Operation Mandhol – India’s Para Commandos conducted their first mission in December 1971 when they attacked artillery positions of the Pakistan army. At the time the nations of India and Pakistan were at war over the future of Bangladesh. The Indian force consisted of a company with 6 officers and 120 men of 9 Para Commando. The commandos attacked six artillery positions and destroyed the guns.

Read more about Operation Mandhol:

“We Cherished Surgical Strikes, But Operation Mandhol – First Ever Raid by Para Commandos in 1971 Was Equally Impressive”, India Times, December 23, 2016.

“Special Forces of India”, Wikiwand.
www.wikiwand.com/en/Special_Forces_of_India

“The Parachute Regiment”, a history of the parachute regiment of India.

Kenya SOF is a recent addition to the Kenya armed forces. The largest of these units in the Kenya SOF is the Special Operations Regiment (SOR). The SOR is composed of the 20 Para, 30 Special Forces, and 40 Rangers Strike Force.

The Special Operations Regiment has been used very aggressively over the past five years. They have been actively engaged in Somalia the past several years. The SOR operators are highly trained, experts in special operations, and well-equipped.

Training is conducted within Kenya but the Kenya SOF also work with and train with commando units of the United States, United Kingdom, Jordan [1], and Belgium.

Another specialized unit is the General Service Unit (GSU) – the commando or paramilitary unit of the Kenya Police Service. The GSU has been in existence for many years – and is heavily involved in counter-terror operations, civil disorders, and special operations.

The Kenyan Special Boat Unit (KSBU) is a Kenya naval unit has been trained up by United States Navy Special Warfare Combatant-Craft Crewman (SWCC) personnel. The KSBU go through a thorough training course including combat medicine, navigation, boat handling, weapons proficiency, and ship boarding procedures. Some of the training takes place at Manda Bay. [2]

The Kenya Air Force is in the process of establishing (as of 2016) an Air Force unit that will operate behind enemy lines to conduct personnel recovery. This unit has been receiving training from the U.S. Air Force and is to be based at the Nanyuki Airbase. [3]

Read More:
“Kenya’s elite forces have become more lethal since Somalia entry”, Daily Nation, October 9, 2016.
“Special Operations: Kenyan Commandos”, Strategy Page, November 23, 2011.

Footnotes:
[1] See “Jordanian SOF Training Kenyan Defence Forces”, Special Operations International, September 22, 2016.
[2] A news release by the U.S. Navy describes a joint combined exchange training (JCET) for the training of the Kenya Special Boat Unit. “Naval Special Warfare Assists In Building Kenyan Special Boat Unit”, Navy.mil, June 10, 2000.
[3] “Kenyan Air Force Establishes Combat Rescue Unit”, Defense House, June 21, 2016.

Afghan Update 20160823 – Big fights ongoing in several Afghan provinces to include Kunduz, Helmand, and Baghlan provinces. NUG government not getting along. Summer Campaign 2016 resulting in heavy seasonal fighting.

The Taliban are on the move in several locations in Afghanistan this fighting season – called ‘Summer Campaign 2016’ by NATO. Some trouble spots of note include Kunduz, Baghlan, Helmand, and Uruzgan provinces.

Kunduz. There is the threat that Kunduz city may fall once again to insurgents; although if this happens the government will likely rush a few ANASOC Special Operations Kandaks (SOKs) and MoI special police units to the city to re-capture it . . . as it did this past fall. At least three districts in Baghlan province have fallen to the Taliban in recent weeks. Khan Abad district was the latest to fall although some news reports say it was recaptured by govt forces.

Baghlan. Read a recent news report (Tolo News, Aug 22, 2016) about Afghan SOF attacking a Taliban target near Pul-e-Khumri – the capital of Baghlan province.

Helmand. The insurgents have been extremely active in Helmand province. The capital of Helmand province is nearly surrounded – many of the districts controlled by insurgents. The Helmand – Kandahar road is blocked by Taliban checkpoints and mines and is not open for traffic. Some reports say that the provincial capital – Lashkar Gar – is at risk.

Uruzgan. Security in Uruzgan has spiraled downhill in the last year. The United States continues its daily use of airstrikes to support the Afghan security forces – in attempt to prevent big failures (such as the loss of a provincial capital or district center).

NUG Not Getting Along. CEO Abdullah and President Ghani are having a rough patch in their relationship. This, of course, has a negative ripple effect across all governmental ministries and agencies.

The Afghan Local Police (ALP) was established by U.S. Army Special Forces in 2010 to serve as a locally-based village or community self-defense force. The ALP units are recruited from local communities of key areas where Afghan government influence or control was minimal. The recruits are selected and vetted by the village or community leaders and are also screened by the Afghan National Police (ANP) and Ministry of Interior (MoI).

The Afghan Local Police were part of a larger counterinsurgency program of the U.S. Special Forces called Village Stability Operations (VSO). The VSO program entailed a comprehensive and complementary plan incorporating aspects of security, governance, and development utilizing a ‘bottom up’ methodology.

The ‘top down’ system of pushing security, development, and governance from Kabul to the provinces and districts was viewed as not working. This was caused by inexperienced, corrupt, and inept government officials and organizations at the national and provincial level. Many Special Forces personnel believed that the establishment of local security forces similar to the Afghan historical arbakai would capitalize on Afghans who would likely fight for their own tribes and communities but would be less inclined to fight for a central government located in a distant Kabul.

A number of key districts were identified by the U.S. Special Forces for the establishment of Village Stability Platforms (VSPs). The ‘platforms’ were a tailor-made ad hoc unit of between 30-50 individuals formed around the nucleus of a special operations team (Green Berets, SEALs, or MARSOC). The ‘platforms’ were augmented by a variety of individuals to include mechanics, intelligence analysts, cooks, SIGINT, interpreters, PSYOP, Civil Affairs, Cultural Support Team (CST), and others.

The Afghan Local Police were a key component of the Village Stability Operations program – providing the ‘security’ aspect of VSO (along with the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police that were also within the VSO area of operations).

The ALP units were established once the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force – Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A) conducted a detailed analysis of the proposed area to determine if the village, community, or district needed a VSO / ALP program, if the program could be successful, and if there was adequate support from the local community. In addition, the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MoI) had to approve of the ALP unit being formed.

The village elders, Afghan security representatives, and special operations personnel would conduct a ‘shura’ and / or ‘jirga’ to discuss the forming of an ALP unit. If the community was receptive then the recruitment of ALP members would proceed. The recruits would be screened by the Afghan security representatives and vetted by the community.

The formal three-week training program was usually conducted by the U.S. special operations team that would form the nucleus of the Village Stability Platform. Often times the ALP recruits would go to a regional training center. Eventually training would be done by the Afghan National Army Special Forces and later by the Afghan National Police.

As the drawdown of U.S. and Coalition troops began in 2012 the United States began closing down some of the Village Stability Platforms and transferring the responsibility of the VSPs and ALP to the respective District Governor (DGov) and District Chief of Police (DCoP). Naturally, without the constant supervision, oversight, advice, assistance, training, and support of the U.S. special operations teams the effectiveness, in most cases, of the Afghan Local Police diminished.

As of 2016 the Afghan Local Police has been fully transferred to the Afghan Ministry of Interior. Almost all U.S. SOF have been removed from training and advising of the ALP. The only exception is a small advisory team located at Camp Resolute Support HQs in Kabul that works with the Afghan MoI on ALP issues. This ‘Special Operations Advisory Group’ or SOAG – of probably 20-25 members – monitors, provides oversight, and performs the ‘Train, Advise, and Assist’ mission for the ALP directorate of the MoI. [1]

There are still some issues with the ALP. The Ministry of Interior had, while the special operations teams were conducting VSO, established ‘unilateral ALP’ units. These were formed, most times without the knowledge of U.S. forces, without the ALP establishment process (selection and vetting) and training the ‘U.S. approved’ ALP units had received. There was constant disagreement between the SOF HQs [2] and the MoI on where ALP units should be formed up. Afghan politics generally interfered with what made sense from a counterinsurgency standpoint.

In addition, warlords and power brokers would form up local militias and call them ALP. While not recognized by the Ministry of Interior and not supported by the United States the international community would sometimes confuse these illegal militias with the ‘official ALP’. This, in turn, would cause a lot of bad press when the ‘so-called ALP’ engaged in humanitarian abuses, corruption, intimidation, and predatory practices – leading the international press (usually European) to criticize the ALP program.

Presently – in 2016 – the ALP program is a successful yet troubled program. There is need for reform on a number of issues – insufficient equipment, poor training, lack of oversight, corruption, ‘ghost policemen’, and more. The Afghan government wants to increase the size of the ALP from it’s present strength of 28,000 to 40,000 (maybe even higher). However, the U.S. SOF community (SOJTF-A) as well as Resolute Support HQs is reluctant to proceed with this request until the ALP reforms are fully implemented.

As of 2016 the Afghan Local Police has proven to be a successful program; although it has some faults. From a standpoint of establishing security in remote districts it proved to inhibit the movement of insurgents, garnered the support of the local population, was a critical part of the Village Stability Operations program, and contributed to the overall security of their area of operations. Certainly the program could have used greater support from the Afghan government, Ministry of Interior, local governmental officials, and some Coalition conventional unit commanders. If the proposed reforms are implemented, continued funding is appropriated by the U.S. Congress, and the Ministry of Interior improves its support of the program then the Afghan Local Police will prove to have been a positive security measure for the Afghan government.

Footnotes:

[1] Some critics who want an increased advisory presence in Afghanistan (therefore higher troop levels) suggest that increasing the SOF support to the ALP program – beyond the current SOAG – is warranted.

[2] The higher SOF headquarters coordinating with the Ministry of Interior was the Combined Joint Special Operations Component Command – Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A) – a one-star command based in the Kabul area. Later CFSOCC-A would morph into NSOCC-A / SOJTF-A. NSOCC-A / SOJTF-A is a two-star command that was comprised of the former CFSOCC-A, NATO SOF, and Task Force organizations.

References:

Goodhand, Jonathan and Aziz Hakimi, Counterinsurgency, Local Militias, and Statebuilding in Afghanistan, United States Institute of Peace, December 2014.
www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW90-Counterinsurgency-Local-Militias-and-Statebuilding-in-Afghanistan.pdf

The men of O Squadron, 43 Commando usually are patrolling the grounds, buildings and jetties of either Faslane Naval Base or nearby Coulport depot. Their mission is to guard the United Kingdom’s nuclear deterrent submarines and the Trident missiles they carry. But every once in a while the Commandos venture overseas for some training. The video highlights 60 British Commandos who did a two-week training stint in Germany. Video posted on YouTube.com by the British Royal Navy.

The Afghan Local Police or ALP was established by U.S. special operations forces (SOF) in 2011 in an attempt to provide local defense forces in key districts of Afghanistan. The ALP program has had limited support from the U.S. military since 2014. The ALP program has transitioned to full Afghan control. At present, there is a Special Operations Advisory Group (SOAG) that works with the ALP Directorate within the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MoI).

For the ALP program to have continued success a number of activities in the Ministry of Interior need to be improved – including improved logistics, personnel management, and adequate training. A recent RAND Corporation publication examines the current state of the Afghan Local Police, provides key findings, and makes some important recommendations.

Findings. The study points out that the MoI “. . . has made some strides to improve its logistic practices and results.” However, the Coalition’s ability to monitor the Afghan Local Police’s logistic situation at district level has been significantly curtailed since the dramatic drawdown of U.S. and Coalition troop levels. Personnel management of the ALP program has improved – the Afghans are doing this entirely on their own. However, there are some local militia groups that have adopted the ALP banner causing confusion among some critics and observers. The ALP are (according to the MoI) sufficiently trained but there are some limitations in the current program.

Recommendations. The RAND study advocates for the continued use of advisors for the ALP program. There is concern that the MoI is not ready for a ‘pull-based’ logistics system and that this should be phased in gradually. A hybrid training system may work better than a centralized training program. A RAND recommendation points to the option of “. . . a combination of regional training centers, local training venues, and mobile training teams”. The study suggests that a multi-level coalition advisory structure be maintained to ensure a long-term sustainment capability.

You can read the RAND Corporation report:

Marquis, Jefferson, et al. Assessing the Ability of the Afghan Ministry of Interior to Support the Afghan Local Police, RAND Corporation, July 2016.
www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1399.html

References:

Afghan Local Police by Afghan War News
www.afghanwarnews.info/police/afghanlocalpolicealp.htm

Photo Credit: ALP training in Panjwei district, Kandahar province, Afghanistan. Photo by SPC Joshua Kruger, DVIDS.

The fight in Helmand province, Afghanistan is raging on in the middle of the 2016 Summer Campaign. Of course, leading the fight against the Taliban is the Afghan National Army Commandos. The Afghan National Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC) has ten Special Operations Kandaks (SOKs). These battalion-strength units of approximately 700-800 men are almost always in the lead during offensives against the Taliban insurgents. The ten SOKs are spread out across the country of Afghanistan; although one (6th SOK) is a national mission unit based in the Kabul area. Many of the districts of Helmand province are controlled by the Taliban and there are fears that the provincial capital is at risk. Read more in “Afghan commandos deployed to Helmand to push Taliban out of Khanshin”, Khaama Press, July 30, 2016.