Members of NATO-ISAF DCOS-STAB, US Army Corps of Engineers, and Donors Conduct a Coordination Meeting with the Afghan Ministry of Energy and Water to Coordinate Projects (2011)

The Stabilization Assistance Review and Burden Sharing

“A Construct for Leveraging
Stabilization Actors and their Capabilities”

This is the third article in a three-part series published in SOF News and focused on implementing the Stabilization Assistance Review. It builds on the two previous articles; Implementing the Stabilization Assistance Review (SAR) and Stabilization Environments and the Range of Military Operations. The Stabilization Assistance Review will likely have a significant impact on how the Department of Defense (DoD) participates in stabilization activities. Embracing a common theme from the current administration, the Stabilization Assistance Review says that “there is no public appetite to repeat the large-scale reconstruction efforts of the past”; and goes on to proffer a requirement for, “a more purposeful division of labor and burden-sharing with multilateral bodies…”. The review recommends that DoD be relegated largely to a supporting role, and it is unlikely that the department will see the large funding streams authorized during the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq such as the Commander’s Emergency Response Program, and the Afghan Infrastructure Fund. For those of us within DoD who wish to continue to be active participants in stabilization, but are faced with significantly reduced stabilization funding, we will need to embrace the burden sharing concept articulated in the Stabilization Assistance Review by leveraging other stabilization actors to our advantage.

The 2019 NDAA did not include any Defense Support to Stabilization (DSS) language or associated funding. The failure of congress to include DSS in the 2019 NDAA is certainly not helpful, but neither is it a show stopper. DoD, either in the lead (usually a non-permissive environment) or in a supporting role (permissive environment), can continue to be a major player in stabilization activities. Whether executing our core stabilization tasks as articulated in DODI 3000.05 “Stability Operations” and the soon to be released DODD 3000.05 “Stabilization” of providing security, public order, and immediate needs; or by conducting our reinforcing stabilization tasks which include targeted basic services and critical infrastructure repair, DoD can play a significant role. But to do this we must adjust our processes in order to conform to the stabilization burden sharing concept and better leverage the stabilization contributions of various non-U.S. actors (our coalition partners both military and civilian, and to a lesser degree Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO), Private Volunteer Organizations (PVO), and other donors).

The following construct provides a framework for implementing the burden sharing concept. It can be employed in support of our current Joint Operations doctrine (Joint Publication 3-0), and would have its greatest impact during phases 2 “Seize the Initiative”, 3 “Dominate”, and 4 “Stabilize” when DoD might be the lead for stabilization and the environment might preclude DOS and USAID from having a meaningful presence (see figure 1). The construct has four steps; information gathering, requirements determination and prioritization, resource allocation, and synchronization.

Although the construct suggests a sequential execution, the reality is that changes in the environment will cause a constant review and updating of all steps simultaneously. A form of this construct can be executed at any level, strategic to tactical, but the primary location should be within the country that the stabilization activities are taking place. To implement the construct the USG should leverage either an existing Combined Joint Interagency Working Group (CJIAWG) type organization, or establish a CJIAWG if one does not exist. Civil Affairs officers can be particularly useful as members of this group given their in-depth understanding of the human terrain and their access.

In the information gathering step the CJIAWG reviews the DOS, DoD, and USAID strategies and plans for the country in question. This analysis results in the end states to be achieved, the milestones that lead to those end states, and the major areas or sectors within which stabilization activities will occur. This analysis will also produce priorities that will help guide the process. At the same time the group identifies various non-USG stabilization actors co-occupying the same space.

During the requirements determination and prioritization step the group develops a list of stabilization projects or initiatives that conforms to the strategies and plans reviewed in previous step. Sources of information can vary widely. Civil Affairs units offer especially insightful information based upon their understanding of the country and their time spent in the field. Each requirement should be submitted with amplifying information to include cost estimates. The initial product is a list of projects or initiatives, broken into sectors. The group then rank orders the list of requirements.

During the resource allocation step there may be select projects that the USG may wish to execute ourselves, so the appropriate department or agency can be aligned with those requirements. Our coalition partners may wish to focus their efforts on a particular area or region of the country, or on a specific sector of stabilization activities such as health care or electrical power. So those resources could be allocated accordingly. In addition, various NGOs and PVOs should also be considered. But the USG leads for coordinating with these organizations are DOS and USAID. They should seek to work with appropriate NGOs & PVOs in order to maximize their capabilities against the list of requirements. A possible lever the USG can use to facilitate cooperation is security. By offering security, these actors might be motivated to support our requirements. But we must understand that these organizations usually seek to keep their position neutral, therefore they tend to distance from the military. Engagements with NGOs and PVOs should be sensitive to this.

The final step of the construct is synchronization of the execution of the stabilization activities. Combat operations may take an extended period of time. The requirement for stabilization activities do not wait for conflict to end. The greater the gap between the end of combat operations and the start of stabilization activities, the greater the opportunity for malign actors to gain a competitive advantage. Therefore the CJIAWG should, to the greatest extent possible, coordinate the execution of stabilization activities with combat operations, ensuring requisite security is in place to support the execution of the projects, and that the stabilization activities are prepared to be executed as soon as practical on completion of the combat operations in order to consolidate gains. All of this information can be captured in a spreadsheet and sorted by priority, sector, implementer, timeframe, etc. as shown in Figure 2.

Despite the recommendations outlined in the Stabilization Assistance Review, DoD can be a more active participant in stabilization activities. But to do so we must become more adept at employing a burden sharing approach that leverages the capabilities of all stabilization actors, and reduces the costs to the USG.

*********

Photo and Images. All photos and images provided by the author.

About the Author: Charles Barham is a retired U.S. Army Colonel with 29 years of service (1981-2010).  He also served for four years as a Department of the Army Civilian Management and Program Analyst in the Afghanistan/Pakistan Hands Program (2010-2014).   He currently serves as a Department of the Air Force Civilian Management and Program Analyst at USCENTCOM in an Interagency Planner capacity.

He served for more than three years in Afghanistan as; Assistant Director of the Police Reform Directorate, Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan 2006-2007, Senior Socioeconomic Advisor in HQ ISAF-DCOS/STAB under Generals David Petraeus and John Allen 2011, as Deputy Director of the NATO/Afghan Transformation Task Force, HQ ISAF under General Joseph Dunford 2013, and as a Senior Planning, Programing and Budgeting Advisor to the Afghan National Army Special Operations Command.

He has served for over six years in HQCENTCOM in positions including Senior Socioeconomic Advisor and Interagency Planner.  He has a Bachelor of Science in Business Administration from the University of Richmond, a Master of Business Administration from Oklahoma City University, and a Master of Strategic Studies from the U.S. Army War College.

]]> 8133 https://sof.news/misc/stabilization-environments/ Thu, 02 Aug 2018 05:00:13 +0000 http://www.sof.news/?p=7461 Stabilization Environments and the Range of Military Operations “Implementing the Stabilization Assistance Review” This article is the second in a series of SOF News articles addressing the Stabilization Assistance Review. It discusses multiple stabilization environments in the context of implementing [...]]]>

Stabilization Environments and the Range of Military Operations

“Implementing the Stabilization Assistance Review”

This article is the second in a series of SOF News articles addressing the Stabilization Assistance Review. It discusses multiple stabilization environments in the context of implementing the Stabilization Assistance Review. At the same time it looks at current Department of Defense (DoD) doctrine which includes a range of military operations which can be overlaid on these environments. In order for the United States Government (USG) to be successful in implementing the Stabilization Assistance Review, Department of State (DOS), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and DoD must take a holistic approach that addresses stabilization activities across all stabilization environments and across the full range of military operations.

There are three basic “stabilization environments”. These environments are based on the similar “zones” (peace, gray zone, war) that are articulated in a USSOCOM White Paper “The Gray Zone”. The stabilization environments are: Stable, the Gray Zone, and Unstable environments. These environments are depicted in Figure 1 “Stabilization Environments”. What distinguishes countries in these environments is their capability in the stabilization functions of security, governance, and service delivery, which are drawn from Joint Publication 3-07 “Stability”. Countries in the stable environment demonstrate adequate capabilities across all three functions.

Countries in the gray zone environment are usually “fragile” countries who suffer shortfalls in one or more functions; while countries in the unstable environment are usually failed states who suffer significant issues across one or more functions.

Over time a country may move through more than one of these environments. As depicted in figure 1 by the black dashed line, a stable country may become unstable or fragile due to one or more issues within the three stabilization functions. If left unchecked, the country may suffer serious issues across these functions and slip into the unstable environment and become a failed state. If corrective actions are taken then it is possible this country may start to re-stabilize and eventually move back towards the stable environment. So what are DoD’s stabilization activities across these environments?

Ask most DoD members when stabilization activities occur in the range of military operations and they would say “Phase IV – Stabilize”. This is a sub-optimal response that fails to maximize stabilization activities and their effects. In reality, stabilization activities can be, and are conducted across the full range of military operations. To help explain what DoD’s stabilizations activities are across these environments we can overlay onto the stabilization environments the range of military operations mentioned earlier in this article (Figure 2). As discussed in Joint Publication 3-0 “Operations”, the range of military operations are; Phase 0 – Shaping, Phase 1 – Deter, Phase 2 – Seize the initiative, Phase 3 – Dominate, Phase 4 – Stabilize, and Phase 5 – Return to civilian control.

Countries we assess to be stable are in the green or stable zone in figure 1.  In this situation, from a DoD perspective, this is our “shaping” phase of operations and our stabilization activities might only include our normal security cooperation activities as identified in our country plans, and perhaps an occasional instance of foreign humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

However, if a country is fragile it is normally in the gray zone where we would normally be conducting deterrence operations. In addition to the aforementioned Phase 0 stabilization activities, DoD would leverage assets such as Civil Affairs Teams who are deployed out amongst the population, seeing first-hand what the issues are and making recommendations for stabilization activities.  Working through the country team, Civil Affairs Teams nominate these activities to insure they support DOS and USAID plans and strategies, and if concurred with, they can implement these activities.  Working in close coordination with our USG interagency partners, as well as other international community actors, we could re-stabilize fragile countries.  This is similar to the old saying of “an ounce of prevention …”. Activities in the Gray Zone Environment and Phase 1 is where the three main USG Organization (DoD, DOS and USAID) can offer the greatest return on our stabilization dollars.

Countries that are unstable or failed states are in the red or unstable environment.  DoD will likely be called upon to conduct combat operations to initially seize the initiative (Phase 2), then dominate our opponent (Phase 3).  It is important to remember that stabilization activities may occur throughout both of these phases as DoD leverages Civil Affairs capabilities as well as other assets to provide for security, public order, and human needs; and in support of DOS and USAID activities if they are present.

As combat operations terminate DoD transitions to Phase 4 and the focus is squarely on stabilizing the country. For countries that have undergone combat operations the scope of stabilization activities in this phase can be significant. This would be “… the pound of cure” that could have been prevented in Phase 1 mentioned earlier. These Phase IV stabilization activities should help drive the country back towards the gray zone environment initially and ultimately back into the stable environment.

The Stabilization Assistance Review is largely focused on Phase IV “Stabilize” activities conducted in “conflict affected” countries, rather than stabilization efforts during the earlier phases within the range of military operations. By focusing on conflict affected the Stabilization Assistance Review addresses the greatest stabilization challenge we might face, but it misses our greatest opportunity for success and our ability to achieve our highest return on stabilization investment by taking action sooner.

The Stabilization Assistance Review does mention “conflict prevention” but mostly in passing. In order for the USG to be successful in implementing the Stabilization Assistance Review we must take a more holistic approach to stabilization by planning and executing stabilization activities across all of the stabilization environments, and across the full range of military operations as demonstrated in Figure 3 “The Holistic Approach to Stabilization Activities” below.

By conducting a comparatively small amount of stabilization activities during Phases 0 and 1 we can keep stable countries stable and help guide fragile countries back to stability. At the same time we are reducing unstable environments where violent extremist organizations and insurgent groups can form and grow. This is in effect the “Ounce of Prevention”. If we focus our efforts in conflict affected countries we are forgoing this opportunity and will pay a far greater price, “the pound of cure”, later in Phase 4. Taking a holistic approach that considers all stabilization environments, and the full range of military operations offers the best chance for the USG to be successful in implementing the Stabilization Assistance Review.

Figures: All charts are by the author.

Editorial Note: The use of ‘gray zone’ and ‘grey zone’ is common and interchangeable among national security writers.

About the Author: Charles Barham is a retired U.S. Army Colonel with 29 years of service (1981-2010).  He also served for four years as a Department of the Army Civilian Management and Program Analyst in the Afghanistan/Pakistan Hands Program (2010-2014).   He currently serves as a Department of the Air Force Civilian Management and Program Analyst at USCENTCOM in an Interagency Planner capacity.

He served for more than three years in Afghanistan as; Assistant Director of the Police Reform Directorate, Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan 2006-2007, Senior Socioeconomic Advisor in HQ ISAF-DCOS/STAB under Generals David Petraeus and John Allen 2011, as Deputy Director of the NATO/Afghan Transformation Task Force, HQ ISAF under General Joseph Dunford 2013, and as a Senior Planning, Programing and Budgeting Advisor to the Afghan National Army Special Operations Command.

He has served for over six years in HQCENTCOM in positions including Senior Socioeconomic Advisor and Interagency Planner.  He has a Bachelor of Science in Business Administration from the University of Richmond, a Master of Business Administration from Oklahoma City University, and a Master of Strategic Studies from the U.S. Army War College.

Implementing the Stabilization Assistance Review

“Sacrificing Responsiveness for Cost Savings?”

In June 2018 representatives from the Department of State (DOS), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Department of Defense (DoD), academia, and other organizations met in Washington, DC and conducted a Stabilization Symposium that discussed the Stabilization Assistance Review (SAR) and its recommendations. The debate was lively and informative, and it uncovered a friction point. This point was the speed at which DoD usually desires stabilization activities to occur, vice the projected speed the Stabilization Assistance Review would suggest stabilization activities will occur in the future. The potential for a sizable gap exists, but this gap can be mitigated.

The Stabilization Assistance Review states “…there is no appetite to repeat large-scale reconstruction efforts, therefore our engagements must be more measured…”, and offers approaches to stabilization activity execution. These approaches do not encourage speed, rather they suggest a slower, more deliberate pace that reduces the cost to the United States Government (USG). The approaches emphasized in the SAR include: “burden sharing” amongst both international community and local actors; that stability activities should “start with small, short-term projects and scale up cautiously”; and that foreign assistance should be “layered and sequenced” allowing for analysis of completed activities to determine if these activities are achieving the desired effect before beginning follow-on activities. These approaches would reduce costs to the USG, but have the potential to jeopardize associated military gains.

We must also consider that the nature of the environment within which these stabilization activities will occur are often “non-permissive”. Historically our DOS and USAID colleagues have experienced significant challenges working in these less secure and more dangerous non-permissive environments. This also contributes to potential delays in stabilization activities.

To compensate for these issues, the USG must be more holistic in its approach to stabilization. We must do a better job of leveraging all actors operating within a country who are or who can provide positive stabilization effects to compensate for times when DOS and USAID either cannot or will not execute stabilization activities, and to allow for a slower USG pace.

We also need a significant shift in how the three organizations work closer together to develop strategies and plans. Each organization must fully understand what the others are trying to do, and just as importantly – why. At the same time each organization should be able to advocate for their equities in the other’s strategies and plans. This will enable greater nesting of strategies and plans, ensuring they are all complementary, and allows for more realistic programs of stabilization activities. This planning must be continuous and occur at all levels.

Constant assessment and feedback must be a part of this process, which lends itself to improved responsiveness and agility, while integrating and synchronizing the various stabilization actors who can also contribute. We must constantly view and assess these strategies and plans against changes in the environment. This allows us to manage change at near the pace of the change itself.

The USG does not have to sacrifice responsiveness in stabilization activity execution to lower costs, but to be successful in this new stabilization joint venture DOS, USAID, and DoD must become more holistic in our approach to stabilization and the various actors who can contribute positive stabilization effects, and improve our processes for developing our strategies and plans to ensure these actors are integrated and synchronized, and that these strategies and plans are more complementary, realistic, responsive and agile.

Author: Charles Barham is a retired U.S. Army Colonel with 29 years of service (1981-2010).  He also served for four years as a Department of the Army Civilian Management and Program Analyst in the Afghanistan/Pakistan Hands Program (2010-2014).   He currently serves as a Department of the Air Force Civilian Management and Program Analyst at USCENTCOM in an Interagency Planner capacity.

He served for more than three years in Afghanistan as; Assistant Director of the Police Reform Directorate, Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan 2006-2007, Senior Socioeconomic Advisor in HQ ISAF-DCOS/STAB under Generals David Petraeus and John Allen 2011, as Deputy Director of the NATO/Afghan Transformation Task Force, HQ ISAF under General Joseph Dunford 2013, and as a Senior Planning, Programing and Budgeting Advisor to the Afghan National Army Special Operations Command.

He has served for over six years in HQCENTCOM in positions including Senior Socioeconomic Advisor and Interagency Planner.  He has a Bachelor of Science in Business Administration from the University of Richmond, a Master of Business Administration from Oklahoma City University, and a Master of Strategic Studies from the U.S. Army War College.

]]> 7090 https://sof.news/afghanistan/afghan-local-police/ Mon, 22 Aug 2016 12:00:56 +0000 http://www.sof.news/?p=574 The Afghan Local Police (ALP) was established by U.S. Army Special Forces in 2010 to serve as a locally-based village or community self-defense force. The ALP units are recruited from local communities of key areas where Afghan government influence or [...]]]>

The Afghan Local Police (ALP) was established by U.S. Army Special Forces in 2010 to serve as a locally-based village or community self-defense force. The ALP units are recruited from local communities of key areas where Afghan government influence or control was minimal. The recruits are selected and vetted by the village or community leaders and are also screened by the Afghan National Police (ANP) and Ministry of Interior (MoI).

The Afghan Local Police were part of a larger counterinsurgency program of the U.S. Special Forces called Village Stability Operations (VSO). The VSO program entailed a comprehensive and complementary plan incorporating aspects of security, governance, and development utilizing a ‘bottom up’ methodology.

The ‘top down’ system of pushing security, development, and governance from Kabul to the provinces and districts was viewed as not working. This was caused by inexperienced, corrupt, and inept government officials and organizations at the national and provincial level. Many Special Forces personnel believed that the establishment of local security forces similar to the Afghan historical arbakai would capitalize on Afghans who would likely fight for their own tribes and communities but would be less inclined to fight for a central government located in a distant Kabul.

A number of key districts were identified by the U.S. Special Forces for the establishment of Village Stability Platforms (VSPs). The ‘platforms’ were a tailor-made ad hoc unit of between 30-50 individuals formed around the nucleus of a special operations team (Green Berets, SEALs, or MARSOC). The ‘platforms’ were augmented by a variety of individuals to include mechanics, intelligence analysts, cooks, SIGINT, interpreters, PSYOP, Civil Affairs, Cultural Support Team (CST), and others.

The Afghan Local Police were a key component of the Village Stability Operations program – providing the ‘security’ aspect of VSO (along with the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police that were also within the VSO area of operations).

The ALP units were established once the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force – Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A) conducted a detailed analysis of the proposed area to determine if the village, community, or district needed a VSO / ALP program, if the program could be successful, and if there was adequate support from the local community. In addition, the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MoI) had to approve of the ALP unit being formed.

The village elders, Afghan security representatives, and special operations personnel would conduct a ‘shura’ and / or ‘jirga’ to discuss the forming of an ALP unit. If the community was receptive then the recruitment of ALP members would proceed. The recruits would be screened by the Afghan security representatives and vetted by the community.

The formal three-week training program was usually conducted by the U.S. special operations team that would form the nucleus of the Village Stability Platform. Often times the ALP recruits would go to a regional training center. Eventually training would be done by the Afghan National Army Special Forces and later by the Afghan National Police.

As the drawdown of U.S. and Coalition troops began in 2012 the United States began closing down some of the Village Stability Platforms and transferring the responsibility of the VSPs and ALP to the respective District Governor (DGov) and District Chief of Police (DCoP). Naturally, without the constant supervision, oversight, advice, assistance, training, and support of the U.S. special operations teams the effectiveness, in most cases, of the Afghan Local Police diminished.

As of 2016 the Afghan Local Police has been fully transferred to the Afghan Ministry of Interior. Almost all U.S. SOF have been removed from training and advising of the ALP. The only exception is a small advisory team located at Camp Resolute Support HQs in Kabul that works with the Afghan MoI on ALP issues. This ‘Special Operations Advisory Group’ or SOAG – of probably 20-25 members – monitors, provides oversight, and performs the ‘Train, Advise, and Assist’ mission for the ALP directorate of the MoI. [1]

There are still some issues with the ALP. The Ministry of Interior had, while the special operations teams were conducting VSO, established ‘unilateral ALP’ units. These were formed, most times without the knowledge of U.S. forces, without the ALP establishment process (selection and vetting) and training the ‘U.S. approved’ ALP units had received. There was constant disagreement between the SOF HQs [2] and the MoI on where ALP units should be formed up. Afghan politics generally interfered with what made sense from a counterinsurgency standpoint.

In addition, warlords and power brokers would form up local militias and call them ALP. While not recognized by the Ministry of Interior and not supported by the United States the international community would sometimes confuse these illegal militias with the ‘official ALP’. This, in turn, would cause a lot of bad press when the ‘so-called ALP’ engaged in humanitarian abuses, corruption, intimidation, and predatory practices – leading the international press (usually European) to criticize the ALP program.

Presently – in 2016 – the ALP program is a successful yet troubled program. There is need for reform on a number of issues – insufficient equipment, poor training, lack of oversight, corruption, ‘ghost policemen’, and more. The Afghan government wants to increase the size of the ALP from it’s present strength of 28,000 to 40,000 (maybe even higher). However, the U.S. SOF community (SOJTF-A) as well as Resolute Support HQs is reluctant to proceed with this request until the ALP reforms are fully implemented.

As of 2016 the Afghan Local Police has proven to be a successful program; although it has some faults. From a standpoint of establishing security in remote districts it proved to inhibit the movement of insurgents, garnered the support of the local population, was a critical part of the Village Stability Operations program, and contributed to the overall security of their area of operations. Certainly the program could have used greater support from the Afghan government, Ministry of Interior, local governmental officials, and some Coalition conventional unit commanders. If the proposed reforms are implemented, continued funding is appropriated by the U.S. Congress, and the Ministry of Interior improves its support of the program then the Afghan Local Police will prove to have been a positive security measure for the Afghan government.

Footnotes:

[1] Some critics who want an increased advisory presence in Afghanistan (therefore higher troop levels) suggest that increasing the SOF support to the ALP program – beyond the current SOAG – is warranted.

[2] The higher SOF headquarters coordinating with the Ministry of Interior was the Combined Joint Special Operations Component Command – Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A) – a one-star command based in the Kabul area. Later CFSOCC-A would morph into NSOCC-A / SOJTF-A. NSOCC-A / SOJTF-A is a two-star command that was comprised of the former CFSOCC-A, NATO SOF, and Task Force organizations.

References:

Goodhand, Jonathan and Aziz Hakimi, Counterinsurgency, Local Militias, and Statebuilding in Afghanistan, United States Institute of Peace, December 2014.
www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW90-Counterinsurgency-Local-Militias-and-Statebuilding-in-Afghanistan.pdf

Village Stability Operations (VSO) was an attempt by United States special operations forces to establish security, governance, and development in key critical districts in remote areas of Afghanistan. Typically, these districts were in regions of Afghanistan where the Coalition conventional forces and the Afghan National Defense Forces (ANSF) did not have a robust presence and where the establishment of security in the district was considered critical. The Village Stability Operations was an effort to, at the remote and rural level utilizing a ‘bottom-up’ [1] approach, support the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) counterinsurgency campaign.

Early Community Defense Initiatives in Afghanistan. The U.S. Special Forces community made several attempts to form local community defense forces in Afghanistan. Most of these ventures had false starts for a number of reasons to include lack of Afghan government support, lack of support from high-ranking U.S. conventional (non-SOF) officers, and limited funding, manning and resources. Some of these early local defense programs included the Afghan Public Protection Program (AP3), Community Defense Initiative (CDI), and Local Defense Initiative (LDI). Village Stability Operations gained momentum and acceptance through the publication of a series of articles [2] and books [3] about local defense at the community level, a realization among the Special Forces community that Direct Action (DA) missions combined with HUMINT was not going to defeat the insurgency, and the push by General David Petraeus (then commander of ISAF) to get President Karzai to accept the program. One positive aspect of VSO over AP3, CDI, LDI and other programs was the tying in of ‘security’ with ‘development’ and ‘governance’ for a comprehensive approach to counterinsurgency efforts.

Village Stability Operations Platform. SOF teams conducting VSO would usually consist of 12-16 personnel. U.S. Army Special Forces detachments had 12 personnel; while the Marine Special Operations Teams (MARSOC) and Navy SEALs would have an equivalent number. In addition, the SOF teams would have a great number of ‘enablers’ to assist them in the VSO mission.

Enablers. The SOF teams would typically have a number of ‘enablers’ to include mechanics, interpreters, SIGINT, military working dog teams, medical teams, Civil Affairs, Tactical Psyop Teams (TPTs), one or two intelligence analysts, cook, and possibly a Cultural Support Team (CST).

Security. The SOF team would work with the other security and military organizations in their operational area in the conduct of Village Stability Operations. These included Coalition forces, elements of the Afghan National Police, and the Afghan National Army. Each district had a small district police force (usually 30-90 personnel) who were members of the Afghan National Police (ANP). The District Chief of Police (DCoP) would be a key player for the SOF team to interact with. Sometimes there may be an Afghan National Army (ANA) company (tolai) or battalion (kandak) nearby. This collection of security forces would also be a key part of the SOF team’s approach to establishing security and stability in the district and undermining the insurgents influence and control.

Many times, when establishing a Village Stability Operations program the VSO platform would come under intense insurgent pressure. Afghan Commandos, advised by a U.S. Special Forces team, would conduct clearing operations in the VSO operational area. The Afghan National Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC) has (as of mid-2016) ten Special Operations Kandaks (SOKs) located across Afghanistan.

Afghan Local Police. An integral part of the VSO program was the Afghan Local Police (ALP). This was a local community defense force with limited authority, training, weapons and equipment that was designed to be defensive in nature. The ALP were recruited from the village, community, or district in which they would serve as ALP members.

ALP Establishment Process. There was a mandated process for an ALP unit to be established which required the acceptance of the local community (through elders, power brokers, shuras, etc.) before it would be stood up. The village elders, government officials, and Afghan National Security Forces representatives would conduct a ‘validation shura’ to officially agree to being an ALP program. The members who would be selected as ALP would be vetted by the local community as well as pass a background check by national authorities. The training (initially provided by U.S. SOF) was three weeks – sometimes conducted locally and other times at regional locations.

For many SOF teams the main focus was the Afghan Local Police – a key tool of establishing the ‘security’ part of VSO. However, the aspects of ‘governance’ and ‘development’ were not neglected.

Governance. The SOF team would attempt to establish a good relationship with the District Governor – sometimes referred to as the DGov.  The DGov is the key person in the advancing of local governance in the district. Some SOF teams would assist the DGovs in their travels to outlying villages and communities in the district – security, of course, being a major concern. Sometimes, either because of security issues – or corruption, or (too many other reasons to list) – the District Governor would also be located in the provincial capital or even Kabul. There were several programs funded and implemented by USAID, international organizations, and the Afghan government that were attempting to strengthen Afghan sub-national governance at the provincial and district level. ‘Community councils’ were established at village, community and district level to advance sub-national governance and development. [4] SOF teams, where possible, would try to leverage these programs for the benefit of the VSO program. Many times the SOF teams would be interacting with traditional local governance structures such as ‘shuras’ and ‘jirgas’. The intent was to connect the local governance to the district, province, and central government agencies and institutions.

Development. According to some counterinsurgency readings, establishing development projects goes hand-in-hand with security and governance in conducting stability operations at the local level. In some districts one could find representatives of other national governmental agencies such as the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL), and ministries and agencies. In less secure districts these ministry representatives often lived and worked in the provincial capitals. The SOF teams would attempt to leverage these developmental government organizations to ensure the people of the district were getting the governmental services they deserved and that the international donor nations were paying for.

For a long time, there were many ‘actors on the scene’ in Afghanistan assisting with both development and governance. Many international governmental and non-governmental organizations were active in assisting with development and governance. SOF teams would seek these organizations out and attempt to leverage their efforts in order to have a synchronized Village Stability Operations effort at the district level.

District Augmentation Teams (DATs). In addition to the SOF team and its enablers – individuals were deployed as part of a ‘District Augmentation Team’ (DAT) at district level where VSO was established. These personnel were assigned to the respective districts by the Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command – Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A) based in Kabul. The DATs were 1, 2, or 3-man teams usually on one-year long tours and were responsible for assisting in the governance and development aspects of Village Stability Operations. Many times the DATs came from the SOF community but there were quite a few who were part of the Af-Pak Hands program.

Provincial Augmentation Teams (PATs). In addition to the DATs, there were some 1-3 man teams assigned at the provincial level to assist in the Village Stability Operations effort. Many times the PATs were co-located with conventional force brigades or battalion units. The PATs assisted in the governance and development aspects at provincial level and assisted the DATs and SOF teams working at the district level.

CJSOTF-A. The Combined Joint Special Operations Task – Force was located at Bagram Airfield (just north of Kabul). The CJSOTF-A was commanded by a U.S. Army Special Forces Colonel (O6) who had as many as five Special Operations Task Forces (SOTFs) under his command. The Special Forces groups, NAVY SEALs, and MARSOC would field these battalion-sized SOTFs across the country of Afghanistan. The VSO teams came from the the SOTFs.

CFSOCC-A. The Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command -A had the CJSOTF-A under its command. CFSOCC-A, a one-star command, was responsible for the U.S. and some of the other Coalition SOF operating within Afghanistan. However, many of the other Coalition SOF worked under NATO SOF; primarily working with the Afghan Ministry of Defense special police units. The U.S. counterterrorist force (JSOC) had its units in country as well, but were not under CFSOCC-A command. Eventually, the NATO Special Operations Component Command – Afghanistan (NSOCC-A) and Special Operations Joint Task Force – Afghanistan (SOJTF-A) – a two-star command – would be established and all three SOF entities would come under the command of NSOCC-A / SOJTF-A.

VSNCC. For a few years CFSOCC-A had established the Village Stability National Coordination Center or VSNCC. The VSNCC was a small group (15-20 personnel) of Special Forces, Civil Affairs, and other SOF personnel commanded by an O-6 who worked Village Stability Operations issues within the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and with the various Afghan ministries. Liaison officers worked with the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, and others to advance the interests of the Village Stability Operations program. Some members of the VSNCC specialized in either governance and development and worked with entities such as the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) or with Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) concerned with sub-national governance or development.

VSO a Successful Program. The Village Stability Operations program was successful where it was applied. One key element of the VSO program was the use of SOF personnel to implement it. SOF personnel are uniquely selected, trained, and suited for VSO type operations. While its effectiveness may have been fleeting in some districts – this was usually the result of the deterioration of security or the withdrawal of the SOF teams conducting the VSO mission. It is unfortunate that the VSO program was not instituted earlier in the Afghan conflict; if it had a longer duration of operation the situation in Afghanistan might be very different today. The VSO program was, when combined with other efforts by the Coalition, Non-Governmental Agencies, and Private Volunteer Organizations, probably one of the best methods of connecting the people of the local village, community and district to the provincial government and national government. Overall, the Village Stability Operations program was a success where it was applied for the short duration of its existence. The Village Stability Operations model is one that should be to be considered for future counterinsurgency and stability operations environments.

Footnotes:

[1] The ‘bottom-up’ approach focus on the establishing security, governance, and development at the local level – village, community, and district level. The ‘top-down’ approach emphasized a strong central government, robust national institutions, development programs funded and administered from central locations, and a strong national army and police force.

[2] Major Jim Gant’s article One Tribe at a Time captured the attention of high-ranking officers within the U.S. military searching for a solution to defeating the insurgency. His unconventional approach gained initial support from the U.S. Special Forces community as well. It was posted on Steven Pressfield Online and published by Nine Sisters Publications, 2nd Edition, 2 Dec 2009.
www.stevenpressfield.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/one_tribe_at_a_time_ed2.pdf

[3] See Seth Jones’ book In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan, W.W. Norton & Company, 2009. The author advocates for a “bottom up” approach to defeating the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan.

[4] Some of these ‘community councils’ would find themselves competing against each other. For instance the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation (MRRD) and Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) both established local community councils with parallel objectives.

References:

Connett, Col. Ty and Col. Bob Cassidy, “Village Stability Operations: More than Village Defense”, Special Warfare Magazine, July-September 2011.
www.soc.mil/SWCS/SWmag/archive/SW2403/SW2403VillageStabilityOperations_MoreThanVillageDefense.html

Hanlin, Rory, “One Team’s Approach to Village Stability Operations”, Small Wars Journal, September 4, 2011.
http://smallwarsjournal.com/node/11412

Jones, Seth & Arturo Munoz, Afghanistan’s Local War: Building Local Defense Forces, RAND Corporation, 2010.
www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1002.html

Moyar, Mark, Village Stability Operations and the Afghan Local Police, Joint Special Operations University, JSOU Report 14-7, October 2014.

Click to access JSOU14-7_Moyar_VSO_FINAL.pdf