Afghan War Update 20170106 – Turkey extends its mission in Afghanistan, Taliban’s diplomatic offensive, Afghan women in a Trump world, meddling of Russia, CSIS report on Afghanistan, Marines back to Helmand, and more.

Turkey Extends RS Mission. Turkey has been a key ally in the Afghan conflict. It heads up one of the Train, Advise, and Assist Commands – TAAC Capital – in Kabul province. In addition many of its military officers work in staff positions at the Resolute Support headquarters in Kabul. The Turkish parliament just approved measure to extend the Turkish Armed Forces in Afghanistan for another two more years. Read more in “Turkey Extends Its NATO Mission in Afghanistan“, Tolo News, January 4, 2017.

Marine Advisors to Helmand. It appears that the Marines will make another entry into Helmand province. The province, long the domain of the U.S. Marines, Brits, Danes, and others was basically abandoned by the U.S. in 2014 when it shut down Regional Command Southwest (also known as TAAC-West) for a short time. However, events in the province has proven the departure was premature. The 215th Corps of the Afghan National Army got crushed – and much of the province is now controlled by the Taliban. Last year the Army put in some SOF teams and some conventional army advisors (with support elements such as fires, MEDEVAC, loggies, intel, etc.) to help stem the tide. This spring Marines will take over the advisory effort from the Army. Read more in “Marines May Return to Afghanistan as Advisors This Spring”, Military.com, January 5, 2017.

The Taliban’s Diplomatic Offensive. When President Ghani attained office in Afghanistan he adopted a three-tiered approach to diplomatically isolating the Taliban. In part, he was very successful. First, he repaired ties with the West; second, he created a regional basis for the rejection of terrorism, and third, he tried to negate the religious basis for the Taliban’s insurgency. The Taliban didn’t take this lying down and immediately started there own diplomatic moves to pull international support from the Afghan regime. Ahamad Bilal Khalil, a researcher at the Center for Strategic and Regional Studies in Kabul, writes about the dynamics of diplomacy in the Afghan conflict in “The Rise of Taliban Diplomacy”, The Diplomat, January 3, 2017.

Afghan Women in a Trump World. The plight of the Afghan women has improved over the past 15 years but much work remains to be done. Funding by the United States and international community has been key in providing programs and ‘coaxing’ the Afghan government and security institutions in providing basic rights to women and integrating woman into mainstream society. But now we have the “Trump Era” which will certainly have an impact on Afghan women over the next few years. In which direction will this go? Heather Barr, a senior researcher on women’s rights at Human Rights Watch provides some insight in “3 important lessons behind the recent news emerging from Afghanistan”, Women in the World, January 3, 2017.

CSIS Report on Afghanistan. Anthony H. Cordesman, a highly-respected observer and critic of the Afghan conflict, has provided an update on his perspective of the war in Afghanistan. The tone of the report is indicated in the lead sentence of the 84-page report – “The Trump Administration will inherit an under-resourced mess in Afghanistan when it takes office.” His report is entitled “The Trump Transition and the Afghan War: The Need for Decisive Action”, Center for Strategic & International Studies, January 2017.

State Spokesman Kirby Spins Recent Russia-China-Pakistan Conference. Three countries recently held a conference to discuss peace in Afghanistan. Excluded were the United States and Afghanistan. This wasn’t exactly an event favorable to the U.S. or Afghan government but John Kirby, State Department spokesman, manages to put a good face on it. See “U.S. Welcomes Any International Effort to Help Afghanistan”, Tolo News, January 4, 2017.

Afghan Update 20160823 – Big fights ongoing in several Afghan provinces to include Kunduz, Helmand, and Baghlan provinces. NUG government not getting along. Summer Campaign 2016 resulting in heavy seasonal fighting.

The Taliban are on the move in several locations in Afghanistan this fighting season – called ‘Summer Campaign 2016’ by NATO. Some trouble spots of note include Kunduz, Baghlan, Helmand, and Uruzgan provinces.

Kunduz. There is the threat that Kunduz city may fall once again to insurgents; although if this happens the government will likely rush a few ANASOC Special Operations Kandaks (SOKs) and MoI special police units to the city to re-capture it . . . as it did this past fall. At least three districts in Baghlan province have fallen to the Taliban in recent weeks. Khan Abad district was the latest to fall although some news reports say it was recaptured by govt forces.

Baghlan. Read a recent news report (Tolo News, Aug 22, 2016) about Afghan SOF attacking a Taliban target near Pul-e-Khumri – the capital of Baghlan province.

Helmand. The insurgents have been extremely active in Helmand province. The capital of Helmand province is nearly surrounded – many of the districts controlled by insurgents. The Helmand – Kandahar road is blocked by Taliban checkpoints and mines and is not open for traffic. Some reports say that the provincial capital – Lashkar Gar – is at risk.

Uruzgan. Security in Uruzgan has spiraled downhill in the last year. The United States continues its daily use of airstrikes to support the Afghan security forces – in attempt to prevent big failures (such as the loss of a provincial capital or district center).

NUG Not Getting Along. CEO Abdullah and President Ghani are having a rough patch in their relationship. This, of course, has a negative ripple effect across all governmental ministries and agencies.

The Afghan Local Police (ALP) was established by U.S. Army Special Forces in 2010 to serve as a locally-based village or community self-defense force. The ALP units are recruited from local communities of key areas where Afghan government influence or control was minimal. The recruits are selected and vetted by the village or community leaders and are also screened by the Afghan National Police (ANP) and Ministry of Interior (MoI).

The Afghan Local Police were part of a larger counterinsurgency program of the U.S. Special Forces called Village Stability Operations (VSO). The VSO program entailed a comprehensive and complementary plan incorporating aspects of security, governance, and development utilizing a ‘bottom up’ methodology.

The ‘top down’ system of pushing security, development, and governance from Kabul to the provinces and districts was viewed as not working. This was caused by inexperienced, corrupt, and inept government officials and organizations at the national and provincial level. Many Special Forces personnel believed that the establishment of local security forces similar to the Afghan historical arbakai would capitalize on Afghans who would likely fight for their own tribes and communities but would be less inclined to fight for a central government located in a distant Kabul.

A number of key districts were identified by the U.S. Special Forces for the establishment of Village Stability Platforms (VSPs). The ‘platforms’ were a tailor-made ad hoc unit of between 30-50 individuals formed around the nucleus of a special operations team (Green Berets, SEALs, or MARSOC). The ‘platforms’ were augmented by a variety of individuals to include mechanics, intelligence analysts, cooks, SIGINT, interpreters, PSYOP, Civil Affairs, Cultural Support Team (CST), and others.

The Afghan Local Police were a key component of the Village Stability Operations program – providing the ‘security’ aspect of VSO (along with the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police that were also within the VSO area of operations).

The ALP units were established once the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force – Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A) conducted a detailed analysis of the proposed area to determine if the village, community, or district needed a VSO / ALP program, if the program could be successful, and if there was adequate support from the local community. In addition, the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MoI) had to approve of the ALP unit being formed.

The village elders, Afghan security representatives, and special operations personnel would conduct a ‘shura’ and / or ‘jirga’ to discuss the forming of an ALP unit. If the community was receptive then the recruitment of ALP members would proceed. The recruits would be screened by the Afghan security representatives and vetted by the community.

The formal three-week training program was usually conducted by the U.S. special operations team that would form the nucleus of the Village Stability Platform. Often times the ALP recruits would go to a regional training center. Eventually training would be done by the Afghan National Army Special Forces and later by the Afghan National Police.

As the drawdown of U.S. and Coalition troops began in 2012 the United States began closing down some of the Village Stability Platforms and transferring the responsibility of the VSPs and ALP to the respective District Governor (DGov) and District Chief of Police (DCoP). Naturally, without the constant supervision, oversight, advice, assistance, training, and support of the U.S. special operations teams the effectiveness, in most cases, of the Afghan Local Police diminished.

As of 2016 the Afghan Local Police has been fully transferred to the Afghan Ministry of Interior. Almost all U.S. SOF have been removed from training and advising of the ALP. The only exception is a small advisory team located at Camp Resolute Support HQs in Kabul that works with the Afghan MoI on ALP issues. This ‘Special Operations Advisory Group’ or SOAG – of probably 20-25 members – monitors, provides oversight, and performs the ‘Train, Advise, and Assist’ mission for the ALP directorate of the MoI. [1]

There are still some issues with the ALP. The Ministry of Interior had, while the special operations teams were conducting VSO, established ‘unilateral ALP’ units. These were formed, most times without the knowledge of U.S. forces, without the ALP establishment process (selection and vetting) and training the ‘U.S. approved’ ALP units had received. There was constant disagreement between the SOF HQs [2] and the MoI on where ALP units should be formed up. Afghan politics generally interfered with what made sense from a counterinsurgency standpoint.

In addition, warlords and power brokers would form up local militias and call them ALP. While not recognized by the Ministry of Interior and not supported by the United States the international community would sometimes confuse these illegal militias with the ‘official ALP’. This, in turn, would cause a lot of bad press when the ‘so-called ALP’ engaged in humanitarian abuses, corruption, intimidation, and predatory practices – leading the international press (usually European) to criticize the ALP program.

Presently – in 2016 – the ALP program is a successful yet troubled program. There is need for reform on a number of issues – insufficient equipment, poor training, lack of oversight, corruption, ‘ghost policemen’, and more. The Afghan government wants to increase the size of the ALP from it’s present strength of 28,000 to 40,000 (maybe even higher). However, the U.S. SOF community (SOJTF-A) as well as Resolute Support HQs is reluctant to proceed with this request until the ALP reforms are fully implemented.

As of 2016 the Afghan Local Police has proven to be a successful program; although it has some faults. From a standpoint of establishing security in remote districts it proved to inhibit the movement of insurgents, garnered the support of the local population, was a critical part of the Village Stability Operations program, and contributed to the overall security of their area of operations. Certainly the program could have used greater support from the Afghan government, Ministry of Interior, local governmental officials, and some Coalition conventional unit commanders. If the proposed reforms are implemented, continued funding is appropriated by the U.S. Congress, and the Ministry of Interior improves its support of the program then the Afghan Local Police will prove to have been a positive security measure for the Afghan government.

Footnotes:

[1] Some critics who want an increased advisory presence in Afghanistan (therefore higher troop levels) suggest that increasing the SOF support to the ALP program – beyond the current SOAG – is warranted.

[2] The higher SOF headquarters coordinating with the Ministry of Interior was the Combined Joint Special Operations Component Command – Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A) – a one-star command based in the Kabul area. Later CFSOCC-A would morph into NSOCC-A / SOJTF-A. NSOCC-A / SOJTF-A is a two-star command that was comprised of the former CFSOCC-A, NATO SOF, and Task Force organizations.

References:

Goodhand, Jonathan and Aziz Hakimi, Counterinsurgency, Local Militias, and Statebuilding in Afghanistan, United States Institute of Peace, December 2014.
www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW90-Counterinsurgency-Local-Militias-and-Statebuilding-in-Afghanistan.pdf

Contents: Video of Rangers doing water jump & helicast, Summer Games security, Marines training with Israeli SF, Paratrooper energy bar, Afghan SF, book review, USSOCOM support contract, “Little Green Men”, iPhone Tactical Assault Kit, SEAL Delivery Vehicles, new AFSOC cdr, and more.

Video –Rangers Conduct Water Insertion Training. 1/75^th Rangers perform a parachute jump into the ocean from a CH-47F Chinook helicopter and a helicast from a UH-60M Black Hawk during water insertion training off the coast of Tybee Island, Georgia on July 20, 2016. (1 minute long video posted on DVIDS, video by SPC Scott Lindblom,3rd Combat Aviation Brigade). www.dvidshub.net/video/476088/1-75th-rangers-jump

CT Forces Advising Brazil for Summer Games.  The Olympic Games will run this summer in Brazil and there are fears that terrorists will try and strike at this time. However, there are a number of police and military counterterrorist units (JSOC, SAS, GSG9, etc.) that have sent in advisors to help out the Brazil security forces. Read more in an article by Steven Bucci in The Daily Signal published August 1, 2016 entitled “Facing the Terror Threat at the Olympic Games in Rio”.

Marines & Israeli SF Train Together. According one news report Israeli Special Forces and U.S. Marines are training together for possible future combat against Islamic terror groups. Read more in a news report by Western Journalism, August 1, 2016.

Paratrooper Snack Food. “Scientists at the Army Natick Soldier Research, Development and Engineering Center’s Combat Feeding Directorate jumped at the chance to develop a nutrition bar based on identified paratrooper needs”. The end result is a snack bar “. . . that is nutritious, provides energy, and is easy to carry and easy to eat.” Read more in “Army jump-starts nutrition with new ‘paratrooper bar’”, Army.mil, July 29, 2016.

Afghan Special Forces. A recent article was published about the Afghan Special Forces. Read “Special Operations: Afghan Operators Are Calling”, Strategy Page, July 27, 2016.

Marine Recon and Air Force SOF Practice Humanitarian Mission. Force Reconnaissance Marines from the III Marine Expeditionary Force and Special Tactics Airmen with the 353^rd Special Operations Group (AFSOC) took part in humanitarian mission training during an exercise called Rim of the Pacific 2016. Read a news report posted by Marines.mil on July 15, 2016.

Book Review – Crisis. Frank Gardner has penned a spy / special operations thriller with a former SBS man as the central figure involved in South American intrigue. Read “Countering a new terrorist threat from an unexpected direction”, Business Standard, August 2, 2016.

Family of Drowned Sailor Seeks Answers. A Navy SEAL trainee drowned during training and the man’s family is looking for some answers on how it could happen. See a news report by NBC News, August 2, 2016.

SEAL Delivery Vehicles. For decades USSOCOM has been trying to develop a new SDV (SEAL Delivery Vehicle). Read the news on a new contract for a DCS SDV in a news report by Strategy Page, August 2, 2016.

Navy SEAL Commander to Retire. Rear Admiral Brian Losey, the head of Naval Special Warfare Command, will be retiring after running into problems with Congress. Read more in “Navy SEAL boss to retire after promotion controversy,” Navy Times, August 2, 2016.

Fulcrum Wins USSOCOM Contract. Fulcrum IT Services, LLC has announced that it was awarded a prime contract from U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) on the SOCOM Wide Mission Support (SWMS) Program. The contract supports all USSOCOM contracts. Read more in a news report posted by Washington Exec, July 19, 2016.

New Cdr for AFSOC. LTG Brad Webb has taken command of the 20,000-strong Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) based at Hurlburt Field, Florida. Read more in “Webb Quietly Takes Command of Special Ops Command”, The Pulse, July 29, 2015.

Marines & 353^rd SOG Practice Airfield Seizure. Marines and the Air Force 353^rd Special Operations Group have been practicing long-range airfield seizures. In addition to the Ospreys, the Air Force also employed MC-130 cargo planes. Read more in “USAF, Marines conduct rapid airfield seizure exercise”, DVIDS, August 1, 2016.

Army SOF Going to iPhones. The United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) is replacing its Android tactical smartphone with the iPhone Tactical Assault Kit (an iPhone 6S). It is the SOF version of the Army’s Nett Warrior battlefield situational awareness tool. Read more in “Army SOF to Trade in Its Androids for iPhones”, DoD Buzz, July 26, 2016.

Pub – “Little Green Men”. The United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) has published a publication (78-pages) entitled “Little Green Men”: a primer on Modern Russian Unconventional Warfare, Ukraine 2013-2014”. Posted on publicintelligence.net.
https://info.publicintelligence.net/USASOC-LittleGreenMen.pdf

Photo Credit.  1-75th Ranger jumps from a Chinook helicopter performing a water jump off coast of Georgia in July 2016 (DVIDS). Picture taken from video by SPC Scott Lindblom, 3rd Combat Aviation Brigade.

The Afghan Local Police or ALP was established by U.S. special operations forces (SOF) in 2011 in an attempt to provide local defense forces in key districts of Afghanistan. The ALP program has had limited support from the U.S. military since 2014. The ALP program has transitioned to full Afghan control. At present, there is a Special Operations Advisory Group (SOAG) that works with the ALP Directorate within the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MoI).

For the ALP program to have continued success a number of activities in the Ministry of Interior need to be improved – including improved logistics, personnel management, and adequate training. A recent RAND Corporation publication examines the current state of the Afghan Local Police, provides key findings, and makes some important recommendations.

Findings. The study points out that the MoI “. . . has made some strides to improve its logistic practices and results.” However, the Coalition’s ability to monitor the Afghan Local Police’s logistic situation at district level has been significantly curtailed since the dramatic drawdown of U.S. and Coalition troop levels. Personnel management of the ALP program has improved – the Afghans are doing this entirely on their own. However, there are some local militia groups that have adopted the ALP banner causing confusion among some critics and observers. The ALP are (according to the MoI) sufficiently trained but there are some limitations in the current program.

Recommendations. The RAND study advocates for the continued use of advisors for the ALP program. There is concern that the MoI is not ready for a ‘pull-based’ logistics system and that this should be phased in gradually. A hybrid training system may work better than a centralized training program. A RAND recommendation points to the option of “. . . a combination of regional training centers, local training venues, and mobile training teams”. The study suggests that a multi-level coalition advisory structure be maintained to ensure a long-term sustainment capability.

You can read the RAND Corporation report:

Marquis, Jefferson, et al. Assessing the Ability of the Afghan Ministry of Interior to Support the Afghan Local Police, RAND Corporation, July 2016.
www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1399.html

References:

Afghan Local Police by Afghan War News
www.afghanwarnews.info/police/afghanlocalpolicealp.htm

Photo Credit: ALP training in Panjwei district, Kandahar province, Afghanistan. Photo by SPC Joshua Kruger, DVIDS.

The fight in Helmand province, Afghanistan is raging on in the middle of the 2016 Summer Campaign. Of course, leading the fight against the Taliban is the Afghan National Army Commandos. The Afghan National Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC) has ten Special Operations Kandaks (SOKs). These battalion-strength units of approximately 700-800 men are almost always in the lead during offensives against the Taliban insurgents. The ten SOKs are spread out across the country of Afghanistan; although one (6th SOK) is a national mission unit based in the Kabul area. Many of the districts of Helmand province are controlled by the Taliban and there are fears that the provincial capital is at risk. Read more in “Afghan commandos deployed to Helmand to push Taliban out of Khanshin”, Khaama Press, July 30, 2016.