This article by Jim Garamone was originally published by DOD News on February 13, 2024.

U.S. Special Operations Command leaders see the current move to integrate the command into great power competition as a return to its roots.

Army Gen. Bryan Fenton and Army Command Sgt. Maj. Shane Shorter, the commander and senior enlisted leader of Socom, spoke with the Defense Writers Group recently and discussed the changes happening in the world and Special Operations Command’s place in it. 

The command has come off more than 20 years as America’s preeminent counterterrorism organization. Even before the attacks on the United States in September 2001, the command was tracking and pursuing violent extremist organizations around the world. The command operated against narco-trafficking gangs in Central and South America, as well as transnational criminal organizations in the Balkans. Socom came into its own in counterterrorism in operations against the Taliban and al-Qaida in Afghanistan, fundamentalist groups in Iraq and against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. 

Special operators also worked with and formed relationships with national and indigenous forces from the Indo-Pacific to Europe to Africa and South America. 

But before that, the special operations community was an integral part of great power competition working to “fill in the gaps” of conventional power structures when the Soviet Union controlled Eastern Europe, Fenton said. “We still have to maintain and stay on the [violent extremist organization] threat because it has not gone away. What I will tell you is … the special operations command team frankly is born for the integrated deterrence, great power competition era.”  

But while the mission set might be changing, the values behind the force are not. “The most important line of effort that we have in our headquarters is still our people,” said Shorter. “We’re not a platform-centric organization, we’re a people-centric organization.”

The first rule of the command is “Humans are more important than equipment,” and Fenton and Shorter are sticking with that.  

Change is tough. Many in the command grew up in the organization when it was sometimes jokingly called “Counter Terrorism Command” and that is what they know. But Shorter said in travels around the command, service members are making the switch to great power competition and integrated deterrence. “We focused hard on the global war on terror, and I’m very proud of what we did, but we’ve never had [to] … pull ‘Socomians’ towards the nation’s main effort.” 

So the bulk of the forces is absolutely laser focused on great power competition and integrated deterrence, Shorter said. Special operators are studying China and Russia. They are taking lessons learned from Russia’s war on Ukraine. They are studying the nature of all-domain combat and applying new tactics, techniques and procedures to it. They are also looking at better ways to integrate new technologies and equipment into the fight, the command sergeant major said.  

“We always will be focused on the nation’s priorities and the department’s priorities,” Shorter said.  

Still, the experience of counterinsurgency combat is valuable, and special operators can take that experience and apply it to new situations and new missions, he said. 

Fenton said that people lead in the strategic priorities of the command. “If we have one more dollar to spend, we’re spending it on our people, and then we’ll wrap the technology around them,” he said.  

That idea is born in the people attracted to special operations. Service members “go through a rigorous assessment selection process, and more arduous training because they really want to be at the leading edge,” Fenton said.  

Transformation of the command also is all about people, the general said. Special operators must “think how we’re going to be prepared, not only in equipment or some level of technology to meet the world, but how are we thinking about the world differently,” he said. “We have to hold these different ideas in our head and actually still complete the mission, even though it doesn’t look the same as it did 20 years ago. But the outcome has still got to be the same. We’ve got to succeed for the nation.” 

Typically, when a counterterrorism mission ends, organizations put the capability on the back burner. In the United States, this happened at the end of the Vietnam War and there are moves to cut the number of special operations personnel. This hits at another Special Operations truth: Special operations cannot be mass produced in times of a crisis. 

The services, from whom Socom gets their recruits, are having trouble attracting new service members. Fenton said Socom has not felt that problem yet, but says it could happen further down the road. Fenton did say there is no retention problem in special operations, and that the command is already working with the services to improve the recruiting climate.  

He has asked members of the command to reach out to recruiters when they travel in the United States to inform the American people about the military in general and Special Operations Command in particular. 

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This article by Jim Garamone was originally published by the Department of Defense on February 13, 2024. Content by DOD is in the public domain.

Photo: Special forces students participate in an iWaterman Maritime Reconnaissance Vehicle course at Marine Corps Base Hawaii, Jan. 31, 2024. iWaterman is a program that teaches students how to utilize the MRV for tactical insertions, extractions and rescues in high surf and over-the-beach operations. (Photo by Marine Corps Sgt. Julian Elliott-Drouin)

(CENTCOM press release, 16 Jan 2024). On 11 January 2024, while conducting a flag verification, U.S. CENTCOM Navy forces conducted a night-time seizure of a dhow conducting illegal transport of advanced lethal aid from Iran to resupply Houthi forces in Yemen as part of the Houthis’ ongoing campaign of attacks against international merchant shipping.

U.S. Navy SEALs operating from USS Lewis B Puller (ESB 3), supported by helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), executed a complex boarding of the dhow near the coast of Somalia in international waters of the Arabian Sea, seizing Iranian-made ballistic missile and cruise missiles components. Seized items include propulsion, guidance, and warheads for Houthi medium range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), as well as air defense associated components. Initial analysis indicates these same weapons have been employed by the Houthis to threaten and attack innocent mariners on international merchant ships transiting in the Red Sea.

This is the first seizure of lethal, Iranian-supplied advanced conventional weapons (ACW) to the Houthis since the beginning of Houthi attacks against merchant ships in November 2023. The interdiction also constitutes the first seizure of advanced Iranian-manufactured ballistic missile and cruise missile components by the U.S. Navy since November 2019. The direct or indirect supply, sale, or transfer of weapons to the Houthis in Yemen violates U.N. Security Resolution 2216 and international law.

Two U.S. Navy SEALs previously reported as lost at sea were directly involved in this operation. “We are conducting an exhaustive search for our missing teammates,” said General Michael Erik Kurilla, USCENTCOM Commander.

The dhow was deemed unsafe and sunk by U.S. Navy forces. Disposition of the 14 dhow crewmembers is being determined in accordance with international law.

“It is clear that Iran continues shipment of advanced lethal aid to the Houthis. This is yet another example of how Iran actively sows instability throughout the region in direct violation of U.N. Security Resolution 2216 and international law,” said General Michael Erik Kurilla, “We will continue to work with regional and international partners to expose and interdict these efforts, and ultimately to reestablish freedom of navigation.”

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This article was first published by U.S. Central Command on January 16, 2024.
https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3645241/uscentcom-seizes-iranian-advanced-conventional-weapons-bound-for-houthis/

Photos from CENTCOM Twitter account dated January 16, 2024. Map by SOF News derived from CIA maps (view larger version). Information about Vessel Boarding Search and Seizure (VBSS) operations. Also known as Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure.

53 years ago, a top-secret mission was launched into North Vietnam to rescue American prisoners of war. Operation Kingpin, known as the Son Tay Raid, was the first ever highly classified joint service operation of its kind. Now, US Army veterans turned documentary producers Dan Smith (former Green Beret), John “Stan” Stanfield and Molly Huggins, along with award-winning director and producer Ehren Parks, have teamed up with the Global Special Operations Foundation and a dying breed of legendary American heroes to tell their incredible story, with an exclusive sneak peek community screening coming to Fort Liberty, NC as a part of Modern Warfare Week.

On November 21, 1970, U.S. Special Forces soldiers and U.S. Air Force airmen executed a swift and stunning raid of the Son Tay prison camp with zero American casualties. The Son Tay Raiders were 23 miles from Hanoi, within 5 miles of 112,000 N.V.A. regulars, and flying into the teeth of the most heavily defended airspace in the world. At the same time, Navy carriers executed the largest night carrier operation of the entire Vietnam conflict in rolling seas to suppress the enemy air defenses.

Not a single prisoner was found. Despite this, the raid stands as one of the most significant operations in modern military history. 27 Minutes at Son Tay is the true story of the raid the way the Raiders want it told; thoughtful, compelling first-person account of the planning and execution of a never before attempted rescue mission into the heart of enemy territory.

Director Ehren Parks, whose previous projects include the award-winning documentary My Life in China, was clear on the import of the film, echoing the vision of the mission ground commander COL Bull Simons. “The Son Tay Raid’s greatness lies in the fact that it brought together the separate branches for a greater purpose: to fulfill the pledge of ‘no man left behind.’”

27 Minutes at Son Tay interviewees include CSM (Ret) “Jake” Jakovenko, Ranger Hall of Fame member known for his prowess with the M-60 Machine Gun and often called the real-life Rambo; SGM (Ret) Tyrone Adderly, fellow Ranger Hall of Fame member and 2022 recipient of the U.S. Special Operations Command Bull Simons Award; Col (Ret) Lee Ellis, Hanoi Hilton resident; Col (Ret) Larry Ropka, master Air Force and CIA covert operations mission planner; Col (Ret) John Gargus, navigator and author of the definitive work on the mission, The Son Tay Raid: American POWS in Vietnam Were Not Forgotten, and RADM (Ret) Larry Chambers, the first African American to attain flag rank in the Navy. The film also features post-humous appearances from Col Bud Sydnor, Gen Leroy Manor, Col Frederic “Marty” Donohoe, and CSM Joe Lupyak.

The producers have partnered with the Global Special Operations Foundation to show a sneak peek community screening of the unreleased film as a part of the Modern Warfare Week, a joint event held for the Special Operations Forces (SOF) community to both educate and connect over the future of warfare from a SOF perspective. Members of the Raid as well as support and planning personnel will be in attendance. Former Green Beret and Executive Producer Dan Smith, whose connections provided the impetus for the film, highlighted what an honor it was to create this film as an educational tool for follow on generations, having served under the legacy of many of these legendary soldiers, sailors, and airmen. Additionally, according to Smith, “The value of the Son Tay Raid cannot be overstated. It is probably one of the most studied special operations since 1970. It has been used as a template to plan, train and conduct high risk missions by international as well as within the US. special operations community.”

The screening will be held Nov. 15th, 3 PM, at the Iron Mike Conference center, Fort Liberty. The event is free and open to the community, but attendees must register here.

The film is in final post-production, but current events has made raising money to complete the documentary a challenge. “Fundraising has been difficult during covid and the film industry labor strikes,” Parks noted, “But as we enter our final stretch to finish the film, we’re hoping the military community will join with us to get this story told the way the raiders want it told without outside influence.” Donations can be made via GoFundMe.

A trailer of the film, exclusive video shorts, and more information are available for preview at
27minutesatsontay.com.

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27 Minutes at Son Tay is a production of Kingpin-27 Minutes at Son Tay Film, LLC; Long Tale; Veritas Art Pictures, producing socially relevant content surrounding current events; and Gepadeaux Media, a service-disabled veteran-owned small business specializing in film and video production and distribution. For media inquiries, please contact Producer Molly Huggins at molly@thegreenglasspen.com or
907-978-4694.

By Michael A. Marra and Brett D. Weigle.

October 3, 2023, marked the somber 30th anniversary of the Battle of Mogadishu, Somalia – another tragic event in another “small war” waged far away from United States soil in a nation few American citizens could find on a map. On that fateful day, U.S. forces serving as part of the second United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) incurred 17 killed and 85 wounded in action in addition to an estimated 1,500 Somali casualties. [1] What was meant to be a routine special operations raid to capture several warlord leaders resulted in a bloody all-day firefight that coined the phrase “Blackhawk down” for future difficult interventions. Ironically, this battle was the culmination of a years-long United Nations effort to rectify a complex catastrophe of environmental, political, and social upheaval in Somalia.

Beginning in early 1992, the first UN effort, UNOSOM I, was unable to suppress the warlords to deliver humanitarian aid. In April 1992, the UN Security Council created the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), led by the United States with the authority to “use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.” [2] UNITAF accomplished this mission by early 1993 and was replaced by UNOSOM II in May with a new mandate. The establishing UN Security Council resolution included language about the importance of “a comprehensive and effective programme for disarming Somali parties, including movements and factions.” [3] This additional mandate departed from the initial UNITAF task of feeding a starving population by providing security for food distribution; instead, this expanded mission led to the raids by special operations forces that culminated in the Battle of Mogadishu. The United Nations and the United States unwillingly were drawn into conflict. How can such good intentions go so horribly wrong?

Can we continue to learn from small wars that provide strategically painful lessons from long ago? With the U.S. military now primarily focused on large scale combat operations in Europe and the Pacific, do small wars like Somalia still matter?

We think so. If the global competition during the first Cold War should be judged by the number of proxy wars it promulgated, then we need to pay attention now – not after we are deeply embedded in another armed intervention. Thinking through the externalities of a coming second Cold War as China, Russia, and the United States compete for their interests will help us campaign in competition and avoid conflicts like UNOSOM II in the future.

Chinese and Russian influence have spread across the Maghreb, the Sahel, and other regions of Africa; for example, China builds infrastructure projects under its Belt and Road Initiative while the Wagner Group’s military involvement destabilizes Libya, Central African Republic, Mali, and Sudan. [4] Seeing this, we understand the struggle for power and influence is an ongoing effort with no “end state,” only a “next state.” As coups and civil wars erupt along these fault lines in Africa, we will be tempted to intervene to preserve our investments and influence via diplomatic, development, and defense efforts. With U.S. military and civilian personnel currently stationed in several African fragile states, American policymakers and planners have a responsibility to continually assess our level of involvement and subsequent risk to U.S. personnel and national prestige.

The full history and internal political machinations of Somalia are well-documented elsewhere, and not the focus of this offering. [5] Rather, our argument concerns the strategic and operational aspects of the decisions to intervene and enforce a peace that was fiercely resisted by the very people the United States was trying to assist. We offer several reflections on lessons civilian and military leaders can learn from this small war for future interventions, since the application of military power to achieve national policies is a matter of supreme political judgement. Far different from other endeavors, failure in war has repercussions that reverberate through decades.

Somalia, like numerous hot spots around the world, is burdened by instability, environmental stress, and deep social fissures leading to violence for many decades. From the infamous Battle of Mogadishu thirty years ago to the present day, Somalia has ranked first or second since 2008 on the Fragile States Index published by the Fund for Peace. [6]  In 2023 alone, the U.S. military flew at least 14 airstrikes in Somalia and one special operations mission that killed Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) leader Bilal al-Sudani, according to Jeff Schogol writing in Task and Purpose. [7] Despite billions of dollars of assistance invested for decades in Somalia, there is a frustrating paucity of progress. The United States alone provided $818 million in humanitarian and military aid in FY2020 and $792 million to date in 2023, according to the Department of State. [8]

These eight lessons from Somalia are as relevant now as they were three decades ago.

Strategy is more difficult than policy or tactics. This intervention in 1993 required an overall strategy, not just a contingency plan. The value of the U.S. national security interest was never clearly defined; was this something we were going to pay for, fight for, kill for, or die for? It clearly ranked as a peripheral national interest but at times the United States acted as though Somalia’s situation were a vital interest. [9] A lack of deep and broad thinking on the “next state” of Somalia after the initial intervention created a “mission creep” due to lack of vision regarding where the operation was going after initial successes in stopping the worst of the famine. While the crisis did need immediate attention to save lives, U.S. policymakers and planners must think through their strategy to ensure all elements of national power are engaged when mapping how we want to help a nation reach its desired future state. After the United States forces departed in 1994, Somalia has struggled to defeat various insurgent groups that threaten the functioning of a Somali central government. [10].

It is more difficult to make peace than it is to make war. Peacemaking, peace-enforcement, and peacekeeping between factions in the same nation is complex, costly, and often contested. Somalia is still in desperate need of a lasting peace so that the rebuilding of society can begin in earnest. There is still a level of unacceptable violence in Somalia that belies the efforts of peacemakers. As the United States engages in African places of unrest, we must admit we will eventually favor one side over another, creating the appearance of partisanship. In areas of fractured societies where multiple groups are contesting for power, the danger of siding with one may mean unifying the remainder against the intervening force – as we saw on the streets of Mogadishu in 1993.

“Resistance = Means × Will” is an enduring axiom. While irregular Somali warlord forces had little training, inadequate equipment, and no real communications gear, their will compensated for their lack of means by multiplying their power of resistance. They were a worthy adversary who inflicted deep costs on U.S. military forces on 3 October 1993. While “will” is extremely hard to measure from afar, it is easy to recognize, and these highly motivated Somali warlords and foot soldiers were a dangerous adversary.

The enemy, regardless of size, gets a vote. Despite our highly motivated soldiers and aviators, exquisite plans, and special operations capabilities, the Somalis fought back hard. Irregular forces stymied our best efforts that day, and on other occasions before UNISOM II departed Somalia in 1994. The enemy always gets a vote, and when they are fighting at home, they have many advantages.

Friction during intervention is unavoidable. Going into complex catastrophes like Somalia requires adaptation because the myriad problems cannot all be anticipated. However, the United States must understand the strong African antipathy to unilateral Western interventions and must seek coalition partners with regional familiarity. Operating in a strong coalition, preferably with the full backing of the United Nations or African Union, is the right approach in Africa. As a corollary, coalition timelines must be more realistic – and that inevitably means longer. The United States must be careful to avoid unnecessary friction by the imposition of rigid timelines on a fluid environment. Speaking in terms of “years” instead of “months” is a smart way to telegraph U.S. commitment and ease friction.

Strategic history punishes good intentions. The turbulent and bloody history of Somalia was well known in 1993, yet the successful 1991 Persian Gulf War may have given false confidence to U.S. Central Command planners that UNITAF would also accomplish its mission according to plan. Having the best intentions for the entire Somali population was simply not enough to overcome the factions who did not appreciate the presence of foreign troops in their cities and villages.

Tragedy happens even in small wars. As the intervention bloomed into a shooting war, the number of civilian and military casualties soared. Firefights between UNISOM II soldiers and Somali fighters—or indiscriminate fires by warlords and rebels—inevitably caught civilians in crossfire. While American combatants survived most wounds during the Battle of Mogadishu, civilian casualties were not that fortunate. In recognition that this tragedy will most certainly recur, in 2022 the Department of Defense implemented its Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan. [11]

War is always a gamble – even a “small war.” We witnessed in Somalia a minor military operation that captured the headlines of every major newspaper and lead every television news program in the world. Suddenly, the risk of a small raid in a small war looked like a failed gamble by the United States in an intervention that seemed difficult to exit. A tactical operation was magnified into strategic consequences by flashing images and first-person descriptions delivered within hours of the event. Wars, even small ones, do not always go the way they are planned, and almost never adhere to sequential and compact timelines on PowerPoint slide shows.

In today’s increasingly fraught global security environment [12], we must acknowledge the hard lessons learned from past small wars like Somalia—lessons whose tuition was paid with blood and treasure. The nature of small wars will not change their root causes, and motivations of external actors to intervene will remain noble. However, the character of a U.S. response need not copy our experience in Somalia in 1992–1994.

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Illustration credit: “On the Alert,” Jeffrey Manuszak, 1994, reference [1], p. 17.

[1] Richard W. Stewart, The United States Army in Somalia (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center for Military History, December 2002), 19,
https://history.army.mil/html/books/070/70-81-1/cmhPub_70-81-1.pdf

[2] United Nations, Security Council Resolution 794 (1992), April 24, 1992, para. 3, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/794.

[3] United Nations, Security Council Resolution 814 (1993), March 26, 1993, para. 7, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/814.

[4] Alex Vines and Jon Wallace, “China-Africa relations,” Explainer, Chatham House, January 18, 2023, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/01/china-africa-relations; Joseph Siegle, “Inflection Point for Africa-Russia Relations after Prigozhin’s Death,” Africa Center for Strategic Studies, September 6, 2023, https://africacenter.org/spotlight/‌inflection-point-for-africa-russia-relations-after-prigozhins-death/.

[5] For example, see “Somalia profile – Timeline,” BBC News, January 4, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14094632.

[6] Fund for Peace, “Fragile States Index,” accessed September 9, 2023, https://fragilestatesindex.org/country-data/.

[7] Jeff Schogol, “US airstrike in Somalia kills 13 al-Shabab fighters,” Africa News, Task and Purpose, August 28, 2023, https://taskandpurpose.com/news/us-airstrike-somalia-13-fighters-killed/; Foundation for Defense of Democracies, “US airstrikes in Somalia,” Long War Journal, accessed September 9, 2023, https://www.longwarjournal.org/us-airstrikes-in-the-long-war; Lloyd J. Austin III, “Statement on Somalia Operation,” press release, Department of Defense, January 26, 2023, https://www.defense.‌gov/‌‌‌‌‌News/Releases/Release/Article/3279923/statement-by-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-on-somalia-operation/.

[8] Lauren Ploch Blanchard, Somalia (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, July 27, 2023), 2, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10155

[9] U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Strategy, Joint Doctrine Note 1-18 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 25, 2018), p. vii, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/jdn_jg/jdn1_18.pdf

[10] For example, see Adam Abdelmoula, “Somalia is on the path of recovery, but real challenges remain,” Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia, United Nations Somalia, December 21, 2021, accessed October 28, 2023, https://somalia.un.org/en/166388-somalia-path-recovery-real-challenges-remain; Ken Menkhaus, “Governance without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of Coping,” International Security 31(3) (2007): 74–106, doi: https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2007.31.3.74

[11] Lloyd J. Austin III, “Department of Defense Releases Memorandum on Improving Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response,” press release, Department of Defense, January 27, 2022, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2914764/department-of-defense-releases-memorandum-on-improving-civilian-harm-mitigation/

[12] National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2040: A More Contested World (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, March 2021), https://www.dni.gov/index.php/gt2040-home.

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The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. 

About the Authors

Professor Michael A. Marra, Colonel (retired), U.S. Air Force, is a veteran of conflicts in Central America, Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, Liberia, and served in major operations including Desert Shield/Storm/Calm, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom as a commander, staff officer and aviator. He is an Associate Professor at the U.S. Army War College in the Department of Military Strategy, Planning and Operations.

Dr. Brett D. Weigle is a retired U.S. Army logistics Colonel. He worked in joint, multinational, and Army command and staff positions in the United States, Bahrain, Germany, Turkey (NATO), Spain (NATO), North Macedonia (NATO), and twice in Korea. He is a veteran of Operations RESTORE HOPE (UNITAF) in Somalia (1992–1993) and JOINT ENDEAVOR in Bosnia (1995–1996). He is an Associate Professor at the U.S. Army War College in the Department of Military Strategy, Planning and Operations.

Defense Strategies Institute is proud to announce the 12th Annual SOF & Irregular Warfare Symposium, occurring this November 29-30 in Tampa, FL. The 2023 Symposium will convene senior leaders and decision makers across the SOF community, regional combatant commands, DoD, nonprofits, and industry to discuss the complexities and multifaceted nature of special operations in the 21st century.

SOF will continue to play an increasingly important role in competition with countries such as China, Russia, and Iran, particularly in irregular warfare. The Symposium will highlight the latest developments across U.S. combatant commands in the realm of special operations and irregular warfare. The integration of intelligence gathering, analysis, and technology in irregular warfare scenarios will be a focal point of discussion. Senior level speakers will delve into a diverse array of topics, addressing the growing importance of information warfare and cyber operations of emerging technologies in irregular warfare contexts.

Speakers.
– Maj. Gen. Michael Martin, USAF, Director, Operations, USSOCOM
– MG Patrick Roberson, USA, Deputy Commanding General, USASOC
– Todd Breasseale, SES, Office of Information Operations, SO/LIC
– William Innes, SES, Deputy Director, Acquisition, USSOCOM
– Tom Searle, PhD, Course Director, Joint Special Operations University
– Col. Rhea Pritchett, USA, PEO Digital Applications, SOF AT&L

Topics.
– Empowering Special Operations: Leading in an Era of Complex Warfare
– Transforming the SOF Enterprise to Achieve the Goals of the NDS
– Harnessing the Power of Information in Modern Warfare
– Developing the AFSOC Force of the Future by Modernizing Capabilities in Contested Environments
– Navigating the 21st Century Battlefield: Adversarial AI and Emerging Tech as a Cyber IW Operation
– Bolstering Deterrence Measures within NATO to Counter the Evolving Challenge of Hybrid Warfare

Info. DSI is now welcoming Sponsors and Exhibitors for the forum. To learn more please contact Amanda Delgado at adelgado@dsigroup.org. Active military and government and state personnel attend complimentary. Those interested in participating in the SOF & Irregular Warfare Symposium can visit Defense Strategies Institute’s website at https://sof.dsigroup.org/. Anyone interested in learning more or sending questions contact Erica Noreika at enoreika@dsigroup.org, 201-896-7802.

Contact

Defense Strategies Institute
Erica Noreika
201-896-7802
https://sof.dsigroup.org/

The DOL Foundation is a national non-profit dedicated to professionally developing military service members, veterans, first responders, and spouses, no matter if they are currently serving or prior service. The Foundation is wholly donor-driven, with as close to 100% of donations received going directly to those we serve.

The DOL Foundation was founded in September 2023 by a cross-functional Board of military servicemembers. Each Board Member has served our country and shown dedication through their continued service.  

Scott Kinder (former Army Special Forces), Otis McGregor (LTC Ret. Army Special Forces), Junior Ortiz (LtCol Ret. USMC), and Ramiro Villalobos (E7 Ret. US Air Force) are each established professionals intent on building a strong Foundation honoring the service and commitment of those who’ve served. No board member receives a salary, we have no corporate offices, we hire no consultants, and we don’t discriminate as to who we serve.

The DOL Foundation is focused solely on the professional development of those we serve. We provide donor-funded coaching, funding pathways for industry-accredited certifications, and educational scholarships.

We believe our coaching services to be a key differentiator in our approach. The overarching goal of our 5 hours of coaching is to help focus on life post-service. We want to give them tools to live life with intention while pursuing their purpose to desired success.

Some of the topics we cover over the five hours of our three-phased coaching are:

Phase 1:

1. Self-awareness and Mindfulness
2. Creating the Vision and Developing a Plan: Ideal Day
3. Owning and Controlling Your Calendar
4. Defining your Post-Service Values

Phase 2: 

1. Targeting What You Want
2. Build your Network
3. Translating Professional Value

Phase 3: 

1. Establishing Milestones and Execution
2. Opportunity Analysis
3. Personal Gap Analysis

All coaching and approved certification costs are covered 100% by the DOL Foundation, and each coaching session is tailored to the service member’s or spouse’s unique needs by matching them to one of our three coaching levels.

The DOL Foundation believes at its core that little is currently being done through existing transition offerings to provide individually tailored professional development services. This failure adds undue stress and anxiety to a complicated post-service career.  

De Oppresso Liber, “DOL,” is Latin for “to free the oppressed” and is the motto of the US Army Special Forces. Our coaches and the Foundation take this calling to heart: we will help those we serve to identify and eliminate what is “oppressing” them and barring them from a happy and successful post-military career.

You can find out more about the DOL Foundation at https://dolfoundation.com, and you can support our mission by donating at https://dolfoundation.com/donate. You can also email any questions you have to Scott Kinder, our Chairman of the Board, scott@dolcoach.com

By Alvin Conley.

SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, Hawaii – The 25th Infantry Division and U.S. Army Hawaii hosted a Division Change of Command Ceremony Aug. 25, 2023, at the installation’s historic Weyand Field.

The ceremony was held to honor U.S. Army Maj. Gen. Joseph A. Ryan as the outgoing 25th Inf. Div. and USARHAW commanding general, and welcome U.S. Army Maj. Gen. Marcus S. Evans as the incoming 25th Inf. Div. and USARHAW commanding general.

Ryan served as the Division commanding general from July 2021 to August 2023. During his tenure as commander, Ryan oversaw several Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center (JPMRC) rotations, deployed 25th Inf. Div. forces throughout the Indo-Pacific as a part of Operation Pathways, and led Task Force Ohana, providing support to Soldiers, families, and the local community.

“I stood here, and I spoke two years ago about commanding with the Hawaiian values of Ha’aha’a and Alaka’i in mind,” said Ryan about his time as the 25th Inf. Div. commanding general. “To be humble and modest, to respect others, to persevere and to lead with courage and commitment. What an honor it has been to serve with you.”

Ryan will move on to become the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, U.S. Army, in Washington D.C. He thanked his family, loved ones, and mentors for their support.

“Family is important in Hawaii,” said Ryan. “To have family here as part of my change of command, and the people I celebrate it with and actually execute it with such as Lt. Gen. Xavier Brunson and Maj. Gen. Marcus Evans, both of whom I’ve known for decades, is really important. It makes this pretty easy because you know what you’ve dedicated yourself to for the past two years is in good hands.”

Ryan welcomed Evans to his new position, as this marks the third time Ryan and Evans have changed command positions.

“Marcus Evans has been my teammate for the last 25 years,” said Ryan. “I’m nothing if not utterly envious of him today. He and Kelly are very simply joining the greatest Division in the Army.”

Evans most recently served as the Chief of Staff, U.S. Special Operations Command.

“Thank you for this opportunity to command in this Division,” said Evans. “Joe and Julie, Kelly and I can’t thank you enough for this transition, and more importantly for you all’s friendship over the years. Thank you both for what your leadership and service has meant to this Division and to our Army. All the best in your next assignment.”

Evans has multiple operational deployments, has served in Airborne, Ranger, Light Infantry and Mechanized formations, and has previously commanded the NATO Special Operations Component Command – Afghanistan, the 75th Ranger Regiment, and the forward deployed Joint Special Operations Task Force.

“I’m truly blessed to be a part of such an incredible unit such as the Tropic Lightning Division,” said Evans. “I look forward to serving alongside you all.”

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This story, “25th ID Welcomes New Commanding General”, by Sgt. Alvin Conley was first published by www.army.mil on August 25, 2023.

Photo: U.S. Army Maj. Gen. Marcus Evans gives a speech at the division change of command ceremony at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, Aug. 25, 2023. Maj. Gen. Ryan is now assigned as Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Washington, D.C., and Maj. Gen. Evans most recently served as the Chief of Staff, U.S. Special Operations Command. (U.S. Army photo by Spc. Mariah Aguilar, 28th Public Affairs) (Spc. Mariah Aguilar)

By David Vergun.

On June 25, 1950, North Korean forces crossed the 38th parallel and attacked South Korea. Three days later, North Korean forces captured South Korea’s capital, Seoul. The following week on July 1, the first U.S. ground troops, arrived in Korea to support South Korea.

The decision to aid South Korea was made by President Harry S. Truman. In his “Memoirs,” published in 1956, Truman states: “If South Korea fell, the communists would attack other nations, resulting in World War III.” The communists he referred to, were the former World War II U.S. allies China and the Soviet Union, which now supported North Korea. 

By early August 1950, the North Korean army had overrun most of South Korea except for a small pocket in the far southeast known as the Pusan Perimeter. During the months of August and September, U.S. Soldiers and Marines, along with United Nations forces, landed in Korea to bolster South Korea’s defense. 

U.N. forces besides the U.S., were the United Kingdom, Canada, Turkey, Australia, Philippines, New Zealand, Thailand, Ethiopia, Greece, France, Colombia, Belgium, South Africa, Netherlands and Luxembourg. 

U.S. forces landed on the western port city of Inchon Sept. 15, and two weeks later, U.N. forces captured Seoul. The following month saw U.N. forces crossing the 38th parallel into North Korea, capturing Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea, and advancing to the Yalu River, the northern boundary of North Korea and China. 

In late October 1950, Chinese forces crossed into North Korea to aid their ally. By January 1951, Chinese and North Korean forces recaptured Seoul. By March 1951, U.N. troops recaptured Seoul.  

On April 11, 1951, Truman relieved MacArthur, who had led the U.N. Command. MacArthur had wanted to expand the war into China, which was against the directives of the president, who didn’t want a wider conflict, which would likely involve the Soviet Union. 

“We were in Korea in the name and on behalf of the United Nations. This ‘unified command’ which I had entrusted to [U.S. Army Gen.] Douglas MacArthur, was a United Nations Command, and neither he nor I would have been justified if we had gone beyond the mission that the United Nations General Assembly had given us,” Truman states in “Memoirs,” an account of his presidency. 

By the latter part of 1951,1952 and 1953, heavy fighting continued, with the front line stabilizing in a stalemate in the vicinity of the 38th parallel. Dwight D. Eisenhower became president Jan. 20, 1953, and on July 27, 1953, the Korean Armistice Agreement was signed, ending the fighting. Prisoners were exchanged and South Korea gained a bit of territory northeast of the 38th parallel. 

About 37,000 Americans lost their lives during the Korean War and over 92,000 were wounded and 8,000 were missing. South Korea sustained 1.3 million casualties, including 415,000 dead. Casualties among other U.N. forces totaled 16,500, including 3,100 dead.  

No peace treaty was ever signed between North and South Korea and in the decades since the Korean War, North Korean forces have conducted numerous cross-border incursions and other acts of aggression. U.S. forces and U.N. representatives are still in South Korea with the goal of preventing another war. 

U.S. Forces Korea is responsible for supporting and training joint South Korea-U.S. forces and United Nations Command multinational forces. The Korean War Veterans Memorial at the National Mall in Washington, D.C., honors those who served and sacrificed. 

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This article by David Vergun was first published by the U.S. Department of Defense on July 24, 2023. DoD content is in the public domain.

Photo: Army Chaplain (Capt.) Emil Kapaun (right) and Army Capt. Jerome A. Dolan, 1st Cavalry Division, carry an exhausted soldier off the battlefield in Korea, early in the war. (Courtesy photo U.S. Army).

By How Miller.

“The Jedburghs” by Bill Irwin is an illuminating portrayal of the direct predecessors of the U.S. Army Special Forces. Each of us can picture ourselves in the roles depicted, and hope that we would have been as resourceful and lucky to have overcome the obstacles before us.

The Jedburghs were the core of what an A-Team is today. After rigorous recruitment, selection, and training, a select few were chosen to be parachuted in as part of a Jedburgh team, sometimes referred to as a “Jed.” Typically a Jed would be a three man team including a radio operator and two officers. At least one of the team was to be indigenous to the area of operation, and a minimum of one had to be either a Brit from SOE or an American from OSS. Most were also multi-lingual.

The book, both extensively researched over twenty years, and told from multiple perspectives, shows the process of assisting and guiding the many active and potential resisters of Nazi occupation in France and beyond. The uncountable number of acts of bravery by those Maquis were made more effective by the equally brave, tenacious, and wise British SOE and the American OSS working side by side with them, providing arms, training, and coordination with the Allied Armed Forces. All the high-ranking generals expressed their deep appreciation of how much the resistance accomplished, both in direct actions and in intelligence provided. For example, it is quite possible the Normandy invasion may have failed without their help.

The breadth of the story gives the reader both an overall understanding of the process and the importance to the Allied Victory, as well as a very relatable recounting of the ground actions of several Jedburgh teams. Some very familiar names are shown in their earlier days, such as “Wild” Bill Donovan, Aaron Bank, and William Colby, along with the first official naming of Special Force HQ.

I was struck by the many parallels described by COL(Ret) Mark Rosengard at SFACON 2022 with Task Force DAGGER and beyond, including gaining trust and coalition building to achieve the prime objective. “By, with and through” is alive and well within the regiment.

The book, first released in 2005, is available in Kindle, audiobook, hardcover, paperback, and audio CD. It contains charts of participants and much more.

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This book review of The Jedburghs by How Miller was first published by Sentinel, a periodical of Chapter 78, Special Forces Association on July 2023. Reprinted with permission of the editor of Sentinel. The book author, Will Irwin, is a Resident Senior Fellow at the Joint Special Operations University. He is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces officer with experience as a defense analyst, researcher, historian, instructor, and writer.

By Jon Soucy.

The wind danced through the trees as pewter-colored clouds hinted at heavy rain. Soldiers went about their duties at a rocket launcher site on a hillside clearing in an otherwise thickly forested area. Aside from the trees, all was quiet. But as the wind gusted again, Soldiers with the 19th Special Forces Group suddenly appeared from the woods in a coordinated assault to seize control of the site.

Located deep in the West Virginia hills, the launcher site and the attack were part of the culminating exercise for one training lane in exercise Ridge Runner, a two-week special operations training exercise hosted by the West Virginia National Guard and the Irregular Warfare Center.

The exercise included more than 420 troops, primarily with the 19th Special Forces Group headquartered in the Utah Army National Guard, and allies and partners from 16 nations. Training scenarios focused on core Special Forces mission sets, including working with foreign forces, counterinsurgency operations and irregular warfare.

“Irregular warfare is actually a difficult term to describe because there’s no doctrinal [definition] for irregular warfare,” said an operations sergeant major with the 19th SFG who oversaw one of the exercise’s training lanes. “It’s designed to be very broad because it includes hybrid threats, it includes security force assistance and doing not only counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare, but also doing foreign internal defense.”

Many of those mission sets were tied together throughout the training scenario. Exercise participants — mostly made up of Special Forces ODAs, or operational detachment alpha teams, the basic SF tactical element — assimilated into West Virginia communities in two simulated nations and met with actual local government officials, law enforcement and emergency services personnel.

They monitored simulated economic and political situations in each “nation” through simulated newscasts and media engagements, and mirrored responses to them with procedures and operations that would be used during actual deployments.

Information from those engagements drove the training and resulting missions, eventually countering a simulated invasion by hostile forces from neighboring nations.

“The change in the scenario replicates what our forces would experience if they were in a friendly country about to be invaded by a hostile force,” said the sergeant major. Teams acting as the opposing forces, or OPFOR, also had to shift in line with those scenario changes — and their actions often caused other shifts by the ODAs.

“What the OPFOR brings to the exercise is kind of a realistic aspect to it,” said a staff sergeant with the 19th SFG on an OPFOR team. “We’re able to do our own planning against what we know or think that the partner force of the ODA is doing. And so, it’s more realistic of how an enemy would react to those situations.”

The exercise also tied into larger service-wide shifts as the Army and Army National Guard move from counterinsurgency operations to preparing for near-peer threats and potential large-scale operations.

“You’re getting away from what for the last 20 years has been the main effort [counterinsurgency operations] and you’re now supporting the warfighter in different capacities,” said the sergeant major. “During the Global War on Terror, special operations, we were doing direct action. We were doing FID [foreign internal defense], we were doing counterinsurgency and going after specific terrorist cells.”

Some tasks and mission sets may be similar in future operations, but their large-scale application has changed.

“This is different,” said the sergeant major. “This is full-spectrum warfare. It’s preparing for invasion or preparing the territories that we would operate in, in order to facilitate conventional battle lines.” Training and ensuring high readiness for that shift is key, he said. “Irregular warfare is our way to do that through more low visibility operations and our ability to work around the civilian populace and provide that support to the conventional military.”

Ridge Runner, and similar exercises, help teams refine those skills.

“It allows you to be very creative,” said the sergeant major. “You have to get very resourceful and kind of adapt to the changing environment and realize that you don’t have the freedom of movement that we did in other places. It’s no longer about having air supremacy. It’s no longer about having open comms with higher [headquarters].”

And the exercise also helped teams focus on basic tactical elements.

“We’re able to work on some of our small unit tactics that we’re doing together as this six-man contingent as well,” said the staff sergeant. “We’ve been able to have those discussions, work on basic patrolling as well and all those things that are in the Ranger handbook and are the fundamentals of success for an ODA.”

That’s critical, as the 19th and 20th SFGs — the two Army Guard Special Forces groups — are integrated into special operations missions worldwide.

“The 19th and 20th Group guys get to do that just as much as their active-duty counterparts,” said the sergeant major. “They deploy to the same areas, they go to the same schools, they work with the same partners.”

And for the sergeant major, that capability is part of the uniqueness of Army Guard Special Forces units. “[It’s] an opportunity to serve in a special operations capacity, wearing a Green Beret and operating in some of the highest missions,” he said.

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This story by Sgt. 1st Class Jon Soucy was first published by the National Guard Bureau on July 7, 2023. DoD content is in the public domain.

Photo: A Soldier with the 19th Special Forces Group, headquartered in the Utah Army National Guard, leads his team, which includes Latvian special operations elements, in an assault on a simulated emplaced missile launcher site while taking part in exercise Ridge Runner near Jolo, West Virginia, June 15, 2023. The two-week exercise brought together Soldiers with the 19th SFG and special operations troops from Latvia, Poland, and other allied and partner nations and focused on interoperability in unconventional warfare tasks. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. 1st Class Jon Soucy)