The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) has published a new report on Afghanistan – with a focus on security sector assistance efforts. This 210-page report, published on June 14, 2019, is entitled Divided Responsibility: Lessons From U.S. Security Sector Assistance Efforts in Afghanistan.

The report  examines the various security sector assistance activities and programs undertaken by dozens of U.S. entities and international partners to develop the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), Ministry of Defense (MOD), and Ministry of Interior (MOI) since 2001. The report looks critically at five core SSA efforts: field advising, ministerial-level advising, equipping the force, U.S.-based training, and working as part of a NATO coalition.

The report describes how advisor and staff personnel were selected, trained, and assigned to fulfill these key functions. It also examines the consequences associated with the US and NATO approach to SSA in Afghanistan, such as not assigning organizations responsibility for key functions; implementing a command and control relationship that did not consistently link ministerial and tactical advising efforts; not having a comprehensive, enduring plan to guide all efforts; and relying on a NATO command that strained unity of effort and hindered the standardization of SSA activities.

Chapter 1: “Introduction”. Provides an overview for policy makers, explains what Security Sector Assistance is, and provides information on SSA’s role in U.S. history.

Chapter 2: “Field Advising”. Contains information and descriptions of the early Embedded Training Teams (ETTs), augmented Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), SFATs, SFAATs, SFABs (the early ones), and air advising.

Chapter 3: “Ministerial Advising”. Explains the role of the ministerial-level advisor, selection and training for advisors, and Afghan input to the advising and training process.

Chapter 4 : “Equipping the Force”. Covers the nuts and bolts (and processes) of providing equipment to the ANDSF.

Chapter 5: “U.S.-Based Training”. Explores the different programs used to train Afghan military personnel. This includes a section on the high rate of ‘AWOLs’ that disappear from U.S. training bases while attending training schools and courses.

Chapter 6: “By, With, and Through NATO”. Provides information of how NATO became involved with Afghanistan, the policies and processes that created challenges in establishing unity of effort, how the U.S. enabled and optimized NATO involvement in Afghanistan, and more.

Chapter 7: “Conclusions”. Each chapter ends with “Key Findings” and “Recommendations”. This chapter provides a summary of “Lessons” and “Recommendations”.

Chapter 8: “Appendices and Endnotes”. This extensive section provides the resources used to research Divided Responsibility: Lessons From U.S. Security Sector Assistance Efforts in Afghanistan . It provides an explanation of the methodology for writing the report and a listing of acronyms.

This document is a good read for those interested in security sector reform, security force assistance, or the effort to organize, equip, and train the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces.

To read or download (PDF) Divided Responsibility: Lessons From U.S. Security Sector Assistance Efforts in Afghanistan visit the website of SIGAR:
https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/lessonslearned/SIGAR-19-39-LL.pdf

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Photo: From the cover of the SIGAR report.

Afghan War Update – September 28, 2017. CSTC-A fails in ammo usage oversight mission, US requests closure of Taliban office in Qatar, Iranian support of the Taliban, district control, ‘Green Belt’ security plan for Kabul, new DoD SES appointed for South Asia, UK at the UN, and more.

DoD Report Faults CSTC-A. A recent report (22 Sep 2017) by the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General finds that the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A) did not provide effective oversight of ammunition for the Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). The report focused on ammunition that was procured by DoD and provided to the ANDSF. According to Defense Security Cooperation Agency officials the DoD spent $702 million in fiscal years 2015-2016 to procure ammunition to support both current and future Afghan security force requirements. Read a synopsis of the report online or download a PDF version.

Taliban Office in Qatar. In a recent meeting between President Ghani (he visited the U.S.) and President Trump the Afghan president was requested to move forward with getting the Taliban’s diplomatic mission in Qatar shut down. The office in the Gulf nation was opened several years ago as a channel with which to conduct peace negotiations. Not much has happened on that front. Of course, there are other political considerations at play here. Read more in “Trump pushing Afghan president to close Taliban office in Qatar, sources say”, The Guardian, September 26, 2017.

New SES Appointed for Afghanistan. Dr. Colin Jackson has been selected to fill a DoD Senior Executive Service position. His role will be Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia.

Black Hawks for AAF. The Afghan Air Force (AAF) has recently received several UH-60s. Over the next several years the AAF will receive 159 of the refurbished choppers to replace its aging fleet of Russian Mi-17 utility helicopters. Presumably the AAF pilots can conduct their transition training in a timely manner and the AAF maintenance personnel can gain the skills needed to maintain these very complex rotary wing aircraft. (um . . ., sure).

New Security Belt for Kabul. The Afghan security agencies will be rolling out a new Kabul security plan that should do a better job of protecting key government institutions and organizations of the international community. Kate Clark of the Afghanistan Analyst’s Network provides us the details in The New Kabul ‘Green Belt’ Security Plan: More Security for Whom?, September 25, 2017.

UK Ambassador Speaks on Afghanistan at UN. The UK representative to the United Nations spoke in a speech to the body on Sep 26, 2017 about the continued support of the United Kingdom to Afghanistan.

Iranian Support of Taliban. Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) was interviewed about Iranian strategic interests in Afghanistan, reports of Iranian support of the Taliban, and the problems the Afghan drug trade pose for Iran. Read “Afghan Opium Trade Sticks a Thorn in Iran’s Side”, The Cipher Brief, September 27, 2017. Echoing the thoughts of Cordesman is John Nixon, a former senior leadership analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency. He writes Iran’s strategic interests in Afghanistan with a focus on the Iranian water shortage and how that drives Iran’s relationship with Afghanistan. See “What’s Next for Afghanistan and Iran? Water Wars”, The Cipher Brief, September 27, 2017.

India to Continue Afghan Support. Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis recently met with Indian officials in Afghanistan. Continued support for Afghan development projects is the way forward for India but no plans exist for putting Indian military members on the ground.

District Control. A recent analysis by Bill Roggio of the Long War Journal states that the insurgents control or contest about 45% of the districts across Afghanistan. Read “LWJ Map Assessment”, FDD’s Long War Journal, September 26, 2017.

The Afghan Local Police (ALP) was established by U.S. Army Special Forces in 2010 to serve as a locally-based village or community self-defense force. The ALP units are recruited from local communities of key areas where Afghan government influence or control was minimal. The recruits are selected and vetted by the village or community leaders and are also screened by the Afghan National Police (ANP) and Ministry of Interior (MoI).

The Afghan Local Police were part of a larger counterinsurgency program of the U.S. Special Forces called Village Stability Operations (VSO). The VSO program entailed a comprehensive and complementary plan incorporating aspects of security, governance, and development utilizing a ‘bottom up’ methodology.

The ‘top down’ system of pushing security, development, and governance from Kabul to the provinces and districts was viewed as not working. This was caused by inexperienced, corrupt, and inept government officials and organizations at the national and provincial level. Many Special Forces personnel believed that the establishment of local security forces similar to the Afghan historical arbakai would capitalize on Afghans who would likely fight for their own tribes and communities but would be less inclined to fight for a central government located in a distant Kabul.

A number of key districts were identified by the U.S. Special Forces for the establishment of Village Stability Platforms (VSPs). The ‘platforms’ were a tailor-made ad hoc unit of between 30-50 individuals formed around the nucleus of a special operations team (Green Berets, SEALs, or MARSOC). The ‘platforms’ were augmented by a variety of individuals to include mechanics, intelligence analysts, cooks, SIGINT, interpreters, PSYOP, Civil Affairs, Cultural Support Team (CST), and others.

The Afghan Local Police were a key component of the Village Stability Operations program – providing the ‘security’ aspect of VSO (along with the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police that were also within the VSO area of operations).

The ALP units were established once the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force – Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A) conducted a detailed analysis of the proposed area to determine if the village, community, or district needed a VSO / ALP program, if the program could be successful, and if there was adequate support from the local community. In addition, the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MoI) had to approve of the ALP unit being formed.

The village elders, Afghan security representatives, and special operations personnel would conduct a ‘shura’ and / or ‘jirga’ to discuss the forming of an ALP unit. If the community was receptive then the recruitment of ALP members would proceed. The recruits would be screened by the Afghan security representatives and vetted by the community.

The formal three-week training program was usually conducted by the U.S. special operations team that would form the nucleus of the Village Stability Platform. Often times the ALP recruits would go to a regional training center. Eventually training would be done by the Afghan National Army Special Forces and later by the Afghan National Police.

As the drawdown of U.S. and Coalition troops began in 2012 the United States began closing down some of the Village Stability Platforms and transferring the responsibility of the VSPs and ALP to the respective District Governor (DGov) and District Chief of Police (DCoP). Naturally, without the constant supervision, oversight, advice, assistance, training, and support of the U.S. special operations teams the effectiveness, in most cases, of the Afghan Local Police diminished.

As of 2016 the Afghan Local Police has been fully transferred to the Afghan Ministry of Interior. Almost all U.S. SOF have been removed from training and advising of the ALP. The only exception is a small advisory team located at Camp Resolute Support HQs in Kabul that works with the Afghan MoI on ALP issues. This ‘Special Operations Advisory Group’ or SOAG – of probably 20-25 members – monitors, provides oversight, and performs the ‘Train, Advise, and Assist’ mission for the ALP directorate of the MoI. [1]

There are still some issues with the ALP. The Ministry of Interior had, while the special operations teams were conducting VSO, established ‘unilateral ALP’ units. These were formed, most times without the knowledge of U.S. forces, without the ALP establishment process (selection and vetting) and training the ‘U.S. approved’ ALP units had received. There was constant disagreement between the SOF HQs [2] and the MoI on where ALP units should be formed up. Afghan politics generally interfered with what made sense from a counterinsurgency standpoint.

In addition, warlords and power brokers would form up local militias and call them ALP. While not recognized by the Ministry of Interior and not supported by the United States the international community would sometimes confuse these illegal militias with the ‘official ALP’. This, in turn, would cause a lot of bad press when the ‘so-called ALP’ engaged in humanitarian abuses, corruption, intimidation, and predatory practices – leading the international press (usually European) to criticize the ALP program.

Presently – in 2016 – the ALP program is a successful yet troubled program. There is need for reform on a number of issues – insufficient equipment, poor training, lack of oversight, corruption, ‘ghost policemen’, and more. The Afghan government wants to increase the size of the ALP from it’s present strength of 28,000 to 40,000 (maybe even higher). However, the U.S. SOF community (SOJTF-A) as well as Resolute Support HQs is reluctant to proceed with this request until the ALP reforms are fully implemented.

As of 2016 the Afghan Local Police has proven to be a successful program; although it has some faults. From a standpoint of establishing security in remote districts it proved to inhibit the movement of insurgents, garnered the support of the local population, was a critical part of the Village Stability Operations program, and contributed to the overall security of their area of operations. Certainly the program could have used greater support from the Afghan government, Ministry of Interior, local governmental officials, and some Coalition conventional unit commanders. If the proposed reforms are implemented, continued funding is appropriated by the U.S. Congress, and the Ministry of Interior improves its support of the program then the Afghan Local Police will prove to have been a positive security measure for the Afghan government.

Footnotes:

[1] Some critics who want an increased advisory presence in Afghanistan (therefore higher troop levels) suggest that increasing the SOF support to the ALP program – beyond the current SOAG – is warranted.

[2] The higher SOF headquarters coordinating with the Ministry of Interior was the Combined Joint Special Operations Component Command – Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A) – a one-star command based in the Kabul area. Later CFSOCC-A would morph into NSOCC-A / SOJTF-A. NSOCC-A / SOJTF-A is a two-star command that was comprised of the former CFSOCC-A, NATO SOF, and Task Force organizations.

References:

Goodhand, Jonathan and Aziz Hakimi, Counterinsurgency, Local Militias, and Statebuilding in Afghanistan, United States Institute of Peace, December 2014.
www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW90-Counterinsurgency-Local-Militias-and-Statebuilding-in-Afghanistan.pdf

Village Stability Operations (VSO) was an attempt by United States special operations forces to establish security, governance, and development in key critical districts in remote areas of Afghanistan. Typically, these districts were in regions of Afghanistan where the Coalition conventional forces and the Afghan National Defense Forces (ANSF) did not have a robust presence and where the establishment of security in the district was considered critical. The Village Stability Operations was an effort to, at the remote and rural level utilizing a ‘bottom-up’ [1] approach, support the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) counterinsurgency campaign.

Early Community Defense Initiatives in Afghanistan. The U.S. Special Forces community made several attempts to form local community defense forces in Afghanistan. Most of these ventures had false starts for a number of reasons to include lack of Afghan government support, lack of support from high-ranking U.S. conventional (non-SOF) officers, and limited funding, manning and resources. Some of these early local defense programs included the Afghan Public Protection Program (AP3), Community Defense Initiative (CDI), and Local Defense Initiative (LDI). Village Stability Operations gained momentum and acceptance through the publication of a series of articles [2] and books [3] about local defense at the community level, a realization among the Special Forces community that Direct Action (DA) missions combined with HUMINT was not going to defeat the insurgency, and the push by General David Petraeus (then commander of ISAF) to get President Karzai to accept the program. One positive aspect of VSO over AP3, CDI, LDI and other programs was the tying in of ‘security’ with ‘development’ and ‘governance’ for a comprehensive approach to counterinsurgency efforts.

Village Stability Operations Platform. SOF teams conducting VSO would usually consist of 12-16 personnel. U.S. Army Special Forces detachments had 12 personnel; while the Marine Special Operations Teams (MARSOC) and Navy SEALs would have an equivalent number. In addition, the SOF teams would have a great number of ‘enablers’ to assist them in the VSO mission.

Enablers. The SOF teams would typically have a number of ‘enablers’ to include mechanics, interpreters, SIGINT, military working dog teams, medical teams, Civil Affairs, Tactical Psyop Teams (TPTs), one or two intelligence analysts, cook, and possibly a Cultural Support Team (CST).

Security. The SOF team would work with the other security and military organizations in their operational area in the conduct of Village Stability Operations. These included Coalition forces, elements of the Afghan National Police, and the Afghan National Army. Each district had a small district police force (usually 30-90 personnel) who were members of the Afghan National Police (ANP). The District Chief of Police (DCoP) would be a key player for the SOF team to interact with. Sometimes there may be an Afghan National Army (ANA) company (tolai) or battalion (kandak) nearby. This collection of security forces would also be a key part of the SOF team’s approach to establishing security and stability in the district and undermining the insurgents influence and control.

Many times, when establishing a Village Stability Operations program the VSO platform would come under intense insurgent pressure. Afghan Commandos, advised by a U.S. Special Forces team, would conduct clearing operations in the VSO operational area. The Afghan National Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC) has (as of mid-2016) ten Special Operations Kandaks (SOKs) located across Afghanistan.

Afghan Local Police. An integral part of the VSO program was the Afghan Local Police (ALP). This was a local community defense force with limited authority, training, weapons and equipment that was designed to be defensive in nature. The ALP were recruited from the village, community, or district in which they would serve as ALP members.

ALP Establishment Process. There was a mandated process for an ALP unit to be established which required the acceptance of the local community (through elders, power brokers, shuras, etc.) before it would be stood up. The village elders, government officials, and Afghan National Security Forces representatives would conduct a ‘validation shura’ to officially agree to being an ALP program. The members who would be selected as ALP would be vetted by the local community as well as pass a background check by national authorities. The training (initially provided by U.S. SOF) was three weeks – sometimes conducted locally and other times at regional locations.

For many SOF teams the main focus was the Afghan Local Police – a key tool of establishing the ‘security’ part of VSO. However, the aspects of ‘governance’ and ‘development’ were not neglected.

Governance. The SOF team would attempt to establish a good relationship with the District Governor – sometimes referred to as the DGov.  The DGov is the key person in the advancing of local governance in the district. Some SOF teams would assist the DGovs in their travels to outlying villages and communities in the district – security, of course, being a major concern. Sometimes, either because of security issues – or corruption, or (too many other reasons to list) – the District Governor would also be located in the provincial capital or even Kabul. There were several programs funded and implemented by USAID, international organizations, and the Afghan government that were attempting to strengthen Afghan sub-national governance at the provincial and district level. ‘Community councils’ were established at village, community and district level to advance sub-national governance and development. [4] SOF teams, where possible, would try to leverage these programs for the benefit of the VSO program. Many times the SOF teams would be interacting with traditional local governance structures such as ‘shuras’ and ‘jirgas’. The intent was to connect the local governance to the district, province, and central government agencies and institutions.

Development. According to some counterinsurgency readings, establishing development projects goes hand-in-hand with security and governance in conducting stability operations at the local level. In some districts one could find representatives of other national governmental agencies such as the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL), and ministries and agencies. In less secure districts these ministry representatives often lived and worked in the provincial capitals. The SOF teams would attempt to leverage these developmental government organizations to ensure the people of the district were getting the governmental services they deserved and that the international donor nations were paying for.

For a long time, there were many ‘actors on the scene’ in Afghanistan assisting with both development and governance. Many international governmental and non-governmental organizations were active in assisting with development and governance. SOF teams would seek these organizations out and attempt to leverage their efforts in order to have a synchronized Village Stability Operations effort at the district level.

District Augmentation Teams (DATs). In addition to the SOF team and its enablers – individuals were deployed as part of a ‘District Augmentation Team’ (DAT) at district level where VSO was established. These personnel were assigned to the respective districts by the Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command – Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A) based in Kabul. The DATs were 1, 2, or 3-man teams usually on one-year long tours and were responsible for assisting in the governance and development aspects of Village Stability Operations. Many times the DATs came from the SOF community but there were quite a few who were part of the Af-Pak Hands program.

Provincial Augmentation Teams (PATs). In addition to the DATs, there were some 1-3 man teams assigned at the provincial level to assist in the Village Stability Operations effort. Many times the PATs were co-located with conventional force brigades or battalion units. The PATs assisted in the governance and development aspects at provincial level and assisted the DATs and SOF teams working at the district level.

CJSOTF-A. The Combined Joint Special Operations Task – Force was located at Bagram Airfield (just north of Kabul). The CJSOTF-A was commanded by a U.S. Army Special Forces Colonel (O6) who had as many as five Special Operations Task Forces (SOTFs) under his command. The Special Forces groups, NAVY SEALs, and MARSOC would field these battalion-sized SOTFs across the country of Afghanistan. The VSO teams came from the the SOTFs.

CFSOCC-A. The Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command -A had the CJSOTF-A under its command. CFSOCC-A, a one-star command, was responsible for the U.S. and some of the other Coalition SOF operating within Afghanistan. However, many of the other Coalition SOF worked under NATO SOF; primarily working with the Afghan Ministry of Defense special police units. The U.S. counterterrorist force (JSOC) had its units in country as well, but were not under CFSOCC-A command. Eventually, the NATO Special Operations Component Command – Afghanistan (NSOCC-A) and Special Operations Joint Task Force – Afghanistan (SOJTF-A) – a two-star command – would be established and all three SOF entities would come under the command of NSOCC-A / SOJTF-A.

VSNCC. For a few years CFSOCC-A had established the Village Stability National Coordination Center or VSNCC. The VSNCC was a small group (15-20 personnel) of Special Forces, Civil Affairs, and other SOF personnel commanded by an O-6 who worked Village Stability Operations issues within the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and with the various Afghan ministries. Liaison officers worked with the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, and others to advance the interests of the Village Stability Operations program. Some members of the VSNCC specialized in either governance and development and worked with entities such as the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) or with Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) concerned with sub-national governance or development.

VSO a Successful Program. The Village Stability Operations program was successful where it was applied. One key element of the VSO program was the use of SOF personnel to implement it. SOF personnel are uniquely selected, trained, and suited for VSO type operations. While its effectiveness may have been fleeting in some districts – this was usually the result of the deterioration of security or the withdrawal of the SOF teams conducting the VSO mission. It is unfortunate that the VSO program was not instituted earlier in the Afghan conflict; if it had a longer duration of operation the situation in Afghanistan might be very different today. The VSO program was, when combined with other efforts by the Coalition, Non-Governmental Agencies, and Private Volunteer Organizations, probably one of the best methods of connecting the people of the local village, community and district to the provincial government and national government. Overall, the Village Stability Operations program was a success where it was applied for the short duration of its existence. The Village Stability Operations model is one that should be to be considered for future counterinsurgency and stability operations environments.

Footnotes:

[1] The ‘bottom-up’ approach focus on the establishing security, governance, and development at the local level – village, community, and district level. The ‘top-down’ approach emphasized a strong central government, robust national institutions, development programs funded and administered from central locations, and a strong national army and police force.

[2] Major Jim Gant’s article One Tribe at a Time captured the attention of high-ranking officers within the U.S. military searching for a solution to defeating the insurgency. His unconventional approach gained initial support from the U.S. Special Forces community as well. It was posted on Steven Pressfield Online and published by Nine Sisters Publications, 2nd Edition, 2 Dec 2009.
www.stevenpressfield.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/one_tribe_at_a_time_ed2.pdf

[3] See Seth Jones’ book In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan, W.W. Norton & Company, 2009. The author advocates for a “bottom up” approach to defeating the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan.

[4] Some of these ‘community councils’ would find themselves competing against each other. For instance the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation (MRRD) and Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) both established local community councils with parallel objectives.

References:

Connett, Col. Ty and Col. Bob Cassidy, “Village Stability Operations: More than Village Defense”, Special Warfare Magazine, July-September 2011.
www.soc.mil/SWCS/SWmag/archive/SW2403/SW2403VillageStabilityOperations_MoreThanVillageDefense.html

Hanlin, Rory, “One Team’s Approach to Village Stability Operations”, Small Wars Journal, September 4, 2011.
http://smallwarsjournal.com/node/11412

Jones, Seth & Arturo Munoz, Afghanistan’s Local War: Building Local Defense Forces, RAND Corporation, 2010.
www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1002.html

Moyar, Mark, Village Stability Operations and the Afghan Local Police, Joint Special Operations University, JSOU Report 14-7, October 2014.

Click to access JSOU14-7_Moyar_VSO_FINAL.pdf

Afghanistan’s largest province, located in the southwest of the landlocked country, is the objective of a resurgent Taliban offensive. According to some news reports the Taliban control 11 of the 14 districts in Helmand province. Almost all roads connecting the provincial capital of Lashkar Gah to other areas of Afghanistan are controlled by the Taliban.

What is District Control?

The assessing of who controls what district is murky at best. It all depends on who is doing the assessing, of course. If you listen to the Afghan government you would be led to believe that the Taliban control only six districts throughout the entire country. The Resolute Support Headquarters spokesmen have a slightly less optimistic – but still very unrealistic way of counting.

If the district center – a small compound of 3-6 buildings that houses the district governor, district police center, and a few other governmental offices – is held by the government (20-30 Afghan National Police and perhaps an infantry platoon or company) – then the district is under government control. The fact that the insurgents control all the land mass of the district beyond the maximum effective range of the government security forces small arms is beside the point. The district is labeled ‘under government control’.  Food for thought.

Helmand Provincial Capital Threatened

Lashkar Gar is experiencing food, fuel, water and medical shortages. There are thousands of refugees cramming the city seeking shelter from the fighting in the countryside. Morale among the Afghan National Defense Security Forces (ANDSF) is extremely low. The Taliban gain significant financial benefit in controlling the province as the opium trade provides funding for its operations.

Helmand province has been the scene of intense fighting over the years – especially since 2006. Many Coalition countries have deployed their troops to this troubled province. These countries include the United States (primarily the U.S. Marines), the British, and the Danes.

One factor in the favor of the ANDSF is the willingness of the Coalition to employ airstrikes to blunt significant gains by the Taliban. The rules of engagement (RoE) recently were loosened allowing more intervention by U.S. air assets. If Lashkar Gar were to fall to the Taliban it would be the second provincial capital to be captured in one year. In late 2015 Kunduz City (of Kunduz province) was captured by the Taliban and held for several days.

Read more on this topic in “The Battle for Helmand: Afghanistan’s Largest Province May Fall Entirely to the Taliban”, by Ankit Panda, The Diplomat, August 11, 2016.

Problems in Helmand. The Afghan government forces have their hands full in Helmand province. It appears that most of the province has been lost to the Taliban and the provincial capital – Lashkar Gar – is now threatened. Despite glowing reports by the Resolute Support HQs leadership the Afghans do not seem to be doing well on the battlefield. In fact, the Taliban now control more of Afghanistan than at any time since 2001. President Obama’s plan to withdraw 1,400 more troops by the end of the year certainly will not help the situation. Read more in “Helmand capital ‘practically besieged’ by the Taliban”, The Long War Journal, August 9, 2016.