advisor Teams (LATs) provided training and assistance at all levels of the ANDSF. Of the 36 Combat Advising Teams (CATs), more than half were advising kandaks (probably more than one), several were advising brigades, and others were at the regional training centers.

Advising Below Corps Level

In January 2015 with the end of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission and beginning of the Resolute Support Mission (RSM) advising below Army corps and police zone level ceased. Tactical advising – a lower echelons of the ANDSF – was conducted by special operations forces and the Train, Advise, and Assist Command – Air (TAAC-Air). In time, it became apparent that some ANA brigades needed some help and Resolute Support HQs decided to employ Expeditionary Advisory Packages (EAPs) to deploy to Afghan brigade level on a temporary and as needed basis. The deployment of the 1st SFAB hopefully provided a more consistent advisory effort than the EAPs could provide at brigade level.

Advising at Kandak Level

The initial impression provided by the US Army while the 1st SFAB was forming up and training was that the 36 plus advisor teams would be located with and working at the kandak (battalion) level. This proved not to be the case once deployed to Afghanistan; at least not initially. Some news sources indicated that by June 2018 SFAB combat advisor teams were ’embedded’ with 26 Afghan army kandaks. This number likely grew as time went on. The term ’embedded’ can mean different things – it is likely that most of the teams were not truly ‘embedded‘. A DoD report issued in December 2018 indicates that teams did advise 34 kandaks.

According to ATP 3-96.1, Security Force Assistance Brigade, (May 2018) an SFAB is designed to field 36 advising teams at the company echelon and below. It also has the capability to form additional teams from its battalion and brigade staffs. These twelve-man teams have a variety of specialists in the operations, intelligence, fires, explosives, medical, logistics, communications, and maintenance fields. Some functional advisory elements were task organized to meet requirements and did not necessarily follow the 12-man construct.

There were a number of factors that limited advising at the kandak level during the initial deployment of the 1st SFAB in Afghanistan. One was the lack of adequate logistical preparation – to include lodging, transportation, and force protection. A second factor was the ‘vetting’ of Afghan units at kandak level to ensure that the insider threat would be mitigated. This included a process where Afghan and contract counterintelligence (CI) teams would interview brigade and kandak members – certainly a lengthy process.

The 1st SFAB stance is there was no delay due to CI vetting; that the kandak advisor teams had to wait until corps and brigade advisor teams were in place and functioning. That the delay in fielding advisor teams at kandak level was a natural progression from top down – and the CI vetting of Afghan units was slowly advancing downward to kandak level as necessary.

One of the more important functions of advising at the kandak level is to assist with synchronization of the effort. There are US and NATO advisors at the ministries and corps. In addition, some brigades are advised on a semi-permanent basis. But it is difficult to see if there is any positive effect of the advising effort at the institutional or operation level taking place at the kandak level. This is where the ‘fly-to-advise’ mission at the kandak level is helpful – having coalition eyes on the ground gauging the success of the advising effort at the higher levels. [4]

The frequency of advising at the kandak level is limited by a number of factors. Is the forward base secure enough for rotary wing to land in and to put a small contingent of advisors on the ground? Has the unit been vetted from a security standpoint (insider threat)? Other factors include the availability of an advisor team (there are more than 36 kandaks in the ANA), availability of helicopters, availability of ‘guardian angels’.

Fly to Advise

Initially most of the advisor teams from the 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade were working at corps or brigade level – but in time some were advising and assisting at the kandak level. The Afghan kandaks are usually located at forward bases which means the advisor teams have the option to embed full-time with the kandaks (as Special Forces teams are known to do, as the early Embedded Training Teams (ETTs) in the early 2000’s did, or as the SFAATs of the 2012-2014 era did). Usually the 1st SFAB teams did not embed – they visited on a periodic basis – (once referred to as Level II advising or Expeditionary Advising Package). The periodic visits could last for a couple of hours or several days. These visits are called “Fly to Advise” missions. [5] The latest DoD IG OFS report indicates that as many as 80% of the advisory missions to kandaks were ‘fly to advise’.

The majority of the fly-to-advise advisor teams were based on major U.S. or NATO bases and probably covered down on more than one kandak. The interaction at kandak level provides a glimpse – if only fleeting – of what is going on at that specific kandak.

Logistics Preparation

Some early news reports of the deployment indicate that the logistical preparation for the arrival of the 1st SFAB was not quite what it should have been. Housing, vehicles, and other aspects of logistics support are reported to have been inadequately prepared. Small, independent advisor teams spread out over a large area tend to rely on other units rather than their own internal and organic support. Sometimes the coordination and preparation of receiving advisor teams falls short; which, apparently happened in some cases with the 1st SFAB advisor teams. Many times the equipment, supplies, comms gear,  and logistics caught up with the deployed teams.

Traveling the Roads

1st SFAB advisor teams working with higher level ANDSF units had the convenience (sometimes) of being located on bases adjacent to their ANDSF counterparts. Sometimes teams did a ‘fly-to-advise’ mission. But many times the advisor teams had to travel the roads. Improvised explosive devices set along the roadside are a constant threat to advisor teams traveling to and from the ANDSF location. To mitigate this the teams would either fly to that location or ride in armored vehicles (MRAPs, MATVs, etc.). In addition, units like the 509th Clearance Company, 5th Engineer Battalion would conduct route clearance missions ensuring safe travels along Afghanistan’s roads. [6]

Training TTPs

When a unit deploys to Afghanistan it will usually fall in on the TTPs of the previous unit that it replaced. But sometimes the new unit will develop some new TTPs that enhance its ability to do its mission. One such TTP is how the 1st SFAB produced videos to help train the ANDSF. The videos are a step-by-step method of training that are about five to ten minutes long and can be run on a laptop. Training topics include vehicle maintenance, functions check on weapons, how to set up a vehicle control point, and more. [7]

Insider Threat

Advisors in Afghanistan are at risk due to the insider threat that has taken the lives of many U.S. and NATO service members. In 2012 the number of attacks by Afghan security force members against Coalition service members reached its height. Advisor missions screeched to a halt until ISAF could develop and implement some procedures that could mitigate the threat. One of the steps taken was to implement the Guardian Angel process; where Soldiers were tasked with protection of advisor teams.

1st Battalion, 28th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Infantry Division took up this force protection mission and accompanied 1st SFAB to Afghanistan. The attached Soldiers from 1-28th coordinated and provided security for the combat advisor teams so the advisors could focus on interaction with their Afghan counterparts.

One member of the 1-28th, Corporal Joseph Maciel, died in July 2018 from wounds sustained during an apparent insider attack at Tarin Kowt airfield in Uruzgan province, Afghanistan while attached to 2nd Battalion, 1st SFAB. Command Sergeant Major Timothy Bolyard of 3rd Squadron, 1st SFAB, was killed in September 2018 by an Afghan policeman at Camp Maiwand – the base for 4th Brigade, 203rd Corps (located at the former FOB Shank in Logar province).

Lessons Learned

The Army is famous for publishing ‘Lessons Learned’ and there are thousands of papers and publications with these lessons documented from the deployments of Army units to Afghanistan over the past 17 years. Many of these are on the topic of training the ANDSF. [8] No doubt there will be – in time – plenty of lessons learned from the 1st SFAB deployment. Unfortunately, many of these will have a classification of FOUO or higher and will not be available for public reading. Hopefully the lessons learned will not end up being just ‘lessons observed’. However, some information is slowly seeping out into the public domain and on social media. A few are noted below.

Rush to Deploy. The 1st SFAB was supposed to have a full year to gear up for its mission. However, the Trump administration’s new South Asia Strategy included an increase in U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan with an emphasis on advising at the tactical level – and the 1st SFAB got its deployment moved up so it would arrive prior to the 2018 summer fighting season. Unfortunately, this shortened its stand-up period by several months and the six-week long advisor academy (MATA) was reduced to two-weeks.

“As we began our training last summer, the United States announced the South Asia Strategy, a critical component of which was increased tactical-level advising. The Army directed our units to prepare for an early 2018 deployment to support that strategy, and we modified our recruiting and training programs to ensure we would be ready.”

Colonel Scott Jackson, 1st SFAB Commander, speaking during a teleconference from Kabul, Afghanistan on June 13, 2018.

Mortar Training. 1st SFAB advisors note that more time is needed to train up the ANDSF on the employment of mortars. This means more pre-deployment training on mortars and perhaps the attachment of additional infantry specialists. [9] 

Afghan Logistics. The Afghans still haven’t figured out how to run their logistics enterprise. The 1st SFAB found they needed to stress logistics training with the ANDSF. This should not have been a surprise – mountains of paperwork and terabytes of reports have documented the logistical woes of the logistical system from ministry level down to the kandak and police district beginning in 2002 up to the present day.

Leaving the Wire – Not so Much. The 1st SFAB found that it is not ‘going out on patrols’ as much as it had anticipated. This is probably due to the fact that much of the train, advise, and assist mission is on staff functions such as personnel, intelligence, operations planning, logistics, and communications – in the past referred to as ‘Functionally-Based Security Force Assistance’ or FB-SFA. These training activities are best done at the corps, brigade, or kandak headquarters on secure Afghan bases. (Of course, there is travel required to get to these bases). Most, except perhaps TAA by NSOCC-A and TAAC-Air, security force assistance activities now done in Afghanistan is on functional processes and systems and less on employment of the ANDSF in combat operations.

Old Problems. Some things never change in Afghanistan. The 1st SFAB found that many of the problems found in the Afghan security forces a decade ago continue to exist today. These include poor logistics, lack of communication, sustainment, ammunition resupply, vehicle repair, corruption, equipment maintenance, mission command, and a reliance on static checkpoints.

SFAB Advisory Network. One of the more important contributions the advisor teams could make is to help the Afghan chain of command resolve problems at the kandak level. Since advisor teams were observing the situation at the kandak level issues could be passed up the SFAB advisor network to advisor teams working at brigade and corps level. When the SFABs and SFAATs were deployed in 2012-2014 this was referred to as the “OC Net”; with hard to solve problems ending up at the Security Force Assistance Center (SFAC) in Kabul.

“By coming out here at the kandak level, we’re really integrating that advising network at all levels to make sure everything is synchronized and everyone is talking. That’s what really makes this mission unique.”

SFC Jeremiah Velex, Combat Advisor Team 1312, 3rd Squadron, 1st SFAB, Nov 5, 2018.

Flexibility. The SFAB deployed over 60 advisory elements throughout Afghanistan. Most advisor teams were 12 personnel strong although there were certainly smaller specialized advisory elements. The brigade had advisor elements with every Train, Advise, and Assist Command (TAAC) as well as with the Task Forces (TFs). Some teams operated at the corps level and in the Regional Military Training Centers (RMTC) while others were at brigade and kandak level.

The SFAB demonstrated the flexibility to tailor the advisory approach to changing ground conditions and provide advisor teams where it was needed. Midway through its deployment the brigade shifted assets to the Regional Military Training Centers (RMTCs) and the Kabul Security Force. Whether this was where the advisory teams were needed or if it was easier to support the teams at this location is a valid question.

ANDSF Reliance on Air Power. The inclination of the Afghan army in the conduct of offensive operations has been always to request and wait for air support from the U.S. (and now from the Afghan Air Force). This is still true today. The Afghan Air Force is slowly coming up to speed in its capability to support the army and police.

What Has the 1st SFAB Accomplished in Afghanistan?

There is not a lot of substantive news reports about the 1st SFAB in Afghanistan. Very few embeds by the media have taken place so the news stories on the mil blogs are quite infrequent. The US Army certainly has been active in spreading the ‘official’ word – providing vignettes showing that the advisor teams are doing great work. Some of the news stories provided by DoD and the U.S. Army indicate that the SFAB advisor teams assisted the Afghan National Army in the following areas.

• Integration of Afghan air and ground assets
• Logistical planning
• Operational planning
• Establishing or assisting in Artillery Leaders Courses
• Training in land navigation

The presence of combat advisor teams at kandak and brigade level certainly provided an enhanced level of awareness on the status of the ANDSF. After the SFAATs of the 2012-2014 era were pulled off kandaks and brigades the accuracy of reporting from the Afghan army went downhill quickly. So did the combat effectiveness of those units. The ability of an advisor team to observe a kandak (even for a short period of time) is invaluable to assessing the status of the ANA.

The Chairman of the Chiefs of Joint Staff General Joe Dunford visited the SFAB in Afghanistan. Dunford is no stranger to the Security Force Assistance mission in Afghanistan. He was the commander of ISAF during the transition of U.S forces from combat operations to the functionally-based security force assistance mission. He seemed pleased with what he saw in the SFABs accomplishments.

“I am actually very encouraged by all the feedback from the Afghans and the SFAB. We have the right organizational construct for 2018, and the advisors we are bringing in are the right people, at the right level, with the right training.”

Gen Joe Dunford, FOB Gamberi, Afghanistan, March 21, 2018.

Conclusion

Using the information currently available it appears that the 1st SFAB had a successful deployment. The brigade formed, trained up for the mission, and deployed advisor teams across the country of Afghanistan. The SFAB deployed both ground-maneuver-focused teams as well as specialty teams focused on engineering, field artillery, intelligence, communications, and logistics. Many of these teams very likely improved the capability of their advised units to fight the Taliban. The impact, however, should not be overstated. The SFAB likely made an ‘incremental difference’ during its deployment; not a ‘strategic difference” The Afghan conflict is still ongoing and will continue for a long time.

“The natural question that comes after any combat deployment is ‘did I make a difference’. I will tell you, looking across the entire theater the last nine months, the answer is yes.”

General Scott Jackson, Fort Benning, December 3, 2018.

The employment of a professional advisor unit in Afghanistan, whose personnel were selected and trained for their job, is a step in the right direction for the U.S. Army. Hopefully the 2nd SFAB will integrate the lessons learned from the 1st SFAB deployment and continue with the fielding of professional combat advisors to Afghanistan. 

Footnotes:

[1] For more on the rationale for SFABs see “All Things SFAB – Explainer of Security Force Assistance Brigades”, SOF News, October 10, 2017.

[2] For SF acceptance of the SFAB concept see “SOF and the Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs)”, SOF News, June 21, 2017.

[3] See “Beret for Soldiers of 1st SFAB – Concern in SF Community”, SOF News, October 29, 2017.

[4] There are three levels of advising in Afghanistan.
www.afghanwarnews.info/sfa/levels-of-advising.htm

[5] See Advising at the Corps and Below, Soldiers ensure Afghans are ready to fight, Army.mil, November 5, 2018.
https://www.army.mil/article/213367

[6] See “Home in time for the holidays”, Guidon, November 29, 2018 for more about the 509th Clearance Company assisting the 1st SFAB.

[7] For more on training videos see “1st SFAB Soldiers produce videos to help train Afghan defense forces”, Army Public Affairs, October 23, 2018.

[8]  See Reconstructing the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), September 2017, 283 pages.
https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/lessonslearned/SIGAR-17-62-LL.pdf

[9] For the need to emphasize mortar and logistics training see “Afghan Forces Need More Mortar Training, Army Advisors Say”, Military.com, August 29, 2018.

References:

News Reports about 1st SFAB
http://www.afghanwarnews.info/sfa/1st-SFAB-news.htm

1st Security Force Assistance Brigade – Fort Benning
https://www.benning.army.mil/Tenant/1-SFAB/

1st SFAB Facebook
https://www.facebook.com/1SFAB/

1st SFAB Flickr
https://www.flickr.com/photos/1sfab/

1st SFAB DVIDS
https://www.dvidshub.net/unit/1sfab

Videos:

November 13, 2018. Shoulder to Shoulder, U.S. Army, 5 mins. An explanation of the 1st SFAB’s mission in Afghanistan.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UaP13PaWiEo

June 12, 2018. Assistance Brigade Commander Provides Resolute Support Update, Defense.gov, 34 mins. Army Col. Scott Jackson, 1st SFAB cdr, briefs Pentagon reporters on 1st SFAB in Afghanistan (100-day mark).
https://dod.defense.gov/Videos/videoid/607256/

March, 6, 2018. 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade, U.S. Army. A five-minute long video explaining the training and mission of the 1st SFAB.
www.sof.news/video/video-1st-sfab/

Photos:

All photos from U.S. Army or DoD, 2017 – 2018.

SFAB Video. The Security Force Assistance Brigades of the U.S. Army are specialized conventional units built to train, advise, assist, accompany and enable our multinational partners. Watch this one-minute long video explaining the SFABs. (U.S. Army, March 11, 2018).

www.youtube.com/watch?v=XlJdAzUxEL8

Video 1st SFAB – the U.S. Army has published a 5-minute long video about the 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade. The 1st SFAB was established in the summer of 2017, received intensive training in the advise and assist mission, and has now deployed to Afghanistan.

www.youtube.com/watch?v=OB9ITFT1n9Q

SOF News Update 20180302 – New rifle for the Army, 1st SFAB, Stan McChrystal on Afghanistan and CT, Operation Gunnerside, Afghan GCPSU growing, book reviews, lasers for AC-130, Gary Rose, expeditionary advising, Gov Greitens in hot water, GB Gazette, SOF’s WMD mission, CANSOF and intel, and more.

New Rifle for the Army? The Department of Defense has established a task force to make American small arms more lethal – giving grunts an extra advantage in the close fight. The intent is to have U.S. infantrymen be able to overmatch any adversary. Included in this study is the possibility of a new rifle to replace the M16 rifle and M4 carbine. Read more in “Combat Troops Have Been Complaining about the M4 and M16 for Years. Now The Pentagon is Doing Something About It”, Task and Purpose, February 28, 2018.

SFAB – New Kid on the Block. The 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB) has arrived in Afghanistan. Formed up just last August 2017 – the unit has gone through an intensive training program to gear it up to provide 36 combat advisor teams across Afghanistan. Tom McCuin, a retired Army CA / PA officer provides his thoughts on the Army’s newest unit in “Training Missions Overseas – Army Puts an End to Overseas Advisor Role Debate”, ClearanceJobs.com, February 27, 2018.

Operation Gunnerside – 75th Anniversary. Norwegian commandos executed an extremely significant and dangerous raid to deny the Nazis of heavy water that could be used to manufacture an atomic bomb. Read more (Scientific American, Feb 23, 2018).

Expeditionary Combat Medic Program. The Army just finished a pilot program for a new medical course to prepare medics to provide treatment in future battles with near-peer enemies. Read “Combat medics train to keep the wounded alive beyond the ‘golden hour'”, Army Times, March 1, 2018.

Review of New Bo Gritz Movie. Peter Bradshaw takes a peak at the new movie (Jan 2018) about former Green Beret and highly-decorated Vietnam veteran in “Erase and Forget review – real-life Rambo finally gets his own movie”, The Guardian, March 2, 208.

Money Boost for USSOCOM. The US Special Operations Command will increase its personnel ranks with about another 1,700 bringing its total to about 71,200. It will also pick up more money for equipment, base funding, and development. Read “Big SOCOM Budget Boost Goes to People, AI – & More”, Breaking Defense, March 1, 2018.

Afghan GCPSU Grows. The Afghan Ministry of Interior’s General Command Police Special Units is continuing to grow. The largest group of students in history recently graduated from the 26-week Special Police Qualification Course at the Afghan Special Police Training Center in Kabul, Afghanistan. The graduates will fill out the existing National Mission Units of the GCPSU as well as provide police for three new NMUs soon to be established. (NSOCC-A, Feb 22, 2018).

“The Guy With the Marker” and the Whiteboard Solution. This is an excellent article on how to solve problems. Through out MDMP and use a whiteboard. “The Whiteboard Solution”, Maximum Disclosure, March 2, 2018.

Proceedings Podcast. A Navy SEAL – Colin Supko – talks about his combat experience and how it’s served him as he created Patriot List, his startup business. Real Clear Defense, March 2, 2018.

School Shootings and Sheepdogs. Erik Prince, founder of Blackwater, provides his perspective on school shootings and methods of preventing them in “Sheepdogs Wanted”, RealClearPolitics, March 1, 2018.

USSOCOM’s WMD Mission. The U.S. Special Operations Command is now in the lead for the counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction mission. Some SOF leaders are scrambling to figure out how to do this mission with the resources currently available. Read “SOCOM Grappling With New Counter-WMD Mission”, Military.com, March 1, 2018.

Navy SEALs and Trump’s Wall. A Fox News contributor stated that Navy SEALs were unable to breach prototypes for the proposed U.S.-Mexico border wall in test scenarios. However, the folks at NSW Command said no SEALs were involved in the testing. (The Hill, Mar 1, 2018).

New Commander for SOJTF-A. It looks like an Air Force two-star will be commanding the Special Operations Joint Task Force – Afghanistan. Major General Albert Elton has been selected to command the SOF unit the commands U.S. and other coalition SOF units in Afghanistan. Read his bio here:
www.af.mil/About-Us/Biographies/Display/Article/466544/brigadier-general-albert-m-buck-elton-ii/

Gary Rose – SF Officer and MoH Recipient. Gary Rose was awarded the Medal of Honor for his heroic actions during the Vietnam War. Read an account of his story in a recent article in the March – April 2018 issue of Military Review.

New Senior NCO for Army SOA. The Army’s Special Operations community has a new top enlisted man. Read “Army Special Operations Aviation Command welcomes new top NCO”, The Fayetteville Observer, February 22, 2018.

Expeditionary Advising in Iraq. Three Army officers with recent experience in Iraq outline how their unit providing advise and assistance to Iraq forces during the initial phase to take Mosul from the Islamic State. Read “Expeditionary Advising: Enabling Iraqi Operations from the Gates of Baghdad through Eastern Mosul”, Small Wars Journal, February 22, 2018.

Gov Greitens Indicted. Former Navy SEAL Eric Greitens has run afoul of the law – something about a compromising photo of a women with whom he had an affair with. Read “Missouri Gov. Greitens, a former Navy SEAL, indicted”, Navy Times, February 23, 2018.

Video – The Road Not Taken. Book author and military historian Max Boot takes part in a panel discussion with Peter Bergen about his new book entitled The Road Not Taken: Edward Lansdale and the American Tragedy in Vietnam, New America, February 22, 2018 (1 hour).
www.youtube.com/watch?v=oNQMScCTKvM

CANSOF and Intel. The Canadian Special Operations Forces Command has awarded a number of contracts to firms that provide intelligence services. Read more in “Canada is using private intelligence contractors for its special forces”, Vice News, March 1, 2018.

Lasers for AC-130 Gunship? The Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) is looking to put lasers on gunships. AFSOC commander Lt. Gen. Brad Webb spoke to reporters about the program. “AFSOC Boss Cautiously Optimistic Laser Program Will Move Forward”, Air Force Magazine, February 22, 2018.

Green Beret Foundation Gazette. The biweekly newsletter has been emailed and posted online. Stories related to the Special Forces community, upcoming fundraising events, SF retirees running for Congress, 2018 Army Spouse of the Year, and more. The Green Beret Foundation’s bi-weekly newsletter is edited and published by Katelyn Haglof – a niece of SSG Matthew Pucino.

Stan McChrystal on Afghanistan and CT. The Yale University Jackson Institute for Global Affairs hosted a panel discussion about Afghanistan and counterterrorism on February 23, 2018. The two key participants were former Secretary of State John Kerry and General (Ret) Stan McChrystal. Watch the 1 1/2 hour long video.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wGA48Lb72_c

Photo Credit. The top photo is of a memorial flight to honor the crew and passengers lost when a 1st SOS MC-130E crashed during an exercise – killing eight crew members and 15 passengers.

SFAB Selection – The 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade (1st SFAB) has a two-day candidate assessment process for its incoming personnel. The SFAB selection takes place at Fort Benning, Georgia.

Six SFAB Units. The U.S. Army plans on establishing six Security Force Assistance Brigades over the next several years. The 1st SFAB has already stood up at Fort Benning, Georgia and it is currently undergoing pre-deployment training for a tour in Afghanistan that will begin in early 2018. The SFAB mission is to provide tacticians who can train, advise, assist, accompany, and enable allied and partner nation armies. Rumor has it that this mission has spawned a new acronym – TA3E – which is somewhat similar to the “TAA” found within the OTERA acronym that describes the Security Force Assistance mission.

Evaluation. The “assessment events evaluate a candidates physical attributes, problem solving, communication, inter-personal skills as well as their ethical perspectives.”

Two-Fold Assessment. Colonel Scott Jackson, the commander of the 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade, says that the candidate must meet the U.S. Army’s standards derived from the unit’s mission profile and also possess the mental and personal attributes to be an effective advisor.

Past Advisory Experiences of U.S. Army. In the past, the U.S. Army has deployed advisory teams throughout many conflicts (Korea, Vietnam, etc.). Over the past decade and a half advisory teams have deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, these conventional force advisory teams were ‘ad hoc’ in nature – temporary arrangements with spotty selection and training practices prior to deployment. The SFAB units of the U.S. Army are a step in the right direction to have a professionalized conventional force advisory capacity and capability.

Complementing SF FID Capability. The SFAB advisor teams will complement the advisory effort that the U.S. Army Special Forces engage in with foreign armies (Foreign Internal Defense of FID). Special Forces has had FID as a core mission for many years but the recent operations tempo has taxed the ability of SF teams to respond to the demand signal for advisor teams from combatant commanders around the world.

Testing Limits. According to an Army news release (see below) the two-day “. . . assessment pushes Soldiers to go beyond their physical and mental limits.” The assessment process was developed with the intent to select strong advisors.

1st SFAB Currently Recruiting. The unit is seeking promotable specialists, sergeants, and staff sergeants with a background in combat medicine, vehicle maintenance, logistics, explosive ordnance disposal, communications, field artillery, and military intelligence. If selected they will serve on 12-man advisory teams.

Read more in “1st SFAB Assesses Candidates”, DVIDS, October 17, 2017.

More Articles on the SFABs.

SOF and the Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs), SOF News, June 21, 2017.

News Stories on 1st SFAB, Afhan War News