Over the last few decades there have been a number of courses established to prepare advisors and trainers for a deployment to Afghanistan. Some of these courses were extremely good, while others . . . not so much. The Afghanistan pre-deployment training at NATO’s Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC) was one of the better ones. With the withdrawal of U.S. and NATO troops from Afghanistan the premier advisor training course is being discontinued.

JFTC. The Joint Force Training Centre is located not far from the city center of Bydgoszcz, Poland. It is a modern yet modest campus of several buildings housing offices, classrooms, training areas, and a large auditorium. JFTC supports training for NATO and partner forces to improve joint and combined tactical interoperability. JFTC conducts a number of activities to include conferences, seminars, exercise support, and training courses. It has an international flavor with staff from many of the different NATO nations. The common language used is English as is all training materials and in training environments.

Advisor Training Schools. For the first several years of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) existence advisors and trainers were deployed on various types of training missions in Afghanistan on an ad hoc basis. Once it was apparent that the U.S. and NATO was committed to supporting the Afghan military over the long-term it was recognized that a professional advising and training effort was required. Over the years a number of schools and courses were established by the U.S. and NATO countries to train their officers and NCOs to be effective advisors and trainers. Many of these courses were established quite a few years after they were needed, but once set up, provided the needed pre-deployment training for advisors and advisor teams heading to Afghanistan.

ISAF and Training the SFAATs. In the 2011 to 2014 timeframe there was a huge push to deploy advisor teams to Afghanistan. The intent was to professionalize the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) and the Afghan security institutions (ASIs) so that the Afghans could take the lead in combat operations. At the same time the U.S. and NATO were reducing their combat power in Afghanistan. With help from these Security Force Assistance Advisory Teams (SFAATs) the Afghans were slowly taking the lead for combat operations. To prepare the advisors and the advisory teams in this Security Force Assistance mission pre-deployment training was necessary. The United States had several advisor courses – one of the largest was located with the U.S. Army’s Joint Readiness Training Centre (JRTC) at Fort Polk, Louisiana. Another course to prepare trainers and advisors was conducted at the U.S.-run Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) in Hohenfels, Germany. Many NATO advisor teams attended the excellent JMRC course in preparation for their Afghan tour.

Photo: Attendees listen to a presentation about Afghan security institutions by senior Afghan officials of the MoI and MoD during the academics portion of the Resolute Support Training Event at Joint Forces Training Centre. (photo by JFTC staff)

RS and Advisor Training. As the effort in Afghanistan was reduced the ISAF combat-oriented mission ceased and morphed into the Resolute Support Mission focused on the train, advise, and assist effort. U.S. and NATO manpower significantly declined over time and the number of SFAATs deployed at the Afghan army kandak (battalion) and police district levels diminished. The training at JMRC in Germany for advisor teams was discontinued. The training of NATO officers and NCOs for deployment to Afghanistan was picked up by NATO’s Joint Forces Training Center in Poland in 2014. JFTC had a tough act to follow as the JMRC advisor training course was very professional and produced a quality product. The emphasis at JFTC was less tactics and more staff level as most of the advisor teams were now with the ministries in Kabul or at the brigade, corps, provincial, or police zone level.

RS Training Events. JFTC conducted its pre-deployment training for Afghanistan for several years. The Resolute Support Training Events were usually run for two-weeks, four times a year. The training audience varied from 200 to 500 personnel each training event. The training was geared for three different types of attendees: those who would work on the Resolute Support Mission headquarters staff in Kabul in a non-advisory capacity, those who would be on the RSM staff supporting the Security Force Assistance mission, and those who would be advisors with the ANDSF or ASIs.

Photo: A Swedish advisor team member is learning how to interact with his interpreter and Afghan counterpart during pre-deployment training at the Joint Forces Training Centre. (photo JFTC staff)

Course Content. The first week of the course was on general Afghanistan topics – RS mission structure, security environment, intelligence updates, ANDSF, Afghan security institutions, aspects of the security force assistance mission, culture, politics, religion, top issues and challenges, and other relevant subjects. This week of academics was, for the most part, conducted in an auditorium setting. All three attendee categories underwent this phase of the training. The non-advisory RSM staff attended just the first week and returned to their home countries or continued on their deployment to Afghanistan.

The second week encompassed two different types of training. Those destined to be advisors went to the ‘advisor track’ while those supporting the SFA effort on the RSM staff were on the ‘SFA staff track’. This week of training combined both academics and practical exercise events – usually in a small group environment. A key component of the training was the presentations given by high ranking officials of the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense that provided an Afghan perspective on the Resolute Support Mission. In addition, during this week of advisor training numerous Afghan role players were employed to provide an ‘advisory experience’ to the course attendees. Some of the RS training events incorporated training and a mini-CPX for Train Advise Assist Command (TAAC) staffs – usually from TAAC North or TAAC West.

Photo: One of the small groups learning about their future role on staff at Resolute Support headquarters supporting the Security Force Assistance effort in Afghanistan. (photo by JFTC staff).

In-Country Site Surveys. Over the past several years JFTC continually refined and improved the advisor / SFA training experience. Prior to each advisor course a small cadre of JFTC staff and subject matter experts would travel to Afghanistan to receive briefings at the RSM headquarters in Kabul as well as travel out to the relevant Train, Advise, and Assist Commands (TAACs) for briefings on the ANDSF, current status of SFA, hot topics, and training issues. Upon their return to Bydgoszcz this small site survey group (approximately 10 personnel) would set out to update and refine the training for the upcoming evolution of advisor training. This ‘site survey’ aspect of JFTC’s training certainly elevated the value of the advisor training at Bydgoszcz. The approach to improving the training utilizing the in-country training refinement visits was one that seemed unique among all the other advisor training courses.

In-Country SMEs. One of the strong aspects of the RS training events was the incorporation of subject matter experts (SMEs) from Afghanistan into the training event in Bydgoszcz. Much of the instruction and mentoring was provided by military personnel assigned to RS headquarters as well as those at the TAACs. These SMEs came from advisor teams or were staff members working in one of the ‘functional’ SFA areas. The use of SMEs provided the students with up-to-date information on the various aspects of the security force assistance mission and the train, advise, and assist processes in place. These in-country SMEs were augmented by recently re-deployed military personnel who had completed an Afghan tour in an advisor capacity.

Photo: Members of the JFTC staff and SMEs during a exercise coordination meeting at JFTC during Resolute Support pre-deployment training for Afghanistan. (photo JTFC staff)

NATO Plans for Future Afghan Advising Efforts. Now that the NATO mission in Afghanistan has ended (ISAF and now RSM) there are no troops left to conduct the train, advise, and assist mission. However, according to recent announcements by NATO, the withdrawal of troops does not mean the end of the relationship with Afghanistan. NATO will continue to provide training and financial support to the ANDSF. It will also continue out-of-country training for the Afghan Special Operations Forces; and, perhaps for other ANDSF or ASI organizations as well. Fortunately, there is a large number of NATO officers and NCOs who have worked in Afghanistan as trainers and advisors over the years that can be called upon to continue this ‘over the horizon‘ Afghan training mission. In addition, JFTC has had the good fortune of being assisted by several civilian firms (foremost among them Cadence Consultancy) that provided quality staff, instructors, and trainers to the RS Afghan pre-deployment course and that remain available for future training efforts.

NATO Mission Iraq. With the end of the Resolute Support Mission the Afghanistan advisor course at JFTC has come to an end. However, the mission of providing advisor training to NATO officers and NCOs will certainly continue. NATO has shown that it will remain involved in advisory efforts – of note is the current NATO Mission Iraq or NMI. This is a non-combat mission that aims to strengthen Iraqi security institutions and forces so they are able to degrade and defeat the fighters of the Islamic State. This advisory, training, and capacity-building mission in Iraq was established in 2018 and involves several hundred trainers and advisors, some who will attend the JFTC NATO Mission Iraq Pre-Deployment Training.

Bydgoszcz. The Joint Force Training Centre is located in the picturesque city of Bydgoszcz, Poland. The JFTC campus is a short walk from the city center where there are a number of hotels for the course attendees. During off duty hours there are some aspects of the small city that can be explored and enjoyed – to include the opera, museums, the river walk, and more. In addition, there are a large number of excellent restaurants in the Old Market Square. Bistro Katarynka is a favorite with superb food, excellent service, and a friendly staff.

Photo: An Afghan flag flies over an observation post, Pekha Valley, Achin district, Nagarhar province. (photo by CPL Matthew DeVirgilio, NSOCC-A)

Not Forgetting Advisor Lessons Learned. The Joint Force Training Centre provided quality training for several years for NATO and partner nations forces sending advisors and trainers to Afghanistan. Their unique method of providing up-to-date and relevant instruction by inviting in-country SMEs, utilizing contractor support, and conducting site surveys in Afghanistan is a model for other institutions providing advisor training. There is concern that with the U.S. and NATO shift in focus from counterterrorism and counterinsurgency missions to great power competition the lessons learned in providing trained professionals for advisory assignments will be lost. Hopefully institutions like JFTC will retain that capability for future conflicts.

*********

Top Photo: A German advisor at TAAC North reviews an ANA exercise plan. (Image by Resolute Support Twitter 16 Feb 2018).

The author served in Afghanistan with the U.S. Army Special Forces. Upon retirement from the military he served as a Counterinsurgency Advisor with the COMISAF Advisory and Assistance Team (CAAT) in Afghanistan during the 2012-2014 time frame. His primary focus was Security Force Assistance. During this period he visited, observed, interviewed, and / or embedded with over 100 SFAATs. He also observed advisor team training in the United States, at JMRC, and at JFTC. From 2015 to 2017 he was an adjunct SFA SME for JFTC to include several JFTC site surveys in Afghanistan. He was a contributor to the RS Security Force Assistance Guide.

Recent news, analysis, and commentary about the Afghan conflict: security, governance, development, Resolute Support, and the ANDSF.

ANDSF

ANDSF Losses. In a recent speech in front of an international audience – the World Economic Forum, in Davos, Switzerland – President Ghani stated that the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces had 45,000 KIA’s since 2014. The number of international casualties is less than 72; which shows who is doing the bulk of the fighting. (BBC News, Jan 25, 2019).

SMW Pilot Fights Battle Online. An Afghan pilot with the Special Mission Wing flies commandos into battle and fights the information operations war online using social media. (Stars and Stripes, January 26, 2019).

CN Ministry to Merge with MoI. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani has ordered the move of the Counter-Narcotics Ministry into the Ministry of Interior. the effort is supposed to result in good governance, public administration reform, greater effectiveness in CN activities, and reduction of drug demand.

Resolute Support

Australia in Afghanistan? Giving President Trump’s desire to half the U.S. troop commitment to Afghanistan and the seeming progress in peace talks it might be time for the Australians to take another look at their involvement in this long war. So says Clive Williams in “Do we still need Australian troops in Afghanistan?”, The Sydney Morning Herald, January 29, 2019.

Security Company in Afghanistan Vanishes. Sabre International Security employed guards for the Canadian embassy in Kabul. When a bombing left many of their workers dead or wounded, the company vanished. Read “A Security Company Cashed in on America’s Wars – and Then Disappeared”, The Atlantic, January 29, 2019.

Reports

SIGAR Report. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction has released it’s Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, January 30, 2019, 296 pages.
https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2019-01-30qr.pdf

Security Force Assistance (SFA)

America’s SFA Problem. A recent article explains why Security Force Assistance has worked out in Africa and other places. “It is too focused on building an army in the absence of a viable state that has the institutional capacity and political willpower to sustain that army.” Read “Getting American Security Force Assistance Right: Political Context Matters”, by Jahara Matisek and William Reno, Joint Force Quarterly 92, January 2019.

Peace Talks

Progress in Talks? U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad has reportedly gotten close to an agreement with the Taliban. He has been engaged in shuttle diplomacy – flying from one capital city to another trying to generate a peace deal with the Taliban that would help the U.S. get out of that very long conflict. Key proponents of the peace deal include:

• The U.S. demand that the Taliban renounce terrorist groups like ISKP and al-Qaeda and not provide a safe haven for terrorist groups.
• The Taliban demand that the U.S. announce a timetable for withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan.

Troop Withdrawal Plan. It would appear that some results are forthcoming from talks between U.S. representatives and the Taliban. Apparently there are some preliminary agreements related to U.S. troops pulling out of Afghanistan. Read “U.S. – Taliban Agree on Troop Withdrawal Plan”, Voice of America, January 26, 2019.

“Peace Plan” or “Withdrawal Plan”? So will the Taliban keep their word? Doubtful. Will the agreement (if implemented) help the U.S. withdraw from Afghanistan? Very likely. Will it bring peace to Afghanistan? History tells us “No”. Can anyone say Decent Interval?

What’s Next? A tentative agreement is just that – ‘tentative’. The talks have not included the Afghan government; some say they get a vote. Certainly the talks between the U.S. and government of Afghanistan will be interesting. What is the Pentagon saying? Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan told reporters that there are no ongoing preparations for an Afghanistan withdrawal. But I bet there is a group of majors and a couple of colonels at Resolute Support headquarters doing a ‘deep dive’ on this right now!

Elections

Countdown Begins. The candidate nomination period for the upcoming presidential elections has concluded in Afghanistan. The elections will take place on July 20, 2019. The folks at Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN) have put together a detailed read on the upcoming elections. (23 Jan 2019).

There are four votes taking place on 20 July 2019:

• Provincial elections
• District council elections
• Parliamentary elections in Ghazni province
• Presidential election

Governance

Corruption. Transparency International has released it’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2018. Afghanistan ranks number 8 in 180 nations in corruption. That means there are only 7 countries in the world more corrupt than Afghanistan. The corruption scale used is 0 to 100; where 0 is ‘highly corrupt’ and 100 is ‘squeaky clean’. Afghanistan is 16 / 100. The countries that are more corrupt than Afghanistan are Equatorial Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Sudan, North Korea, Yemen, South Sudan, Syria, and Somalia. It would appear Afghanistan is in good company. Is this a country worth fighting for?
https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018

Development

El Nino and Afghanistan. The worlds climate has a big effect on Afghanistan. How much rain and snowfall the country receives determines how much success the agricultural and livestock sectors of the economy experience. Read Afghanistan El Nino Outlook for 2019, United Nations OCHA, January 20, 2019.

Commentary

Pashtun Nationalism and the Taliban. Mohammed Ayoob, a senior fellow at the Center for Global Policy in Washington, DC and a professor at Michigan State University, offers his explanation of why the Taliban enjoy support within the Pasthun population of Afghanistan. He also believes that the U.S. needs to account for this support when negotiating with the Taliban. Read “Pashtun nationalism and the American withdrawal from Afghanistan”, The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, January 21, 2019.

Trump is Getting Played. Michael Rubin explains why the Taliban are winning in the negotiations with the United States. Read “The Taliban plays Trump for a fool”, Washington Examiner, January 29, 2019.

CIA’s Proxy Forces. A paramilitary organization supported by the Central Intelligence Agency has done more damage than good – at least in the view of Bonnie Kristian – a fellow at Defense Priorities and weekend editor at The Week. Read “America’s War in Afghanistan: Fostering Anger, Not Security”, Real Clear Defense, January 21, 2019.

Videos

Video – What’s Happening in Afghanistan?, Center for Strategic & International Studies, January 31, 2019, 4 mins. After 17 years of war, President Trump has called for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan. Will Kabul fall to the Taliban if the United States disengages? CSIS experts Melissa Dalton, Seth Jones, and Dan Runde explain what’s happening in Afghanistan.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=stiSUBpmot0

Waltz on U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan. Representative Mike Waltz, a former Green Beret with two tours in Afghanistan, is not very trusting of the Taliban. He was recently on Fox News expressing his doubts. (Jan 29, 2019). Watch the 4-min video.

Video – Peace Talks Interview. Laurel Miller and Barnett Rubin chat about the prospects of peace. Miller was President Obama’s special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. She is now the International Crisis Group’s Asia Group director. Rubin is the director of the Afghanistan-Pakistan Program at the Center of International Cooperation. He also served in the State Department. Watch “US and Taliban peace talks make progress toward ending war in Afghanistan”, PBS News Hour, January 28, 2019. (11 mins).

**********

General John Nicholson has completed two years as the commander of NATO’s Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan. One is tempted to evaluate his performance as the head guy in the Afghan War for the past couple of years. Of course, any attempt to do this would fall short of an accurate assessment of his performance. There are just too many variables and factors at play that he doesn’t control or influence.

Nicholson took over in March 2016 when General John Campbell departed command. [1] General John Nicholson inherited a difficult situation. U.S. and NATO troops had conducted a significant reduction in force in the few years before he took command. The U.S. went from 100,000 troops in 2011 down to about 9,000 in March 2016. The Regional Commands (RC East, RC South, etc.) headed by two-star generals had been downsized to Train, Advise, and Assist Commands or TAACs headed by one-star generals. Two of the RCs were completely disbanded – replaced by “Advise and Assist Cells” or ACCs that would maintain contact with the Afghan Army corps via cell phone, email, and infrequent “fly to advise” visits.

Decreased Combat Power. When Nicholson arrived there was very little U.S. combat power on the ground – unless you count the U.S. Special Forces teams and NATO SOF units that worked with ANASOC’s Special Operations Kandaks (SOKs) and the Ministry of Interior’s Special Police Units like the CRU-222. Air support – in the form of close air support and ISR – was drastically reduced. The war with ISIS was heating up in Iraq and Syria and resources slowly shifted to the Middle East.

Decreased Advisory Effort. The huge influx of advisor teams that arrived in 2012-2013 under Generals John Allen and Joseph Dunford were largely scaled back. In 2012 and early 2013 there were Security Force Assistance Advisor Teams (SFAATs) located at all levels of the Afghan National Army (ANA) down to kandak (battalion) level. On the police side of the house there were advisor teams working with the Provincial HQs and at district center level. Toward the end of Dunford’s command these SFAATs were drastically reduced (call it the “Obama effect”). By the end of 2014 and extending into 2016 the only permanent advisor teams to the ANA operated at corps and institutional – and even then the 203rd and 215th were ‘uncovered’. Air advisors with Train, Advise, and Assist Command – Air (TAAC-Air) were still flying with their Afghan counterparts – therefore they operated at ‘tactical’ level.

NSOCC-A / SOJTF-A. SOF advisors – both U.S. and Coalition – were also still at the tactical level. The advisory and training package at Camp Commando (formerly Camp Morehead) outside of Kabul had a heavy mix of U.S. and Coalition SOF working with the Afghan National Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC). NATO and other partner nation SOF teams continued to train and work with the elite units of the General Command Police Special Units (GCPSU). However, even SOF downsized considerably in Afghanistan. U.S. SOF withdrew almost completely from the heavy commitment to the Village Stability Operations (VSO) program and the Afghan Local Police (ALP); although it did keep a robust advisory presence at the Ministry of Interior (MoI) to keep the ALP on track. The Police Special Units found at province level lost their training and advising SOF teams as well. The Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force – Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A) was downsized to a battalion-sized organization and renamed the Special Operations Task Force – Afghanistan (SOFT-A).

Interagency Downsizing. Along with the drastic military cutback of troops by the U.S. and its allies there was a corresponding reduction in State Department, USAID, law enforcement, and other non-military government agency personnel. Interagency organizations and personnel are – as everyone knows – an important cog in the counterinsurgency fight. In COIN, the key areas to attend to include security, governance, and development. Some would add information operations to the mix. We still have our eye on the security aspect but are not paying as much attention to the governance and development areas.

Some Background. The overall effort in the 2015-2016 timeframe – due to the significant drawdown – was to concentrate resources on the two security ministries (MoD and MoI), some of the Afghan training institutions, and the ANA corps (with the exceptions previously mentioned). It was believed by the Resolute Support staff that the “Afghans knew how to fight at the kandak level” but that the security ministries lacked the ability to sustain the force due to a lack of systems and processes at the ministerial, institutional, and corps level. Not everyone believed this; but it was a convenient phrase to utter as the SFAATs were pulled off police districts and provincial hqs and ANA kandaks and brigades.

Was the Afghan army and police good enough to beat the Taliban in 2016? A look at the current security situation tells you “No”. Past reports by SIGAR, DoD (IG, 1230, & 1225), UNAMA, NATO, international organizations, and a host of think-tanks provide the answer to that question. The Taliban have not been beaten. Sure they take losses on the battlefield; U.S. air support causes significant casualties when they mass and Afghan SOF continue to hammer the insurgents during clearing operations. However, if you look at the number of districts that the Taliban ‘control’ or ‘contest’ (you can’t use the unreliable Afghan government estimates or the very rosy projections of RS HQs; go with Long War Journal) you will see that the Taliban have been steadily gaining more ground in the rural countryside.

Contributing Factors at Play in early 2016. Pakistan still supported / supports the Taliban (funding, some training, sanctuaries, etc.). Russia, Iran and other nations continued their meddling to the detriment of the mission. The Afghan National Unity Government (NUG) negotiated by John Kerry was (and still is) dysfunctional. Hamid Karzai continued his sniping on the edges – causing political turmoil where he could. Warlords (power brokers, strongmen, or whatever term you choose – I am thinking Noor, Dostum, Raziq, etc.) eroded the power of the central Afghan government. The Afghan parliament is almost as bad as the U.S. Congress – blocking ministerial appointments and hindering reform efforts. The judicial system is largely non-functional. Corruption, despite the best efforts of the international community, rules Kabul. Old, inept, and incompetent generals within the MoD and MoI hinder the younger Afghan officers best efforts in the field.

So this is what General Nicholson inherited in March 2016. This was not the fault of General Campbell – his predecessor; nor that of Dunford, Allen, or even Petreaus. Certainly Nicholson knows Afghanistan [2] – having spent a few years there already; commanding units in the field as well as spending a year as the operations officer (2 star position) at the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). What exactly can you do with 8,400 troops (along with another 3,000 NATO and partner nation troops)? Not that much. Especially when you take into consideration all the factors listed above.

Some Positives. There are some aspects of the past two years that deserve recognition. General John Nicholson seems to have taken on leadership of the Afghan security institutions and the fielded forces as a primary concern. A lot of movement has taken place in this area with the cooperation of President Ghani. Corruption within the army and police – still a huge and some say the biggest problem – appears to be another major concern receiving emphasis from Nicholson and his staff. But I doubt there will be much progress here – this is a generational thing. Nicholson increased the occurrences of the Expeditionary Advisory Platforms or EAPs – an attempt to get advisors, if only on a part-time basis, down to the ANA brigade level. The RCs that were shut down in the 203rd and 215th area of operations received permanent advisory platforms once again. They could not be re-established as TAACs as that would be an acknowledgment of failure (Europe wouldn’t have it); but these two corps did get significant help in the form of Task Force Forge and Task Force Anvil – now known as Task Force Southwest and Task Force Southeast.

Current Initiatives. Some things are going in the right direction. The 4-year plan for the MoD and MoI has some promising components. The Afghan Air Force (AAF) is getting a lot of attention. In addition to the robust air advisory effort the AAF is receiving more A-29 Super Tucanos, UH-60 Blackhawks, MD-530 helicopters, and other aircraft. RS HQs is promoting this increase in the AAF as a ‘game changer’ (Things that make you say “Hmmm”). The Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) are doubling in size – both within the MoD and the MoI. The new National Mission Brigade is one of the examples of this increase in the Afghan SOF units. This special attention to Afghan SOF probably is the result of the success of the ASSF and the fact that 70% of the offensive operations carried out by Afghan security forces are conducted by the ASSF. This noteworthy performance of the ASSF happens while the regular ANA units (there are exceptions, of course) sit in garrison, occupy numerous static checkpoints, or conduct meaningless brigade level ‘clearing operations’ where the intent is ‘telegraphed’ to the Taliban weeks in advance. In 2017 the U.S. took steps to limit the funding going to insurgents by way of the drug trade – hitting drug labs with a lot of airstrikes combined with Afghan ground units doing drug trade interdiction missions. Various estimates on the effectiveness of these operations ranged from very effective to just a slight dent in Taliban finances. Probably most important is the emphasis Nicholson and his staff have placed on developing good leadership within the security forces.

SFABs. Another new development occurring under Nicholson’s watch is the deployment of the 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB). This is the brainchild of General Milley – chief of staff for the U.S. Army. Milley served (while a three-star) as the ISAF Joint Command (IJC) commander on Kabul International Airport (KIA) – I can’t bring myself to use the new name of the airport. He saw first-hand the good work that the Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs) and SFAATs were doing all over Afghanistan. These initial SFABs – similar to the Advise and Assist Brigades (AABs) deployed in the later stages of the Iraq conflict – were ad hoc advising efforts. Permanent brigades stripped of lower ranking Soldiers (left in garrison stateside) deployed to different regions of Afghanistan to conduct the Security Force Assistance (SFA) mission strongly supported by General Allen and later by General Dunford (he changed it to “Functional SFA”) and General Campbell. The 1st SFAB is currently deploying to Afghanistan and will provide about 36 combat advisor teams with the mission to “Train, Advise, Assist, Accompany, and Enable” (TA3E) at the tactical level – many probably at kandaks. Will this also be a ‘game-changer’? Probably not; we will likely witness an incremental improvement in the combat effectiveness of some ANA kandaks. But it probably will not have significant effect on the overall security situation. Many other factors come into play.

The Report Card? General John Nicholson has done a good job. We will discount his ‘cheerleading efforts’ that provided a rosy (but false) picture of the situation in Afghanistan and how things were improving. Probably all past ISAF / RS commanders have done this – Nicholson and Dunford seemed to be the best in the cheerleading department; while Petraeus, Allen, and Campbell seemed less optimistic. Nicholson did seem to recognize his constraints and the political reality. Working with CENTCOM, DoD, and NATO he and his staff developed a way ahead that outlined how the U.S. and its allies would assist Afghanistan in professionalizing their security institutions and fielded forces and hopefully enable them to ‘overmatch’ (I hate that term) the Taliban on the battlefield. The new plan (already underway, but introduced in the summer of 2017) is politically acceptable – a modest increase in troop levels.

What will be the end result? Over the next few years we will probably see a significant increase in the effectiveness of the Afghan Air Force and the Afghan Special Security Forces; with a slight incremental increase in the effectiveness of the regular ANA. However, while the ASSF will continue to expand their capability to ‘clear’ areas of insurgents, the ANA and police will likely continue to fail to ‘hold’ these areas, and the Afghan government will likely continue to fail to ‘build’ in these areas. However, more important are the factors beyond the control of the General John Nicholson and future RS commanders. The Afghans will continue to have governance problems, the corrupt systems embedded in the security ministries will not go away, the drug trade will still exist, Pakistan will continue to support the Taliban, and the Taliban will not really negotiate for peace while they see themselves winning on the battlefield. So as the end of his tour approaches – how did he do as RS Commander? It isn’t fair to pin the success or failure of the overall effort on one man.  But . . . the Taliban didn’t win yet.

The Future Prospects? The next commander will face the same challenges and constraints that General John Nicholson has faced. Things may or may not get marginally better. Realistically, the Afghans need to sort this thing out. In 18 months (or perhaps two years) we will probably once again say “the Taliban didn’t win yet”.

Footnotes:

[1] “Campbell Passes U.S., NATO Colors to Nicholson in Kabul Ceremony”, Defense Media Activity, March 2, 2016.

[2] “Army’s Nicholson: Career ‘largely defined’ by Afghanistan”, Stars and Stripes, January 27, 2016. Nicholson’s previous deployments in Afghanistan includes time as a brigade commander in 2006, deputy commander of RC South in 2008, and as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations for ISAF in 2011.

References:

General John Nicholson – Biography RS HQs
https://www.rs.nato.int/about-us/leadership/resolute-support-headquarters/rsm-commander.aspx

General John Nicholson – Wikipedia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_W._Nicholson_Jr.

Edits: (There is always something that needs fixing!)

Added a sentence on the recent air strikes against drug labs in southern Afghanistan.

Resolute Support Social Media – Everyone knowledgeable about counterinsurgency recognizes the importance of winning the media battle. Unfortunately, it seems the insurgent and terrorist groups like ISIS, the Taliban, and others seem to be way out in front of the U.S. and its coalition partners in the information operations (IO) and social media fight. But things seem to be getting better.

CJTF-OIR is setting a high bench mark for successfully using social media in the IO war against ISIS in the Syrian – Iraq area of operations. CJTF-OIR’s use of Twitter and other social media avenues is fairly consistent and rings of accuracy (to an extent). Resolute Support Social Media staff workers in Kabul seem to be a step behind CJTF-OIR but it isn’t for lack of trying. The strategic communications (EF8) and PAO advisors get high marks for working with the Afghan institutions in developing their IO organizations. The use of social media in Afghanistan is just as important as in the Middle East region (Iraq and Syria).

Take a look behind the scenes of one ‘social media operator’ who just completed a tour in Kabul with Resolute Support HQs managing the Facebook, Twitter, Flickr, and YouTube accounts for Resolute Support. Megan Gully, a member of the U.S. Army Material Command Public Affairs office, deployed to Kabul for an extended tour. Read her story “Commentary: My Deployment to Afghanistan”, DVIDS, July 28, 2017.

Resolute Support Video – SHAPE NATO has published (July 6, 2017) a one-minute long video explaining how the International Security Force Assistance (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan transitioned to the Resolute Support Mission. The video is entitled RSM: for the future of Afghanistan.

“Following the completion of the mission of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) at the end of 2014, a new, follow-on, NATO-led mission called Resolute Support was launched on 1 January 2015 to provide further training, advise and assistance for the Afghan security forces and institutions. At the NATO Summit in Warsaw, Allied leaders decided to extend the presence of RSM beyond 2016. The United Nations Security Council welcomed the Resolute Support Mission with the unanimous adoption on 12 December 2014 of Resolution 2189, which underscores the importance of continued international support for the stability of Afghanistan.”

Watch the video:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ReuwMhgY1Q0

SSG Adam Thomas was killed in action in Nangarhar province, Afghanistan on October 4, 2016. He was taking part in a joint Afghan – U.S. counter-terrorism mission against the Islamic State – Khorasan when his dismounted patrol was struck by an improvised explosive device (IED). Thomas, age 31, of Tacoma Park, Maryland, was a Special Forces Medical Sergeant and a member of Company B, 2nd Battalions, 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), Fort Carson, Colorado.

SSG Thomas joined the Army in April of 2008. He had a previous deployment to Iraq in 2008-2009 and an Afghan deployment in 2011-2012.

During his service he earned a number of awards to include the Bronze Star, Purple Heart, Afghanistan Campaign Medal with Campaign Star, Iraq Campaign Medal with Campaign Star, Combat Infantryman Badge, Expert Infantryman Badge, Basic Military Free Fall Parachute Badge, Special Forces tab, Ranger tab, Parachutist Badge, and four Army Commendation Medals.

Thomas was a 2003 graduate of Larking High School in Elgin, Illinois. He was to elementary school in the St. Peter area of Minnesota. He attended college at St. Olaf College in Northfield, Minnesota. His parents still live in Minnesota. His mother is the Executive Director of the nonprofit Literacy Volunteers of Southwest Minnesota. His father is a professor at Southwest Minnesota State University.

Read more:

“Nangarhar Casualty Release”, Resolute Support Press Release, Oct 4, 2016.
“DoD Identifies Army Casualty”, DOD News Release, October 5, 2016.
“Fort Carson-based Special Forces soldier killed by IED explosion in Afghanistan”, The Denver Channel, October 5, 2016.
“DoD identifies soldier killed in Afghanistan”, Army Times, October 5, 2016.
“Army Staff Sgt. Who Grew Up in Minnesota Killed in Afghanistan”,  CBS Minnesota, October 6, 2016.
“Larkin High School graduate killed on patrol in Afghanistan”, Chicago Tribune, October 7, 2016.
“Former Coach Remembers Minnesota Soldier Killed in Afghanistan”, CBS Local, October 8, 2016.

Websites Honoring SSG Adam Thomas

Fallen Heroes of Operation Enduring Freedom
www.fallenheroesmemorial.com/oef/profiles/thomasadaml.html