A publication has been released by the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) about how special operations forces command and control evolved with the Village Stability Operations (VSO) program.

The VSO program in Afghanistan provides a timely and relevant example of how SOF can contribute to the competition space below the level of armed conflict in today’s era of great power competition (GPC). Like terrorism, GPC will play out in countries with weak sociopolitical systems. The characteristics of VSO can be replicated in many parts of the world for sustainable strategic effect.

VSO was an instrument used within a foreign internal defense (FID) environment where the Afghan government was unable to effectively govern – whether due to insecurity, ineffectiveness, or corruption. VSO and its accompanying Afghan Local Police (ALP) program endeavored to create security, development, and governance in active conflict zones.

With the 2018 National Defense Strategy the U.S. military is shifting focus from counterinsurgency and counterterrorism to the near peer threat. VSO is inherently political in character and has a joint, interagency, international, multinational, and corporate nature. This report presents concepts for how special operations forces can contribute to not only the counterterrorism fight but also within the context of great power competition.

JSOU. The Joint Special Operations University is the educational component of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) located at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. It provides specialized professional military education to SOF professionals as well as conducting research and analysis in support of USSOCOM objectives.

Authors.

Dr. William Knarr (U.S. Army Colonel, Ret.) is a non-resident Senior Fellow at JSOU where he supports their research program and teaches / leads seminars on irregular warfare. He also is an adjunct professor at the National Intelligence University where he teaches graduate courses on intelligence and special operations.

Mark Nutsch (U.S. Army Major, Ret) has provided contract support to USSOCOM J3 Training and Education. He has served on active and reserve status in the Airborne Infantry, 75th Ranger Regiment, and as a Special Forces officer. He was the commander of SFODA 595 when it deployed into Northern Afghanistan in 2001.

Village Stability Operations and the Evolution of SOF Command and Control in Afghanistan: Implications for the Future of Irregular Warfare, by William Knarr and Mark Nutsch, JSOU Report 20-2, JSOU Press, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, April 2020, PDF, 174 pages.
https://jsou.libguides.com/ld.php?content_id=53882670

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Image: From the front cover of the report cited above.

Dan Green has provided us with a book that details the U.S. special operations forces (SOF) participation in an innovative method to combat the insurgents in Afghanistan. The Village Stability Operations (VSO) and Afghan Local Police (ALP) were programs to energize local support for the Afghan national, provincial, and district government institutions in remote and inaccessible areas where conventional U.S., NATO, and Afghan security forces were scarcely distributed.

The Village Stability Operations program was designed to work along three lines of effort – security, governance, and development. A big part of the VSO program was the establishment of a local police force called the Afghan Local Police. Special operations forces from the U.S. Army Special Forces, U.S. Navy SEALs, and U.S Marines (MARSOC) were embedded in villages, communities, or district centers to work the three lines of effort of VSO and to help establish and train the ALP. In his book, Dan Green provides a detailed history of how SOF was able to stabilize the southern Afghan province of Uruzgan.

Dan Green is the author of two previous books – Fallujah Redux and The Valley’s Edge.  Dan Green is a Defense Fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy focusing on counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, and stability operations in the Middle East and Central Asia. He is a reserve officer with the U.S. Navy with several deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq as both a Naval officer and various civilian agencies. His time in Afghanistan includes a stint as a tribal and political engagement officer in Uruzgan province (2012), as a ISAF Liaison Officer to the U.S. Embassy’s Office of Interagency Provincial Affairs in Afghanistan (2009-2010), and as a civilian with the State Department as the political advisor to the Tarin Kowt Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Uruzgan province (2005-2006). Dan Green has also served two tours in Iraq (2007) and (2015-2016).

The book by Dan Green is now available on Amazon.com at the link below.

www.amazon.com/Warlords-Shadow-Special-Operations-Afghans/dp/161251815X/

SOF News Weekly Update for 20160925 – SOF tactical drones, Marine’s Raider insignia, 352nd SOW, ‘offroad aircraft’ for SOF, Norway’s all-female SOF unit, the revamped AC-130J Gunship (Ghostrider), SF out of Philippines, battlefield technology shop for USSOCOM, US Special Forces out of Philippines, papers on hybrid warfare and UW PSYOP, and more.

Marine’s Raider Insignia. A retired Marine Corps general comes out in favor of the MARSOC insignia – saying it gives Marine SOF ‘street cred’. (Marines Corps Times, Sep 19, 2016).

SOF Microdrone. It is something out of the movies but will soon become part of the SOF toolkit. An autonomous drone that can fly without a GPS and which requires little human interaction. Read more in “Special Operators Are Getting a New Autonomous Tactical Drone”, Defense One Technology, September 11, 2016.

352nd SOW Training in UK. Some CV-22’s have been conducting low-level and terrain-following missions in the UK. Read more in The Press and Journal, September 20, 2016.

US SOF’s ALP. The good, the bad and the ugly. Read an extensive report about how one of US special operations forces programs – the Afghan Local Police or ALP – worked very well or went very wrong. See “How to replace a bad ALP commander: in Shajoy, success and now calamity”, Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN), September 1, 2016.

Off-Road Aircraft for SOF? An interesting concept has the attention of the SOF community. A vehicle that can travel on the ground (70 mph) and fly (up to 10,000 ft). Read more in a news report by The Washington Times, September 20, 2016.

Airborne Laser Designators for SOF Contract Air? One former SOF aviator thinks we should consider putting a more robust support system on SOF contract aviation assets that support SOF ground elements around the world. An interesting read on SOF contract aviation. Read more in “Supporting SOF Teams With Airborne ISR”, LinkedIn Pulse, September 13, 2016.

Norway’s All-Female SOF Unit. In 2014, Norway created the world’s first all-female special operations unit. Call “Hunter Troop”, or Jegertroppen, its members undergo a year-long training program. In 2014 the course had a 96% attrition rate. Read more in a news report by Task & Purpose, September 14, 2016.

10th SFGA and Colorado State University – A Healthy Combination. USSOCOM is sponsoring a to promote the psychological health of SOF members. Read more in “CSU promotes groundbreaking study of program for returning military”, CSU Source, September 23, 2016.

7th SFGA DCO Interview. The DCO of 7th SFGA chats about the Florida community and post-Army plans in “A conversation with Col. Robert Kirila”, NWF Daily News, September 23, 2016.

Female Marine Falls Short in MARSOC training. A female Maine finished Phase I (Assessment & Selection) of the Marines Special Operations training course but did not advance to the next phase. (Marine Corps Times, Sep 23, 2016).

Interesting Article on SF Selection and the Private Sector. Read “Special Forces, Entrepreneurship, and Selecting for Intangibles”, The Havok Journal, September 21, 2016.

AC-130J Gunship. New armament makes the gunship a formidable weapon. Watch a video on the improvements made to this airplane – referred to as a ‘bomb truck with guns’. (Defense News, Sep 19, 2016).
www.defensenews.com/video/air-forces-most-lethal-gunship

Book Review of SAS Rogue Heroes. A new book provides fresh insight into the Special Air Service activities during World War II and also on its more unofficial goings-on after the war. (Daily Mail, Sep 22, 2016).

SF Out of Southern Philippines. For years one of the quiet success stories of U.S. Army Special Forces has been the SOF task force operating in the Philippines helping the Philippine military keep the Islamist insurgents at bay. SF has been deployed on an almost continuous basis since 2002 in that country conducting an advise and assist mission. Things are about to change with the election of Rodrigo Duterte as the President of that nation. He has called for the U.S. Special Forces to leave the southern Philippines. At the height of the mission over 1,000 participants were deployed; currently there are about 200 U.S. military involved in the mission. Read more in “Duterte Wants U.S. Special Forces Out of the Southern Philppines”, Foreign Policy Passport, September 12, 2016.

Interesting Video of SOF on Ground in Syria. A short video clip seems to show a demonstration against American special operators in Syria as they leave a Syrian town. (Task & Purpose, Sep 19, 2016).
http://taskandpurpose.com/video-appears-show-american-special-operators-run-syrian-village/

SF as Observers in Foreign Wars? One author suggests the reintroduction of American military observers accompanying foreign armies into battle as ‘military observers’. He believes that Special Forces officers and NCO’s are ideally suited for this job. Read more in “Special Forces as Military Observers in Modern Combat”, Real Clear Defense, September 21, 2016.

USSOCOM Cdr Comes Out Against Publicity. Army General “Tony” Thomas, Commander of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), has come out strongly against the the many books and movies about SOF that seem to be to revealing. Read more in “Top U.S. Special Operations general: “We’re hurting ourselves’ with all these movies and books”, The Washington Post,  September 15, 2016.

Paralyzed Green Beret to be Forced out of Army without Medical Benefits? It appears that Human Resources Command is about to commit a huge blunder in its adverse discharge of a Special Forces Soldier from the Army. SFC Tim Brumit was paralyzed from the chest down after he jumped from a boat into shallow water in Florida attempting to assist a distressed swimmer in the summer of 2015. The multiple combat veteran with 12-years service dove at the wrong time – between waves when the water was extremely shallow. The Army decided to find “No” on the Line of Duty investigation means that he will receive an other than honorable discharge which will cost him a huge amount of money in future medical costs. The Army’s reasoning is that they found traces of drugs and alcohol in his system. Read more in a story by Army Times, September 17, 2016.

Challenge Coins? Not just SF. See “CIA challenge coins: Secret symbolism, dark humor can be had for a price on eBay”, The Washington Post, September 21, 2016.

SOF in the Future. Read an article by LTG Charles Cleveland (Ret) and Col David Maxwell (Ret) on where SOF needs to go in the future. “U.S. Special Operations Forces at 9-11, Today, and for the Future”, The Cipher Brief, September 11, 2016.

14 Firms funded by CIA. The Central Intelligence Agency has been pumping money into innovative Silicon Valley firms for a few years. Read more in “14 cutting edge firms funded by the CIA”, Business Insider, September 21, 2016.

Paper: UW PSYOP. Read “Unconventional Warfare Psychological Operations: An ODA’s Experience at JRTC”, Small Wars Journal, September 11, 2016.

Paper: Hybrid Warfare and SOF. “Hybrid warfare: How to shape special operations forces”, by Norbert Vaczi, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, June 2016.

Paper: SOF and Somalia. Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency in Somalia: Assessing the Campaign Against al Shabaab, by Seth G. Jones et al, RAND Corporation, September 2016. “This study finds that a tailored engagement strategy – which involved deploying a small number of U.S. special operations forces . . . ”

Paper: Governance and COIN in Afghanistan. An AfPak Hand who worked for the Combined Joint Special Operations Component Command – Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A) in 2011 writes on his experience working at the district level along the Pakistan border. Read The Illusion of Governance: The Challenges of Providing Effective Governance as a Tool of Counterinsurgency in Eastern Afghanistan’s Paktika Province, by Jorge J. Mendoza, 2011, 119 pages.

The Afghan Local Police (ALP) was established by U.S. Army Special Forces in 2010 to serve as a locally-based village or community self-defense force. The ALP units are recruited from local communities of key areas where Afghan government influence or control was minimal. The recruits are selected and vetted by the village or community leaders and are also screened by the Afghan National Police (ANP) and Ministry of Interior (MoI).

The Afghan Local Police were part of a larger counterinsurgency program of the U.S. Special Forces called Village Stability Operations (VSO). The VSO program entailed a comprehensive and complementary plan incorporating aspects of security, governance, and development utilizing a ‘bottom up’ methodology.

The ‘top down’ system of pushing security, development, and governance from Kabul to the provinces and districts was viewed as not working. This was caused by inexperienced, corrupt, and inept government officials and organizations at the national and provincial level. Many Special Forces personnel believed that the establishment of local security forces similar to the Afghan historical arbakai would capitalize on Afghans who would likely fight for their own tribes and communities but would be less inclined to fight for a central government located in a distant Kabul.

A number of key districts were identified by the U.S. Special Forces for the establishment of Village Stability Platforms (VSPs). The ‘platforms’ were a tailor-made ad hoc unit of between 30-50 individuals formed around the nucleus of a special operations team (Green Berets, SEALs, or MARSOC). The ‘platforms’ were augmented by a variety of individuals to include mechanics, intelligence analysts, cooks, SIGINT, interpreters, PSYOP, Civil Affairs, Cultural Support Team (CST), and others.

The Afghan Local Police were a key component of the Village Stability Operations program – providing the ‘security’ aspect of VSO (along with the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police that were also within the VSO area of operations).

The ALP units were established once the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force – Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A) conducted a detailed analysis of the proposed area to determine if the village, community, or district needed a VSO / ALP program, if the program could be successful, and if there was adequate support from the local community. In addition, the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MoI) had to approve of the ALP unit being formed.

The village elders, Afghan security representatives, and special operations personnel would conduct a ‘shura’ and / or ‘jirga’ to discuss the forming of an ALP unit. If the community was receptive then the recruitment of ALP members would proceed. The recruits would be screened by the Afghan security representatives and vetted by the community.

The formal three-week training program was usually conducted by the U.S. special operations team that would form the nucleus of the Village Stability Platform. Often times the ALP recruits would go to a regional training center. Eventually training would be done by the Afghan National Army Special Forces and later by the Afghan National Police.

As the drawdown of U.S. and Coalition troops began in 2012 the United States began closing down some of the Village Stability Platforms and transferring the responsibility of the VSPs and ALP to the respective District Governor (DGov) and District Chief of Police (DCoP). Naturally, without the constant supervision, oversight, advice, assistance, training, and support of the U.S. special operations teams the effectiveness, in most cases, of the Afghan Local Police diminished.

As of 2016 the Afghan Local Police has been fully transferred to the Afghan Ministry of Interior. Almost all U.S. SOF have been removed from training and advising of the ALP. The only exception is a small advisory team located at Camp Resolute Support HQs in Kabul that works with the Afghan MoI on ALP issues. This ‘Special Operations Advisory Group’ or SOAG – of probably 20-25 members – monitors, provides oversight, and performs the ‘Train, Advise, and Assist’ mission for the ALP directorate of the MoI. [1]

There are still some issues with the ALP. The Ministry of Interior had, while the special operations teams were conducting VSO, established ‘unilateral ALP’ units. These were formed, most times without the knowledge of U.S. forces, without the ALP establishment process (selection and vetting) and training the ‘U.S. approved’ ALP units had received. There was constant disagreement between the SOF HQs [2] and the MoI on where ALP units should be formed up. Afghan politics generally interfered with what made sense from a counterinsurgency standpoint.

In addition, warlords and power brokers would form up local militias and call them ALP. While not recognized by the Ministry of Interior and not supported by the United States the international community would sometimes confuse these illegal militias with the ‘official ALP’. This, in turn, would cause a lot of bad press when the ‘so-called ALP’ engaged in humanitarian abuses, corruption, intimidation, and predatory practices – leading the international press (usually European) to criticize the ALP program.

Presently – in 2016 – the ALP program is a successful yet troubled program. There is need for reform on a number of issues – insufficient equipment, poor training, lack of oversight, corruption, ‘ghost policemen’, and more. The Afghan government wants to increase the size of the ALP from it’s present strength of 28,000 to 40,000 (maybe even higher). However, the U.S. SOF community (SOJTF-A) as well as Resolute Support HQs is reluctant to proceed with this request until the ALP reforms are fully implemented.

As of 2016 the Afghan Local Police has proven to be a successful program; although it has some faults. From a standpoint of establishing security in remote districts it proved to inhibit the movement of insurgents, garnered the support of the local population, was a critical part of the Village Stability Operations program, and contributed to the overall security of their area of operations. Certainly the program could have used greater support from the Afghan government, Ministry of Interior, local governmental officials, and some Coalition conventional unit commanders. If the proposed reforms are implemented, continued funding is appropriated by the U.S. Congress, and the Ministry of Interior improves its support of the program then the Afghan Local Police will prove to have been a positive security measure for the Afghan government.

Footnotes:

[1] Some critics who want an increased advisory presence in Afghanistan (therefore higher troop levels) suggest that increasing the SOF support to the ALP program – beyond the current SOAG – is warranted.

[2] The higher SOF headquarters coordinating with the Ministry of Interior was the Combined Joint Special Operations Component Command – Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A) – a one-star command based in the Kabul area. Later CFSOCC-A would morph into NSOCC-A / SOJTF-A. NSOCC-A / SOJTF-A is a two-star command that was comprised of the former CFSOCC-A, NATO SOF, and Task Force organizations.

References:

Goodhand, Jonathan and Aziz Hakimi, Counterinsurgency, Local Militias, and Statebuilding in Afghanistan, United States Institute of Peace, December 2014.
www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW90-Counterinsurgency-Local-Militias-and-Statebuilding-in-Afghanistan.pdf

Village Stability Operations (VSO) was an attempt by United States special operations forces to establish security, governance, and development in key critical districts in remote areas of Afghanistan. Typically, these districts were in regions of Afghanistan where the Coalition conventional forces and the Afghan National Defense Forces (ANSF) did not have a robust presence and where the establishment of security in the district was considered critical. The Village Stability Operations was an effort to, at the remote and rural level utilizing a ‘bottom-up’ [1] approach, support the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) counterinsurgency campaign.

Early Community Defense Initiatives in Afghanistan. The U.S. Special Forces community made several attempts to form local community defense forces in Afghanistan. Most of these ventures had false starts for a number of reasons to include lack of Afghan government support, lack of support from high-ranking U.S. conventional (non-SOF) officers, and limited funding, manning and resources. Some of these early local defense programs included the Afghan Public Protection Program (AP3), Community Defense Initiative (CDI), and Local Defense Initiative (LDI). Village Stability Operations gained momentum and acceptance through the publication of a series of articles [2] and books [3] about local defense at the community level, a realization among the Special Forces community that Direct Action (DA) missions combined with HUMINT was not going to defeat the insurgency, and the push by General David Petraeus (then commander of ISAF) to get President Karzai to accept the program. One positive aspect of VSO over AP3, CDI, LDI and other programs was the tying in of ‘security’ with ‘development’ and ‘governance’ for a comprehensive approach to counterinsurgency efforts.

Village Stability Operations Platform. SOF teams conducting VSO would usually consist of 12-16 personnel. U.S. Army Special Forces detachments had 12 personnel; while the Marine Special Operations Teams (MARSOC) and Navy SEALs would have an equivalent number. In addition, the SOF teams would have a great number of ‘enablers’ to assist them in the VSO mission.

Enablers. The SOF teams would typically have a number of ‘enablers’ to include mechanics, interpreters, SIGINT, military working dog teams, medical teams, Civil Affairs, Tactical Psyop Teams (TPTs), one or two intelligence analysts, cook, and possibly a Cultural Support Team (CST).

Security. The SOF team would work with the other security and military organizations in their operational area in the conduct of Village Stability Operations. These included Coalition forces, elements of the Afghan National Police, and the Afghan National Army. Each district had a small district police force (usually 30-90 personnel) who were members of the Afghan National Police (ANP). The District Chief of Police (DCoP) would be a key player for the SOF team to interact with. Sometimes there may be an Afghan National Army (ANA) company (tolai) or battalion (kandak) nearby. This collection of security forces would also be a key part of the SOF team’s approach to establishing security and stability in the district and undermining the insurgents influence and control.

Many times, when establishing a Village Stability Operations program the VSO platform would come under intense insurgent pressure. Afghan Commandos, advised by a U.S. Special Forces team, would conduct clearing operations in the VSO operational area. The Afghan National Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC) has (as of mid-2016) ten Special Operations Kandaks (SOKs) located across Afghanistan.

Afghan Local Police. An integral part of the VSO program was the Afghan Local Police (ALP). This was a local community defense force with limited authority, training, weapons and equipment that was designed to be defensive in nature. The ALP were recruited from the village, community, or district in which they would serve as ALP members.

ALP Establishment Process. There was a mandated process for an ALP unit to be established which required the acceptance of the local community (through elders, power brokers, shuras, etc.) before it would be stood up. The village elders, government officials, and Afghan National Security Forces representatives would conduct a ‘validation shura’ to officially agree to being an ALP program. The members who would be selected as ALP would be vetted by the local community as well as pass a background check by national authorities. The training (initially provided by U.S. SOF) was three weeks – sometimes conducted locally and other times at regional locations.

For many SOF teams the main focus was the Afghan Local Police – a key tool of establishing the ‘security’ part of VSO. However, the aspects of ‘governance’ and ‘development’ were not neglected.

Governance. The SOF team would attempt to establish a good relationship with the District Governor – sometimes referred to as the DGov.  The DGov is the key person in the advancing of local governance in the district. Some SOF teams would assist the DGovs in their travels to outlying villages and communities in the district – security, of course, being a major concern. Sometimes, either because of security issues – or corruption, or (too many other reasons to list) – the District Governor would also be located in the provincial capital or even Kabul. There were several programs funded and implemented by USAID, international organizations, and the Afghan government that were attempting to strengthen Afghan sub-national governance at the provincial and district level. ‘Community councils’ were established at village, community and district level to advance sub-national governance and development. [4] SOF teams, where possible, would try to leverage these programs for the benefit of the VSO program. Many times the SOF teams would be interacting with traditional local governance structures such as ‘shuras’ and ‘jirgas’. The intent was to connect the local governance to the district, province, and central government agencies and institutions.

Development. According to some counterinsurgency readings, establishing development projects goes hand-in-hand with security and governance in conducting stability operations at the local level. In some districts one could find representatives of other national governmental agencies such as the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL), and ministries and agencies. In less secure districts these ministry representatives often lived and worked in the provincial capitals. The SOF teams would attempt to leverage these developmental government organizations to ensure the people of the district were getting the governmental services they deserved and that the international donor nations were paying for.

For a long time, there were many ‘actors on the scene’ in Afghanistan assisting with both development and governance. Many international governmental and non-governmental organizations were active in assisting with development and governance. SOF teams would seek these organizations out and attempt to leverage their efforts in order to have a synchronized Village Stability Operations effort at the district level.

District Augmentation Teams (DATs). In addition to the SOF team and its enablers – individuals were deployed as part of a ‘District Augmentation Team’ (DAT) at district level where VSO was established. These personnel were assigned to the respective districts by the Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command – Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A) based in Kabul. The DATs were 1, 2, or 3-man teams usually on one-year long tours and were responsible for assisting in the governance and development aspects of Village Stability Operations. Many times the DATs came from the SOF community but there were quite a few who were part of the Af-Pak Hands program.

Provincial Augmentation Teams (PATs). In addition to the DATs, there were some 1-3 man teams assigned at the provincial level to assist in the Village Stability Operations effort. Many times the PATs were co-located with conventional force brigades or battalion units. The PATs assisted in the governance and development aspects at provincial level and assisted the DATs and SOF teams working at the district level.

CJSOTF-A. The Combined Joint Special Operations Task – Force was located at Bagram Airfield (just north of Kabul). The CJSOTF-A was commanded by a U.S. Army Special Forces Colonel (O6) who had as many as five Special Operations Task Forces (SOTFs) under his command. The Special Forces groups, NAVY SEALs, and MARSOC would field these battalion-sized SOTFs across the country of Afghanistan. The VSO teams came from the the SOTFs.

CFSOCC-A. The Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command -A had the CJSOTF-A under its command. CFSOCC-A, a one-star command, was responsible for the U.S. and some of the other Coalition SOF operating within Afghanistan. However, many of the other Coalition SOF worked under NATO SOF; primarily working with the Afghan Ministry of Defense special police units. The U.S. counterterrorist force (JSOC) had its units in country as well, but were not under CFSOCC-A command. Eventually, the NATO Special Operations Component Command – Afghanistan (NSOCC-A) and Special Operations Joint Task Force – Afghanistan (SOJTF-A) – a two-star command – would be established and all three SOF entities would come under the command of NSOCC-A / SOJTF-A.

VSNCC. For a few years CFSOCC-A had established the Village Stability National Coordination Center or VSNCC. The VSNCC was a small group (15-20 personnel) of Special Forces, Civil Affairs, and other SOF personnel commanded by an O-6 who worked Village Stability Operations issues within the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and with the various Afghan ministries. Liaison officers worked with the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, and others to advance the interests of the Village Stability Operations program. Some members of the VSNCC specialized in either governance and development and worked with entities such as the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) or with Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) concerned with sub-national governance or development.

VSO a Successful Program. The Village Stability Operations program was successful where it was applied. One key element of the VSO program was the use of SOF personnel to implement it. SOF personnel are uniquely selected, trained, and suited for VSO type operations. While its effectiveness may have been fleeting in some districts – this was usually the result of the deterioration of security or the withdrawal of the SOF teams conducting the VSO mission. It is unfortunate that the VSO program was not instituted earlier in the Afghan conflict; if it had a longer duration of operation the situation in Afghanistan might be very different today. The VSO program was, when combined with other efforts by the Coalition, Non-Governmental Agencies, and Private Volunteer Organizations, probably one of the best methods of connecting the people of the local village, community and district to the provincial government and national government. Overall, the Village Stability Operations program was a success where it was applied for the short duration of its existence. The Village Stability Operations model is one that should be to be considered for future counterinsurgency and stability operations environments.

Footnotes:

[1] The ‘bottom-up’ approach focus on the establishing security, governance, and development at the local level – village, community, and district level. The ‘top-down’ approach emphasized a strong central government, robust national institutions, development programs funded and administered from central locations, and a strong national army and police force.

[2] Major Jim Gant’s article One Tribe at a Time captured the attention of high-ranking officers within the U.S. military searching for a solution to defeating the insurgency. His unconventional approach gained initial support from the U.S. Special Forces community as well. It was posted on Steven Pressfield Online and published by Nine Sisters Publications, 2nd Edition, 2 Dec 2009.
www.stevenpressfield.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/one_tribe_at_a_time_ed2.pdf

[3] See Seth Jones’ book In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan, W.W. Norton & Company, 2009. The author advocates for a “bottom up” approach to defeating the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan.

[4] Some of these ‘community councils’ would find themselves competing against each other. For instance the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation (MRRD) and Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) both established local community councils with parallel objectives.

References:

Connett, Col. Ty and Col. Bob Cassidy, “Village Stability Operations: More than Village Defense”, Special Warfare Magazine, July-September 2011.
www.soc.mil/SWCS/SWmag/archive/SW2403/SW2403VillageStabilityOperations_MoreThanVillageDefense.html

Hanlin, Rory, “One Team’s Approach to Village Stability Operations”, Small Wars Journal, September 4, 2011.
http://smallwarsjournal.com/node/11412

Jones, Seth & Arturo Munoz, Afghanistan’s Local War: Building Local Defense Forces, RAND Corporation, 2010.
www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1002.html

Moyar, Mark, Village Stability Operations and the Afghan Local Police, Joint Special Operations University, JSOU Report 14-7, October 2014.

Click to access JSOU14-7_Moyar_VSO_FINAL.pdf

The Afghan Local Police or ALP was established by U.S. special operations forces (SOF) in 2011 in an attempt to provide local defense forces in key districts of Afghanistan. The ALP program has had limited support from the U.S. military since 2014. The ALP program has transitioned to full Afghan control. At present, there is a Special Operations Advisory Group (SOAG) that works with the ALP Directorate within the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MoI).

For the ALP program to have continued success a number of activities in the Ministry of Interior need to be improved – including improved logistics, personnel management, and adequate training. A recent RAND Corporation publication examines the current state of the Afghan Local Police, provides key findings, and makes some important recommendations.

Findings. The study points out that the MoI “. . . has made some strides to improve its logistic practices and results.” However, the Coalition’s ability to monitor the Afghan Local Police’s logistic situation at district level has been significantly curtailed since the dramatic drawdown of U.S. and Coalition troop levels. Personnel management of the ALP program has improved – the Afghans are doing this entirely on their own. However, there are some local militia groups that have adopted the ALP banner causing confusion among some critics and observers. The ALP are (according to the MoI) sufficiently trained but there are some limitations in the current program.

Recommendations. The RAND study advocates for the continued use of advisors for the ALP program. There is concern that the MoI is not ready for a ‘pull-based’ logistics system and that this should be phased in gradually. A hybrid training system may work better than a centralized training program. A RAND recommendation points to the option of “. . . a combination of regional training centers, local training venues, and mobile training teams”. The study suggests that a multi-level coalition advisory structure be maintained to ensure a long-term sustainment capability.

You can read the RAND Corporation report:

Marquis, Jefferson, et al. Assessing the Ability of the Afghan Ministry of Interior to Support the Afghan Local Police, RAND Corporation, July 2016.
www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1399.html

References:

Afghan Local Police by Afghan War News
www.afghanwarnews.info/police/afghanlocalpolicealp.htm

Photo Credit: ALP training in Panjwei district, Kandahar province, Afghanistan. Photo by SPC Joshua Kruger, DVIDS.