The last several years the term Irregular Warfare (IW) has gained increased prominence within the national defense community. It has become a buzzword meaning different things to a variety of people and organizations. Irregular warfare consists of unconventional warfare (UW), counterinsurgency (COIN), counterterrorism (CT), foreign internal defense (FID), and stability operations (SO).

The U.S. recently published the Irregular Warfare Annex to the National Defense Strategy – which clarifies the role of IW within the Department of Defense and other government organizations. Since the IW annex has been published (Nov 2020) national security commentators have provided their perspective on what it means for the US defense establishment. Some of their more recent articles are provided below – with a brief synopsis of the article and link to the author’s article or publication.

Reimagining IW. A career Department of Defense civilian serving in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD SO/LIC), Kevin Bilms, expresses his views on how “Irregular Warfare” needs a new market strategy that will eliminate some misconceptions and assist others in recognizing IW’s potential value in great power competition. Read “What’s in a Name? Reimagining Irregular Warfare Activities for Competition”, War on the Rocks, January 15, 2021.

From CT to IW? Jason Criss Howk notes that the U.S. is moving from a narrow focus on counterterrorism (CT) to a broader focus on irregular warfare (IW). He says that the shift to a larger view of IW and all the tools in the government tool box is also part of a natural evolution of how CT is conducted. “From Counterterrorism to Irregular Warfare: What Does That Mean?”, Clearance Jobs, January 15, 2021.

Critical Thinking in the Military. Steve Ferenzi, a strategic planning officer at the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), shares his thoughts about red teaming and critical thinking in the military. He argues that “traditional American military culture diametrically opposes divergent thought.” For the US military to lead through influence and tools short of armed conflict it needs a tectonic cultural shift to harness the power of divergent thought. Read his article “The Death of Critical Thinking in the Military? Here’s How to Fix It”, Real Clear Defense, January 14, 2021.

IW and a Pentagon Bureaucracy Change. The introduction of great power competition has brought back (for some) the importance of irregular warfare (IW). The Defense Department has placed more emphasis on IW as part of a broader effort to counter Russia and China. Despite the emphasis on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency over the past two decades the US still has an overwhelming conventional force advantage with its near-peer adversaries. For that reason, Russia and others are using political warfare and irregular warfare to advance their strategic interests. It is time for the US to step up its IW game as well. The Pentagon has recently turned the Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office into the Irregular Warfare Technical Support Directorate. Read “A small bureaucratic change at the Pentagon hints at a major shift for US special-operations units”, Business Insider, January 11, 2021.

Dave Maxwell on IW, UW, PW, and CT. A retired Special Forces officer provides his perspective on the way forward when confronting Russia and China (as well as Iran and North Korea) in this new era of great power competition. He believes that SOF needs to focus on CT as well as on irregular warfare, unconventional warfare, and support to political warfare. He advocates some new principles both to frame special operations and communicate how the force supports the national strategy. “The Two Special Operations Trinities”, Small Wars Journal, January 6, 2021.

IW in Competition. Kevin Bilms states that “Irregular Warfare” is not a perfect term, but it helps to understand strategic competition short of an all-out war. He proposes that IW “. . . represents one way the military can apply its power complementarily with diplomatic, economic, financial and other elements of government power to secure strategic outcomes.” Read more in “Better Understanding irregular warfare in competition”, Military Times, January 1, 2021.

CA and IW. Three Army officers collaborate in an article on the role that Civil Affairs can play in bridging planning gaps and seams between convention and special operations forces in an irregular warfare environment. See “Building a Bridge: Cultivating an Irregular Warfare Mindset in the 83rd Civil Affairs Battalion”, Eunomia Journal, The Civil Affairs Association, December 28, 2020.

Podcast – Breaking the Boom-Bust Cycle of Irregular Warfare. David Maxwell (retired SF) and Deak Roh (of the ASD SO/LIC office) examine the IW Annex to the National Defense Strategy of 2018 and its relevance in an era defined by great power competition. Modern War Institute at West Point, December 18, 2020, 45 minutes.

Embracing IW. David H. Ucko, a professor at the National Defense University, believes that the release of the IW annex to the National Defense Strategy is insufficient to influence the reform and change needed to bring IW to the forefront within DoD and the US government at large. “Nobody Puts IW in an Annex: It’s Time to Embrace Irregular Warfare as a Strategic Priority“, Modern War Institute at West Point, October 14, 2020.

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Photo: A U.S. Army Special Forces Soldier assigned to 20th Special Forces Group and a Lithuanian National Defence Volunteer Forces (KASP) member conduct mission planning during exercise Saber Junction 2018 at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany. The exercise provided the opportunity to conduct irregular warfare in enemy occupied territory. Photo by 1st Lt. Benjamin Haulenbeek, SOCEUR, Sep 16, 2018.

References:

Summary of the Irregular Warfare Annex to the National Defense Strategy, DoD, 2020
https://media.defense.gov/2020/Oct/02/2002510472/-1/-1/0/Irregular-Warfare-Annex-to-the-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.PDF

Summary of the National Defense Strategy, DoD, 2018
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf

Special Forces and Irregular Warfare (IW)
https://specialforcestraining.info/topics/irregular-warfare.htm

“Book Review – The American Way of Irregular War”, SOF News, August 4, 2020. In this book LTG (Ret) Charles Cleveland provides an interesting look at the past 40 years of history of U.S. special operations. He provides recommendations for the restructuring of the U.S. special operations community and its approach to irregular warfare.
http://www.sof.news/publications/american-way-irregular-warfare/

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) has published a new publication by Will Irwin that augments previous reports about ‘resistance’. This new monograph explores “. . . the variety of considerations facing decision makers, the approaches used in strategic- and operational-level decision making, and how . . .” to better inform and influence that process with regard to special warfare.

This report describes some of the factors that decision makers consider when exploring support to resistance as a foreign policy option. The report describes how national security officials have arrived at certain conclusions in the past and why (in some instances) presidents have directed actions that were especially risky.

Foreword. LTG Kenneth Tovo, U.S. Army (Ret SF) provides the foreword. Tovo describes the three pubs dealing with ‘resistance’ that Will Irwin has authored. He comments that UW options generated by a TSOC rarely get passed up the chain of command for consideration at the national decision-making level. He also argues that it is important to truly understand the operational environment before embracing any policy but especially one of support to resistance. Tovo also stresses the importance of nesting support to resistance to a strategic framework. He concludes the foreword stating that “. . . supporting resistance movements will be an increasingly attractive policy option as we seek to compete with our adversaries while avoiding general war.”

Report Contents. Irwin uses some past examples of unsuccessful and successful UW campaigns to illustrate the points of his report. The Bay of Pigs event is an example of support to a resistance gone wrong; while the successful removal of the Taliban regime in 2001 shows how to do it right. He then discusses two important aspects of supporting resistance movements – recognizing an opportunity and the role of timing. Once again Irwin provides historical examples to make his point. Later in the paper the elements of risk, planning considerations, and legality are explored.

The paper highlights many of the considerations that decision makers typically face when considering an unconventional or support to resistance course of action. This paper, and the two previous papers on support to resistance published by JSOU, are excellent references and tools for special warfare planners and leaders.

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Will Irwin is a Resident Senior Fellow at the Joint Special Operations University. He is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces officer with experience as a defense analyst, researcher, historian, instructor, and writer.

Decision-Making Considerations in Support to Resistance, by Will Irwin, JSOU Report 20-1, March 2020, 86 pages, PDF.
https://jsou.libguides.com/ld.php?content_id=53517726

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Image: Front cover of the JSOU report.

Village Health Defense:
Health Self-Protection Framework for Rural Villages
in Militarized, Ceasefire, and Conflict Zones

by Moe Gyo

Background

Village Health Defense is a health self-protection framework to be employed by rural villagers in militarized, ceasefire, and conflict zones. The framework aims to anticipate, avoid/contain, and/or mitigate adverse health outcomes resulting from hostile/detrimental interactions between villagers and armed state actors. It seeks to strengthen the holistic relationship between armed non-state actors and their popular support base.

Village Health Defense has been designed and is presented within the context of the ongoing ethnic-based insurgencies inside Burma (aka Myanmar). The armed state actor is the Burma military who is arrayed against twenty armed non-state actors – ethnic armed organizations (EAOs). The framework further builds upon, and extends health to, the rural village self-protection techniques identified as Village Agency by the Thai-based Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG) and used by ethnic villagers in the militarized, ceasefire, and conflict zones of Karen State in Burma.

While a Burma-situated framework and non-state actor perspective, the Village Health Defense framework is modifiable to fit insurgencies elsewhere involving armed state and/or non-state actors.

Counter-Insurgency and Human Rights Abuses

Armed conflicts began in Burma shortly after its independence in 1948 between the dominant Bamar people from central Burma and the non-Bamar ethnic people from the peripheral hill and delta areas. These conflicts have been continuous since then through successive military, quasi-military, and civilian governments. The key issues are related to the ethnic people’s social, economic, and political aspirations for the self-autonomy and ethnic equality promised to them when they joined with the Bamar people to establish the Union of Burma. Consequently over the subsequent seventy years, many ethnic people formed EAOs to initially fight for independence and later for self-autonomy as manifested in some equitable form of political and resource power sharing. Counter-insurgency operations by the Burma military in areas controlled by the EAOs have resulted in numerous human rights abuses including war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Human Rights Abuses (including War Crimes and Crimes
against Humanity) Committed by Burma Military Units

Soldier Violence / Repression

Individual war trauma:

Beatings
Shootings
Shelling
Stabbings
Torture
Executions
Landmine injuries and deaths
Rape and other sexual violence

Deliberate destruction of villages, houses, schools, clinics, markets, and places of worship
Landmines planted in villages and fields, and on roads/trails
Kidnapping and disappearances
Arbitrary arrest and detention
Seizure/theft of money and valuables
Punitive curfews
Deprivation in health care, education, and access to humanitarian assistance
Religious, language, cultural, and livelihoods restrictions/discrimination
Checkpoints and restrictions on movements
Arbitrary checkpoint fees and other monetary payments

Food Insecurity

Seizure/theft/destruction of food, cooking supplies, food storage containers, crops, and livestock
Forced agricultural cropping programs
Forced selling of property or incurring of debt to meet arbitrary monetary demands
Uncompensated land confiscation
Arbitrary crop payments-in-kind

Forced Labor

Military conscription
Human minesweepers
Portering weapons and other war-related supplies
Guiding patrols
Sentry and messenger duties
Arbitrary gathering and delivering building materials to soldiers’ camps
Constructing roads and soldiers’ camps

Forced Displacement/Relocation

Conflict-induced displacements
Counter-insurgency relocations to “peace villages”
Refusal to allow reconstruction of/return to village

Human Rights Abuses and Adverse Health Outcomes

Such human rights abuses by Burma military units, in the form of soldier violence/repression, food insecurity, forced labor, and forced displacement/relocation, have been associated, through research* and anecdotally, with one or more of the following adverse health morbidity and/or mortality outcomes in Eastern Burma: *

Acute respiratory infections
Anemia
Diarrhea
Dysentery
Gunshot wounds/deaths
Infant/child deaths
Landmine injuries/deaths
Malaria
Malnutrition
Maternal deaths
Night blindness
Worm infestations
Other diseases, injuries, and deaths

* Chronic Emergency: Health and Human Rights in Eastern Burma, Back Pack Health Worker Team, 2006; Diagnosis Critical: Health and Human Rights in Eastern Burma, Back Pack Health Worker Team, et al., 2010; and, Health and Human Rights in Karen State, Eastern Myanmar, PLOS One, William W. Davis, et al., 2015.

These human rights abuses may cause adverse health outcomes either directly (e.g., trauma) or indirectly through changing conditions to those that lead to adverse health outcomes. Thus, the anticipation, avoidance/containment, and mitigation of the effects of these hostile/detrimental interactions with Burma military units are necessary components in protecting the health of ethnic villages in the militarized, ceasefire, and conflict zones in Burma.

***

Village Health Defense

The KHRG identified multiple effective techniques/activities used by rural ethnic villagers in the militarized, ceasefire, and conflict areas of Karen State in Burma to protect themselves from human rights abuses perpetuated by Burma military units. These villagers’ resistance techniques/activities are diverse and contextual. They have largely functioned to reduce or evade compliance with demands and restrictions. To these ends, villagers have employed techniques/activities including negotiation, bribery, lying, refusal, confrontation, false compliance, delayed response, evasion, counter-narratives, fleeing, displacement, preparation of hide and hidden food sites, advanced warning systems of approaching soldiers, and other self-protection techniques/activities. Village Agency is the term given by the KHRG to these rural village-level resistance initiatives villages in the militarized, ceasefire, and conflict areas of Karen State in Burma.

Building on Village Agency, Village Health Defense utilizes the value of villagers’ own collective knowledge, expertise, capacity, and insights as well as their pre-existing Village Agency techniques/activities to strengthen and extend collective villagers’ skills, abilities, techniques, and confidence necessary to also protect themselves from adverse health outcomes which may be associated with hostile/detrimental interactions with Burma military units. Village Health Defense seeks to intervene to modify/disrupt the relationship between the human rights abuses by Burma military units, and associated adverse health outcomes with actions over which villagers have more control and a lower probability of catastrophic effects despite the obvious power disparities, especially in the use of violence. Thus, Village Health Defense tries to carefully integrate those health self-protection techniques/activities which are less dangerous and over which villagers have more control.

***

Village Health Defense addresses three contact phases:

• Pre-contact with Burma military units
• Contact with Burma military units
• Post-contact with Burma military units

Village Health Defense: Pre-Contact with Burma Military Units

Pre-Contact Expected Outcome:
Village is less vulnerable to adverse health outcomes from hostile/detrimental interactions with Burma military units.

Pre-Contact Phase Objective – ANTICIPATE:
Assert the probability, extent, and possible impact of human rights abuses which may result in adverse health outcomes; and make the necessary preparations and precautions.

Village Agency Pre-Contact Phase Techniques/Activities:*

• Negotiating:
  Designate elderly women as village heads to act as “mother figures” to young Burma military unit leaders
  Designate dual village heads to deal with different Burma military unit leaders
  Develop the ability to size-up Burma military unit leaders
  Construct counter-narratives
• Bribing:
  Designate/collect communal money, food, crops, and animals to bribe Burma military unit leaders
• Lying:
  Prepare to underreport village populations, family members, acreage tilled, crops harvested, populations of draught animals, and other resources
•  Advanced location and preparation of displaced hide sites
• Cultivate several, geographically-dispersed, covert agricultural fields
• Establish covert trade and “jungle market” capabilities with local villages
• Establish and implement, in agreement with other villages, early warning systems of troop movements
• Secure local armed non-state actor(s) and/or religious mentor(s) patronage/protection
• Direct some individual family members to move to/secure employment in secure areas including urban areas and cross-border labor locations
• Develop evacuation plans and kits, and displacement site living skills
• Establish a rotating duty system to spread the burden of forced labor

Village Health Defense Pre-Contact Phase Techniques/Activities:

• Pre-position/hide food, shelter materials, insecticide-treated nets (ITNs), and environment-appropriate healthcare resources in the jungle near pre-designated hide sites
• Locate sources of adequate clean water, locally-available food, proper sanitation sites, and traditional remedies/medicines near pre-designated hide sites
• Obtain agreements with other villages to support each other in displacement with water, food, shelter, and medicine
• Establish healthcare assistance relationships with the health department/medical branch of the local armed non-state actor(s)
• Network with local and international aid groups, including those cross-border, which can provide healthcare and nutritional support
• Train, where and to the extent possible, skilled local village health workers, traditional birth attendants, and traditional medicine practitioners
• Develop village First Aid and emergency obstetric care skill sets
• Obtain, where and when possible, necessary and appropriate immunizations and prophylactics
• Address any outstanding medical and dental issues
• Conduct public health education, especially good personal hygiene practices and health in displacement
• Educate women of child-bearing age about family planning techniques and offer contraceptives to minimize maternal and child mortality during possible displacement
• Provide mine risk and unexploded ordinance education
• Prepare healthcare evacuation kits including regular medicine, herbal medicine medical supplies, and ITNs

* Village Agency: Rural rights and resistance in a militarized Karen State, Karen Human Rights Group, 2008

Village Health Defense: Contact with Burma Military Units

Contact Phase Expected Outcome:
Adverse health outcomes from human rights abuses are minimized from hostile/detrimental interactions with Burma military units.

Contact Phase Objective – AVOID/CONTAIN:
Establish conditions to prevent and/or lower the probability and possible impact/extent of human rights abuses which may result in adverse health outcomes.

Village Agency Contact Phase Techniques/Activities:*

• Ignoring
• Refusing
• Confronting
• Evading
• Delayed responding
• Negotiating:
  Size-up Burma military leaders and respond accordingly
  Use elderly women as “mother figures” to young Burma military unit leaders
  Use dual village heads to deal with different Burma military unit leaders
  Don’t offer as much money, food, animals, and/or labor as could
  Use counter-narratives
• Bribing:
  Use communal money, food, crops, and animals, as necessary, to bribe the Burma military unit leaders
• Lying:
  Underreport village population, family members, acreage tilled, crops harvested, populations of draught animals, and other resources
  Exaggerate resource poverty and the inability to comply
  Claim to comply with similar demands from a related Burma military unit
  Feint illness
  False compliance
• Fleeing/displacement to, and sustainability in, prepared hide sites:
  Monitor further troop movements with pre-established warning systems
  Carry evacuation kits including important documents to hide sites
• Employ the rotating duty system to comply with and spread the burden of forced labor

Village Health Defense Contact Phase Techniques/Activities:

• Minimize exposure time to Burma military units
• Immediately protect, stabilize, and treat or transport victims of human rights abuses

* Village Agency: Rural rights and resistance in a militarized Karen State, Karen Human Rights Group, 2008

Village Health Defense: Post-Contact with Burma Military Units

Post-Contact Phase Expected Outcome:
Functional health is restored and there is a return, as much as possible, to a normal healthy life after human rights abuses from the hostile/detrimental interactions with Burma military units.

Post-Contact Phase Objective – MITIGATE:
Treat and recover from the adverse health outcomes caused by human rights abuses.

Village Agency Post-Contact Phase Techniques/Activities:*

• Displacement site sustainability:
  Cultivate covert agricultural fields
  Harvest at night
  Use pre-established overt trade and “jungle markets” with other villages
  Villages continue to support each other with early warning systems and monitoring of troop movements
  Secure local armed non-state actor(s) and/or religious mentor(s) patronage/protection
  Obtain and maintain assistance from individual family members who moved to/secured employment in secure areas

Village Health Defense Post-Contact Phase Techniques/Activities:

• Village sustainability:
  Mark land, fields, roads, and trails in respect to landmines/unexploded ordinance
  Access healthcare assistance from the health department/medical branch of the local armed non-state actor(s)
  Access healthcare and nutritional support from local and international aid groups, including those cross-border
• Displacement site sustainability:
  Construct and maintain proper sanitation and clean water sites
  Share water, food, medicine, and shelter with fellow villagers
  Promote good personal hygiene practices
  Use hidden food stores, locally-available food, and traditional remedies/medicines
  Access health care assistance from the health department/medical branch of the local armed non-state actor(s)
  Access health and nutritional support from local and international aid groups, including those cross-border
  Establish health services appropriate to the displacement conditions
  Prioritize treatment, especially of children, pregnant women, and elderly
  Immediately respond to malnutrition, typhoid, diarrhea, dysentery, measles, cholera, and other diseases with epidemic potential with the resources at hand

* Village Agency: Rural rights and resistance in a militarized Karen State, Karen Human Rights Group, 2008

***

Village Workshops

Village workshops are facilitated by the local armed non-state actor or associated community-based/civil society organization to develop a locally-derived Village Health Defense capability. The workshops utilize the collective capacity and analytical ability of villagers to assess and respond to their specific situation through anticipating, avoiding/containing, and/or mitigating any adverse health outcomes from human rights threats posed to them by interactions with Burma military units. In these workshops, villagers:

1. Identify and understand the probable human rights abuse threats, faced by them, which may result in adverse health outcomes and that the village requires protection;
2. Identify and understand the health vulnerabilities and possible adverse health outcomes that the village may have from the revealed human rights abuse threats;
3. Identify and evaluate the existing self-protection techniques/activities and capacities which the village has to protect against human right abuse threats which may result in adverse health outcomes;
4. Consider and evaluate the self-protection techniques/activities and capacities within the Village Health Defense template and otherwise offered by the workshop facilitators which the village should utilize to protect themselves against human right abuse threats which may result in adverse health outcomes;
5. Prioritize resultant self-protection techniques/activities according to the anticipated severity of particular adverse health outcomes, probability of the occurrence of associated human rights abuses, and what is most appropriate and achievable to address, given the capacities of the village so as to determine where to place emphasis;
6. Incorporate the resultant self-protection techniques/activities into the Village Health Defense’s three-phase framework; and,
7. Assign roles and responsibilities for self-protection techniques/activities in each of the Village Health Defense’s three phases with appropriate timelines for any preparatory activities.

The final Village Health Defense framework must accurately reflect, as much as possible under the circumstances, the village’s specific human rights abuse threats, health vulnerabilities, and self-protection capacities/resources, and seek to realistically reduce the:

• Incidences and severity of human rights abuse threats which may possibly result in adverse health outcomes;
• Health vulnerabilities through building self-protection capacity by identifying and developing appropriate health self-protection techniques to anticipate, avoid/contain, and/or mitigate possible adverse health outcomes from human rights abuses;
• Exposure time to human rights abuses so as to avoid, control and/or mitigate the worst potential morbidity and mortality effects of particularly risky moments; and,
• Adverse health outcomes – morbidity and/or mortality – resulting from human rights abuses from hostile/detrimental interactions with Burma military units.

Conclusion

Village Health Defense provides a framework for rural villages in militarized, ceasefire, and conflict zones to utilize augmented village-derived and contextual-based self-protection techniques/activities to anticipate, avoid/contain, and/or mitigate adverse health outcomes resulting primarily from hostile/detrimental interactions with armed state actors. It is important for all armed non-state actors to protect their popular support base. The protection of the population’s health is a key aspect of that vital holistic relationship.

***

Author: Moe Gyo serves with various ethnic organizations in the Thai-Burma borderlands.

This paper can be downloaded at the link below:
www.sof.news/pubs/village-health-defense-Moe-Gyo-June-2018.pdf

]]> 6565 https://sof.news/publications/modern-political-warfare/ Fri, 06 Apr 2018 03:17:02 +0000 http://www.sof.news/?p=5746 RAND Corporation has published a 355-page paper entitled Modern Political Warfare : Current Practices and Possible Responses (April 2018). Those readers in the special operations community will recognized the names of many of the co-authors of this paper: Linda Robinson, Todd C. [...]]]>

RAND Corporation has published a 355-page paper entitled Modern Political Warfare : Current Practices and Possible Responses (April 2018). Those readers in the special operations community will recognized the names of many of the co-authors of this paper: Linda Robinson, Todd C. Helmus, Raphael Cohen, and several others.

This study examines political warfare as practiced today by nations and nonstate actors. The research was sponsored by the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) G-9. The contents of the paper are listed below by chapter.

Chapter 1 – Introduction
Chapter 2 – History of U.S. Political Warfare
Chapter 3 – Case Study: Russia
Chapter 4 – Case Study: Iran
Chapter 5 – Case Study ISIL
Chapter 6 – Attributes of Modern Political Warfare
Chapter 7 – Influence Communications Lessons for the United States
Chapter 8 – Effective Statecraft and Integration of Measures Short of War
Chapter 9 – Conclusion

This paper is a good read for those in the SOF community. Chapter 8 provides eight recommendations for the U.S. military and U.S. special operations forces (SOF) in particular as they provide many of the capabilities used in political warfare.

www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1772.html

]]> 5746 https://sof.news/update/20161223/ Fri, 23 Dec 2016 08:00:53 +0000 http://www.sof.news/?p=2180 SOF News Update 20161223 – Russian SOF may get a robot ‘tanklet’, why sending more U.S. SOF to Syria is a bad idea (according to one pundit),  SOF should be SOF – some recommendations, book excerpt of “Rogue Heroes”, Iraqi [...]]]>

SOF News Update 20161223 – Russian SOF may get a robot ‘tanklet’, why sending more U.S. SOF to Syria is a bad idea (according to one pundit),  SOF should be SOF – some recommendations, book excerpt of “Rogue Heroes”, Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service (CTS), protection of SOF under Geneva Conventions, how to be a Green Beret, and more.

Russian SOF ‘Tanklet’. Read up on a mobile explosive device delivered by a small robot tank that may soon be fielded to Russian special operations forces in “Russian Special Forces May Get a Robot Tanklet”, Popular Science, December 21, 2016.

More SOF for Syria – Bad Idea. Daniel L. Davis, a retired U.S. Army colonel and senior fellow with Defense Priorities, believes that sending more special operations forces to Syria is a wasteful effort. He reviews the limited accomplishments thus far and has little hope for future engagements in that war-torn country. Read “Sending special ops to Raqqa means more cannon fodder for Syria”, The Hill Defense Blog, December 22, 2016.

CTS Success and Degradation. The Iraqi SOF (Counter Terrorism Service) is bearing the brunt of the fight for Mosul. While the end result will be victory in a few weeks (or months) the CTS will be significantly degraded due to excessive casualties. Who fills the security void? The proxy forces of Iran. Read “The Iraqi Military, The US-led Coalition and the Mosul Operation: The Risk of Snatching Defeat from the Jaws of Victory”, Small Wars Journal, December 22, 2016.

What Does it Take to be a GB? Bert Kunz – a retired Green Beret – is interviewed on the selection process for Special Forces. Read “Special Profile: What Does it Take to Become a Green Beret?”, Scout.com Warrior, December 21, 2016.

Recommendations for use of SOF. One author provides some recommendations that she believes will give the DoD “. . . the flexibility to engage, support, and deploy SOF effectively and efficiently.” Read “Special Operations Forces: Let SOF be SOF”, by Kristen R. Hajduk, a fellow with the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), December 2016.

SOF, Clandestine Operations, and the Geneva Convention. One Special Forces officer – CPT Charles Staab – believes that international law concerning warfare needs to be updated to account for the changes in warfare and to accord certain protections to special operations forces that operate without benefit of uniforms or openly-carried weapons. Read more in “Uncloaking the Dagger: Does Adherence to the Geneva Conventions Betray Special Operations Forces”, Small Wars Journal, December 22, 2016.

Navy SEAL Eric Olson to Advisory Board. The former head of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) Admiral Eric Olson has been appointed as members of the Sarcos Robtics company advisory board. GovConWire, December 22, 2016.

Book – “Rogue Heroes”. Ben Macintrye has wrote a book about the early beginnings of the British Special Air Service. Read a short excerpt of the book at Barnes & Noble, December 2016.

Building relationships and rapport is an extremely important step towards working with a a component of a resistance movement – whether it is a guerrilla force, part of the underground, or a the support network. It is also extremely important during counterinsurgency (COIN), Foreign Internal Defense (FID), and other types of advisory and training missions that involves working with paramilitary forces or the military of other countries.

Among the most essential components of such missions is relationship-building, the working with local allies to overthrow corrupt regimes like the Taliban. It involves embedding in local militia units, sharing their accommodations, eating at their communal meals. It involves drinking tea, taking horse rides along steep mountain trails. It’s sharing their hardships, bathing in icy rivers, and sleeping in a cave or under a truck in the mountains in freezing November weather.

“I find the best way to start out is, even if you don’t know a language fluently, showing an effort that you want to learn the language,” said Chief Warrant Officer 2 Brad Fowers, a Special Forces Soldier who served on one of the first Special Forces teams to go into Afghanistan in 2001. “Picking up on cultural nuances, you know, the placing of a hand on the chest, head gestures, picking up on all of these things and kind of giving that back when you communicate with a partner force just shows a lot of respect.”

Building trust, whether it’s by showing local fighters they can rely on America, that there will be bombs, ammunition and humanitarian supplies to support them, he said, “is everything. I think that was really highlighted in Afghanistan. … You have a handful of Americans there. At any time, that town can fold on you. You only have so much ammunition. You’re just as reliant on them as they are on you.”

U.S. Army Special Forces Green Berets learn how to work with indigenous forces during the Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC) and are put to the test during an Unconventional Warfare exercise called Robin Sage. A huge part of the SF Soldiers ability to establish rapport and a long-term beneficial relationship is the ability to converse in the counterpart’s language. Green Berets go through extensive Special Forces language training before they are assigned to a Special Forces operational detachment.

Read the rest of the article about building relationships with local proxy forces – “A Green Beret reflects on necessity of strong relationships with local allies” – by Elizabeth M. Collins, Defense Media Activity, Army.mil, November 17, 2016.

SOF News Update 20161002 – Counter-Terrorism,  Australian SAS to train NATO troops, India’s communist rebels, museum for Navy SEALs, airstrikes in Somalia, article about UW in Gray Zones, Son Tay Raiders reunion, Soldier’s Medal for Green Beret, Turkey Special Forces in northern Syria, female attempting TACP training falls short, and more.

Maoists of India. Almost 90 percent of terrorism related deaths worldwide are caused by Islamic terrorists – the remaining terrorist related deaths are by the remnants of leftist (communist) rebel groups. One such group is the Maoists of India (sometimes referred to as Naxalites). Read more in “Counter-Terrorism: Distant Second and Fading”, Strategy Page, September 28, 2016.

Endstate Fallacy: How Do Wars End? Anthony H. Cordsman of the Center for Stategic & International Studies (CSIS) has penned a paper that discusses how wars and conflicts will result in endstates that are hard to control or pre-determine. He looks at the five conflicts (wars) the U.S. is currently involved in (with either conventional or special operations forces) – Libya, Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Read The “End State” Fallacy: Setting the Wrong Goals for War Fighting, CSIS, September 26, 2016.

Green Beret Recognized for Boston Marathon Heroism. An Army Special Forces officer, LTC David Diamond, had just completed the 2013 Boston Marathon when he heard a loud blast. A veteran of five tours in Iraq, he immediately ran to the scene of the explosion and began providing life-saving first aid. Read “Green Beret awarded for heroism during ‘pandemonium’ of Boston bombing”, The Hill Defense Blog, September 27, 2016.

Australian SAS to Train NATO Troops. Australian special operations troops are training up Iraqi government forces as part of a larger NATO-led effort. In addition, it appears that Australia’s relationship with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will continue to grow. Read more in “Australia’s SAS elite set to train elite European troops”, The West Australian, September 28, 2016.

41-Year-Old Chaplain Earns Ranger Tab. An Army officer with zero tactical knowledge has passed Ranger school. Read his story in Task & Purpose, September 28, 2016.

Son Tay Raiders Reunion. In November 1970 a group of Special Forces Soldiers boarded helicopters and landed at a North Vietnamese prisoner of war (POW) camp thought to house a number of American POWs. The camp was empty but it prompted better treatment of the POWs by the North Vietnamese. The SF Soldiers recently held a reunion. Read “Son Tay raiders reunite at Fort Bragg”, Fayetteville Observer, October 1, 2016.

Female Attempting TACP Training Injured. The first woman to enter Tactical Air Control Party training has left the program due to an injury. She was in the TACP Preparatory Course at Joint Base San Antonio-Lackland, Texas. Read more in “First woman to attempt TACP training left after injury”, Air Force Times, September 28, 2016.

Paralyzed Green Beret Can Remain in Army. The Special Forces Soldier who suffered a serious injury trying to rescue a drowning victim can be honorably discharged and receive medical care for his injury after discharge. The Army has overturned a decision to discharge him with a less than honorable record which would have cost him thousands in medical expenses for the rest of his life. Sanity prevails! The current leadership in 7th Special Forces is viewed by some as ‘toxic’; which may have contributed to this case getting so out of hand – and requiring the intervention of a U.S. Congressman and the commander of USASOC. Read more in “Army Overturns Decision to Kick Out Paralyzed Hero”, The Daily Beast, September 29, 2016.

“Defensive” Airstrikes in Somalia. The U.S. has had SOF operating in Somalia for a few years – working with Somalian counter-terrorist forces. Part of the assistance the U.S. SOF provides are enablers – such as ISR and airstrikes. The United States African Command (AFRICOM) has been releasing news reports about ‘self defense air strikes’ in Somalia. There is a little more to the story. Read “AFRICOM masks military operations in Somalia as ‘self defense strikes'”, The Long War Journal, October 1, 2016.

Turkish SF in northern Syria. Turkey has deployed hundreds of its Special Forces into northern Syria. Not to fight the Syrian regime troops; not to wage war against ISIS; but to stop the advance of the Kurdish forces that have been doing the heavy lifting against the Islamic State. Read more in a news report by The Independent, October 1, 2016.

More on northern Syria. A week ago the press was reporting that U.S. Special Forces were ‘run out’ of a northern Syrian town by a militia group. Seems it didn’t quite go down that way; it was a propaganda ploy by one of the many factions involved in the fighting. The situation in northern Syria is confusing at best. One recent news report tries to shed light on the whole mess. Read “Syrian Rebels Taunt U.S. Troops”, The Daily Beast, September 30, 2016.

Article – UW in Gray Zones. Two writers, currently working with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, explore the similarities between covert action and unconventional warfare that have led to a negative perception of UW and lengthy delays in its use. The authors offer three actions to overcome these perceptions and enable the use of UW as a timely foreign policy option. Read “Enabling Unconventional Warfare to Address Grey Zone Conflicts“, Small Wars Journal, September 28, 2016.

Museum for SEALs. A museum is being planned in suburban New York to honor U.S. Navy SEALs. It is expected to be built by 2018 at a county park on eastern Long Island. Read more in a news report by Stars & Stripes, September 30, 2016.