In December 19, 2018 President Trump surprised just about everyone when he announced that the U.S. would begin immediately withdrawing its 2,200 military personnel from northeastern Syria. This decision was apparently the result of a phone call with the Turkish president that took place a few days earlier on December 14, 2018. This abrupt shift in policy was at odds with previous statements by administration, state, defense, and CJTF-OIR officials.

In the months prior to the phone call numerous officials had stressed the long-term commitment to helping the Syrian Democratic Front (SDF). In fact, the initial purpose of the phone call was to warn the Turkish president not to proceed with plans to attack U.S.-backed Kurdish forces in Syria. Instead Trump basically invited the Turks to do what they want in Syria. A part of the conversation included Trump asking the Turkish president if his forces were up to the task of cleaning up the remnants of ISIS.

In an attempt to alleviate concern about the unfinished fight against ISIS in Syria President Trump stated that Turkey can finish the job. On December 23, 2018 – just four days after announcing the U.S. military withdrawal from Syria – President Trump tweeted:

“President @RT_Erdogan of Turkey has very strongly informed me that he will eradicate whatever is left of ISIS in Syria . . . and he is a man who can do it plus, Turkey is right “next door”. Our troops are coming home!”

During a subsequent trip to visit U.S. troops in Iraq President Trump stated:

“We’ve knocked them silly. I will tell you I’ve had some very good talks with President Erdogan who wants to knock them out also, and he’ll do it.”

For the last few years, since early 2015, the United States has been providing training, advise, assistance, weapons, equipment, intelligence, and ‘enablers’ to the Syrian Democratic Front. The SDF has been the primary ground force in Syria that has been fighting ISIS. The SDF has been enabled by the U.S. and other Coalition partners with fires support (artillery and mortar) and airstrikes. As a result of SDF military operations the Islamic State has seen its territorial holdings in Syria diminish significantly. Currently, ISIS controls a few pockets of territory along the Middle Euphrates River Valley (MERV).

The SDF, assisted by the U.S. and Coalition nations, has liberated more than 20,000 square miles of previously held ISIS territory in Syria. More than 3 million civilians have been liberated from ISIS rule. The SDF is a local Arab and Kurdish military militia. However, the majority of the SDF is made up of fighters from the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG). There are also some smaller ethnic groups in the SDF such as the Yezidis and Syriac Christians.

Photo caption: US tactical vehicle provides security on roads near Manbij, Syria. Manbij is an SDF stronghold that separates the SDF enclave from areas held by Turkish-backed Syrian forces. Photo by Staff Sgt. Timothy Koster, Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve, June 20, 2018.

The Islamic State is not quite defeated. There are more military operations that need to be conducted to eliminate the few remaining pockets of IS resistance. In addition, IS has already shifted its strategy from that of a conventional force holding ground to an insurgency. It is now operating in the shadows with small groups of fighters, an intelligence apparatus, and a support structure hidden from view. It has adopted insurgent and terrorist tactics now that its conventional military capability has been significantly degraded.

President Trump’s decision to immediately start the withdrawal of U.S. military personnel from Syria puts the fight against IS in jeopardy. If the Kurds lose the support of the U.S. and the Coalition partners then it will be in danger of attacks by the Turkish military and its proxy Syrian militia forces. The Kurds will likely shift their attention from the remaining ISIS pockets and focus on the threat of Turkish incursions.

The situation in Syria is certainly complex. Russia, a key Assad ally, does not view the YPG as a terrorist organization. Russia considers Kurdish held territory as a future holding of the Syrian government; not territory that should be ceded to a Turkish occupation. The Syrian government sees any Turkish military presence in Syria as illegal and against its interests. Another major player, Iran, is concerned about ISIS regaining strength in Syria – which could affect the fight against ISIS in Iraq. Turkey would likely meet with varying degrees of resistance from these major players should it attempt to send military forces to the areas where ISIS is currently operating within Syria.

However, President Trump says to not worry about ISIS. He has the assurance from President Erdogan that Turkey’s military forces will clean up the remaining ISIS threat. Certainly, this statement will alleviate the concern that some Trump supporters have about abruptly leaving Syria without finishing the mission of killing off the remaining IS fighters. But . . .

A brief look at the map above that depicts which warring faction holds what territory in Syria quickly will cast doubt on Turkey’s ability to chase down and defeat ISIS fighters. Turkish forces are either in Turkey along the Turkish Syrian border or located in a small pocket of Syria (Afrin) to the west of the SDF held territory. The remaining pockets of ISIS are in the central eastern region of Syria along the Euphrates River. It would be extremely difficult for Turkish military forces to conduct operations in the part of Syria where ISIS is currently found without traversing territory (almost 250 kms) held by the Syrian government forces or the SDF.

Turkey views the YPG – the Kurdish element of the SDF – as an extension of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK). The PKK is a Kurdish resistance group in Turkey that has been labeled as a terrorist organization by both Ankara and Washington. The PKK has been conducting insurgent military operations within Turkey for several decades. The Turks would like to eliminate the Kurdish enclave in Syria and establish a buffer zone in Syria south of the Turkish border to provide greater security against possible Kurdish attacks and attempts to support the PKK.

Turkish desire to eliminate ISIS as a threat is certainly secondary to its aim to diminish the Kurdish control of northeastern Syria. The Turks are not that concerned about an ISIS organization that has been at war with the Syrian Kurds and the Assad regime. In addition, in order to reach the areas where ISIS now exists the Turks would have to traverse across areas of Syria now held by either the SDF or Syrian government forces. President Trump’s assertion that Turkey will finish the fight against ISIS is misplaced optimism.

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Top photo: SDF mortar team fires 120mm at ISIS target near Deir ez-Zor in the Middle Euphrates River Valley, Syria. Photo by SGT Matthew Crane, CJTF-OIR, November 16, 2018.

Once again the Kurds are cast aside. This is nothing new. Over the span of the past 100 years they have been used as proxy forces and then kicked to the side of the curb once their usefulness has run its course. The United States decision to abandon the Syrian Kurds is yet once more instance of history repeating itself.

On Thursday, December 19, 2018, President Trump declared that the fight against the Islamic State in Syria was over and that we had ‘won’. He announced the immediate withdrawal of the U.S. troops and diplomatic personnel in northeastern Syria that is controlled by the Syrian Democratic Front (SDF).

The biggest loser in this latest Trump decision are the Syrian Kurds. The SDF – with some Arab but mostly Kurdish fighters – have been instrumental in the degradation of the Islamic State in Syria. Other losers – in the long run – will be the Syrian people who will continue to suffer the abuses of the Assad regime, Iran proxy forces, and Hezbollah. The United States loses bargaining position and the ability to influence events in Syria and in the Middle East region.

The big winners in this debacle are the Assad regime, Iran, Russia, Turkey, and IS. It will be interesting to see how all this shakes out over the next few years. Turkey certainly will do everything it can to marginalize and / or destroy the Kurdish enclave in northeastern Syria. The Kurds – realizing now the mistake of trusting the United States – will likely come to an accommodation with the Assad regime. That would solidify the northeastern region of Syria for Assad. Then again – Assad and the Turks could come to an arrangement that would decimate the Kurdish enclave.

The 5th Special Forces along with many supporting U.S. military elements spent a lot of time and energy getting the SDF established, equipped, and trained to fight the Islamic State in Syria. Certainly there has to be some angst at Fort Campbell about the future of the Syrian Kurds. The abandonment of the Syrian Kurds is a tragic error on the part of the United States. And once again the Kurds realize that they have no friends but the mountains.

Kurdistan Independence Referendum. Independence in the Middle East has been an elusive dream for many Kurds. The Kurds of Iraq believe the time has come to pursue the establishment of an independent state for the Kurdish people. The overwhelming majority of Kurds living in northern Iraq voted for independence in a recent referendum held in early October 2017. Over 70% of the eligible voters participated in the referendum with nine out of ten voters backing independence.

Iraqi Government Reaction. The Iraqi central government is not keen on losing a significant portion of its territory. In addition, it does not want to lose the revenue of the large oil reserves of the Kurdish region. The central government of Iraq responded quickly with statements opposing the vote for Kurdistan independence and actions limiting the autonomy of the Kurdish region. International flights were prohibited and some border crossings were taken over by Iraqi security forces.

Possible Military Action. The ability of the Iraqi security forces to take military action against the Kurds is questionable. Although threats of reoccupying the Kurdish areas of Iraq should be taken seriously, it is doubtful military action will be taken to wrest control of the entire Kurdish enclave. There is the possibility that Kirkuk could be the scene of violence. One cannot discount the possibility of the Iranian-back Shiia militias working in conjunction with the ISF to attempt to occupy Kirkuk.

Regional Implications. Outside of Iraq the neighboring powers also expressed their dismay. The nations of Iran, Turkey, and Syria all have significant Kurdish populations and they are worried that an Iraqi Kurdish independence movement will spill over the border into the Kurdish populated areas of their countries. There will be significant regional implications if Iraqi Kurds attain independence.

Regional Reaction. The Iranians have pushed a small number of tanks and artillery to border areas where Iran meets the Kurdish autonomous region. In addition, Iran ordered a fuel embargo stopping international movement of fuel products in or out of Iraqi Kurdistan. International flights are barred from landing at either the Erbil or Sulaymaniya airports and the regional airlines of other countries are complying with that request. Turkey has agreed to deal only with Baghdad on oil exports – putting a severe cramp in the revenue flow of oil from Iraqi Kurdistan to Turkey. Lurking in the background is Russia – with a seemingly close working relationship with Iran, Syria, and Turkey.

Is There A Case for Kurdish Independence? The Kurds have a long history, a distinct national identity, common language, shared culture, ethnic identity, and defined geographical location. [1] At the conclusion of World War I an international agreement [2] provided a legal basis for statehood. This was never achieved but the Kurdish people have not forgotten what they almost attained. Richard N. Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, spells out some criteria that should be considered for the establishment of a new country. He believes that there is a persuasive case for Kurdish independence.

U.S. Support of Kurds. The United States has issued formal statements opposing the Kurdish independence movement. There are some observers of the Middle East who advocate a breakup of the Iraqi state into three separate nations – comprised of Sunni, Shia, and Kurd peoples. The U.S. opposes this construct as well as an independent Kurdish state. As this situation develops – Kurdistan independence – the U.S. will be put into a vexing situation. Despite being staunch U.S. allies in the fight against the Islamic State [3] the Kurdish enclave in northern Iraq may find that the U.S. support of the Kurds is a temporary arrangement.

Unique Relationship of U.S. SOF with the Kurds. The Peshmerga have a long history with U.S. Special Forces. In 1991, shortly after the Gulf War, the 10th Special Forces Group deployed to southern Turkey and northern Iraq (Operation Provide Comfort) to set up administer refugee camps and facilitate the movement of Kurds from the Turkish border area back to a safe haven zone inside northern Iraq. Operation Provide Comfort would continue for a number of years with the establishment of a no-fly zone (and continued coordination with U.S. SOF). During the 2003 invasion of Iraq the 10th Special Forces Group linked up with the Peshmerga and conducted an offensive against Iraqi units in northern Iraq.

Viability of a Kurdistan State is Questionable. Kurdistan is a land-locked region. To travel from Kurdistan by air to international destinations you must overfly Iraq (to the south), Iran, Turkey, or Syria. If these four nations refuse overflights then the Kurds would have to move people and goods by ground movement. Once again this movement overland must be allowed by the four countries mentioned above. An independent Kurdistan would find trade with international partners to be heavily dependent on good relations with its neighboring countries.

Compromise in the Future. It is unlikely the international community will rally in support of Kurdistan independence. One way out of the current dispute is a negotiated settlement between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the Baghdad central government. The major agenda topics would include how the territory would be allocated (Kirkuk comes to mind), how oil revenues are shared, and how much autonomy an Iraqi Kurdistan would enjoy.

Footnotes:

[1] A number of old maps provide insight into the historical lands of the Kurdish people. These can be viewed at “Atlas of Kurdistan”, Wikimedia Commons Atlas of the World.
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Atlas_of_Kurdistan

[2] The Treaty of Sevres was signed on August 10, 1920 that formalized the conclusion of the Ottoman participation in World War I. The agreement took away all the lands of the Ottoman Empire not on the Anatolian Peninsula and provided for a possible Kurdish territory (that did not include Kurds from present-day Syria, Iran, or Iraq). However, the emergence of Mustafa Kemal and of modern day Turkey resulted in the cancellation of a Kurdistan referendum.

[3] In the early fight (2014) against the onslaught by the Islamic State it was the Kurdish Peshmerga that held the line against ISIS while the Iraqi security forces fled and left vast areas of Iraq under ISIS control. U.S. special operations forces (and SOF of other nations) worked closely with the Iraqi Kurds to fend of the Islamic State fighters. Of late, the Kurds in Syria have proven to be very valuable proxy forces for U.S. SOF.

SOF News Update 20170630 – Video of Philippine SOF engaging insurgents, volunteers for MAVNI program face deportation, Black Hornet mini-UAV, drug use in SOF, Leahy Law & security assistance, SOF’s counter culture, SPMAGTF-CR-AF, not losing in Afghanistan, SOF caught in the middle in Syria, and more.

Video of Philippine SOF Engaging Insurgents. Vice News provides a 9-minute long video of Philippine special operations forces (SOF) snipers engaging insurgents in Southern Philippines.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O16JP0YRKv4

PD-100 Mini-UAV for SOF. The Black Hornet PD-100 is a very tiny helicopter UAV used by a number of SOF units from across the globe. Read more in “Warplanes: Something The Batman Would Hang On His Belt”, Strategy Page, June 28, 2017.

MAVNI Program Hits Roadbump. During the long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan it became apparent that the U.S. military did not have enough Arabic and Dari / Pashtun speakers. Admiral Eric Olson, a past commander of United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), was instrumental in establishing the Pentagon’s “Military Accessions Vital to National Interest” program that recruited foreign-born individuals with language abilities needed by the military. Many members of the program worked as interpreters for U.S. SOF and a few have entered the training pipeline for SOF. Now it appears that President Trump’s new immigration policies is putting the program through some hurdles. Over 1,000 individuals with signed contracts are facing deportation. Read more in “Lawmakers press Trump not to deport foreign-born military recruits”, Stars & Stripes, June 28, 2017. The Office of Inspector General for the DoD recently published a report relating to counterintelligence and insider threats and the MAVNI program. It probably is good reading but it is classified.

Green Beret Challenge. A former Special Forces Soldier is hosting an event for about 24 people who want to know what it is like to be a Green Beret. This is an opportunity for ordinary people to test themselves by experiencing what a SF Soldier does in training and in the field. (Macon.com, June 29, 2017).

UK’s SBS Train on Oil Rigs. The United Kingdom’s Special Boat Service (SBS) has been conducting training exercises on North Sea oil rigs. (Energy Voice).

Canadian SOF Mission in Iraq Extended. Canadian SOF will continue their mission to train up the Peshmerga in their fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Read more in “Liberals extend ‘advise and assist’ mission in Iraq to March 2019”, National Post, June 29, 2017.

SOF’s Counterculture. Boots unbloused, no hat, sun glasses on head, rolled up sleeves, and more in a war zone will easily help you identify an SF guy. The conventional CSM or SGM sees a young trooper who is undisciplined but perhaps there is more to that Soldier than meets the eye. Read “Surfers, Hippies, Hipsters, and Snowflakes – Counterculture in SOF”, SOFLETE.com, June 29, 2017.

2017 Navy SEAL Patriot Award. The Navy SEAL Foundation announced that Kenneth Griffin will receive their annual award for his work in support of the Naval Special Warfare community. General (Ret) David Petraeus is the keynote speaker for the event to be held in September 2017.  (PR Web).

SPMAGTF-CR-AF Train Up with Explosives. The personnel of Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force – Crisis Response – Africa have been training up on the use of explosives in Spain with members of the Spanish Second Air Support Deployment Squadron (SEADA). (Marines.mil, June 28, 2017).

Drug Use in SOF Units? Members of the U.S. House of Representatives are under the impression that U.S. special operations forces has a big drug use problem. Read “House lawmakers demand accountability review for U.S. special operations forces”, The Washington Times, June 28, 2017.

Road to Stalemate in Afghanistan. The Afghan security forces are slowly losing ground in Afghanistan. While the government controls the major cities and provincial capitals its hold on the rural countryside is tenuous. The U.S. strategic plan for Afghanistan has yet to be unveiled but it is unlikely to lead to victory. James Dobbins, a veteran diplomat with a lot of Afghan experience, writes “Trump’s Options for Afghanistan: Losing or Not Losing”, RAND Corporation, June 23, 2017.

More on Leahy Law. The passage of the Leahy Law is seen as an obstacle to SOF units attempting to provide training to indigenous forces in other countries. Vetting of units is problematic and time consuming. Rachel Kleinfeld opines on the Leahy Law, how U.S. security assistance is effective at the tactical level, how security assistance most times fails to achieve our national interests, and ‘failed states’. Read “Rethinking US Security Assistance Beyond the Leahy Law”, Just Security, June 28, 2017.

SOF in the Middle: Between Turks and Kurds. A news report states that U.S. special operations forces are being positioned in key areas in an attempt to prevent Turkish military forces from attacking our Kurdish allies. Read more in “U.S. special operations forces dispatched to Tal Abyad in northern Syria”, Military Times, June 28, 2017.

Syria Update 20160103 – The conflict in Syria goes on. The host of combatants (internationals, proxy forces, militias, jihadists, terrorists) in the country is beyond comprehension at times. The multitude of international players involved – whether directly through combat or indirectly through provision of funds and foreign fighters – and their relationship with others is complex. Below is a selection of recent news articles, reports, analysis, commentary, and papers on the conflict in Syria.

President Obama on Libya (Mar 28, 2011 press conference):

“To brush aside America’s responsibility as a leader and – more profoundly – our responsibilities to our fellow human beings under such circumstances would have been a betrayal of who we are. Some nations may be able to turn a blind eye to atrocities in other countries. The United States of America is different. And as President, I refused to wait for the images of slaughter and mass graves before taking action.”

President Obama on Syria (Dec 16, 2016 press conference):

“So with respect to Syria what I have consistently done is taken the best course that I can try to end the civil war while having also to take into account the long-term national security interests of the United States.”

Iran’s Intentions. One opinion piece states that “Iran intends to incorporate the brutalized Arab land into its version of a caliphate.” Read Clifford D. May’s thoughts in “The sorrow and the pity in Syria”, The Washington Times, December 20, 2016.

Obama’s Syrian Legacy. Stephen F. Hayes is less than flattering of President Obama’s performance on the Syrian conflict. Read “Obama’s Syria Legacy Is a Betrayal of ‘Who We Are'”, The Weekly Standard, December 26, 2016.

Eastern Aleppo Falls. The rebel occupied enclave of Aleppo is no more. The fighters and many of the civilian population have fled to a neighboring province to the west – Idlib. Read more in “The Fall of Aleppo . . . And What Happens Next“, by Rachel Ansley, Atlantic Council, December 14, 2016.

SDF’s Advance on Raqqa. On December 10, 2016 the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) announced the start of the next phase of their operation against the Islamic State. The SDF is made up of local Arabs (and some allies) and began operations to isolate Raqqa in late November. The Kurds are in play for the taking of Raqqa but there is a lot of consternation on the part of the Turks – who fear an expansion of Kurdish-held territory in Syria. The Coalition (U.S. and allies) is supporting the SDF with training, advise, and assistance (airstrikes, material, equipment, advisors, and ISR). Not much has been in the news about the advance on Raqqa – probably because not much has happened.

U.S. Fighter for Kurds Explains. An American who fought with the Kurds in Syria for six months provides his perspective in “This American Fought ISIS. Now He’s Trying to Get Washington to Untangle Its Syria Policy”, Mother Jones, December 26, 2016.

ISIS takes Palmyra. In mid-December the Islamic State attacked Palmyra – taking the city from Syrian government forces. Syria’s crack troops (including Russian SOF, Hezbollah, and Iranian proxy forces) were occupied with the siege of Aleppo leaving less than capable units in Palmyra. As the regime forces began to buckle Iranian and Russia forces withdrew from their Palmyra garrisons. It may be some time before the regime musters enough forces to take this city back from the Islamic State.

Syrian Govt’s Next Move? The Syrian regimes next target is not yet known – however, there are lots of cities and regions that deserve its attention to include Palmya, Idlib province, and areas closer to Damascus (capital). It now has the momentum against the rebel forces (with the significant contributions by Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia). However, Syria also has to avoid being over-extended. Its forces are not strong enough to control all areas of Syria. So perhaps the next few months will see some refitting, retraining, and regrouping. Iran, Russia, and Turkey also need to come to terms with their respective national interests as well. Should the focus be on consolidation, going after the remaining rebel groups, hitting ISIS, or taking on the Kurds?

Russia Warns U.S. The United States has been warned that moves to ease restrictions on the delivery of weapons to Syrian rebels (such as surface-to-air shoulder-fired missiles) could have severe consequences. Russia views such an activity as a direct threat to Russian forces operating in Syria. See “Russia Calls US Move to Better Arm Syrian Rebels a ‘Hostile Act'”, Voice of America, December 27, 2016.

Attraction to the Islamic State. What prompts a person to leave his country and join ISIS? Read about one young Turk’s change from college student (astronomy) to Islamic Front fighter in “Descent Into Jihad”, Voice of America, December 22, 2016.

And, of course, There is Trump. Who knows what U.S. Middle East policy will look like in February.

More Foreign Aid, Less Military Adventurism. Chris Murphy, a Democratic senator from Connecticut, has wrote an opinion piece about the U.S. meddling in Syria. He says our half-hearted effort was counter-productive, extended the conflict, and caused the death of thousands. Murphy believes spending more aid money on fragile states could alleviate suffering and prevent civil wars. Read more in “Marshal Plans, Not Martial Plans”, The New York Times, January 2, 2017.

News on the Middle East 20161109 – Civil war in Syria, U.S. deal with Turkey on fighting ISIS in Syria, SDF announces Raqqa offensive, US Apache Gunships, ‘Hearts and Minds’ of Mosul, counter-drone operations, defining military success in Iraq, and how to deal with the humanitarian crisis after the conquest of Mosul.

U.S. and Turkey Deal on ISIL in Syria. The United States and its “ally” – Turkey – has come to an agreement for a long-range plan to conduct operations against the Islamic State in Syria – specifically it’s Syrian capital of Raqqa. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff – General Joe Dunford – met with his Turkish counterpart on November 6, 2016 to coordinate operational planning and resolve some challenging issues. One wonders whether the U.S. is selling out the Kurds while coming to an agreement with the Turks. Hmmm. Read more in “Dunford, Turkish Leaders Create Long-term Plan Against ISIL in Raqqa”, U.S. Department of Defense News Release, November 6, 2016.

Syrian Conflict. There are a lot of foreign interests being played out in Syria. The Iranians and Russians are actively fighting ISIS, the Kurds, and the Syrian rebel forces. The U.S. is supporting anti-Assad groups (covert action on the part of the CIA) and anti-ISIS groups (Special Forces assisting the Syrian rebel groups and Kurds). Other Middle East and European nations are siding with the U.S. at the same time that some Middle East nations are covertly aligned with ISIS. Turkey has entered the fight against the Assad regime and ISIS; but many think their main objective is to prevent the emergence of a Kurdish nation-state carved out of northern Syria. The conflict is in its sixth year with no end in sight. So the place is a mess! Read more in Civil War in Syria, Global Conflict Tracker by the Council on Foreign Relations, November 2016.

SDF Announces Raqqa Offensive. The Syrian Democratic Forces has proclaimed the beginning of an offensive to take the ISIS stronghold of Raqqa, Syria. There are a lot of moving parts in this equation. Will Kurdish forces occupy the mostly Sunni city? What part will the Turkish Army play? How much support (advisors and air) will the United States offer? Read a statement by SECDEF on the coming Raqqa offensive (DoD Release, Nov 6, 2016). Read also “Turkey Raises Concerns Over Role of Syrian Kurds in Operation to Retake Raqqa”, Radio Free Europe, November 8, 2016.

Mosul Aftermath. What happens in Mosul, Iraq once the combined forces of the Iraqi Security Forces, Peshmerga, and various armed militias take the city from the Islamic State? Who will be the holding force to secure and stabilize the city? Will the Iraqi government rush in enough police and city administrators to properly govern and secure the city? And what about the humanitarian aspects of caring for the many residents who have suffered under the yoke of ISIS? Some estimates say that over 700,000 people will be displaced over the short-term – requiring shelter, food, water, security, and medical care. Senior administration officials of the U.S. Department of State would have you believe that the Mosul post-liberation operation is prepared and well-coordinated. Hmmmm. Read Background Briefing on Humanitarian Response and Preparation for Post-Operational Mosul, U.S. Department of State, November 7, 2016.

US Attack Helicopters Aid Mosul Fight. The Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) has AH-64 Apache gunships supporting Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) for the Mosul offensive. See “US Apache Gunships Back Iraqi Forces in Mosul Offensive”, DoDBuzz, November 8, 2016.

Hearts and Minds – Mosul. When ISIS first took the city of Mosul from the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) over two years ago the Sunni population of Mosul welcomed them. However two years of ISIS rule has turned the city’s inhabitants against ISIS and now the ISF are being welcomed as liberators. Read “Winning Hearts and Minds in Mosul”, by Max Boot, Commentary, November 7, 2016.

Next President’s War. In January the new U.S. president will inherent U.S. involvement in several conflicts in the Middle East and South Asia. These countries include Libya, Iraq, Syria, Somalia, Yemen and Afghanistan. Read more in “This is the War Against al-Qaeda the Next President Will Inherit”, Defense One, August 2016.

Counter-Drone Measures. News that the Islamic State is using drones in Iraq has prompted the U.S. military to take active anti-drone measures. Some reports say that the U.S. Air Force is using its assets in the anti-drone fight. Read “The U.S. Military Has Drone-Killing Planes in the Middle East”, War Is Boring, November 2016.

Success in Iraq? President Obama’s strategy in Iraq is to roll back ISIS but without the large-scale deployment of ground troops to fight the war. He is relying on U.S. airpower to degrade ISIS and support the Iraqi Security Forces (as well as the Peshmerga) and on the “Train, Advise, and Assist” effort of advisors (SOF and conventional) to professionalize the Iraqi Security  Forces (ISF). To some extent – although slowly – this seems to be working. Read more in “Defining Military Success in Iraq”, Defense One, November 3, 2016.