Task Force South West – The U.S. Marines, after a two-year absence, are returning to Helmand province, Afghanistan. Marines from II Marine Expeditionary Force will arrive in Afghanistan in the spring of 2017. Some reports indicate the Marines will be doing a nine-month rotation; a departure from their usual seven-month combat zone rotations of the past. The security situation in Helmand province has deteriorated significantly since the departure of the Marines from Helmand in 2014 and the closing of Regional Command Southwest (RC-SW). [1]

Prior Marine Presence in Helmand Province. There was a very large Marine presence in Helmand province for many years. The last Marines left in October 2014. Camp Leatherneck, located adjacent to the British Camp Bastion, housed thousands of Marines. Many smaller combat outposts (COPs) were spread throughout the province. In 2011, when the U.S. had its highest number of troops in Afghanistan, there were about 20,000 U.S. Marines in Helmand province – along with thousands of British soldiers as well as military contingents from Denmark, Georgia, Estonia, and other nations.

RCs Became TAACs and RC-SW Shutdown. With the Obama Administration deciding on a significant draw down of U.S. forces during 2014 leading into 2015 planners at the International Security Force Assistance (ISAF) headquarters decided to strip away the full-time advisory support from the Afghan National Army’s 203rd Corps (SE Afghanistan) and 215th Corps (SW Afghanistan – Nimroz and Helmand provinces). The other ANA Corps (201st, 205th, 207th, and 209th) would retain their NATO and U.S. Advisors on a persistent, full-time basis. The 2-star level Regional Commands (RC-East, RC-South, RC-West, and RC-North) would become 1-star level Train, Advise, and Assist Commands or TAACs. So RC-East became TAAC-East, RC-North became TAAC-North, and so on.

Advise and Assist Cell Southwest (AAC-SW). When the U.S. Marines and other NATO units pulled out at the end of 2014 the 215th ANA Maiwand Corps, responsible for Nimroz and Helmand provinces, was ‘uncovered’ by U.S. or NATO advisors. To fill this advisory gap Resolute Support (RS) headquarters (RS replaced ISAF in January 2015) decided to provide a small group of advisors for the Afghan army and police in southwest Afghanistan by way of periodic visits to Helmand province – and through telephone calls and email from Kabul. RS Hqs called this group of advisors the Advise and Assist Cell Southwest (ACC-SW). This small expeditionary advisory team – the ACC-SW – was based at RS HQs in Kabul and came under the direction of the Advise and Assist Directorate (ADD). [2]

Security Situation Worsens in Helmand – 2015-2016. The Taliban, emboldened by the absence of foreign troops and their enablers (air support, artillery fires, logistical assistance, and ISR), went on the offensive. The 215th ANA Corps suffered defeat after defeat on the ground in Helmand province. The security environment in Helmand was getting progressively worse with each passing month. Many of the 13 districts of the province fell under control of the Taliban.  Over the past two years the ANDSF have performed miserably in Helmand province.

“Ghost Soldiers and Policemen”. The army and police are very under strength in personnel. Many of the soldiers and police that are on the books in the region are actually ‘ghost soldiers’ or ‘ghost police’ – meaning they don’t exist but their commanders are collecting their paychecks. The ‘ghost soldier and policeman’ problem means that the ranks are thin. Desertions of soldiers and police went up after the departure of Coalition troops, the violence increased, and casualties rose significantly.

Poor Leadership. Corruption and bad leadership are a few of the many problems contributing to the security situation in the province. The leadership of the 215th Corps and 505th Police Zone HQs has been historically weak.

Drug Culture. Helmand is the biggest poppy-growing region of Afghanistan and many Afghan security personnel fall under the influence of the drug lords. Drug eradication in Afghanistan is the lowest in a decade – primarily because of the poor security situation in Helmand. The opium trade has a huge impact on the economic, political and military situation in the province. Afghan police and army personnel are faced with lucrative incentives to not disrupt the drug trade. The Taliban funds a significant part of their operations with drug trade proceeds – the drug trade is worth millions of dollars.

Poor Morale. Soldiers of the 215th are comprised almost completely of personnel NOT from Helmand province. Even if the soldier had a commander that would allow him to go on leave – his family home is likely in another part of Afghanistan and getting there is extremely dangerous. Many commanders will only grant leave if the soldier or policeman gives up part of his pay. This is a big cause of members of the ANDSF leaving their jobs before their contract has finished – going absent without leave (AWOL). Much of the money allocated for food is stolen by the Afghan commanders – leaving the lower ranking police or soldier with an inadequate diet. Combine the problems of bad food, horrible leadership, stolen pay, no leave, constant violence, poor MEDEVAC support, high casualties, and ghost soldiers and police and you have a province where the policemen and soldiers have low morale and very little fighting spirit.

Special Operations in Helmand Province. With the departure of the U.S. Marines at the end of 2014 the only U.S. forces that ventured into Helmand province were special operations forces advising Afghan Commandos [3] and the periodic visits of the Advise and Assist Cell. Usually these Special Forces teams were attached to Afghan National Army Commando units – the Special Operations Kandaks (SOKs) that are part of the Afghan National Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC) and the Ktah Khas. Across Afghanistan the SOF units of the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Ministry of Interior (MoI) have been misused and overused over the past two years conducting conventional force missions, manning checkpoints, and not getting any time off for training and leave. Recently, however, U.S. advisors have been pushing the MoD and MoI to provide a respite for Afghan SOF during the winter campaign 2016-2017 to allow some refit and retraining to occur for the SOF units. [4]

Task Force Forge. In early 2015 the U.S. Army set up Task Force Forge – an advisory and assistance force of a few hundred personnel to stem the successive defeats that the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces were experiencing in Helmand. This was supposed to be a temporary effort but it has become more permanent and by October 2016 Task Force Forge was almost 600 strong. Task Force Forge efforts were assisted by the Advise and Assist Cell – Southwest as well as Expeditionary Advisory Packages (EAPs) [5] from TAAC-South and Kabul providing specific functional assistance and advise. Task Force Forge had Soldiers serving in an advisory and training capacity as well as support and force protection Soldiers. It would appear that the re-establishment of a more permanent entity in southwest Afghanistan equal to the Train, Advise, and Assist Command (TAACs) found in other regions of Afghanistan is unlikely. Not reforming an entity known as TAAC-SW, is most likely to avoid sending a signal that the mission in Afghanistan is floundering and that NATO (and the U.S.) is back-sliding into a bigger commitment. Most of Task Force Forge is located at Camp Shorab with the 215th Corps but some are working with the Afghan police in the provincial capital at Lashkar Gah. In addition, there are support units located at Camp Dwyer. Subordinate units of the 10th Mountain Division and the 1st Cavalry Division have deployed as part of Task Force Forge. Some U.S. Army units may continue to support Task Force South West.

Refit and Retraining of ANDSF. The 215th Corps commander and many of his brigade and kandak commanders as well as staff were replaced in 2016. The former 215th commander relieved in mid-2016 may be going to trial over corruption charges. Over the past year many of the 215th ANA Corps kandaks have been pulled out of combat, refitted with personnel and equipment, and put through a re-training period to make them combat ready once again. One possible mission of Task Force South West is to continue to assist in the retraining of the 215th ANA Corps kandaks as part of the Operational Readiness Cycle (ORC) that Resolute Support is attempting to get the Ministry of Defense to embrace.

Helmand Province Controlled by the Taliban. For the most part Helmand province is controlled by the insurgents. [6] The government forces occupy Camp Shorab and the provincial capital – although Lashkar Gar is constantly threatened. [7] In addition, the government has troops and police in a few of the district centers of the 13 districts of Helmand. However, most of the rural countryside, many of the district centers, and much of the road networks are controlled by the Taliban. Depending on the source estimates indicate that the Taliban control 70-85% of the province.

Fight for the Districts. In past years the Marines (and our allies) lost many lives in the fight for districts – Sangin and Marja districts for instance. The topic of district control in Helmand province is subject to interpretation with varying explanations of what district control really entails. [8] and [9] The district of Sangin, long a battleground between the Brits and the Taliban – and later the U.S. Marines and the Taliban was recently taken (once again) by the Taliban in the beginning of 2017. Over the past two years district after district has fallen to the Taliban. If not for the use of Afghan SOF (advised by U.S. SOF and supported by U.S. airpower) Helmand province would probably be entirely in Taliban possession. [10]

Task Force South West Composition and Mission. The Marine TF will likely be about 300 personnel in strength. [11] In addition to advising the 215th Corps Task Force South West will conduct a ‘train, advise, and assist’ mission with the 505th Police Zone Headquarters. The Marine unit will have many seasoned officers and NCOs – some who have deployed to Helmand province in the past. Most task force members will come from the 6th Marine Regiment based at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina as well as from across the II Marine Expeditionary Force. In addition, advisors from other Marine units who possess specific functional skills will be attached to the task force. There are sure to be additional Marine units rotating into Helmand province in the future in light of commitment to Afghanistan until 2020 made by the European Union and NATO at the Brussels Conference and Warsaw Summit this past year (2016). The Marines deploying to Helmand to form up Task Force South West have been in the middle of a month’s long training program for the Helmand mission.

Task Force South West Commander. BG Roger Turner – a Marine with some experience with Helmand province – will be the commander of Task Force South West. He has two Iraq OIF (Operation Iraqi Freedom) deployments and commanded the 5th Marine Regiment from 2011-2013  – including a year-long tour to Helmand province.

What Has Changed for the better in the Past Two Years? This article points out many negative aspects of the situation in Helmand province such as the drug trade, corruption, loss of territory, horrible leadership , ghost soldiers and police, and high casualties. Is anything going well?

The Good News. Resolute Support headquarters would tell you that overall the ANDSF is becoming increasingly capable and that capacity is growing. The Afghan Air Force (AAF) now has A-29 Super Tucanos and armed MD-530 helicopters to provide close air support, Mi-17s to conduct air resupply and MEDEVACs, and Afghan Tactical Air Controllers (ATACs) to coordinate air support. The corps, zones, and ministries have refined its logistics systems and process so that more supplies and equipment is finding its way to the units on the front lines. Almost all of the training and education is now conducted by Afghans at the regional training centers and national level institutions. National level intelligence organizations are becoming more capable in providing targeting information to Afghan SOF units to interdict senior insurgents. The ANDSF has gotten better at planning larger operations integrating ISR, D-30 fire support, and aerial fires. The interoperability between the police and army has increased. RS HQs points out that no major cities have been attacked and held by the Taliban (that is, if we disregard the fall of Kunduz for two years in a row) and that the Taliban have not achieved any of their strategic objectives. (That is a matter of interpretation – though it is a nice sound bite).

The Bad News. But the final analysis rests on the combat effectiveness of the ANDSF – and that is up for debate. The ANDSF still have not mastered the ability to conduct counterinsurgency. They can clear villages, valleys, and lines of communication with their special operations forces but when they try to hold those areas with the ANA or ANP they usually return back to Taliban control. Most of the ANDSF generals are inept, ineffective, weak, corrupt, and many don’t have a real job. The ANDSF has more generals than the U.S. military. Retention is a huge problem in the ANA. And . . .  as mentioned above the Taliban control more territory now than they have at any point since 2001.

Overall Summary of Afghanistan? It appears that the U.S. is in Afghanistan at least until 2020 – continuing a war where (as of January 2017) a total of 2,247 U.S. military personnel have died and more than 20,000 have been wounded. In 15 years the U.S. has spent over $115 billion on the ANDSF and Afghan reconstruction. Our attempts to facilitate ‘on-budget’ assistance to the Afghan government results in reduced U.S. visibility over reconstruction funds – opening the door to increased corruption and wasting of U.S. money. Many of the investments that the U.S. has made for the ANDSF and Afghan society in general are not sustainable by the Afghan government. Corruption in the Afghan government and ANDSF continue to erode state legitimacy, weakens popular support for the government, discourages foreign investment, and fuels the insurgency. Currently the U.S. government is spending approximately $13 million per day attempting to get the Afghan government to stand on its own two feet. The ANDSF, hampered by corruption and poor leadership, is very ineffective. The only effective force is the ASSF – a grouping of Afghan SOF units that spends most of its time traveling around the country retaking territory that has been lost by the ANA and ANP and putting out fires.

What’s New about the Mission? If you have served in Afghanistan (Helmand specifically) and you are returning for another round – what is there to know? The mission focus has changed. Resolute Support is not doing the fighting – it is a ‘train, advise, and assist mission’. Within the RS organization there is a complicated ‘security force assistance framework’ to assist the advisor in the field. Terms such as FB-SFA, OTERA, TAA, 5 Functional Pillars, MAAR, 8 Essential Functions, PoAM, ANET, SFA Center, Connect Point, and more have emerged to confuse the advisor in the field. The staff of Task Force South West will need to come up to speed quickly on the new terminology.

More of the Same. However, once the SFA terminology and SFA framework is understood everything else is not so confusing. Afghanistan is still Afghanistan, the Afghans are still Afghans, Afghan culture hasn’t changed, the human terrain is still important, the Taliban have not gone away, Helmand is still Helmand, Pakistan still provides sanctuaries for the Taliban, and the art, craft, and science of advising remains the same. The Marines of Task Force South West should quickly adapt to the new environment.

Can the Marines of Task Force South West Make a Difference? The Marines lost almost 400 personnel over several years in Helmand province. The British lost over 100. The Danes, Georgians, and other Coalition nations lost service members in Helmand province as well. A year ago – in 2015 – the Taliban controlled about 25% of the province. At of the beginning of 2017 it is reported that the insurgents are in control of 85% of the province. Hopefully the small contingent of Marines being sent into this troubled province will be able to make a difference but the odds are stacked against them.

Footnotes for Task Force South West article:

[1] See the Wikipedia description of Regional Command Southwest. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regional_Command_Southwest

[2] For more on the ACC-SW see “RS HQs Advise and Assist Cells”, Afghan War News, August 23, 2015. http://afghanwarnews.blogspot.com/2015/08/rs-hqs-advise-and-assist-cells.html

[3] See “Afghan Commandos Lead the Fight Against Taliban in Helmand province”, SOF News, July 31, 2016. www.sof.news/afghanistan/anasoc-helmand/

[4] “Afghan SOF Units Conduct Training During ‘Winter Campaign'”, SOF News, January 3, 2017. www.sof.news/afghanistan/winter-campaign-2016-afghan-sof/

[5] Read more about the “Expeditionary Advisory Package (EAP) Concept for Afghanistan”, SOF News, January 9, 2017. www.sof.news/afghanistan/expeditionary-advisory-package/

[6] “Helmand Province Under Siege”, SOF News, August 9, 2016. www.sof.news/afghanistan/helmand-province/

[7] This article reflects the situation of Lashkar Gar – “Helmand capital practically besieged by the Taliban”, Threat Matrix of Long War Journal, August 9, 2016. www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/08/helmand-capital-practically-besieged-by-the-taliban.php

[8] “Helmand Province at Risk”, SOF News, August 11, 2016. www.sof.news/afghanistan/helmand-province-risk/

[9] See “Control of a District”, Afghan War News. www.afghanwarnews.info/districts/district-control.htm

[10] See more on the importance of U.S. air support to keep Helmand province from falling to Taliban in “Airstrikes Barely Holding Off Taliban in Helmand, Afghan Officials Say”, The New York Times, August 8, 2016. www.nytimes.com/2016/08/09/world/asia/afghanistan-taliban-helmand.html

[11] “300 Marines to Aid Fight Against Taliban in Spring”, The New York Times, January 7, 2017. www.nytimes.com/2017/01/07/world/middleeast/300-marines-to-aid-fight-against-taliban-in-spring.html

[12] For facts and figures provided in this paragraph see High-Risk List, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), January 2017.
https://sigar.mil/pdf/spotlight/2017_High-Risk_List.pdf

Additional Readings, Notes, and Resources about Task Force South West:

[a] In August 2016 a Special Forces NCO was killed while accompanying Afghan SOF units during an operation in Helmand province. www.sof.news/afghanistan/ssg-matthew-thompson/

[b] Read more on the Task Force South West mission in “The U.S. Marines are sending a task force back to Afghanistan’s Helmand province”, by Andrew deGrandpre and Shawn Snoe, Marine Times, January 6, 2017. www.marinecorpstimes.com/articles/marines-afghanistan-taliban-task-force

[c] A news report describing in detail the dire security situation in Helmand province – “Band-Aid on a bullet wound: What America’s new war looks like in Afghanistan’s most violent province”, by Thomas Gibbons-Neff, The Washington Post, October 16, 2016. www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/10/16/band-aid-on-a-bullet-wound-what-americas-new-war-looks-like-in-afghanistans-most-violent-province/

[d] Press release by USMC – “II MEF Marines Deploying to Afghanistan Spring 2017”, Marines.mil, January 6, 2017.
www.marines.mil/News/Press-Releases/Press-Release-Display/Article/1044052/ii-mef-marines-deploying-to-afghanistan-spring-2017/

[e] Ghost Soldiers and Policemen. While the problem of ‘ghost soldiers and policemen’ have been a persistent problem of the ANDSF in general it is particularly acute in Helmand province. In July 2016 the Commander of Resolute Support submitted a letter to the Afghan government directing (or requesting?) a “. . . viable action plan to address personnel accountability and ‘ghost’ personnel in Helmand and within the ANP overall.” (See page 74 of DoD 1225 report, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2016, www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/Enhancing_Security_and_Stability_in_Afghanistan-June_2016.pdf).

Image Credit: Map of Helmand province at top of page from Wikipedia, Creative Commons license.

Updates: This article about Task Force South West has been updated with minor edits since it was first published (grammar, small mistakes, new content, recent events, and additional readings). In addition, the sequencing of the material has been adjusted to improve readability and make it a more useful resource.

Expeditionary Advisory Package. For the past few years the U.S. military has been utilizing an Expeditionary Advisory Package (EAP) model to advise Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) elements at a few of the Afghan National Army (ANA) corps and Afghan National Police (ANP) police zones. During the 2014-2015 drawdown of U.S. (and other Coalition forces) it was determined that Coalition trainers and advisors were not needed to conduct the Train, Advise, and Assist (TAA) mission at the 203rd and 215th Corps (and the corresponding Police Zones of 303 and 505) on a full-time basis. The Expeditionary Advisory Package was initially designed to conduct the TAA mission from a centralized location (Kabul) sending the EAPs to the 203rd and 215th Corps areas as needed. These original EAPs were known as Advise and Assist Cell – Southeast (AAC-SE) and Advise and Assist Cell – Southwest (AAC-SW). The AACs came under the control of the Advise and Assist Directorate or ADD based at Camp Resolute Support in Kabul. In time, EAPs were pushed from Kabul to other areas to perform functionally-based advising or to respond to strategic emergency situations (as in the fall of Kunduz in 2015 and 2016).

The latest DoD 1225 report (Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2016, page 10) provides a statement explaining the purpose of the EAP.

“To assist with ANDSF capability development across the country, the coalition is increasingly relying upon expeditionary advising teams that provide immediate, focused, and tailored TAA support to the ANDSF for both enduring and emergent capability gaps.”

TAACs. In the other parts of the country the corps and police zones are advised full-time by Train, Advise, and Assist Commands or TAACs. The TAACs are a very slimmed down version of the old regional commands. With the drawdown it was planned that advising was only to be done at the ANA corps and police zone level or higher level. The ANA levels below corps include brigade, kandak (battalion), and tolay (company) – with the exception of SOF and aviation units. [1] The TAACs are headed by ‘framework nations’. The U.S. heads up TAAC East (201st Corps) and TAAC South (205th Corps). The Turks head up TAAC Capital. The Germans (assisted by many other European nations) run TAAC North (209th Corps). Italy is fielding TAAC West (207th Corps). Task Force Anvil (SE 203rd Corps) is U.S. as is Task Force Forge (SW 215th Corps). In additional to the corps the TAACs are also conducting the TAA mission with the corresponding police zones in their region.

Optimistic Assessments of ANDSF. The (incorrect) assessment that led to advisors working at levels ‘no lower than corps’ was fueled by optimistic reporting on the part of military leaders of the United States and other Coalition nations of the ANA being able to conduct operations effectively at the tactical level. The various reporting mechanisms (CUAT, RASR, MAAR, etc.) used by the Regional Commands (and now the Train, Advise, and Assist Commands) did not adequately take into account the corps, brigades, and kandaks ability to conduct tactical level counterinsurgency (COIN) operations effectively. Those aspects of the reports that did concern itself with a tolay or kandak’s combat effectiveness in a COIN environment were subjective in nature and usually saw the units score improve incrementally over time even though they were not fighting any better than they did one or two years previously.

Timeline vs. Conditions. In addition, a driving factor to the ‘no lower than corps’ advising effort was the recognition by senior military leaders that the Obama administration’s commitment to Afghanistan was based on time not conditions. Aligning the force structure of U.S. and Coalition trainers and advisors with a cap of 9,800 U.S and a few thousand Coalition forced the issue of advising only at the corps level and above. [2] The ‘time-based withdrawal’ approach prevented senior military leaders from being honest with themselves and each other about the poor progress of the ANDSF. A sentence from the ‘Executive Summary’ of a recent report by the Center for Strategic & International Studies is telling.

“The U.S. can only succeed if it shifts from a deadline and withdrawal-oriented strategy to one based on providing enough aid to achieve decisive results that reflect the military and civil realities on the ground, and the real world conditions of Afghan forces and governance.” [3]

Reality on the Ground. We have seen the results. The ANA was not quite ready to lose mentors and advisors at the tactical level (brigade and kandak). The ANA did not perform to those optimistic expectations aired in public proclamations by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the U.S. Department of Defense, senior NATO officials in Europe, a the Obama Administration. The Taliban control more territory now than any other time since 2001. The ANA has taken a significant amount of casualties the past few years and suffers from corruption, ineffectiveness, and poor leadership.

Need for Advisors at Tactical Level. Resolute Support is sending advisors down below corps . . . once again. Expeditionary Advisory Package deployments have been taking place at the 203rd Corps and 215th Corps on a regular basis. [4] However, a recent development (as of 2016) are the EAPs working at brigade level (on a temporary short-term basis) at almost all the other corps around the country. In addition, some EAPs are responding to specific emergency situations that the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) are incapable of or are having difficulty in responding to. [5] In late 2016 it was noted by Resolute Support that each of the existing TAACs either had or were in the process of establishing their own internal EAPs.

EAP Model. The mission and duration of the EAPs is situational and flexible. Some EAP missions will last only a week – such as when an EAP deploys to assist one of the corps or police zones in a functional area. Other EAPs can be as long as several weeks assisting in a long-term ANDSF operation or responding to a operational crisis – where warfighting assistance and facilitating enablers is provided.

Troop Level Needed for Effective Advisory Effort? With a reduction of troop strength by the Obama administration from 9,800 to 8,400 one wonders just how much coverage can be provided by these EAPs. Is 8,400 U.S. enough? What should our force strength in Afghanistan be in 2017 so that enough of these EAPs can be deployed on a frequent enough basis at brigade and perhaps kandak level to make a real difference? 8,400? 9,800? or 20,000?

Footnotes:

[1] The exception to the ‘not advising below corps level’ has been the use of U.S. and Coalition SOF working for NATO Special Operations Component Command – Afghanistan / Special Operations Joint Task Force – Afghanistan (NSOCC-A/SOJTF-A) to advise the Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) or Afghan SOF and the aviation advisors working for Train, Advise, and Assist Command – Air (TAAC-Air) doing the ‘train, advise, and assist’ mission with the Afghan Air Force (AAF) and the Afghan Special Mission Wing (SMW).

[2] Above corps level advising takes place at the institutional level (functional training branches, officer schools, etc.) and the Afghan security ministries (MoD and MoI).

[3] See page 2 of The Trump Transition and the Afghan War: The Need for Decisive Action, by Anthony H. Cordesman, Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), January 5, 2017 for the quote referenced.

[4] The EAPs for the 203rd and 215th now work in conjunction with the recently established Task Force Anvil (southeast) and Task Force Forge (southwest). These Task Forces are a more permanent presence than the EAPs but are not quite TAACs. The EAPs provide a command and control element and functional specialists on an as-needed basis. The EAPs focus “. . . on sustained ANDSF progress in performing the eight EFs, assisting with typical warfighting and policing functions and operations, or to address other enduring or emergent ANDSF capability gaps as appropriate.” (page 17, DoD 1225 Report, Dec 2016). Note: An EF is an “Essential Function” – a methodology where the train, advise and assist effort is organized into eight distinct functional areas to facilitate the TAA effort at Resolute Support HQs.

[5] For instance, in the past year an Expeditionary Advisory Package has been sent to troubled locations like Farah province, Kunduz city, Uruzgan province, and Helmand province to respond to what could be a strategic failure on the part of the ANDSF. As an example, Kunduz city – the capital of Kunduz province – has repeatedly seen Taliban offensives that resulted in temporary control of the city. A huge black eye for the ANDSF. It was only through the efforts of Afghan SOF units (advised by U.S. and NATO SOF), U.S. airpower, and EAPs from Kabul and Mes-e-Sharif that the city was recaptured from the Taliban in the fall of 2015 and fall of 2016.

Additional Readings:

Read more about the job of the Expeditionary Advisory Package in a news release entitled “This time it’s different”, DVIDS, January 5, 2017.This news release by the 3d Cavalry Regiment’s Public Affairs Office provides a detailed description of how an EAP from Train, Advise, and Assist Command – East (TAAC-East) working with the 201st ANA Corps in eastern Afghanistan is advising at brigade level.

Read an Army news release about an Expeditionary Advisory Package sent to the 203rd ANA Corps in December 2014 in “Army, USMC generals talk Afghanistan transition on expeditionary advisory trip”, Army.mil, December 20, 2014.

See a news report about a 100-man ‘expeditionary advisory package’ sent to Helmand province to assist the 215th ANA Corps in securing Lashkar Gar when the provincial capital was under threat by the Taliban in August 2016. “US Sends 100 Troops to Key Afghan City Under Taliban Siege”, Military.com, August 22, 2016.

Read a Department of Defense news transcript (DoD, Aug 25, 2016) that describes an expeditionary advisory package sent to train, advise and assist the provincial police zone headquarters in Helmand province.

Feature Photo: The photo at top of page is of soldiers assigned to the 201st Afghan National Army Corps returning from conducting collective training near Camp Torah in Sarobi district, Afghanistan, December 27, 2016. The training, with assistance from a TAAC-East EAP, was conducted as part of the corps winter campaign strategy designed to build capability and capacity. (U.S. Army photo by CPT Grace Geiger, PAO, 3d Cav Regt.).

A Combat Controller from the 22nd Special Tactics Squadron was presented with the Silver Star Medal for his actions while deployed with a U.S. Army Special Forces team in Afghanistan.

Staff Sgt. Keaton Thiem, a combat controller with the 22nd Special Tactics Squadron, ventured out into enemy fire multiple times, controlled 22 aircraft delivering 3,000 pounds of munitions, rescued four joint-partner teammates from sniper fire…and now, he’s receiving the Silver Star Medal.

During a ceremony Nov. 16 here, the vice commander of Air Force Special Operations Command, Maj. Gen. Eugene Haase, presented the nation’s third highest medal for gallantry against an armed enemy of the U.S. in combat to Thiem. Thiem’s actions occurred when he was deployed with a U.S. Army Special Forces team in support of Operation FREEDOM’S SENTINEL.

Read the entire article – “Combat Controller continues Special Tactics legacy of valor”, Team McChord, November 16, 2016.

Afghan Update 20160830 – More U.S. troops to Lashkar Gah, RS HQs spokesperson ‘spins’ the news, training Afghan pilots, AUMF and ‘the Forever War’, Australian aid worker released, Afghan Assessment by ISW, and eastern district falls to Taliban.

U.S. Reinforcements to Helmand. The provincial capital of Helmand province, Lashkar Gah, is under threat by the Taliban. The insurgents have taken control of much of the province during the Summer Campaign 2016 and the Afghan security forces are failing. The U.S. recently sent in 100 more troops to shore up the defenses of the provincial capital – presumably as part of the ‘train, advise, and assist’ mission. There’s a lot of ‘TAA’ to be done in Helmand at the moment! Read more in “Over a hundred US troops sent to Lashkar Gah to battle Taliban”, The Guardian, 22 August 2016. A U.S. Special Forces Soldier from 1st SFG recently died in Helmand province.

Afghan Commandos. The commandos of the Afghan National Army (ANA) are the country’s best hope for staving off the advances from the Taliban and ISIS, The Diplomat, August 23, 2016.

“Shift, Clear, and Hold”. Ahmad Murid Partaw offers a unique perspective on how to secure Helmand province. Read “How to Stop the Taliban in Afghanistan’s Most Crucial Province”, The National Interest, August 24, 2016.

Afghan Assessment by ISW. The Institute for the Study of War has issued an update to its analysis of the Afghan conflict. It isn’t pretty. “Taliban militants are successfully expanding their territorial control across several regions of Afghanistan during their 2016 summer offensive, Operation Omari.” Read “Afghanistan Partial Threat Assessment: August 28, 2016”.

RS HQs Gives Us – Spin, Spin, and More Spin. According to the Resolute Support spokesperson – BG Charles Cleveland – the Afghan security forces are on a positive trajectory. Yep. And the Taliban control more territory in Afghanistan now than at any other time since they lost power in 2001. Cleveland actually says that the Afghan army has had success in Helmand this year – despite the fact that 80% of the province is held by the Taliban and the provincial capital – Lashkar Gar – is threatened by the insurgents. Read more in a news release by U.S. DoD, August 25, 2016.

Jani Khel District Falls to Taliban. The district located in Paktia province (along Pakistan border) fell to the Taliban on August 28th. Read more in “Taliban Capture District in Southern Afghanistan”, Radio Free Europe, August 28, 2016. Over 30 Afghan security personnel died in the attack on the district center. Afghan forces will likely retake the district from the Taliban in the next few weeks. Read more on this in “Afghan Forces Readying to Launch Offensive to Retake Eastern District”, Voice of America, August 28, 2016.

Afghan Security Forces Casualty Rates Soar. Last year the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) suffered devastating losses. This year, Summer Campaign 2016, the losses are even worse. The losses are expected to be over 20% higher than in 2015. Read more in a news report by the Daily Mail, August 25, 2016.

US Training of Afghan Pilots. The Afghan Air Force has had a slow start. One of the significant problems with the Afghan Air Force is the lack of qualified pilots. One program to generate more pilots is managed by Raytheon where Afghans attend flying training in the United Arab Emirates and the Czech Republic. Learn more in “US Training of Afghan Pilots Hitting Stride, Contractor Says”, Military.com, August 27, 2016.

Australian Aid Worker Released. A female aid worker kidnapped four months ago in Afghanistan has been released. Read the story in The New York Times, August 29, 2016. See also a story in The Sidney Morning Herald, August 29, 2016.

Ending the ‘Forever War’. In 2001 the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) was passed by Congress just three days after the 9/11 attacks. The intent was to authorize the targeting of those who planned, authorized and/or committed the terrorist attacks and those who aided or harbored them. The AUMF was specifically mean’t for al Qaeda and the Taliban regime. However, the AUMF has been used over the past 15 years for much more – including the invasion and occupation of Iraq and further military action in Somalia, Yemen, and other locations. One commentator, Gene Healy, thinks it is time to end the AUMF. Read more in “Bringing an End to the Forever War”, War on the Rocks, August 29, 2016.

AAF Has Aircraft; Lacks Pilots. A short video describes the problem that the Afghan Air Force (AAF) has – no pilots for their aircraft.
http://gandhara.rferl.org/a/afghan-airforce/27935136.html

Afghan Update 20160823 – Big fights ongoing in several Afghan provinces to include Kunduz, Helmand, and Baghlan provinces. NUG government not getting along. Summer Campaign 2016 resulting in heavy seasonal fighting.

The Taliban are on the move in several locations in Afghanistan this fighting season – called ‘Summer Campaign 2016’ by NATO. Some trouble spots of note include Kunduz, Baghlan, Helmand, and Uruzgan provinces.

Kunduz. There is the threat that Kunduz city may fall once again to insurgents; although if this happens the government will likely rush a few ANASOC Special Operations Kandaks (SOKs) and MoI special police units to the city to re-capture it . . . as it did this past fall. At least three districts in Baghlan province have fallen to the Taliban in recent weeks. Khan Abad district was the latest to fall although some news reports say it was recaptured by govt forces.

Baghlan. Read a recent news report (Tolo News, Aug 22, 2016) about Afghan SOF attacking a Taliban target near Pul-e-Khumri – the capital of Baghlan province.

Helmand. The insurgents have been extremely active in Helmand province. The capital of Helmand province is nearly surrounded – many of the districts controlled by insurgents. The Helmand – Kandahar road is blocked by Taliban checkpoints and mines and is not open for traffic. Some reports say that the provincial capital – Lashkar Gar – is at risk.

Uruzgan. Security in Uruzgan has spiraled downhill in the last year. The United States continues its daily use of airstrikes to support the Afghan security forces – in attempt to prevent big failures (such as the loss of a provincial capital or district center).

NUG Not Getting Along. CEO Abdullah and President Ghani are having a rough patch in their relationship. This, of course, has a negative ripple effect across all governmental ministries and agencies.

Afghanistan news – Topics include SOF burning the candle at both ends, contractors in Afghanistan, National ID card, Afghan documentary on Helmand province, and Afghan mental health issues.

US SOF Burning Both Ends of Candle in Afghanistan. Phillip Lohaus, a research fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), writes on how things are not going so well in Afghanistan. Currently there is one Special Forces battalion (SOTF-A) advising ten Afghan National Army Special Operations Kandaks (SOKs). For the SOTF-A to ‘Train, Advise, and Assist’ more would be stretching its capabilities and diminishing its effectiveness. Read Lohaus’s article posted at The Cipher Brief, August 18, 2016.

A Lot of Contractors in Afghanistan. According to a new congressional report Defense Department contractors make up 77 percent of the total US presence in Afghanistan. As of March 2016 there are almost 29,000 in the country. Read the CRS report dated August 15, 2016 posted on the Federation of American Scientist (FAS) website.

“Afghan Women Are More Than Victims”. Marzia Nawrozi, a contributing writer for Afghan Women’s Writing Project and Free Women Writers, has wrote an article about how women have been “. . . portrayed as weak voiceless victims of violence.” She says that this is a “. . . one-dimensional portrayal  . . .” Read more in “Afghan Women are More Than Victims”, Free Women Writers, August 12, 2016.

Staying for a While? Some analysis believe that the United States is going to be in Afghanistan for quite a long time. They see a Taliban insurgency that will continue to threaten the Afghan government’s hold on the countryside, the emergence of the Islamic State in Afghanistan, and the continued threat of terrorism finding a base in Afghanistan. Read more in “Why the U.S. Won’t Be Leaving Afghanistan Any Time Soon”, Strator, August 16, 2016.

New Afghan Documentary. A documentary is forthcoming about the British in Musa Qala district, Helmand province, Afghanistan. Read a review of “Heroes of Helmand: The British Army’s Great Escape”, Task and Purpose, August 16, 2016.

COMRS Concerned about NUG Disagreements. General Nicholson, the commander of Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan, has some concerns about the current troubles between CEO Abdullah and President Ghani. Read more in “US Commander to Afghan Leaders: Don’t Let Political Process Undermine Security”, Voice of America, August 18, 2016.

Mental Health Issues in Afghanistan. “After almost 40 years of conflict and crisis, experts say the vast majority of the Afghan population suffers from some form of post-traumatic stress disorder, . . .” Read more in “After Years of War, Afghans Wary to Talk of Mental Health”, ABC News, August 18, 2016.

Afghan ID Cards. A good idea, poorly implemented. Read how “Afghan ID cards were meant to stop voter fraud but instead stoked ethnic division”, The Washington Post, August 18, 2016.

Child Soldiers in Afghanistan. The Child Soldier Prevention Act of 2008 restricts the U.S. government from providing military assistance to a foreign nation if it employs child soldiers. A recent UN report from April 2016 found that Afghanistan employed child soldiers within the Afghan Local Police (ALP). Many human rights activists want to see Afghanistan added to this list. Greg Graff argues that we need to be careful on this issue – that much is at stake. Read more in his report posted on American Enterprise Institute (AEI), August 17, 2016.

Afghan Interpreters at Peril? The US Congress is having difficulty in assisting around 10,000 Afghans who served for years as interpreters for US military forces in Afghanistan. And now the Taliban are slowly getting back – targeting these out-of-work interpreters in killings. The Visa program to bring these loyal Afghans to the U.S. is getting shut down by Congress yet the Obama administration wants to bring in thousands of unvetted Syrian immigrants. Who do we blame here? Senators Chuck Grassley of Iowa and Jeff Sessions of Alabama – playing politics in an election year; instead of doing what is right. Where’s the justice? Read more in “Dimming Hope for Afghan Translators”, The New York Times, August 18, 2018.

Violence Against Women – Afghanistan. Amy Jo Davies has penned an article entitled “How Does Violence Against Women Manifest? The Case of Post-Conflict Afghanistan”, E-International Relations, August 18, 2016.

SOF News Update: Gen Dunford interview, how Afghans flee to Europe, Helmand province threatened, book review of “Tribes”, Russia and Political Warfare, Afghan interpreters punished yet again, 1st Special Service Force honoured, and Russian aggression in Estonia.

Russian Aggression in Estonia. Dr. Spencer Meredith III, Ph.D and a Special Forces officer (unnamed) have wrote an article about Russian resurgence and its ‘war of words’ to accomplish its regional objectives. Read “War of Words: Countering Russian Aggression in Estonia”, Special Warfare Magazine, January – June 2016, pages 56-60.

Taliban ‘Special Forces’. Afghan security forces say they are facing extremely disciplined and well-equipped Taliban in the fight for Helmand province. Supposedly the new fighting group is known as the “Red Unit”. Read more in a news report by Reuters, August 14, 2016.

First Special Service Force Honoured. The First Special Service Force Association held a memorial service at the Royal Canadian Legion Branch 517 for the fallen veterans of the FSSF. Read more in a news report by The Daily Observer (CA), August 13, 2016.

U.S. Continues to Punish Afghan Interpreters. U.S. Senator Mike Lee (R-Utah) is among many politicians who are handing Afghan interpreters seeking to gain visas to enter the United States a raw deal. His political maneuvering is an example of everything wrong with American politics. Read more in “Editorial: A promise to Afghans”, Boston Herald, August 14, 2016.

Helmand Province. The Taliban are on the  march in southern Afghanistan. Read more in “Afghan Forces Struggle to Hold Firm Against Taliban in South”, The New York Times, August 14, 2016.

Cultural Assessment of ISIL. The TRADOC G2 Global Cultural Knowledge Network has published a Cultural Assessment of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), May 31, 2016.

U.S. Soldier Dies in Afghanistan. A SSG from the 4th Infantry Division died August 12th from a non-combat-related injury. Read “DoD Identifies Army Casualty”, U.S. DoD News Release, August 14, 2016.

Book Review. Kimberly Dozier reviews Sabastian Junger’s latest book Tribe. Junger says veterans returning home from recent tours have found themselves feeling out of sync with society – and Junger thinks he knows why. Read “Why Vets Come Home and Miss the War”, The Daily Beast, August 14, 2016.

D.N.C. Emails & Russia’s Approach to Political Warfare. Russia has certainly been testing the waters with how much it can prod the West. Recent news that the Russians have hacked into the Democratic National Committee’s emails show that they will use whatever means they can to get ahead in their competition with the west. Read more – “In D.N.C. Hack, Echoes of Russia’s New Approach to Power”, The New York Times, July 25, 2016.

Defeating ISIS. Anthony H. Cordesman of the Center for Strategic & International Studies has penned a report entitled Defeating ISIS: The Real Threats and Challenges, August 4, 2016.

Gen Dunford Interview. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is interviewed by James Kitfield on a variety of topics to include Russia, Iraq, and more. Read “Our Greatest Challenge: CJCS Gen Dunford”, Breaking Defense, August 12, 2016.

Afghan Exodus. Many young Afghans are fleeing their country for safety and better lives in Europe. Learn how they enter Europe illegally through smugglers along ‘the Balkan route’. Jelena Bjelica and Martine van Bijlert provide details in “Afghan Exodus: The re-emergence of smugglers along the Balkan route”, Afghanistan Analysts Network, August 10, 2016.

Afghanistan’s largest province, located in the southwest of the landlocked country, is the objective of a resurgent Taliban offensive. According to some news reports the Taliban control 11 of the 14 districts in Helmand province. Almost all roads connecting the provincial capital of Lashkar Gah to other areas of Afghanistan are controlled by the Taliban.

What is District Control?

The assessing of who controls what district is murky at best. It all depends on who is doing the assessing, of course. If you listen to the Afghan government you would be led to believe that the Taliban control only six districts throughout the entire country. The Resolute Support Headquarters spokesmen have a slightly less optimistic – but still very unrealistic way of counting.

If the district center – a small compound of 3-6 buildings that houses the district governor, district police center, and a few other governmental offices – is held by the government (20-30 Afghan National Police and perhaps an infantry platoon or company) – then the district is under government control. The fact that the insurgents control all the land mass of the district beyond the maximum effective range of the government security forces small arms is beside the point. The district is labeled ‘under government control’.  Food for thought.

Helmand Provincial Capital Threatened

Lashkar Gar is experiencing food, fuel, water and medical shortages. There are thousands of refugees cramming the city seeking shelter from the fighting in the countryside. Morale among the Afghan National Defense Security Forces (ANDSF) is extremely low. The Taliban gain significant financial benefit in controlling the province as the opium trade provides funding for its operations.

Helmand province has been the scene of intense fighting over the years – especially since 2006. Many Coalition countries have deployed their troops to this troubled province. These countries include the United States (primarily the U.S. Marines), the British, and the Danes.

One factor in the favor of the ANDSF is the willingness of the Coalition to employ airstrikes to blunt significant gains by the Taliban. The rules of engagement (RoE) recently were loosened allowing more intervention by U.S. air assets. If Lashkar Gar were to fall to the Taliban it would be the second provincial capital to be captured in one year. In late 2015 Kunduz City (of Kunduz province) was captured by the Taliban and held for several days.

Read more on this topic in “The Battle for Helmand: Afghanistan’s Largest Province May Fall Entirely to the Taliban”, by Ankit Panda, The Diplomat, August 11, 2016.

The fight in Helmand province, Afghanistan is raging on in the middle of the 2016 Summer Campaign. Of course, leading the fight against the Taliban is the Afghan National Army Commandos. The Afghan National Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC) has ten Special Operations Kandaks (SOKs). These battalion-strength units of approximately 700-800 men are almost always in the lead during offensives against the Taliban insurgents. The ten SOKs are spread out across the country of Afghanistan; although one (6th SOK) is a national mission unit based in the Kabul area. Many of the districts of Helmand province are controlled by the Taliban and there are fears that the provincial capital is at risk. Read more in “Afghan commandos deployed to Helmand to push Taliban out of Khanshin”, Khaama Press, July 30, 2016.