A term that has seen an increased level of use is ‘Over the Horizon’. The Department of Defense and national security commentators have been using over the horizon (OTH) in two contexts when discussing Afghanistan. One is the ability to hit terrorist targets and threats inside Afghanistan from bases or assets outside of Afghanistan. The second is the ability to provide training, advise, assistance, and support to the Afghan security ministries and Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) from outside Afghanistan.

OTH and Counterterrorism

The United States has the most professional counterterrorism capability in the world. The Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) has proven to be extremely effective in eliminating terrorist threats whenever it has targeted them. JSOCs achievements in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Somalia, and around the world are well documented. It has evolved into a very proficient killing machine that can conduct offshore, over the horizon counterterrorism (CT) operations.

Temporary Base in Afghanistan. The ability to hit specific terrorist targets in Afghanistan is hindered by the lack of bases from which to operate from in Afghanistan. The huge air base at Bagram Air Field (BAF) has now been turned over to the Afghans. The only ‘known’ U.S. military presence is at the international airport in Kabul and perhaps at a location near to the U.S. embassy. In addition, the significant intelligence capability of the military and other intelligence agencies has been severely diminished. However, it is certainly plausible that a CT strike and support package could fly into the Kabul airport (with the permission of the Afghan government) and set up a temporary base long enough to hit a terrorist target in Afghanistan. In fact, an arrangement could be made that establishes a ‘warm base’ or ‘cold base’ at either Bagram or the Kabul airport. One ready for occupation that could quickly transition to a forward operation base for SOF units.

Base in Central Asia. There are a few neighboring countries that might host U.S. counterterrorist forces on a permanent or temporary basis. Iran and Pakistan are not among these countries. This could be an agreement for U.S. CT forces to deploy for the length of a mission. Or it could be the establishment of a small base manned by a minimal number of support staff to accommodate a CT force to come in, set up, and then conduct an operation. For a number of years the Central Asian states of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan hosted U.S. military forces during the 20-year U.S. conflict in Afghanistan. In fact, this has been a topic of discussion among national security gurus. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken hosted Uzbekistan Foreign Minister Kamilow and Tajikistan Foreign Minister Muhriddin in Washington, D.C on July 1, 2021. A discussion about permanent or temporary basing in one of those countries was likely on the meeting agenda. Of course, Russia continues to exert significant influence in the region so geopolitical concerns have to be taken into account.

Regional Bases and Assets. The U.S. has a number of air bases and facilities in the Middle East region that have a substantial number of fighter, bomber, surveillance, and tanker aircraft and drones that can hit targets in Afghanistan. In addition, these bases can support a CT ground force that can stage on a base in the Middle East and then strike a target in Afghanistan. The U.S. Air Force has long range bombers and the U.S. Navy maintains an almost constant presence in the region with an carrier strike group as well as naval vessels with cruise missile capability. The long flight times and overflight permissions are an important planning and execution factor for consideration.

OTH and Support to Afghanistan

The Resolute Support Mission (RSM) in Afghanistan has come to an end; although it hasn’t been declared as officially over. The RSM has been engaged in Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan through the Train, Advise, and Assist (TAA) mission for the past several years. The endeavor has been providing support to the Afghan National Army, the Afghan National Police, and the Afghan security institutions. Thousands of advisors and trainers from the United States, NATO, and other partner nation countries have ‘cycled’ through tours of duty providing advice and training to the Afghan security forces. So there is a wealth of advisory experience that the international community can tap into within their respective militaries in the effort to support the ASI and ANDSF.

Leveraging Technology for Communication. Of course, this training and advising mission has to be done in an over the horizon effort now that the withdrawal is complete. In a technological world that now has the internet, video conferencing, email, cell phones, and other advanced methods of communication – providing support to the Afghan security forces is entirely possible from outside the country. The world is just now coming out of a year long struggle with COVID – an event that transformed the way we communicate and work. The use of Zoom and other online communication methods have become refined over the past year. This certainly is something that needs to be leveraged by the United States and others to assist Afghanistan. Is it ideal? No. But it is a tool in the toolbox.

Training. The ‘T’ part of the TAA mission that Resolute Support conducted in Afghanistan can, to a certain extent, be done from outside the country. Online instruction grew significantly over the past year providing learning opportunities at the elementary, high school, and university level. Large and small businesses conducted internal and for profit training over the internet using Zoom and other media. Of course, the U.S. and other nations have to actually do a little work to set up organizations to carry on this training. Certainly, with funding, people, and organizations earmarked for this event it can be done. Is it as good as person-to-person instruction? No, but it can be done.

There are a host of military schools and exercises that Afghan officers and NCOs can participate in that are located in Europe, the United States, and the Middle East. One positive move is the coordination being done to host training for the Afghan SOF in Qatar.  The instruction provided at Camp Commando (near Kabul) can be augmented with the training offered by US and international SOF in Qatar for the Afghan Commandos and other Afghan SOF units. This type of arrangement could be extended to conventional Afghan military personnel and units – something that will help train the ANDSF.

For several years NATO’s Joint Force Training Centre has conducted a two-week training course for NATO officers and NCOs scheduled for deployment to Afghanistan to work as mentors and advisors. This course could be continued to allow for a readily available pool of military professionals that can train and advise the Afghan security forces – except now it would be done remotely and by bringing Afghan counterparts out of Afghanistan for meetings and training. The Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) in Germany provided training for advisor teams preparing for deployment to Afghanistan. So the JMRC has some institutional knowledge on the topic, and with some work, an onsite course for Afghan military officers could be setup to offer training on a variety of military topics.

The International Military Education and Training (IMET) program can be leveraged to professionalize the Afghan military. At one time there was a counterinsurgency academy in Afghanistan that members of the Afghan military attended – staffed by Afghan and international military officers and NCOs. This could be reestablished in a Central Asian or Middle East country. The U.S. could bring back the AfPak Hands program to maintain continuity of U.S. trainers and advisors. So there are a lot of opportunities that could be utilized from existing or past training programs.

Advising. One of the ‘As’ in the TAA mission is advising. The advisory mission began in the early years of the U.S. involvement in the Afghan conflict. It became a major effort in the 2011-2012 timeframe when the U.S. and other nations deployed hundreds of Security Force Advisory and Assistance Teams (SFAATs) to work at the kandak (army) and district (police) level all the way to the ministries. This effort lasted about two years until the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) transitioned to the Resolute Support Mission. With the transition the troop levels dropped significantly, which required a big reduction in the advisory teams. The SFAATs were pulled off the kandaks, districts, brigades, and provinces but remained at corps level. During this process Resolute Support continued the TAA mission but through innovative concepts such as the Expeditionary Advisory Package. Eventually, in the past few years, even some corps level advisory teams were removed with the TAA mission being conducted by email, cell phone, through the security ministries, and in conferences in the Kabul area.

Assisting. One of the most important aspects of the TAA mission was providing assistance. A very significant part of this assistance was helping the Afghans with their maintenance and logistical operations. This is most likely one of the weakest aspects of the security situation. The Afghan military is burdened with a vast amount of equipment – drones, aircraft, vehicles, computers, and more – that they do not have the expertise or capability to maintain and sustain. The effort to build and Afghan military to resemble the U.S. military was a huge mistake. For example, providing the Afghans with the UH-60 Blackhawk (a complex and expensive aircraft) instead of additional Mi-17s or Mi-35s was a disaster in the making. Now the U.S. has to rapidly put together a method of providing maintenance, logistical, and technical support to the ANDSF from outside the country. The U.S. will need to find a way to provide contract support by remote and virtual means. Of course, this is less effective than in-country contract workers maintaining vehicles and aircraft. Of course, continuing to fund the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) will be key to helping the ANDSF and ASIs.

RAA Operations. More recently – as demonstrated in Iraq and Syria – U.S. special operations forces as well as conventional forces have been using new technology and methods to offer train, advise, and assist support. This has been called remote advise and assist operations. SOF, and CF personnel, have developed persistent relationships with Afghan leadership. These relationships should be leveraged to continue an over the horizon advising capability. One way to maintain these personal relationships is to invite Afghan military leaders to one of the bases maintained by the U.S. in the Middle East. The working relationship can be continued remotely. This can be done – there just has to be some vision and a will to do it. Is it as effective as in-country advising efforts? Of course not. But it is one method of getting the job done.

Conclusion. Certainly the United States has the capability to conduct over the horizon counterterrorism missions in Afghanistan to hit targets that pose a threat to the the homeland. It won’t be as effective and responsive as operating from a base within Afghanistan; especially consider the loss of intelligence capability. But it can be done.

The advise and train mission can also be done. However, it appears that the political climate will offer a lot of lip service to this OTH training mission but the assets needed (money, people, organization, political will) is most likely lacking. Thus far – it is not apparent that much planning or preparation has occurred on conducting an OTH assistance mission for the Afghan military.

Even if the U.S. got its act together on conducting an effective OTH training mission – there is another significant factor to consider. After twenty years of the U.S. and the international community providing billions of dollars and thousands of military personnel to first fight the Taliban and then provide training and assistance – the Afghan government and military have not been able to defeat the Taliban. The likelihood of the Afghans defeating the Taliban now – even with US and international over the horizon assistance is bleak.

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Image: Map derived from a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) map of Afghanistan.

The Biden administration wasted very little time in setting a course correction in the United States role in the Yemen conflict. Citing humanitarian issues (as well as other concerns) it has decided to eliminate support for offensive operations provided to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in their fight against the Iran-supported Ansarallah / Houthi rebels in Yemen. The conflict has raged for many years.

Humanitarian Crisis. The Yemen conflict has resulted in a humanitarian crisis – which the United Nations says is one of the worst in the world. There are widespread food shortages resulting in malnutrition. The economy is in a shambles and government services are operating in a very basic level. The aerial bombardment by Saudi and UAE aircraft has resulted in numerous civilian casualties. There is a significant lack of medical supplies and services for the civilian population. In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic and cholera are taking a toll among the population.

The Houthis. With a strong base in the north region of Yemen the Shia group has attempted to extend its reach south and east throughout the country. It controls the capital city (Sanaa). Other religious, ethnic, and political groups have joined their movement. Most of the civilian population (estimates vary from 70 to 80%) come under Houthi control. The Houthis enjoy a strong position in the conflict – with no sign of their impending defeat in the future.

Iranian Support. The Houthi rebels have been supported by Iran for a number of years. Many observers of the conflict believe that the Houthis are an Iranian proxy group. The Iranians provide funding, weapons, equipment, trainers, and advisors to the Houthis. Through its Qods Force, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is very involved in the support provided to the Houthis.

Iranian Weapons and Equipment. Weapons, equipment, supplies, money, and personnel are transported to Yemen on international air flights as well as sea movement to Yemen’s ports. These weapons include short-range ballistic missiles, surface-to-air missiles, drones, and other sophisticated equipment. The missile systems and components have been used by the Houthis against Saudi oil and infrastructure targets. These weapons shipments are in violation of the U.N. Security Council Resolution 2216.

Yemeni Government. The government of President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi was ousted from the capital city and surrounding areas in a 2014-2015 offensive – dividing the country. The United Nations- recognized Yemeni government has benefited from external support from Gulf nations. However, the government supporters are fragmented and often engaged in internal conflicts.

Saudi-led Coalition. Saudi Arabia and the UAE say that they are actively reducing Iran’s regional influence in their intervention in the Yemen conflict. The involvement by the Saudis and their allies began in 2015 after the Houthi rebels ousted the Republic of Yemen Government from the capital city Sanaa in 2014. The Saudi coalition was able to help the ousted government regain some territory to include the major city of Aden but the conflict soon turned into a stalemate.

United Arab Emirates. The UAE has stepped back on its military involvement – although it still conducts counter terrorism operations and provides support to the breakaway Southern Transitional Council. It withdrew ground forces from Yemen in 2019. Other nations that have supported the Saudi action in Yemen in the past include Kuwait and Sudan.

U.S. Support. For the past several years the U.S. has provided intelligence, logistics, precision-guided munitions, and other types of support to Saudi Arabia and its allies involved in the Yemen war. This support was increased after missile and drone attacks against Saudi oil facilities by the Houthis. The U.S. stopped providing aerial refueling support to Saudi and UAE aircraft in 2018. In the last few years U.S. support has been limited to intelligence sharing, targeting support, and training (in an attempt to limit civilian casualties). The U.S. has been criticized for its role in providing Saudi Arabia and UAE with arms and munitions used in the Yemen conflict.

U.S. SOF. In addition, the U.S. has had special operations forces advisors on the ground in Yemen providing training, advice, and assistance. U.S. SOF have worked with units from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) as well as Yemen governmental security forces. The U.S. has also conducted unilateral counter-terrorism operations in the country against al-Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates. In January 2017 a Navy SEAL (Ryan Owens) died during a counterterrorism raid in Yemen. In January 2020 U.S. SOF conducted an unsuccessful operation to kill or capture a key IRGC-QF operative in Yemen (Abdul Reza Shahlai).

Past activities of U.S. SOF in Yemen include foreign internal defense, counterterrorism, intelligence sharing, surveillance and reconnaissance, maritime interdiction, and drone strikes. U.S. SOF involvement in Yemen has also provided the opportunity to work with and assist in the development of GCC special operations capabilities. This also lends to increased interoperability of GCC SOF with U.S. SOF. In addition, the United Kingdom and France has also deployed its special operations forces to Yemen.

Trump and Yemen. Under the Trump administration the U.S. has taken a strong stance against Iran’s activities across the Middle East. This includes attempting to diminish Iran’s influence in Yemen. The Trump administration had declared the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). It appears that the Biden administration may reverse this designation. The humanitarian implications of an FTO designation are significant. It would become more difficult to get foreign aid and assistance into areas of Yemen controlled by the Houthis.

Biden and Yemen. The Biden administration is likely to give priority to the nuclear talks about the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreement with Iran over concerns about Iranian meddling in Middle East affairs. Some sales of aircraft and munitions to Saudi Arabia and the UAE are on hold and under review by the Biden administration. U.S. activities in Yemen are likely to be curtailed. This prohibition by the Biden administration does not include the actions the United States will take against al-Qaida affiliates in Yemen – to include al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsular (AQAP).

A Diplomatic Solution? The U.S. has now announced increased support to United Nations efforts for a political settlement of the conflict. In early February the United States named Tim Lenderking, a career member of the Senior Foreign Service, as U.S. Special Envoy to Yemen. However, a ceasefire and end to the conflict is unlikely. A United Nations Special Envoy to Yemen (established in June 2012) has failed in attempts to arrange a permanent ceasefire and political agreement. The Houthis are entrenched in Sanaa and the western highlands of Yemen. However, the opposition (Hadi government) and its supporters in the Gulf Cooperation Council insist that any political solution must include a Houthi departure from Sanaa.

U.S. Interests in the Yemen Conflict. There are reasons for the United States to be concerned with the events taking place at the southern end of the Arabian peninsular. There are fears that Yemen could become a sanctuary for transnational terrorist groups like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. The vital international shipping lanes near the Bab al Mandab Strait are at risk. In addition, Iran could possibly use Yemen in the future to threaten Saudi Arabia’s southern borders. How the Biden administration addresses these concerns while resetting the relationship with Iran will be watched with great interest.

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References:

Yemen: Civil and Regional Intervention, Congressional Research Service, CRS R43960, December 8, 2020.
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43960

Congress and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2020, Congressional Research Service, CRS R45046, June 19, 2020.
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45046

2016 – “The Year That Was”. A collection of articles that look back at 2016 in terms of national security, defense, Middle East, Afghanistan, India, Africa, books, war, conflict, and . . . of course . . . special operations.

Middle East in 2016

The Middle East . . .  Read more in “The Year that Was in the Middle East”, Lawfare, December 21, 2016. See also “Brookings expert’s takes on the biggest Middle East stores of 2016”, Brookings, December 28, 2016.

Syria. Russia (as well as Iran) embraced Syria and saved the Assad regime – one of its (Russia) best achievements was using its SOF and airpower to help capture Aleppo. The U.S. has been sidelined, a peace treaty negotiated in late December, and the Syrian Kurds are wondering when the U.S. will sell them out (as has happened many times before).

Iraq. ISOF has taken a leading role in the capture of Mosul (and previously other cities as well) but suffered 50% casualties in the 1st phase of the Mosul campaign. The tide has turned against the Islamic State as it suffers from territorial losses but the conflict with ISIS is far from over. The Kurds of Iraq are looking at a more autonomous future but it isn’t assured.

Turkey. A failed-coup, purging of many of its senior military officers, intervention in Syria (a defense against Kurdish gains), and a drift from the U.S. and NATO.

Yemen. If there was a conflict off the radar it is the one in Yemen. Activity of U.S. SOF in Yemen seems on again and off again. Our national interest, military and political objectives, and commitment seems to be either unknown or misunderstood by many. However, the al-Qaeda in the Arabian Penisula (AQAP) organization is considered extremely dangerous (in terms of striking the homeland) and U.S. drone strikes in Yemen against al-Qaida continue. To that end (it seems) the U.S. is supporting the Saudi coalition fighting the Houthi rebels (who are supported by Iran).

Jordan. Three Green Berets lost their lives in an armed attack by a gunmen in November. They were members of 5th Special Forces Group from Fort Campbell, Kentucky. Jordan is a close ally and one of the more stable Middle East countries.

South Asia in 2016

South Asia. Things don’t seem to be getting better in this part of the world. Afghanistan is still a mess and the India-Pakistan conflict may be heating up again.

Afghanistan – 2016 and Upcoming Challenges. For Afghanistan, 2016 was another year of good and bad. On a good note the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) have stayed loyal to the government, have not collapsed with the withdrawal of most of the Coalition forces from Afghanistan, and continue to improve in some functional areas. The government revenue – strangely – went up from taxes and other revenue sources. However, there is lots that has gone sour. The National Unity Government of Ghani and Abdullah can be counted as a failure and the Afghan security forces made no headway in degrading or defeating the Taliban. The Taliban control more territory since 2001. The Taliban mounted offensives in several areas of the country including Kunduz, Uruzgan, Farah, and Helmand province. Read “Challenges and Opportunities for Afghanistan in 2017”, The Diplomat, December 29, 2016.

Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF). The one bright spot about the conflict in Afghanistan has been the performance of the special operations kandaks of the Ministry of Defense and the special police units of the Ministry of Interior like the Crisis Response Unit (CRU). The Afghan government is seeking U.S. funding to expand the Afghan Local Police (ALP) from 30,000 to 40,000 – if the Afghans can institute the needed ALP reforms this could happen (a positive thing). There is something to be said about having competent Train, Advise, and Assist (TAA) teams working on a daily basis with tactical units. Unfortunately, the U.S. special forces community was hit hard with SF casualties this year in Afghanistan. Killed were Green Berets from 1st, 3rd, 7th, 10th, and 19th Special Forces Group.

India – Year in Review. India’s SOF units were busy and the military forces (including SOF) saw steps toward modernization. Read “From surgical strike to 80 martyred personnel, 2016 a mixed year for Army”, Business Standard, December 29, 2016.

Pakistan. A continuing thorn in the side of India (Kashmir) and a direct threat to Afghanistan (support of Haqqani Network and Taliban) – Pakistan also suffers from terrorism. Some would say a ‘self-inflicted wound’. Read more in “Pakistan’s Counterterrorism Failures”, Gandhara Blog (Radio Free Europe), December 29, 2016.

Africa in 2016

AFRICOM’s Top Stories in 2016. The United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) has had a busy year. Read more in “Year in Review – AFRICOM’s tops stories in 2016”, United States Africa Command, December 28, 2016. Poaching has emerged as a big issue – this problem never seems to go away and the U.S. is taking (perhaps half-hearted) some efforts to assist in the anti-poaching effort. China seems intent on continuing its presence in Africa and its military base in Djibouti (next to the French and U.S. base) should assist it in this objective. But what has AFRICOM’s attention is the Islamic State, Boko Haram, and Al-Shabaab . . . and to a lesser extent . . . the LRA. AFRICOM has big plans for the next year – see “New in 2017: Bigger exercises, more engagements in Africa”, Army Times, December 29, 2016.

SOCAFRICA Spread Thin. AFRICOM’s special operations component that handles SOF missions and operations for the African continent has been extremely busy. With 54 countries on the continent there is a lot of area to cover. There is lots of terrorist activity, security training and cooperation, and JCETs to occupy SOCAFRICA.

Everyone is in the Fight. MARSOC FID teams and 3rd Special Forces Group teams have had a leading role in SOCAFRICA’s operations, exercises, JCETs, and training events. 10th Special Forces Group has a piece of North Africa (heads up the FLINTLOCK annual exercise, which is a far cry from the FLINTLOCKs of old that took place in Germany in the 60s and 70s). 19th Special Forces Group stays busy with JCETs and exercises in Africa as well. 20th Special Forces Group heads up the effort against the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) as they fill the ranks of SOCFWD-CA. NSW and AFSOC are also spread across the continent. Lots of former SOF have found some meaningful contract work in Somalia, Kenya, and other African locations working for SOCAFRICA, AFRICOM, or other governmental agencies.

Somalia. There is a U.S. SOF presence in Somalia – sort of a ‘shadow war’. In 2016 the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) made progress in its operations against al Shabaab. However, Ethiopia (a member of AMISOM) has been withdrawing its troops and the AMISOM mission may come to a close. Some former SOF are working in a contract basis there and the State Department may be stepping up its involvement soon.

Libya. The U.S. (and other European allies) have quietly assisted various factions in Libya to defeat the Islamic State enclave in Sirte with airpower (Navy fix-wing and Marine Cobras took part), ISR, and SOF on the ground. A big question is what happens next in Libya. Can a strong central government (Government of National Accord in Libya) emerge that can reconcile the various political entities and militias? In order to do that a strong security force has to be built that is professional, non-political, and competent. Certainly a classic Security Force Assistance (SFA) mission ideal for European nations like Britain and Italy (with a little help from U.S. SOF).

Nigeria & Lake Chad Basin. SOCAFRICA has been in the fight against Boko Haram – probably one of the most dangerous groups in the world at this time. U.S. SOF and conventional units as well have provided assistance to Niger, Cameroon, Nigeria, and Chad to develop a unified effort against this terrorist and insurgent group. Exercises like FLINTLOCK continue to improve the regional cooperation among various African military organizations in this part of Africa. Nigeria’s attempt to buy the A-29 Super Tucano counterinsurgency aircraft from the United States failed and it is now in talks with Russia and Pakistan for a viable close air support fixed wing aircraft. While AFRICOM says Boko Haram is weakened it is still a threat.

Uganda Region. SOCFWD-CA’s mission continues against the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). Although its ranks have been severely diminished it still has managed to survive. In October 2011 a 100-man U.S. Army Special Forces contingent deployed to help defeat Joseph Kony and his vicious band. A good information operations campaign (MISO folks can count this as a success) encouraging LRA fighters to defect (“come home”) has helped reduce the ranks of the LRA.

Other Spots. We won’t go into Ethiopia, Kenya and other locations.

Terrorism in 2016

The Big Two. The two biggest terrorist organizations currently posing a threat to U.S interests are the Islamic State and al-Qaeda. Both have done well in mastering the information domain or terrorist use of social media. In addition they continue to pose a long-term threat to the U.S. homeland as well as to our allies on the European continent. A big part of the U.S. strategy is to target the leaders of these groups and to deny them sanctuary where they can plan, prepare, and launch attacks against U.S. interests.

A Resurgent al-Qaeda. The Islamic State is getting a lot of press. Al-Qaeda, on the other hand, seems content with staying off the radar screen. Publicity draws counter terrorism resources. The terrorist organization was severely hurt during the post-9/11 decade and, in part, replaced by the Islamic State in many areas of the world. But al-Qaeda is making a come-back. Read more in “A more dangerous long-term threat: Al-Aaida grows as ISIS retreats”, The Guardian, December 29, 2016. See also Bruce Hoffman’s (Georgetown University) article “Al Qaeda: Quietly and Patiently Rebuilding”, The Cipher Brief, December 30, 2016.

Islamic State in Decline? ISIS has seen its territory in Iraq reduced significantly. It has taken some losses in Syria as well (thanks to the Syrian Kurds). Libyan government and militia factions have chased ISIS out of Sirte, Libya (wonder where they went to?), and the ISIS footholds in Afghanistan have been reduced (by U.S. drones, U.S. SOF, ANASF, and the Taliban). But ISIS is adaptive and will still be around for a long time. While progress has been made some critics are hesitant to declare victory. See Rita Katz’s article “2016 in Review: Barack Obama’s War on the Islamic State has Failed”, INSITE Blog on Terrorism & Extremism, December 30, 2016.

How to Fight Terrorism in 2017? Matthew Olsen, former director of the National Counterterrorism Center, was recently (Dec 30) interviewed by The Cipher Brief on how to confront terrorism over the next year.

Defense Topics in 2016

DoD’s Top 10 Issues in 2016. The U.S. Department of Defense published a report that highlighted the Defense Department’s top ten issues for 2016. They included delivering ISIL a lasting defeat, building the force of the future, rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region, standing with our European allies, thinking outside the five-sided box, Resolute Support for Afghan security forces, investing for the future, recognizing our best, a new generation of defense leaders, and taking care of our people. See 2016 Year in Review, Department of Defense, December 22, 2016.

Gender Integration. Putting women into combat training and combat units and the integration of females into SOF has had mixed results. While three women graduated from the demanding Ranger School in 2015 – it appears that none have achieved the coveted Green Beret or SEAL Trident. The Marines gender integration plan seems uncertain as well.

Navy. According to one observer NAVSPECWARCOM continues to wield a disproportionate amount of influence within the SOF community – especially at USSOCOM. On a positive note the Sailors no longer have to wear those ‘blueberry’ uniforms that so effectively camouflage those who venture overboard. Former SEALs continue their leading role in the entertainment business with more movies, TV documentaries, books, and speaking engagements as a result of their past successful exploits like the Bin Ladin operation.

2016 is Another Big Year for SOF. The nature of conflict over the past several years and most likely into the foreseeable future has seen an increased use of special operations forces in the ‘Gray Zone’. Using SOF and drones helped keep the Obama administration from putting ‘boots on the ground’ in many of the overseas conflicts. Read more in SOF, Obama, and the Light Footprint. Of course, the U.S. isn’t the only nation to use special operations forces effectively. Our SOF allies can be found fighting alongside U.S. SOF in Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan, and a few other places. And, of course, Russia has its SOF units working hard in Crimea, Ukraine, and Syria as a component of their strategy of political warfare.

NATO: Aghanistan, Russia, and Immigration. NATO reaffirmed its support for Afghanistan with positive outcomes from the Brussels Conference (fall) and Warsaw Summit (summer). The Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan will continue until 2020. In addition, NATO has been occupied with the potential threat of Russia to the Ukraine, Poland, and Baltic States. Finland, Norway, and Sweden are feeling the pressure. NATO is responding with an increase of NATO exercises in Eastern Europe and positioning of NATO units forward into Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. Conventional forces stationed forward may help but NATO needs to increase its ability to stem the use of hybrid warfare by Russia. Immigration is a side issue with implications for maritime assets of NATO.

Intelligence in 2016

Biggest Spy Stories of the Year. Intelnews.org brings us the “Year in review: The 10 biggest spy-related stories of 2016”, December 29, 2016. Russia’s military intelligence organization is making a comeback – see “The GRU: Putin’s No-Longer-So-Secret Weapon”, The Daily Beast, 31 Dec 2016.

Other Topics in 2016

“War on the Rocks” and 13 Defining Developments of 2016. #1 – Taliban comeback, #2 – North Korea and nuclear development, #3 – chaos in Venezuela, #4 – Britain exit from EU, #5 – COP21 agreement, #6 – Boko Haram in Nigeria and humanitarian crisis, #7 – Philippines shift away from U.S. and towards China, #8 – Yemen’s forgotten war, #9 – Trump victory over Clinton, #10 – TPP failure, #11 – chance of peace in Colombia, #12 – South Korean politics, #13 – advantage to Assad regime. Read more on these topics in an end of year article by Ali Wyne – a fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Center on International Security in “Thirteen Developments That Defined 2016”, War on the Rocks, December 30, 2016.

Best Books of 2016. Foreign Affairs “The Best Books of 2016” lists their best academic and non-fiction books of the past year, posted December 9, 2016.

FRONTLINE. A documentary channel of Public Broadcasting System (PBS) has listed its ten most popular documentaries of 2016. A few of them are worth mentioning – #2 – “Saudi Arabia Uncovered”, #3 – “The Secret History of ISIS”, #7 – “Netanyahu at War”, and #9 – “Confronting ISIS”.

Did I Slight Anyone? Probably. SOF is busy all over the world. One only has to take a glance at the 2016 Fact Book published by the United States Special Operations Command to realize the extent of SOF’s commitment world wide. Not mentioned in this article are the contributions by Special Forces ODAs (from 1st, 7th, 19th and 20th SFGA), CA, PSYOP (or perhaps MISO is a more modern term), Rangers, Army SOF aviation, MARSOC, NSW, and AFSOC to SOCSOUTH and SOCPAC. Equally important ‘indirect SOF missions’ that achieve strategic national objectives in the western hemisphere and Pacific region.

2017? Should be another interesting year. U.S. Special Operations Forces will continue to be engaged around the world in conflicts and training events. A new administration is taking charge and it will soon develop its approach to the use of hybrid warfare by Russia (someones playing chess while we play checkers), the persistent terrorist threat, and expansion of Chinese influence in the Pacific.

The Combating Terrorism Center of West Point (the Army’s military academy) has published the July 2016 issue of CTC Sentinel. The cover story of this issue is on the destructive way that al-Qaida and the Islamic State are fighting each other. It is noted that as the Islamic States land holdings diminish it is branching out to other parts of the world. This puts it into direct competition with other jihadist groups. Other articles look at Germany’s response to terrorism and the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons.
www.ctc.usma.edu/publications/sentinel

The U.S. military conducted a counterterrorism strike against al-qaida operatives in Yemen – killing three. The strike took place on August 4th in the Shabwah Governate in central Yemen. The U.S. is putting pressure on the al-Qaida organization in Yemen to prevent them from plotting and executing attacks against the United States and Americans. Al-Qaida continues to be a significant threat and has had a destabilizing effect on Yemen. Read a news release about the strike by U.S. DoD, August 5, 2016.